The Author

Frederick A. Johnsen is the author of numerous historical aviation books, including Thundering Peacemaker,
The B-29 Book, Bombers in Blue, Darkly Dangerous, and The Bomber Barons. His articles and photographs
have appeared inAirpower,Airman,Aviation Week and Space Technology,Air Progress, FlyPast,Air Classics,
Wings, GeneralAviationNews andFlyer, KokuFan, and other periodicals and books. Fred has degrees in history
andjournalism from the University ofWashington, where he worked his way through college in the University's
Kirsten Wind Tunnel. He served as the consulting curator to the Museum of Flight in Seattle, Washington,
during critical design phases there, and was the founding curator of the McChord Air Museum at McChord Air
Force Base, Washington. He has worked as an Air Force historian since 1981, receiving recognition from Air
Mobility Command and the U.S. Air Force, including the U.S. Air Force Excellence in Wing History Programs
Award for 1992, for his work.
 Douglas

A·1
SKYRAIDER
A Photo Chronicle
Frederick A. Johnsen

Schiffer Military/Aviation History

Atglen, PA
 Front cover artwork by Steve Ferguson, Colorado Springs, CO

PATTON'S SPAD
On 9 October 1966, four VA-176 A-1H Skyraiders from the USS Intrepid were vectored deep into North
Vietnam to cover a rescue helicopter trying to reach a downed F-4 Phantom II crew. After pushing through a
brief flak barrage, the Spad lead flight pushed further inland where they were set upon by four MiG 17's. In the
ensuing maneuvers which twisted down to tree top level, the opponents separated and two of the jets were
heavily damaged at the hands ofthe Spad flight leader and his wingman. Seconds later, tail-end-element Lt(jg)
Tom Patton in Spad "09" (Bu.N. 13543) reached the fight and dropped down on the last MiG skimming just
above the jungle. The enemy pilot attempted a climbing turn followed with a reverse turn which negated all of
the MiG's speed. Patton skillfully split-S'ed into point blank range at six o'clock and closed to within 100 feet
of the silver intruder. After gutting his target with the last of his 20mm ammo, Patton even tried for a coup de
grace with four of his Zuni rockets but missed. The riddled MiG rolled over and plunged out of sight through
a low hanging cloud. After a quick turn beneath the thin cloud bank, the victorious Navy aviator caught a glimpse
of the MiG driver drifting into the jungle beneath his parachute.

Acknowledgements:
Edward H. Heinemann, designer of the Douglas Skyraider, provided many hours' insight into the design and
development of this aircraft. He also read the manuscript in an effort to track down any errors that might have
crept in. General Nguyen Cao Ky gave his perspective and recollections of VNAF Skyraider operations. Harry
S. Gann, of Douglas Aircraft Company at the time of my research, was a reliable source of vintage Skyraider
photos. Museums lending a hand include the National Air and Space Museum, Pima Air Museum, U.S. Naval
Aviation Museum, and the former, but not forgotten, Pacific Northwest Aviation Historical Foundation
(PNAHF). The office of Naval History in the Washington Navy Yard was very helpful.
Many individuals provided anecdotes, photos, research, and technical manuals. These include: Jerry
Boynton, AI Butterworth, John Campbell, Gary Cave, Jeff Ethell, Dave Feigert, David M. Forrest, Rene J.
Francillon, Herb Kissling, Keith Laird, William T. Larkins, Ronald G. Linder, Dave Menard, Houston
Morrison, James and Jean Morrow, Earl Otto, Dennis Peltier, Doug Remington, Bill Riepl, and Paul
Swendrowski, among others.
Manuscript typing and proofreading chores were devotedly performed by Sharon Lea Johnsen and Helen
F. Johnsen. From his library of vintage aviation publications, my father, Carl M. Johnsen, performed Skyraider
research.
The chapter footnote citations are rich with bibliographic material about books and periodicals containing
Skyraider information.
Special thanks to Barrett Tillman and Walt Boyne.

Dedication
For Sharon

< ,

Book Design by Robert Biondi

First Edition
~1i;..;'r ,t, '}:W:.'t{-t"/I:J:; Copyright © 1994 by Frederick A. Johnsen.
;J". '\j • ., .-,-.. . , . ""Library of Congress Catalog Number: 93-84499

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or used in any forms or by any means -
graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying or information storage and retrieval systems -
without written permission from the copyright holder.

Printed in the United States of America.

ISBN: 0-88740-512-6
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Published by Schiffer Publishing Ltd,

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 Contents
Preface 5

Chapter I 7
Building a Better Bomber

Chapter II 21
Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy

Chapter III 55
Korea Proves the Skyraider

Chapter IV 65
Cold-War Demands

Chapter V 71
Able Dogs in Foreign Service

Chapter VI 77
Early Asia

Chapter VII 88
The Navy in Vietnam

Chapter VIII 91
No More Kid Gloves:
New Tricks for an Able Dog

Chapter IX 101
Wind-Down in Asia

Chapter X 109
Skyraiders for the Future

\
AD-1 's glossy sea blue wing mirrored its fuselage numbers in flight. (H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collec-
tion)

4 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 Preface
T
he rubble from the Korean War still smoked
figuratively when I saw myfirst Douglas Skyraider.
It was while on a Sunday drive, a time when my
father was fond of checking out the local airports
for unusual birds. Newly-minted, its glossy sea blue wings
folded overhead, the Skyraider seemed to be all hard points
and stores-pylons as it reposed on the Douglas ramp.
Skyraider encounter number two came in the summer of
1961. America had moved to suburbia, and I was reluctantly
entering a shopping mall to get school clothes for the impend-
ing sixth grade when an echelon of rumbling, gray, business-
like ADs from Moffett Field chugged overhead. An impression
stuck in my 10-year-old mind: Supersonic jets had failed to
oust the rugged, prop-driven, bomb-hauling Skyraider from
navy service.
In the late 1970s, I would walk amongst veteran ex-
Vietnamese Skyraiders which had probably hauled out more
South Vietnamese refugees to Thailand when Saigon fell than
Douglas designer Ed Heinemann could ever have envisioned
his AD carrying. These Skyraiders and others were now
entering the expensive world of privately-kept warbirds.
For so many years, the Douglas Skyraider was simply
there. The legends of its prowess began to accumulate.
Company publicists didn't miss a chance to show the Skyraider
could carry more ordnance than a B-17 heavy bomber of
World War II. Single-engine, prop-driven Skyraiders were
given the pivotal task of carrying nuclear weapons. Lugging a
special fuel store with a trailing hose, Skyraiders could refuel
fleet jets. Bulky radars and electronics systems could be
nested in the metamorphosing fuselage of the Able Dog (as
we all knew the letters AD really stood for). In far-off South
Vietnam in the very early 1960s, coups and counter-coups
were executed and thwarted with the aid of menacing
Skyraiders. Then Bernie Fisher rode his A-1 E through a
nightmare of enemy fire and debris to rescue his flying buddy
on the ground at A Shau, earning Fisher a justly-deserved
Congressional Medal of Honor, and his Skyraider a perma-
nent berth in the Air Force Museum. But the capper had to be
the Navy "Spad" drivers who outflew North Vietnamese MiG
pilots, and used their A-1 s' cannons to shoot down two MiGs
over North Vietnam (see cover).
The study of any aspect of history must be woven in a
context which at least acknowledges the tenor of the times.
References to prevailing ideas, technological breakthroughs
and limitations, and blind luck season this biography of the
Douglas Skyraider aircraft. Interviewees for this book include
Edward H. Heinemann, designer of so many famous Douglas
planes including the Skyraider; General Nguyen Cao Ky,
South Vietnam's spirited flying Premier, who grew to love the
Skyraider in combat over his homeland; and legions of pilots,
crew chiefs, armorers, and para-rescue technicians who
relied on the Skyraider to help them do their jobs. It has been
argued that the classic "war story," whether relayed over a
beer in the club hours after a mission, or at a dinner party ten
years later, is quintessentially true in spite of embellishments.
The truth lies not in whether a Skyraider took 30 or 300 hits
from groundfire, or whether it pulled out of a dive at tree-top or
grass-top height, but rather in the fact that the old Skyraider
did what had to be done at the time, and delivered its crews
home to talk about it.
I have endeavored to flavor this manuscript with war
stories that ring true, interviews with key people in the Skyraider
saga, accounts from official Navy and Air Force historical
sources, and data from company and military tech orders.
My mentors in daily newspaper reporting and in the Air
Force history program instilled in me a penchant for attribu-
tion. Use the footnote references to gain a perspective of my
sources, decide if any conclusions drawn in this manuscript
match your own, or will warrant a healthy debate some time.
Some self-proclaimed adventurers of the 1980s longed to
round up a handful of Skyraiders, bomb-up, and do battle with
communist guerrillas in Latin America. Was this hopelessly
nostalgic saber-rattling, or an accurate assessment of the
best tool for this task? Read on ...
Frederick A. Johnsen
Preface 5
6 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
 CHAPTER I
Building a Better Bomber
'This world belongs to the energetic. " Ralph Waldo Emerson

E
d Heinemann peered over the shoulder of pilot before Northrop left Douglas' employ in 1937. Northrop had
Vance Breese, sitting ahead of Heinemann in the founded Douglas' EI Segundo, California operation, which he
prototype Northrop-designed BT torpedo bomber ultimately left to form his own company. (Northrop kept some
C3.s it hurtled toward earth in a vertical dive. Through ties; when his XP-61 Black Widow night fighter was ready for
the windscreen, landscape seemed distant in a high oblique its maiden flight in May 1942, Northrop relied on veteran pilot
view, and did not convey the sensation of speed as the Vance Breese to take the big twin-engine XP-61 up for the first
encapsulated aviators wrung out the aircraft. time.)4 "About the time Jack (Northrop) left, we converted the
Steep, nearly vertical dives such as this one in 1937 over BT's engine and made a lot of changes and came out with a
southern California set up a terrific buffeting in the tail of the new airplane. That was in the two years after Jack left,"
screaming dive bomber when its wing-mounted speed brakes Heinemann said. Next, Heinemann and his associates took
were deployed to slow its descent. Ed Heinemann was re- the second BT airframe and tried many variations, including a
sponsible for the design of much of the BT, including the short-lived tricycle landing gear. Changes to the fuselage,
hydraulic cylinders that activated the dive brakes mounted on engine mount, cowling, powerplant, bomb displacement tra-
the trailing edge of the wing. peze, canopy, tail, instruments and other features ultimately
Years later, Heinemann recalled how the turbulent air . metamorphosed this aircraft into the famous Douglas SBD
vortices set up by the deployed speed brakes "damn near Dauntless dive bomber. Because John K. Northrop was
shook the tail off."1 Pilot Vance Breese refused to take instrumental in the organization which designed the prede-
Heinemann on any more of the tests because in the dive, the cessors of the Dauntless, he has sometimes been cited as the
Pratt and Whitney engine's carburetor emitted enough un- creator of the SBD. But while Northrop was an aeronautical
burned gasoline through the hot exhaust to torch, endanger- design genius in his own right, the Douglas SBD dive bomber
ing the fabric tail surfaces. This phenomenon apparently was bore enough evidence of Heinemann's handiwork for the
the result of rapid barometric changes affecting engine carbu- patent on the SBD to be taken out in his name.
retion as the aircraft dived into ever-thicker atmosphere. No The durable Dauntless was exploited by Navy and Marine
one would ever accuse Ed Heinemann of closeting himself in pilots throughout World War II. But Navy planners soon were
an office far from the action. He took pride in flying in aircraft anticipating the SBD's replacement, with improved perfor-
which bore the Heinemann design touches. Unable to pinpoint mance made possible by the use of the new R-3350 radial
the buffeting problem from his perch in the gunner's seat ofthe engine, which generated 2,500 horsepower compared with
BT any longer, Heinemann took another approach. "The 1,200 horsepower for the Wright Cyclone powerplant of the
Depression was on and we were all broke, but I managed to SBD.
buy a Bell and Howell motion picture camera and put it on the The Douglas company's response to the Navy's quest for
wing. You wouldn't believe how much that tail oscillated."2 a Dauntless replacement was the awkward-looking XSB2D,
Heinemann returned to the design room. Charlie Helm, a two prototypes of which were ordered by the Navy in October
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) advi- 1943. The XSB2D featured tricycle landing gear, and remote
sor, suggested the magnitude of the vortices caused by the turrets in the fashion of the Douglas A-26 Invader bomber.
deployed brakes could be reduced if air bled through the dive One turret was mounted dorsally and another ventrally, to
brake panels. Reluctantly at first, Ed inserted rows of circular sweep rear and beam attack approaches. In addition to the
holes in the speed brakes to allow some of the air to stream pilot, a gunner was carried for the turrets. The wing of the
through the braking panels, rather than forcing all the air to SB2D was a cranked inverted gull, not as pronounced as that
burble overthe brakes. 3 The brakes still more than adequately of the F4U Corsair fighter. An internal bomb bay carried the
slowed the BT, and the bleed-through holes eliminated the tail. plane's offensive ordnance.
buffeting. In retrospect it seemed a simple solution, void of The SB2D was only mediocre in performance. Hardly a
frills or complexities. This simplicity was to become a trade- worthy successor to the storied SBD Dauntless, the SB2D
mark of Ed Heinemann, who was proud to say his design never entered service. Instead, the Curtiss SB2C Helldiver
philosophy was conservative by nature. went to sea with the carriers in late 1943. Many naval aviators
The basic BT layout had been designed under the super- had misgivings about the big, heavy SB2C. Even Curtiss
vision of John K. Northrop for Douglas Aircraft Company, officials referred to the Helldiver by one of its nicknames - "the
Beast."5 With some naval aviator pundits, it was only natural
that the SB2C nomenclature meant "Son of a Bitch, Second
OPPOSITE: Ed Heinemann, center, donned Navy khakis for a
fact-finding tour with the men of the U.S.S. Ticonderoga in Class." Ed Heinemann had his own reasons to dislike the
the fall of 1944. What the Douglas designer saw in the Pacific Helldiver. When the Curtiss plant submitted its bid to the Navy,
influenced the final design of the Douglas Skyraider dive the Helldiver weighed substantially less, on paper, than the
bomber. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.) SB2D. When Helldivers were produced, the weight had in-

Building a Better Bomber 7

The abortive XBTD-1 project spawned this Navy bomber with
dual nosewheels. It quickly lapsed into oblivion in favor of
the much more workable XBT2D·1 which was to be the
Skyraider prototype. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)
creased to that projected by the Douglas team for the SB2D,
and Heinemann had been convinced such would be the case
before Curtiss' design ever entered service.
The SB2D evolved into a single-seat copy, the BTD,
which was evaluated by the Navy in June 1944. Problems with
the airfoil section used in conjunction with an inverted gull wing
were among the disappointments which attended the SB2D/
BTD program. The single-seat BTD was the result of a change
in Navy operational philosophy. The SBD and SB2D reflected
the earlier doctrine of employing aircraft as scouts, with a
bombing capability also. As a scouting plane, the slow Daunt-
less had made good use of its back-seater, both as a defen-
sive gunner and as another pair of eyes to scan for the enemy.
But the BTD and its successors were to be dive bombers
primarily, and torpedo bombers secondarily. Their scouting
role was downplayed , and they were to have performance that
was competitive enough to let a lone pilot engage or elude
enemy air opposition.sln 1944, nobody dreamed this change
in doctrine would one day lead to dogfights between piston-
engine dive bombers and jet MiG fighters, with the piston-
powered Skyraiders emerging victorious on two separate
occasions.
Though still not a sterling winner, the revised single-seat
BTD flew better than its sire, the XSB2D. In the summer of
1944, the Navy called representatives from Douglas, Martin,
Fleetwing and Curtiss to Washington, D.C., to brief Navy
Bureau of Aeronautics officials on the status ofthe com panies'
dive bomber projects. A hot, humid June day wore on outside
as the BuAer representatives exchanged views on the BTD
with Heinemann and his design assistant, Leo Devlin. With
Heinemann and Devlin were Douglas aerodynamicist Gene
Root and BTD project engineer Reid Bogert. The talks stag-
nated, so Heinemann boldly asked for the floor to make a
proposal. Chairman of the meeting was assistant Bureau of
Aeronautics chief Rear Admiral Lawrence B. Richardson, who
listened as Heinemann unfolded his idea. The BTD "De-
stroyer" was an enigma. Heinemann wanted to cancel the
existing BTD contract and apply its unspent money on an
8 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
In 1943, four of the men who would shape the Skyraider
program met for a drink. From left to right, Navy LCDR J.A.
Thomas, Edward H. Heinemann, CDR J.N. Murphy, and
Heinemann's right-hand man, designer Leo J. Devlin. (Photo
courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)
entirely new design which Heinemann had been hatching,
using the R-2800 engine. Ed pressed for 30 days to prepare
the new design for BuAer approval. Admiral Richardson was
willing to let Heinemann's team submit a new proposal for the
dive bomber competition, but the admiral said the new plane
must be built around the R-3350 engine, and the first look
would be made at 9:00 a.m. the next morning, not 30 days later
as Ed had hoped for!?
Heinemann and his stunned engineering associates left
the cool recesses of BuAer and returned to the Statler Hotel.
Ed, Leo and Gene began putting an airplane on paper in a
hotel room. When hunger gnawed at the engineers, they sent
out for hamburgers and continued their incredible toiling.
Heinemann was convinced of one thing: The XSB2D and BTD
had failed in part because the Douglas design team had
catered to every wish of the Navy. In accommodating an
encyclopedic list of features the Navy said it wanted, the
aircraft had ultimately become exercises in compromise and
its frequent bedfellow, mediocrity. Ed Heinemann determined
to give the Navy a dazzling dive bomber, while professionally
evaluating the wisdom of all of that service's design requests.
"If the Navy was not right, and we were sure they were not
right, we told them."s
When Heinemann, Devlin and Root settheir pencils down
at 3:00 in the morning, they surveyed Ed's dimensioned
drawings, Leo's weight computations, and Gene's aerody-
namic calculations. "With those pieces of paper," Heinemann
later recalled, "we could pretty well define the airplane."
Known initially as the XBT2D-1 ,this design was the beginning
of the Skyraider series. "When I think back, I think I was more
confident than I had any reason to be," Heinemann said ofthat
marathon redesign session. Perhaps part of Heinemann's
confidence came from a feeling his new airplane was only an
interim plane at best anyway. "When we laid that airplane out
originally, we thought it would last for five years."9 (That was
in 1944. The last Skyraider was built in February 1957, and
South Vietnamese Skyraiders flew combat as late as 1975.)
 ----'f~F5

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3 The BT2D-1 was a straightforward design with few quirkS, unlike its failed predecessor BTD prototypes. This
0- November 12,1945 drawing still bears strong resemblance to the last AD-7 to come off the Douglas produc-
..,.
CD
tion line more than a decade later. (Drawing courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)

CD
 ~.

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Douglas Model BT2D-1 three-view drawing. (Courtesy Edward H. Heinemann.)

10 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 Heinemann related. He quickly discarded the idea of using a
Grumman-style wing-folding mechanism which streamlined
the wings back along the fuselage for compact storage aboard
aircraft carriers. The mechanism needed a canted spar in
order to fold properly, and this was more complex than a
traditional spar. "It didn't appeal to me," the conservative
Heinemann explained. Instead, the XBT2D's lower spar dis-
engaged to allow the wings to fold overhead. "We'd never built
a wing fold before, and we were concerned about it." Where
the Bureau of Aeronautics specified that the wing-fold fittings
should incorporate five percent overstress, the Douglas team
added ten percent above that just to be sure the structure
would not fail. 10
The 36-year-old Heinemann organized the XBT2D de-
sign team at EI Segundo in the summer of 1944; from the
Douglas Santa Monica plant he borrowed engineer Harold
Adams. For the first few weeks Heinemann called meetings
almost daily for the purpose of focusing the design. The
sessions lasted 30 minutes to an hour or so. Using about a
dozen copies of a master outline drawing of the XBT2D,
Heinemann asked his design team section chiefs to suggest
changes they deemed justifiable. These jam sessions were
productive. At first, Devlin and Root conceived a Dauntless-
style wing planform using a straight center section and ta-
pered outer wing panels. But Ed thought this was merely a
holdover from the old SSD with no engineering reason to exist,
so he chose instead to use a constant taper from root to tip.
This constant taper gave a broader wing chord at the root than
Ed Heinemann's built-up motor mount departed from the the constant-center section would have, and Heinemann said
norm, and saved weight and space on the Skyraider. (Dou-
glas Aircraft photo courtesy Harry Gann.) this enhanced structural integrity. Heinemann also found it
possible to design the constant-taper wing at a lighter weight
BuAer pondered Heinemann's new design, and approved than the SSD-style planform would have required, he said. 11
the use of the remaining BTD funds to flesh out the new As the section chiefs refined the XBT2D's design, their
XBT2D at Douglas' EI Segundo plant. Martin and Fleetwing individual section specialties of wing, tail, fuselage, stress,
were the competitors to beat, and they each had a half-year weight, powerplant and aerodynamics influenced the out-
lead on the Douglas team. "We had to know what they were come. After the meetings, Bob Smith redrew the aircraft to
doing and what their faults were, and capitalize on them," incorporate the latest validated thinking of the working group.

Above left: Deep well for side-mounted dive brake action is visible in this factory view of the BT2D-1 under construction in
January 1945. Behind are two tails of ill-fated BTD aircraft on the line. Above right: Among Ed Heinemann's incorporations
into the Skyraider design was a constant taper to the wing leading and trailing edges from tip to root, which he said eased
construction and saved weight. (both - Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann.)

Building a Better Bomber 11

 BT2D-1 taking shape on the Douglas line in February 1945. (Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann.)
"After a week ortwo, there were no more changes," Heinemann
said. Douglas had flirted with this design brainstorming tech-
nique on the A-26 Invader attack bomber for the Army Air
Forces, but the new XBT2D dive bomber was the first of
Heinemann's projects to fully exploit this philosophy. In the
years following the XBT2D's development, Heinemann tried
to keep the same engineers doing the same section's tasks on
later designs, to build on their own prior experiences. The
XBT2D's smooth finish was the result offlush-riveting the skin
to the airframe structure. Conservative Heinemann eschewed
anything as exotic as the spot-welding technique Vought had
used on its sleek F4U Corsair fighter. Heinemann exhorted his
engineers to "... use things we know how to use," rather than
plunge into unorthodox techniques or materials. From his
early years on the Northrop design team, Heinemann formed
a negative opinion of castings and of magnesium - both of
which John Northrop placed great store in. Heinemann had
seen polar explorer Lincoln Ellsworth's Northrop Gamma
come back with weakened castings, and the impression stuck
in his mind as he shepherded the forerunner of the Skyraider
in 1944. He challenged his engineers to prove that alternate
12 Douglas A·1 Skyraider
materials were better than aluminum before committing such
materials to the design. 12
The Douglas team worked with Navy counterparts includ-
ing Captain (later Admiral) John Murphy, head of BuAer's
aircraft section; Commander Emerson Fawkes and Captain
(later Admiral) John Thomas. The Navy men concurred with
Heinemann when he came up with a novel engine mount
design for the XBT2D. Eight welded tubes originally were
devised to support the engine in a conventional manner. But
these hampered oil-cooler installation and cluttered the en-
gine accessory section space. Material strength was at the
heart of the problem. With the traditional welded steel tube
structure, all eight tubes were necessary. "It took four legs if
we made it out of sheet." So the plane's motor mount was
radicalized into a built-up truss of one-eighth-inch aluminum
which resulted in more unencumbered spaceforthe oil cooler,
oil pumps, carburetor and other appliances. When confronted
with this apparent aberration in his conservative-design phi-
losophy, Heinemann shrugged. His eyes flashed the begin-
nings of a smile as he explained, "Well, you have to make
some progress." The mandated R-3350 engine was large. To

Douglas test pilot LaVerne Browne made the first flight in the
XBT2D-1 on March 18, 1945, while carrier dive bombers still
engaged the enemy in combat. Browne, who portrayed
"Tailspin Tommy" in a series of 1930s motion pictures, test-
flew hundreds of Skyraiders for Douglas. Recalling the
maiden flight of the prototype of the Skyraider, he said, "I
wish I could interject some dramatic incident that occurred
on that first flight. There wasn't any. I just floated around up
there for an hour and a half and brought her down, though I
did do something that's unprecedented, I believe, for a first
trip. The airplane handled so well that I put it through rolls
and Immelmans to check it for maneuverability." (Douglas
photo)
properly streamline a fuselage behind this engine, the fuse-
lage took on a substantial cross section. Fuel stowage in the
spacious fuselage was a natural way to give the XBT2D long
range, especially since this aircraft deleted its predecessors'
internal weapons bay. Rather than invite problems from fuel
leaks that sometimes attended rigid metal fuselage tanks,
Heinemann chose the so-called "udder tank," a self-sealing
rubber fuel cell which hung from the fuselage ceiling. 13 As
Heinemann followed the service career of his Skyraider de-
sign, he learned the planes sometimes tanked enough gas to
fly for more than 10 hours, after which the weary, fatigued
pilots occasionally had to be lifted from the cockpits. 14
Later in the summer of 1944, the Navy's Bureau of
Aeronautics invited makers of naval aircraft to send engineer-
ing representatives to the Pacific Theater of operations to
learn about aircraft operations in actual service. Douglas
Aircraft tapped Ed Heinemann, and he looked forward to the
experience with professional curiosity. "This was the begin-
ning of one of the most important segments in my life. I was on
the way to a grand symposium which convened aboard
carriers and air stations throughout the South Pacific. I would
meet with the men who flew and maintained the planes that my
colleagues in the industry and I had designed and built. I was
about to discover undeniably just how good or bad our
products were."15 Heinemann's counterparts at Curtiss and
Fleetwing failed to get appointed by their companies, so rather
than delay any further, the Navy packed Heinemann aboard
aConsolidated PB2Y Coronado flying boat on a mail run to the
Pacific on Friday, 13 October, 1944.
Heinemann shipped out of Hawaii aboard the aircraft
carrier Ticonderoga (CV-14) five days later. He spent time
with the aircraft maintenance crews, patiently hearing their
gripes as well as their praise, throughout which ran a common
thread - a plea for simplicity. Dressed in khakis and sporting
an overseas cap, civilian Heinemann blended in well with his
Navy hosts as he circulated among pilots and mechanics, and
observed many launches and recoveries of Helldivers, Hellcats,
and Avengers. From copious notes, Heinemann digested
diverse recommendations: Chart boards currently in use were
too heavy; all running lights should be on one rheostat; 20-
millimeter cannons were preferable to .50-caliber machine
guns. 16
As Ed Heinemann toured the Pacific in the fall of 1944, the
prospect of a protracted war against Japan was very real. In
1944, a Navy PB4Y-2 aircrewman wrote, "...we had been at
war with Japan for two and a half years, and we were
considering the possibility of a five- to ten-year war ahead of
US."17In 1945, aU .S. Army Air Forces B"24 Liberator flew with
the legend "Golden Gate in '48" emblazoned beside its cock-
pit. A less optimistic crew named their Liberator "Breadline in
'49." To all but the very few persons who were privy to the
nuclear secrets of the United States in 1944-45, peace with
Japan seemed several years distant at best. Ed Heinemann
fancied that his XBT2D dive bomber would wade into battle
against Japan, and like a proud father, he wanted to give his
dive bomber all the advantages he could bestow.
On newly-captured Guam in November, Ed observed the
ravages of coral dust as it coated aircraft and made a gummy,
abrasive mixture with oil and grease. It was while on Guam
that he decided to put canvas barriers over the airfoil sections
ofthe wings when they were folded, to keep the elements from
reaching the wing guns and internal equipment. Heinemann
had seen similar canvas boots on the folded wings of Grumman
aircraft in the Pacific. But where the Grumman boots had to be
removed prior to extending the wings, Heinemann's dive
bomber would incorporate canvas baffles which could be left
in place always, thereby simplifying maintenance chores
while protecting the aircraft. Heinemann returned from the
Pacific more convinced than ever that a single-place dive
bomber was in order, and that dive bombers should handle
that role aggressively, sparing fighters whenever possible
from compromising their mission by lugging bombs or rock-
ets. 18
Back at EI Segundo, Heinemann pushed his team to keep
the BT2D on schedule. Project engineer Reid Bogert, who had
sweated out the early XBT2D drawings in the Statler Hotel
with Heinemann, Devlin, and Root, fell ill and was replaced by
Leonard Quick. By now, the BT2D was known as the Daunt-
less II. The Douglas design team worked under stringent
rules: No part could be overweight unless an equal amount of
weight was pared off elsewhere in the design; some parts
which failed to meet minimum weight standards were tested
before final acceptance, to make sure they were not made
stronger - hence heavier - than their maximum loads would
require.
An in-house memo circulated among BT2D project work-
ers explained that the saving of 100 pounds on the aircraft
Building a Better Bomber 13
An XBT2D-1 test in the 1946-47 period was the installation of rocket tubes outboard of the 20-millimeter wing guns. From the
tubes, one in each wing, spin-stabilized five-inch rocket projectiles were fired at ground targets. The program was not
adopted. (Photo courtesy Douglas via Harry Gann.)

14 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 Four Navy AD-1s in echelon show off the ventral dive brake. (Douglas Aircraft Co. photo via Harry Gann.)
could shorten carrier takeoff roll by eight feet, or increase
combat radius by 22 miles, or raise sea-level climb rate by
eighteen feet a minute, or boost the speed by about a third of
a mile an hour. By challenging the Navy's original request for
an internal bomb bay, Heinemann's crew shaved 200 pounds
off the weight of the earlier BTD by eliminating the bay
altogether. Fuselage-mounted dive brakes on the BT2D saved
70 pounds. By making the stub wing a one-piece structure that
passed beneath the fuselage, rather than a two-piece stub
wing, 100 pounds were lopped off the old BTD weight. The
horizontal stabilizer likewise was a one-piece structure pass-
ing through the aft fuselage/rudder area, saving 20 pounds off
the old BTD weight. When all the weight-saving measures
were used, the BT2D was a half ton lighter than Douglas had
promised the Navy, giving that much more flexibility to Navy
mission planners who could hang more ordnance orfuel. After
early Korean War aircraft losses, armor plate weighing about
620 pounds was bolted to the planes, markedly enhancing
their survivability while remaining within acceptable weights. 19
The BT2D had a gross weight of 16,500 pounds, which
was 1,500 pounds less than the BTD. If an aircraft deserved
to wear the name of Dauntless II in honor of its sterling SBD
predecessor, it was the BT2D. Fuel servicing time per man
was two minutes on the BT2D, compared with 13 on the BTD.
If the "udder" fuel tank of the BT2D required removal, the task
required two man hours. For the BTD, this took 72 man hours;
for the SBD Dauntless, 144 manhours.
The old SB2D and BTD had better performance in their
higher speed ranges than they did in slow flight, where their
special wing airfoil sections were not at home. The BT2D
Dauntless II went back to basics, in the form of a more
standard NACA (National Advisory Committee on Aeronau-
tics) airfoil which gave better slow-speed handling, though
maybe at the expense of performance at the top end of the
plane's speed range. This NACA airfoil gave the Dauntless II
greater lift than the BTD.20
When the XBT2D was first conceived, the Navy still
placed value on zero-lift vertical dives. A wing provides lift to
counteract gravity in level flight. In a vertical dive, the airfoil is
still capable of generating "lift", albeit at 90 degrees to the pull
of gravity, since the plane is now nosed down. With no similar
force tugging in the opposite direction, the lift factor can cause
the diving plane to describe a descent path that is not truly
vertical. Dive brakes which keep a plane's speed from building
up too fast can help promote vertical dives, but Heinemann
could see problems ahead for the heavy XBT2D if its brakes
were expected to keep the plane slow and stable in a true
vertical zero-lift dive. The wing-mounted brakes of the SBD
Dauntless helped promote zero-lift dives by acting as spoilers,
disrupting normal lift over the wing. Heinemann pondered
Building a Better Bomber 15
 AD-2 with radar pod, at NAS Alameda in September 1948. (Photo by William T. Larkins.)

wing brakes for the XBT2D, but discarded them because they
would have complicated the wing-folding design and could
contribute to buffeting. A reversible-pitch propeller was con-
sidered, but no prop with adequate characteristics was avail-
able. The design teamed even toyed with the idea of using
parachutes as dive brakes, but this plan was not adopted.
Heinemann reasoned he could adequately slow the XBT2D
Dauntless II with the more-stable fuselage-mounted brakes if
the Navy would back off from its quest for zero-lift dives. In the
process, a weight savings over other braking systems could
be attained with the fuselage brakes. In keeping with his vow
to challenge the Navy's design specifications if they seemed
unrealistic, Ed Heinemann contested the wisdom of trying to
make the XBT2D fly vertical zero-lift dives. 21 In use the SBD
Dauntless often flew a 70-degree dive. 22 Ultimately, the Navy's
Bureau of Aeronautics agreed that the XBT2D would be
designed for 70-degree dives.
This dive brake philosophical change opened up new
realms for the XBT2D. Where the older SBD had difficulty
maintaining level flight with its wing-mounted brakes ex-
tended, the XBT2D suffered no loss of lift with its fuselage
brakes. The brakes on the XBT2D Dauntless II could be
deployed for maneuvering advantages for formations or de-
scents, as well as air-to-air combat. With three brake panels
on the aft fuselage - one on each side and the third ventrally-
located - the XBT2D reached 300 miles an hour in a dive. In

Early XAD-1W photo shows belly radome, and early-style flat-paned windscreen. (Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann.)

16 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

AD-1 in glossy sea blue sported insignia with insignia blue background to stars and bars; flat black anti-glare panel.
Grumman F8F Bearcat escorted. (H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collection)
a clean-configuration dive, the big Dauntless II could hit 500
miles an hour, though this was of little value in combat since
the pullout had to begin much sooner at higher speeds.
The XBT2D cockpit went through five mock-ups at con-
siderable expense by Douglas, to ensure pilot comfort, safety,
and ease of operation. Special instruments with quarter-inch
numbers were evolved for the XBT2D instrument panel after
Heinemann's team determined this size to be needed to
enhance instrument legibility at the average XBT2D cockpit
distance of 24 inches from the pilot's eyes. 23
Heinemann's Pacific carrier cruise manifested itself in
many pilot and groundcrew conveniences built into the Daunt-
less II. Douglas personnel estimated only half as much time
would be required to service the Dauntless II as had been
needed for the ill-fated BTD. The Dauntless II was nearing
completion in time for a March 1945 first flight, and its builders
were enthusiastic about the plane's performance on paper.
The landing gear retracted aft into the wings, as the main
wheels rotated 90 degrees to lie flush in wing recesses. When
it became apparent the production main gear assemblies
would not be ready to meet the March schedule, the Douglas
company procured Vought F4U Corsair landing gear, which
retracted in the same fashion as the gear planned for the
Dauntless II. This rearward-retracting landing gear offered an
advantage over gear which retracted inboard or outboard.
With rearward-retracting landing gear, less spanwise space
was consumed by the landing gear, leaving more underwing
and underbody space open for hanging external stores. This
underwing area would not go wasted on the Dauntless II.
The prototype XBT2D-1 emerged from final assembly
sporting a Dash-8 version of the R-3350 engine instead of the
Dash-24 of the production version, which, like the landing
gear, was unavailable. On the 18th of March, 1945, war in
Europe was playing out to an inevitable Allied victory, as U.S.
Army Air Forces B-29s were continuing a 9 March shift in
tactics to night incendiary raids against Japanese cities, as
opposed to standard daylight precision bombing. While vic-
tory in Europe seemed certain on that spring day, the war
against Japan still showed the potential for dragging on
several more years. Thus, not a few engineers and naval
planners looked to the Douglas XBT2D-1 as a tool to defeat
Japan when the first Dauntless II roared into the southern
California sky that March.
LaVerne Browne was at the controls of the' natural-
aluminum XBT2D-1 for that first takeoff. Thirty-two test hops
later, the Douglas team certified the XBT2D-1 for delivery to
the Patuxent Naval Air Test Center in Maryland, on 7 April,
1945. 24
Meanwhile, the competing Kaiser Fleetwing XBTK was
still unflown, and the Martin XBTM had been returned to the
Building a Better Bomber 17
Above left: Ground run-up of AD-1 revealed white radar pod on pylon. Above right: Wings folded, showing Ed Heinemann's
canvas wing-root dust boot in place. (both - H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collection)

factory for modification after a less-than-stellar debut at
Patuxent River. As the Douglas XBT2D-1 raced through its
Navy tests in only five weeks, Navy test pilots heaped super-
latives upon the new bomber. On 5 May, 1945, the Navy
signed a letter of intentto buy 548 BT2D aircraft. As production
swung into action, problems cropped up with propeller vibra-
tions and engine exhaust cracks and detonation problems.
Production delays ensued as the powerplant and propeller
were debugged. 25 The Aeroproducts propeller, which was to
be manufactured by the Aeroproducts-Allison Division of
General Motors, followed the Aeroproducts design philoso-
phy of brazing sheet steel to a forged, ribbed internal structure,
providing substantial strength and structural integrity even
when punctured by gunfire. After its initial XBT2D-1 teething
troubles were corrected, the Aeroproducts four-bladed prop
was touted for its durability. Several times during the Korean
War, direct hits from 37-millimeter rounds tore holes in these
props without destroying them or ruining their ability to propel
their aircraft to safety.26
The BTD was lauded by the Navy for its simplicity and
performance. The Heinemann decision to challenge Navy
design requirements which he considered unsound had paid
off in an uncluttered airplane that was not overburdened with
compromises in its design. In February 1946, with reduced
peacetime contracts in effect for both the Douglas and Martin
bombers, the name of the BT2D was changed from Dauntless
II to Skyraider. The Douglas pattern of Sky-prefixed names
already included the transport Skytrain, Skytrooper and
Skymaster designs; Navy combat planes following the
Skyraiderwould bear names like Skyshark, Skyray, Skyhawk,

Outboard hardpoints on this early AD, BuAer No. 122225, carried rails for HVAR rockets. (both - H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation
Historical Society collection)

18 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

and Skywarrior, among others. Two months after changing Notes
1. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20
the Douglas bomber's name to Skyraider, the Navy Depart- July 1982.
ment revised its aircraft nomenclature. Thus the BT2D-1 2. Ibid.
became the AD-1 under the new simplified system, which 3. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - Combat
Aircraft Designer, p. 36.
stood for Attack, Douglas, model One. 4. Frederick A. Johnsen, Darkly Dangerous- The Northrop P-61 Black Widow
The Kaiser-Fleetwing XBTK, powered by the R-2800- Night Fighter. Tacoma, Bomber Books, 1981, p.2.
34W engine, never progressed beyond five 1945 prototypes. 5. Service Department, Curtiss-Wright Corporation, Airplane Division, Co-
lumbus, Ohio, Pilot and Beast: What Every Young Pilot Should Know About
The Martin BTM became the AM Mauler under the revised the Helldiver.
designation system. The Mauler airframe rode behind a Pratt 6. B.R. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, p. 11.
and Whitney R-4360 engine. The Mauler was three feet longer 7. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - Combat
Aircraft Designer, pp. 100-105.
than the Skyraider, and weighed about two tons more than an 8. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20
AD-2. The Mauler demonstrated a maximum ordnance load- July 1982.
carrying ability of 10,689 pounds; in May of 1953, an AD-4 9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
Skyraider carried 10,500 pounds of bombs as part of its useful 11. Ibid.
load which weighed in at 14,941 pounds total. The AM-1 12. Ibid.
Mauler was a viable warplane for the Navy, and 151 of the 13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
Martin bombers were built. But the Douglas Skyraider, with its 15. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - Combat
simple, well-planned design philosophy, was selected for fleet Aircraft Designer, p. 111.
standardization, resulting in termination ofthe Mauler produc- 16. Ibid.
17. Lt. R.L. Meierhenry, publisher, Battle DiaryofVPB-121, San Diego: Frye
tion run in October 1949. Most of the AM-1 s were assigned to and Smith, Ltd., 1945.
Reserve units the following year, and many of the former first- 18. Heinemann's trip was written in report form for the Bureau of Aeronautics
line Mauler squadrons converted to the Skyraider at that time. as Report On Trip To Pacific Combat Area, 27 November 1944, Report
Number ES 6712, EI Segundo Division, Douglas Aircraft.
19. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - Combat
Aircraft Designer, pp. 125-140.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Barrett Tillman, The Dauntless Dive Bomber of World War Two, Annapo-
lis: Naval Institute Press, 1976, p.14.
23. Edward H. Heinemann and Rosario Rausa, Ed Heinemann - Combat
Aircraft Designer, pp. 125-140.
24. B.A. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, pp. 18-19.
25. Ibid.
26. "Tough Props," Aviation Week, May 4, 1953.

Building a Better Bomber 19

20 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
 CHAPTER II
Between the Wars:
Skyraiders Enter the Navy
"To something new, to something strange." Longfellow, Keramos
P ost-World War II Navy air was not unlike an awk-
ward teenager, possessing great strength, but still
a trifle uncomfortable with its rapidly-nearing adult-
hood in the simultaneous jet- and atomic-ages.
Navy planners clearly understood the value of jet propul-
sion. Back as early as 20August 1943, the Navy signed a letter
of intent asking the young McDonnell Aircraft Corporation to
design an all-jet carrier-based fighter aircraft. The straight-
wingXFD-1 Phantom became the first American all-jet aircraft
to operate on an aircraft carrier when it landed aboard the USS
Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV-42) on 21 JUly 1946.
Butthe airframes and wing airfoils which capitalized on jet
speeds sometimes demanded fast landing speeds and long
takeoff rolls unless flung into the air with a strong catapult.
Early jet engines also required more time than propellers to
rev up to produce significant power increases. For carrier
operations, quick applications of power were vital for wave-
offs. The Navy cautiously hedged its bets when ordering the
Ryan FR-1 Fireball in February of 1943.
The Fireball combined a conventional tractor Wright R-
1820 radial piston engine driving a three-blade propeller with
a General Electric 1-16 turbojet mounted in the aft fuselage.
The piston engine and propeller allowed rapid acceleration
response; the jet gave a boost in speed, albeit modest, from
a cruise of 152 miles an hour to a top speed of 404 miles an
hour at 17,800 feet. Fireballs began carrier qualification trials
aboard the USS Ranger (CV-4) on 1 May 1945. These
unusual aircraft were phased out of the Navy flying inventory
in 1947 following service aboard the aircraft carriers USS
Wake Island (CVE-65), USS Bairoko (CVE-115), and USS
Badoeng Strait (CVE-116).1
With acceleration, expeditious takeoff and landing rolls,
load-carrying capacity, and endurance all compromised by
early naval jet fighter aircraft, it was obvious in the 1940s that
carrier-borne attack aircraft would still depend on propellers
for the time being, if they were to carry useful payloads and
perform their intended functions.
The Douglas AD Skyraider still had a home in the bur-
geoning jet-age Navy. When Ed Heinemann's team was
designing the Skyraider back in 1944, word from the Navy's
Bureau of Aeronautics projected a five-year life span for this
aircraft. Heinemann tacked on another five years, and guessed
his attack bomber would be around until about 1955 or SO.2
As early as 1947, the Bureau of Aeronautics had ex-
pressed interest in having a carrier-capable jet bomber which
could deliver strategic nuclear weapons. It was two years
before Ed Heinemann's design team at Douglas finished their
OPPOSITE: A mixture of single-seat attack Skyraiders and
multi-place electronics birds stretches into the recesses of
the Douglas plant in a factory portrait of unusually artistic
composition. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)
Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy
response-theA3D Skywarrior. 3 Meanwhile, in 1949, produc-
tion deliveries began of the North American AJ Savage
nuclear strike aircraft, powered by two reciprocating Pratt and
Whitney R-2800 engines and one Allison J33 turbojet
powerplant.
The AD Skyraider also had nuclear-weapons capability,
but its rough-and-ready attack role was not especially threat-
ened by the advent of the A3D and AJ.
While the AD was waging war in Korea, Ed Heinemann
was pondering the Skyraider's successor at Douglas. His
team worked from 1950 to 1952 on a single-engine jet succes-
sor, the speedy A4D Skyhawk. The Skyhawkfirstflew 22 June
1954, with squadron deliveries to Navy Attack Squadron VA-
72 beginning in October 1956. 4 The Skyhawk, often affection-
ately called "Heinemann's Hot Rod," could carry a load of
5,000 pounds, later raised to more than 9,000 pounds, al-
though the A4D did not enjoy the great range or loiter time of
the Skyraider.
Ultimately, the Grumman A-6 (originally called A2F) In-
truder would finish off the remaining Skyraiders in Navy
service, but the Navy didn't even request design proposals for
such an aircraft until 1956. The A-6 did not enter service until
it flew with VA-42 in early 1963.
Thus, while the Navy planted the seeds which grew to be
all-jet replacements for the Skyraider, the piston-engine AD
could not be discarded prematurely.
When World War II ended in September 1945, orders for
many military aircraft were reduced or eliminated altogether.
The Navy's original request for 548 Skyraiders was quickly
trimmed to 377 aircraftwhen peaceinthe Pacific was achieved.
Soon, this was further pared back to 277 planes. s
The 25 XBT2D-1 s, which bore the X designating an
experimental design, but which were builtto production plans,
were delivered to the Navy during 1945. Before a year had
passed, pilots from Navy squadrons VA-3B and VA-4B had
finished carrier qualifications aboard the USS Sicily.
The early AD-1s bore Ed Heinemann's weight-saving
design philosophy. The main landing gear and its wing attach-
ments were designed to withstand carrier landing sink rates of
14 feet per second. In 1946, the Navy began noting serious
buckling of AD-1 wing structure around the landing gear.
Investigation revealed many landings were made at much
higher sink rates than had originally been projected for the
Skyraider. The vertical forces were driving the landing gear
into the wings as the AD-1 s slammed into carrier decks. s
If the actual sink rates could not be kept to a maximum of
14 feet per second, the AD would have to be strengthened.
Ri~ets were loosen.ing a.nd skin was wrinkling o~ the. AD-~ s
gOing through service trials out of Alameda, California, With
the Navy's Pacific Fleet Air Headquarters. Initial reinforce-
ments applied to the AD-1 s failed to halt deterioration of the
21
The first production AD-3W shows fuselage compartment crew door ahead of national insignia. This compartment replaced
side-mounted dive brakes. Revised windscreen from earlier flat-paned design is evident. (Douglas photo courtesy Harry
Gann)

Above and below: Two views depict the first AD-4, BuAer number 122853. AD-4s figured prominently in Korean War Skyraider
operations. (Douglas photos via Harry Gann)

22 Douglas A·1 Skyraider

 AD-4Q shows rear compartment crew door plus side brakes in this retouched photo. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

structure. A major strengthening redesign was instituted by
Douglas at EI Segundo. A compromise to Ed Heinemann's
original design was inevitable. The Skyraider put on 400
pounds to secure its structure against the stresses of carrier
landings. But there was value to Heinemann's weight-con-
scious design ideas. Only those structures which absolutely
needed strengthening put on weight; the rest of the originally
lightweight structure still left leeway for later payload or
structural additions which might have overgrossed an air-
plane with an initially heavier weight.
Even with the 400-pound rework, the AD-1 s began exhib-
iting wing-fuselage joint damage and landing gear leg defi-
ciencies. Skin doublers in the wheel wells, internal wing
strengthening, and reinforcement of the wing skin was added,
finally allowing the AD to pass sink-rate tests in excess of 23
feet per second. During this evolutionary strengthening ofthe
damaged AD-1 s, the structural improvements were incorpo-
rated into the remaining AD-1 s and the early AD-2s on the
Douglas assembly line.
Where the 277 production AD-1s had achieved a top
speed of 366 miles an hour behind the R-3350-24 engine
which put out 2,500 takeoff horsepower, the AD-2 of 1948
used the improved R-3350-26W powerplant to obtain 3,020
horsepower, giving the Dash-2 Skyraider a listed top speed of
321 miles an hour at 18,300 feet. The AD-2 featured enhanced
fuel capabilities and more bomb racks than the AD-1. The

AD-4N, with aft crew compartment and dorsal air vent, carries electronics counter measures pod beneath starboard wing, and
searchlight pod under port wing on April 11, 1952. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 23

Additional vertical fins aided stability of the awkward-looking AD-4W with its belly-mounted radome. (Douglas photos cour-
tesy Harry Gann)
workhorse Skyraider was evolving into an ever-better combat variants. The first of 178 AD-2s was delivered early in 1948.
machine. Twenty-one of these were AD-2Q versions with an elec-
Early AD-2s appeared with the flat-paned windshield of tronic countermeasures capability in a compartment behind
the AD-1 and earlier models. Later, AD-2s employed a wind- the fuselage udder gas tank. Room for an operator was made
shield and canopy which had markedly curved side panels, in this aft-fuselage location, and the dive brakes were retained
which were used on the remainder of the single-seat AD outside the compartment, giving the AD-2Q the same basic

AD-3W aft compartment was packed with gear, as evidenced by this company rendering. (Courtesy Harry Gann)

24 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

The tracks of the tides and wakes of ships lace San Francisco Bay behind an AD-1 (BuAer No. 09204) belonging to attack
squadron VA-20A on 2 June 1947. (Photo by William T. Larkins)
performance as a stock AD-2. One AD-2 earmarked for target
tug modification was soon outmoded by the development of
the Mark 22 Dart target, a system which could be mounted to
any Skyraider. The AD-2Q was passed by the Patuxent River
test center 30 November, 1948.
When the AD-3 followed the Dash-2 down the production
line, a landing gear oleo strut travel of fourteen inches was
used instead oftheten inches previously called for. Some fine-
tuning still was being made to tame abrupt carrier landings.
The AD-3W mounted a radar in a bulbous fairing beneath
the fuselage. Two operators, seated side-by-side in the aft
fuselage, manned the radar. As the American fleet had neared
the Japanese home islands in 1945, kamikaze attacks threat-
ened their advance. Picket ships were posted ahead of the
main fleet, to detect incoming Japanese aircraft, but soon the
pickets took an unacceptably high toll of losses. If the Navy
could elevate radar to increase its line-of-sight, the task of
detecting incoming hostile planes could be performed with
greater safety, closer to the main fleet. Wartime Navy plan-
ners initially favored using the four-engine Douglas C-54
transport as a platform for APS-20E search radar, but sea-
Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy
soned Navy fighter interception specialists argued that the
unarmed C-54s would be decimated in the skies near Japan.
Instead, Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress bombers, redesig-
nated PB-1 Ws, were modified for this role, so they could bring
their dozen .50-caliber machine guns to bear in any combat.?
But the naval Flying Fortresses, which entered service too
late for World War II, required land bases. The big AD-3 of
1948 could bring an umbrella of airborne radar protection
aboard the carriers at sea. The Skyraider's Airborne Early
Warning (AEW) radome first was fitted to the sole XAD-1W,
which had started out as an XBT2D-1 .
The AD-3W did not ease into fleet service without opera-
tional problems. The large ventral radome created some
aerodynamic situations which Douglas engineers found diffi-
cult to recreate in a wind tunnel. This led to some surprises
during flight testing of the radar Skyraiders. On 14 October
1948, an AD-3W test aircraft was going through scheduled
maneuvers at Patuxent River. Early indications were routine,
with but minor changes being made to the plane to enhance
stability.
25
Bearing pre-1947 style national insignia is the XBT2D-1Q
Skyraider with countermeasures provisions. Effective
January 1947, a red bar was to be added to the white bars
flanking the star. Long prop dome was unusual for
Skyraiders. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann)
This Skyraider was aloft the following day when a fuel tank
which should have been nearly full registered empty on the
gauge as the R-3350 engine wheezed and manifested all the
symptoms of fuel starvation. The test pilot, Lieutenant Com-
mander Weems, brought the stricken AD-3W down for a water
landing on the Patuxent River's surface. The broad radome
planed over the water like a boat hull, and Lieutenant Com-
mander Weems was able to prolong this action until the AD-
3W slid up on the shallow riverbank.
When the Navy investigated the unusual mishap, the
accident board concluded that the shape of the large radome
had altered the airflow over fuel vents, causing the udder tank
to collapse as its gas siphoned overboard. The condition
causing this fluke was corrected.
The following month, Douglas test pilot R.O. Rahn pushed
an AD-3W prototype into a high-speed dive during a test
series monitoring the radome's aerodynamic characteristics
under such conditions. Rahn was jammed down into the AD's
seat by a violent uncommanded pitch-up and rollover which
probably resulted in a maximum loading of eleven gs on the
AD-3W. a Rahn brought the Skyraider back under control, and
flew to the Douglas Santa Monica, California, plant for a
landing. The Santa Monica control tower crew told Rahn his
ECM-Iaden AD-1Q, circa 1947. (Photo courtesy Edward H.
Heinemann)
26 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
The AD-1Q (BuAer No. 09372), with 1947 red added to the
bars of the national insignia. Dust boot is in place over the
exposed wing root. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann)
radome was gone from the belly of the AD-3W as he ap-
proached for landing. This plane had carried only the radome
cover, and not the actual radar dish. Rahn had most emphati-
cally found the AD-3W's high-speed dive parameters.
In addition to the 31 AD-3Ws, 124 straight AD-3s were
delivered, along with 15 AD-3Ns for night sorties, and 23
countermeasure AD-30s. Two of the -3Ns were converted to
AD-3S configuration as submarine killers intended to operate
in concert with two AD-3Es modified from AD-3Ws, as subma-
rine hunters.
During 1949, Douglas introduced the AD-4 on the shop
floor. Changes from the Dash-Three included use of a P-1
autopilot in the AD-4, replacement of the older APS-4 radar
with APS-19A equipment, and smaller changes. The first of
372 AD-4s reached squadrons in 1950. AD-4Bs (the liB"
denoted special armament) were modified to givethis Skyraider
the capability of using tactical nuclear weapons. These totaled
165 aircraft. The 307 AD-4Ns were equipped for night opera-
tions. Thirty-nine AD-40s carried countermeasures equip-
ment, and 168 AD-4Ws slung the belly-mounted radar scan-
ner.
Mission requirements dictated converting 29 AD-4s to
AD-4B configuration, while 63 AD-4s were winterized under
Publicists delighted in comparing the Skyraider's capacity for
ordnance with the smaller total carried by a World War II four-
engine B-17 bomber. This maximum load was photographed
in May 1953. (Photo courtesy Edward H. Heinemann)
 Fifteen bombs of varying capacities are mounted on the external hard points of this AD-4B. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

the designation AD-4L. When 159 AD-4Ns were stripped for
day-attack duties, they were classified AD-4NAs. Twenty-
three more AD-4NAs were built in this configuration. Thirty-
seven AD-4Ns were winterized to become AD-4NLs.
The AD-5 marked some major changes in the Skyraider
design. Its production was extended in part due to the Korean
War, which proved the utility ofthe AD in the jet age. The Dash-
Five Skyraider's fuselage was lengthened two feet, and wid-
ened to provide for a side-by-side crew seating arrangement.
A main selling point of the AD-5 was this enlarged fuse-
lage, which Douglas said could be converted from the basic
AD-5 day attack bomber to an AD-5N night attack version or
an AD-5W airborne early warning or anti-submarine patrol
aircraft. This basic chassis employed what Ed Heinemann

A total of 12 five-inch high velocity aircraft rockets (HVARs) could be carried by Skyraiders, as seen on this early AD-1. Old·
style flat-paned windscreen is readily visible. (U.S. Air Force photo)

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 27

Above: One of 63 winterized AD-4Ls, with de-icer boots, carries a pair of 11.7S-inch Tiny Tim rockets in addition to 12 five-inch
missiles and a centerline bomb. Early Skyraider with pre-1947 insignia painted under, as well as on, fuselage dive brakes,
carries five-inch and 11.7S-inch air-to-ground rockets. (both - Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

28 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

A·1H carries 84 folding-fin rockets in 12 underwing pods, plus 18 new-type low-drag gravity bombs on multiple ejector racks.
(Douglas photo)
called "the Detroit philosophy." This meant the AD-5 started
down the assembly line in one basic form, and emerged from
the other end customized to one of the three basic versions,
after the fashion of Detroit automobile assembly lines of the
day. Special kits offered other multiple roles for the AD-5. In
1953, Heinemann was quoted in Aviation Week magazine as
saying "We do not advocate doing this to all aircraft." For multi-
use planes all too frequently resulted in disappointing compro-
mises in performance. 9
Nearly 30 years later, Heinemann was even more to the
point when characterizing the boxy AD-5: "The Dash-Five was
kind of a dog. It was never really accepted, but they (the Navy)
bought it and used it." "It was kind of a homeless airplane,"
Heinemann added. Heinemann never was totally sold on the
multi-use concept. Douglas officials told the Navy the Dash-
Five could be configured for a variety of roles, "and sure
enough, they bought some," Heinemann said with a trace of
irony in his voice, for defense planners have a weakness for
so-called multi-role aircraft. But the order for AD-5s kept the
Skyraider production line open longer than it otherwise would
have, making it feasible to produce the single-seat AD-6 and
AD-7 later when the need arose. 10
The roles offered by Douglas for the AD-5 in 1953 were:
- VIP transport kit, with four plush rear-facing seats fastening to
studs in the floor behind the flight deck, for quick disconnect.
- High-density passenger kit, using two center-facing bench
seats capable of carrying ten passengers plus a flight crew of
two.
- Cargo kit, featuring a hoist and plywood flooring in the space
behind the pilot, for carrying up to a ton of cargo.
- Ambulance kit, with four litters and a hoist.
- Long-range kit, using a pair of 150-gallon fuel tanks, to double
the internal fuel tankage, plus external tanks.
- Tow-target kit, including a belly pod for the target reel.
- Photographic kit, featuring five aerial mapping or reconnais-
sance cameras.
Among the changes built into the basic AD-5 was the lack of
main wheel doors to save weight, and the relocation of the

AD·1 wings stagger to fold, as the system powering the mechanism hefts the weight of the outer wing panels. The squadron
is VA-20A at NAS Alameda in 1947. See also photos page 18. (Photos by William T. Larkins)

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 29

Retouched Douglas photo of 1949 shows AD-3E with long AD·3W radome installation. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)
turtledeck behind cockpit. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

AD-4NL with searchlight pod under wing, and winterization
features in place. Wingtip mounts a test probe in this 31
August 1951 company shot. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)
radar operator from the aft fuselage to the seat beside the pilot
in versions calling for a second crew member. This latter
alteration facilitated communication between the two crew-
men, enhancing their ability to work as a team. The capacious
AD-5 fuselage made possible inflight servicing of the elec-
tronic equipment aboard Dash-Fives so equipped. The regu-
lar AD-5 day attack version, with four 20-mm. cannon, could
be operated by one person. Initially, AD-5s carried only one
A blue bus. This early AD-5 photo, taken November 1952,
shows the forward-swept large-store pylons introduced on
this and subsequent Able Dogs. The AD-5 could go to war or
carry passengers and freight, as needed. (Douglas photo via
Harry Gann)
set of flight controls, for the pilot in the left seat. But when the
South Vietnamese air force began employing AD-5s and
American advisors before the United States was overtly flying
combat in southeast Asia, the Navy added a second set of
flight controls, both to train Vietnamese aviators, and in some
cases, to obscure the fact that American pilots were actually
making combat strikes in VNAF Skyraiders.

Night-flying AD-4N carried flash suppresors on muzzles of 20-millimeter wing cannons, as well as ridge above exhaust stacks
to block flame from affecting pilot's night vision. (H.G. Martin/Kansas Aviation Historical Society collection)

30 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

A Navy AD·4NA, with rear compartment, shows off gray-and-white camouflage scheme initiated in 1955. The photo was taken
in 1956 at Moffett Field; AD·4NAs that survived in the inventory until 1962 were redesignated A·1 Ds. (William T. Larkins
photo)

AD·6s rolled off the Douglas line in dark sea blue paint overall. Navy squadron VA-65 added green and white trim to this
specimen, photographed at Oakland, California in September 1955. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

The AD-5N could use sonar and a searchlight, to become
a one-ship sub hunter and killer, theoretically obviating the
need for a two-plane hunter-killer team.
To compensate for the belly radome of the AD-5W, the
vertical fin-and-rudder area was enlarged 50 percent, instead
of using auxiliary vertical fins as had been done on the AD-4W.
All AD-5s carried this larger tail. Two new bomb racks, one
under each wing, swept forward ahead of the wing leading
edge, adding a rakish appearance while carrying heavier
ordnance, or fuel stores.
Two independently-sliding canopy sections covered the
side-by-side crew seats up front in the AD-5. Two panels in the
rear of the crew compartment were removable for emergency
egress, and an escape hatch was designed into the bottom of
the rear compartment. Electrical wiring on the AD-5 was
rerouted in the engine compartment to facilitate easier access
to the oil tank and accessories than had been enjoyed on
earlier Skyraiders. Additionally, electrical and hydraulic com-
ponents in the forward equipment compartment were sepa-
rated.
To save space, the AD-5 used electric trim tabs instead of
manual tabs as had been used on the AD-4. The side-
mounted dive brakes were deleted on the AD-5, but the ventral
brake remained. 11
The number of regular AD-5s built was 212; 239 AD-5Ns
were built, 218 AD-5Ws were built, and a single AD-5S was
finished. Fifty-four AD-5Qs were converted from AD-5Ns.
The AD-6 was a single-seat Skyraider employing some of
the engineering refinements of the AD-5, plus a low-level dive
bombing mission role. The AD-6 carried a bomb director
which was suitable for either high-or low-level bombing.
Removable external armor plate shielded vital areas of the
AD-6 from flak and small-arms fire, and could quickly be taken
off if not needed.
(Text continues on page 51)

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 31

Above: AD-SW used the larger fuselage of the AD-S plus the radome set for early-warning duties. Pylons are not fitted out-
board of the large forward-swept hardpoint. Below: Fuselage and tail differences can be seen in this comparison photo of a
new AD-SW (foreground) and an equally new AD-5. (both - Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

32 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 , (

Jack Spanich's AD-4NA, restored to represent the Navy's MiG-killing A-1 H from VA-176, captured all the snarling line in this
1978 photograph. (Photo by the author)

The South Vietnamese extended the combat life of the A-1 over their countryside into the 1970s. (Photo via Keith Laird
collection)

Color Gallery 33
 USAF Skyraiders provided ground-attack and rescue support in Southeast Asia. (USAF photo)

Museum-piece Skyraider AEW.1 recalls British service. (Photo courtesy of John M. Bowdler)

34 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 French AD-4s figured in international diplomacy, including unsuccessful American attempts to get them back for use in
Southeast Asia. (Photo via Jim Morrow collection)

1
I

._---~

.-
--~.
--- ~"-

u.s. Navy and Marines occasionally shared dual-marked Skyraiders for stateside use. (Photo via Jim Morrow collection)
Color Gallery 35
 ,i
;

/'

Blue AD-4Q (BuAer No. 124063) served Navy squadron VA·728, a reserve squadron, in the early 1950s over South Korea.
(Photo via Doug Remington collection)

AD-4 number H·512 ofVA·728, BuAer No. 123836, between missions in South Korea, circa 1951-1953. (Photo via Doug
Remington collection)

36 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

Ordnance expended, a South Vietnamese Air Force A-1 taxies back to its revetment at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in the last half
of the 1960s. (Photo courtesy of Bill Latner)

Vietnamese A-1 E, with characteristic black and yellow checker fuselage band seen on many 23rd Wing VNAF Skyraiders.
(USAF photo)

Color Gallery 37
 First Special Operations Squadron A-1 s follow an H-3 to a rescue site in Southeast Asia. (USAF)

USAF A·1 E beside a ramshackle Air Vietnam hangar. (Keith Laird collection)

38 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

VNAF A-1, No. 34557, shares ramp space in South Vietnam with civilian Piper Aztec. Hardpoinfare off A·1s wings. (Keith Laird
collection)

56th SOW A-1H, No. 137593. (Merritt/Holmberg/Morgan collections)

Color Gallery 39
-

40 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

Bearing typical.commander's strip~s in this USAF A-1
of the 56th Special Operations Wing, photographed
from the open 'door of a- rescue helicopter. (USAF
photo)

Color Gallery 41
42 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
Color Gallery 43
 Extra long-range tanks hang from this 56th SOW A-1 H, No. 137713. (Merritt/Holberg/Morgan collections)

Southeast Asia A-1 pilots couldn't resist the open-cockpit appeal of their slower than Mach mounts. This aircraft is a 56th
SOW A-1H, No. 137517. (Merritt/Homberg/Morgan collections)

44 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

Above and below: USN EA-1 of VAW-13. (Jim Morrow photos)

Striking study of single-seat Navy A-1. (Jim Morrow photo)

Color Gallery 45
 "Sock It To 'Em" of the 56th SOW shows oil migration pattern on centerline tank. (Merritt/Holmberg/Morgan collections)

Ex-French AD-4 of the late Jack Spanich in 1982. Spanich was a warbird importer who painted this example to represent a
USAF A·1H of the 1st Special Operations Squadron. (Photo by Paul Swendrowski)

46 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 ----
._~

----:-----~ .'
--~~
-
---- ~--
---"---------_._- 1 · - ~~-< _~, _
Aluminum-silver painted AD·4 in French service, No. 12694. (Jim Morrow collection)

- --~ ~~~~~~---,.;;.;.-...-."
AD-5W from VAW·11 of the USS Kearsarge. (Jim Morrow collection)

Color Gallery 47
 The wooden flight deckof the USS Intrepid felt the impact of this Skyraider's arrested landing as two underwing fuel
pods wrenched from the wings and skated ahead of the aircraft as its engine tore loose and crashed to the deck in
flames. Earlier in its WESTPAC cruise, this Skyraider had ditched and was repaired. This was its test hop; the plane
did not fly again, and the pilot was uninjured. (Photos courtesy of John M. Campbell archives)

48 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

The electronics countermeasures AD-5Qs became EA-1Fs with the redesignation system of 1962. Underwing pylons vary to fit
their special purposes on this Skyraider, and guns are absent. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

Gloss blue AD·6 of Navy squadron VA·155 shows white national star painted directly on sea blue fuselage, without the use of
insignia blue to surround the star - a common U.S. Navy practice in the 1950s. (Photo by William T.Larkins)

Air Task Group One used this AD-6 in 1958. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 49

 VA-115 - the Arabs - flew AD-6 BuAer No. 139731 in 1962 at Moffett Field. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

A clean A-1J from USS Oriskany, seen at Moffett Field in 1963. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

50 Douglas A·1 Skyraider

Heinemann's planes in action: AD-6 with buddy store drags a refueling hose for another Douglas product, an A4D Skyhawk,
in September 1956. (Douglas photo via Edward H. Heinemann)

The underwing bomb racks of the AD-6 were similar to
those of earlier Skyraiders, although the pylons were posi-
tioned 14 inches forward ofthe position on the previous single-
seat AD-4 and earlier Skyraiders.
The follow-on AD-7 was the last variant of the Skyraider
to leave the Douglas plant. The Dash-7 acknowledged the
rigors of low-altitude combat flying by incorporating structural
improvements in the wing to enhance fatigue life. 12 Where the
AD-6 had been powered by an R-3350-26-WA engine, the
Dash-7 used the -WB version giving comparable perfor-
mance. When the last of 72 AD-7s was delivered in February
1957,3,180 Skyraiders had been built. Into the 1960s, military
planners would ponder reopening the line, to crank out more
of these durable attack planes which turned out to be well-
suited for countering jungle warfare in Southeast Asia.
The Navy began pumping Skyraiders into its squadrons in
1946 with deliveries to VA-19A (later designated VA-194).
Navy Skyraider squadrons peaked out at 29 in the fall of 1955,
remaining at that number until the middle of 1957 when the
number of active Navy Skyraider squadrons began to wane.
By late 1965 the Navy operated only 10 A-1 squadrons. 13 The
last two U.S. Navy Skyraiders left service in 1971. They were
A-1 Es, dispatched to the U.S. Marine Corps Museum at
Quantico, Virginia, and to the Military Aircraft Storage and
Disposition Center (MASDC) at Davis-Monthan Air Force
Base, Arizona. 14

U.S.(Navy squa ronSOper? tng yr?ider anne ..qrps began receiVtn

included: VA-19A(laterVA-194), VA-1B (VA~24), Skyraidersin 951, intosquadronVMA-121 (the
VA-28 (VA·25), VA-3B (VA-44), VA-4B(VA-45), letter 'M' indicated a: Marine squadron.) At some
VA-5B (VA-64), VA-6B (VA-65), VA-20A (VA- ~tations such~s Seattle, Washington's, old Sand.
195), VA-34, VA-114, VA-154,VA-155, VA-175, Point Naval ~ir Station, Skyraiders flown by Re-
VC-12 (VAW-12),VA-35, VF-54 (VA-54), VA-55, servists wore joint Navy and Marine markings.
VA-74,VA-75, VA94, VA-12A (VA-115), YA-~ 74, U.S. Marine Corps Skyraidersquadrons included:
VA-175, VC-l1 (VAW-l,1), V~,.15i VA-923 (VA- VMA,.121, Vf\1A-151 ;Vf\1fk-1, VMC-3 (lat~rVMJC-
125r,VA~7p2 '. 4§),:V.fk~~~0lM~!~~)'iYC! MA'.. -2.,_·. 1.· . VM,.AT...:·· VMA T.•. .·20.·...••·•.:VM•.. C...:.2.
............ :::< ••• , ••••. "-"'-,;,. ".,:::;,,:,. L ••: ""'.,, ' • • '•••.••

35 (VAAW,.35)' ( ,. 28;(VA:~~p5);VF7J~4(V A- JC:'2);'y - 51 ,V . . ,. ,.....'.'. 12, VM,LX':225, VMA-

196), VA-95, VA,.105, VA-104'; VA-16,VA-176, ~?4, VMA-33n, VMA-33?;and VMA-33.3;
VA-215, VA-216, VF-92, VC~4 (VFAW-4),VA-96,
VA-126, VA-52, VA-122, VA-144, VA-152, VA-
165, and VA-135. 15 (In Navy usage, the letter V
indicated 'squadron'; A indicated 'attack'; F was
'fighter', and so forth.)

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 51

The bUddy store mounted to the centerline rack as seen on
this AD-6 in October 1955. A trailing hose could be winched
out to refuel fleet jets who ran low. (Douglas photo via
Edward H. Heinemann)
A clean AD-6 shows off its many hardpoints and the demar-
cation between the white undersides and gray upper sur-
faces. Fuselage colors blended with a soft spray line; wing
leading edge was gray sharply masked to white below the
leading edge. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)

In May of 1958, an AD-6 of VA·35 refuels a McDonnell F3H-2N from VF-31 over the Mediterranean Sea. (Douglas photo via
Harry Gann)

52 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

When the last AD-7 rolled out in February 1957, Navy and Douglas officials gathered to honor the rugged Skyraider. Standing
in the center of the grouping in a dark business suit is Ed Heinemannn, designer of the AD. (Douglas photo courtesy Edward
H. Heinemann)

Notes
1. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft
Since 1911, pp. 295-296, 362-363.
2. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20
July 1982.
3. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft
Since 1911, pp. 186-188.
4. Ibid., pp. 305-309.
5. B.R. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, p. 19.
6. Ibid., p. 21.
7. Frederick A. Johnsen, Winged Majesty - The Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress
in War and Peace, Tacoma: Bomber Books 1980, pp. 31-33.
8. B.A. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, p. 24.
9. "AD-5 Converts from Bomberto Transport," Aviation Weekmagazine, Aug.
24, 1953, pp. 24-26.
10. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20
July 1982.
11. "AD-5 Converts from Bomber to transport," Aviation Week magazine,
Aug. 24, 1953, pp. 24-26.
12. "Standard Aircraft Characteristics - AD-7 Skyraider", Douglas Aircraft
Co., Inc., EI Segundo Division, 7 November 1955.
13. B.A. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, pp. 137-138.
14. British Aviation Research Group, A History of the Douglas Skyraider,
AEw'1,p.8.
15. B.R. Jackson, Douglas Skyraider, pp. 137-138.
16. Ibid.

Between the Wars: Skyraiders Enter the Navy 53

 Blue single-seat Skyraider came to grief on a carrier deck as crash team raced to protect pilot. (Campbell Archives)

54 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 CHAPTER III
Korea Proves the Skyraider
'J!\n undying hatred and a wound never to be cured. " Juvenal, Satires
~ e Korean peninsula is a series of folded granite and
limestone mountains jutting from China, and sharing
a brief border in the extreme northeast with Russia.
Only about 20 percent of the land is flat, and most of this is in
the southwest, where Korea's major rice crop flourishes.
Korean summers can be hot and muggy, with monsoon rains.
The winters are cold and dry, with crusty snow accenting
terraced rice paddies and frozen rivers.
Koreans are proud and industrious, and work their un-
even terrain to produce crops and industrial goods that gained
worldwide markets in the 1980s.
The evolution of a Korean state is marked by centuries of
invaders and foreign occupiers. The Chinese moved troops
down into the Korean peninsula in 109 B. C., remaining in force
nearly 400 years. A rising kingdom within Korea led to the
Shilla dynasty by 668 AD., during which a unified Korean
identity emerged. Mongol invaders in the 13th Century al-
lowed much of the Korean social structure to remain. The
seizure of power by General Yi Song-gye in 1392 established
the durable Yi Dynasty, which further entrenched the Korean
identity. In 1910, Japan established colonial rule over Korea
which lasted until American and Russian troops split the
country and defeated the Japanese in 1945.
The same post-World War II land-grabbing goals which
prompted the Soviet Union to blockade Berlin in 1948 in an
effort to take West Berlin led to the Soviet arming of North
Korea. The United Nations had plans for the reunification of
the two Koreas, separated by the 38th Parallel, but a Soviet-
backed attack from the North on June 25, 1950 made combat
the only alternative to a Soviet-dictated combining of the two
Koreas.
While the United States moved quickly to evacuate Ameri-
cans from threatened South Korea, the long-term American
combat commitment was made under the aegis of a United
Nations multi-national force sent to Korea to return the bor-
ders to their pre-1950 invasion position as a prelude to any
future peace.
More than four decades later, the 38th Parallel still marks
an armed truce between the communists to the north, and the
Republic of Korea (ROK) to the south. South Koreans, still
outraged at indignities suffered under Japanese rule, are
loathe to accommodate the North Koreans who attacked them
from the north. Even now, some pundits say the large Ameri-
can military presence in the south may be needed more to
. keep the South Koreans from zealously attacking the north,
instead of vice versa! After a resolution from the U.N. Security
Council asked member-nations to help the Republic of Korea
repel its invaders, American support began in earnest.
In 1950, some U.S. Navy planners argued about the
relative merits of prop-driven attack planes such as the AD,
and fast-moving jets. In a study ultimately published in August
1950 in Naval Aviation News, arguments in favor of prop-
driven planes like the Skyraider centered on loitering time over
target and its attendant morale value on friendly troops below,
as well as the short-field and rustic terrain advantages prop
planes held over their slow-to-accelerate jet brethren. Jet
backers claimed speed would replace loitering time as a virtue
to pinned ground troops, and argued that jets were more
accurate ordnance delivery platforms. 1
The heavy demands that were quickly placed on Navy
and Marine attack aviation beginning in the summer of 1950
over Korea gave no room for debate. The available Skyraiders
and Corsairs roared into combat, delivering bombs, rockets,
and gunfire while F9F Panther jets typically prowled overhead
in shifts, looking for air opposition.
Days after the United Nations resolution urged military
support of South Korea, U.S. Navy Skyraiders from the U.S.S.
Valley Forge were attacking communisttargets north of Seoul. 2
The "Happy Valley" was the Navy's lone aircraft carrier in the
region at the time. "Valley's" attack bombers hit airfields and
other transportation complexes around Pyongyang on July 3
and 4, before withdrawing to Okinawa to help guard against a
possible Chinese invasion of Formosa. Ultimately, other pa-
trol forces would watch the approaches to Formosa for a
communist Chinese invasion that was never launched. Mean-
while, Valley Forge steamed back to Korean waters in time to
provide close air support for the First Cavalry Division's
landing at Pohang on the east coast.
Opposition failed to materialize for the Pohang landings,
so Valley Forge's planes, including Skyraiders, turned to
coastal targets like the petroleum refinery at Wonsan, which
they devastated. The Valley Forge was the core ofTask Force
77, with Carrier Air Group Five aboard. During that first hectic
July, CAG Five's pilots began nicknaming parts of Korea after
the way enemy vehicles littered the roads. The stretch from
Seoul to Pyongtaek was known as "Wreckage Row," after
repeated workouts from VA-55's Skyraiders, which had been
the first ADs to enter combat in July.
Ground/air coordinators of strikes in Korea were amazed
when they first employed Skyraiders. "A single plane, the AD,
could make run after run on enemy installations and still have
enough load to handle all targets in the area," a Navy corre-
spondent wrote in 1950.3 The Skyraider legend was borne-
and it would endure for decades of service.
The Valley Forge was joined near Korea by the carriers
Boxer and Philippine Sea in time for the September 15, 1950,
amphibious invasion at Inchon. Ultimately, during the Korean
War, the Navy would operate Skyraiders in 12 attack squad-
rons, four composite squadrons, and two fighter squadrons of
the Seventh Fleet. The Marines put ashore two attack squad-
rons of Skyraiders, and one Marine composite reconnais-
sance squadron to bolster the combat effort. 4
Korea, Proves the Skyraider 55
 VA-195's famous kitchen-sink bomb, lugged to a Korean target by an AD. (McDonnell Douglas photo courtesy Harry Gann)
The amphibious invasion at Inchon was critically timed to
match the optimum height of the region's 30-foot tides. The
United Nations counter offensive at Inchon, in the rear of the
communists' newly-held territory, was intended as a thrust for
Seoul, a major transportation hub from which the communists
had to be routed. The U.N. plan placed the burden of air
support near Inchon upon the Navy's carriers, which now
included the smaller Sicily and Badoeng Strait in addition to
the three fast carriers Valley Forge, Boxer, and Philippine
Sea. The Royal Navy furnished HMS Triumph to round outthe
carrier force available for the Inchon landings. Boxer was
fresh into the fray after ferrying 145 U.S. Air Force F-51
Mustang fighters, 2,000 tons of Air Force supplies, and 1,000
military passengers to the Far East for combat.
On September 12, 1950, three days before the invasion,
aircraft from Valley Forge and Philippine Sea began striking in
the Inchon area. The hammering was taken up on the 14th by
planes from the Sicily and Badoeng Strait. When the Marines
landed at Wolmi-do and next Inchon itself, they found the
enemy's beach defenses decimated by CAG-Five's air strikes.
Overhead air support helped the Marines advance toward
Seoul, and retake Kimpo airfield in a couple days. By Septem-
ber 19, Marine squadrons from Japan arrived at Kimpo, and
began operational missions from there the following day.
56 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
The Skyraider excelled in the close air support role,
causing naval aviation's official house organ, Naval Aviation
News, to state in December 1952: "The load carrying ability,
the accuracy of dive bombing, and the ruggedness of the AD
Skyraider attack plane employed from carriers and by the
Marines has been the most devastating attack factor in the
Korean air war."
By October 1950, the U.N. counter-offensive was taking
effect, and optimists forecast an end to the war. But U.N.
forces soon engaged increasing numbers of communist Chi-
nese troops sent down to help North Korea's faltering con-
quest. The following month, in early November, plans were
made to stem the flow of Chinese troops into North Korea by
severing bridges across the Yalu River, which split Korea from
China. Navy dive bombers got the tasking on November 8,
with a frustrating caveat: They were forbidden to fly across the
Yalu into Chinese airspace. This precluded attacks down the
length ofthe bridges straddling the river, and also did not allow
the naval aviators the chance to silence antiaircraft guns on
the Chinese side of the river. The gunners in China had no
orders keeping them from firing across the river on the
American planes.
To compound the problem ofthe Yalu border bridges, the
North Koreans staged their newly-acquired Russian MiG-15
jet fighters in Manchurian sanctuaries, from which they could
defend the vital Yalu bridges. Classic Navy jet-and-prop
tactics were employed in the Yalu operation, as seen on
November 9, when Skyraiders were joined by other piston-
engine attackers - F4U Corsairs - for a bridge busting strike.
Fifty minutes after the Skyraiders and Corsairs cleared the
carriers, a flight of F9F Panther jet fighters launched for the
Yalu, followed by two more jet flights at 15-minute intervals.
Long before the slower Skyraiders and Corsairs reached the
target, they were overhauled by the first jet escort element
which flew top cover inbound to the target. The second jet
flight relieved the fuel-guzzling first jets over the target, and the
third and final jet flight escorted the prop planes out of the fray.
The jet escort relays worked - throughout November, none of
the bridge-busters was lost to MiGs as long as a fighter escort
was present. The Panther pilots, meanwhile, claimed three
MiG-15 kills, and several probabies for the loss of one F9F.5
Though hampered by airspace restrictions, the Skyraiders
and Corsairs dropped bridge spans, slowing Chinese ad-
vances. The hard freeze of the Korean winter put an end to the
bridge busting by late November, when the Yalu froze and
allowed the Chinese to cross it without benefit of bridges. 6
The Chinese hit Marine ground forces and forced an
evacuation from the Chosin reservoir in November. Carrier
planes covered the Marines' withdrawal. As the communists
took over airfields, carrier air, including Skyraiders, became
increasingly vital to United Nations operations in Korea. The
Chinese continued to push south below the 38th Parallel, but
the see-saw land war would reverse again, enabling Marine
Skyraiders to fly from Korean soil.
Interdiction became a way of life for the AD pilots, replac-
ing some of their close air support duties. Now, bridges, trains,
convoys, and any form of transportation used by the enemy
was targeted by the ADs.
But one of the most unusual air support strikes of the
Korean War was executed by torpedo-laden Skyraiders from
U.S.S. Princeton in May 1951. Their target was not shipping
- the torpedoes were destined to burst the floodgates of the
Hwachon reservoir in central eastern Korea. United Nations
forces had dug in behind the Pukhan River. The communists
sought to lower the depth of the river to facilitate crossing by
closing the Hwachon floodgates upstream.
The Skyraiders of Air Group 19, escorted by Corsairs,
carried the first torpedoes launched by Navy air since World
War II. The reservoir strike also was the debut of Skyraider
torpedo tactics in combat. One of the floodgates was de-
stroyed, another ripped open below water level, and other
parts of the 200-foot-high dam suffered damage.
The Able Dog fliers had to jink around ridges and settle
into a short run-in to the dam, barely reaching the proper
altitude above water when it was time to release their tin fish.
The exit was obstructed by high-tension lines and mountains,
forcing the Skyraiders into abrupt climbouts after dropping
their torpedoes into the fresh water reservoir. The torpedo
attack succeeded where earlier conventional bombing had
failed; the river was allowed to rise again.?
The communists' spring offensive of 1951 was defeated
by United Nations forces. As the year unfolded, carrier aircraft
were directed to serve U.N. needs in northeast Korea, which
coincidentally removed the ship-based Skyraiders from the
arena of air-to-air combat. Peacetime tests had shown the AD
to be a contender when matched with piston-engined fighters
like the F8F Bearcat. And years later, over Viet Nam, Navy
Skyraiders would twice make world news by downing North
Vietnamese MiG jet fighters. But Korea was not to be a
dogfight war for the Able Dog, except in isolated bouts with
night nuisance hecklers. The commander of Navy Task Force
77 employed his Skyraiders almost exclusively for interdiction
now. His fast-flying Panther jets and bomb-laden Skyraiders
and Corsairs adopted a routine for interdiction sorties that was
vital, but lacked razzle-dazzle. The task force commander
described the day-in, day-out interdiction campaign as "a day
to day routine where stamina replaces glamour and persis-
tence is pitted against oriental perseverance."B
During this period, persistent Skyraider fliers participated
in a six-strike effort to remove a North Korean rail bridge from
the war forever. A ravine of about a ninth of a mile separated
two tunnels near Songjin in the north. Lt. Cdr. Clement M.
Craig spied the railroad bridge while winging home from a
combat mission. That same day, Navy fliers damaged one of
the bridge's approaches. A cycle of bombing and rebuilding
began, with the Navy keenly interested because this span was
a choke point for all traffic moving into northeast Korea from
Manchuria. The day after the first strike, VA-195's Skyraiders,
led by the squadron commander, Lt. Cdr. Harold G. Carlson,
removed one bridge span and damaged two more. The site
became known as "Carlson's Canyon." Soon a second span
crashed to the bottom of the ravine after raid number three.
But about ten days into the game, communist builders had
made major repairs with temporary timbers. Strike four wiped
out the new construction, but within two weeks the bridge was
rebuilt and awaiting the laying of rails to accommodate
southbound communist war supplies. Strikes five and six were
executed by hefty blue Skyraiders loosing one-ton bombs,
which Navy correspondents said put an end to efforts to
rebuild the "Bouncing Bridge of Carlson's Canyon."9
Communist power plants on the Yalu River and nearby
attracted an armada of carrier air, shore-based Marines, and
Fifth Air Force planes on June 23 and 24, 1952. The first day's
strikes employed Skyraiders in a mixed bag of 223 carrier
birds and 77 ground-based Marine aircraft. The mix of blue
birds included Panthers and Corsairs in addition to the durable
ADs. On the 24th, the carriers launched about 323 planes
while the Marines mustered 60. The fliers wearing golden
wings took credit for a significant part of the muscle used to
actually bomb the power plants. 1o
The Joint Chiefs of Staff originally scheduled the
powerplant strikes for June 19, but slipped the beginning to
June 23 for the benefit of Vice-Admiral Robert P. Briscol,
commander of Naval Forces Far East. This allowed Briscol's
forces time to muster four fast carriers forthis major joint effort.
This marked the first time so many fast carriers were amassed
since the Hungnam evacuation operations of December 1950,
when carrier air support covered the evacuation of U.S.
Marines by keeping Skyraiders and Corsairs loitering at the
beck and call of the Marines as they withdrew down a
mountain road lined by the communists. ll
Korea Proves the Skyraider 57
 As late as June 19, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington
had changed the power plant attack plan by adding the
generating plant at Sui-ho to the target list. Sui-ho lay a scant
38 miles from a major MiG concentration at Antung. Vice
Admiral J.J. Clark, the Seventh Fleet's new commander,
wanted to get carrier air into the fray, and he flew to Seoul to
propose to the Air Force that the Navy ought to have a hand
in the Sui-ho strike. For the first time since the frustrating Yalu
bridge attacks of 1950, the Sui-ho mission put Navy air up MiG
Alley. Sui-ho was to be hit first by Navy and Air Force fighter-
bombers. With Sui-ho under attack, Fifth Air Force planes
would tackle the Chosin plants Three and Four and the Fusen
plants Three and Four. Meanwhile, Navy air would strike at
Fusen plants One and Two and four plants located at Kyosen.
That night, Air Force B-29s were to bomb Chosin plants One
and Two, using SHORAN navigational bombing equipment. 12
The morning of June 23, 1952, cloud cover rendered the
Yalu River powerplants obscured, and all crews stood down.
As the day wore on, the cloud cover shifted south, exposing
the targets and masking the approach and departure paths
the United Nations planes would use. The die was recast, and
at 1600 on June 23,35 Skyraiders from Boxer, Philippine Sea,
and Princeton rolled into their attacks on the works at Sui-ho.
Panthers flew flak suppression and Air Force Sabres watched
for MiGs. Inexplicably, the MiGs did not attack, and in fact an
estimated 160 communist planes fled to Manchuria, probably
in fear of airfield attacks by the American force. 13
While Sui-ho burned, Fifth Air Force F-51 Mustang fight-
ers, sturdy prop-driven retreads from World War II, attacked
Fusen Three and Four. Carrier-based Skyraiders joined Cor-
sairs and Panthers in hitting Fusen One and Two, as well as
the Kyosen four-plant system. Returning Skyraider pilots said
the flak at Sui-ho was admirably suppressed by the F9F jets,
allowing the Able Dogs a clear shot with an aggregate of 90
tons of bombs. As the Skyraiders slipped back into cloud cover
after the attack, 79 F-84 Thunderjets and 45 F-80 Shooting
Stars from the Air Force took their turn over Sui-ho. The
Kyosen raid was a Corsair show, with only six ADs in the
gaggle.
Fusen One and Two reeled under the firepower of about
90 Navy planes, including a contingent of Skyraiders. Fliers
observed one power house cave in, and watched the demo-
lition of a transformer yard. The next day, the Navy ignored the
useless rubble at Sui-ho, and sent bombers against Kyosen
and Fusen. From Princeton, Skyraiders followed the flak-
killing Panthers over Fusen. The ADs dumped five-thousand-
pound bomb loads here, proving themselves again without
equal in the dive bombing role. 14
The Air Force continued hammering the power plants two
more days. When it was over, Navy sources said seven of the
nine targeted plants were destroyed, and the other two were
nearly useless. The shared tasking between Navy and Air
Force units worked well. Lt. Gen. Glen E. Barcus, Fifth Air
Force commander, sent a message to Admiral Clark at
Seventh Fleet, saying, "My hat's off to the Navy for a terrific
job. We must get together again sometime."15
Air planners of the decisive powerplant raids were cha-
grined when members of Parliament in England criticized the
attacks as provocative, and U.S. congressmen raised ques-
58 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
tions over the timing of the attacks. This lack of United Nations
solidarity has been viewed by Air Force historians as blunting
the overall effect the otherwise successful strikes had on the
will of the communists. 16
The Navy pioneered remotely-controlled bombs during
World War II, ranging from explosives-laden PB4Y-1 libera-
tors like the one which took Joseph Kennedy to his death in
Europe, to Bat glide bombs carried under the wings of PB4Y-
2B variants of the Privateer patrol bomber. A more successful
marriage of explosives and remote-control electronics was
the direction of F6F-5K Hellcat drones by AD-4Q Skyraiders
during the Korean War.
On August 28, 1952, the Navy's Guided Missile Unit 90,
aboard U.S.S. Boxer, unleashed drone Hellcats for the first
time in combat. 1? As the unmanned F6F, toting a 2,000-pound
bomb, roared down Boxer's lefthand catapult, an AD-4Q
already launched on the right side shepherded the drone by
means of a television guidance system. A second Skyraider
mother ship on deck guided the Hellcat through takeoff until
the airborne AD-4 took control. Droning was used when
targets were too heavily defended by the communists to
permit a manned attack. In the stand-off Skyraider, the drone
operator, watched a television image ofthe Hellcat's "view" as
he guided the F6F flying bomb on its final combat sortie. The
spacious AD-4Q fuselage accommodated the drone-direction
equipment and operator aft of the pilot. A half-dozen drone
Hellcat attacks were controlled by Skyraiders during this
Korean War operation.
Whether flying nameless interdiction sorties or spectacu-
lar powerplant attacks, the blue Skyraiders over Korea proved
they were more than a flash in the pan. What the Corsair did
well with bombs, the AD did better. Where the fast-flying jets
were only secondarily suited to bombing, the Skyraider was
bred for the task. Combat over Korea proved a real need
existed in the 1950s for Ed Heinemann's AD, and production
continued with newer models.
As new Skyraiders rolled off the line back home, the
United Nations air forces began a new campaign of sustained
pressure on the communists in October 1952. The Navy's
Task Force 77 launched "Cherokee" strikes - mass fighter-
bomber strikes against enemy troops and supply dumps near
the fighting arena. The task force typically launched eight
Skyraiders, eight Corsairs, and up to a dozen Panther jets on
a Cherokee strike. This firepower, including the Skyraider's
incredible capacity for repeated bomb runs, stood a good
chance of neutralizing the target. In its own fashion, the Fifth
Air Force also highlighted juicy targets worthy of mass at-
tacks. 18
On the ground, the Eighth Army designated a bomb line
behind which no U.N. air strikes could be targeted without
positive control by an airborne controller or a tactical air
controller. The intent was to spare friendly casualties from
wayward bombs, but the bomb line sometimes extended as
far as 10,000 meters in front of Eighth Army lines. To honor the
bomb line meant rounding up controllers for on-scene strike
work. This procedure robbed the Cherokee strikes of the
lightning spontaneity necessary to get the most effect from
Cherokee's massed firepower. 19
Shrapnel riddled the fuselage of this Navy Skyraider over Korea, but failed to stop the plane. (McDonnell Douglas photo
courtesy Harry Gann)
Fifth Air Force went to bat, and persuaded Eighth Army to
shorten the bomb line to about 3,000 meters out from friendly
outposts. Another 25 miles out (approximately) an imaginary
line divided general support missions from interdiction sorties.
This gave the Cherokee fliers a field day in the area between
3,000 and about 20,000 meters ahead of the Eighth Army's
positions. Cherokee foretold of future ground support combat
in Vietnam, where again Army commanders would have, at
times anyway, a surfeit of airpower at their disposal. Taking
hits and spreading ordnance with a quickness that chilled the
enemy, the armored ADs contributed mightily to the success
of Cherokee operations. Air Force scholars said Cherokee
strikes seemed to take a serious morale toll of the commu-
nists. Some Eighth Army officers called Cherokee "airpower's
most potent contribution" to the condition of static lines of
combat in Korea. 2o
Among the Marines' contributions to Korean combat was
the placement of VMA-121 ,the Wolfraiders, with AD-3s on the
Korean peninsula. As part of Marine Air Group (MAG) 12, the
AD-3s bombed in concert with F4U and special attack AU-1
Corsairs flown by VMA 212 and 323. These ground-based
squadrons were the closest Marine units to the scene of battle,
and pilots, armorers, and mechanics sometimes carried small
arms and wore steel pots as they traveled out to their Skyraiders,
in acknowledgment of the potential for guerilla attacks, Navy
journalists wrote. Col. Robert E. Galer, a World War II ace who
downed 13 Japanese planes, commanded MAG 12. The
group's seven-day-a-week war was fought from a former
Japanese fighter base, constructed during the Second World
War when the Japanese feared American air attacks on their
occupied Korea. But runways and aprons sufficient to support
lightweight Zero fighters could not handle heavy, bomb-laden
ADs, so U.S. Army engineers beefed up the field for Skyraider
and ground-attack Corsair operations. 21
Local Korean labor earned as much as a dollar a day
assembling bombs which Marine ordnancemen loaded under
the Skyraiders and Corsairs for the next day's sorties. The
Wolfraiders' ADs were under the operational control of Fifth
Air Force. They dropped bombs to support Army troops and
Korean units as well as ground-pounding leathernecks. As the
war progressed into 1952, the Marines found themselves
more frequently flying pre-briefed strikes, a departure from the
free-wheeling nature of close-air support where they had
loitered in their ADs over friendly troops, just waiting for a call
Korea Proves the Skyraider 59
to attack a hot spot. A Navy journalist put it this way: "...Under
the present set-up, the close air support is not quite so close
as it used to be."22
"Close" or not, the Marines added to the combat log of the
Skyraiders over Korea. Chains of command which delayed
response time were not the making of the Marines who
manned the blue ADs - when called, the flying leathernecks
exploited their Skyraiders' abilities to punch out enemy bun-
kers, guns, or troop concentrations. The Wolfraiders used the
huge capacity of their Skyraiders to surpass a Corsair record
for highest bomb tonnage dropped by a squadron in a single
day. Previously, "Deathrattler" Marines in Corsairs set the
mark at 218,000 pounds of bombs. Without disclosing the
Wolfraiders' new high tonnage mark, possibly as a bow to
wartime censors, Naval journalists said the ADs ofthe ground-
based VMA-121 carried 2,OOO-pounders to beat the old Cor-
sair tally. 23
Toward the end of combat in the first half of 1953, Marine
Air Wing One put a pair of ADs, with radar and an operator for
the set in the planes' bellies, at a forward base where North
Korean "Bedcheck Charlie" nuisance flights disrupted the
nocturnal peace. The radar, intended as a bombing aid, was
adapted for night stalking. The quarry were slow-flying North
Korean PO-2 aircraft which harassed the United Nations
positions. Radar-equipped jet interceptors were at a loss to
get down with the slow PO-2s in the darkness. Majors Robert
H. Mitchell and George H. Linnemeier piloted the Marine ADs
assigned to this night combat air patrol. The Skyraider could
hang in at 90 knots to do battle with the annoying PO-2, but the
intercept had to be made in darkness, at minimum altitude,
over terrain which jutted up several thousand feet abruptly.
The radar operator, like his World War II counterpart in Army
Air Forces P-61 Black Widow night fighters, shared the night
shift by mapping the terrain with radar while tracking Bedcheck
Charlie. Major Linnemeier killed a PO-2 with 20-millimeter
cannon fire, but found his glossy sea blue AD targeted by
communist AA gunners in what may have been a trap.
Linnemeier escaped the flak and returned home victorious.
The next night was Robert Mitchell's date to intercept Charlie.
Mitchell claimed hits on his bogey, but he had to break off the
attack when the big Skyraider overhauled the communist
plane too fast. 24
It is fitting that Marines, legendary for possessing the grit
and ingenuity to bulldoze obstacles, turned Skyraiders into
night fighters over Korea. Marine units working the AD in
Korea included VMA-121 at K-3 beginning in the fall of 1951,
flying AD-3s; VMA-251 at K-6 in June and July 1953, flying
AD-3s; and VMC-1, based at K-16, flying AD-2Qs and AD-
3Ns.
Navy squadron VC-35 put successive Skyraider night
attack teams to sea with Task Force 77 for 34 months of
operations. Though VC-35 was mainly an anti-submarine
unit, its radar-equipped ADs were suited to nocturnal heckling
along communist supply lines. The pilot and two radar opera-
tors scanned roads and railways for signs of activity. A sighting
could bring a brilliant burst of light from a flare dropped by the
Skyraider. If a target presented itself under the canopy of the
flare, the Able Dog roared in for battle. The plan was to deny
60 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
the communists the advantage of darkness for moving war
supplies to the front.
In spite of land battle reverses early in the fighting, the
Korean air war favored the United Nations fliers. To be sure,
flak and weather were mortal foes, and MiGs challenged
especially the Air Force, but a tongue-in-cheek cockiness
peNaded Naval air war stories relayed home by correspon-
dents. These anecdotes flesh out the Skyraider's Korean War
diary:
In the first months of combat in 1950, VA-55 AD-4 pilots
took ribbing from jet pilots aboard their carrier who snickered
at the propeller-driven dive bombers. The Skyraider drivers
took pride in the fact they had license to do what any red-
blooded fighter pilot longs for - the ADs could "flat hat" at
treetop level in search of targets, while the jets milled over-
head, or came down for specific attacks. The AD pilots rubbed
it in with an Op Order saying "Window-peeking is hereby
authorized." Honors of "chief peeker" went to VA-55's Lt. Bud
Gallagher. On one exhilarating "flat hat" sortie, Ensign "Atomic"
Aldrich of VA-55 obseNed two trees doing the impossible -
moving closer together on a railroad track. A quick squirt of 20-
millimeter fire from the wings of Aldrich's Skyraider knocked
out a handcar loaded with eight enemy soldiers. 25
During this early period, a VA-55 pilot experienced the
effect of his own 1,OOO-pound general-purpose bombs. He
was east of Seoul in 1950. making his third run on a commu-
nist-held railroad bridge. As he pulled out from the bomb run,
the sound and impact of an explosion shook him and heeled
his blue AD-4 into a steep bank. Recovering, the flier found he
had no aileron response and scant hydraulic pressure. limp-
ing back to his carrier, the Skyraider pilot applied rudder to
control the plane's wings-level attitude. The LSO waved him
off once, but the ADA plunked down in a good landing next
time around. Two chunks of shrapnel, products of the
Skyraider's own wrath, had embedded themselves in the AD-
4. One fragment damaged hydraulic lines in the port stub wing;
the other punched through the bottom of the fuselage, cutting
hydraulics, electrical wiring, and ruining aileron controls be-
fore spending its energy in the pilot's parachute pack. 26
Ensign R. Sanders of VA-65 was piloting his blue AD-4 on
September 17, 1950, a few miles southeast of Seoul when
small arms fire dropped his Skyraider's oil pressure to zero.
Sanders scrambled for altitude, but the Skyraider's radial
engine gave up without oil at 3,000 feet. Between rugged
terrain and unacceptable rice paddies, only a dirt road prom-
ised much in the form of a place to park the silent Skyraider.
Sanders popped the plane's three fuselage-mounted dive
brakes. His path was leading him to a stout tree; to clear the
tree would mean missing the road on this deadstick one-time-
only approach. So Sanders ploughed into the thick tree trunk
with his wing root, touching down on the dirt road at 135 knots.
The extended belly dive brake vaulted the skidding Skyraider
onto its nose until the brake ripped free. The plane dragged
through the dirt another 100 feet before nosing up, and rocking
back to a halt. Shaken but mobile, Ensign Sanders walked
away from the smashed Skyraider, noting that the plane's
radio continued to broadcast its scratchy litany as the plane lay
wrecked in the dirt. 27
 The Skyraider pilots looked for incongruities on the ground,
which sometimes gave away communist camouflage. In 1951 ,
Ensign Louis Page took his Skyraider from the Philippine Sea
for a sortie along the west coastline of Korea. Page saw a
haystack, neatly placed in the middle of a railroad yard.
"Haystack and railroad yards just don't go together," Page
later recounted. So he pushed his AD into a strafing run and
pumped 20-millimeter into the hay. A resounding explosion
showed there was much more than a needle hiding in this
haystack. With the aggressive pride of a fighter, Page was
quoted as saying, "It was a wonderful day. Everything I shot
at burned."28
Ice glazed the deck of the Valley Forge on a frigid early
morning in February 1952 when Lt. Cdr. William "Buck" (of
course!) Rogers gunned his AD-3 "Guppy" radar bird and
braced for the expected jolt of a catapult launch into the
darkness. With no help from the still-cocked catapult, the
Skyraider was sliding down the deck toward the carrier's bow.
Rogers brought back the throttle and tapped the brakes, but
the icy deck offered no resistance. The pilot jammed full power
The Marines stayed on after the Korean truce. This AD-3 bought some trouble at airfield K·6 in August 1954, while assigned to
Marine attack squadron VMA-121. (Photo courtesy Dick Berry via Dave Forrest)
on and alerted his two radar operators for a ditching. The bulky
AD with its large, drag-producing belly radome, dipped be-
neath the Valley Forge's bow as pilot Rogers raised landing
gear and nudged back on the stick. The radome smacked the
waves smartly, and the AD careened back into the air in a
shower of sea spray. Rogers coolly nursed the Guppy at
wave-top height as flying speed increased. Back on deck,
Rogers and electronics men Donald Backofen and Raymond
Frausto checked out impact damage to their Skyraider's
radome. A faulty holdback ring on the catapult had allowed the
Skyraider to skid forward when Rogers first throttled up. As
with the Patuxent River incident where a Skyraider Guppy
boated to shore on its belly radome, this bulbous housing
proved amazingly seaworthy.29
Also in 1952 aboard the "Happy Valley," eight ensign
pilots found a novel way to mark their passage to lieutenant,
junior grade. They orchestrated an all-ensign air strike, flying
their VF-194 Skyraiders under the lead of one of their num ber
they had picked. The raid was pulled off a day before they all
were scheduled for promotion. Each of the eight Skyraiders
Korea Proves the Skyraider 61
was loaded with 4,000 pounds of bombs which the ensigns
delivered to bridges, railroads, and other targets. Charles
Brown led the raid, backed up by Robert Miller, Frank Melton,
Dean Hofferth, Joe Akagi, Joe Molnar, Ken Wittman, and Stan
Broughton. 30
Lt. Cmdr. Lynn DuTemple was pulling away from his
fourth pass on a rail bridge in Hamhung when the canopy of
his AD crystallized in a fractured pattern. He thought it was
small-arms fire, and trotted the damaged VA-195 asset back
to the Princeton. When he entered the pattern and made
appropriate prop and throttle adjustments, the hollow
Aeroproducts propeller howled so loudly the LSOs on the
deck could hear it. When the prop ticked to a halt, one blade
bore a 37-millimeter AA hole as big as a man's hand. 31 A photo
of lucky DuTemple and the blade later was used by
Aeroproducts in advertisements touting the toughness oftheir
propellers.
Another Princeton AD pilot in 1952 found himself inverted
over Wonsan after anti-aircraft fire exploded 20-millimeter
ammo in the wing ammunition cans of his plane. Lt. Og) Bill
Buttlar was banking away from an enemy train at 400 knots
when the explosions in his wing cranked the Skyraider over on
its back. Buttlar regained control. and made an emergency
landing. 32
After massive hydroelectric powerplant strikes in 1952, Lt.
Cdr. M.K. Dennis of VA-195 made the age-old off-hand
comment, "We dropped everything on them but the kitchen
sink." Navy wags were not going to let this pass - not as long
as the hefty, bomb-hauling Skyraiders of VA-195 were avail-
able. Aviation mechanics R.B. Deland and H.J. Burdett picked
up Dennis' comment, and worked a fix with Princeton's
maintenance people to permit a genuine sink, complete with
S-trap drain pipe, to be lashed to a 1,OOO-pound bomb. 33
Nay-sayers predicted the contraption could not get air-
borne, or that the blocky sink would create problems during
Clean AD-3 (BuAer No. 122799) of VA·95 at Oakland, California. October 17, 1953. (Photo by William T. Larkins)
62 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
the bombing dive. Lt. Og) Carl B. Austin took the apparatus
under his AD for a sortie over North Korea's capital city of
Pyongyang. Lieutenant Austin said flak over the capital city
was so intense he pondered whether he could get in close
enough to drop the sink bomb. He did deliver the ordnance,
making it clear the communist war effort was going down the
drain. 34
Another Princeton Skyraider driver, Lt. Og) Jack Everling,
neared his target at Kowan in 1952 when something struck his
AD with enough force to knock the control stick from his grip.
As this happened, the Skyraider's clock cover glass splin-
tered. spraying shards inside the cockpit. Everling climbed
and leveled off to assess the trouble. His wingman followed,
and radioed to Everling the news that his plane's left elevator
had a huge hole in it. Reports later said the gap was large
enough for a man to crawl through. Everling found he could
apply some stick back pressure and use trim to keep his AD
level as he motored back to the deck of the Princeton.
Following a safe landing, the Skyraider was assessed for
damage. More than 200 shrapnel holes were counted. The
blast which tore open the elevator produced enough concus-
sion to pop a rivet from the armor plate behind his seat. This
missile rivet struck the clock and sent glass flying. Butthe AD's
structural integrity brought it and its pilot home safely.35
The night Skyraiders which used radar to help find and
destroy communist road traffic sometim~s were nicknamed
"Roadrunners". Lt. Dawn D. Tanner's previous profession of
California Highway Patrolman suggested another patch for
his Skyraider squadron off the Korean coast. In a shield
reminiscent of the California patrol logo, these nocturnal
Skyraiderfliers from the Princeton wryly called themselves the
Korean Highway PatroL They no doubt caused more acci-
dents in North Korea than their California police counterparts
could have administered aid to back home. 36
Notes
1. "Close Air Support With Jets", Naval Aviation News, August 1950,
pp.9-11.
2. Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, United States Navy Aircraft
Since 1911, London: Putnam, 1976.
3. "Carrier War Off Korea", Naval Aviation News, December 1950, p. 12.
4. Data provided by aviation historian Rene J. Francillon.
5. "Naval Air War", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, pp. 4-5
6. Ibid.
7. "First Torpedo Attack", Naval Aviation News, July 1951.
8. "Naval Air War", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 7.
9. "Navy Wrecks Korea's 'Bouncing Bridge"', Naval Aviation News, February
1952, p. 13.
10. "Naval Air War", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 7.
11. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953,
Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 482-489.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. "Navy Hits Korean Power Plants", Naval Aviation News, August 1952,
p.16.
15. Ibid.
16. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953,
Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 482-489.
17. Data provided by aviation historian Rene J. Francillon.
18. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953,
Washington: Office of Air Force History, 1983, pp. 618-619.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. "Land-Based Marine Air Hammers Reds", Naval Aviation News, Septem-
ber 1952, pp. 10-11.
22. Ibid.
23. "Record Smashers", Naval Aviation News, February 1953, p. 9.
24. "AD Night Interceptor", Naval Aviation News, October 1953, p. 6.
25. "Legalized Flat-hatters", Naval Aviation News, November 1950.
26. "Pilot Collects Own Bomb", Naval Aviation News, December 1950.
27. "Landing the Hard Way", Naval Aviation News, January 1951.
28. "Railroad Haymaker", Naval Aviation News, June 1951.
29. "Grunt and Groan", Naval Aviation News, April 1952.
30. "All-Ensign Air Strike", Naval Aviation News, August 1952, p. 13.
31. "The Whistler", Naval Aviation News, September 1952, p. 19.
32. "Shoots Himself', Naval Aviation News, September 1952, p. 19.
33. "Including a Sink", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 13.
34. Ibid.
35. "Grateful Pilot", Naval Aviation News, December 1952, p. 13.
36. "Skyraider Patrolman", Naval Aviation News, August 1953, p. 10.
Korea Proves the Skyraider 63
64 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
 CHAPTER IV
Cold-War Demands
"He who did well in war just earns the right to begin doing well in peace. " Robert Browning, Luria

A fter Korea, no doubt existed aboutthe Skyraider's A fleet pilot, early for his practice, loosed a 500-pound
utility as a ruggedly reliable dive bomber. Kept in bomb, oblivious to the red, yellow and gray Skyraider. "You
production for the peacetime, post-Korean War could hear it coming, just like in the movies! I swore at that pilot
Navy, the boxy multi-place AD-5s were superseded by im- for hours." The hefty Skyraider was skidded sideways by the
proved single-seaters - AD-6s and AD-7s - which would see blast, but emerged from the range none the worse for wear.
combat in southeast Asia 10 years later. 1 "It wasn't a very accurate way to judge, I'll tell you that. It
Publicists were fond of pointing out the Skyraider's ability was kind of seat-of-the-pants," Morrison said.
to carry a heavier bomb load than a World War II Boeing B-17 On target sleeve runs, the deployment of the sleeve well
Flying Fortress four engine bomber. The Navy harnessed the behind the AD on a steel cable was hardly noticed by the crew.
Skyraider to carry atomic weapons in view of the AD's With nearly 3,000 horsepower, "the weight was not a factor
Herculean qualities. when you had that many ponies pulling you," Morrison re-
When the United States used small Pacific atolls like membered. Comparing notes, the VU-1 crews agreed de-
Kwajalein and Eniwetok for atmospheric testing of atomic stroyers were the least likely to hit the target sleeve, and on
weapons, the planes dropping these cataclysmically hot loads occasion even gave the AD a run for its money with their AA
included Douglas Skyraiders. 2 Later, during the time when fire. Much more stable in the water were fleet oilers, whose
U.S. Navy Skyraiders participated in the Vietnam war through gunners enjoyed a high percentage of hits on the sleeves
20 February 1968, A-1s sometimes sat cocked on a carrier towed by the ADs of VU-1. 4
catapult, armed with nukes which never were unleashed. 3 If On 23 July 1954, communist Chinese fighters doggedly
sitting nuclear alert was the penultimate in responsibility and attacked a commercial DC-4 transport, firing at the Douglas
importance for some Skyraider pilots, other AD crews earned airliner until it crashed into the sea near Hainan. World powers
, their pay in the less prestigious but sometimes dangerous job tensed as they would nearly 30 years later when Russian jets
of target towing. would down a Korean 747 airliner north of Japan. The USS
Navy Utility Squadron One (VU-1) employed a mixed bag Philippine Sea, simmering in the heat of July, was near
of aircraft at NAS Barber's Point, Hawaii in the early 1960s for enough to launch patrols to search for survivors of the DC-4
a variety of target duties. Drone F9F Panther jets of Korean shootdown.
War vintage, North American FJ-3 Fury jets, F8U Crusaders, Philippine Sea's aircrews included a mixture of combat
TV-2 Shooting Stars, Piasecki HUP-2 helicopters and brightly- veterans and new fliers who were more familiar with peace-
painted AD-5 Skyraiders executed their tasks for the squad- time flying-hour reductions than they were with live fire and
ron. combat turns. For several days, they flew their F9F-6 Cou-
The AD-5s had dark gray fuselages highlighted with gars, F4U-4 Corsairs, AD-4Ns and AD-4W "Guppy" radar
yellow and red wings for high visibility. The Skyraiders towed Skyraiders in search of evidence of the downed airliner. 5 On
target buckets for anti-aircraft gunners in the fleet, and scored 26 July, 15 AD-4s and two Corsairs searched for the crash and
bomb strikes from about 500 feet off the deck "and not very far provided protection to one AD-4W in their midst for relaying
out" from the target area, recalled former Aviation Machinist's communications back to ship. Eleven of the Able Dogs were
Mate Houston Morrison. Morrison frequently was tapped for stationed in three groups, at altitudes of 500,3,000, and 5,000
right-seat duty in the big AD-5s. His job consisted of "radio and feet. Near the north end of Hainan, while the American fliers
eyeballs," he explained. Scoring bomb strikes near Molokai warily honored Chinese claims to a 12-mile territorial limit, two
for fleet units held its own brand of excitement for the AD unidentified aircraft initiated a firing pass on the AD-4s. The
crews. "One morning we damn near got it," Houston ex- Skyraider pilots knew what to do, and quickly carried the fight
plained. Making an inspection run overthe target during a time back to their attackers. The attacking aircraft were identified
period when the range was supposed to be safe from activity, as Soviet-made Lavochkin La-7 single-engine fighters. These
Morrison soon was startled by the fact he could hear a World War II holdovers were said to be capable of exceeding
screaming noise above the roar of the AD's big R-3350 400 miles an hour. Their closely-cowled radial engines and
engine. underslung belly-mounted oil coolers occasionally caused the
La-7s to be mistaken for P-51 Mustangs. But the rounded
wingtips and tail of the La-7 left its own signature.
The pilots of these two camouflaged La-7s near Hainan
OPPOSITE: Folded wings reveal six hardpoints beneath each were presumed to be Chinese. Their attack on U.S. Navy
wing of these blue AD-5s of VC-33. Cowling over nose was
painted anti-glare flat black to reduce the reflection of the Skyraiders would prove as costly to them as the Libyan Sukhoi
glossy sea blue in front of the pilot. (McDonnell Douglas attack on U.S. Navy F-14s in similar circumstances more than
photo courtesy Harry Gann) a quarter century later. The first La-7 made his pass only to find

Cold-War Demands 65
The end of Navy blues is evident in this mid-1950s portrait of two VC-33 AD-5s warming up for launch. (McDonnell Douglas
photo courtesy Harry Gann)

Classic weekend warriors - AD-4Bs of NAS Atlanta show off white paint, Dayglo orange markings, and black exhaust paths,
common in the late 1950s and early 1960s. (Photo courtesy Frank Price via Dave Forrest)

66 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

Above: AD-5Q at Moffett Field April 29, 1961. Below: A practice nuclear store rides the centerline of this AD-6 of VA-196, May
16,1959. (Both photos by William T. Larkins)
himself on the receiving end of 20-millimeter fire from an AD-
4. The Lavochkin summarily struck the water. The second La-
7 enjoyed a temporary reprieve as an excited AD pilot forgot
to arm his cannons. A brace of Skyraiders and Corsairs closed
on the lone Lavochkin. Four Skyraiders and one Corsair
shared in the subsequent kill. Anticipating international inquiry
into the peacetime combat off the China coast, the AD and
F4U fliers actually figured as an example in international law
cases dealing with the right to overfly an attacker's territory if
in hot pursuitofthe attacker. In fact, a U.S. Navy veteran of the
engagement recalled, the fight never left international skies. 6
The Cold War 1950s provided the framework for U.S
Skyraider operations of that era. From nuclear weapons
delivery to antisubmarine patrols to carrier onboard delivery
(COD), the threat was perceived to be Soviet, and possibly
Chinese, hostilities. In this setting, some nuances of Skyraider
operations helped define the character of Ed Heinemann's
Able Dog and the men who flew it.
Maintenance officers cringed when their beloved carrier-
based ADs took part in Pinwheel operations. Pinwheel in-
Cold-War Demands 67
 EA-1F of VAW-13 at NAS San Diego, January 28,1967. (Photo by William T. Larkins)

This AD-4 sported antennae, including probably an AT-53 blade angling down and back from lower fuselage. (U.S. Navy photo
via Don Keller)

68 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

volved lashing Skyraiders to the carrier deck, and rewing their Notes
powerful R-3350 engines to maneuver the carrier in port in 1. The French rebuffed U.S. efforts to get back surplus French AD-4s for use
in Viet Nam, placing a heavy load on the available AD-5s, -6s, and -7s in
tight places. But it worked. American stocks.
In cities like Seattle, Washington, Naval Air Reserve units 2. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Edward H. Heinemann, 20
sometimes shared their aircraft with reserve Marine aviators July 1982.
3. Ibid.
in the 1950s and early 1960s. Seattle's Sand Point Naval Air 4. Interview between Frederick A. Johnsen and Houston Morrison, July 1982.
Station was a choice close-in flying field long coveted by non- 5. Rosario Rausa, Skyraider - The Douglas A-1 "Flying Dump Truck",
aviation users who eventually succeeded in carving it into a Annapolis: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1982,
pp. 101-105.
park. Sand Point NAS hosted boxy AD-5s in gray and Dayglo 6. Ibid.
orange paint, bearing the dual legends "Navy" and "Marines" 7. Information provided by aviation historian Rene J. Francillon.
on their fuselage sides. Some of the Marine Corps reservists
couldn't help but exercise the combat techniques they had
honed as regulars in years gone by. Ships in Puget Sound
were considered fair game for mock dive bombing runs. But
the plum was the Aurora Bridge carrying Highway 99 over a
ship canal near Lake Union. It was a high bridge with clear
spans large enough to allow a Skyraider to pass. And right
through this urban Seattle neighborhood a reserve Leatherneck
took his AD-5, for all the usual reasons ...
And in early 1954, another Marine, MajorWarren Schoeder,
strapped into a blue AD-2 at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)
EI Toro, California and showed how 250-gallon napalm tanks
could be converted to carry fire retardant instead. 7 This forest-
fire-battling Skyraider did not become a firefighting tool, how-
ever. Surplus aircraft, in which permanent tanks with doors
could be mounted, became the preferred firebombers, replac-
ing the idea of dropping a tank which would burst on impact.

Cold-War Demands 69
Gaggle of four Royal Navy Skyraiders shows two placements for fuselage roundel/number combination. (Douglas photo via
Harry Gann)

70 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 CHAPTER V
Able Dogs in Foreign Service
"My country is the world, and my religion is to do good. " Thomas Paine, Rights of Man
I t is axiomatic that an aircraft as versatile, rugged, and
long-lived as the Douglas Skyraider will serve more users
than it$ original customer. From Scandinavia to the
tropics, a variety of Skyraiders were welcomed into the air
services of at least eight countries.
Long before America's Military Assistance Program (MAP)
began supplying A-1 s to South Vietnam, the British took
delivery of 50 AD-4W radar birds beginning in November
1951. The AD-4W provided early-warning radar capability to
the fleet at sea. Its origins were traceable to the 1944 'Cadillac
Project' at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Mount
Cadillac facility, where first a TBM was fitted with a large early-
warning radar as an intended response to aggressive Japa-
nese kamikaze attacks. 1 The Cadillac Project also converted
four-engine Boeing B-17Gs as PB-1Ws for Navy use, but
neither the radar-fitted TBMs nor the PB-1Ws saw combat
before World War II ended in 1945.
The AD-4W improved on earlier radar-equipped Skyraiders
by housing new APS-20A radar in its belly fairing, and by using
an autopilot, new instrument panel, and redesigned
windscreen. Under provisions of the Mutual Defense Aid
Program (MDAP) 50 AD-4Ws were earmarked for use by
Great Britain's Royal Navy. Twenty were brand-new planes
from the U.S. Navy's production run atthe Douglas EI Segundo
plant, while the other 30 Skyraiders for Britain were taken out
of the U.S. Navy's inventory.2
The new British Skyraiders underwent modernization at
NAS Quonset Point, Rhode Island, or NAS Alameda, Califor-
nia, prior to ferry flights to NAS Norfolk, Virginia, where radar
Skyraiders received electronic equipment. From Norfolk, the
British Skyraiders were shipped to Glasgow, Scotland.
In British service, the AD-4Ws were redesignated AEW.1 s.
They wore a glossy sea blue finish, with large Royal Navy
roundels on the fuselage sides; the undersides of both wings
near the tips; and the top surfaces of both wings, inboard even
with the aileron trim tabs. Individual aircraft codes and other
lettering were white with few exceptions. During the Suez
crisis in 1956, AEW.1 s which intervened wore black-and-
yellow invasion stripes around the wings and fuselage. These
invasion markings, also applied to participating French
Aeronavale F4U-7s in the Suez operations, were for the
benefit of Anglo-French troops which were landed in an effort
to block fighting between Israel and Egypt. The stripes gave
the ground-pounders a quick means of verifying whether
aircraft overhead were friendly when they were still too distant
for regular markings to be seen c1early.3
Royal Navy 778 Squadron took the first four Skyraider
AEW.1 aircraft in November 1951. The British Skyraiders
bypassed the usually long-winded carrier suitability trials,
since this aircraft type was already well accepted in U.S. Navy
shipboard service. The first AEW.1 s were checked at
Farnborough for compatibility with British arrestor systems
and catapults. It became 778 Squadron's responsibility to
evaluate the Skyraider's American electronics in the Royal
Navy operating regime. The Royal Navy envisioned a very
active use of the AEW.1 s' radar, enabling these Skyraiders to
control carrier air patrols and direct strike aircraft, as well as
detect surface ships at great distances. 4
In July 1952, the evaluation role of 778 Squadron changed
as the squadron was redesignated a front-line squadron, No.
849 Squadron. In November 1952, 849 Squadron's A Flight
was formed, borrowing Headquarters Flight Skyraiders since
the first four AEW.1 s to arrive in Great Britain were still the only
Royal Navy Skyraiders on hand. The ship HMS Perseus
delivered 13 more AEW.1 s on the 19th of February, 1953,
followed a little over a month later by another shipment of
Skyraiders. A Flight and B Flight equipped themselves with
aircraft, with C Flight forming early in June. By December, D
Flight and E Flight were formed. These were sufficient to allow
one flight for each Royal Navy aircraft carrier then being built.
But construction delays on the carriers kept all RN Skyraiders
except those of A Flight land-based for their first year of
service. This delay further prompted the British to pare their
Skyraider flights back to four (A through D).
The Squadron Flights of 849 Squadron remained in
permanent commission, regardless of the status of their
particular aircraft carrier. As deployed by 849 Squadron, the
Skyraider AEW.1 s were used mainly for airborne early warn-
ing against low-flying aircraft, anti-submarine searches,
weather reconnaissance, and the British equivalent of COD
(Carrier Onboard Delivery).5
Spare engines and parts were in short supply for the
Royal Navy Skyraiders, according to British aviation histori-
ans. By late 1958 several of the 50 British AEW.1 s were being
robbed of parts at Royal Naval Air Station (RNAS) Donibristle,
where major airframe reconditioning took place on the British
Skyraiders. 6
On 29 January 1953, A Flight went to sea for the first time,
on the HMS Eagle.
On 16 April 1956, Eagle, carrying A Flight's Syraiders, left
port. Eagle was kept in the Mediterranean due to mideast
tensions, and in the fall of 1956, Eagle's A Flight and HMS
Albion's C Flight launched AEW.1 s to provide airborne early
warning protection forthe Anglo-French fleet engaged in Suez
operations, and for ship-to-shore duties. The Suez interven-
tion was named Operation Musketeer. The last embarkation
for A Flight as a Skyraider unit came on 13 April 1959, aboard
HMS Eagle. The next month, A Flight was reduced to three
Skyraiders, and in August this dwindled to a pair of AEW.1 s.
The first Fairey Gannet arrived in September for A Flight, and
Able Dogs in Foreign Service 71
Factory shot of a Royal Navy Skyraider AEW.1 shows outboard placement of roundels, which accommodated code letters on
wing. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann)
by December 1959, A Flight operated three Gannets and two
Skyraiders. In February 1960, A Flight relinquished the last
two of its Skyraiders.7This scenario was typical for Royal Navy
Skyraiders.
Half of B Flight's Skyraider aircrews trained in the United
States. When the Flight's complement of Skyraiders arrived,
B Flight's first assignment was a tour of five months at Royal
Naval Air Station Hal Far, Malta. B Flight was assigned to HMS
Ark Royal in 1955, and sailed with that carrier in October ofthat
year for a Mediterranean cruise. When Ark Royal was docked
for refitting in 1956, B Flight remained at Culdrose as A and C
Flights gave sufficient airborne early warning support for the
Suez operation that year. Continued refit operations took Ark
Royal out of service again in 1957 and 1958, so B Flight's
Skyraiders were re-assigned to HMS Victorious. A number of
cruises in British home waters as well as the Mediterranean
cemented the bonds between B Flight and the Victorious. 8
C Flight began Skyraider work in June 1953, embarking
with A Flight aboard Eagle, and later that year flying out to Hal
Far, Malta, to relieve B Flight. During C Flight's 1953 Malta
duty, it became the only AEW Skyraider Flight to embark
aboard a wartime class light fleet aircraft carrier, the HMS
Glory, for about two weeks from 30 November. In October
1958, C Flight joined HMS Albion for a 1O-month cruise which
included Cyprus, Karachi, Singapore, New Zealand, Austra-
lia, South Africa and South America. 9
72 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
D Flight flew from HMS Eagle in 1953, and the following
year, the Flight moved to RNAS Eglinton to confirm U.S. Navy
performance data on the search radar. D Flight's subsequent
carrier embarkations included the Bulwark, Albion and Cen-
taur. Following operations with HMS Girdle Ness during trials
of the Seaslug missile in 1959, D Flight returned to Culdrose.
A 10-month Far East cruise aboard HMS Albion, ending 15
December 1960, was also the end of front-line Royal Navy
Skyraider service. The next day, D Flight disbanded. Its four
Skyraiders were sent to Abbotsinch for disposal. 1o
E Flight was a casualty of the 1954 reorganization of
British Skyraider Flights, when it was relettered as D Flight. E
Flight served at RNAS Hal Far, Malta during its brief existence,
as well as at Culdrose, before assuming D Flight's identity.11
The replacement of British Skyraider AEW.1 s with Fairey
Gannets in the Royal Navy signaled advances in airborne
early warning aircraft, but not the expiration of the British
Skyraiders as usable airplanes. The Skyraider's legendary
loitering ability and hauling capacity had already led to the use
of U.S. Navy ADs as target tugs, and when Sweden needed
tugs, 12 surplus Royal Navy AEW.1 s filled the bill.
Aircraft-carrier gear, including tail hooks, and the bulging
belly radomes and radars were stripped from the AEW.1 s sold
to Sweden late in 1961. The target winch operator occupied
the former radar observer's cabin in the fuselage. The radome
originally had prompted the use of two additional vertical fins.
In April 1972, AEW.1 number WT121 was airlifted into Royal
Navy Air Station Yeovilton for display in the Fleet Air Arm
museum collection there. (John Bowdler collection)
With the radome removal came the removal of these fins as
well. The Swedish Skyraiders were painted bright yellow, and
registered to Svensk Flygtjanst AB at Bromma, Sweden. They
were modified to tow differing targets for the Swedish Army,
Navy, and Air Force. They also could be fitted with radar-
defeating pods under their port wings. In 1973, Sweden began
replacing its Skyraiders with Mitsubishi MU-2Fs and Learjets. 12
A French AD-4 revs up in Algeria in 1963. (J.P. Hoehn collection)
After years of outside display at Yeovilton, Skyraider WT121
was moved indoors for exhibition. (Photo by John Bowdler)
French armed forces were the recipients of varied Ameri-
can aircraft from the time the Free French began fighting
Germany in World War II with Martin B-26s, through the use
of Bell P-63 Kingcobras, Douglas A-26s, and Consolidated
PB4Y-2s in Indochina, and on to Republic P-47 Thunderbolts
and A-26s against Algerian rebels in the 1950s. From 1954
until Algeria wrestled its independence in 1962, the French
Able Dogs in Foreign Service 73
Silver paint was standard for French Skyraiders like this AD-4NA of the 20th TFW, photographed at Chateaudun Air Depot in
June 1966. (J.P. Hoehn collection)
fought the rebels with ground-attack aircraft. The aging P-47s
needed a replacement; the Skyraider's Korean War ground
attack exploits made it a most desirable substitute.
In 1959, France received the first of 40 AD-4NAs and 53
AD-4Ns. French AD-4s were pressed into service in Algeria.
The Algerian rebels had no airpower, and only light anti-
aircraft capabilities. The French aviators fought a war un-
marked by spectacular air actions. When ordered not to drop
bombs on some Algerian villages, some of the French balked
at the prospects of letting suspected rebel hideouts go un-
scathed. So they harassed the Algerian rebels in a time-tested
manner: Empty beer bottles were dumped from the French
AD-4s. 13 Long before, airmen had learned a falling empty beer
bottle would catch the wind and howl like a bomb in flight.
When no bomb explosions followed, the targeted villagers
(and rebels) could speculate on delayed-fuse bombs lying in
the earth.
A late French AD-4 freshly overhauled, circa 1972. (J.P. Hoehn collection)
74 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
By 1965, the United States was scrambling to keep
Skyraiders operable. Both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force
were using A-1 s in Southeast Asia, as was the growing air
force of the Republic of South Vietnam (VNAF). In theory, it
was reasonable for American planners to expect the French
to return the AD-4s when they were finished with them. But a
minor international incident between the United States and
France brewed when the French instead gave 10 ADs to
Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk in 1965, followed later by five
more Skyraiders. The Cambodian Skyraiders probably saw
more service against the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
communists afterSihanouk'sfalifrom power in 1970thanthey
did earlier, but sabotage, attrition, and inexperience removed
Cambodian Skyraiders from service in the ensuing period. 14
Though French colonies had waned, France continued
close ties with a number of African states in the 1970s. The
Republic of Chad, Central African Republic, and Gabon all
Last stand for the French AD-4s was Africa, where a Djibouti-
based Skyraider of 21 Escadrille awaited armorers. Another
AD-4 and a Skyraider hulk keep company in the distance.
(J.P. Hoehn collection)
made use of French AD-4s, with Gabon replacing the
Skyraiders with variants of a Macchi jet trainer in the 1980s.
But in fact, according to French aviation historian Rene'
Francillon, French crews operated the Skyraiders in these
emerging African nations.
But the key foreign user of Ed Heinemann's rugged
Skyraider was South Vietnam's VNAF, a fighting force worthy
of its own definitive history book, and its own sections in this
volume.
Ex-French AD-4, nearest camera, shared ramp space in
Phnom Penh with Cambodian-marked AD-6, circa 1972.
Published accounts indicate Cambodia had AD·4s from
France; swept pylons and serial number 137587 under tail
show this gray Skyraider to be an ex-U.S. Navy AD-6 which
was sent from NAS Quonset Point, R.I. to NAS Alameda,
California, in late 1963, where it was stricken from Navy
records. Perhaps 137587 went next to the South Vietnamese
air force. Its subsequent dilapidated condition in Cambodian
markings is still not fully explained. (Photo by R. Linder.)
Notes
1. British Aviation Research Group, A History of the Douglas Skyraider AEW.
1,1974. p. 8.
2. Ibid, p. 20.
3. Frederick A. Johnsen, F4U Corsair, London: Janes, 1983. p.53
4. British Aviation Research Group, A History of the Douglas Skyraider
AEW.1, p. 19.
5. Ibid, p. 20.
6. Ibid, p. 20.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. InteNiew, Rene Francillon with Frederick A. Johnsen, 1 August 1984.
14. Rosario Rausa, Skyraider - the Douglas A-1 'Flying Dump truck',
Annapolis: Nautical and Aviation, 1982. p. 223.
Able Dogs in Foreign Service 75
 IS':
v -
758

Gray Skyraider paint scheme predominated in the early to mid 1960s in Southeast Asia, as seen on these VNAF A·1 Hs. VNAF
insignia was a modification of U.S. marking, with red border on bars and red perimeter to blue star field. Bars beside white
star were yellow, split with red.

76 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 CHAPTER VI
Early Asia
'~ great country cannot wage a little war. " Wellington, to the House of Lords, 16 January 1838.
I n the summer of 1964, a generation of Americans knew
of war only as something seen at the movies, or related
by older family members who had participated in World
War II or Korea. But a new war - a shooting war - was building
in Southeast Asia even as President Lyndon B. Johnson
pursued an aggressive space program and his vision of a
Great Society at home.
Bitter ironies attended the fighting in Southeast Asia from
the start. When France withdrew from French Indochina in
1954, the resulting Geneva Accord signed by France banned
the use of combat jets in that fighting arena. Although the
United States did not sign the Geneva Accord, American
support for the provisions in that document extended to the jet
ban.
Though it mattered little· to the communist troops in
Vietnam whether the bombs which felled them were lugged to
the target by a jet or a piston-powered airplane, American
planners were reluctant to make an overt breach of the
Geneva Accord after voicing support for the Accord's con-
tents, which included free and independent elections in Viet-
nam.
But reconnaissance jets - RF-1 01 Voodoos and RB-57
Canberras -were deployed by the U.S. Air Force in Vietnam
in 1964. After all, American defense planners reasoned, such
planes were not "combat" jets in the strictest interpretation of
the word. Claude Witze, senior editor for Air Force Magazine
in 1964, said the jet ban prompted one sensitive military
planner to suggest "that newsmen should not mention the type
of engine that propels the Army's Huey helicopter. A turbine
turns the rotor blades, which makes it technically a jet."1 And
Hueys were already deployed in Vietnam.
The Air Force utilized piston-engine ground-attack air-
craft in Vietnam both as a means of honoring the Geneva
Accord, and because the rugged simplicity of some of the
unsophisticated prop planes lent itselfto the little brushfire war
being waged in southeast Asia. North American T-28 trainers
were fitted with bomb racks and machine guns, and joined
Douglas B-26 Invaders in the early Vietnam war. When aT-28
and a B-26 crashed, cries of structural weakness prompted
congressional hearings. Subsequently, the Douglas Invaders
would be beefed up by On Mark Engineering in Van Nuys,
California to strengthen their wing spars and otherwise update
them for modern ground attack duties; the T-28 would be
withdrawn from attack use by the U.S. Air Force Air Comman-
dos and replaced by a Navy attack aircraft: The Douglas
Skyraider. In fact, the South Vietnamese gained some AD-6s
in 1960.
With the uniform aircraft designation system adopted for
Navy and Air Force aircraft in 1962, the multi-place AD-5
became the A-1 E, and the single-seat AD-6 was redesignated
A-1 H. The Air Force obtained surplus A-1 Es from Navy
storage, and added a second set of pilot controls, a feature not
required by the Navy. The extra controls enabled a South
Vietnamese pilot to participate in strikes during a time when
American military advisors in Vietnam were not supposed to
fly solo combat.
In May of 1964, 50 A-1 Es and 25 single-seat A-1 Hs were
being readied at NAS Alameda for combat in Vietnam with the
Republic of Vietnam Air Force. U.S. Navy pilots were to
provide transition training at Bien Hoa for the Vietnamese.
The following month, U.S. Air Force crews led by Lt. Col.
John M. Porter flew six A-1 Es on a hop from the Philippines to
the USAF Special Air Warfare Center also at Bien Hoa. The
Skyraider was employed in a familiar role of ground-attack,
dumping napalm and bombs from the many hard points
beneath the wings and fuselage. Limited warfare in southeast
Asia demanded rugged, simple bomb-carriers with long loiter-
ing time, and not necessarily speed. The previous decade had
seen both Navy and Air Force emphasize high-speed nuclear-
equipped strategic aircraft. "In the strategic sense, the 1957
era found Naval aviation locking horns with the Strategic Air
Command for equitable distribution of strategic targets," wrote
Lt. Cdr. A. Dodge McFall in an article sympathetic to the
continued use of the A-1. 2
While the Navy and Air Force fought over who got to bomb
what in the event of total war, the fact remained that by 1964
no suitable replacement for the venerable A-1 existed. Under
the acronym COIN (COunter INsurgency), new propjet planes
were proposed as replacements for the Skyraider. Conven-
tional jets also stood ready.
But in mid-1964, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara reviewed the new COIN proposals and said they
offered little improvement over the A-1. Even when given a
$123,000 overhaul before shipment to Vietnam, the big
Skyraider was a bargain when compared with sophisticated
$4 million Grumman A-6 Intruders for the same mission. Air
Force Secretary Eugene M. Zuckert voiced support for send-
ing A-1 s to Vietnam in 1964, saying an exhaustive evaluation
of the Skyraider by the U.S. Air Force Special Air Warfare
Center at Eglin AFB, Florida showed "that because of its
simplicity of operation, versatility, maintainability, minimum
runway requirements and other capabilities, the A-1 would be
highly successful for its role in South Vietnam."3 In fact,
queries were made into the feasibility of reopening the Skyraider
production line to meet the needs of combat in Southeast Asia,
but the cost was deemed prohibitive.
Coups and internal bickering periodically plagued the
government of South Vietnam, and the Douglas Skyraiders of
the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) were employed both in
coup attempts and anti-coup activities. In early 1962, rebelling
Early Asia 77
VNAF pilots nosed their AD-6 Skyraiders toward the Saigon
palace of President Ngo Dinh Diem in an attack which failed
to harm Diem.
The first batch of AD-6s had been shipped to the Republic
of Vietnam by the Eisenhower administration in 1960 when
the VNAF commander at that time, Col. Nguyen Xuan Vinh,
grounded his squadron of Grumman F8F Bearcats, declaring
the Grummans to be no longer safe for flight. Early logistics
support for the AD-6s was inadequate, and a number of the
batch of 25 VNAF Skyraiders languished on the ground,
awaiting parts.
Though these VNAF AD-6s failed to oust Diem in 1962,
they were more instrumental in his removal from office during
a coup executed on 1 and 2 November 1963. Coup leaders
sensed the time was right for action as the Diem government's
repressive measures against Buddhists stirred international
opinion. With Army of Vietnam (ARVN) units dispatched to
fight the ground war, Diem would be hard-pressed to maintain
his security in the face of a serious coup challenge. Coup
leaders quickly seized the VNAF commander, while his deputy
collaborated with the rebels, and launched an air mission
which included four A-1 Hs (redesignated from the earlier AD-
6 nomenclature) against the presidential palace in Saigon.
When ARVN troops loyal to Diem attempted to intervene
on his behalf, the potential for air raids thwarted them. On 2
November 1963, President Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh
Nhu, head of the secret police, surrendered to the rebels and
were killed. The Skyraider's muscle had been used in
internecine warfare by Vietnamese fliers against their coun-
trymen. 4
General Duong Van Minh tried to head the new Saigon
government, while purging Diem officials from office. Govern-
ment disarray was evident, and sparked concerted enemy
attacks. Dissatisfaction with Minh's stewardship led Maj. Gen.
Nguyen Khanh, commander of I Corps, to undertake another
coup on 30 January 1964. Khanh, mindful of the VNAF's role
in the Diem overthrow the previous year, retained a self-
proclaimed "anti-coup" officer, Nguyen Cao Ky, as com-
mander of the VNAF.
In his 1981 book, The United States Air Force in South-
east Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965, published by the Office
of Air Force History in Washington, D.C., author Robert F.
Futrell said, "Col. Nguyen Cao Ky had won command of the
Vietnamese Air Force for his part in the Minh coup, and
polished his prestige by supporting the Khanh coup." In a July
1982 interview, Ky said he rose to the position of VNAF
commander in the Minh regime after another commander
failed to work out. "After the coup against Diem," Ky related,
"a new commander of the Air Force was named. I guess
because of connections and friendship they named a man
who was not a flier." Ky recalled that his predecessor lasted
about 10 days, after which the Armed Forces Council asked
him to take charge of the VNAF.
From this point, Ky's record was that of an anti-coup
officer. Still later, in 1965, when Ky became prime minister of
the Republic of Vietnam amid rumors he had been instrumen-
tal in yet another coup, he denied the contention. "Actually, I'm
an anti-coup officer. I never staged a coup, because to
78 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
effectively stop the communists, we must work together," he
said later.
According to author Futrell, VNAF A-1 sortie rates were
adversely affected because Air Vice Marshal Ky needed a
"Palace Guard" flight of standby A-1 Hs at Tan Son Nhut
tasked to thwart coup attempts. Part of Ky's own elite 83rd
Squadron, these pilots were hand-picked for their flying abili-
ties as well as their loyalty to the government. Routinely, they
flew air strikes against Viet Cong in South Vietnam's III and IV
corps areas when not flexing their Skyraiders' muscles in
support of the government beginning in 1964.
In addition to his role as Air Vice Marshal, Ky personally
commanded the 83rd Squadron at Tan Son Nhut. He became
a colorful figure in the international news media, as he was
often photographed wearing the black flying suit and lavender
flying scarf of the 83rd. The insignia of this squadron featured
a dragon's head surmounted by five stars. In Vietnamese
beneath this was the legend THAN PHONG. This was the
Vietnamese translation of the Japanese word "kamikaze,"
and meant "Wind of a God" to the VNAF A-1 pilots, with none
of the suicidal connotations history has attached to "kami-
kaze." The lavender scarf, Ky explained, represented a Viet-
namese wildflower called Xim, which had been popularized by
a Vietnamese poet whose words later influenced the lyrics of
a song about the flower. s
Khanh's judgment of Ky's loyalty paid off in September
1964 when disaffected ARVN troops following Brig. Gen. Lam
Van Phat moved armor into Saigon in an attempted coup
against Khanh.
Ky and VNAF remained loyal to the Saigon government,
and A-1 s were launched as a warning to the rebels. "We
considered them an enemy," Ky said. "We didn't have to drop
one bomb." Ky figured the rebel troops would respect the
potency of the VNAF A-1 s, having called them in for many air
strikes against communist positions. "We just scrambled one
or two flights and flew over their heads, and that was it," Ky
recalled. An L-19 dropped a message to the rebel leader,
underscoring the intention of the VNAF to defend the govern-
ment of Khanh. The coup was thwarted, under a small
. umbrella of Skyraiders which never unleashed ordnance. 6
In the summer of 1965, Air Vice Marshal Ky was engaged
to a strikingly beautiful Air Vietnam stewardess who was to
become his wife. Over dinner one night in Mayor June of that
year, the future Madame Ky told her fiance she would be
working a DC-6 flight out of Tan Son Nhut the next morning.
The VNAF commander possessed a military pilot's inherent
love of unorthodox flying, and Ky determined to fly formation
on his girlfriend's airliner. The young general soon learned the
only VNAF aircraft available which could maintain formation
flight with the powerful DC-6 was an A-1 Skyraider, also at Tan
Son Nhut Air Base as part of a special operations squadron he
had set up. "So I came down to the A-1 squadron and said 'I
need one'," Ky recalled.
The 83rd Squadron's flying safety officer said he could not
let the Air Vice Marshal fly an A-1. Ky remembered his
response: "What do you mean? I'm the boss. If you won't let
me, you're out of a job!"
"Of course, I was wrong," the general reflected years later.
 took hold. "The second time was perfect, like a true A-1 pilot,"
Ky recalled years later, with the hint of a satisfied smile subtly
animating his face. 8
Nguyen Cao Ky embraced the Skyraider as the ideal
ground attack aircraft available for Vietnam. "I liked the A-1
better than the A-37 (an attack jet version of the small Cessna
T-37 trainer) - particularly for the ground support role; you
could stay longer in the air." Ky also remembered the durability
of the A-1 under fire. After his initial flight, Ky became proficient
in the A-1 and participated in combat strikes, staying current
even after his governmental rise to the post of Prime Minister
in June 1965. Ky retained control of the VNAF during this time.
"I always liked combat missions," he later remarked. Ky said
his 83rd Squadron had a strength of between 18 and 24
Skyraiders. He enjoyed the challenges imposed by the big
prop-driven A-1, and said the huge engine's torque made for
some squirrelly handling that was "more fun" than flying jets.
"With a propeller, you have to learn about the plane, and
there is some personal feeling attached to that. While with a
jet flying high and fast, you feel like you are sitting in a
mechanized robot. But the A-1 is still an airplane," Ky ex-
plained.
VNAF A-1 operations in the mid-60s appealed to Ky's
fighter-pilot instincts. "At the beginning, we had a really good
group of fighter pilots. We had good esprit d'corps. Those
were the best years of our lives." Ky said he watched this
camaraderie and skill-level erode from the A-1 flying squad-
rons, as well as other VNAF units, as his country's air force
expanded and adopted some Americanized features of orga-
nization. "We had so many good combat fighter pilots behind
the desk doing red tape."9
Until his election as South Vietnam's vice president in
South Vietnam's General Nguyen Cao Ky, 1965. (Nguyen Cao
Ky collection.)
1967, General Ky remained commander of the VNAF. During
this time, VNAF A-1 s supported troops battling the Viet Cong
Though squadron officers balked, they nonetheless gave the in South Vietnam, and occasionally flew leaflets to North
VNAF leader a helmet. Ky had never before flown the big A- Vietnam, to warn civilians of impending American bombard-
1. "OK, start the engine for me," the general requested. Ky ment. "For some reason, I never kept records of my flying
listed the A-1 's flight procedures on a knee pad strapped to his time," Ky said, adding that he did not keep a journal or diary
leg, and made ready for his first flight in the roaring Douglas because to do so seemed presumptuous at the time. From
warplane.? "So here I am, in the cockpit. Fortunately, I had memory, Ky recalled his longest A-1 mission lasted four
some basic training on the T-6. It's very similar," Ky said. He hours. Sometimes, he carried a centerline fuel tank to stretch
advanced the throttle and roared down the Tan Son Nhut the range or loitering capability of his A-1 . But the Viet Cong
runway, charging into the morning sky, buoyed byadrenalin brought the fighting uncomfortably close to home. "With
and the excitement of a new flying adventure. Going over his fighting in the III Corps area," he explained, "you were fighting
scribbled post-takeoff checklist and cleaning up the landing as soon as you got up to altitude. You didn't have to go far to
gear, the general found himself at 10,000 feet, and lost, when fight the enemy," he said, especially during the last two years
the procedures were completed. "But talking with the control before Saigon fell in April 1975.
tower, I eventually could see her airplane." Ky moved in on the While still VNAF commander, prior to his 1967 vice
DC-6 for some formation air work. "It scared the pilot. He knew presidential election, Ky and other Vietnamese pilots were
I never flew an A-1 before." After about 15 minutes of flying in enjoying the conviviality of a black-tie formal affair when Bien
concert with the DC-6 airliner, General Ky broke formation at Hoa Air Base came under a nocturnal Viet Cong attack. The
the urging of his fiance speaking on his radio frequency. Skyraider contingent on the ramp at Bien Hoa had to be taken
Chugging noisily back to Tan Son Nhut, Ky's A-1 was on aloft right away to avoid destruction on the ground by enemy
final approach with the gear down and locked. Ky prepared for fire. Ky sent his subordinates out in formal attire to fly A-1 s,
a smooth touchdown, but the reality was something else. "I while wisely electing to ground himself out of respect for the
made the worst landing in all my life - three or four big volume of alcohol he had consumed in the course of the
bounces," General Ky said. Not satisfied, Ky shoved in the evening. 1O
throttle and accelerated back into the sky as the A-1 's prop

Early Asia 79
 Vietnamese Skyraider pilots learned to judge when to
release their bombs, from experience, and by visual judg-
ments, General Ky said. "Normally once you get enough
experience, you go in with the feeling. You automatically had
the right angle and speed." "Normally we didn't use dive
brakes," Ky continued. He said VNAF pilots were instructed to
peel into a roll for initiating a diving attack, but in actual practice
in the rush of combat, targets sometimes were acquired
simply by pushing the stick forward and lining up with the
target.
When responding to a call for A-1 air strikes, Ky said, the
VNAF usually tried to dispatch three Skyraiders to do the job,
but sometimes only a pair of the Douglas warplanes would go.
Ground forces often specified A-1 s when calling in an air
strike, Ky said, because the A-1 s could carry more ordnance
and loiter longer than the VNAF's diminutive A-37s. The A-1 s
also tended toflytheirwarat a lower altitude, andthe chugging
roar of radial 3350s was a morale booster to ARVN troops on
the ground.
By about 1968-69, the U.S. Air Force had established a
good pipeline of parts for VNAF Skyraiders through a supply
depot at Bien Hoa Air Base, according to General Ky. Gone,
at least for awhile, were the parts shortages which had
grounded many of the VNAF's original AD-6s in the beginning
of the decade.
Ky said his A-1 fliers and their American advisors gener-
ally cooperated well. "As airmen, we didn't have any problem
to deal with other airmen. It's not like the other services. We
share the common spirit of pilots." Ky said the first time USAF
captains would meet with VNAF pilots, "they (the Americans)
thought they were the champs." But, Ky continued, the skills
of some of the VNAF A-1 crews surprised their American
advisors, who began to loosen up and adopt local styles and
habits. "They shared everything with us. They started to eat
Vietnamese food and go to town with us and live the Vietnam-
ese way," Ky said.
On 24 April 1~:llO, USAF and VNAF tactical aircraft began
striking targets in Cambodia occupied by North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong troops. The missions were in anticipation of an
incursion into Cambodia on 29 April and 1 May by 48,000
South Vietnamese and 42,000 American troops, authorized
by President Richard M. Nixon. 11
At this time, Nguyen Cao Ky was vice president of the
Republic of Vietnam. Though he had relinquished command
of the South Vietnamese air force when elected vice presi-
dent, Ky still flew when possible. A sure rarity among senior
politicians was this flying vice president who undertook a
combat sortie into Cambodia in a VNAF A-1 during the 1970
offensive in that country.
General Ky's A-1 was called in on a small anti-aircraft
position consisting of one 75-millimeter gun - a weapon with
a considerable bite. The general's ordnance load consisted of
500-pound bombs without fuse extenders and 20-millimeter
ammo for his Skyraider's wing-mounted cannons. The roaring
A-1, diving low and laden with bombs, had a high intimidation
value. The communist gunners· abandoned their weapon
rather than keep firing at Ky, he said. "If they were not really
professional or courageous, at the sight of an airplane diving,
80 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
they just jumped," Ky explained. Ky made only one pass on the
75-millimeter gun emplacement. "After that the ground troops
said, 'OK! thank you!'," indicating the gun had been knocked
out of the fight. Had ground forces not transmitted the victory
message, Ky said he was prepared to wheel back in for a
strafing run. So the vice president returned to base, with the
sweat of combat making his flight suit cling to his wiry frame. 12
As American forces pulled out of Vietnam in the first
quarter of 1973 under Henry Kissinger's negotiated peace
plan, the VNAF had grown in numbers of personnel and
aircraft. By the previous December, VNAF strength was
42,000 personnel, plus an additional 10,000 being trained,
with about 2,000 aircraft. Yet left to their own defense, the
South Vietnamese found themselves unable to check Hanoi's
persistent pushes south.
General Ky found himself at odds with South Vietnam's
president Nguyen Van Thieu. Ky's strong anti-communist
beliefs caused him grief as he observed the enemy exerting
relentless pressure on South Vietnam. Ky felt the war had
been lost by a directionless United States military presence,
which now had departed, leaving a void. "America came to
Vietnam without a firm policy to win the war," Ky said. "I told
(Presidents) Johnson and later Nixon: Why do you send
almost 600,000 Americans to Vietnam if you have a no-win
policy?"
"We should have gone north and finished the war within
three months," when America was present in Vietnam, Ky
said. We could have done this with all the power we had."13
Against this backdrop of a losing war, Nguyen Cao Ky
made his last flight in an A-1 Skyraider during 1974. "I was so
depressed," Ky remembered. Hopping into a multi-seat A-1 E
with another pilot, Ky flew to the coast to escape the rigors of
the city for a few hours. "It was a night flight with a full moon
and it was beautiful. I think that is why I still flew when I was
Premier. When you are depressed with too many problems,
you feel better."
Ky and his fellow aviator chugged over the Asian land-
scape, letting the luminous full moon and the satisfaction of
flying with finesse in a reliable A-1 temporarily hold their
country's woes in check. The pilots stayed overnight on the
coast, and flew back the following day.14
Nguyen Cao Ky's affair with the Douglas Skyraider began
and ended with joyrides which buoyed his spirits. In the nine
years between those flights, Ky planned, and sometimes flew
in, VNAF Skyraider combat and internal security operations
which proved the mettle of the durable Douglas design.
"When you look at the old A-1 ," Ky reminisced, "it's like a
lady."
The alliance between the U.S. Air Force and the air arm
of South Vietnam went through phases and evolutions, as did
the war and politics of the era. On 14 April 1961 , the U.S. Air
Force's 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, forever to
be known by its nickname, "Jungle Jim", was created at Eglin
AFB, Florida. The archetypal Jungle Jim fliers were hardy
adventurers who sometimes wore the moniker "Air Comman-
dos."
Jungle Jim was charged with the responsibility for training
foreign air forces in counter-insurgency techniques. In prac-
tice, this training role would put the air commandos them-
selves into combat. In 1961, the Jungle Jim roster of aircraft
included C-47s, Douglas B-26s, and North American T-28
trainers which were modified for interdiction bombing and
strafing. 15 While Jungle Jim's band of airmen evolved their
counter-insurgency syllabus in Florida in 1961, the air force of
South Vietnam - VNAF - struggled to keep its few AD-6
Skyraiders flying sorties against insurgents. A long supply
pipeline back to the United States kept some of these early
VNAF AD-6s on the ground; operational lapses kept others
from doing their job. Once, in the fall of 1961, a handful of
VNAF AD-6's was ordered to attack Viet Cong troops massed
across a river from the edge of Phuoc Thanh province. A
cumbersome South Vietnamese Rule of Engagement re-
quired the Skyraider pilots to delay attacking until the Phuoc
Thanh province chief approved the air strike in his territory.
When the provincial leader could not be located, the Vietnam-
ese AD-6 drivers loitered for three hours. The Viet Cong had
long since crossed the river to press their attack while the
armed Skyraiders could do nothing. 16
Into this convoluted scenario on 11 October 1961 Presi-
dent John F. Kennedy authorized sending Jungle Jim to South
Vietnam, expressly "as a training mission and not for combat
at the present time."17 The U.S. ambassador to South Viet-
nam, Frederick Nolting, requested Jungle Jim's aircraft arrive
in VNAF markings. Back at Eglin, those Jungle Jim forces
readying for deployment to Vietnam were designated Detach-
ment 2A of the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron, and
were code named Farm Gate. They departed Florida 5 No-
vember 1961, reaching Bien Hoa air base.
The commander of the 4400th, Col. Benjamin H. King,
earlier had been briefed by Gen. Curtis LeMay, Air Force Chief
of Staff, that his Farm Gate crews would participate in combat
in Vietnam while training VNAF airmen. This was a touchy
subject in 1961, for the overt presence of American combat-
ants in Vietnam was downplayed as long as possible by the
government of the United States. In early operations, Farm
Gate crews in armed T-28s followed Vietnamese crews in AD-
6s to obseNe VNAF attack procedures, and occasionally to
fire on targets when authorized. The Farm Gate crews were
anticipating a combat role against the communists, and this
was good for their morale.
But erratic policy guidelines caused the mission of Farm
Gate crews to be in doubt, and to emphasize training instead
of combat. Some clarification came about on 6 December
1961 when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff formally authorized
Farm Gate aircraft to partake in combat sorties if Vietnamese
were on board the planes fortraining. This doctrine would lead
to the use of dual flight controls in Farm Gate A-1 Es three
years later.
On 26 February 1962, a pair of VNAF pilots strayed from
a Mekong delta airstrike and pressed an attack against the
palace of South Vietnamese President Diem. Purpose oftheir
renegade mission turned out to be a grudge against Diem's
controversial brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, head of South Vietnam's
secret police. The 1st Fighter Squadron of the VNAF gave
chase in more AD-6s, to no avail. It was apparent the miscre-
ant AD-6 pilots held the potential for mayhem, so some Farm
Gate aircraft took to the ai r to avoid possible destruction on the
ground. South Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners knocked down
one of the Skyraiders. Its pilot was captured. The other flier
failed to inflict any damage, and crash-landed his AD-6 in
Cambodia.
NeNous over this apparently isolated event, and mindful
of his countrymen's potential for launching a coup, Diem
grounded the VNAF in the aftermath of the February palace
attack, although that attack lacked the feNor of a full-fledged
coup. When he returned the VNAF to flying status, President
Diem denied his aircraft all ordnance larger than 20-millimeter
ammunition. Still later, Diem reintroduced bomb loads for
VNAF strike aircraft, but in practice the amount of such
ordnance still was restricted on VNAF planes in II and III
Corps, the geographic regions closest to Diem's Saigon
palace. 1B
While Diem's VNAF bomb load restrictions were in place
in early 1962, U.S. ambassador Nolting received the go-
ahead to employ USAF Farm Gate aircraft in support of
ground combat operations, as long as VNAF AD-6s accompa-
nied the Farm Gate flights. This caveat was to deflect any
impression that the United States was assuming responsibil-
ity for the air war. 19
On 4 March 1962, VNAF AD-6s, armed only with their 20-
millimeter cannons, scrambled to attack 50 to 70 VC near a
river bend 30 miles from Tan Son Nhut. Farm Gate planes,
exempt from Diem's bomb ban, were asked to join the attack.
The following day, optimistic Vietnamese reports listed 50 to
60 Viet Cong killed in the air attacks; a U.S. advisor scaled this
down to 25 dead.
Captured Viet Cong guerrillas revealed the locations of 12
communist headquarters, most of which were near the Cam-
bodian border. President Diem approved bombings, to be
followed by an airborne assault, on 2 January 1963. All
available VNAF AD-6s, numbering 26 Skyraiders, joined
Farm Gate's two dozen T-28s and 16 B-26s in a day-long
tactical role that killed as many as 1,000 enemy soldiers, and
paved the way for the Vietnamese paratroopers and rangers
who followed. It was a textbook application of tactical air
support in the III Corps area, and American advisors were
encouraged by its success. Perhaps the VNAF Skyraiders,
augmented by Farm Gate planes, were overcoming their
earlier logistical and political hobbles. 20
Farm Gate crews patterned techniques for coming to the
aid of friendly outposts under night attack from the Viet Congo
The strategy was passed on to the VNAF, which kept C-47s
on alert as flare-droppers. These flare ships would illuminate
outposts under night attack, permitting strike aircraft to direct
their ordnance at the attacking Viet Congo But in 1963, the
commander of one VNAF fighter squadron at first balked at
using his A-1 H (formerly AD-6) crews for night combat, citing
inexperience. The commander yielded partially to American
pressure and took on about half the nocturnal missions his
squadron had been given. As 1963 pressed on, the VC
intensified operations in South Vietnam, creating greater
need for VNAF response. In the face of heightened combat,
the commander of the 516th VNAF Fighter Squadron cut four
T-28s from a squadron detachment, to release those crews for
Early Asia 81
A-1 upgrade training. The commander of a VNAF fighter But to avoid widening the appearance of U.S. involvement, the
squadron sometimes ignored requests for napalm strikes and third U.S. Skyraider squadron was turned down in Washing-
in September 1963 he occasionally released only nine of his ton, with more A-1 s diverted to the VNAF instead.
26A-1 Hs to the air operations center for combat use. The rest The facade of USAF pilots flying only training or support
of his flyable A-1s, he said, were needed for pilot upgrading. missions was torn several times. On 8 March 1964, a single-
Through 1963, combat experience showed the value of seat VNAF A-1 H crashed, killing USAF Col. Thomas M.
air escorts for convoys. The Viet Cong were often reluctant to Hergert, deputy chief of the Military Assistance Advisory
attack a convoy if an L-19 spotter plane was flying overhead, Group (MAAG) Air Force Section. Colonel Hergert had been
because the L-19 could call in an air strike on the attackers. On flying as wingman to a Vietnamese Skyraider pilot on an
the last day of 1963, the Vietnamese 5th Division had a ranger interdiction mission. A loose interpretation of the "support-
battalion surrounded by about twice as many Viet Cong in III and-training-only" doctrine had been employed, whereby USAF
Corps, 10 miles west of Ben Cat. While South Vietnamese pilots were flying combat, but not leading flights, or being the
ground troops worked their way toward their besieged ranger first to attack. The Americans were not to continue if the
comrades, a forward air controller in an L-19 and at least two Vietnamese flight leader aborted the attack. Later that month,
A-1 Hs armed with bombs and cannons orbited overhead, letters written by another USAF Farm Gate pilot who was killed
asking for clearance to strike. But 5th Division tried using revealed the use of basic Vietnamese airmen who were not
armed Bell UH-1 helicopter gunships instead. The chopper really pilot candidates as the token VNAF on-board personnel
attacks did not blunt the Viet Cong attack, but without clear- for some Farm Gate combat sorties. The Farm Gate airmen
ance to join the fray, the armed A-1 s were powerless to help. somewhat derisively referred to these required VNAF mem-
The big gray Skyraiders chugged back to Bien Hoa and bers as "sandbags." By using the "sandbags" who were not
landed, without participating in the rangers' battle. The next pilots, Farm Gate missions did not tie up actual VNAF fliers
day, rescuing ground troops entered the scene of battle to find who could be more productively used in other aircraft.
the rangers had ultimately been scattered and defeated by the Renewed emphasis was placed on building up VNAF
larger VC force. The rangers sustained six fatalities, 12 Skyraider squadrons, while banning USAF participation in
wounded, and 31 missing. American strategists were dis- combat missions except where bona fide training could be
mayed that the South Vietnamese had failed to capitalize on cited. The three VNAF fighter squadrons, flying A-1 s, were to
the Skyraiders at their disposal. 21 be enlarged to four by October 1964, and then to six by early
In 1964, VNAF's commander, Col. Nguyen Cao Ky, took 1965, according to plans hatched by MACV (Military Assis-
steps to centralize control of his squadrons. Previously, Corps tance Command Vietnam). Along with this increase in VNAF
commanders in the Vietnamese corps areas had guarded air A-1 aircraft came a push to enlarge the number of VNAF pilots
assets in their corps, sometimes not releasing them to neigh- available to fly the big Skyraiders. The aim was to increase the
boring corps. Now Ky planned to assign new wings to geo- ratio from 1.5 pilots per plane to 2 per plane. Training ofVNAF
graphical corps areas, but not to the corps commanders. This 516th and 520th Fighter Squadron pilots was split between
gave Ky the centralized control of these air assets for deploy- the USAF's 34th Tactical Group and the U.S. Navy's VA-152
ment wherever needed. squadron at Bien Hoa. The 34th received the original flight of
Meanwhile, wing failures in Farm Gate B-26s and T-28s six A-1 Es on 30 May 1964, ferried from Clark Air Base in the
prompted the withdrawal of most of these two aircraft types Philippines to Bien Hoa. The E-model Skyraider, under the
from combat. The old craft were being loaded beyond their revised designation system for American military aircraft, was
limits in wrenching maneuvers that overstressed their wing the multi-seat AD-5. The day after their arrival, these A-1 Es
spars. Some B-26s would return to Southeast Asia as B-26K flew combat. The 34th Group had a dozen A-1 Es by the end
Counter Invaders with strengthened wings and more under- of June, with which to train Vietnamese pilots.
wing ordnance racks. Butthe real solution tothe gap in ground During this period, frailties in USAF-VNAF tactical opera-
attack aircraft left by the B-26s and T-28s was to send more tions manifested themselves. In July 1964, the Nam Dong
Skyraiders overseas. The dual-control A-1 Es (AD-5s) which special forces camp was besieged by Viet Cong at night.
arrived in 1964 gave Farm Gate fliers a chance to get into While a flareship remained on station and illuminated the area
combat with Vietnamese crewmen aboard, to legitimize the until dawn robbed the VC of cover, VNAF A-1 Hs did not arrive
operations in the eyes of American planners who still insisted on scene with an 0-1 forward air controller until daylight
the U.S. role was advisory. because the A-1 drivers were not released for night sorties. To
Viet Cong groundfire was becoming more concentrated compound this delay, the 0-1 was bound by Vietnamese rules
and more accurate. A defense to this was the use of four-ship which forbade FACs from marking targets near friendly forces
attack formations, allowing two A-1 s to cover the two making without positive identification. The FAC over Nam Dong was
an attack. The U.S. Air Force planned to have three Skyraider unable to raise the ground forces on radio. Later that month,
squadrons in South Vietnam by 1965. In part, these U.S. USAF A-1 Es, ostensibly with qualified VNAFtrainees aboard,
Skyraiders would shore up sortie rates which sagged. The pressed attacks coordinated by a U.S. Army 0-1 pilot. But
other forecast benefit, reasoned General Joseph H. Moore, subsequent Vietnamese Skyraider pilots in this battle refused
Second Air Division commander, would be the example to to strike targets pointed out by the U.S. controller and a
VNAF fliers set by USAF A-1 E crews flying timely air support Vietnamese ground observer. By the time a Vietnamese FAC
strikes, with their token Vietnamese crewmembers aboard. was on station, the VC were gone from the battle scene. 23

82 Douglas A·1 Skyraider

 As the second half of 1964 wore on, American planners
tried to make ground attack aviation in Vietnam more effec-
tive. More A-1 s were earmarked for the VNAF, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff proposed letting the "sandbag" VNAF observ-
ers fulfill the need for VNAF observers aboa~d USAF A-1 Es on
strike missions. The use of "sandbags" was resisted by
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Ambassador to
South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, who were loathe to see the
American air combat role expanded in Vietnam. As forecast,
the fourth VNAF A-1 squadron came into existence in Octo-
ber. By December, the men of this unit, the 520th Fighter
Squadron, were ready to fly combat in their A-1 Hs. Their
intended base of Can Tho (the name of which was later
changed to Binh Thuy) was still under construction, and
security for the Skyraiders could not be provided after dark. So
five 520th Skyraiders deployed to Binh Thuy daily from Bien
Hoa, to spread the A-1 umbrella over a larger part of South
Vietnam.
By December 1964, the USAF's 34th Group could muster
about 50 Skyraider sorties daily, some 17 of which were
usable for combat. Though plagued by engine maintenance
problems, the 34th kept an operational readiness rate of 80
percent. A comparable Vietnamese A-1 operational rate of
that period was 58 percent,24
On 1 November 1964 a Viet Cong mortar squad got close
enough to the Bien Hoa flightline to lob projectiles in the dark
of night for a half hour. Five USAF B-57s were destroyed;
other USAF and VNAF planes were destroyed or damaged.
Four persons were killed and 72 injured in the VC attack.
Washington was at once outraged at the attack and indecisive
on how to respond. While the Americans mulled over their
response, on the night of 6 November Air Vice Marshal Ky
commanded a flight of 32 VNAF A-1 Hs which struck a Viet
Cong camp in Zone D Northeast of Saigon. The South
Vietnamese made it known this air raid was a response to the
Bien Hoa mortar attack. By their own tallies, the South
Vietnamese claimed to have inflicted 500 Viet Cong casual-
ties in this Skyraider fight. Whatever the casualty count, this
raid showed an increased capability on the part of Vietnamese
Skyraider squadrons.
By year's end, 48 USAF A-1 Es and 92 VNAF A-1 s were
counted in South Vietnam. Together these Skyraiders could
mount about 60 combat sorties daily plus training missions. 25
The Vietnamese contribution to this mission tally was limited
by Air Vice Marshal Ky's anti-coup flight of Skyraiders at Tan
Son Nhut. These A-1 s were manned by dependable, loyal
fliers. Though the palace guard drew combat missions, these
planes sometimes were withheld from action if dissidence
seemed to warrant this.
VNAF and USAF pilots learned to love their big radial-
engine bombers. Some pilots requested A-1 s for the experi-
ence of flying a propeller-driven, tailwheeled design reaching
back to World War II, when their fellow flying class graduates
were testing the limits of supersonic jets. Some new naviga-
tional aids, and the Yankee crew extraction parachute system,
helped ease the Skyraider into its mid-Sixties war.
The U.S. Air Force flight manual for A-1 aircraft, upgraded
for changes through 30 April 1972, explains the nature of the
Vietnam-era Skyraider which confronted USAF and VNAF
pilots. For the dual-control A-1 Es, an additional throttle control
lever was installed on the center console, enabling the pilot in
the righthand seat to make throttle adjustments with his left
hand, which was standard for stick-and-throttle aircraft. This
right-seat throttle was directly connected to the original pilot's
throttle on the left console of the aircraft, and the right seater
did not have his own throttle stops or friction locks. Addition-
ally, the right seatthrottle had a stowable guard which covered
the spare throttle when the left seat pilot was flying, to prevent
accidental movement of the throttle controls by the right
seater. 26 Some A-1 Es were fitted with right-seat rudder pedals
identical to those for the left seat. The right-seat pilot, some-
what euphemistically called the "assistant pilot" in the USAF
Skyraiderflight manual, had at his disposal a control stick grip
identical to the pilot's grip, with appropriate trim tab switches,
gun trigger, and external-stores release switches. The assis-
tant pilot's control stick could be removed and stowed in a
bracket on the outboard side of the righthand console. When
this was done, crews were admonished to install a dust cap
over the control stick housing's electrical connector to avoid
short-circuiting the trim tab or armament release circuitry.
Some A-1 Es were fitted with an assistant pilot's rudder trim
control knob which was identical to the pilot's rudder trim
equipment. The assistant pilot could use this to trim the rudder
when the trim selector switch was turned to the position
marked CO-PILOT.
Aircraft supplied to foreign countries were identified as
Military Assistance Program (MAP) equipment. The Air Force
Skyraider flight manual makes distinctions between equip-
ment typically installed on USAF A-1 s versus the equipment
in MAP Skyraiders. Among the USAF-reserved options was
the XM-47 mine disperser, and autopilot gyro horizon indica-
tor.
According to the flight manual, many USAF and VNAF
Skyraiders flew with the stall warning system deactivated.
Some others did not use the speed brakes. But for USAF and
MAP A-1 s which retained functional dive brakes, features and
limitations were discussed in the flight manual. For A-1 Es with
operable brakes, the brake was a hydraulically-actuated flat
surface that hinged from the bottom of the fuselage. A switch
on the control stick actuated the brake. The brake had a blow-
back feature which retracted the brake at airspeeds above
348 knots indicated airspeed (lAS) to avoid structure damage.
An interconnect between the landing gear and the speed
brake prevented extending the brake when the landing gear
was down. This feature also retracted the brake if it was in the
deployed position when the landing gear handle was moved
to the Down position. An override made it possible to have
gear and brake extended simultaneously for emergency op-
eration. This override was located on the lefthand console on
A-1 Es so equipped.
Single-seat USAF and MAP Skyraiders had three fuse-
lage-mounted brake panels: One ventral and two sidemounted.
No mechanical linkage tied the three panels together. Rather,
each brake panel's operating cylinder operated simultaneously
with the other two. On the single-seaters the speed brake
control was situated on the left console. When activated, the
Early Asia 83 ,
On 1 July 1966, this modified A·1G of the VNAF 524th Tactical Fighter Squadron suffered a landing gear collapse, with the
usual severe bending of the hollow Aeroproducts propeller. VNAF tail marking was yellow with red stripes; 524th Squadron
emblem on cowl (both sides) featured a red disc edged in yellow, with a black bomb, white lightning bolt, yellow '524' and
white inscription 'Thien Loi'. This A-1G carried no national insignia on its wings. (Photos by Earl Otto.)

84 Douglas A·1 Skyraider

three brake panels took about two and a half seconds to open.
A manual lockout valve could be set to prevent the ventral
brake from deploying when large stores, which might inter-
fere, were carried on the centerline rack. A solenoid safety
lock prevented use ofthe brakes on single-seat Skyraiders on
the ground.
The speed brakes were designed to allow steep dives
without building up excessive speed, which made stick forces
greater and prolonged recovery from a dive. USAF and MAP
Skyraider pilots were cautioned never to use the moveable
stabilizer for dive recovery. Only elevator back pressure on
the control'stick was permitted, to avoid excessive loads
which could cause structural failure. Crews were also told,
when making dives with the speed brakes extended, to keep
the brakes deployed until the dive recovery was well under-
way and the Skyraider was nearly level. If the brakes were
retracted in the dive before pull-up, the dive speed would
increase and possibly be joined by a nose-down trim change. 27
Though it may seem incredible, the statistics of flight
include several instances in which the pilots of folding-wing
aircraft attempted to take off in their machines while the wings
were still folded. The USAF Skyraider flight manual detailed a
feature of the A-1 which would, it was hoped, deter this costly
oversight. Crews were admonished that "the wing pin lock
door and the wing fold handle should be kept in the open
(unlocked and folded) position at all times when the wings are
folded ...The angular position of the wing pin lock door, when
in the full open position and restricting the movement of the
pilot's knee, serves as a warning to the pilot to spread the
wings before takeoff."
USAF and VNAF pilots learned the fundamentals of the
twisting and folding main landing gear mechanism on their
sturdy Skyraiders. As the main struts streamlined and re-
tracted aft, they automatically telescoped in, compressing to
fit between the wing spars.
The men who flew Skyraiders for the VNAF and USAF in
southeast Asia were warned never to set or reset their planes'
G-2 gyro compass while flying the Skyraider with the P-1
autopilot in use. If the G-2 compass was set in this mode, it
could induce in the autopilot abrupt and violent rudder forces
stronger than the design limits of the A_1. 28
These Skyraider pilots had the Yankee crew escape
system at their disposal. A rocket pulled the crew member
from the cockpit as his seat bottom folded downward. With the
crew member pulled into a standing position and automati-
cally separated from the partially extracted seat, the rocket
separated from the crewman and the parachute deployed.
The firing sequence activated a canopy cutter to create
openings forthe pilot and right-seater in the A-1 E; in the A-1 H,
the entire canopy was jettisoned before the extraction se-
quence would work. Two angled rocket nozzles spin-stabi-
lized the Yankee rocket; two lines between the crewman's
parachute and the rocket were attached with a swivel to avoid
fouling. The Yankee system was viable even at ground level.
In the event passengers were aboard the A-1 E in seats
behind the pilots, the following instructions for abandoning the
airplane in flight were given by the Air Force to its Vietnam-era
students: 29
WARNING
It is imperative, if passengers are occupying the middle
compartment, that the aft canopy be jettisoned before
the forward canopy.
Failure to observe this precaution will cause an
extreme pressure drop within the airplane. At speeds
greater than 250 KIAS, the result may be structural
failu re to the aft fuselage section and collapse ofthe aft
canopy with an inward burst of shattered plexiglass. At
speeds below 250 KIAS, the reduced pressure may
dangerously hinder an attemptto jettison the aft canopy.
When abandoning the airplane from the middle
compartment, care must be taken to keep the body as
low to the compartment rail as possible during bailout.
Upon gaining the proper position for bailout, give a
vigorous coordinated push with the feet and pull-push
with the hands and arms while diving for the wing. This
is necessary to ensure a clear breakaway from the
fuselage, wing, and horizontal stabilizer. The body
should be doubled up with the legs and arms well
tucked in upon leaving the airplane. Bailout should be
accomplished from a point as far forward as possible.
This will provide the individual with some protection
from the slipstream, during the initial roll over the rail,
and will aid in clearing the horizontal stabilizer.
Whenever possible, bailout should be made from
the right side of the airplane.
EqUipped with this knowledge and much more provided by
seasoned pilots, VNAF and USAF Skyraider pilots gained the
confidence needed to maximize their use of the A-1 as a
combat aircraft.
A normal takeoff run was described in the Air Force A-1
flight manual as follows:
TAKEOFF
Release brakes and advance throttle smoothly to full
power, do not exceed predicted TOP or allowable MAP.
As the aircraft accelerates, the pilot should be in no
hurry to raise the tail. During the initial roll, the pilot
should concentrate on heading control. The rudder
becomes effective at an airspeed of 15 to 20 knots. It
may therefore be necessary, especially in a calm or
light wind condition, to apply small amount of braking
action to help maintain directional control until the air
speed atwhich the rudder becomes effective is reached.
The tailwheel should be held on the runway for the first
part of the roll, as this will help maintain directional
control and minimize the need for braking. After the
rudder becomes effective, back stick pressure is re-
laxed and enough forward pressure is applied to raise
the tailwheel off the runway to position the airplane in
a slightly flatter than takeoff attitude. To maintain a
straight takeoff roll, it is necessary to change rudder
pressure as the airspeed increases. At takeoff speed,
rudder pressure should be almost neutral. The flatter
Early Asia 85
 attitude is held until takeoff airspeed is approached at
which time the airplane is rotated slightly and allowed
to lift from the runway. No attempt should be made to
pUll it off. Typical takeoff speeds with wing flaps up and
gross weight of 18,500 pounds are 95 to 100 KIAS. With
25-degree wing flap setting and a gross weight of
25,000 pounds, takeoff speed Is 110 KIAS. The landing
gear should retract in a maximum time of 9 seconds.
The throttle lever should not be retarded until the
wheels are retracted and the airplane has attained
sufficient altitude and airspeed to permit safe control in
the event of sudden engine failure.
For landing the Skyraider, the manual for USAF and VNAF
pilots instructed:
LANDING
liThe most important factor in landing is a good ap-
proach and airspeed. For the best aircraft control on
approach, maintain a speed 20 percent above stalling
speed for aircraft weight (Section VI). Use power as
necessary to maintain airspeed on final. Leave the
power on when making wheels landings, during cross
wind landings, or when encountering turbulence. If the
landing is to be made three point, then all three wheels
should contact the runway simultaneously. Under this
condition the tail wheel is on the ground immediately
and the chances of a ground loop are reduced. The
three point attitude should be established just prior to
touchdown. In making a wheels landing, the aircraft
must be flown to a touchdown point with power on and
landing on the two main gear only.
On touchdown the power is gradually eased off
while lowering the tail wheel to the runway. After the tail
wheel is on the runway, hold the stick full back with
aileron into the wind, check the throttle closed, trim full
nose up, and raise the flaps. Use rudder and aileron
aggressively to maintain directional control. Placing
the stick into the crosswind will help to keep the aircraft
rolling straight with approximately one third less rud-
der displacement. The raised upwind aileron is keeping
the wing from raising; the lowered downward aileron is
creating drag, preventing to some degree the
weathervane tendency. As airspeed decreases during
the rollout and the controls become ineffective, quickly
slide your feet up on the brakes and cautiously begin to
use differential braking for directional control. Do not
86 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
land with feet on the brakes. The application or reduc-
tion of power, variations in wind direction or speed,
landing in a crab, over controlling on the part of the
pilot - all of these, separately or in combination can
cause the airplane to rapidly change its heading. If this
heading change is not correctly countered it can de-
velop into a vicious swerve. For this reason, the pilot
must be especially alert and immediately responsive to
any heading deviation on the ground.
When VNAF and USAF pilots jumped from the two-seat A-1 E
to the single seat A-1 H, some alterations in flying technique
were advised in the flight manual:
A-1 H LANDING
With very few exceptions, procedures and techniques
used in landing the A-1E can be employed in landing
the A-1 H. The rudder is about three feet smaller in total
area than the E and the rudder has a stiffer feel due to
greater rudder spring tension in the controls. For these
reasons be more alert in the H than in the E for devia-
tions in roll-out heading. The shorter control stick is a
significant difference and will require a few changes in
technique. Because of limited lateral displacement of
the stick, when landing in strong cross-winds, the leg
on the upwind side of the cockpit will sometimes have
to be raised to obtain full aileron deflection.
Without a bomb ejector cartridge, Skyraider centerline stores,
particularly empty fuel tanks, could strike the fuselage upon
release. Jettisoning large centerline stores could also cause
the Skyraider to nose over.
The Americans and South Vietnamese were not the only
personnel in Southeast Asia with a Skyraider syllabus. The
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia prepared a somewhat rustic
training document for ground troops. Translated by lieuten-
ant Colonel Sok Sambaur of the Khmer (Cambodian) Air
Force, part Four of the "Aircraft Shooting Lesson" is entitled
"Howto ShootA-1 (orT-28)." Crediting these prop planes with
a rather incredible speed of 600 kilometers per hour, the
document stated: "We must lead him by three times the length
of his fuselage, because he almost has the speed of an OV-
10. We must all shoot together at the karman Uuncture of
wings and fuselage), pointing our guns at the same place
when he is diving."30
The accuracy of groundfire in Southeast Asia would take
a toll of the Skyraiders over the years of conflict.
Notes 16. Ibid, p. 75.
1. Air Force Magazine, August 1964. 17. Ibid, p. 80.
2. "Farewell to 'Spads'," by Lt. Cdr. A. Dodge McFall, USN, U.S. Naval 18. Ibid, p. 129.
Institute Proceedings, April 1965. 19. Ibid, p. 129.
3. Aviation Week and Space Technology, June 1, 1964, p. 16. 20. Ibid, pp. 156-157.
4. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, Office of Air Force History, 21. Ibid, p. 197.
Washington, D.C., 1977, p.27. 22. Ibid, p. 218.
5. Interview, Gen. Nguyen Cao Ky with Frederick A. Johnsen, 22 July 1982. 23. Ibid, pp. 220-224.
6. Ibid. 24. Ibid, p. 237.
7. Ibid. 25. Ibid, p. 263.
8. Ibid. 26. Flight Manual, USAF Series A-1 E/G/H/J Aircraft, T.O. 1A-1 E-1 , 30 April
9. Ibid. 1971 (change 2-30 April 1972).
10. Ibid. 27. Ibid.
11. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, Office of Air Force History, 28. Ibid.
Washington, D.C., 1977, pp. 141-142. 29. Ibid.
12. Interview, Gen. Nguyen Cao Kywith Frederick A. Johnsen, 22 July 1982. 30. Aircraft Shooting Lesson, How to Shoot A-1 (or T-28), translated 15
13. Ibid. August 1971 by Lt. Col. Sok Sambaur, Cambodian Air Force. Translation
14. Ibid. furnished by Colonel Ronald G., Linder, USAF (Retired).
15. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to
1965, by Robert F. Futrell, Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C.,
1981, pp. 79-84.

Early Asia 87
 CHAPTER VII
The N,ctvy in Vietnam
"Once more upon the waters! Yet once more!" Byron, Chi/de Harold

A n American presence in French Indochina built month advising and training the Vietnamese Air Force, ac-
subtly for years. During World War Two, Army cording to a report published in the January 1965 issue of
Air Forces B-24 Liberator bombers hit Japanese Naval Aviation News, the Navy's official flying house organ.
targets in occupied Indochina while Navy fighters and bomb- Overt U.S. Navy combat missions in A-1 s began August
ers ranged over the land. After the end of the Second World 5, 1964, in retaliatory strikes launched from the USS
War, colonial France fought a gentleman's war against com- Ticonderoga and Constellation after North Vietnamese patrol
munist and nationalist insurgents who sought to remove the boats attacked American destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin. A
French from power. When the French garrison at Dien Bien total of 64 sorties included A-4 Skyhawks and MiG-cap F-8
Phu faced a major siege by the insurgents, French reinforce- Crusaders, as well as A-1 Hs from VA-52 and VA-145. 2
menttroops were flown in by U.S. Air Force C-124 Globemaster Five targets in North Vietnam were hit during the four-hour
transports. operation of August 5. In addition to an oil tank farm at Ninh,
A familiar pattern emerged in Vietnam. The communists the planes of the fleet hit four patrol boat bases. Following the
controlled the northern part of the country, contiguous to strike, Robert McNamara, secretary of defense, estimated 25
communist China, while the non-communists fled to the south. patrol boats were destroyed. A Skyhawk was downed and its
This geography would later produce frustrating rules of en- pilot captured. Lt. Gg) Richard Sather's Skyraider from Con-
gagement allowing communist jets to escape pursuit by flying stellation was another victim of anti-aircraft fire. A second
across the border into China. Skyraider from the Constellation sustained damage requiring
But in the late 1950s the concerns were not over jet it to divert to Danang in South Vietnam where the pilot landed
warfare. Rather, in observance of Geneva accords, the United safely. Sather initially was listed missing in action. 3
States sought to bolster South Vietnam's air forces with For nearly four years, the Navy would launch Skyraiders
propeller-driven planes instead of escalating a hardware war on southeast Asia combat sorties from carriers in the South
by introducing jets. South Vietnam had been flying F8F China Sea. The American posture in the early years offighting
Bearcats. The U.S. Navy, with its lingering use of piston- in southeast Asia frequently linked communist raids with
engine shipboard planes, had more to offer the Vietnamese specifically-cited retaliatory air strikes designed to instill a
than did the fast-flying jet U.S. Air Force of the period. Not cause-and-effect reaction among the communists. Commu-
surprisingly, AD Skyraiders were picked for the growing air nist attacks which killed American advisors in South Vietnam,
force of South Vietnam, as chronicled in the previous chapter. and allegations of increased communist atrocities against
The U.S. Navy trained South Vietnamese air force pilots civilians, provided the "cause" for the "effect" of raids launched
in Skyraider operations in 1960 when some AD-6s were given by the carriers Hancock and Coral Sea in the first part of
to the Vietnamese. Initially, six officers and eight enlisted February 1965. The second strike, launched February 11,
members of the VNAF (Vietnam Air Force) trained at Corpus was a responsive strike against North Vietnamese and Viet
Christi, Texas, for a month and a half before joining with attack· Cong barracks and staging areas. Among the naval partici-
squadron VA-122 for more training out of North Island, San . pants were the sturdy Skyraiders of VA-125, joining A-4C and
Diego, California. The Vietnamese aviators flew single-seat A-4E Skyhawk attack jets. F-8C and F-8E Crusaders provided
AD-6s. They participated in training exercises off the Califor- fighter escort. Though three jets were downed, the A-1s
nia coast and over the expansive desert near Yuma, Arizona. escaped this fate. The Skyraider was back in combat with the
The original AD-6s for the South Vietnamese came under the U.S. Navy, and serving reliably.4
auspices of the Mutual Defense Assistance Pact,1 On June 20, 1965, four A-1 H single-seaters from VA-25
Four years later, in October 1964, the U.S. Navy was mixed it up with North Vietnamese MiG jets, downing a MiG-
given the task of training 22 U.S. Air Force officers how to fly 17 and discouraging another. Navy Lt. Clint Johnson was
A-1 H Skyraiders at Corpus Christi. Training Squadron 30 (VT- credited with squeezing off the 20-millimeter rounds which
30) had the job at Corpus. The Air Force fliers were subse- doomed the enemy jet fighter. Johnson, flying VA-25's A-1 H
quently assigned to South Vietnam to advise VNAF Skyraider number 139768, caught the MiG-17 slow and in front of him as
fliers. Ultimately, USAF Skyraider pilots would train their own the jets attempted to dogfight in the A-1 s' speed range. A
in use of the A-1, but in the early 1960s, the Navy had the second A-1 pursued the attack on the MiG, joining Johnson in
expertise. a classic scissors maneuver. One A-1 fired from above and
In South Vietnam, Detachment Zulu of U.S. Navy squad- the other from below the communist jet, according to a
ron VA-152 trained more Vietnamese pilots in the tactical contemporary account of the fray in the June 28, 1965, issue
employment of the Skyraider in the early 1960s. The detach- of Aviation Week and Space Technology. The Aviation Week
ment presented A-1 qualification certificates to successful clientele of aerospace engineers and related industry profes-
VNAF graduates. The detachment flew nearly 1,000 hours a sionals doubtlessly were amazed to see the old and slow

88 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

Skyraider emerge victorious in a dogfight against jets, though
the outcome was less profound to them than it was to the MiG-
17 driver that June day.
Nor was VA-25's kill to be the only jet downed by a
Skyraider over Vietnam. On October 9, 1966, Lt. Ug) W.T.
Patton, flying A-1 H number 137543 of VA-176, engaged a
MiG over North Vietnam. Patton wasn't certain whether his
bogey was a MiG-17 or a -21. The enemy jet was attacking a
fellow Skyraider at low altitude and subsonic speed. Patton
entered the engagement from about a half mile above the
MiG, diving to build up speed against the faster jet.
The MiG pilot broke off his attack and sought to gain
altitude in a climbing left turn. Patton's diving speed brought
him to within about 200 feet of the MiG, where rounds from the
A-1 H's four cannons punctured the jet aircraft's structure. As
the MiG rapidly departed controlled flight and went inverted,
the North Vietnamese pilot ejected. Subsequent accounts of
Patton's victory suggest his quarry was a MiG-17.
In 1966, Lt. Ug) Norman Lessard told a war correspondent
what Skyraider bomb strikes were like, from launch to recov-
ery aboard the USS Ranger. Sometimes laden with four tons
of bombs, Lessard's Skyraider hurled off the Ranger to join
other VA-145 A-1 s en route to the target. Radio silence was
seldom broken by Lessard and his squadron mates, who
chose instead to motor within 30 feet of each other for sign
language or, if at night, light signals. 5
Plunging earthward in an attacking dive, Lessard had no
time to contemplate his vulnerability to the intense communist
anti-aircraft fire. He concentrated on attack angles and sight
computations, registering bomb release by the distinct feeling
his A-1 had when heavy ordnance fell from the wings. Then it
was into a muscle-tugging 4.5g pullout for Lessard and his
"Spad." If the target were important enough, or the groundfire
negligible, a second run-in might be initiated.
There was some frustration for Lessard and his comrades
because their targets frequently were obscured by the jungle's
canopy. Only the occasional secondary explosion hinted at
target destruction. Far more visible was the return fire from
automatic weapons and heavy anti-aircraft guns. 6
It was the intense groundfire which damaged the A-1 H of
Navy Lt. Ug) Dieter Dengler on February 1, 1966, as the flier
from USS Ranger struck North Vietnamese targets near the
Laotian border. The Skyraider remained controllable, so
Dengler headed west, managing a crash landing in Laos.
Dieter vacated his Skyraider and hid from searchers whom he
thought to be of no good to his cause. He slept in his sleeping
bag that night, and commenced his foot travel again at
daybreak. A pair of Pathet Lao men caught Dengler about
noon, and relieved the Navy flier of his watch and compass.
For the next week and a day, Dengler was abused by his
captors. He was staked to the ground where leeches and
insects infested him, and marched from village to village. On
one occasion, Dengler faced whistling bullets when he was
tied to a tree as his captors intentionally shot branches from
the tree.
Dengler, a naturalized citizen born in Germany, probably
confounded his tormentors because he still carried an expired
German passport to explain his accent. Two weeks after
crash-landing his A-1 , Dieter Dengler was brought to a prison
in the jungle where six other prisoners were kept. Months
passed as the prisoners contemplated an escape, waiting for
monsoo ins they thought would aid their getaway. Getting
wind of guards' inclinations toward executing the prisoners,
the captives made their break June 29, 1966. Skyraider pilot
Dengler slipped out of his wooden restraints and stole four
American and Chinese guns. A firefight erupted, during which
several guards were shot and probably killed. Dengler and
U.S. Air Force 1 Lt. Duane Martin paired up and slipped into
the jungle, barefoot and ill. The two built a raft and traveled
down a stream until losing the vessel in a waterfall.
Ten days after their violent escape, Dengler and Martin
stumbled across an abandoned village where they spent the
night. Days later, Dengler tried signal fires, but drew no
friendly aircraft. A week later, as Dieter Dengler and Martin
approached what they thought was an abandoned village, a
man leaped from a hut and set upon Martin with a machete.
The Air Force lieutenant fell, dying from wounds hacked by his
attacker, who then turned on Dengler who had been behind
Martin. When the swung machete missed Dieter, he managed
to escape into the jungle. That night, Dengler torched the
village where the attack had taken place.
Twenty-two days after escaping the prison, Dengler tried
again to signal planes by laying out an S.O.S. message with
remnants of a parachute flare. Another Skyraider pilot - Air
Force Lt. Col. Eugene Deatrich - saw Dengler's sign and
ushered a rescue helicopter to where Dengler waited for the
lowered sling.?
As 1966 closed, Navy carrier Airborne Early Warning
Squadron 33 ryAW-33) retired its last two EA-1 E "Guppy"
Skyraiders, so nicknamed for the ventral radomes they car-
ried. The EA-1 E entered seNice under the old designation
AD-5W. The Guppies of VAW-33 intercepted. and photo-
graphed Soviet Badger jet bombers reconnoitering 1964
NATO exercises, and flew support missions for the splash-
down recoveries of five Gemini space capsules. The retire-
ment of VAW-33's last pair of Guppies marked the end of
operational ASW (antisubmarine warfare) EA-1 E seNice in
the Navy.s (Some electronics-laden EA-1 F-models seNed a
while longer.)
When VA-75 launched the first jet A-6 Intruder attacks in
July 1965, the inevitable draw-down of A-1 s was apparent.
The radar of the Intruder gave the jet an attractive all-weather
capability, and its electronics jamming abilities were turned
against the surface-to-air missiles which increasingly made
flying over North Vietnam dangerous. VA-25 took Navy
Skyraiders out of combat in the first quarter of 1968, but A-1 s
flew combat with the U.S. Air Force and the air force of South
Vietnam for several years to come.
Notes
1. "South Viet Nam to Get Skyraiders", Naval Aviation News, October 1960,
p.30.
2. "For This Unprovoked Attack", Naval Aviation News, September 1964,
p.11; plus information provided by aviation historian Rene Francillon.
3. "For This Unprovoked Attack", Naval Aviation News, September 1964,
p.11.
4. "Vietnam: War at Sea and Ashore", Naval Aviation News, May 1965, pp.
18-22.
5. "Today's Pilots for Today's Conflict", Naval Aviation News, 1966, p.B.
6.lbid.
7. "A Grounded Eagle Escapes Captors", Naval Aviation News, November
1966, pp. 18-19.
B. "VAW-33 Retires EA-1E 'Guppies"', Naval Aviation News, 1967, p.16
The Navy in Vietnam 89
90 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
 CHAPTER VIII
No More Kid Gloves:
New Tricks for an Able Dog
"Let us not be too particular. It is better to have old second-hand diamonds than none at all." Mark Twain

B y 1965, American air operations in Vietnam were

increasingly overt and aggressive, in the wake of
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks viewed
as provocations. As 1965 began, the U.S. Air Force pondered
a way to avoid the need for a lengthy ground battle by using
C-123s took. In March, the Second Air Division revived the
forestfire idea, suggesting saturating the windward area ofthe
woods with fuel to be ignited by bombing. It was hoped the
wind would spread this fire into the defoliated target acreage.
MACV bought the scheme. Choices ranged from having low-
airpower to rout a Viet Cong base from the Soi Loi Woods, a flying KC-135 tankers spray fuel from altitudes of 300-500
tropical forest 10 miles from the Cambodian border, and some feet, to having transport planes dump barrels of fuel.
25 miles northwest of Saigon, within South Vietnam. On 31 March, 24 C-123 sorties dumped 1,200 gallons of
The American answer to the problem intended to deny the diesel fuel each from drums, along with flares intended to
Viet Cong use of the forest in which to hide their base. To do ignite the splashed fuel. Skyraiders swept over the fuel-
this, plans called for stripping the trees of their leaves by soaked woods, dropping napalm on. the same area. The
chemical defoliation, and then burning the denuded trees with conclusion ofthe Soi Loi firebombing experiment was eight S-
a fueled fire. American advisors supported the idea, and the 57 sorties, sowing M35 incendiary bombs ahead of the main
South Vietnamese government agreed. Vietnamese officials fire in an effort to induce the flames to spread in that direction. 2
asked the U.S. Air Force's Ranch Hand defoliation operation Two thunderstorms followed the bombers that day, and
to spray 18,500 acres in the Soi Loi Woods where, the quenchedtheflames.Thefireshadnotfannedfarfromwhere
Vietnamese believed, one Viet Cong regiment and two guer- the flares and Skyraider napalm had ignited them, just as
rilla units shared the woods with 100 acres of crops. The some MACV analysts had originally predicted. Though propo-
defoliation and burning were to be preceded by publicity nents of the fire-starting blamed the rain, subsequent experi-
intended to move noncombatant residents of the woods into ments proved again and again that forest fires were not a
secure South Vietnamese resettlement areas. practical tool of war in the jungles of South Vietnam. 3
General William Westmoreland, commander of the U.S. The use of Skyraiders for flak-suppression was to con-
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), asked for a tinue throughout the war, with varying success. The loiter time
staff opinion on the Soi Loi operation. Air Force Major General of the chugging A-1 was high, allowing repeated runs on a
Robert R. Rowland, head of the Air Force Advisory Group in persistent target.
Vietnam, hatched the fire plan. MACV analysts said the Skyraiders were employed in other unconventional op-
tropical Soi Loi Woods would not catch fire like an American erations in Vietnam. The early Farm Gate U.S. Air Force fliers
pine forest would, but the chemical defoliation might in itself be
sought ways to airdrop vital supplies to besieged outposts.
promising. So defoliation was ordered, preceded by heavy This included airdrops from Skyraiders. At Pleiku, U.S. Air
USAF and VNAF Skyraider strikes in the Soi Loi Woods Force Colonel Eugene P. Deatrick, Jr., commanderofthe First
between 18-20 January. The combined A-1 strikes dropped Air Commando Squadron, worked with Lieutenant Colonel
more than 395 tons of bombs. In addition to specific VC Eleazar Parmly IV, the U.S. Army Special Forces commander,
targets, the Skyraiders engaged in area bombing. Sometimes to use the Air Commandos' Skyraiders in this supply role.
the Skyraiders released bombs with delayed fuses. These Canisters were already approved for this purpose, and were
bombs later exploded with a random uncertainty that made used by some VNAF Skyraider squadrons, but Deatrick and
Soi Loi residents uneasy, and may have helped persuade Parmly experimented with empty napalm tanks filled with
some of them to leave. Ranch Hand Fairchild C-123 Provider supplies and rigged with a parachute. Each A-1 could carry
transports began defoliating the area on 22 January, while the eight of the 500-pound converted napalm tanks. Tactics called
Skyraiders continued to bomb and strafe. This A-1 action for twilight drops, masked by strafing runs to keep the enemy
while the spray planes were deployed accounted for an unaware of the actual purpose of the drops by making them
additional 372 tons of bombs dropped in 316 sorties, with look like air strikes. Release of the parachute canisters was at
85,000 rounds of 20-millimeter cannon ammunition spent in slow speeds, at altitudes between 50 and 300 feet.
the Soi Loi Woods. 1 The aggressive Skyraider work was Early in November 1966, the squadron began these air
unusual for this period in the Vietnam war, and no doubt drop tactics west of Pleiku, with ground forces reporting a high
helped reduce the number of ground fire hits the low and slow recovery rate of supplies dropped this way.4
Though Seventh Air Force lauded the ingenuity of the
First Air Commando Squadron for these airdrops, further
OPPOSITE: The paraphernalia of modern warfare is lugged
from a Skyraider by U.S. Air Force A·1 pilot Ronald G. Linder,
experiments in this vein were turned down. The use of napalm
who flew combat and trained south Vietnamese pilots. (Photo tanks for supply drops by A-1 s was not publicized, and only a
from the collection of Col. Ronald G. Linder, USAF Ret.) few pilots were trained in the technique. During operation

No More Kid Gloves: New Tricks for an Able Dog 91

The U.S. Air Force snapped up multi-place A·1E Skyraiders for use in Vietnam, to train south Vietnamese pilots. Rigged with
dual controls, the early gray A·1 Es ostensibly were flown by Vietnamese pilots, with Americans only observing and advising,
in a time when the United States was not overtly engaged in combat operations. In actuality, Americans frequently flew
combat with Vietnamese on board to legitimize the strike. Black paint obscures the exhaust smudges on the fuselages of
these USAF A·1Es circa 1965. (Photo by Col. Ronald G. Linder, USAF Ret.)

Blackjack 31 in early 1967, the Army's Fifth Special Forces
Group recovered all 96 containers dropped by Skyraiders.
Later at Can Tho during Blackjack 41, several napalm contain-
ers filled with ammunition exploded on impact when the
supporting parachutes failed. The Skyraider delivery had a
disadvantage - nine·napalm tanks were equal to one airdrop
bundle from a C-7 Caribou aircraft, and a single Caribou could
carry three such bundles. It was more difficult to chase down
the numerous smaller Skyraider loads. s
But the successes enjoyed by Skyraider pilots in accu-
ratelydelivering supplies in converted napalm bombs prompted
some Army Special Forces officers to suggest expanding
these A-1 supply missions to cover all of Vietnam. Some Air
Force officers argued against diverting Skyraiders from actual
airstrike missions. In August 1967, the napalm canisters
received Air Force certification as airdrop supply containers,
but the airdrop role for U.S. Air Force Skyraiders dwindled
from a small start. 6
During the months of pilot training, while droning in an
airplane over a monotonous landscape, or while seated safely
with friends in the officers' club, it is human nature to ponder
whether one has the courage and judgment to wage heroic
actions in an emergency. Two U.S. Air Force Skyraider pilots
who demonstrated their heroism underfire in Vietnam earned
the United States' highest award, the Medal of Honor.
On 10 March 1966, Major Bernard F. Fisher (always
hailed as "Bernie" in written accounts of his actions) swung
into A-1 E number 649. The gray Skyraider was loaded with
100-pound bombs and poised on the ramp at Pleiku where the
First Air Commando Squadron set up shop. The mission was
an effort to rout 2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers who had
attacked and now occupied the south portion of the strategic
Special Forces camp at A Shau. The importance of A Shau
was the ability of the Special Forces there to observe North
Vietnamese troop movements into South Vietnam from nearby
Laos.
The ride to A Shau covered 150 miles. Fisher and five
other A-1 E pilots found an undercast obscuring the valley.
Major Fisher spied a hole in the clouds and took the other
Skyraiders down into the valley. The gray murk opened up
only 800 feet above ground, and the valley walls rose to 1,500
feet. The A Shau valley is less than one mile wide, but six miles
long, terminating in mountains at one end and Laos at the
other. Attacks on the communist troop positions could only be

92 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

made one way, down the length of the A Shau valley. Anti-
aircraft gunners on the sides of the valley poured fire into the
Skyraiders, sometimes actually aiming down on the low-flying
prop bombers. Captain Hubert King was the first casualty of
the A Shau shooting gallery when his A-1 's canopy shattered
from bullet impacts which narrowly missed King. With visibility
robbed by a crazed and shattered windscreen, King an-
nounced his predicament and poked his Skyraider back into
the clouds and limped for Pleiku. 7 King had been one of four
ofthe six Skyraider pilots participating in that first pass. Fisher
and the other two remaining from that first pass cranked their
A-1 s around in tight turns to make another attack on the
overrun A Shau camp. The besieged defenders of A Shau,
holed up in the north bunker of the camp, radioed enemy
positions to the Skyraider pilots who responded with accurate
attacks.
On the second Skyraider attack, Major Dafford W. "Jump"
Myers was jolted in his A-1 E as big-bore anti-aircraft rounds
connected with the moving target he presented. As Myers'
Skyraider lost power it sheeted flame back past its tail. Myers'
A-1 would come to earth quickly, and he guided his sudden
glider in for the only landing approach he would get on the
battle-littered A Shau landing strip. On the radio Major Fisher
urged Myers to retract his Skyraider's landing gear when it
became apparent the crippled A-1 was carrying too much
deadstick speed to stop on the short runway with its wheels
rolling. In the rushed seconds remaining, Major Myers pulled
up the gear and tried in vain to jettison the plane's centerline
fuel tank. That drop tank ruptured and exploded in flame as
Myers rode the Skyraider to a halt, skidding off the right side
of the runway. Overhead, Bernie Fisher made a pylon turn
above his long-time buddy Myers. As the Skyraider burned,
Myers finally emerged after doffing his personal gear. Trailing
smoke, Myers scrambled out the right wing of his ruined
Skyraider and headed for undergrowth on the side of the
airstrip opposite enemy positions. The other two Skyraiders of
the original six joined up with Bernie Fisher and his wingman,
Captain Francisco "Paco" Vazquez, and the four A-1 s repeat-
edly strafed the enemy to aid both the Special Forces contin-
gent and their downed fellow flier.
The airborne command post involved in the A Shau
operation said a rescue helicopter was 20 minutes away. Ten

USAF A-1 Es adopted tactical camouflage colors for the war in southeast Asia. Dark aft canopy was tinted blue, giving rise to
the nickname for the rear compartment on A-1 Es: 'The Blue Room.' (Douglas photo via Harry Gann.)

No More Kid Gloves: New Tricks for an Able Dog 93

Bernie Fisher's legendary A-1 E almost didn't make it to the Air Force Museum. Number 32649 suffered a major accident in
Vietnam, shedding debris in the process. (Photos courtesy Dave Menard.)

A diving A-1E pilot concentrates on the onrushing ground as he makes an attack against communist positions in southeast
Asia. (Douglas photo via Harry Gann.)

94 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

minutes later another radio transmission from the command
post said the chopper was still 20 minutes distant, and asked
Fisher if he could meet up with the helo and guide it back
through the hole in the clouds.
Major Fisher quickly nixed that idea. The departure of
Skyraiders from their strafing runs would likely have given the
communists timeto reach the downed Myers and capture him.
Instead, against advice from the command post, Bernie Fisher
elected to land on the same airstrip and try to pick up Myers.
With Paco Vazquez flying on his wing, hosing A Shau with
cannon fire, Bernie Fisher shredded through a pall of smoke
and touched his Skyraider's wheels on the plank steel runway
mat. Battle debris, rocket pods, oil drums and sheet metal
littered the wet metal-clad airstrip. Fisher gingerly applied
rudder to dodge the garbage in his path, and came to the
sinking realization his big Skyraider could not stop on the
2,500-foot runway. Cobbing the power to his plane's Wright R-
3350 engine, Fisher clambered back into the sky. His aborted
landing no doubt had telegraphed his intentions to the persis-
tent communist attackers. 8
Fisher wrenched his A-1 E through a demanding 180-
degree turn and attempted a landing from the opposite direc-
tion, sailing through heavy gunfire. Through years of piloting,
Fisher had the skill needed to place seven tons of roaring
warplane down right near the beginning of the runway. Again
he missed debris, riding the plane's brakes and raising wing
flaps to decrease lift, putting more weight on the wheels for
better friction. Still, Fisher's gray Skyraider rolled off the
opposite end of the wet runway. He cranked in a turn. As the
A-1 E's wings passed over 55-gallon drums in the weeds at the
end of the runway, the plane's tail banged into some in the
turn. Quickly taxiing back down the strip to where Myers was
concealed, Fisher stopped when he saw his buddy waving
both arms, but the Skyraider's fast taxi run made it overshoot
Myers' location by about 100 feet. Fisher planted the plane's
parking brake, unbuckled from his seat, and headed to the
right side of the wide cockpit to see if Myers needed help
reaching the plane. What Fisher saw next he described as
"two little red beady eyes trying to crawl up the back of the
wing."g It was smoky Myers, and Fisher unceremoniously
grabbed his fellow aviator's flightsuit and hauled the man
headfirst onto the floor of the A-1.
As the rescue was taking place, the three remaining
airborne A-1 Es kept bombing and strafing to occupy the North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong soldiers. When they ran out of
ordnance, this trio made dry attack runs, hoping to keep the
communists ducking. Fisher demanded power from his A-1,
and scooted around the junk on the runway while the plane
built up flying speed. He hoisted the A-1 aloft with minimal
flying speed, and avoided climbing until the plane built up
airspeed.
Captain Jon Lucas, in one of the other three A-1 s, regis-
tered battle damage in the fray as his plane smoked away from
A Shau. More A-1 s replaced Fisher's gaggle at A Shau that
March day. The bravery of these U.S. Air Force Skyraider
pilots was credited with helping to hold off the communists
until 13 of the 17 surviving Special Forces members could be
evacuated. Bernie Fisher's special bravery also saved his
No More Kid Gloves: New Tricks for an Able Dog
friend, Jump Myers, from capture or death. Nineteen bullet
holes attested to the hell Fisher's Skyraider had gone through
to rescue Myers, in the heart of enemy-held ground. 10
Major Fisher's Skyraider, itself once the victim of a dam-
aging belly landing, was carefully rebuilt. In its May 1967
issue, Air Progress magazine urged its readers to write their
congressmen, requesting that Fisher's historic Skyraider be
sent to the Air Force Museum for preservation. It was, and
visitors to the great museum galleries at Wright-Patterson Air
Force Base, near Dayton, Ohio, can conjure Bernie Fisher's
war as they view the gray A-1 E in which he earned the Medal
of Honor.
Only one other of the 12 Air Force Medal of Honor
recipients from the Vietnam war was an A-1 driver. He was
Lieutenant Colonel William A. Jones III, commanding officer of
the 602nd Special Operations Squadron based at Nakhon
Phanom in Thailand. The squadron operated single-seat A-
1H (AD-6) and A-1 J (AD-7) Skyraiders. On 1 September
1968, Lieutenant Colonel Jones' Skyraider flying under the
call sign "Sandy 1", signifying the lead of a search-and-rescue
flight, was his perch from which to direct the rescue of a
downed F-4 Phantom aircrew. It was Jones' 98th combat
mission, and ittook him into North Vietnam, northwest of Dong
Hoi. Another flight of Phantom jets made radio contact with the
downed F-4 pilot, but they misunderstood the flier's location,
and led the Sandy Skyraiders eight miles from where the pilot
was. The Skyraiders burned up nearly an hour's precious
search time before the pilot of an F-1 00 reestablished contact
with the airman in distress, and guided the A-1 s to the right
location. The Super Sabre pilot warned Lieutenant Colonel
Jones the crashed airman was in range of a host of antiaircraft
weapons up to 37-millimeter. ll
Bill Jones nosed his single-seat Skyraider down to scan
the jungle for signs of the pilot. A scraggly broken cloud layer
obscured some of the higher hilltops as Jones spread a search
pattern over the rugged ground.
His wingman and other fighters called out enemy gun
positions to Jones as he dragged the jungles forthe concealed
airman. A jolting explosion temporarily caused smoke to fill
To keep their out-of-production Skyraiders flying, Air Force
A-1 E mechanics stripped badly damaged Skyraider hangar-
queens in a desolate boneyard circa 1965. (Photo by Col.
Ronald G. Linder, USAF Ret.)
95
Jones' Skyraider. An enemy gunner had come too close for
comfort, but failed to seriously damage the A-1 . A trap set by
the communist gunners was to beef up any available AA
defenses around a downed American flier, using the hapless
airman as bait, certain to draw rescuing aircraft into the ring of
fire.
Still searching for the airman, Jones' pluck was rewarded
when the downed pilot radioed that a Skyraider had just
passed directly overhead. This pinpointed his position.
Bill Jones found himself in a situation similar to that
experienced by Bernie Fisher, with hillside gunners on the
limestone karst firing down on his Skyraider. Jones cranked
his single-seater into a turn that lined him up for an attack on
those hillside guns. He pickled off rockets and fired his 20-
millimeters at the enemy guns, and rolled in for a second
attack. This time, 14.5-millimeter gunfire found his Skyraider.
The rocket motor in the A-1 's Yankee extraction system
ignited when hit by a round, but did not deploy. The Skyraider
was an airborne Roman candle as the rocket motor spewed
flame. Colonel Jones cleared the area and pulled the Yankee
extraction handle to initiate the pilot extraction sequence. The
canopy blew away instantly, accompanied by a rush of air that
fanned the flames. But the torching extraction rocket no longer
worked to propel Jones from his A-1. He released the Yankee
system so he could climb from the cockpit under his own
power. In the rapid sequence of events since his Skyraider
began to burn, Jones tried to radio the downed flier's position,
but his transmissions went unheard as his fellow pilots used
the frequencies to urge him to bail out ofthe flaming Skyraider.
When Jones' radio failed to transmit, and the fire began 'to
subside, he assessed his predicament. If he left the crippled
Skyraider now, the other rescue planes would have to run the
same gauntlet to locate the downed Phantom flier all over
again. Plus, Jones would also become the object of a search,
further complicating an already complex situation.
Bill Jones was out of this fight, unable to transmit on his
radio and severe!'~ burned on his hands, arms, shoulders and
head. But he carried the downed flier's location with him as he
limped 90 miles back to NKP (Nakhon Phanom). Captain Paul
Meeks flew wing for Jones, and took up a lead position to ease
Jones' navigating tasks. Only a portion of the left side of the
wind-screen remained in place on Jones' A-1, so he deliber-
ately skidded in skewed flight, presenting that left panel to the
slipstream to give his burned body some additional protection
from the open-air blast. Faced with an undercast at NKP,
Jones managed to follow Meeks down through the cloud deck
in tight formation. Jones brought his A-1 H in hot and shallow
in a no-flap landing. As rescuers tried to lift him from his
scorched Skyraider cockpit, Bill Jones grabbed for his charts,
refusing aid until he was convinced the positions of the
Phantom flier and the enemy gunners were understood by the
other aircraft in the area. He continued debriefing even while
on the NKP operating table, where his wounds were tended.
Later that afternoon, the Phantom pilot was successfully
plucked from the jungle. Bill Jones' tenacity paid off. 12
Asthe war progressed, U.S. Air Force use of the Skyraider
typically included the role of "Sandy", the call sign for rescue
escort. The Sandys often acted as on-scene rescue com-
manders, and frequently escorted HH-3 rescue helicopters to
96 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
the site of a downed airman. The rescue chopper might hold
several miles from the position of the downed flier while the A-
1s went in to beat up AA batteries prior to calling for the
vulnerable helicopter. The courage of the Skyraider pilots was
matched by that of the rescue helo crews who braved a hail of
enemy fire while hovering over the downed airmen, lowering
a rescue sling and a para rescue specialist if the flier was
incapacitated.
In the mid summer of 1967, U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant
Bud Pentz was a door gunner on an HH-3 Jolly Green Giant
rescue chopper paddling out of Da Nang toward a Navy flier
down in North Vietnam, about 50 miles south of Hanoi. A
Crown airborne rescue command post C-130 controlled all the
aircraft involved in this penetration into North Vietnam. A-1 s
were tasked in their familiar ground attack and flak suppres-
sion role.
The pilot of Pentz' Jolly Green elected to land about 100
yards from the injured Navy flier, since the flier's leg injuries
prevented him from climbing aboard a jungle penetrator
device which the chopper crew could wind down into the
undergrowth and then hoist back up. North Vietnamese troops
challenged the rescue with small arms fire. "There was no way
we could get in position to give protective fire," Pentz said. So
he removed his 7.62-millimeter M-60 machine gun from its
door mount, grabbed several ammunition containers, left the
HH-3, and covered the successful extraction of the Navy pilot
by a para rescue specialist from Pentz' Jolly Green. Suddenly
Sergeant Pentz was surrounded and cut off from his chopper
by men and women wearing starred pith helmets and firing
small arms. "Probably the smartest thing I did was take a radio
with me," Pentz later explained. Rather than keep the entire
HH-3 and crew in jeopardy any longer, Sergeant Pentz urged
them to get airborne while he held off the North Vietnamese
with his M-60. The Jolly Green radioed the Sandys and told
them one of the rescuers had just become a rescuee in need
of help. A pair of A-1 Es from NKP loitered protectively for the
next 90 minutes to two hours, as faster jets came and went
delivering a variety of ordnance including cluster bomb units
on the North Vietnamese. "For three hours, I saw just about
everything in the Air Force arsenal," Pentz said. The A-1 s
spotted targets for the jets and used their 20 millimeter
cannons to surgically intervene when the North Vietnamese
were within 150 yards of Pentz. "The Sandy pilots were telling
me constantly what was going on; I never felt alone," Bud
remembered. The A-1 s explained over the radio what kind of
ordnance was aboutto be dropped. "Iftheywere using general
purpose bombs, they'd tell me to get low." The incessant
bom bing and strafing, plus Pentz' trusty machine gun, kept the
pith-helmeted attackers at bay. "I know for a fact there were
more than 100 sorties involved in keeping them off me."13
Bud took refuge in a bomb crater. The Orbiting A-1s
advised him when the enemy troops got closer, and then the
Sandy drivers told him the direction ofthe next Skyraiderfiring
pass to afford him protection. The Skyraiders dropped what
ordnance they had, made cannon passes and dry runs to keep
the communists busy. As the first pair of Skyraiders retired,
two more took up station in the wake of a Navy jet attack. Pentz
looked up to see the unique blue Plexiglas covering part of the
A-1 Es glint in the sun. "That was probably the best sight I could
see above me," said Pentz, whose previous combat experi-
ences gave him a healthy respect for the durable A-1 s. When
the Skyraiders advised Pentz the enemy troops were too
close to his position to allow for bombing, Bud momentarily
poked up from his crater and cut loose with 7.62-millimeter
rounds. But he didn't spend most of his time trading bullets.
"Mostly I was hiding - not so much from them, but from the
ordnance."14
Ultimately, F-4s massed for a plane-after-plane attack to
paralyze the North Vietnamese troops. Another HH-3 touched
down in coordination with the F-4 Phantoms. Pentz was down
to two rounds of ammunition for his machine gun. Grabbing
the firing pin to render the weapon useless to the enemy,
Pentz dived for the door of the HH-3. "There was no way I
could have ridden the tree penetrator because of the intensity
of the ground fire," Bud recalled. As he was diving into the
chopper, it lifted off, its hard floor catching Pentz in mid air. He
had seen enemy soldiers as close as 15 yards, but had not
been hit during his three-hour ordeal. The Air Force thought
Bud Pentz' actions warranted the Distinguished Flying Cross.
Bud remained grateful to the aircraft which persisted in his
own rescue - especially the long-lasting cool-headed A-1
Skyraider pilots. 15
Jerry Boynton was an Airman First Class when the Air
Force sent him to Nakhon Phanom - NKP - on 26 February
1970. Because he had previous reciprocating engine experi-
ence as a Lockheed C-121 mechanic, Airman Boynton had
settled into his A-1 training at Hurlburt earlier that year with
minimal adjustment. At Hurlburt in Florida's Eglin Air Force
Base complex, Boynton learned about the Yankee extraction
seat system, A-1 engine runs, fuel tank removal and other
aspects of Skyraider operations. Since his A-1 schooling
lasted four weeks, Boynton was in for on-the-job training with
the 22nd Special Operations Squadron at NKP. At Nakhon
Phanom, Jerry became involved in hanging ordnance under
the wings of A-1 s, including 50-pound loads of Willie Pete -
white phosphorous -rockets, often in the harried climate of
frantic-search-and-rescue (SAR) operations. "It was an un-
written law that during a SAR no unauthorized person was on
the flightline," Boynton remembered, to avoid accidents and
injuries possible in the mix of whirling Aeroproducts props and
live ordnance. Six A-1 s were kept on alert for SAR while
Boynton was involved in Skyraider operations at NKP. These
six Skyraiders were paced on SAR missions. The first two
went in to the location of the subject of the rescue. They
dropped all their ordnance to suppress flak and keep enemy
troops at bay, and then orbited with the Jolly Green rescue
helicopter while the second two Skyraiders layed down smoke
as needed. Then the chopper's turn came; if the Jolly Green
still found enemy fire too stiff, the last pair of A-1 s went in to
soften things up, he recalled. For protracted rescue efforts,
more A-1 s could be generated to augmentthe first six Sandys.
Crew chiefs whose Skyraiders had launched would go help
their fellows prepare the other A-1 s during peak SAR activity,
to get Skyraiders into the fight as expeditiously as possible. 16
About the middle of 1970, the 22nd SOS sent two
Skyraiders and two Jollies on temporary duty to Pleiku for 30
days. The squadron set up 90-day temporary duty at Bien
Hoa. Skyraiders rotated back to NKP with aircrews every
No More Kid Gloves: New Tricks for an Able Dog
three days; crew chiefs stayed behind, receiving niceties such
as mail with the arrival of new aircrews and Skyraiders. It was
during one such temporary duty period for Boynton in the latter
half of 1970 that the 22nd SOS became the 602nd SOS and
1st SOS. By October, these two squadron designators were
consolidated as the 1st SOS. Early in November 1970, the 1st
SOS relinquished sixA-1 s-a mixed bag of Es and Hs-tothe
VNAF, which was expanding its Skyraider war. Some of the
Vietnamese who came to NKP to pick up the A-1s betrayed
their lack offamiliarity with the big attack bombers as they tried
to get acquainted with the A-1 s. Others in the VNAF contin-
gent had only flown A-1 s equipped for Military Assistance
Program standards. As they eyed these planes newly stricken
from U.S. Air Force records they kept remarking "Our air-
planes don't have this; our airplanes don't have that," as they
encountered equipment peculiar to USAF A-1 s, Boynton said.
It was this transfer of Skyraiders to the South Vietnamese
which prompted the consolidation of the remaining USAF
planes and crews of the 602nd and 1s~ Special Operations
Squadrons. Boynton recalled that the A-1 s given to the VNAF
had black undersurfaces, which the Vietnamese requested be
painted white. Around November 1970 this was done, includ-
ing USAF A-1 s as the planes passed through periodic main-
tenance cycles, he saidY
Late in November 1970, some new, unknown "assistant
pilots" showed up at NKP. "We didn't know where they came
from," Jerry Boynton said. The strangers affixed panels in the
cockpits of A-1 Es for guiding smart bombs, mating the most
sophisticated weapons and weapons delivery technology with
these holdover planes from World War II design philosophy,
Boynton remembered. Security was tight around the entire
operation involving A-1 Es and smart bombs, but Boynton
learned through the G.!. grapevine that these specially-
equipped A-1 Es took part in the clandestine night prison raid
on Son Tay inside North Vietnam. The Skyraiders, Boynton
was told, had flown from NKP to Da Nang, and out over the
ocean, turning at minimum altitude and running lean and hot
for the several hours needed to fly from Da Nang to Son Tay
and recover at NKP after the mission. This lean fuel mixture
"more or less cleaned out the cylinders," Boynton remem-
bered, but he said it did no harm to the 3350s. 18
Official Air Force published history still is vague about the
role ofthe A-1 s in the Son Tay prison break-in of 20 November,
and the stories gleaned at that time at NKP still need more
thorough documentation. But an Air Force supply officer at a
jet base in Thailand where smart bombs were routinely
stocked and used is reported to have remarked about an
unusual shipment of these weapons going to the base at NKP
about this time, and published Air Force historical accounts of
the Son Tay raid say the Skyraiders involved were five
multiseat A-1 Es, consistent with Boynton's information about
additional pilots being used to operate smart bomb guidance
equipment.
The Son Tay prison compound was supposed to house as
many as 50 prisoners of war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
approved planning a raid to rescue the prisoners at Son Tay
back on 5 June 1970. A heavy rainy season was to foil this
scheme in a most unusual way.
97
This page and opposite: Skyraiders of the First Special Operations Wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida, reveal irregularities in
camouflage. An Air Force tech order prescribed the pattern for camouflaging aircraft including Skyraiders. In actual practice,
one wave of the spray gun brought about a variation in style. These single-seat A-1 Hs and multi-place A-1 Es trained many
U.S. and Vietnamese fliers in the art of Skyraider warfare. (Photos by Tom Brewer via John M. Bowdler.)

The rains brought flooding which fouled water wells
serving the prison. The Hanoi government also apparently
perceived they would receive international praise for humane
actions if they separated the Protestants and the Catholics in
Son Tay, because each group had requested to hold separate
religious services. Weighing the water problems and the
erroneously-perceived propaganda value to be derived by
segregating the prisoners according to their religious prefer-
ences, the North Vietnamese moved all ofthe prisoners of war
from Son Tay by 14 July, while American planning for the raid
progressed. Reconnaissance photography picked up con-
tinuing activity at Son Tay, however, because a contingent of
guards and other North Vietnamese continued to dwell there. 19
The armada massed for the November raid on Son Tay
included "Wild Weasel" F-1 05 Thunderchiefs to thwart North
Vietnamese anti-aircraft missile batteries; five HH-53 helicop-
ters to carry raiders in, and additionally, freed prisoners out,
one more-expendable HH-3E helicopter, two pathfinding
Combat Talon MC-130E unconventional warfare transports,
and the five A-1 E Skyraiders. The HH-3 chopper was to
deliver shock troops in the middle of the Son Tay prison yard.
A tree known to be in the yard would certainly smash the rotor

98 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

blades of the HH-3 as it landed, so the rescuers planned on
leaving it behind as they loaded everybody into the HH-53s.
The Combat Talon C-130s were to aid the five Skyraiders
in navigating to and from Son Tay in the dead of night.
Planners also intended for the C-130s to drop a pallet
loaded with napalm bombs to create a flaming beacon for
other aircraft in the operation. The A-1 Es also were fitted with
napalm in case the C-130s were unable to drop theirs.
Primarily, the A-1 Es were tasked to bomb a bridge in an effort
to slow any enemy reinforcements. (Accurately bombing a
bridge at night near a P.O.W. camp lends further credibility to
the stories that the Skyraiders were equipped with precision
smart bombs which could be maneuvered to a target.) If
enemy troops prevailed after this, the A-1 Es were to strafe
with their 20-millimeter cannons. The planners also blocked
No More Kid Gloves: New Tricks for an Able Dog
the periods from 21-25 October and 21-25 November as the
bestfor likely having clear weather, and just enough moonlight
to complement night-viewing optics without silhouetting the
aircraft or troops. In actuality, typhoon Patsy was forecast to
make the Gulf of Tonkin too rough for the Navy carriers to
launch their diversionary strikes by 21 N(~)Vember.
The October dates had been lost due to peace negotia-
tions which Dr. Henry Kissinger, a special assistant to the
President of the United States, feared would be hurt by an
American incursion of 150 men into North Vietnam. So on the
night of 20 November the Son Tay raiders launched. 20
While Navy A-6s and-7s purposely alerted North Viet-
namese and Chinese radar to confuse the issue, the main
force pressed on for Son Tay. The first C-130 dropped its
napalm marker; a minute later the second C-130 delivered the
99
five multi-place Skyraiders overhead. Once the A-1 Es moved Notes
out on their own, the second C-130 dropped its napalm pallet. 1. William A. Buckingham, Jr., Operation Ranch Hand - The Air Force and
Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971, Office of Air Force History, Wash-
The Skyraiders went to work on the bridge and then orbited ington D.C. 1982, pp.109-112.
above the napalm marker. 2. Ibid.
The expendable HH-3 inadvertently landed in a military 3.lbid.
4. Ray L. Bowers, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia -Tactical
sapper training school instead of the Son Tay prison yard. Airlift, Office of Air Force History, Washington. D.C. 1983, p.424.
Fortunately no tree existed in the sapper schoolyard to cripple 5. Ibid.
the chopper, and it quickly lifted off for the prison. The 6. Ibid.
7. Major Donald Schneider, Air Force Heroes in Vietnam (USAF Southeast
Americans achieved their objective of penetrating the prison, Asia Monograph Series Vol. VII, Monograph 9) Air War College, Maxwell
killing North Vietnamese as they raced through the compound AFB, Alabama, 1979. pp. 3-11, 72, and 75.
in a futile search for the P.O.W.s who weren't there anymore. 8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
The raiders demolished their HH-3 with an explosive charge, 10. Ibid.
and left Son Tay aboard the HH-53s. Surface-to-air (SAM) 11. Ibid.
missiles damaged two of the F-1 05s; one was abandoned and 12. Ibid.
13. Interview, Frederick A. Johnsen with Bud Pentz, July 1982.
its crew rescued at dawn in Laos. 21 14. Ibid.
The Son Tay raid received mixed reviews. Critics mar- 15. Ibid.
veled at launching such a sophisticated attack, and not having 16. Interview, Frederick A. Johnsen with Jerry Boynton.
17. Ibid.
up-to-date intelligence information on the location of the 18. Ibid.
prisoners. Those more sympathetic said the raid worked well, 19. Earl H. Tilford, Jr., Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, 1961-1975,
and proved what a coordinated armada could do. Dismal Office of Air Force History, Washington, D.C. 1980, pp. 103-112.
20. Ibid.
failure or tactical milestone, the Son Tay raid called upon the 21. Ibid.
ability of the capacious A-1 E Skyraider once more. 22. Benjamin Kraljev, Jr., Colonel, USAF, "The Son Tay Raid", Airlift: The
(Son Tay postscript: Colonel Benjamin Kraljev, Jr. was an Journal of the Airlift Operations School, Winter 1984, Military Airlift Com-
mand.
unconventional warfare action officer involved in the Son Tay
planning. In the winter 1984 issue of Airlift: The Journal of the
Airlift Operations School, Colonel Kraljev said the A-1 E left-
seaters were hand-picked for longevity in the type. He said the
right-seaters were returned from southeast Asia "under the
guise of participating in a night recovery system Rescue was
developing. We now had a stick and rudder pilot who was
highly experienced in the airplane with a pilot who knew what
was going on currently in southeast Asia." Colonel Kraljev
does not mention the use of smart bombs. He further says the
bridge at Son Tay was neutralized by an Army demolition
charge. But he is quick in his defense of the suitability of the
Skyraider for the raid: "We decided we also needed some
fighter support, something that could fly low and slow. The
obvious answer was A-1.")22

100 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 CHAPTER IX
Wind-Down in Asia
''There has never been a protracted campaign from which a country has benefitted." Sun Tzu, 400-320 B.C., Art of War

I n the wintry months of January and February 1969, while

the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held anti-
war rallies on American college campuses, Second Lieu-
tenant Gary Cave buzzed over the foliage of South Vietnam
in his gray USAF-emblazoned Cessna 0-1 E.
The single-engine Cessna 0-1 was a derivative of the
Iightplanes that company was famous for. Laden with "Willie
Pete" - white phosphorous rockets used for target-marking-
the 0-1 served as bird dog for the bomb-haulers. Gary Cave
was a FAC (Forward Air Controller), who guided American
and South Vietnamese attack aircraft to specific targets. He
was assigned to the 22nd Tactical Air Support Squadron at
Sinh Thuy.
Thus it was on a wintry 1969 day that Lieutenant Cave was
coordinating between U.S. Army intelligence advisors and
South Vietnamese army troops, requesting an air strike against
a concrete bunker over which cut boughs were regularly
replenished by the enemy. The network for fielding such
requests through American and Vietnamese channels was
capricious. As Cave orbited in his noisy Cessna, he was
prepared for a wait of between five minutes and two hours for
approval of this bomb strike.
With approval came a flight of VNAF A-1 sJo do the job.
These were not the novice "sandbag" Vietnamese that early
USAF pilots had ridiculed - the complexion of the war had
changed enough that Lieutenant Cave had at his disposal

A 1st Special Operations Squadron (1 50S) Skyraider - probably a G-model- used sandbags for wheel chocks in its revet-
ment in Southeast Asia.

Wind·Down in Asia 101

A VNAF A·1 H sits poised for battle, on the ramp at Tan Son Nhut, 14 December 1970. (Photo by Norman E. Taylor, via Dennis
Peltier.)
some high-time Skyraider fliers. Some could boast more than against the particular target at hand. As Lieutenant Cave
6,000 flying hours, most of it in combat in their homeland. switched channels on his 0-1 's comm radios to contact
The leader of the four VNAF A-1 s sent to demolish the ground units and the VNAF A-1 drivers, he missed hearing
bunker spoke English, and addressed Lieutenant Cave, by only the first ordnance hard point on the A-1 leader's plane.
the FACs' traditional call sign: "'David', I have four A-1 s." It was Cave copied the rest of the ordnance load: Some 250-
traditional for the inbound attack aircraft to list their ordnance pounders, rockets, CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units), and the heavy
to "David" - the FAC - so he could orchestrate the attack 20-millimeter ammunition.

A VNAF A-1 H securely ensconced in a steel and earth-fill revetment at Pleiku, circa 1972-73. Modern revetments afforded
protection, but communist ground attacks nonetheless destroyed VNAF Skyraiders here. Small South Vietnamese flag flaps
from the corner of the revetment, its yellow and red colors reproduced on the rudder of the A-1. (Photo by Col. Ronald G.
Linder, USAF Ret.)

102 Douglas A-1 Skyraider


Near Pleiku,the gutted, burned hulk of an 'A-1 E lies neglected
in the weeds. Though the VNAF employed Skyraiders after
the United States retired them from combat, anti-aircraft
accuracy and equipment were threatening an end to the
environment the Skyraiderhad been built to fight in. (Photo
by Col. Ronald G. Linder, USAF, Ret.)
Flying about 1,500 feet above ground level, perhaps 600
feet to one side of the mysterious bunker, Cave called in all
four Skyraiders to bomb in trail, following the leader. When the
leader loosed his first store, Gary Cave watched, momentarily
perplexed, because the plummeting object looked like the
plane's centerline fuel tank. "It was huge," Cave remembered,
obviously unlike any mere 250-pound bomb. This was the one
piece of ordnance Cave had not copied in the radio transmis-
sion with the Vietnamese flight leader - a 2,000-pound bomb.
The resulting blast "demolished one bunker and a lot of trees
and everything else around it," Cave said. With scant time to
react, Cave found his light 0-1 rocked into a 25-to 30-degree
bank by the huge blast's concussion, which shook the plexiglas
windows in the Cessna. Cave vouched that his fear instincts
were, at that moment, as good as the next man's.
The Skyraiders rumbled away from the smoky, choking
rubble, toting most of their ordnance unexpended. 1
Increasingly, the VNAF shouldered responsibility in its
Skyraiders. In contrast to early operations, when inexperi-
enced VNAF A-1 pilots had been grounded after the sun went
down, by 1967 two VNAF A-1 's flew nocturnal cover over Bien
VNAF A-1Hs at Tan Son Nhut, 13 November 1970, fitted with high-speed, low-drag bombs. (Photo by Norman E. Taylor, via
Dennis Peltier)
Hoa, ready to strike at infiltrators in the dark. Yet, the quick
reaction afforded by this airborne umbrella all too frequently
was retarded by maddening delays in obtaining Vietnamese
approval to hit targets. 2 Pairs of night-riding VNAF Skyraiders
similarly patrolled over Binh Thuy after that base was jolted by
five stand-off ground attacks between December 1966 and
May 1967. Nha Trang also employed two Vietnamese A-1s.
All of these base protection sorties were in concert with other
mass-firepower planes including AC-47 gunships and UH-1
helicopter gunship variants.
The 1968 Tet offensive appears to have been engineered
by Hanoi as a media show as much as it was a military
campaign. Sensing the anti-war value to be derived from a
bloody campaign, the North Vietnamese orchestrated largely
Viet Cong attacks on most of the major cities of South
Vietnam. American media scholars and critics have argued
that, while the United States and ARVN forces actually thwarted
North Vietnam's 1968 Tet offensive militarily, the increased
levels of bloody combat relayed home on American news
broadcasts implied theAmericans were mired and losing. This
implication contributed to the growing weariness in America
with the dragging war, and probably hastened America's
departure from South Vietnam thereafter.
Between January 30 and February 25, 1968, the VNAF
flew 4,648 close air support sorties and 1,535 interdiction
sorties, working their A-1 Skyraiders hard, along with the rest
of their aircraft inventory.3 This was a large-scale campaign
affecting all four South Vietnamese regional corps areas. The
VNAF Skyraiders performed well, but their performance limi-
tations kept the A-1 s tethered to the particular corps in which
the squadrons were based. It was not feasible to amass
Skyraiders for attacks in other corps as long as they were
physically located in a distant corps. This pointed up an
ongoing dilemma of VNAF Skyraider operations. Early in the
war, USAF advisors criticized the practice of ARVN corps
commanders to conserve the A-1 s based in their corps areas,
keeping them for duties in their own corps instead of crossing
corps boundaries if greater needs were in other regions.
Wind·Down in Asia 103
A train of 500-pound bombs on trailers services Vietnamese A·1 Hs at Tan Son Nhut, 13 November 1970. (Norman E. Taylor
photo via Dennis Peltier)
During Tet, it seemed, the rapidly-changing needs for airstrikes
were beyond the timely response capabilities of the slow A-1 s
when requested by another geographic corps.
On March 30, 1972, 40,000 North Vietnamese soldiers,
equipped with Soviet long-range artillery, tanks, and new
hand-held SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, launched a new offen-
sive. The concentrations of North Vietnamese tanks were
unusual. The attack appeared designed to cut off South
Vietnam's northern provinces of Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
Only the massive application of airpower prevented the fall of
these provinces. In the central highlands of South Vietnam,
communist objectives appeared to be the capture of the cities
of Kontum and Pleiku. Airlift saved besieged defenders and
airstrikes broke North Vietnamese attacks, but not without
high cost. By April 30, Dong Ha and Quang Tri were lost to the
North Vietnamese. For the first time U.S. and VNAF planes
were downed by the SA-7 missiles. The air environment was
not permissive; the new Soviet antiaircraft weapons signaled
a new and deadly era for air operations in Vietnamese skies.
One VNAF A-1 H was bagged by an SA-7 on 1 May; the next
day, two more Skyraiders were lost. The hostile AA firepower
made air operations costly below 10,000 feet and 450 knots,
spelling trouble for the Skyraiders. 4
By this time, the South Vietnamese were putting jet A-37s
into battle, as well as their old Skyraiders. U.S. airpower was
a major factor in the 1972 counteroffensive, and a centralized
direction of airpower was used to advantage, as aircraft
shifted quickly from Military Region I, (the new term for the
former corps regions) to MRII, to MRIII. If total daily sorties
averaged 207, 45 of these were generated by the plucky
VNAF. This was just about "the maximum they (the VNAF)
104 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
could generate considering the limited range of their aircraft
and number of sorties that had to be flown in support of the
other military regions," U.S. Air Force historians concluded. s
Pleiku-based VNAF Skyraiders joined the jet A-37s in
tank-busting duties during the battle for Kontum. Cloud cover
dictated low attacks, and the slow Skyraiders took numerous
hits. Nine A-1 s were lost to enemy action during the battle for
Kontum. By late May, parts of Kontum were in North Vietnam-
ese hands. Though ultimately staved off by airpower, some
North Vietnamese resistance was felt northwest of the city as
late as July, long after Kontum was resecured by the South
Vietnamese. The old VNAF bugaboo of pilots who were only
qualified for daylight visual operations reappeared during the
Kontum fighting. The Vietnamese Skyraiders could not join
the A-37s when these conditions of visibility were not present. s
Ultimately, the offensive was broken by airpower and the
onset of the rainy season. Observers noted that VNAF air
support was more intense than during the 1968 Tet offensive.
But the slow-movers -especially the Skyraiders - were in
grave danger from the new levels of communist anti-aircraft
firepower. When possible, the VNAF did attempt to centralize
its airpower during the 1972 counter-offensive, although still
limited by the performance of its Skyraiders andA-37s.
By 1972, in-country Skyraider operations were the prov-
ince of VNAF A-1 s, except for penetrations by Thai-based
USAF Skyraiders on SAR (Search And Rescue) escort mis-
sions. Ronald G. Linder had flown USAF Skyraiders in Viet-
nam back in 1964 and 1965 as a flight instructor with the First
Air Commando Squadron. He returned to Skyraider duty in
1972 and 1973. "I was requalified in the A-1E at Hurlburt
Field ... Florida" in August-October 1972, Linder, who retired
A·1E, 132514, at Tan Son Nhut in December 1970 with oil-swirled centerline tank. Two prop blades appear to be replacements,
possibly indicating a belly flop in this Skyraider's past. (Norman E. Taylor photo via Dennis Peltier)
as a USAF colonel, recalled. "It was the last 'Express' class
and had only three or four members. One day in late October
1972 we were on the gunnery range when halfway through the
mission we were recalled." The impending U.S. withdrawal
from Vietnam prompted the U.S. Air Force to turn over its
remaining Skyraiders to the VNAF, Linder was told. "We had
search and rescue A-1 s in Thailand, a training section at
Hurlburt Field, and one A-1 , at Hill AFB, Utah, which was used
for ordnance testing."?
The following month, Ronald Linder was assigned as
chief USAF advisor to the VNAF Sixth Air Division, headquar-
tered at Pleiku. Here, the VNAF's 530th squadron operated a
collection of A-1 Es, Gs, Hs, and Js.
In the fall of 1972, up to the 27 January 1973 ceasefire,
Pleiku was subjected to a number of rocket attacks. VNAF
Skyraiders, some fully armed and in revetments, were de-
stroyed in these attacks.
"I flew 20 combat missions in December 1972 and Janu-
ary 1973 with the Black Cat Squadron (530th Fighter Squad-
ron, VNAF) at Pleiku," recalled Colonel Linder. "(I) believe that
I flew the very last A-1 combat mission flown by an American
in Vietnam on 22 January 1973 just six days before the
ceasefire," he added. 8
Linder recalled VNAF Skyraiders flew during the ceasefire. 9
The South Vietnamese air force continued to prosecute
the war until South Vietnam fell with the surrender of Saigon
on 30 April 1975. Before this time, according to official U.S. Air
Force historical accounts, the VNAF Skyraiders had been put
in storage to streamline VNAF maintenance chores in the
absence of an American presence. But with the takeover of
South Vietnam by North Vietnamese forces in April 1975,
scores of South Vietnamese fliers evacuated their homeland,
taking airworthy VNAF-planes including Skyraiders to the
U.S. base at U-Tapao, Thailand.
To downed airmen and harried helicopter rescue crews,
the Southeast Asia Skyraider saga will forever conjure images
of loitering USAF A-1 s keeping the enemy from reaching
downed Americans. Answering to the radio call sign "Sandy",
these rescue A-1 s were a latter-day Twentieth Century rein-
carnation of the cavalry, often arriving in the nick of time and
making the difference between a successful save, or an
addition to Hanoi's cold POW/MIA (Prisoner-of-War/Missing
in Action) list.
In the 1960s, when the U.S. Navy still operated A-1s in
combat, their carrier-launched Skyraiders also participated in
rescue plots. But the camouflaged Sandys of the U.S. Air
Force will forever be the archetypal avenging angels ofthe war
in Southeast Asia. By 1967, the Skyraider posted the highest
loss rate of any USAF plane in Southeast Asia, due at least in
part to the heroic and dangerous low-level loitering which
determined search-and-rescue pilots adopted in defense of
their downed fellows. During 1967, Skyraider loss rates were
6.2 per 1,000 sorties over North Vietnam; 2.3 over Laos; and
1.0 over South Vietnam. Twenty-five Air Force Skyraiders
downed over North Vietnam between June 1966 and June
1967 included seven performing rescue missions. 10
All too frequently, enemy gunners used downed fliers as
bait to lure rescue planes within range of hastily-deployed
anti-aircraft weapons. Although the U.S. Navy set air-to-air
combat tacticians buzzing when Navy Skyraiders shot down
two North Vietnamese MiG jet fighters, the Air Force paid the
price with two confirmed A-1 losses to enemy MiGs during
Wind-Down in Asia 105
Grey USAF A-1E takes on high-drag iron bombs with box fins of World War II design. Skyraiders in Southeast Asia hauled all
kinds of ordnance; may have even carried smart bombs. (USAF photo)
rescue operations. The HH-3 rescue helicopter crews knew
and respected the Sandy A-1 fliers who escorted them. Dave
Feigert, then an Air Force lieutenant flying right seat in "Jolly
Green" rescue choppers, remembered backto 1966and 1967
when "Sandy"crews and "Jolly Green" crews stood up for each
other in barroom brawls a bit less glamorous than those
staged in Hollywood. Feigert's collection of A-1 anecdotes fit
the classic parameters of war stories - they are fantastic
enough to be true.
Like the time Sandy pilot Dave Lester, flying on temporary
duty (TDY) status out of Udorn, Thailand, had his A-1 shot out
from under him. Lester, an accomplished skydiver, was over
Laos in the fall of 1966 when he had to abandon his crippled
Skyraider near Tchepone Pass. Lester had rehearsed this
contingency mentally. He free-fell after leaving the A-1, to
present a smaller, speedier target to the enemy gunners on
the ground. Close to the jungle he popped his chute, nestling
into the top boughs of dense trees some 200 feet above the
jungle floor. He could hear the communists below him as he
orchestrated his own rescue just as if he were still charging
around in his Skyraider, vectoring help for another downed
106 Douglas A-1 Skyraider
flier. Dave Feigert was aboard the HH-3 that located Lester.
The only hitch in the operation was the intense rotor downwash
from the large HH-3. "We damn near blew him out ofthe trees,
and down to the hostile jungle floor so far below," Feigert said.
Lester braced himself with his parachute harness for the
rough rotor wash, and grabbed the jungle penetrator winched
to him from the helicopter. As he scrambled onto the penetrator
amid a flurry of leaves, the Jolly Green hoisted him to safety
from the treetops.l1
The spacious A-1 Es featured a large aft cabin once
intended to carry as many as 10 passengers in addition to the
flight crew of two up front. But for SEA USAF operations, A-
1Es usually were flown solo. The glazing over the aft cabin
was tinted blue and crews going aft would report "I'm going to
the Blue Room," as if they were wandering the halls of a
mansion. During a two-ship formation out of Thailand, with
only one man per A-1 E, the leader's wingman noticed the
unmistakably bulky form of the formation leader moving
around in the Blue Room. Nobody, obviously, was flying the
airplane.
 The pilot had trimmed his big dive bomber for level flight,
and then moved aft for reasons of his own. But when the door
to the flight deck jammed shut, the aviator became a prisoner
in his own plane. He contemplated using his service .38-
caliber revolver to destroy the door latch, but succeeded in
manually wrestling it open. All the while, in the back of his mind
lurked the possibility the big A-1 E would slip out of trim and
head earthward with the pilot still locked in the Blue Room. The
incident became a source of much laughter thereafter when
the Sandy drivers and air rescue crews got together for a
beer. 12
There was a grim aspect of the Skyraider's war that
involved anti-personnel attacks. In a reversal of the "shake-
and-bake" tactics, one USAF A-1 would drop napalm tanks to
flush communist troops out of jungle hiding. The next A-1
would arrive overhead as the troops were running in clear
ground. This Skyraider dispensed CBUs (Cluster Bomb Units)
which were deadly anti-personnel shrapnel-producing explo-
sives. 13
Notes
1. Interview, Frederick A. Johnsen with Maj. Gary Cave, USAF, August 1984.
2. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam - 1961-1973, Office of Air
Force History, USAF, Washington, D.C. 1979, pp.130-131.
3. The Vietnamese Air Force, 1951-1975, An Analysis of its Role in Combat,
USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series, Volume 3, 1975, pp. 33-34.
4. Ibid, p. 45.
5. Ibid, p. 46.
6. Airpowerand the 1972 Spring Invasion, USAF Southeast Asia Monograph
Series, Volume 2, p. 75.
7. Letter by Col Ronald G. Linder, USAF (Ret.), 9 Sep. 82.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. The United States Air Force Search and Rescue in Southeast Asia, Earl
H. Tilford, Jr., Office of Air Force History, USAF, Washington, D.C. 1980, pp.
72-73.
11. Interview, FrederickA. Johnsen with Maj. Dave Feigert, USAF, November
1984.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.

Wind-Down in Asia 107

In the 1970s, Atlantan Dave Forrest restored his AD-4, BuAer number 123827, in the glossy blue colors and markings it wore
at NAS Atlanta in the 1950s. Here carrying civil registration number N23827, Forrest's Skyraider cruises at 12,500 feet over
central Georgia in concert with a restored Hawker Sea Fury, left, and P·51 Mustang, right. (U.S. Navy photo via Dave Forrest.)

108 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 CHAPTER X
Skyraiders for the Future
"...all times, when old, are good." Byron, The Age of Bronze

A s this is written, more than 50 Skyraiders world-

wide are in the hands of collectors, museums, or
other organizations in a position to make them
available for preservation or public viewing. Recent U.S. civil
registration records show more than 20 Skyraiders have
received civil registration numbers in this country, although
the assignment of an N-number to a Skyraider does not signify
the aircraft is currently flightworthy.
Georgia resident Dave Forrest deserves credit for his
pioneering efforts to get an early AD-4 flying on the warbird
circuit. The late Jack Spanich boosted the American civilian
Skyraider population when he brought several ex-French AD-
4s back, beginning in the late 1970s. David Tallichet added
several late-model singleseaters and A-IEs to his warbird
stable in the early 1980s.
One of the most remarkable civil-owned Skyraider resto-
rations is the AD-4 rebuilt over a 10-year period by Dave
Forrest of Atlanta, Georgia. This Skyraider, BuAer No. 123827,
toured with VA-55 aboard the U.S.S. Valley Forge during part
of 1949, through March 1951. It ended its Navy career as a
gate guardian at the old NAS Atlanta, Georgia, before Forrest
acquired the plane. Its subsequent meticulous restoration to
flying status included repainting the plane in the markings it
wore in 1956, plus civil registration number N-23827.

In January 1966, the long-neglected AD-4later acquired in Atlanta, Georgia, by Dave Forrest was missing cowl panels,
windscreen, canopy Plexiglas and much dignity.

Skyraiders for the Future 109

 .I

Before and after views of Dave Forrest's AD-4, derelict on the ground in Atlanta, and back in the air in vintage glossy blue with
an orange Naval Reserve fuselage band. Plane's BuAer number is 123827. (Dave Forrest collection)

110 Douglas A-1 Skyraider

 The boom in civil Skyraiders has exacted a toll on the
warbird community. Jack Spanich and Florida warbird opera-
tor Harry Doan each died in Skyraider accidents.
France's burgeoning warbird movement embraced about
seven surplus ex-French AD-4s in the 1980s so that it is now
possible to see Able Dogs flying on two continents.
The U.S. Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Dayton, Ohio, displays the A-1 E in which Bernie Fisher
earned his Medal of Honor for his harrowing A Shau Valley
rescue during the war in Southeast Asia. It is refreshing that
the Air Force had foresight to save Fisher's actual aircraft
because of its significance; all too often, museums paint
nondescript examples of aircraft to masquerade as significant
combat aircraft that were scrapped.
The list of Skyraiders in preservation and in private
ownership fluctuates like the commodities market. Some of
the more stable Skyraiders on display, and likely to remain so,
include:
Bradley Air Museum, Windsor Locks, Connecticut: AD-
4N BuAer No. 125739.
Fleet Air Arm Museum, Yeovilton, UK: AD-4W AEW.1,
BuAer No. 124121, and AD-4W, BuAer No. 124086.
MCDONNELL
--
Two of Dave Tallichet's ex-SEA Skyraiders, an A-1 H and a multi-place A-1 E, in storage adjacent to the Douglas plant at Long
Beach, California in July 1982. (Photo by Frederick A. Johnsen.)
Musee de L'Air, Paris, France: AD-4NA, BuAer No.
126979.
Pima Air Museum, Tucson, Arizona: EA-1 F, BuAer
NO.135018.
United States Marine Corps Museum, Quantico, Virginia:
AD-4B BuAer No. 132261 (may be at nearby Camp
Barrett).
United States Naval Aviation Museum, Pensacola, Florida:
EA-1 F, BuAer No. 132532, and A-1 H, BuAer No. 135300.
United States Navy, Naval Air Station Lemoore, Califor-
nia: A-1 H.
United States Air Force, Hurlburt Field, Florida: A-1 G,
BuAer No. 132598.
United States Air Force Museum, Dayton, Ohio: A-1 E,
BuAer No. 132649.
United States Air Force, McClellan Air Force Base, Cali-
fornia: A-1 E, BuAer No. 132463.
Royal Thai Air Force Museum, Bangkok, Thailand: A-1 H,
BuAer No. 134472.
Additionally, flying examples will continue to create excite-
ment at air shows around the United States and in Europe,
while others go on display in museums.
Skyraiders for the Future 111
With amazing fidelity to markings details, Jack Spanich recreated VA-176's MiG-killing A-1H using this ex-French AD-4NA he
purchased abroad. Telltale marks of an AD-4NA - fuselage door and dorsal air scoop - belie the markings in this photo taken
at the 1978 Experimental Aircraft Association Fly-In Convention at Oshkosh, Wisconsin. (Photo by Frederick A. Johnsen.)
A variety of high-speed bombs decorates "Anita
Michelle", a slngle-seat A-1 of the 56th Special
Operations Wing. (Merrlt/Holmberg/Morgan ...........).
collections) h
'-- '