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22 People V Puno Excra
22 People V Puno Excra
22 People V Puno Excra
*
G.R. No. 97471. February 17, 1993.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
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of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the
modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and
specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are
invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate
conclusion thereon.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no showing that
appellants had any motive other than the extortion of money from
complainant under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.—ln
the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants
had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed
the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other
esoteric qualification or dubious justification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For kidnapping to exist, there must
be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was
to deprive the offended party of her liberty.—With respect to the
specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of
ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be
indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to
deprive the offended party of her liberty, and not where such
restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the
offenders.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While the court holds that the
crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code,
the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway
robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No.
532 is rejected; Ransom defined.—Neither can we consider the
amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of
ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof
from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal
law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for
redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that
releases from captivity. It can hardly be assumed that when
complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her
at gunpoint, what she gave under the circumstances of this case
can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of
kidnapping. There were merely amounts involuntarily
surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of
which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly,
while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in
Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject the theory of the trial
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VOL. 219, FEBRUARY 17, 1993 89
thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to
gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an
information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking
(apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things
subject of the robbery.
REGALADO, J.:
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1 Original Record, 1.
2 Ibid., 72.
3 Ibid., 137; per judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr.
4 Appellant's Brief, 5; Rollo, 47.
5 Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; Rollo, 68-84.
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92
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6 Ibid., 73-75.
7 TSN, August 13, 1990, 14-15.
8 Ibid., id., 16; September 5, 1990, 18, 25-26
9 Ibid., id., 11.
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14
States vs. 15
Ancheta, and consistently reiterated
thereafter, it has been held that the detention and/or
forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for
an appreciable period of time but for the primary and
ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable
for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed
in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the
victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious
illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention
whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably
confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
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14 1 Phil. 165 (1902); see also U.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163 (1902).
15 People vs. Remalante, 92 Phil. 48 (1952); People vs. Guerrero 103
Phil. 1136 (1958); People vs. Ong, et al., 62 SCRA 174 (1975)' People vs.
Ty Sui Wong, et al., 83 SCRA 125 (1978); People vs. Jimenez, et al., 105
SCRA 721 (1981).
16 TSN, August 13, 1990, 21-22.
95
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17 Keith vs. State, 120 Fla. 847, 163 So. 136; People vs. Akiran, et al, 18
SCRA 239, 246 (1966).
18 Original Record, 136.
96
Penal Code,
19
particularly Article 267 which are inconsistent
with it." Such opinion and complementary submission
consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct
interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential
Decree No. 532 on the pertinent provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any
definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General,
Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious
illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on
brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant
portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery"
invariably uses this term in the alternative and
synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous
ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that 20
highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous.
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage
(bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in the
proper context and perspective, we find that a band of
brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is
more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the
matter reveals that during the early part of the American
occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for
robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against
robbery was inadequate to cope with such21 moving bands of
outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed.
The following salient distinctions between brigandage
and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the
subject and are of continuing validity:
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19 Rollo, p. 79.
20 U.S. vs. Ibañez, 19 Phil. 463 (1911), Art. 306 of the Code also
specifically refers to them as "highway robbers or brigands."
21 U.S. vs. Carlos, 15 Phil. 47 (1910).
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22 Aquino, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, Volume Three, 1989 ed., p.
174, citing U.S. vs. Decusin, 2 Phil. 536 (1903) and U.S. vs. Maaño, 2 Phil.
718 (1903).
23 U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422 (1904).
24 Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege (2 Inst. 11;
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, 390).
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