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(Sách) AQA History as Unit 1 - Totalitarian Ideology in Theory and Practice, c.1848-1941 - Sách Gáy Xoắn
(Sách) AQA History as Unit 1 - Totalitarian Ideology in Theory and Practice, c.1848-1941 - Sách Gáy Xoắn
Nelson Thornes
Text © James Staniforth 200 8
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Illustrations by: Roger Penwill, Gary Rees (c/o Linda Rogers Associates), David Russell Illustration
AQA introduction iv
vi Nazi Germany 88
Introduction to the History series
5 Nazi ideology and the
Introduction to this book 1
establishment of the Nazi State 88
Timeline 8
N azi i deology 89
The USSR and Marxism 10 The esta b li s hment of the d i ctators h i p from
Ja n u a ry 1933 to the a rmy 'Oath of Loyalty' 107
1 Marxist ideology, Lenin
and Stalin 10 6 German totalitarianism
to Russia 16
Bibliography 139
4 Italian totalitarianism in
the 1930s 67
•
AQA introductio n
II Key p rofile
Sources to reinforce topics or themes and may provide
fact or opinion. They may be quotations from historical
The profile of a key person you should be aware of to works, conte1nporaries of the period or photographs.
fully understand the period in question.
II Cross-referen ce
II Key term
Links to related content which may offer more detail
A term that you will need to be able to define and on the subject in question.
understand.
II
AQA introduction •
II Activity
A�Examination-style questions
Various activity types to provide you with different
challenges and opportunities to de1nonstrate both Questions at the end of each section in the style that
the content and skills you are learning. Some can be you can expect in your exam.
worked on individually, some as part of group work
and smne are designed to specifically "stretch and L earning outcomes
challenge" .
Learning outcomes at the end of each section remind
you what you should know having completed the
II Q u estion chapters in that section.
•
I ntroductio n to the History series
When Bruce Bogtrotter in Roald Dahl's Matilda was issue being addressed and to avoid malting notes on
challenged to eat a huge chocolate cake, he just opened material that is not properly understood.
his mouth and ploughed in, taking bite after bite and • Taking time to think, which is by far the n1.ost
lump after lump until the cake was gone and he was i1nportant component of study. By encouraging
feeling decidedly sick. The picture is not dissimilar to students to think before they write or speak, be it
that of some A level history students. They are attracted for a written answer, presentation or class debate,
to history because of its inherent appeal but, when faced students should learn to form opinions and 1nake
with a bulging file and a forthcoming examination, their judgements based on the accumulation of evidence.
enjoyment evaporates. They try desperately to cram These are the skills the examiner will be looking for
their brains with an assortment of random facts and in the final exan1.ination. The beauty of history is
subsequently prove unable to control the outpouring of that there is rarely a right or wrong answer so, with
their ill-digested material in the examination. sufficient evidence, one student's view will count
The books in this series are designed to help students for as much as the next.
and teachers avoid this feeling of overload and
examination panic by breaking down the AQA history II Un it 1
specification in such a way that it is easily absorbed.
Above all, they are designed to retain and promote The topics offered for study in Unit 1 are all based on
students' enthusiasm for history by avoiding a dreary 1 change and consolidation'. They invite consideration
rehash of dates and events. Each book is divided of what changed and why, as well as posing the
into sections, closely matched to those given in the question of what remained the sa1ne. Through a
specification, and the content is further broken down study of a period of about 50 to 60 years, students are
into chapters that present the historical material encouraged to analyse the interplay of long-term and
in a lively and attractive form, offering guidance short-term reasons for change and not only to consider
on the key tenns, events and issues, and blending how governments have responded to the need for
thought-provoking activities and questions in a way change but also to evaluate the ensuing consequences.
designed to advance students' understanding. By Such historical analyses are, of course, relevant to
encouraging students to think for themselves and to an understanding of the present and, through such
share their ideas with others, as well as helping them historical study, students will be guided towards a
to develop the knowledge and skills they will need to greater appreciation of the world around the1n today as
pass the examination, this book should ensure that well as developing their understanding of the past.
students' learning remains a pleasure rather than an Unit 1 is tested by a 1 hour 1 5 minute paper containing
endurance test. three questions, from which students need to choose
To make the most of what this book provides, students two. Details relating to the style of questions, with
will need to develop efficient study skills frmn the start additional hints, are given in Table 1 and links to the
and it is worth spending some time considering what examination requirements are provided throughout
these involve: this book. Students should fa1niliarise themselves with
these and the marking criteria before attempting any of
• Good organisation of material in a subject-specific the practice examination questions at the end of each
file. Organised notes help develop an organised section.
brain and sensible filing ensures time is not wasted
hunting for misplaced material. This book uses Answers will be marked according to a scheme based
· on 1levels of response'. This means that the answer will
cross-references to indicate where material in
one chapter has relevance to material in another. be assessed according to which level best matches the
Students are advised to use the same technique. historical skills displayed, taking both knowledge and
understanding into account. Take some time to study
• A sensible approach to note-making. Students are
these criteria and use them wisely.
often too ready to copy large chunks of material
from printed books or to download sheaves of
printouts from the internet. This series is designed Marking criteria
to encourage students to think about the notes they
collect and to undertake research with a particular Question 1{a), 2{a) and 3{a)
purpose in mind. The activities encourage students Level 1 Answers contain either some descriptive
to pick out that information that is relevant to the material that is only loosely linked to the focus of
II
I ntroduction to the History series •
U nit 1 Question M arks Question type Question stem H ints for students
Question 1 , (a) 12 This question is focused on Why did . . . Make sure you explain 'why',
2 and 3 a narrow issue within the Explain why . . . not 'how', and try to order your
period studied and requires answer in a way that shows you
In what ways . . .
an explanation understand the inter-link of
(was X important)
factors and which were the more
important. You should try to reach
an overall judgement/conclusion
Question 1 , (b) 24 This question links the narrow How far . . . This answer needs to b e planned
2 and 3 issue to a wider context and How important was . . . as you will need to develop an
requires an awareness that argument in your answer and
How successful . . .
issues and events can have show balanced judgement. Try
d ifferent interpretations to set out your argument in
the introduction and, as you
develop your ideas through your
paragraphs, support your opinions
with detailed evidence. Your
conclusion should flow naturally
and provide supported judgement
the question or some explicit comment with little, development and skills of written communication are
if any, appropriate support. Answers are likely to be weak. (0-6 marks)
generalised and assertive. The response is li1nited in
Level 2 Answers show son1e understanding of the
development and skills of written communication
demands of the question. Either they will be almost
are weak. (0-2 marks)
entirely descriptive with few explicit links to the
Level 2 Answers demonstrate smne knowledge and question or they contain son1e explicit com1nent with
understanding of the demands of the question. Either relevant but limited support. They display lin1ited
they are ahnost entirely descriptive with few explicit understanding of different historical interpretations.
links to the question or they provide smne explanations Answers are coherent but wealdy expressed and/or
backed by evidence that is limited in range and/or poorly structured. (7-11 marks)
depth. Answers are coherent but weakly expressed and/
Level 3 Answers show a developed understanding
or poorly structured. (3-6 marks)
of the demands of the question. They provide some
Level 3 Answers demonstrate good understanding assessment, backed by relevant and appropriately
of the de1nands of the question providing relevant selected evidence, but they lack depth and/or balance.
explanations backed by appropriately selected There is smne understanding of varying historical
information, although this 1nay not be full or interpretations . For the most part, answers are
cmnprehensive. For the most part, answers are clearly expressed and show son1e organisation in the
clearly expressed and show some organisation in the presentation of material. (12-16 marks)
presentation of material. (7-9 marks)
Level 4 Answers show explicit understanding of the
Level 4 Answers are well focused, identifying a range demands of the question. They develop a balanced
of specific explanations backed by precise evidence and argument backed by a good range of appropriately
dem.onstrating good understanding of the connections selected evidence and a good understanding of historical
and links between events/issues. For the most part, interpretations . For the most part, answers show
answers are well written and organised. (10-12 marks) organisation and good skills of written communication.
(17-21 marks)
Question 1{b), 2{b)and3{b)
Level 5 Answers are well focused and closely argued.
Level Answers either contain some descriptive
1
The arguments are supported by precisely selected
material that is only loosely linked to the focus of
evidence leading to a relevant conclusion/judgement,
the question or address only a limited part of the
incorporating well-developed understanding of
period of the question. Alternatively, there may be
historical interpretations and debate. For the most part,
some explicit comn1ent with little, if any, appropriate
answers are carefully organised and fluently written,
support. Answers are likely to be generalised and
using appropriate vocabulary. (22-24 marks)
assertive. There is little, if any, awareness of different
historical interpretations . The response is limited in
•
Totalitarian regim es
Fig. 1 Parade of the 55 guard a t a party rally in Nuremberg in the late-1930s. The uniformity of the crowd is something totalitarian
regimes try to create
•
• I ntrod uction to this book
II
Tota litarian regi mes •
Key
D D i ctatorshi p
D Democracy
----:_:_
--
,'
East ' Soviet
'
, _ _
.t ............
I
France � -_--- . - -._ ' ,' ''
StJ�fzer!an�, Hungary
..l. ... .1 -,•...... .,....
_·
l Romania
Alb�,:,t �
�\:? �
� ��
� (}
The 20th century saw a new term coined to describe countries where the
all-powerful ruler was not necessarily a hereditary monarch. The age of
the 'dictator ' had arrived. By 1 939, all of central and eastern Europe was
governed by a dictatorship of one fonn or another.
Some of these dictatorships existed in countries where the military had
stepped in and seized power, suppressing opposition and restricting
individual freedmn. The main aim of the dictatorships established
in these countries was to provide order and stability and to prevent a
(communist) revolution. Greece under Metaxas and Portugal under
Salazar both followed this route. The dictatorships established in
Russia (in 1 9 1 7 L Italy ( 1 922) and Germany ( 1 93 3 ) were different.
In these countries one party seized power, suppressed opposition
and restricted personal freedom. However, the regime went beyond
seizing and consolidating power. It was not enough for the regime
to be obeyed, as was the case in 20th century Portugal, 1 9th century
Russia or 1 8 th century France. The governments established by Lenin,
Mussolini and Hitler wanted their people to believe, not just obey. It
is this feature that distinguishes totalitarian dictatorships from other
dictatorships .
•
• I ntroduction to this book
allowing humans
free health care for all to be cloned
self -government
for Wales
'----v----"
Left-wing Right-wi ng
F i g. 4 A linear representation ofpolitical ideas
II
Totalita rian regi mes •
II
• I ntroduction to this book
Communism Nazism
Socialism Fascism
Liberal democracy
Fig. 5 A horseshoe representation ofpolitical ideas
•
Tota lita rian regimes •
The nation is
everything. All
the classes should
work together
for the benefit of
the nation.
When you have worked your way through this book, look back at this
chapter to compare Stalin's Russia, Mussolini's Italy and Hitler 's
II Did yo u kn ow?
Germany with the key features of a totalitarian State to reach a Fascism and Nazism were similar, to
judgement on the extent to which they were totalitarian. the extent that it can be effective to
think of the formula:
Fascism + racism = Nazism
This helps to explain why Nazism
was more right wing than Fascism.
Although M ussolini came to adopt
anti-Semitic policies as he fell under
the influence of Hitler (see page 78),
anti-Semitism was not central to
Fascism. In contrast, it was one of
the defining features of Nazism.
II
• I ntrod uction to this book
II Ti meline
The colo u rs represent the geogra p hica l locations o f the events i n t h e ti meline a s follows: Green: Totalita rianism i n general, Red: The U S S R,
Blue: Ita ly, Black: Nazi Germany
M ussolini passes Inspi red by M ussolini, Death of Lenin. The Italian M ussolini refers Stalin and B u k h a rin
a new electoral Hitler attempts to A power struggle socialist deputy to the new defeat the United
law and then seize power in the to replace him Giacomo 'totalitarian' Op position of
wins a majority M unich Putsch. The begins. Trotsky Matteotti is government Trotsky, Zinoviev
in the election, putsch fails and is the clea r m u rdered by of Ita ly. Other and Ka menev.
giving him the Hitler is im prisoned favourite, so Fascists political pa rties a re B u k h a rin sup ports
power to rule where he writes h is Zinoviev a n d banned a n d t h e the NEP, telling t h e
without t h e a utobiography, Mein Kamenev unite Vidoni Pact bans peasants to enrich
constraint of Kampf with Stalin to strikes themselves
other parties stop Trotsky
Unemployment Hitler becomes chancellor of Sergei Ki rov, Sta lin's The Night of the Long The
reaches 6 million Germany. The Enabling Act n u m ber two, is Knives sees Hitler pu rge the N u rem b u rg
in Germa ny. The gives h i m the power to rule by assassinated. Stalin SA and remove opponents Laws
Nazi Pa rty becomes decree for fou r years. Other intro d u ces the of the regimes from within margina lise
the la rgest pa rty political parties are banned. Emergency Decree and o utside the Nazi Pa rty. Jews in
in Germany, but Hitler copies M ussolini and Aga i nst Terrorism, Hindenb u rg dies and Hitler Germ an
President Hinden b u rg signs a Concordat with the giving the N KV D com bines the positions of society
refuses to make Hitler Pope. The first concentration greater powers ch ancellor a n d president in
ch ancellor cam p opens at Dachau the new office of Fuhrer
Outbreak of the Assassination Italy enters Hitler invades the Hitler begins Fina l defeat of
Second World War. of Trotsky by a the Second Soviet Union in the mass totalitarian Italy
Nazi Germany a n d Sta linist agent World War p u rsuit of living exterm ination and Germa ny.
Soviet Russia have in M exico. Stalin space and his of E u ro pean The Soviet
a non-aggression is now the o n ly desire to destroy Jews Union emerges
pact. Italy is too su rvivor from Commu n ism. Ita lian victorious from
weak to join the Lenin's original troops fight with the Second
war government of the Germans in the World Wa r
1917 Soviet Union
II
Tota lita rian regi mes •
Lenin a bolishes the Germany signs Italy fails to gain Lenin Stalin becomes The King a ppoints
Constituent Assembly. the Treaty of territory expected a bandons War General Mussolini p rime
Beginning of the Versailles, following the Paris Com munism and Secretary of the minister of Italy.
Russian Civil War, accepting Peace Conference. introduces the Com munist This is followed
which the Bolsheviks responsi b ility Ga b rielle d'Annunzio capitalist NEP. Pa rty, a position by the sym bolic
had to fight until1921 for causing the captures Fiume and Pa rty objections that gives him M a rch on Rome,
to consolidate their First World War establishes a State are ended by the unrivalled power which fascist
control of the Soviet and therefore that inspires Fascist Decree Against p ro pagand a
Union. Lenin introduces agreeing to pay Italy Factionalism, p resents as the
War Com munism repa rations which p revents seizure of power
pa rty dissent
The NEP starts Bukharin is The Lateran The Wall Stalin celebrates The Nazi Pa rty Ryutin
to fail. Stalin defeated. Fi rst Treaty between Street Crash his 50th birthday as becomes attacks
turns against Five Year Plan the Italian State leads to undisputed leader the second Stalin's
Bukharin for agriculture and the Pope economic of the Soviet Union. la rgest pa rty policies.
begins in the wins Mussolini crisis in the Seizure of grain from in Germany Stalin is
Soviet Union, the sup port of USA and the the peasants becomes unable to
ending the NEP Italian Catholics economic the official policy in have him
collapse of the countryside. Stalin executed
Germany decrees the elimination
of the kulaks as a class
Italian victory in The beginning of the Show Trials Hitler expands Germany, Italy introduces The Italian
Abyssinia leads and the Great Purge in the Soviet uniting the Reich with anti-Semitic pa rliament is
Mussolini to Union. During the next three years, Austria and annexing legislation replaced by
announce that 50 leading Bolsheviks a re put on the Sudetenland from as a result of the Cha m ber
Rome is once public trial and found guilty of Czechoslovakia. Kristallnacht the growing of Fasces and
more the heart crimes against the State. M illions of takes place, a pogro m against influence of Nazi Corporations
of a great em pire citizens a re a rrested and sentenced German jews that marks the Germany
to imprisonment or death. The1936 beginning of the exclusion of
Constitution is introduced jews from German society
Start of the Cold George Germany is Chinese Hannah Arendt Death of Stalin. Collapse of
War. Over the O rwell d ivided into Com munist publishes The The worst Communism
next four years, writes 1984. cap italist, Party takes Origins of excesses of Soviet in the Soviet
the Soviet Union The book democratic power Totalitarianism totalitarianism Union
establishes describes a West end but
com munist and totalitarian Germany and dictato rship
totalita rian puppet State based co m munist, continues
States in Poland, on the S oviet totalitarian
Rumania, Hungary, Union East Germany
Bulgaria and
Czechoslovakia
•
1 Marxist id eo logy, Le nin an d Stalin
• h ow the Bolshevik Revo lution II The Bo ls hevik Revo luti on a n d the fi rst
led to the esta b l i s h ment of tota lita ria n state
the fi rst totalita rian state
The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1 9 1 7 overthrew the Russian
• M a rxist stage theory, provisional government that had, in turn, forced Tsar Nicholas II to
i nc lu d i ng t h e d i ctators h i p of
abdicate in February 1 9 1 7 . The Bolsheviks differed from other political
parties in Russia primarily because they alone wanted to leave the First
the pro leta riat
World War, and this policy was popular with peasants and workers
• h ow M a rxist theory was as well as the armed forces . However, they also had a set of political
a d a pted by Len i n and Sta li n
ideas they were committed to because the Bolshevik Party was a
Marxist party. As such, they had sought power to create a Marxist ( or
• the power struggle to re p lace communist) state. They did not seize power to create a totalitarian state.
Len i n from 1924 to 1928: the The Bolsheviks freed political prisoners, ended press censorship and
advanced personal freedom, particularly for Russian women whose lives
strengt h s and weaknesses
were transformed by birth control and divorce. However, the changes
of Sta li n, Trotsky, Zi n ovi ev,
were not universally popular and in 1 9 1 7 the Bolsheviks only really
Ka m e n ev a n d Buk h a ri n had control over Petrograd and Moscow, the two main cities . Those
• t h e role o f ideology as i t relates
citizens of the new Soviet Union who rej ected the Bolsheviks' ideas and
govermnent resisted in the Russian Civil War, which lasted from 1 9 1 8
to the futu re of the revolution
to 1 92 1 . The war was brutal and it transformed the Bolsheviks and their
and the Soviet economy. leaders, V I. Lenin and Leon Trotsky.
Chapter 1 M a rxist ideology, Len i n a n d Sta lin •
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and M a rxism
II Key term
The communist Red Army was created with a brutal military discipline.
If soldiers deserted, Lenin approved shooting every tenth man in the
Cheka: the All-Russian Extraordinary unit; this decimation was deemed necessary to install the discipline
Commission for Combating required to win the war. Some 48,000 former tsarist officers were
Counter-revolution and Sabotage recruited into the Red Army, with their families held hostage to ensure
was led by a Polish aristocrat called their loyalty. In December 1 9 1 7, Lenin created the first secret police,
Felix Dzerzhinsky. It had the power the C heka.
to investigate, arrest, interrogate,
try and execute any opponents of These measures were necessary to ensure the Bolsheviks won the war
the regime. The Cheka created the and therefore could impose their official ideology and pursue Utopia.
first Soviet labour camps and is No measure was too extreme in the pursuit of the communist ideal.
estimated to have been responsible In January 1 9 1 8, elections were held for the new Russian parliament,
for around 1 40,000 deaths. It was the Constituent Assembly. The Bolsheviks failed to win a 1najority,
replaced by the G P U in 1 92 2 . so Lenin sent in the Red Army and dissolved the assembly. In March
1 9 1 8 , the last non-Bolshevik:s left the governn1ent. In 1 92 1 , Lenin was
facing opposition to the New Economic Policy (NEP ) . He forced the
AQA Exa m i ner's tip
policy through and then introduced the Decree Against Factionalism
on the last day of the 1 Oth Party Congress in 1 92 1 . The decree meant
it was no longer acceptable to argue with a party decision once the
You need a clear understanding of
decision had been reached; instead it had to be accepted and defended.
the concept of totalitarianism as the
Those who criticised official policies would be guilty of factionalism
basis for the rest of your studies. You
(forming rival groups) and could be expelled fron1 the party. Stalin later
could be asked about the success
of one of the regimes in creating a accused anyone who criticised his policies of 'factionalisn1' .
totalitarian state, which means you The pressure for an ideologically pure economy that would also
would need to link your knowledge ensure that the Bolsheviks had the weapons and food to fight led to
of the key features on pages 4-5 to the introduction of the economic policy known as War Communism.
what Stalin, M ussolini and H itler The policy involved the Bolshevik State taking control of all industry
actually did, which is covered in the as well as seizing the peasants' surplus grain and, where there was
rest of the book. no surplus, the grain the peasants needed to feed themselves. This
caused a famine in which an estimated 5 million people died . Lenin
ended War Comn1unism in February 1 92 1 when he introduced
the NEP. It allowed private ownership of industry if fewer than 1 0
workers were employed, and State requisitioning of only a percentage
of the surplus grain a peasant farmer produced. Lenin saw it as a
temporary expedient: it restored economic stability but at the expense
of Cmn1nunism.
A crucial part of the fight was the propaganda en1ployed by the
Bolsheviks . Trotsky led the war effort from a cmn1nand train that
travelled the front line, with a printing press and loud speakers to get
across the Bolshevik message of 'peace, land, bread and freedom' .
The Bolshevik victory in the Civil War was due in no small part to the
ever-increasing control that the party and the State exercised over the
Soviet people. These measures, however brutal, were justified because
they ensured a Bolshevik victory and the establishment of Utopia.
That millions died was of no consequence. It is a classic feature of
totalitarian dictatorship that the end justifies the 1neans . Lenin had
laid the foundations for the totalitarian rule of Stalin and indeed the
totalitarianism of both Mussolini and Hitler. Mussolini may have
invented the word but Lenin was the real creator.
• Activity
Study the key features of a totalitarian state on page 5. H ow far had Lenin
created a totalitarian state?
Chapter 1 M a rxist ideology, Len i n a n d Sta lin •
I m perialism
I n this epoch the em peror ru les, his r u le is i n itia lly based o n h i s s u periority at ga i n i ng resources.
The em peror would own all l a n d . However, as this stage develops, the e m peror would become
t h reatened by outsiders and therefore grant land to others, who i n return wou ld provi d e
sold i ers to d e f e n d the cou ntry. A n e w l a n d - o w n i n g aristocracy w a s therefore created .
Feud alism
At t h e stage of feu d a l i s m , land was owned by t h e a r i stocracy. T hey would exploit the
peasantry, who wo rked o n t h e land b u t did n ot own it. T h e key resou rce was t h e food
pro d u ced which t h e a r i stocracy c o u ld sell. The s u rp l u s of food led to t h e d evelopment of
trade and i n d u stry and a new class of m e rc h a nts w h o would want a ccess to political power.
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and M a rxism
Ca pitalism
This was the stage M a rx observed i n B rita i n i n the m i d - 1 9th c e n t u ry. T h e re were two
classes: the m i d d le class of factory owners and mercha nts, or the b o u rgeoisie, and t h e
w o r k i n g c l a s s or t h e proletariat. T h e b o u rgeoisie o w n e d t h e m e a n s of p ro d u ct i o n ( t h e
facto ries) a n d beca m e i n creasi ngly wealthy, s e l l i n g g o o d s f o r a profit. T h ey e x p lo ited t h e
proletariat, payi ng t h e m l o w wages w h i c h e n s u red t h a t the proletariat lived i n terri b l e
conditions. M a rx a rgued the proletariat accepted t h e i r position i n soci ety beca u s e of
t h ree great decept i o n s :
• The C h u rch taught that s u ffering w a s a l l p a rt of God 's plan a n d that it b rought
a greater reward i n the afterlife. It was for t h i s reason that M a rx fa m o u s ly ca lled
religion 'the o p i u m of t h e masses'. M a rx was a lso a m ateria list, which meant that he
looked for rat i o n a l explanations of events based o n what c o u ld b e seen, h e a rd a n d
touched, rat h e r t h a n accepting a ny s u pernatu ra l force c o u ld be res p o n s i b l e . T h i s
m e a n t h e rejected any role f o r re ligion i n society.
• Trades U nions served the bourgeois factory owners more t h a n they served the working
class. By seeking to i m p rove workers' pay a n d conditions m a rg i n a lly they prevented the
proletariat becom i ng revo lutionary and overthrowing the b o u rgeois system of government.
• Parliam enta ry democracy d eceived t h e worki ng class i nto b e l i eving that they h a d control
ove r gove r n m e nt d e c i s i o n s . A lthough the working class h a d been given t h e vote in B rita i n
i n 1 8 67, t h e i r lives d i d n o t i m p rove because M Ps were sti ll m i d d le-class factory owners
who would not pass laws that were aga i n st t h e i r own i n t e rests. For exa m p le, P u b l i c H e a lth
Acts to p rovide clea n water for the working classes i n cities were p e r m i ssive (they a llowed
loca l cou n c i ls to raise taxes to pay for sewers, rather than forc i ng them to d o s o ) .
T h e refore, for t h e proletariat t o rise u p a n d overthrow t h e b o u rgeoisie a n d e n d t h e stage
of ca pita l i s m , it was cruci a l that the workers a c h i eved a level of political awareness. T h i s
m e a nt awareness t h a t they were b e i ng exploited, a n d aware n ess that t h ey m a d e u p t h e vast
m aj ority of the cou ntry and t h e refore they had the power. It was this need t h at led M a rx to
end the Com m u n ist M a n i festo with the battle-cry:
'The proleta r i a n s have nothing to lose but their c h a i n s . T h ey h ave a wo rld to win. P ro leta r i a n s
of a l l cou ntries, u n ite ! '
Socia lism
M a rx believed that it was i n evitable that the proletariat would become politically aware and
that they would then rise u p and overthrow the bourgeois government. D u ring this stage, the
dictatorship of the proletariat would develop i n which workers' organ isations would ensure that
food, goods and services were d istributed fairly according to people's needs. The State would
achieve this through taxation of the m iddle class and the provision of benefits to the working
class, as well as through State ownership of industry which wou ld ensure profits were shared by
a ll. M a rx believed that the stage of socialism would be transitional. It would last long enough for
the m i d d le class to be re-educated to understa nd that equa lity was su perior to private ownersh i p .
If necessary, elements of the m id d le class who refused to accept socialism w o u l d be e l i m i n ated.
Co mm unism
T h i s stage was M a rx 's Utopia. As everyone worked together for the c o m m o n good and
therefore had e nough resources for their needs, there would no longer be a ny n eed for
money a n d government cou ld whither away. Society wou ld be class- less. F u rthermore, as
this was the u ltimate stage i n h u m a n hi story, this stage wou ld be reached i n all countries.
This would mean that the world would also become State-less as there would n o longer be
com petition between d i fferent States.
Fig. 5 (continued)
II
Chapter 1 M a rxist i d eology, Len i n an d Sta lin •
• Activity
Revision exercise
Study Figure 5 sum marising M a rxist stage theory.
I m pe ri a lism
Feudalism
Ca pitalism
Socialism
Com munism
• Activity
Source analysis
Study Source 1 . I dentify the reasons why Marx would argue that the bonus
P h i lip G reen awarded h is fam i ly was u nfai r. Relate you r answer back to what
you have read about M a rxist ideology on pages 1 3-1 5 .
•
• Section 1 The U S S R a n d M a rxism
The Russian Marxist political party was the Social Detnocrats. Lenin had
becmne one of their leaders, but he was increasingly concerned about
how the party was organised and how the communist revolution could
come about. In 1 902, he addressed the problem of Russia's backwardness
in his work What is to be Done� In it, he argued that a s1nall, professional
revolutionary elite should form the 'vanguard of the proletariat' . These
revolutionaries would carry out the revolution for the working class.
II
Chapter 1 M a rxist ideology, Len i n a n d Stalin •
A year later, the Social Democrat Party conference held first in Brussels
and later in London saw the party split. Lenin's desire for a revolutionary
elite was rejected by his old friend Yuri Martov as undemocratic and the
two went their separate ways . Lenin's party took the name Bolshevik,
meaning 1majority men', after Lenin had won a maj ority in the vote to
determine who would control the party newspaper Iskra ( 1the Spark') .
Martov's group beca1ne known as the Mensheviks, or 1Ininority
men'. Trotsky sided with Martovi he would only rej oin Lenin and the
Bolsheviks in the summer of 1 9 1 7 after Lenin had approached him. This
perceived lack of loyalty to the Bolsheviks and Lenin would be a crucial
factor in the struggle for power after Lenin's death.
Bolshevik M enshevik
Revolution The stage of Capitalism could be skipped and Russia was not ready for a proletarian revolution; a
the bourgeois and proletarian stages cou ld be capitalist revolution had to occur first
telescoped into one
The pa rty An elite party of professional revolutionaries A mass organisation with membersh ip open to
trades unionists
Discipline Authority to be exercised by the Central Comm ittee Open, democratic discussion within the party;
of the party; this was described as 'democratic decisions to be arrived at by votes of members
centralism'
Strategy Rejection of co-operation with other parties and Alliances with all other revolutionary and bourgeois
trades unionists; instead aimed to turn workers into li beral parties and to work with trades unions in
revo lutionaries pursuing better wages and conditions for workers
Activity
Study Ta ble 1 , which s u m m a rises the differences between the Bolshevik and
M enshevik parties.
•
• Section 1 The U S S R a n d M arxism
Ill Key term 2 ignored the need for a spontaneous revolution of the exploited
workers who formed the majority in society and instead used a small
Political Testament: Lenin's final revolutionary elite
message to the Bolshevik Party,
3 abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat in favour of the
first written in September 1 922. In
dictatorship of the party who represented the proletariat
it, he failed to name a successor,
criticising all the leading Bolsheviks. 4 accepted that the party relied on two classes : the proletariat and the
He believed that the Central poorer peasants
Committee should be increased 5 allowed the political system to determine the economic system,
in size and that all the leading the exact opposite of Marxism where the political system was
Bolsheviks should rule collectively. the inevitable consequence of the economic system. This 1neant
In a postscript added in January imposing War Communism and its replacement the NEP when War
1 923, Lenin proposed the removal of Communism failed.
Stalin from his position as General
Secretary of the Bolshevik Party. All the proble1ns that the Bolsheviks faced after 1 9 1 7 can be directly
attributed to the decision to force the revolution. The Civil War, the
problems of War Communism, the need to resort to the NEP and the
Ill Cross- refe re nce problems with the peasantry were all because the Soviet Union did not
To recap on War Com m unism, have a proletarian maj ority. Lenin himself acknowledged the problem in
see page 1 2. his Politi cal Testament, writing on 25 Dece1nber 1 922: 'Our party relies
on two classes and therefore its instability would be possible and its fall
inevitable if these two classes were not able to come to an agreement. ' His
adaptation of Marxist theory was so significant that the official ideology of
the Soviet Union was Marxist-Leninis1n rather than Marxism.
Fig. 7 The leading Bolsheviks mourn Lenin. Carrying Lenin's coffin are (left to right):
Stalin, Kamenev, Tomsky, Molotov, Zinoviev (partially hidden), Kalinin and
Bukharin. Note the absence ofTrotsky
On 2 1 January 1 924, Lenin suffered a third and fatal stroke. His death
was critical for the Soviet Union's future because the struggle to succeed
II Cross-referen ce him meant a battle of personalities and political ideas. Both would have
I nformation on how M a rxist theory a fundamental impact on the future of the Soviet Union, on Marxism
was adapted by Stalin in the 1 920s in the Soviet Union and on the development of totalitarianism. The
can be found on page 28. struggle that took place between 1 924 and 1 928 would see Stalin emerge
as victorious and adapt the existing Marxist-Leninist ideology into a
Stalin's further adaptation of Marxist
ideas is d iscussed in Chapter 2. n1ore personal set of ideas that have becmne known as Stalinis1n - a truly
totalitarian system.
II
Chapter 1 M a rxist ideology, Len i n a n d Stali n •
j oseph Stalin
Joseph Stalin ( 1 8 79-1 9 5 3 ) was born in Georgia as Joseph
Vissarionovich Djugashvili, taking the name 'Stalin' or 'Man of Steel'
from 1 9 1 1 rather than his earlier alias 'Koba' . He trained as a priest
in a seminary in Gori but read illegal works by Marx and Lenin,
becoming a committed Marxist and a follower of Lenin. He raised
money for the Bolshevik Party by robbing banks, for which he was
arrested and sent into exile'. Stalin returned to Petrograd in March
1 9 1 7 and was made a me1nber of the Central Com1nittee in April,
but he played little part in the October Revolution. He was a member Fig. 8 joseph Stalin
of the Bolshevik government as Commissar for Nationalities, but his
key position was General Secretary, a post Lenin gave him in 1 922. II Cross-refe re n ce
By the start of 1 923, Lenin was regretting this move and, on his
Trotsky is introduced on page 1 1.
death, Stalin was rank outsider in the race to succeed Lenin.
Leon Trotsky
By 1 924, Trotsky had established himself as the obvious successor
to Lenin. He had plotted the October Revolution, saved the new
Soviet State in the Civil War and created the Red Army. However,
both his success and his leadership of the army meant that other
leading Bolsheviks thought he needed to be stopped. Trotsky was,
at times, too arrogant, believing that power would si1nply pass to
himself. This led one Bolshevik to recall that he had few deeply
committed followers and he also reportedly told friends that he
Fig. 9 Leon Trotsky
thought he would never be made leader because he was Jewish.
G rigori Zinoviev
Grigori Zinoviev ( 1 8 83- 1 936) was a lower middle-class Ukrainian
Jew. A close associate of Lenin, he returned to Russia after a period
of exile with Lenin in April 1 9 1 7 . Along with his close friend Lev
Ka1nenev, he opposed the October Revolution, favouring a period
of co -operation with other left-wing parties rather than a one-party
State. Lenin persuaded him to rejoin the leadership, malting him
leader of the Leningrad Party. He was also the first Chairman of the
Comintern (the organisation responsible for spreading Communism
abroad) and a member of the Politburo when it was reformed in
1 9 1 9 . He was charged with the defence of Petrograd during the Civil
War, but the city had to be saved by Trotsky after Zinoviev panicked. Fig. 1 0 Grigori Zinoviev
His reputation was further undermined by his womanising; he had
a particular taste for chorus girls .
Lev Kamenev
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and Marxism
of the Moscow Party. Kamenev was well liked but his reputation was
damaged by three associations: he was married to Trotsky's sister,
his son Lutik was well known in Moscow as a drunk and playboy ( a
thinly disguised Kamenev junior was the feature o f a play i n Moscow
in the 1 920s) and he worked closely with Zinoviev.
N i kolai B u kharin
S i nce he became Genera l Secreta ry, Com rade Sta l i n has concentrated
i n his hands i m meas u ra b le power, and I am n ot s u re that he will a lways
know how to use that power with sufficient caution. On the other
hand Com rade Trotsky is d isti ngu ished n ot o n ly by h i s outsta n d i ng
q u alities ( person a lly he is the most capa b le m a n in the p resent Centra l
Comm ittee ) , but a lso by h i s excess of self- confidence a n d a rea d in ess to
be carried away by the p u rely a d m i n istrative side of a ffai rs.
II
Chapter 1 M a rxist ideology, Len i n and Sta lin •
Fig. 13 Stalin with the men who were his colleagues in the 7920s and his victims in the 7930s. From left: Stalin, Rykov, Kamenev and Zinoviev
Lenin's criticism of all the leading Bolsheviks was deliberate. He did not
want any of them to rule alone, preferring a collective leadership to be
II Key term
established. Lenin probably felt that a collective leadership was 1nore in Collective leadership: rule by
keeping with Marxis1n and his own view of 'dictatorship of the party' to several leading figures rather than
create a truly socialist State. by an individual. Lenin hoped a
collective leadership would replace
Lenin also had concerns about the personalities of the leading Bolsheviks. him and rule the Soviet Union
He recognised the arrogance of Trotsky who, because of his great intellect, after his death.
often appeared to be talking down to normal party members. They
were suspicious of Trotsky anyway because he was both Jewish and an
ex-Menshevik, which is what Lenin was referring to in his Political
Testament when he wrote of Trotsky's 'non-Bolshevism' . Lenin also
believed Stalin was becon1ing too powerful as General Secretary, using
the power to create a party loyal to him rather than Bolshevism. Lenin
had also been disturbed by Stalin's actions in Georgia in 1 922. After
the Bolshevik Revolution, Georgia had declared independence from the
Soviet Union. Lenin did not want the break-up of the Soviet Union and
sent Stalin and his fellow Georgian Sergo Ordzhonikidze to negotiate the
return of the State to the Soviet Union. Stalin instead forced Georgia to
rejoin the Soviet Union, using the Red Army and the Cheka and directly
ignoring Lenin's instructions . Stalin had also been rude and abusive to
Lenin's wife in a phone conversation and, although he later was forced to
send her a written apology, Lenin noted Stalin's rudeness in the postscript
to the Political Testament. Stalin's abrasiveness and Trotsky's arrogance
terrified Lenin, as he thought the two would clash and split the party.
•
• Section 1 The U S S R a n d M a rxism
Fig. 14 The Lenin legacy - how Stalin linked himself to Lenin and used this association to his advantage
II Cross-referen ce
Lenin reached the conclusion that Trotsky needed to be controlled and
he therefore argued that the size of the Central Com1nittee should be
Stalin's speech at Lenin's fu neral is increased to 50- 1 00 n1.e1nbers. However, the dynamite in the testan1.ent
explored on page 44. was that Stalin should be removed.
Stalin's supervision of the Lenin It was essential to Stalin that Lenin's loss of faith in hin1. remained a
Enrolment is discussed on page 24. secret. Lenin had become a god -like figure to the Russian people and the
The Decree against Factionalism is Bolshevik Party as the founder of the Soviet Union and the country's
explained on page 1 2. leader, through the Civil War and the challenges faced as a result of being
the world's only communist country. All the leading Bolsheviks were
desperate to associate then1.selves with Lenin and to appear to be his
natural successor. Stalin was the most successful and this 'Lenin legacy'
was a crucial strength of Stalin in the power struggle.
Stalin's survival
Despite Lenin's attempts to remove hin1, Stalin survived because of a
combination of good fortune and political cunning:
• Lenin was unable to act himself because of the strokes he had
suffered. Stalin controlled access to Lenin.
• Lenin had urged Trotsky to attack Stalin over his ill treatment of
the Georgians at the 1 2th Party Congress in 1 923, but Trotsky, in
an example of the type of arrogant miscalculation that destroyed his
chances of becoming leader, had done a deal with Stalin. In return
for keeping quiet about Georgia, Trotsky was allowed to present his
economic policies without criticism from Stalin or his supporters.
• Before it was published, Stalin was informed of the comments of
the Political Testament by Lenin's two secretaries, whom Stalin had
appointed. He therefore ensured the testan1.ent was read to the Central
Com1nittee first. Kamenev and Zinoviev saw Trotsky as a much greater
threat and so backed Stalin, arguing he had changed his ways . The
Central Com1nittee voted not to publish Lenin's final wishes.
The
Politburo.
Set up in
1917 and
reformed i n 1 91 9,
this was the main
day-to-day
decision-making body i n
t h e Soviet U n io n. Seven
members were elected in j une
1 924: Stalin, Trotsky, Zi noviev,
Kamenev, Bu kharin, Rykov
and Tomsky.
Chooses
The Central Committee of the
the
Bolshevi k Party, elected by the Party
Congress. It met a bout every three months
and was the policy-m a king body
of the Soviet U n io n.
The Party Congress. This met about once a year and elected the Central
Committee. Its mem bers were representatives from a ll the regional parties.
Regional secretaries. They effectively ran the Bolshevi k Pa rty in cities and
towns across the Soviet U nion . They were appoi nted by Sta lin as General
Secretary. In turn, they chose the regional delegates to the Party Congress.
t t t t t t
Regional secretaries
They select delegates to the Party Congress
meaning that Stalin was able to rebuild the party organisation. He was 1 924 Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev
able to select his supporters to fill these posts . v. Trotsky.
• Stalin could appoint, prmnote and demote the top 5, 500 officials in the 1 926 Stalin and Bukharin v. Trotsky,
Soviet Union. As well as working in an office rather than in a mine or Zinoviev and Kamenev.
on a railway, these officials received privileges. They had holidays and
1 928 Stalin, Molotov, Kirov and
lived in party housing, could use party dacha (holiday homes) and had Kaganovic v. Bukharin, Rykov
access to party shops where luxuries like oranges were available. and Tomsky .
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and Marxism
II
Chapter 1 Marxist ideo logy, Len i n and Sta lin •
of the NEP, arguing that it was capitalist and that the time had come to
introduce rapid industrialisation. They also started to question Socialism
II Cross- refe re n ce
in One Country, arguing that without an international revolution the The policy of N E P is found on page
economic backwardness of the country would destroy the Soviet Union. 12 and on page 27.
This was an attack on Bukharin as well as Stalin and so the two united. Rapid industrialisation is discussed
Stalin was able to brand their opponents as factionalists and Bukharin's on page 27.
popularity, combined with Stalin's control of the delegates, won the day.
At the 1 4th Party Congress in December 1 925, Kamenev's warnings
against Stalin were shouted down by angry delegates who then defeated
the programme of Zinoviev and Kamenev by 5 5 9 votes to 6 5 . In 1 926,
Zinoviev lost control of Leningrad and was replaced as Chair of the
Comintern by Bukharin.
The policy of ending the NEP and beginning rapid industrialisation was
not new: it had been Trotsky's policy in 1 924. Zinoviev and Kamenev
therefore decided to make a tactical alliance with Trotsky, but this
lacked credibility given their attacks on each other a year earlier. As their
support lay outside the Central Committee, they held protest meetings
which only confirmed that they were factionalists . In October 1 926, they
supplied copies of Lenin's Political Testament to the world's press, but it
was too late. The Central Committee removed them from all positions
of power and used the secret police against their supporters, seizing
their printing presses . Trotsky was placed in internal exile in 1 928 and
deported from the Soviet Union in 1 929. Kamenev was sent to Rome
as Ambassador in January 1 92 7 and expelled frmn the party at the end
of the year. He was sent into exile in 1 92 8 but was allowed to return to
the party after denouncing Trotsky. Zinoviev was also expelled and re
admitted to the party in 1 92 8 .
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and Marxism
:¥-
the world. Trotsky believed that aiding socialist revolutions around
Pril\ted lU\d PublisMd by Europe would mean that the Soviet Union would not be isolated as
THE SOCIALIST l.A&OUR PRESs; ..;:
U. AlfD � S.&t<l'l>F.... $TII f.P.T
1 the country would create socialist allies . Stalin was dismissive of
r.J.ASGOW
Trotsky's ideas .
II
Chapter 1 Marxist ideology, Len i n and Stalin •
• Activity
Source analysis
Study Source 5. Why do you t h i n k Bolsheviks like Stalin o bjected to B u kh a rin's
policies for the countryside?
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and Marxism
Activity
Revision exercise
Review this section to i dentify the m a i n stre ngths and wea knesses of
the five leade rs h i p ca n d idates. Copy and com p lete the ta b le below to
su m mari se t h e m .
Stalin
Trotsky
Zinoviev
Kamenev
Bukharin
II
C h a pter 1 M a rxist i d eology, Len i n a n d Sta lin •
• Activity
Revision exercise
Copy and com plete the ta ble to summarise the d ifferent leaders h i p ca ndidates between 1 924 and 1 9 2 8 and their policies
using the bu llet points below. Some poi nts will need to be used more than once.
Cand idate Posts Policy or position, 1 924 Policy or position, 1 92 6 Policy or position, 1 92 8
---------------------------------- �--�------------
joseph Stalin
Leon Trotsky
Grigori Zinoviev
Lev Kamenev
Nikolai Bukharin
• S u m m a ry q u estions • Activity
G roup activity
II Explai n why the Bolshevi k Revolution was not a true M a rxist revolution.
I n grou ps, identify a list o f reasons
fJ H ow i mportant was the role of ideology in explaining Sta lin's victory i n for Sta lin's success i n the power
t h e power struggle in the years 1 924 t o 1 92 8 ? struggle. Try to fi nd five pieces of
evidence to support each reason .
•
2 Russian totalitarianis m in the 1 9 3 0s
Fig. 1 The Worthy Successor of Lenin. Large-size portraits of Lenin and Stalin were commonplace from the 1930s, reinforcing the
·
legitimacy ofStalin's rule by his association with Lenin
In this chaptery ou will learn about: On 29 December 1 929, Stalin celebrated his 50th birthday at his dacha
at Zubalovo. The previous years had been difficult for the General
• the m e a n i n g of t h e Secretary, or GenSek. He had fought a struggle for control of the USSR
i ntolera n ce of d iversity at the same time as critical decisions were taken about the future of
the Bolshevik Revolution. As he celebrated his birthday with allies like
• t h e reasons why the Soviet Vyacheslav Molotov and Lazar Kaganovich, Stalin could reflect that his
U n i o n was i ntolera nt of main rivals were defeated, humiliated and, in the case of Leon Trotsky,
d iversity exiled. Stalin had a right to feel self-satisfied. The success of the Stalin
faction had been assured with the fall of Bukharin and the right, but
• t h e extent to w h i c h t h e these other leading Bolsheviks did not yet fully recognise that the
Soviet U n i o n w a s i ntole ra nt next phase in Soviet government would not be the dictatorship of the
of d iversity i n t h e 193 0sl proletariat but the personal dictatorship of the Red Tsar.
with refe re nce to eco n o m i c}
politica l} re ligious a n d II The i ntolera n ce of d ive rsity
c u lt u ra l d iversity
The intolerance of diversity - the refusal to accept any difference - is
• M a rxist t h eories of lea d e rs h i p a key theme in totalitarian states . This includes different ideas as well
as any form of individuality. It is a direct result of totalitarian regimes
a n d the cu lt of perso nality.
having an exclusive ideology, the implementation of which would create
II
Chapter 2 R ussian totalitarianism in the 1 93 0s •
the 'perfect' state. If there were alternative views and beliefs, by definition
they are not 'perfect', and therefore they should not be allowed to exist.
II Cross- refe ren ce
To recap on M a rxist ideology and
In the Soviet Union there was a strong ideological basis for refusing to stage theory, review page 10.
allow individual freedom and diversity:
• Marxism was a scientific theory that stressed that progress towards
Utopia was inevitable. However, in the stage of Socialism, the
'dictatorship of the proletariat' would occur. This involved ending
class divisions (diversity) by one of two methods : re-education and
the creation of a new class consciousness, or extern'lination. This
would ultimately lead to Comn'lunism, the 'Utopian State'. However,
before this stage could be reached, it was necessary to subordinate the
individual to the State to ensure that the state would triumph against
the enemies of Socialism. It was believed that as the final stage of
communism became ever nearer, capitalist enemies would struggle
ever harder to prevent this socialist victory.
• Marxis1n had not been followed in the Soviet Union. Most of the
population were peasants . The Soviet State had to destroy their
belief in an alternative vision of Utopia. Other sets of ideas, such as
Trotskyism, were also dangerous and destructive forces that had to be
eradicated as concepts.
• It was essential that the country was united because of the threat of war
presented by international Capitalis1n in the 1 920s, the aggressive Nazi
regi1ne from 1 933 and the USA and its capitalist allies in the 1 940s
II Cross- refere nce
and 1 950s. There could be no argument or opposition when, according The NEP and War Communism are
to Lenin, the survival of the world's first communist state hung by a discussed on page 1 2, and Stalin's
defeat of B ukharin on page 25.
'hair 's breadth'.
• 'Stalinism' was also a personal ideology that rejected any opposition
to the leader: like the 1 9th century tsars, Stalin believed he was the
Soviet State. He also added a racial element to Soviet intolerance
• Key term
in that he prmnoted Russian Nationalism. At ti1nes, this spilled Five Year P lans: sets of targets for
over into violent attacks on minorities, such as Ulaainians in the industrial production, but they did
collectivisation drive and Jews in the purges. not specify in detail precisely how
these targets would be achieved. It
Economic intolerance was left to managers on a regional,
local and individual factory basis
The adoption of the NEP in 1 92 1 had introduced diversity into the to work out how to reach their
economy. The State accepted that the control it had tried to exercise targets. In total, there were five
through War Communism had failed and therefore private ownership of Five Year Plans, three before the
land and 90 per cent of industry was once again allowed. The NEP had been Nazi invasion in 1941 and two
introduced to try to aid economic recovery, and by 1 92 7 production had post-war:
returned to 1 9 1 3 levels before the extren'le disruption of the First World War,
• First Five Year Plan Oct 1 928 to
Civil War and the policy of War Communism. But the NEP was a capitalist Dec 1 932.
policy and Stalin's opposition to it had enabled him to defeat Bukharin.
• Second Five Year Plan Jan 1 933 to
In 1 92 7, the party agreed to implement a Fi ve Year P lan for industry. Dec 1 937.
Stalin argued in 1 93 1 that the Soviet Union was 5 0- 1 00 years behind • Third Five Year Plan jan 1 938 to
the West and that this deficit had to be made up in 1 0- 1 5 years . j une 1 941 .
The introduction of collectivisation would ensure that the level of
• Fourth Five Year Plan Jan 1 946 to
agricultural productivity would increase and that the State would also Dec 1 950.
be more successful in procuring ( or collecting) the grain they were
entitled to from the peasants .
• Fifth Five Year Plan Jan 1 951 to
Dec 1 955.
State control of the economy was ensured through the State Planning
The First Plan ended a year early
Commission or Gosplan, which set targets for production, prices
because the State claimed all
and wages; allocated manpower and resources; and produced the
targets had been met. The Third
statistics that proved the success of the socialist economy. Gosplan Plan was abandoned when the
also provided State control of the economy. This ensured there could N azis invaded .
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and M a rxism
II A closer look
Successes Failures
• Huge increase in the production of heavy industry: oil • Failure to fulfil the plan in almost all areas, e.g. the target
production rose from 1 1 .7 to 21 .4m tonnes, coal production for coal was 75m tonnes.
35.4 to 64.3m tonnes.
• Decrease in the production of woollen cloth meant there
• New towns were built, such as Stalinsk, Magnitogorsk and was a shortage of clothes.
Karaganda.
• Inefficient distribution and planning meant machines
• New tractor factories were built at Stalingrad and Kharkov. rusted because factories were not completed or factories
were flooded by the completion of a new dam.
• A emphasis on quantity rather than quality meant
substandard goods were produced.
• Poor living standards: rationing was introduced, black
market food prices rose and there was a shortage of
housing in industrial cities.
Successes Failures
• Overfulfilment of some areas of the plan, e.g. steel and • Targets were still not met in key areas: coal production was
machine tools. still below the target of 1 50m tonnes.
• Huge increase in production: oil production rose to 28.5m • Living standards were still low because of the shortage of
tonnes, coal production to 1 28m tonnes. consumer goods. In 1 935, there were no razor blades or
frying pans in Leningrad shops.
• I mprovement in living standards: bread rationing was ended,
real wages rose and electricity was supplied to almost all The Baltic-White Sea Canal was opened but it epitomised
Moscow's citizens. the failures of Soviet planning. It cost 60,000 lives, was too
narrow and shallow to be of use to the Soviet navy, and
• Prestige projects were completed, including the opening of
was bombed and closed early in the Second World War.
the Moscow Underground.
• The ability to manufacture machine tools is the mark of a
sophisticated economy: imports fell from 78% in the First
Plan to only 10%.
The Third Five Year Plan
Successes Failures
• Production continued to grow: coal production reached • The concentration on arms meant that living standards
1 50m tonnes by 1 940. declined still further with real wages falling by 1 0%.
• The plan focused on war production and by 1 941 the Soviet • There was no increase in the production of oil and steel.
air force was the largest in the world.
• According to Bairoch's 1 982 estimate, the Soviet Union's
• Whole factories were dismantled and transported to the share of world manufacturing rose only to 9%, giving it the
East where they were rebuilt away from the Nazi threat. fourth largest share in the world.
• The Soviet Union's share of world manufacturing rose to
17.6% from 5%, giving them the second largest share in the
world according to Hillmann's 1 939 estimate.
II
Chapter 2 Russia n totalita rianism in the 1 930s •
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and M a rxism
• Activity
I n an i n d iv i d u a list country like Russia t h e people had a lways
u n d e rstood worki ng to i m p rove their own lot; but t hey d i d n ot cotton
Source analysis on to the com m u n ist idea of working for the com mon good. So
Study Source 2. somet h i ng had to be d evised to i n d uce them to work, a n d to work we ll.
II H ow might this source be A fu n d a menta l part of com m u n is m is equality, so equal wages were the
used as evidence of the fa ilure order of the d ay, with the natura l resu lt that the amount of work done
to elimi nate d iversity? sank to the level of the i d lest and worst men. That cou ld not cont i n ue,
so i t was decided that wages would go by qua lifications and by the
lfJ H ow might this source be
amount of work done - that evi l bourgeois i d ea that had so p roudly
used as evidence for the
i ntolerance of diversity? been knoc ked out.
One of the 'sloga ns' issued by the Bolshev i ks was even that 'Anyon e
who advocates equality is a n anti-revolutionary, a n d is a n ti-State: so he
will be d e a lt with accord i ng ly.'
Political i ntolerance
Lenin had laid the foundations for political intolerance with the creation
of the one-party state, which removed the fonnal political expression of
alternative ideas. It should be noted, however, that there were only 1 2 years
of legal political parties in the history of Russia/Soviet Union, and that
political intolerance was actually the norm. There was also intolerance
within the Bolshevik Party, again the legacy of Lenin's actions, as the
1 92 1 Decree Against Factionalism had made it i1npossible to challenge
Ill
Chapter 2 R ussian totalitarianism in the 1 930s •
LTrotsky 1879-1940 L Kamenev 1883-1936 v Lenin 1870-1914 L Smllga 1891-1938 A. Joffe 1883 - 1917.
Com mi ssar Red Army Cha irman CC Soviet Premier Military Rev. Comm. Commissar Foreign Affairs
Assass inated Shot Stroke Shot Sui id
�
V. Nogln � 94-1916 A Bubnov
.
1883-1940 M. K. Muranov
C<
1873-1959 S. Shaur;;r� C�t8�1918
< Directorate Red Army
N�tur.el causes Died in prison Natural Causes Civil Wat
:�·.�!!
..
·-.
�j_.··
;
·�r ·
.-.
.. . -...
. ..- · :;) ; .t
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Fig. 2 The fate of Lenin's government. By the end of 1940, only Stalin was left alive from Lenin's original government in 1 9 1 7
the official party line. In 1 936, Stalin introduced a new constitution for
the Soviet Union. Known as the 1 936 Constitution, it was prepared
by Bukharin although Stalin took all the credit. It guaranteed personal
freedoms but it also increased the powers of central government, leaving
the republics with only minor responsibilities. The constitution clearly
pointed out that the party was the key institution and that the party's
interests came before any personal or group interests. It also noted that
the struggle with the exploitative classes had now ended and that the
foundations of Socialism_ had therefore been achieved. As political parties
were the expression of class interest and classes no longer existed, the
constitution recognised only one legal party, meaning that the Bolshevik
•
• Section 1 The U S S R a n d Marxism
Kirov had offered a clear threat to Stalin's position. The 1 7th Party
Congress held in February 1 934 was the 'Congress of Victors', a
reference to the success of the First Five Year Plan and the economic
transformation of the country. In this climate, the Leningrad delegates
believed it was time to carry out Lenin's wishes from his testament and
'retire' Stalin. They privately offered Kirov the post of General Secretary,
which he rejected, telling Stalin of the offer. According to Anton Antonov
Ovseyenko, Kirov told Stalin: 'You yourself are to blame for what
1!1
Chapter 2 R ussian tota litarianism in the 1 9 3 0s •
happened. After all, we told you things couldn't be done in such a drastic
way. ' The voting for membership of the Central Committee confirmed
that Congress generally saw Kirov as an alternative to Stalin. Only 3 votes
were cast against Kirov, while 292 were cast against Stalin. The pro-Stalin
elections chairman asked Kaganovich what to do; the loyal Kaganovich
ordered him to destroy 2 8 9 ballot papers so there were only 3 votes against
both Stalin and Kirov. According to Antonov-Ovseyenko, Kirov predicted
his own doom, warning friends that his head was now on the block.
- Key p rofi le
Laza r Kaganovich
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and M a rxism
The can a l was fin ished i n fa b u lously q u ick time. When it was fi n is h ed
h uge n u m be rs of words were written i n the S oviet papers a bout the
N KV D as the saviour and reformer by kind methods of the 'cri m i n a l
classes'. T h e k i n d N KV D had a llowed those m isgu ided cri m i n a ls t o
rega i n t h e i r souls a n d become decent people aga i n by perm itting them
to join i n helping i m p rove the we lfa re of their country. N o mention was
made of the awfu l death-roll that occu rred .
This experi ment was so successfu l, that it was felt that, when i m portant
strategic work was req u i red to be done i n a h u rry, q u ite the best thing
was to a llow the N KVD to help some more of the cri m i n a l classes to
repent of their e rrors.
II
Chapter 2 Russian totalita rianism in the 1 9 3 0s •
II Key p rofi le
M i khail Tu khachevsky
Mikhail Tukhachevsky ( 1 8 9 3- 1 9 3 7) was the most talented of
Stalin's generals, who made his reputation during the Civil War and
particularly the Russo-Polish War of 1 920- 1 . He was n1ade Marshal
of the Soviet Union in 1 93 5 . Stalin was j ealous of his status and
feared he could use the Red Army to depose hi1n. Tukhachevsky was
arrested in 1 93 7 on bogus charges of plotting with the Japanese and
Gennans, although it has been suggested by the historian Vladimir
Rogovin that he was genuinely plotting to remove Stalin.
Stalin's n1otives for the Great Purge have been debated. Historians
like Robert Conquest have argued that Stalin carried out the purges to
explicitly destroy potential opposition. His vengeance on those who
had opposed hin1 in the 1 920s and at the 1 934 Congress of Victors
was responsible for the destruction of the party. Stalin was realistic
enough to recognise the threat to the Soviet Union frmn the West or,
increasingly, Nazi Gennany, and was therefore making sure that there
would be no rival leader to challenge hi1n if the anticipated war was as
disastrous as the First World Wari he was not playing the part of the
Tsar in the sequel. Yagoda was replaced by Yezhov, who was charged
with the instigation of the Great Purge. The impact of the Great Purge
was to transfonn the party frmn one consisting of 5 5 year olds who
were old comrades of Lenin and lacked the necessary respect for Stalin,
to a new generation of 35 year olds who understood that obedience to
Stalin was all. For this reason, terror was a systematic part of Stalin's
rule, designed to crush all opposition and diversity. In July 1 93 7, the
NKVD set targets for arrests and executions by regioni 72, 500 were to
be executed and 1 7 7, 500 arrested. Truth and lies, innocence and guilt
ceased to have any meaning as obedience beca1ne all. The destruction
of Bukharin makes this clear. During the confessions of Zinoviev
and Kamenev at their Show Trial, both Bolsheviks had admitted that
they were part of a wider conspiracy against the party. Bukharin had
been questioned about this involvement with oppositionists but his
protestations of innocence were accepted and he was told that the
investigation was to be discontinued. However, in December 1 93 6
the investigation was renewed. On 4 December 1 936, h e gave a
speech to the Central Cmnmittee which developed into accusations
and questioning. Bukharin asked why he had been released if he
was considered to have been involved. Kaganovich replied, 'We were
referring to the legal aspect of the matter. It's one thing to speak of
legal matters, quite another to speak of political matters . ' Bukharin
may therefore have been innocent of the specific charges but he was
guilty of crimes against the party, in that he was not supporting the
party line that all oppositionists should be destroyed. By refusing to
fully cooperate in the 1nurder of former colleagues, Bukharin was
failing to act in the best interests of the party. Stalin sat and listened
to the evidencei his interjections in proceedings were to make j okes .
The Great Purge was therefore part of a process of crushing not just
opposition but also concepts like truth, evidence and reality.
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and Marxism
• Activity
This view has been challenged by historians like J . Arch Getty and
Robert Thurston, who have argued that the purges were the result of
Cha llenge you r thin king complex social and economic circumstances. Stalin was reacting to
circumstances: he feared for his own life after the assassination of Kirov
Review the evidence in this
and gave the NKVD greater powers to protect the party leadership . To
chapter.
justify these powers, the NKVD found conspiracies and those arrested
II Which i nterpretation of the then provided more information (under torture) that drove the process
purges d o you find the most on. The replacement of Yagoda with Yezhov was not part of a decision
convincing? Expla i n w hy. to act against the party. Instead, it followed an explosion at a mining
fJ Consider the q u estion of complex in Siberiai Yagoda had failed to prevent an act of terrorism
Soviet totalitarianism. and Yezhov was known to excel at ferreting out conspirators . Industrial
How does your answer to managers were informed on by workers who were frustrated by the lack
Question 1 i nfluence you r of raw materials that hindered their ability to exceed individual targets
u n derstan d i ng of how and gain the status of Stakhanovite - elite workers who received higher
totalitarian the Soviet U nion wages and other privileges. Gulags were responsible for 1 0- 1 5 per cent
was under Stalin i n the 1 93 0s? of Soviet GNP by 1 93 9 and therefore the economy relied on purging.
Individuals also took the opportunity to settle scores and remove rivals
for j obs and sexual partners. The lover of the wife of the head of the
Leningrad NKVD, Filip Medved, unsurprisingly found himself sent to
a labour camp . The NKVD targets demonstrated lack of control, for it
is a grim irony that this target is one of the few that the Soviet Union
succeeded in overfulfiling. The purges had snowballed out of Stalin's
control. Bukharin was destroyed by his rivals for Stalin's patronage.
His failure to play the game made it impossible for Stalin to defend
hi1n, although it was suggested in a contemporary play that Stalin
sent Bukharin to Paris in 1 93 6 to give him a chance to defect and
save himself.
II
Chapter 2 R ussian totalitarianism in the 1 9 3 0s •
part of the drive to bring the republic under control. A new law passed
in 1 929 made it illegal to engage in religious activity outside churches
and only officially licensed congregations were permitted to meet. The
League of the Godless, established in 1 925, saw its membership grow
to 1 million in 1 92 9 . The Muslims of the Soviet Union were so harshly
treated that by 1 930 it was reported to the Central Committee that
Islam in the Soviet Union was on the verge of complete destruction and
disappearance off the face of the Earth. It was estimated that 1 0, 000
out of 1 2, 000 mosques had been closed. In the Muslim Asian republics,
religious leaders were accused of working with kulaks to resist the
regime and were treated accordingly.
Even so, in April 1 93 1 a British diplomat in Leningrad, Reader Bullard,
wrote in his diaty that the churches in the city were 'crammed' for the
Russian Easter. This could not continue and the 1 930s saw churches
destroyed and anti-religious propaganda. Children were indoctrinated
with a vicious contempt for priests. Anti-religious museums were
opened in churches, containing artistic works showing the corruption
of priests as well as scenes of poverty in cities in religious countries
such as London in Britain. Churches were subject to oppressive levels of
taxation and the government then seized the church when these debts
could not be paid. All but 87 of Moscow's 500 Orthodox churches were
closed. The Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow was destroyed to
make way for the new Palace of the Soviets, and the Archbishop's Palace
at Novgorod became a rest home for scientists . In July 1 937, Yezhov
identified categories of people who were carrying out anti-Soviet activities
and set quotas for arrest and execution by region. Prominent on his list
were the clergy. As a result, between 1 9 3 7 and 1 9 3 9 1 0 5, 200 Orthodox
priests were executed and a further 8 7, 500 arrested. By 1 939, only about
1 00 churches remained open and only 1 2 out of 1 63 bishops survived.
Many Jewish members of the party were subject to denouncement
during the purges because of their religion. As early as 1 934, Bullard
was recording that there was only one Catholic priest in Leningrad for
36, 000 Catholics . Despite this, in the census of 1 93 7, 5 7 per cent of
the population described themselves as having a religion. The militant
atheism that the Bolsheviks preached could not break the traditional
superstition and popular religion. After the Nazi invasion in June 1 94 1 ,
Stalin reopened churches and used religion a s a unifying factor to
mobilise support for the Bolshevik regime.
C u ltural d iversity
Control of the press and the arts ensured that only the official doctrine
would be communicated to the people. Pravda and Izvestiya were the two
main newspapers, responsible for printing the party message.
Following the Soviet p ress, one finds it extrao rd inarily d ifficult to try
a n d j udge how t h i ngs rea lly a re going on . The papers a re of cou rse
controlled a n d the Bolshevik Government a re firmly convinced that
they have created heaven on earth, so a ll their geese a re swa ns, a n d a re
written up as swa ns.
Radio stations were controlled by the state. A new artistic style was
officially prescribed called 1Socialist Realism'. This style had to be followed
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and Marxism
II
Chapter 2 R u ssian totalitari a n ism i n the 1 930s •
• Activity
Cha LLenge you r thinking
Study the text on pages 42 and 43.
II Why do you t h i n k Stalin restored tradition a l values i n the Soviet U nion
in the 1 93 0s?
fJ What was the p urpose of Soviet edu cation? Did it achieve its p urpose?
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and M a rxi sm
Activity
Using the evidence on pages 31-44, identify exam ples of d iversity that
suggest there were limits to Stalin's totalitarianism.
II Key profi le
Vyacheslav Molotov
• Activity
Source analysis I n leaving us, comrade Len i n com m e n d ed to us to hold h igh a n d p u re
the great ca lling of the Pa rty M e m be r. We swear to thee, Com rade
Study Source 5 . Len i n , to honour thy com ma n d .
H ow d oes Stalin give the
I n leavi ng us, Com ra d e Len i n com manded us to keep the u nity of the
i mpression that Len i n was
party as the a p p le of o u r eye. We swear to thee, Com rade Len i n , to
a god-like figure?
honou r thy com m a n d .
fJ H ow do you think this speech
linked Stalin to Len i n ? I n leavi ng u s , Com rade Len i n o rd e red us to m a i nta i n a nd strengthen
the d i ctators h i p of the p roletariat. We swea r to thee, Com rade Lenin,
to exert o u r fu l l strength i n h o n o u ri ng thy com m a n d .
II
Chapter 2 Russian totalita rianism in the 1 9 3 0s •
Stalin was already referred to as Vozhd by those who worked with him
within the party secretariat. When these allies of Stalin used the term,
it meant 'the boss', referring to Stalin's position as General Secretary as
well as his control over appointments within the party. Pravda started
to push the use of the name nationally from 1 929, where it also became
synonymous with 'leader '. In 1 925, Petrograd was renamed Leningrad
in deference to the dead founder of Bolshevism. Other leaders, like Kirov
and Molotov, were recognised in the same way. Stalin's contribution to
the Soviet State was also recognised: the city of Tsaritsyn was renamed
Stalingrad in 1 925, and Stalinsk and Stalinabad also appeared on the
map. After Stalin's victory in the power struggle, he no longer had to take
j oint billing with other leading Bolsheviks. Pravda began to systematically
develop the cult of Stalin when it devoted the entire edition of 29
December 1 929 to him. Articles, letters, poems and pictures all praised the
'Lenin of today' who was now guiding the USSR to the Utopian future.
Excessive praise of Stalin became the norm over the next 24 years. He
acquired the status of living God in the USSR. He was considered to be
capable of doing no wrong, to be all-seeing, all-knowing and all-powerful,
constantly acting in the best interests of the Soviet people. Source 6 is
typical of the way in which Stalin was viewed by the Russian people.
J. V. Sta lin is the genius, the leader a n d teacher of the Party, the great
strategist of socia list revolution, helmsman of the S oviet State and
ca pta i n of a rm ies . . .
• Activity
Source analysis
Everyone i s fam i liar with the cogent a n d i nvincible force of Stali n 's
logic, the crysta l clarity of h i s m i n d , h i s i ron wi ll, h i s d evotion to the Study Source 6 . H ow does
Pa rty, h i s a rdent fa ith i n the people, a n d love for the people. Everybody Alexan drov's use of language
is fa m i li a r with h i s modesty, h i s s i m p l icity of m a n ne r, h i s conside ration
create the cult?
for peop le, a n d h i s m erci less severity towa rds enem ies of the people . . . { H i nt: look at i n d ividual words
he uses and their mea n i ngs a n d
Sta l i n i s the worthy conti n u e r o f the cause o f Len i n , o r a s i t i s said i n
con n otations. )
the Party: Sta lin i s the Len i n o f today.
•
• Section 1 The U S S R a n d Marxism
• Activity
Study the section on the cult of
Stalin and Figure 6. What roles
is Stalin presented as fulfilling i n
t h e U SS R ?
The cu lt
of
Sta lin
II
Chapter 2 R ussian totalitarianism in the 1 930s •
and a cheap icon of the tsar, symbols of the two pillars of faith. The
Russian peasantty now transferred their allegiance to a new 'little
father ', with a picture of Stalin replacing the tsar and the cross. It
mattered little that the Bolsheviks and Stalin were responsible for the
murder of the last tsar and had banned the Orthodox Church.
• Stalin himself played a key role in creating his own cult by deifying
Lenin. Lenin too had filled the crucial psychological role of guide and
leader for the Russian people, in spite of his hatred for such veneration.
As we have seen in Source 5, Stalin directly linked himself to Lenin.
The 'Lenin of today' therefore benefited frmn the cult of Lenin.
• The psychology of adulation is also complex. It is possible that, as
the cult grew, it became more difficult to resist as the average Soviet
citizen wished to behave in the same way as their neighbours and to
take part in the same mass activities . It is also likely that, once people
had invested their emotions and commitment in Stalin, they did not
want to have to face up to the reality of him as it would mean their
worship had been 1neaningless.
• Soviet propaganda played a crucial role in creating the cult, from
the gigantic busts and portraits of Stalin at every corner and every
crossroads to speeches on artistic and scientific subjects which were
also peppered with the glorification of Stalin. All the examples of
Soviet propaganda on page 42 were typical of the way the cult was
created and maintained.
• Stalin clearly benefited frmn the cult. He could impose his views and
detnand absolute subtnission without having to argue a case because
he was the batyushka and therefore his word was law. This suited him
psychologically as he could not personally accept any criticistn. Stalin
had detnanded the death penalty for Ryutin and his family in 1 932
after Ryutin's public criticism of Stalin.
• It was easier to follow an individual than a set of ideas. The
complexities of Marxism and the Soviet version of Marxist-Leninism
required the cult. It was not easy to explain to the uneducated masses
the rationale for government decisions, particularly when they
contradicted previous policies . The masses accepted policies because
Stalin said they were a good idea and he knew best, particularly
valuable when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed and then the Gennans
invaded 22 months later.
• Although many Soviet citizens suffered during the 1 930s, millions
were also grateful to Comrade Stalin. Famine devastated Ukraine and
the purges traumatised millions, but they disproportionately affected
Leningrad, the party and those in 'bourgeois' professions. Pravda
stressed that 'life was getting more joyous' and living standards made
some improvements. The Soviet people had to have someone to express
their thanks to for the material improvements in their lives and the
successes of the regime, and they wanted to thank a real person rather
than an abstract concept. The people were grateful for the end to
rationing in 1 935, for the order in their lives, for their education, for the
systematic unmasking of the enemies of the people discovered during
the purges and for the victory in the Great Patriotic War. Furthermore,
each of these successes reinforced the genius of Stalin.
•
• Section 1 The U S S R and M a rxism
You speak about you r d evotion to m e. M aybe the p h rase just sli pped
out. M aybe . . . B ut if it d id n 't just slip o ut, I would advise you to d isca rd
the principle of d evotion to i n d ivi d ua ls. It is not the Bolshevik way.
Be d evoted to the working class, to its pa rty, its State. That is what
is needed a n d what is good . B ut don't get m ixed u p with d evotion to
people, which is j ust a n e m pty and su perfluous fad of i ntellectuals .
II
Chapter 2 R ussian tota lita ria nism in the 1 93 0s •
- The question is asking you to consider the reasons for the development
of the cult of personality, so review pages 44-48. Remember that you
will get few marks for describing examples of the cult. In planning your
answer, you need to ensure that you consider both the reason suggested
in the question as well as other possible reasons. After you have identified
all the reasons you will cover, consider which reason was the most
significant. It might help you to think about whether you see Stalin as
all-powerful or someone who lacked control over various aspects of the
Soviet system. If you see him as all-powerful, you will probably argue that
Stalin created the cult for the benefits it brought; if you see him as less
in control of events, you might argue that it was the people's desire for a
leader to worship that was significant. What evidence from this chapter
could you use to suggest that Stalin did not create the cult?
•
3 Fascist id eology an d the establishm e nt
of the first Fascist State
Fig. 1 The respectable fascist. fvfussolini leading a Fascist march in 7927, dressed as an Italian gentleman to reassure the
property-owning classes
II
Chapter 3 Fascist ideology and the esta blishment of the first Fascist State •
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
Activity
D fvfussolini speaking in 1920
Source analysis Bolshevism i s lyi ng p rostrate in its d eath t h roes, mortally wou nded .
Study Sources 1 and 2. Without t h e beati ngs, t h e revolver s h ots, a n d t h e a rson of t h e
Fascists - w h e n would t h e terri b le d ru n ke n R u s s i a n frenzy o f Italian
What d o these two s peeches Bolshevism ever h ave evaporate d ?
tell us a bout the methods of
Fascism? fvfussolini speaking in 1922
fJ What d oes Source 2 tell us
about why fascists hated Mussolini had certain core ideas that were at the heart of Fascism. Once
com m u nists? he was in power he sought answers to practical problems. These policies
were later justified as being the 'fascist programme' that developed from
Fascist ideas. Mussolini argued that 'Fascism is not only a party, it is also
a regime; it is not only a regime but a faith; it is not only a faith but a
Ill
C h a pter 3 Fascist ideology and the esta blish ment of the first Fascist State •
For Fascism, t h e growth of e m p i re, that i s to say the expa nsion of II Accord i ng t o M ussoli ni,
the nation, is an esse ntial sign of health . Peoples which a re rising a re what are the key featu res of
a lways i m p e ria list; a n d reject i o n of i m peria lism is a sign of d ecay a n d Fascism ?
death. B u t e m p i re d e m a n d s d iscipli ne, the co-o rd i nation of a ll forces fJ Accord ing to M ussolini, what
and a d e e p ly felt sense of d uty and sacrifi ce: t h i s fact exp l a i n s m a ny does Fascism oppose?
aspects of the p ra ctical work i ng of the reg i m e a n d the n ecessa ry
Reach a judgement on
severe m e a s u res which m u st be taken agai nst those who wo u ld
whether Fascism is mainly
o ppose t h i s i n evitable m ovement of Italy in t h e twe ntieth ce n t u ry.
a ' positive' or a ' negative'
ideology. '
II A dapted from B. fvfussolini, The Doctrine of Fascism, 1932
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
II Cross-refe re n ce
• extreme nationalism. Mussolini wished to return Italy to the glory
of the Roman Empire, so an aggressive foreign policy including wars
To recap on M ussolini's invention of of conquest would be necessary. There was a racial element to this
the concept of totalitarianism, look aggressive Nationalism. He sought to extend the Italian Empire in
back to the introd uction on page 1 . Africa, a traditional ai1n of Italian foreign policy. The actions of the
To learn about the racism inherent Italian army in both Libya ( 1 928-33 ) and Ethiopia ( 1 9 3 5-6) were
to fascist ideology that developed as brutal, displacing 1 00,000 Libyan Arabs to concentration camps
a result of extreme N ationalism, see and gassing and massacring the Ethiopians. In both cases, racial
pages 78-80. superiority was used as a justification. Anti-Semitism was not,
however, at the core of Fascism.
• militarism. The military actions in Africa typified Mussolini's
II Key term desire to transform the character of the Italian people by militarising
B lackshi rts: the fascist paramilitary the population. The intimidation of political opponents by the
organisation or Squadre, which B lackshirts was more than a means to political power, as it
carried out violent attacks on emphasised Mussolini's belief in the need for strength. Mussolini
socialists, and trades u nion believed that it was war that drove forward history and therefore it
members and buildings. They was 'better to live one day as a lion than 1 00 years as a sheep' and
dressed in black shirts and gave that 'war is to man what childbirth is to woman'. The creation of 'an
the traditional Roman salute. army of 8 million bayonets' and 'an air force that would block out the
sun' would be accompanied by the militarisation of children through
II C ross-refere n ce
education, where teachers wore military uniform and children learned
military discipline. Mussolini's military actions in the 1 930s were
To learn more a bout M ussolini's increasingly because of his belief in the transformational power of
Third Way, read page 73. violence rather than because of strategic need; Italian aid to Franco
in the Spanish Civil War crippled the Italian economy and was
unpopular, and the annexation of Albania in 1 93 9 was unnecessary as
Albania was already an Italian puppet State.
• hatred of communism. Belief in the greatness of the Italian nation
meant that Mussolini despised the internationalism of Communism.
The loyalty of Italian socialists and Communists was considered to
be to Moscow and the Soviet Union rather than the Italian State; the
PSI's flag was the Italian national flag with the Soviet 'hammer and
siclde' added to the top. Mussolini rejected the idea that econmnic
factors drove on history, believing that the heroism of individuals
like himself was the critical force. Fascism also believed in creating
harmony among all Italians rather than class warfare.
• corporatism. Mussolini believed Fascism was a 'Third Way' between
liberal democratic capitalism and communism. As such, it was both
a political and an economic system, and the Corporate State was the
economic system that was an alternative to capitalism and socialism.
It developed over the period 1 925-39, aiming to create harmony
between workers and employers through the creation of corporations
led by fascist officials. The Ministry of Corporations was created in
1 926, headed by Mussolini himself.
II
C h a pter 3 Fascist ideology a nd the establishm e n t of the fi rst Fascist State •
Activity
Revision exercise
The historia n Alexander De Grand identified five sub-id eologies within Fascism. Com p lete the table below to indicate
who you believe each s u b-ideology was designed to a ppeal to and whether you consider each sub-ideology to be
revolutionary or reactionary. Revolutionary refers to the aspects of ideology that intended to m a ke significant changes,
modernising Italy. Reactionary refers to the aspects of ideology that were against m od ern ideas a n d change.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
north and rural south, and the lack of support for the regime from the
papacy, meant most Italians saw the government as something that did
not represent them and did little for them. In 1 9 1 2, the Prime Minister
Giovanni Giolitti attempted to end the impression that the government
was in the corrupt hands of a s1nall self-perpetuating elite by extending
the franchise to all men over the age of 30 (men over 2 1 who were literate
or had served in the army were also given the vote) .
II Key profi le
This change had made little i1npact when the First World War started.
Although Italy had been an ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary since
the 1 8 82 Triple Alliance, it did not enter the war in 1 9 1 4, as Italy was
unprepared for war and particularly vulnerable to the British navy. In
1 9 1 5, Italy did j oin the war, but on the side of the Triple Entente following
the prmnise of territorial gains in the secret Treaty of London. Italy's war
was not a great success, with the Battle of Caporetto in October 1 9 1 7
being a national humiliation with half a million Italians either captured
or deserting. In total, over 1 million Italians were killed or injured. The
II Key terms
victory at Vittorio Veneto in 1 9 1 8 was of limited significance to the
outcome of the war, but it did raise expectations that Italy would receive
ltalia irredenta: Italian-speaking rich rewards at the peace conference. Italy expected to receive possession of
areas of the Austro-H ungarian Ita lia irredenta (1unredeemed Italy'), as well as territory from the Turkish
Empire that had remained part Empire, colonies in Africa and payment of a war indemnity. The Paris
of Austria at the time of Italian Peace Conference did not award Italy the war gains expected; although it
unification. Acquiring these areas gained South Tyrol, Trentino and the Istrian Peninsula including the city of
in the Tyrol and around Trieste Trieste, it did not gain the city of Fiume or any German colonies. The First
were Italian war aims agreed as
World War became known as the 1mutilated victory'.
part of the Treaty of London.
The Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando could not survive the national
Proportional representation: the
humiliation of the peace treaties and he resigned in June 1 9 1 9 . In
system of election used in both
September 1 9 1 9, Gabriele d'Annunzio, a war veteran, staunch nationalist
Liberal Italy and Weimar Germany.
Political parties receive a number and poet, led an army of volunteers who seized the city of Fiume on the
of seats in direct proportion to the Dalmatian coast. He held the city for 1 5 months. His supporters wore
percentage of the vote they win. black shirts and used the traditional Roman salute.
This encourages large numbers This seemed to be clear evidence of the success of direct action rather
of political parties to stand for than the failure of the weak and unpopular political process . It also
election and often results in suggested that the government was powerless to stop such actions . The
governments made up of more
November 1 9 1 9 election, conducted under the system of proportiona l
than one party ( coalitions ) .
representation, only served to further emphasise the contrast between
II
Chapter 3 Fascist ideology and the esta blishment of the first Fascist State •
l n nsbruck • AUSTRIA
,.,. ',i
B re n n e r Pass
\'\ � - - - - '
I
,' B o u n d ary
� I
I
I
SOUTH TYROL ) agreed by
\
'
(ALTO A D I G E) Treaty of
SWITZ. Lo n d o n ,
Merano •
1 91 5
Balzano
��;;z;;:(
North-east
-
boundary
YUGOSLAVIA
s ·,// - of Italy i n 1 9 1 4
b o u ndary c.�/
Udine e
Settled
by Pact
1 91 4 of Rome,
frontier
1 91 4
frontier
ITALY
Lake Fi e
Garda
Adriatic
Sea
Key
Italian-speak i n g area
ol____ _---'
50 km
German-speak i n g area
_
•
• Section 2 Fascist I ta ly
II Key term
Syndical Union claimed 300,000 members in September 1 9 1 9 . Strikes
and rioting were frequent, with 1 . 5 million strikers in 1 9 1 9 . The
Biennia rosso: the two 'red years' of Italian Socialist Party ( P S I ) grew in support from 50, 000 pre-war to
1919-20, during which the threat 200, 000 in 1 9 1 9 and, worryingly for the property- owning classes,
of the trades union and socialist it rej ected a reformist programme and joined the international
movements seemed likely to lead
communist movement. The biennio rosso reached a cli1nax in August
to a Russian-style revolution.
1 920 when workers occupied factories and shipyards in several
cities in the north. In Turin factory councils were set up, similar to
II Exploring the d eta i l
Russian soviets . In the countryside, many ex-labourers had returned
from the war and simply seized land they previously had rented. The
Key Ras a n d their locations government was powerless to act and accepted the seizures .
Roberto Farinacci, Cremona:
Mussolini reacted t o the fear o f both property owners and
here, fascists had a reputation
for extreme brutality. They industrialists in the cities and landowners in the countryside,
terrified the population into changing the fascist programme so that the central feature was
obedience, allowing Farinacci to anti-Communism. He certainly had nothing to lose as the Fascists
make himself mayor of Cremona had failed to win even a single seat in the 1 9 1 9 election. The fascist
in 1 922, an act that angered Squadre, each of around 40 men led by an ex-anny officer, attacked
M ussolini. socialists, broke strikes, and damaged the offices of the socialist
newspaper Avanti and the offices of the PSI and CGL. Between
ltalo Balbo, Ferrara: organised November 1 920 and May 1 92 1 , 200 died and 8 0 0 were injured . At the
the Celibano group ( named after same time, the Squadre grew frmn 20,000 to 200, 000 1nembers . It was
their favourite drink, cherry
at this point that they adopted the black shirts and Roman salute that
brandy) who acted as strike
D 'Annunzio had pioneered. Support for the Fascists grew, beginning
breakers for local landowners,
with peasants and landowners in the Po valley. Across the regions of
as well as beating up Socialists
and Communists. H is invasion of Emilia and Romagna, antisocialist, nationalistic fascist groups began
Portomaggiore in june 1 921 with to take over local government, establishing Ras ( local fascist bosses ) .
4,000 Squadre led to two days Fascism also found support a1nong the professional clas ses, middle
of violence that left the dead classes and the young, attracted by the dyna1nism of the movement.
unburied in the streets. Furthermore, support came frmn an unusual source. Pri1ne Minister
Dino Grandi, Bologna: elected to Giolitti had lost control of the situation and therefore called an
parliament aged 24 in 1919, but election for May 1 9 2 1 , inviting Mussolini to fight the election as part
quickly acquired a reputation for of the governing coalition that would be nationalist and antisocialist.
leadership of the Bologna ras and The violence of the fascist movement was therefore legitimised and
for uncompromising treatment Mussolini was given credibility as a national politician. The Fascists
of opponents. won 35 seats, which gave them_ disproportionate power in the new
coalition as Giolitti's National Bloc would struggle to rule without
Fig. 5 Benito fvfussolini, centre right, at the fascist convention in Naples, 1 922. On the far
left is General Emilio De Bono and next to him is !tala Balbo
II
Chapter 3 Fascist ideology and the estab lish ment of the first Fascist State •
u
pact, indicating that violence would remain :z
<:(
0:
a fascist strategy.
'
LJ.._
[J
important moves : he united the movements
as a single political party, the PNF, and
returned to the policy of Squadre violence.
The fascist violence seemed to suggest that
O I Nl A
the communist threat was growing and
this, together with parliamentary weakness,
suggested that Italy was ungovernable. In
May, the socialist council of Bologna was
driven out by the Fascists . On 1 August
1 922, a general strike began and Mussolini
made it clear through II Popolo d 'Italia and
public speeches that if the government failed TUNISIA Mediterranean
Sea
to restore order, the Fascists would crush the 0 200 km
strike the1nselves . On 2 August, strikers in
Genoa, Ancona and Leghorn were defeated F i g . 6 The growth offascist support: Italy 1919-22
and on 3 August the Fascists took control of
Milan, burning the offices of Avanti to the
ground, driving out the socialist government and running the trains
after the transport workers went on strike. These successes convinced
Mussolini that power could be taken by force, and on 1 3 August the
Fascist Party Congress approved this policy. In September, Mussolini
told a crowd at Udine that 'Our programme is simple : we intend to
govern Italy. '
The Ras certainly favoured action and so Mussolini began to plan the
March on Rmne. The intention was for three columns of Fascists to
march on the city on 28 October to take power. In fascist myth this
became the event where Fascism triumphantly took power in Italy. The
reality was very different. Mussolini hi1nself was in Milan, trying to
negotiate fascist inclusion in the cabinet. Far from confidently expecting
victory, Mussolini's train ticket to Rome sat in his pocket alongside
another ticket to Switzerland and safety. Facta had acted ineffectually
throughout the summer, but he now assured himself of the support of
the army and prepared to act against any 'march' . The King approved
plans to defend the city and the cabinet approved plans to resist
Fascism. Around 30, 000 troops and police awaited the fascist columns,
which had been stopped outside the city.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
II Key p rofile
Luigi Facta
Luigi Facta ( 1 8 6 1 - 1 930) was the last prime minister of Italy before
Mussolini. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1 8 92 as
a Liberal. He served as finance minister before the First World War
and was appointed as prime minister in February 1 922. He proved
to be indecisive in dealing with the political crisis of 1 922. He
was sacked for failing to deal with fascist violence in the summer
of 1 922, but reappointed when it became clear no one else could
form a govermnent. He only finally acted against Mussolini at the
eleventh hour, but the King refused to agree to his plans to defend
Rmne and instead dismissed him a second time. He was finance
minister in the coalition govermnent led by Mussolini and was
made a life senator by Mussolini in 1 924.
At 9am Facta met King Victor Emmanuel III to get martial law formally
declared. The King backed down, having changed his mind overnight. A
range of reasons have been suggested, including the King's fear that his
cousin, the Duke of Aosta, might lead a revolution to usurp him as well
as the influence of those at court and in his family who were sympathetic
to Fascis1n. He was also visited during the night by army generals who
advised the King that the loyalty of the army could not be guaranteed,
and the prospect of civil war was probably what led Victor Emmanuel
to act as he did. It meant Mussolini could not be stopped. Salandra,
a trusted adviser of the King, failed to form a coalition government
including the Fascists because Mussolini would not be satisfied with
1nerely seats in the cabinet. Left with no choice, Victor Emmanuel asked
Mussolini to form a government on 29 October. Mussolini finally caught
the train from Milan, changing from his black shirt into a suit, symbolic
of the mix of violence and legal measures he had used to secure power.
Finally, the March on Rmne took place on 30 October, a symbol of the
seizure of power but otherwise an event of no consequence.
The Army m ust not partici pate in the struggle . The Fascists ren ew
aga i n their h ighest a d m i ration for the Army of Vittorio Veneto. Neither
d o the Fascists m a rch aga i n st the police a n d guards, but against the
politica l class of feeble, wea k- m i nded m e n who, i n fou r years, h ave not
been a ble to give a true gove rn ment to o u r nation.
II
C h a pter 3 Fascist i d eo logy an d the establishment of the first Fascist State •
Political instability
-------------"----------;.- - --
Corrupt democracy
The 'mutilated victory'
National divisions
Squadre violence
National debt
.
Unemployment
I
Direct action of D'Annunzio
II Key c h rono logy
Union power
The esta blishment of the
Biennia rosso
dictatorship
1 922 N ovember Power to rule
• Activity by decree for 12
months.
Ta lking point
1 922 December Creation of the
In pairs, argue either that M ussolini's rise to power was mainly d u e to his
Fascist G rand
actions or that his rise to power was mainly due to the circu mstances in Italy
Cou ncil.
between 1 9 1 9 and 1 92 2 . Each member of the pair then expla ins h is or her
arguments in three min utes while the partner listens. The pairs then swap 1 923 january Creation of the
roles. Write down all the arguments put forward by your partner. Fascist militia.
Mussolini's appointment as prime minister did not create a Fascist 1 924 April National
Italy. Although he held the critical positions of Minister of the Interior election Leads
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, the 1 4-man cabinet contained only to the Fascists
four Fascists . The remaining 1 0 members, mainly Liberals, Catholics becoming the
and military leaders, were convinced that Mussolini could be used largest party.
to crush the threat of the left. After this crisis passed, they believed 1 924 j une M u rder of
that either Mussolini would become a respectable politician, tamed Matteotti and
by the trappings of power, or he could be dismissed. Mussolini had the Aventine
been appointed by the King and therefore he could be dismissed by Secession.
the King just as easily. The Fascists were still a minority in the Italian
1 925 December Legge
parliament where their 35 seats represented only 7 per cent of the
Fascistissime
popular vote. However, by the end of 1 92 5 all other political parties had
bans other
been banned and a one-party state had been established. Mussolini was political
able to achieve this through a combination of factors . This revolution parties.
was more easily achieved because it was partly endorsed by the King
and parliament. The use of violence was also critical, and the murder of 1 926 October Formal decree
the socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti on 1 0 June 1 924 represented a confirms the
one-party state.
key turning point.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
Initially Mussolini gave the impression that he would work within the
constitution, telling the Cha1nber of Deputies at the end of 1 922 that he did
not wish to close parliament and replace it with a govermnent of Fascists.
He stressed that the strength of the Blackshirts would allow hi1n to close
parliam_ent but that he did not wish to do so, arguing, 'I formed a coalition
government . . . in order to gather in support of the suffering nation all those
who, over and above questions of party and section, wish to save her.' The
response frmn parliament was to grant Mussolini emergency powers to rule
by decree for 1 2 months. The Socialists and Communists voted against
the decree, but it was supported by the Liberals and the Catholics, both
of whom preferred a strong fascist government to a left-wing takeover. At
the same time, Mussolini was taking two important steps to consolidate
power. In December 1 922, he set up the Fascist Grand Council, which
would be responsible for presenting policy to the government. Mussolini
himself would choose members of the council, ensuring that he controlled
the move1nent and the creation of fascist policy. At the same time, he took
a decisive step to bring all the Squadre under his control. He created a new
State militia from the Blackshirts called the Volunteer Militia for National
Security (MSVN) . They were paid by the state and took orders from
Mussolini as leader of the party and prime minister. The militia enabled
Mussolini to use the threat of violence against opposition politicians
and any Ras who tried to oppose him. Three opposition politicians were
murdered in 1 923 and 50 were violently attacked.
II
Chapter 3 Fascist ideology and the establishment of the first Fascist State •
II A closer Loo k
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
Fig. 9 fvfussolini and Victor Emmanuel /// in 1 922. The King's refusal to act against fvfussolini in 1922 or 1924 allowed !l Duce power
Chapter 3 Fascist ideo logy and the esta blishment of the first Fascist State •
Activity
Revision exercise
Copy a n d complete the tab le below.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
• S u m m a ry q u esti ons
D I n what ways was the F i rst World Wa r sign ificant in the development
of Fascism?
fJ Why was the fear of Com munism strong i n Italy between 1919 and 1 924?
IJ Identify the ways in which Fascism was attractive to workers, peasa nts,
ex- First World Wa r soldiers, Catholics and the elite.
m In what ways did the King help M ussoli n i between 1 922 and 1 92 5 ?
lfi H ow far had M ussoli n i overcome the limits to his power as prime
m i n ister by the end of 1 92 5 ?
II
4 I talian totalitarianism in the 1 93 0s
• t h e extent to w h i ch Fascist
Ita ly was i ntolerant of
d iversity i n the 193 0s,
with referen ce to p o litica l,
eco n o m i c, religi o u s a n d
cu lt u ra l d i ve rsity
• l l D u ce a n d the cu lt of
M usso l i n i i n relati o n to fascist
i d eo logy.
• Activity
The m a ny practical expressions of Fascism, s uch as the party
organ isation, e d ucational systems, discipline can o n ly be u n d e rstood
Cha llenge you r thinking w h e n con s i d e re d in re lation to its gen e ra l attitu d e towards life.
The Fascist syste m of life stresses the i m portance of the State a n d
Study Source 1 .
recognises the i ndividual o n ly i n so fa r a s h i s intere sts coi ncide with
II Identify the reasons why those of the State.
M ussolini argued that Fascism
was i ntolerant of d iversity. The Fascist conception of the State is a ll - e m b raci ng; outs i d e of it no
h u m a n or s p i ritual values m ay exist. Fascis m does not m e re ly aim at
fJ Which areas of Italian politics
rem o u ld i ng the forms of life, but a lso man h i mself and his character
and society do you th i n k
M ussoli n i wou ld s e e k to and his fa ith . To achieve this p u rpose it enforces d isci p li n e and m akes
control? use of authority.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
There are a number of reasons why Fascist Italy was intolerant of diversity:
• Italy was founded in 1 8 6 1 as a liberal democracy and constitutional
monarchy. The problems that existed post-unification grew out of
the unsolved issues of regionalism_ and uneven economic division.
However, it was an essentially tolerant society. Fascist Italy therefore
had very few roots in the ideology of Italy's past and Mussolini
reacted against Italy's recent past.
• Fascism stressed the subordination of the individual to the state .
The fascist belief in duty and sacrifice in pursuit of a common goal
was crucial and precluded any alternative, individual beliefs . The
common goal was, of course, the Utopian State that all totalitarian
dictators pursue. Mussolini wanted to create a new heroic Italy. To
do this, he believed he would have to create new Italians. All other
beliefs were wrong and threatened to undern1ine the creation of a
perfect state.
II Key term
• The nationalism of Fascis1n led to racism. Although racism was not
as central to Fascism as it was to Nazism, there was a si1nilarity in
Ethnic cleansing: the policy of that the belief in the racial superiority of the Italian people expressed
removing members of a rival itself in the belief that they had a right to territory in Europe and
ethnic group from a particular North Africa. The Italian nation's desire for resources, living space
region or territory. The policy and the status of being a great imperial power led to the seizure of
involves the relocation or Fiume and the conquest of Abyssinia and Albania. In addition, the
execution of all men, women and
policy of ethnic cleansing was carried out in Libya. Italian Jews were
children in the territory. Relocation
also persecuted from 1 93 8 . However, the lack of a racial ideology to
often involves forcing people into
underpin the legislation introduced helps to explain why Italian Jews
camps where they starve to death
or die as a result of d isease. The were not persecuted to the extent that Jews in the rest of Europe were.
term has been used to describe the • Fascist Italy was certainly intolerant of political diversity. Mussolini
actions of the Serb forces against announced his intention to rule as a dictator on 3 January 1 925 and
the Bosnian M uslims in the war in from that point political diversity was steadily destroyed, both in
Yugoslavia in the early 1 990s. theory and in practice. The establishment of the one-party state was
II
Chapter 4 Italian tota litarian ism in the 1 93 0s •
achieved following the failure of the opposition and the King to act in
the aftennath of the Matteotti crisis. It is not unreasonable to argue
II Cross- refe re n ce
that the establishment of the one-party state and the intolerance of Racism in Nazi ideology is discussed
political diversity were funda1nentally popular in Italy, at least until on pages 94-97.
1 940 and Italy's entry into the Second World War. The basis of this More information on the conquest of
intolerance of diversity was Mussolini's belief in totalitarianis1n: Abyssinia can be found on page 79.
'Everything within the state, nothing outside the state, nothing
against the state.' However, the extent of economic, social and To recap on the Matteotti crisis, look
back to page 64.
religious intolerance are all open to question and 1night suggest that
Fascism was not as totalitarian as Mussolini liked to believe.
II A closer look
Liberal Italy
Political d iversity
The establishment of the one-party state destroyed any official political
diversity. The next 1 5 years saw the suppression of political opposition.
However, it has been argued that Mussolini's main motivation was not so
much the fascist revolution as the pursuit of personal political power. For
this reason, control over the government and the Fascist Party itself were
also essential features of political intolerance.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
were passed. As the fascist grip on Italy tightened, he declared, 'I am the
government. Italy will obey me as she has never obeyed before. ' Elections
ceased in all but name. With opposition parties banned, unions and
employers submitted names to the Fascist Grand Council, which then
chose 400 representatives. Voters decided whether to elect or reject the
list in its entirety. A new electoral law was introduced in May 1 928 that
restricted the franchise. Replacing universal manhood suffrage was a
franchise that aimed to prevent the least wealthy from voting - the group
that by definition was the most likely to oppose Fascism. Only those
who paid taxes of more than 1 00 lire a year were entitled to vote. As a
result of this measure, the numbers of Italians entitled to vote fell from
1 0 million to 3 million.
II C ross- refere n ce
The first election under this system was held in March 1 929 when
the surprise was not that 2, 8 64,000 voted in favour of the list but that
Information on the Lateran Treaty 1 3 6,000 felt able to vote against it, despite the presence of Blackshirts
can be found on page 75. outside and frequently inside polling stations . The Catholic Church led
the way and it was estimated that the Lateran Treaty helped to deliver
thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of voters. Even 9 5 . 3 per cent
of the vote was not sufficient for Il Duce, so the results in this and
subsequent elections were rigged to show a 9 8 per cent approval rate. The
new deputies made a mockery of parliamentary consent for legislation,
simply roaring their assent to measures introduced. Ultimately, there
could be no clearer recognition that parliamentary democracy had
fully consented in its own murder than the fact that in January 1 93 9
parliament abolished itself, t o b e replaced b y the Chamber o f Fasces
and Corporations, which was equally a sham. In 1 928, King Victor
Emmanuel had accepted his own impotence when he agreed that in the
future the choice of the prime minister would lie with the Fascist Grand
Council. Local government was also abolished and elected mayors were
replaced by fascist appointees .
• Activity
The ignoble phenomenon of a d ictators h i p is a s h a meful blot on
E u ropean civilisation. Reactionary m i nds, which a re i nd ignant at red
Source analysis d ictators h i ps, have o n ly sym pathy with 'white' d i ctators h i ps , which a re
Study Source 2 . What reason does equally, if not more, bloodt h i rsty, no less b ruta l a n d u nj ustified by a ny
N itti give to explai n why political i deal, even a false one.
oppression was so read i ly accepted The Fascist government a bolished i n Italy every safeguard of the
in Fascist Italy?
i n d iv i d u a l a n d every liberty. N o free m a n can live i n Italy, a n d a n
i m moral l a w prevents I talians from g o i n g t o a foreign country on pa i n
o f punish ment. Ita ly is a prison where life h a s become i ntolera b le . . .
Without a free pa rlia m e nt, a free p ress, a free o p i n i o n a n d a true
democracy, there will n ever be peace.
army and the civil service were naturally supportive of any regime that
resisted radical change, and were particularly defensive against the threat
of socialism. Given the affinity of these organisations with Fascism, it
was no hardship for many members of both to j oin the PNF as a way of
advancing their careers. The judiciary was dealt with slightly differently.
The initial investigation into the Matteotti murder had demonstrated
to Mussolini that he needed tighter control over those who dispensed
justice to ensure that they understood the need to dispense fascist justice.
Dozens of judges were sacked and the legal syste1n was perverted to allow
imprisomnent without trial. Mussolini was happy to personally intervene
in cases and the judiciary was increasingly happy to let him.
Further initiatives were introduced to help suppress political opposition.
Known opponents were kept under surveillance. It has been estimated that
• Activity
in a typical week 20,000 visits, searches or arrests took place. Critical to Revision exercise
these was the Organisation for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism
(OVRA) - the secret police - which was established in 1 926. The OVRA
II I dentify the methods
M ussolini used to overcome
sounded more intimidating than might have been the case, given that political oppositio n in Italy
it was staffed by only 3 7 5 agents. The Special Military Tribunal for the after 1 926.
Defence of the State was established in November 1 926. It adopted
milita1y procedures and penalties although it was used to try political fJ a Identify 1 0 pieces of
opponents, and therefore it had the ability to impose the death sentence, evidence that suggest
which had been abolished in 1 9th century Italy. The tribunal met in that M ussoli ni's Ita ly was
secret and there was no right of appeal. Until the final fall of Mussolini, successful in crushing
political opposition.
it heard an average of 2,000 cases a year, although until l 940 there were
only nine executions. Penal camps were established on the Lipari Islands b For each of these pieces of
off the southern coast which ensured that dissidents were tracked down evidence, explain why it is
and removed from society. In total, 5, 000 opponents were imprisoned or not necessarily evidence of
banished for a total of 28, 000 years. Many fled Italy, including political success.
opponents like Francesco Nitti (prime minister 1 9 1 9-20) and Sturzo,
who had founded the PPI. Some 3,350 exiles fought for the Spanish
Republic in the Spanish Civil War in the Garibaldi brigade that was formed
in Nove1nber 1 93 6 . Carlo Roselli was one of the founders of 'Justice
and Liberty', a group that aimed to unite all non-communist political
opponents . High profile gestures like dropping anti-fascist pamphlets from
planes enraged Mussolini and the leaders were arrested. Roselli escaped
from the Lipari Islands and edited the group's anti-fascist j ournal Justice
and liberty from Paris. He was assassinated by Mussolini's agents.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
• Activity
Mussolini had the ability to control the party. He chose the Party
Secretary, who in turn nominated the party directorate, which met
Revision exercise weekly, as well as the 92 provincial secretaries . Mussolini changed
Party Secretary frequently to prevent anyone creating their own power
Draw a d iagram showi ng the
base. The extremists were brought under control through the inspired
relationsh i p between the Fascist
Party and the State. You could start
decision to make Farinacci Party Secretary in January 1 92 5 . Farinacci
by placing M ussolini at the top or centralised the Fascist Party and closed the provincial press, and in
in the centre of your page. doing so brought the ras under control and ensured they could not act
independently by using the violence of the Squadre . He was forced to
resign in April 1 926, by which point Mussolini's position was much
more secure. The October 1 926 revised Party Statute affirmed the
strength of Il Duce as it officially made Mussolini head of the party,
made all party posts subj ect to selection by Mussolini and confirmed
the Fascist Grand Council ( selected by Mussolini ) as the body that
made policy. The party itself was purged, with around 1 70, 000 Fascists
expelled because of their extremism. By 1 93 9, party 1nembership
numbered 2 . 6 million, but these 1nembers were mainly opportunists
and bureaucrats who built a career through possession of a party card.
New j obs were created through the establishment of new ministries and
government organisations, often with little actual work required. Other
forms of public en1ployment were also dependent on me1nbership of the
party, and in the 1 930s teachers and university professors had to swear
an Oath of Loyalty. Of the 1 , 250 professors active during this period,
only 1 1 refused. These careerist Fascists had no interest in challenging
Mussolini and no commitment to any particular set of ideas . There
was no violent purge of the party such as the one that took place in the
Soviet Union under Stalin. The OVRA did not become a State within
a State such as the NKVD was under Stalin or the SS became under
Hitler. The Italian police force remained under the control of the State
and not the party. Most individual Ras were too concerned with fighting
each other to challenge Mussolini, although Italo Balbo, one of the few
ras who may have had ideas beyond his station, was sent to Libya where
he died in a mysterious plane crash.
Economic d iversity
Unlike Communism, Fascism was not an ideology that contained explicit
ideas for economic reform. Mussolini's early incarnation as a Socialist
was long dead by October 1 922 and the support he had received from
the Conservative establishment was mainly because the Fascists offered
physical protection from socialist and communist reform. There was a
wing of the Fascist party that expected economic revolution, but its vision
of national syndicates was not shared by Mussolini and the taming of the
party by Farinacci reduced its influence. However, Mussolini's belief that
the Fascist State was all-encompassing and totalitarian clearly implied
that there would have to be economic reconstruction.
Ill
Chapter 4 Italian tota lita ria n ism in the 1 93 0s •
IJ fvfussolini, 1926
Capitalism Impossible - workers would be Capitalism would ensure Capitalism had led to the
exploited. The working class that what was produced was strikes of the post-war period
would strike and try to seize profitable but not necessarily as the socia list unions won over
power what the State needed - why exploited Italian workers
produce guns when you are
making money from radios?
Socialism I mpossible - the lack of Socialism would reduce The Soviet Union had been
incentives for workers would productivity as workers would crippled by the Bolshevik
lead to those who worked hard have no incentive to work if their Revolution and the Civil War.
resenting those who took their wages were guaranteed. They The Soviet Union was no longer
wages in return for minimal would also resist change, such a great power
effort as retraining workers to produce
weapons rather than radios
Corporate State Possible - harmony would be Fascist officials would ensure A new way had to be found. Only
ensured through the meeting that the decisions reached were a leader like ll Duce could find
of workers and employers as in the best interests of the State a solution. Foreign academics
fascist officials would prevent and politicians recognised the
stalemate advantages of the Third Way
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
Religiou s d iversity
II Cross-refe re n ce
The Bolsheviks had attacked religion and the power of the different
Churches across the Soviet Union. The basis of this position was the
Marx's criticism of the Church is fundamental opposition to religion as an alternative set of ideas that
discussed on page 1 5. could win the loyalty of Soviet people. Mussolini himself was an avowed
atheist: he married in a civil ceremony in 1 9 1 5 and had even written
an anti-clerical novel, The Cardinal's Mistress, as a young man. Early
fascist ideology was, therefore, anti-Catholic. However, when Mussolini
reinvented Fascism, he went out of his way to promise the Catholic
Church that its independence would be respected. In 1 925, he even
married his wife Rachelle in a church in Milan.
Mussolini was being pragmatic. Liberal Italy had been in conflict with
the Pope for 60 years . When Italy was created in 1 8 6 1 , Rome was not
part of the new State. The constitutional monarchy with its belief
in freedom and democracy objected to the Catholic Church and its
traditional values, which seemed to hold Italy back. Removing the
political power of the Pope over Rome was critical to the Liberals as
they sought to create a nation State where the people would be loyal
to Italy, not the Pope. However, French troops protected the Pope.
In 1 8 70, the outbreak of the Franco -Prussian War led to the French
troops being withdrawn, which had enabled Italian troops to complete
the unification of Italy. The Pope lost political control over Rome.
Therefore, at the heart of Liberal Italy was a conflict between the state
and the Catholic Church, which ensured that Italian people's loyalties
were torn in two competing directions .
Chapter 4 Italian tota lita rianism in the 1 93 0s •
II Key p rofi le
Pope Pius XI
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
II C ross-refere nce
However, fundamentally the existence o f the Catholic Church was an
affront to Fascism. Mussolini was forced to tolerate the Church and this
The conquest of Abyssinia is undermined his hold on Italy. The Pope was a rival for the affection of
described on page 79. the Italian people. Furthermore, Catholic organisations and the values
of the Church came into conflict with Fascisn1. In 1 93 1 , the Pope
opposed Mussolini's attempts to suppress Catholic Action, a Catholic
• Q u esti ons leisure organisation, calling Fascism a 'pagan ideology'. A compromise
was reached whereby Catholic Action's activities were confined to
II How successful was M ussolini those of a religious nature and former members of the PPI were not
i n his relations with the allowed to be leaders . The changes did the movement no harm and its
Catholic Church? numbers swelled from 250,000 in 1 930 to 3 8 8,000 in 1 93 9 . The Pope
also objected to the introduction of anti-Semitic 1neasures, declaring,
fJ How d amaging d o you t h i n k
'Spiritually, we are all Jews . ' However, the death of Pius XI in February
toleration of a rival s e t o f
ideas w a s to M ussolini's desire 1 939 prevented a damaging clash between Church and State. The new
for a totalitari a n State? pope, Pius XII, never criticised Mussolini's policies publicly.
..
C h a pter 4 Italian totalita rianism in the 1 93 0s •
The Piccole Italiane was set up for girls aged 9 to 1 4 and the Giovani
Italiane for girls aged 1 5 to 1 7 . Both these organisations provided
instruction in fascist ideology and the genius of Mussolini, as well as
opportunities to play sport, go camping, and take part in artistic and
musical activities . There was also military training and members wore
military-style uniforms . By 1 93 7, there were 7 million 1nembers of
the Balilla. The Opera Nazionale Dopolavaro ( meaning literally, 'after
work') was set up in 1 925 to coordinate the leisure time of adults,
and took control of a wide range of social organisations . By 1 932, it
controlled all football clubs, 1 , 3 5 0 theatres, 2, 20 8 drama societies,
8 , 2 6 5 libraries, 3, 324 brass bands and 2) 3 9 orchestral societies .
Membership stood at 4 million in 1 93 9 and the organisation was
genuinely popular; a little fascist rhetoric was a price worth paying
for day trips, cheap holidays, local entertainment and sports facilities .
Fascis1n stressed the traditional role of women, subservient to men, and
returned them to the home to fight the 'battle for births' . The youth
moven1ents trained girls for their future role as mothers. A 'mother
and child day' was introduced in 1 933 and working 1nothers received
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
maternity leave and state benefits . Women gained the vote in local
elections in 1 925, although this reform was undermined by the fact
there were no more local elections . Women continued to be allowed into
higher education, to study to become teachers, for example, but they
could not teach subj ects that were particularly important to the regime;
as a consequence, men taught history, Latin and philosophy, but the
sciences were taught by women. However, the reality for most middle
II Exploring the d eta il class women was that opportunities were restricted. In 1 93 8, a law was
Anti-Sem itic measures passed limiting the number of women in the workplace to 1 0 per cent
and women were forced into appropriate employment as secretaries and
Foreign Jews were banned from
telephone operators, for example.
Italian schools.
All Jews who had arrived in Italy Racial policy
after 1 91 9 were given six months
to leave, meaning Jews who jews
had fled from Nazi Germany or Although Mussolini was an extreme Nationalist, this did not lead to
Austria had to move on again. discrimination against ethnic minorities in Italy in the immediate
Jews were forbidden to join the aftermath of his appointment as prime minister. The Jewish
Fascist Party or the army. community stood at around 5 0 , 000, or 0 . 1 per cent of the population,
State employment was denied to and was particularly well integrated . One in three adult Jews was
Jews, so all Jewish teachers were a member of the Fascist Party, the mayor of Milan was Jewish and
dismissed. Mussolini had a Jewish mistress, Margherita Sarfatti. Mussolini
Jewish property was confiscated himself stated in 1 932, 1\nti-Semitism does not exist in Italy. Italians
and Jews could not be managers of Jewish birth have shown themselves to be good citizens and they
of businesses employing more fought bravely in the war. ' In 1 93 5 , he ridiculed the anti- Semitism of
than 1 00 workers. Nazi Germany. However, by 1 93 8 Mussolini's attitude had changed and
Marriages between Jews and Italian Jews came under attack. In July 1 93 8 , the Manifesto of Racist
Italians were forbidden. Scientists asserted that there was a pure Italian 1\ryan' race and Jews
did not belong to it. Discriminatory measures followed in September
and October 1 93 8 .
II Cross-refere n ce Mussolini's new-found anti-Semitism was clearly influenced by
The Anschluss is explained on Hitler and Nazi policies . After 1 93 6, he and Hitler brought their
page 1 1 6. nations ever closer, united by a common hatred of the left and by their
desire for expansion. In March 1 93 8, Mussolini allowed Hitler to carry
out the Anschluss with Austria, having prevented it only four
years earlier.
The inevitable consequence of the closer relationship between
Mussolini and Hitler was the introduction of anti-Semitism into Italy,
despite the fact that this created conflict with the Pope. It is
also likely that Mussolini's aggressive foreign policy made war
increasingly likely, and that at a time of war it was not possible to
tolerate 'racial aliens' who might not have been entirely loyal to the
fascist regime. However, it is difficult to believe that these measures
would have been easily accepted without at least some level of
complicity from the Italian people. The Italian historian Michele
Sarfatti has argued that Italy did not become anti-Semitic overnight.
He points out that the myth of a Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy was a
com1non theme in fascist literature in the 1 920s and in the 1 930s as
much anti-Jewish printed material appeared in Italy as in any other
European country except Nazi Germany. The anti- Semitic legislation
of the 1 930s was the natural conclusion to this wave of hatred. The
ultimate consequence of discrimination would be the complicity of
Mussolini and the fascist regime in the Holocaust, with 7,000
Italian Jews murdered.
II
Chapter 4 Italian totalita rianism in the 1 93 0s •
Africans
II A closer loo k
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
• Activity
Revision exercise
Review the section on the intolera n ce of d iversity a n d copy a nd com p lete the
table be l ow.
I ntolerance Limitations
Culture ltalianisation of
South Tyrol and !stria
II
Chapter 4 Italian tota lita rianism in the 1 930s •
II l l D u ce a n d t h e cu lt of M usso li n i i n
re lation t o fascist i d eo logy
Following Mussolini's appointment as prime
minister and the symbolic March on Rome that
·
marked the fascist takeover, he began to project
an image of himself as the saviour of Italy. He
was already Il Duce - 'the Chief ' - of the PNF.
He now created an image of himself as Il Duce
of Italy in a similar way as Stalin had created a
leadership cult in the Soviet Union, although
Mussolini unashamedly encouraged his cult. It
has been suggested by one of Mussolini's foremost
biographers, Denis Mack Smith, that Fascis1n
was merely theatre and Mussolini's talents lay
mainly in acting the role of Il Duce, supported by
a propaganda machine that emphasised the fascist
slogan 'Mussolini is always right. ' The cult of the
leader was clearly a central feature of Fascism in
action and at the heart of fascist ideology.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
Fig. 6 The cult ofII Duce traced a direct line from the caesars ofAncient Rome to the
great modern leader fvfussolini
II
Chapter 4 Italian totalitarianism in the 1930s •
early and slept for nine hours every night. In 1931, Starace introduced
the salute to Mussolini as leader to start all meetings of the Fascist Party.
Mussolini was far more concerned with creating an image of himself as
the man of action who would save Italy than ensuring Italy was governed
effectively. He preferred to remain ignorant in discussions with the Nazi
government than to employ an interpreter and ad1nit his lack of fluency
in German.
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
II Cross- refe rence The cult of M u ssol i n i and fascist ideo logy
N azi ideo logy is considered on One of the key reasons for the development of the cult was the status of
pages 94-97 and page 1 29 covers the the leader within fascist ideology. Fascist ideology is confused because
influence of Nietzsche's ideas on the it developed over time, but a consistent strand is the belief that Il Duce
N azi Fuhrerprinzip. was a man apart. The philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche had argued that
evolution would not simply stop and that therefore hu1nanity in the
1 9th century would not be the Saine as humanity in the 20th century.
He therefore developed the concept of the 'superman', which both
Fascist Italy and Nazi Gern1any picked up and incorporated into their
ideas . The evolution of man into 'superman' was accompanied by the
belief in the 'will to power ' . In Fascism this can1e to mean the ability
of Il Duce, the 'superman', to mould Italy and the world through his
will. This will was greater than the power of the people, for people
power 1neant liberal democracy and national weakness . Nietzsche was
a rationalist, that is he sought logical explanations for events rather
than religious or supernatural explanations. He proclaimed that 'God
is dead. ' His ideas went far beyond the simplistic ideas that Mussolini
and Hitler seized upon and would have been appalled to be considered
a founder of Fascism; he was an individualist who did not intend his
ideas to be applied to states . However, the roots of the fascist belief
in their superman, Il Duce - able to shape the world through the
strength of his will - can be found in Nietzsche's work, as can the
creation of a new secular religion with Mussolini the 'God-like' leader
of the 1novement.
The worship of the leader was also an inevitable by-product of Fascism's
rejection of alternative forms of government. Mussolini's Third Way
extended beyond the econmny and the Corporate State to become a
Ill
Chapter 4 Italian totalita rianism in the 1 93 0s •
•
• Section 2 Fascist Italy
Learning outcomes
Activity
Th rough you r study of this section you should be aware of the development
Revision exercise
of fascist ideology, the d i fferent i nterpretations of fascist ideology, and its
II Review you r reasons why the contri bution to M ussoli n i 's rise to power. You should also be able to reach
cu lt of M ussolini developed . a j u dgement on the relative i m portance of the wea knesses of Li beral Italy,
fJ Add any additional ideological the fear of Com m u n ism and the role of M ussolini h i m self in expla i n ing his
reasons you have identified appointment as prime m i n ister i n October 1 922.
after reading the section on You should u ndersta nd the reasons why Fascism was i ntolerant of d iversity,
the cult of M ussoli ni and
what i ntolera nce of d iversity meant in relation to politics, the economy,
fascist ideology.
religion and c u lt u re, and the extent to which Italy was tru ly i ntolera nt in the
IJ Review you r reasons why the 1 920s and 1 930s.
cult of M ussolini might have
You shou ld u nderstand how and why the cult of ll Duce developed, i nclu d i ng its
been lim ited in its success.
place in fascist ideology, and the key features of the cult. You shou ld a ppreciate
Add any additional reasons the im pact of the King and the Pope on the extent of the cult.
you have identified after
reading the section on limits
to the cult.
II
C hapter 4 Italian tota lita rianism in the 1 93 0s •
- It is important that you plan this answer carefully, as you need to think
about who are the 'others' that need to be considered. The King is an
obvious starting point but Facta, Giolitti and even Orlando could be
considered. Clearly, other factors will need to be covered to demonstrate
balance and judgement. The appeal of Fascism, the social and economic
circumstances and the fear of revolution generated by the growth of
workers' actions and PSI support are all important. So too is the role
of Mussolini in terms of creating the fascist movement and also his
actions in 1 922. Remember that your answer should not just cover
reasons generally, but link them to the actual appointment of M ussolini.
This means that the post-war economic and social problems must be
related to the political crises and the lack of any alternative to M ussolini
by October 1 922 . This approach will also ensure you demonstrate
judgement by showing how the factors you are covering link together.
•
Nazi id eo logy an d the estab lishm e nt
of the Nazi State
In this chapteryou will /earn about:
II Cross-referen ce
In 1 928, a secret govermnent report concluded that the Nazis and
Adolf Hitler had 'no noticeable influence'. The Nazi attempt to seize
To review the fascist March on Rome, power in November 1 923 by aping the fascist March on Rome had led
re-read pages 59-60 . to Hitler 's arrest and i1nprisomnent. Although Adolf Hitler was able to
The origin of the term Weimar rebuild the party on his release frmn prison in 1 925, econmnic stability
Repu blic is outlined on page 92 . in Germany led to increased political stability. Extre1nist parties like the
Nazis appeared to have missed their chance. In the 1 928 elections to the
German parliament, the Reichstag, the Nazi Party saw its support decline
to 3 . 4 per cent of the vote and only 1 2 seats. It appeared that both Hitler
and the Nazi Party would be consigned to the footnotes of history. Less
than five years later, Hitler was sworn in as the fifteenth chancellor of the
Weimar Republic on 30 January 1 93 3 .
The next 1 8 1nonths saw the transformation o f a theoretical de1nocracy
into a one-party dictatorship in which Nazi ideology was increasingly put
into practice. Initially, Nazi ideology was a confused and contradictory
set of ideas based on the 1 920 2 5 -point progra1nn1.e and Hitler 's 1 925
autobiography Mein Kampf. Once the Nazis were in power it became
clear that, although some of these contradictions continued to exist, the
Nazi values central to Hitler were given free reign and extremist actions
took place because of a commitment to a set of extre1nist values . Hitler 's
popularity as 'Fuhrer ', fear of the Nazi terror state and the fact that many
Nazi ideas were genuinely popular with large sections of the German
population allowed an intolerance of diversity that would have genocidal
consequences from 1 94 1 .
II .
Chapter 5 N azi ideology and the esta blish ment of the N azi State •
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
• Activity
Revision exercise
Look back to the section on ideology in the i ntrod uction (pages 4-8), Marxism i n Chapter 1 (pages 1 3-1 5) and
Nationalism i n Chapter 3 (page 5 4) .
Identify wh ich of the bullet points below are nationa list and wh ich are socialist. Copy and com plete the ta ble.
II
Chapter 5 N azi ideology a n d the esta blishment of the N azi State •
was trained to do the job of their superior; the Russian army may have
been bigger than the Wehrmacht, but its men were untrained peasants.
Gennany had the second largest navy in the world, and the develop1nent of
the new Dreadnaught-class battleships had closed the gap between Britain
and Germany by 1naking much of the British fleet obsolete. Germany
had begun to acquire an overseas empire and, although the 1 3 colonies in
Africa, Asia and the Pacific were of limited economic and strategic value,
they confirmed Germany's status as a great power. Germany had also
taken steps to improve the social and economic condition of the people
and had introduced unemployment insurance and old-age pensions in the
1 8 80s. Germany was also the land of great composers such as Beethoven
and Wagner, great writers like Goethe and Schiller, and great philosophers
like Marx and Nietzsche. Most of us would agree today that the dominant
power of the 20th century was the USA but in 1 9 1 4 the likelihood was
that the 20th century would be the German century.
German entry into the First World War was greeted with widespread
enthusiasm. The war would enable the country to break out of the
encirclement faced from France and Russia and to ensure its don1inance
of continental Europe. There was no sense that Germany might be
defeated in the war. The German army enjoyed immediate success,
driving through Belgium and northern France and approaching Paris; the
front line was so close to the city that Parisian taxi drivers transported
French soldiers to the front. In the east, the Russian army was defeated
in the autumn of 1 9 1 4 at the battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian II Key term
Lakes . Sebastian Haffner in his n1emoir of the inter-war years Defying ' N ovember Criminals': the term
Hitler ( 2002) has written of the psychological impact of the war used by nationalists to describe
starting in the summer and the glorious sunshine that he associated those who undermined the
with German victories . None of the western campaign was fought in war effort and surrendered in
Germany, and after the German victories in the autumn of 1 9 1 4 the 1 918. The term was particularly
eastern front was in Russia. Germany was never invaded, never defeated applied to the first chancellor
and ahnost broke through to Paris at the end of May 1 9 1 8 . When Lance and president of the new Weimar
Corporal Adolf Hitler was admitted to hospital in October 1 9 1 8, he, like Republic, Friedrich Ebert, and
most German soldiers and civilians, had no reason to doubt that victory to the political party he led, the
was at hand. The German surrender on 1 1 November 1 9 1 8 was therefore Social Democratic Party {SPD), as
incon1prehensible to Germans. Scapegoats were sought for defeat and well as Communists. E bert was a
the myth developed that Germany had been 'stabbed in the back' by the Jew, and extreme Nationalist and
'November Criminals' . The new Wei1nar Republic of Germany that was anti-Semitic political groups often
established was born out of defeat, associated with failure and, in the extended the term 'Novem ber
eyes of many Germans, governed by traitors. Sebastian Haffner was a
Criminals' to apply to prominent
German Jews who they believed
seven-year-old boy when the war began. In his memoirs he contrasts the
were less com mitted to the war.
outbreak of war with Germany's defeat and the Weimar 'revolution'.
It has been of o m i nous sign ifica n ce for the later h i story of Germany
that in spite of a l l the terri b le m isfortu nes that the wa r b rought, its
outbreak was associated in a lmost everyon e's memories with a n u m ber
of u n forgettable d ays of great excitement, w h i le the revolution of
1 9 1 8, w h i le it fi n a lly b rought peace a n d freedom, o n ly awakens d a rk
memories in the m i n d s of m ost Germans. The very fact that the war
began i n brilliant s u m mer weath e r and the revolution i n cold, wet
N ovem ber fog was a severe h a n d i ca p for the revolution. Though
N ovem ber 1 9 1 8 meant the e n d of the war, h us b a n d s restored to wives,
and life restored to m e n , it reca lls no sense of joy, o n ly a bad m ood,
d efeat, a n x iety, senseless gu nfights, confusion a n d bad weather.
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
II
C h a pter 5 N azi ideology and the establishmen t of the N azi State •
II A closer Loo k
N ational self-determination and the Treaty of Versa illes
The principle of national self-determination was one of the key
ideas on which the president of the USA, Woodrow Wilson, wanted
to base all the peace treaties . It meant that the future of disputed
territory would be decided in line with the wishes of the people of
that territory. Germany accepted an armistice on the basis that the
principle would apply. As a result, they expected to lose Alsace
Lorraine to France as it had been annexed by Germany in 1 8 7 1
following the defeat of France in the Franco -Prussian War. Germany
had imposed the use of German in schools, changed the language
of road signs and appointed Gern1an-speaking civil servants in
Alsace-Lorraine, but the people still considered themselves to be
French. Other non- German territory was lost, including Eupen
and Mahnedy to Belgium and northern Schleswig to Denmark.
However, Germany expected that national self-determination
would apply to German people who were not currently part of
Gennany and that they would be able to incorporate Germans who
had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until its collapse
in 1 9 1 8 . Uniting Austrian- Gennans with Germany would create
the 'Greater Germany' that Gennan Nationalists had longed for
since the 1 9th century. Instead, the Germans discovered that
national self-determination did not apply to countries that had
lost the war. The Treaty of Versailles did not allow the 2 million
Gernuns living in Poland to choose to join Germany. In the Treaty
of St Germain, signed by Austria and the Allies in 1 9 1 9, 3 million
Germans became citizens of the new State of Czechoslovakia.
Finally, both the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St Germain
explicitly forbade the unification of Germany and Austria. This
union, known as the Anschluss, became one of the goals of many
German nationalists and was part of the programme of Hitler and
the Nazis.
Activity II C ross-reference
Revision exercise For more information on the
Anschluss, look ahead to page 1 1 6.
Look back to the section on the Treaty of Versai l les and national self
determ i nation on pages 92-93 . To recap on proportional
representation, re-read page 56.
Use t h i s information t o copy a n d complete t h e tab le below to expla in why the
German peop le found the Treaty of Versai lles so h u m i liating.
Reason for hu m iliation Reason why this was so Evidence from the Treaty
humiliating of VersaiUes
------
M ilitary terms
Territorial terms
War guilt
Process
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
II
Chapter 5 N azi ideology and the establis h m e nt of the N azi State •
1 3 The cou ntry req u i res a strong central gove r n m e nt for the Reich.
Activity
Source analysis
Look back to the sections o n ideology in the i ntrod uction (pages 4-8) ,
Marxism on pages 1 3-1 5 and N ationa lism o n page 54. Study Sou rce 2, which
sets out the key poi nts of the G e rman Workers' Pa rty programme in 1 92 0 .
II Key profile
Anton D rexler
Anton Drexler ( 1 8 84-1 942) formed the German Workers' Party
in January 1 9 1 9 in Munich. It was a party of workers and ex
servicemen, although Drexler himself had been unfit for military
service. The party was nationalist and anti-Semitic, though son1e
of the original members also held socialist ideas . Hitler attended
a meeting in September 1 9 1 9 and was persuaded to j oin the party.
Hitler was the main asset of the party and Drexler became j ealous.
Inevitably, they clashed and Hitler resigned from the party. Other
party members persuaded him to rejoin with effective total control
and Drexler was sidelined.
Nazi ideology was not a coherent set of ideas. Karl Marx believed he
had created a scientific theory, but Nazism was a range of ideas set out
by different people at different times. The greatest area of confusion
•
• Section 3 N azi Germ a ny
-�
Fig. 5 Nazi ideo logy: key themes
• Activity
lies in the fact that the party was both 'nationalist' and 'socialist'. This
reflected the ideas of the early 1nen1bers . Hitler was a Nationalist, but
Thin king point other founding members who were workers were more concerned with
protecting their rights. Drexler was mainly a Nationalist, but he thought
Why was N azi ideology
contradictory? the party should try to attract the support of German workers by winning
them over from the Gern1an Socialist and Communist Parties.
The two ideas of 'Nationalism' and 'Socialism' were united in the idea
II Key term of the Volksgemeinschaft, or 'people's comn1unity' . The Nazis sought
Lebensraum : meaning 'living space', to create a State that was exclusively German, including those Germans
the term was the Nazi idea that currently living outside Germany. At the same ti1ne, non- Germans
all Germans had a right to land. would be encouraged to leave Germany. Those who remained would
Germany's large population and be outside the people's community and would therefore be exploited in
relatively small territory meant the interests of those of 'German blood'. The German worker would
that more land would have to therefore be protected not by redistributing wealth from the rich, but
be acquired. Living space would by redistributing wealth fro1n non- Germans and by the State acquiring
therefore be gained in Poland and more land that could be given to Germans at the expense of non
U kraine, with German families Germans . This was the basis of the Nazi idea to acquire more territory
relocated to the east where they
abroad known as Lebensraum .
would run large farms with local
( slave ) labour. The Nazis idealised Alfred Rosenberg made further sense of Hitler 's unconnected ideas by
the German family living on the drawing to his attention the Jewish nature of Bolshevism. Rosenberg
land and Lebensraum was an pointed out that Marx and Engels were Jews, Trotsky and other leading
essential part of this vision.
II
Chapter 5 N azi id eology a n d the esta blishment of the N azi State •
Activity
Revision exercise
Review this section to remind yourself of the key themes of N azi ideology. Copy
and complete the table below to summarise the key themes.
Nationalism
Socialism
Volksgemeinschaft
•
• Section 3 N azi Germa ny
II A closer loo k
Hitler and the Nazi Party's ill thought-out attempt to seize power
was foiled on the morning of 9 November 1 923. The Bavarian
governor von Kahr was malzing a speech in a Munich beer cellar
on the evening of 8 November when Hitler and Goering led a
group of armed Sturm-Abteilung ( SA) members into the hall.
Hitler announced the beginning of a national revolution and that
600 armed men were surrounding the cellar. Von Kahr was arrested
by the SA, although he was released
after agreeing to co - operate, enabling
him to warn the Munich police. Hitler
was persuaded to continue the Putsch
by General Ludendorff and the next
Inorning 3, 000 Nazis 1narched towards
the centre of Munich. Hitler thought he
had secured agreement with the Munich
police chief and the Putsch would not
therefore be resisted. However, 1 00 police
Inet the 1narch and opened fire. Sixteen
party members and three police were
killed. Hitler was arrested and stood trial
for his treachery in 1 924. His closing
speech was a propaganda triumph, in
which he won nationalist support by
stating his intention in trying to seize
power was to be a destroyer of Marxism
rather than just a minister. He received
a lenient sentence of five years, of which
Fig. 6 The end of the fv1unich trials, 1923. General Ludendorff leaves the courthouse he served only nine months, at Landsberg
after his case is dismissedfor lack of evidence prison. Goering was shot in the thigh
and was smuggled out of the country to
Austria. To control the pain he was given
1norphine, which beca1ne a lifelong addiction. The police turned
their guns away from the war hero Ludendorff and he was acquitted
at the trial. He was elected to the Reichstag in May 1 924 as a Nazi
Party delegate.
The Munich Putsch gave the Nazi Party exposure, but while Hitler was
imprisoned the movement split between north and south, nationalists and
socialists, and revolutionaries and democrats. Although Hitler was able to
unite the party at the February 1 926 Bamberg Conference, it was of little
consequence. The Nazi message was not particularly relevant to most
Germans who were enjoying economic prosperity. The Nazis won only
1 4 seats in the December 1 924 Reichstag election and just 1 2 seats in the
May 1 928 elections. It seemed that the party would fade into histmy.
II
C h a pter 5 N azi ideology and the esta blishment of the N azi State •
had prevented cheap imports of foreign food. Cheap food was popular
with the working class whom the SPD represented, but meant German
farmers lost out. Grain prices collapsed, with the price of wheat, rye and
feedstuffs falling from 250 marks a tonne in 1 927 to 1 60 marks by 1 930.
Pig farmers in north Germany suffered as a result of cheap bacon imports
from Denmark. A double blow occurred in 1 92 7, with a poor harvest and
an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Some 1 3 million farmers were
affected and there were no State benefits to help them_ out - national
insurance did not cover the self-employed.
Many small farmers found themselves having to borrow against the
value of their land and then found they could not meet repayn1.ents. A
demonstration of 30,000 farmers in Oldenburg in 1 928 was followed
by a deinonstration of 1 40,000 in Schleswig-Holstein later that year. By
the late- 1 920s, the average agricultural income was 44 per cent below
national average. The Nazis forged a link with the rural community
by attacking the high levels of interest charged by banks and promised
a people's community in which tariffs would be restored, interest
payments would be reduced and foreclosures would stop . The Nazi
view of Gennany was that the banks were Jewish and German farmers
were being victimised. Many German farmers were attracted by the
promises of support and thought little of anti-Seinitism, whereas other
rural communities happily accepted Nazi racial views . There was a clear
correlation from 1 930 onwards between how rural an area was and the
number of Nazi voters; in the September 1 930 Reichstag election the
Nazis won 27 per cent of the vote in rural Schleswig-Holstein on the
Danish border, cmnpared to only 1 2. 8 per cent in Berlin.
What finally destroyed the Gennan econmny was the Wall Street Crash
of October 1 92 9 . Share prices on the American stock Inarket collapsed,
Fig. 7 Hyperinflation of German currency,
with devastating effects for Gern1.any. Payment of reparations had proved 1923. The depreciation in value of
to be crippling and the Gennan government had unwisely printed money money made paper notes almost
in an attempt to meet domestic bills. The result was hyperinflation and worthless and caused poverty. The
the collapse of the German currency. In 1 9 1 8, a pound was worth about cartoon shows a mother, half-buried
in bank notes, holding up her starving
20 marks, but at the peak of inflation in 1 923 a pound was worth about
child and crying out for bread
20,000 Inillion marks.
At the same time, Germany failed to make reparations
payments to France and Belgium, who responded by
occupying the Ruhr region in November 1 923. The
crisis was solved by the introduction of a new currency
and by rescheduling the debt under the Dawes Plan
of 1 924, which also encouraged foreign loans and
investment into Gennany. Most of these loans came
from the USA. Between 1 924 and 1 930, long-term
American loans to Gern1.any accounted for $ 1 , 293
million out of a total of $ 1 , 430 million. In addition,
$ 1 , 5 60 Inillion was owed in short-term loans and
$ 2 1 7 n1.illion in direct investinents from American
companies like General Motors, which had opened Fig. 8 A 100,000 mark note from February 1923. The continued
factories in Germany. use of marks and the use of the Imperial symbol, the
. . double-headed eagle, are evidence of the continued
Unfortunately, rather than being used to Increase the support for the empire and lack ofsupportfor the Weimar
productivity of the German economy, many of these democracy from key institutions like the banks
loans were wasted on reparations payments and on social and welfare
provision, like swiinming pools . The German economy was dependent on
the well being of the American economy. When the Wall Street Crash hit
the USA, American banks recalled their loans and American companies
closed their factories to cut costs. The result was that German banks and
•
• Section 3 N azi G ermany
There was g reat competition fo r j o bs. N orth e i m 's suga r- beet refi n e ry
needed a n a d d i t i o n a l two h u n d red men each a u t u m n after the crop
was i n . In Septe m ber 1 9 3 0 over n i ne h u n d red a p plied for these j o bs .
Wages were lower but the jobs were sti l l d e s i red because they re
esta blished the worke r's right to reg u l a r u n e m p loym ent benefits.
The m a xi m u m period a worker could rece ive regu la r u n e m p loyment
payme nts was one yea r - less d e pe n d i ng o n h ow long h e h a d
p reviously been e m ployed . After that the u n e m p loyed w o r k e r came
u nd e r the care of the city We lfa re Offi�e, w h ic h o rd i na ri ly s u pported
orpha ns, c r i p p les and the aged . There was n o l i m i t to the length of
time a worke r could stay o n the Welfa re Office ro lls, a s long a s he h a d
n o othe r i ncome.
Norm a l wages of a semiski lled worker were a bout 30 ma rks per week;
regular unemployment pay was 15 marks per week, a n d 'emergency'
benefits were only slightly less. But the welfare dole was o n ly 8.75 m a rks
per week for a m arried m a n a n d half as much for a single m a n . The
process of movi ng d ownwa rds through the d ifferent grades of benefit
was speeded u p when it was decided in Novem be r 1 93 0 that 'emergency
payments' would be made only to those who could ' p rove need'. This
was the first of a series of measures designed to ease the strai ns caused
by unemployment o n the State and local budgets.
-
11· Exploring the deta i l -
The collapse of the economy led to mass une1nployment. More than
5 . 5 million Germans were unemployed by the end of 1 932. This level
Ta ble 1 Official unemployment in of unemployment meant that the government did not have enough
Germany, 7928-32 money to pay meaningful benefits as not enough workers were paying
Sept 1 928
-
650,000 ___ _j national insurance. Typical weekly payments of 5 Reichsmark were not
enough to buy food. The unemployed lived rough in cities, and a spoon
I
Sept 1 929 1 ,300,000 and bowl became a prized possession as it meant you could get a meal
Sept 1 930 3,000,000 from the mobile soup vans provided by charitable organisations . The
Nazis also set up soup kitchens in many small towns . The suicide rate
Sept 1 931 4,350,000 increased . Many members of professional middle classes were told they
Sept 1 932 5,1 02,500 would have to work for less pay or face becoming unemployed. Their
children faced up to the prospect of not being able to go to university
jan 1933 6,1 00,000
as planned, but there was no work to go to as an alternative. Fear of
It has been estimated that the becoming unemployed gripped the German middle classes, alongside
total u nemployed was as high as the growing fear that the mass of unemployed workers would rise up in
8.5 million when those who were not a communist revolution.
covered by insurance are included.
The attraction a n d strengths of t h e N azis a n d N azism
The Nazi Party's message had not fundamentally changed but in the
Germany of 1 930 people were now listening. In the September 1 930
Reichstag election, the Nazis made a breakthrough, winning 1 8 .3 per
cent of the vote and 1 0 7 seats . The peasant farmers of north Germany
and the small traders and artisans of the small towns of southern
Germany were particularly strong in their support for Nazism, as were
the under-35s. The working class mainly supported left-wing parties,
with the Social Democratic Party ( SPD ) being the largest party and the
Communist Party of Germany (KPD) also growing in support.
II
Chapter 5 N azi ideology a n d the esta blishment of the N azi State •
The middle-class fear of the working class meant they frequently turned
to the Nazi Party as the only reliable protection from the extreme
left. The paramilitary wing of the party, the Sturm-Abteilung ( SA, or
' Stormtrooperst took to the streets to fight the left, disrupted meetings
of the SPD and KPD, and beat up members of the Reichsbanner, the
SPD 's paramilitary force. Such actions won support from industrialists;
for example, Kierdorf, the director of Germany's largest mining
company, gave the Nazis 1 00, 000 marks . Alfred Hugenberg was the
chairman of the rival German National People's Party ( DNVP) but he
turned to Hitler to lead his campaign against the Young Plan. Hugenberg
lacked a powerful speaker and therefore placed his media empire of 500
newspapers and the Universal Film Corporation at Hitler 's disposal.
Such exposure ensured the Nazi message was heard at a time when
unemployment had reached 23 per cent and only 63 per cent of the total
population were in full-time work.
Between 1 930 and 1 932, there were three Reichstag elections and a
presidential election. Until the second Reichstag election of November
1 932, support for the Nazi Party grew. The Nazis became the largest
party in the Reichstag in July 1 932, winning 3 7 . 3 per cent of the Fig. 9 'Hitler, our last hope. ' This Nazi
vote, the highest level of support for a single party. The Nazis did propaganda targets the working
not, however, win a maj ority of the vote and therefore of seats in the class unemployed, although it was
often the middle classes, who held
Reichstag. This meant that it was the responsibility of the president, jobs but feared unemployment,
Paul von Hindenburg, to choose the chancellor. Between 1 930 and that were won over to Hitler
1 932, he chose three other chancellors before he turned to Hitler. It
is important to understand both why the Nazis became the largest
party, meaning that Hitler could pressure the president into appointing II Exp lori ng the detail
him chancellor, and why Hindenburg resisted appointing Hitler until The You ng Plan
January 1 93 3 . This plan was introduced in 1 929 to
reduce Germany's reparations and to
resched u le the debt over 59 years.
II Key_ profi le
It therefore accepted the Treaty of
H i ndenburg
Versailles and condemned Germany
to pay '80 gold marks every second
Paul von Beneckendorff und von Hindenburg ( 1 8 4 7- 1 934) for 60 years', as one campaign
was president of Germany from 1 92 5 to 1 93 4 . He had come poster stated.
out of retirement to lead the Gern1an army in the First World
War. His election as president in 1 925, at the age of 7 8, was
seen as evidence of a desire for a strong, traditional style of
leadership . Hindenburg found himself having to select successive
German chancellors during the political crisis of 1 930-3 2 . His
appointment of Hitler in 1 933 marked the end of any form of
democracy in Germany.
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
Cha ncellors of Germany, Ta b l e 2 German political parties and their key supporters
1 928-3 3
Party Religion of Class and age of supporters
1 92 8 j une Hermann Muller, SPD su pporters
1 930 March Heinrich Bruning,
National Socialist German Protestant Lower middle class, farmers
Centre Party
Workers' Party and the you ng
1 932 May Franz von Papen, (Nazi Party, N S DAP)
non-party
1 932
German National People's Party Protestant Aristocracy and middle class
December Kurt von Schleicher, (Nationalist Party, DNVP}
non-party German People's Party Protestant Industrialists and middle
1930 (DVP) class
january Adolf H itler, NSDAP
Centre Party Catholic Catholics of all classes
(Zentrum or simply 'Z'}
German Democratic Party Protestant Liberals and State-employed
(Democrats, D D P} middle class
Social Democratic Party Workers in trades unions
(SPD}
Communist Party of Germany Revolutionary working class
(KPD} and the you ng
These first four parties all generally tried to make the Weimar
Republic work and sought to resist extremism. The Nationalist Party
was generally opposed to the SPD and the Weimar Republic, but it
j oined the grand coalition, providing Germ.any with great political
stability. However, in 1 92 8 the party lost 2 million votes as a result
of joining the coalition. Alfred Hugenberg was elected chainnan and
the party once more opposed the Weimar Republic. The chancellor
from June 1 92 8 to March 1 930 was the Socialist Hennann Muller.
His coalition collapsed under the pressure of finding a solution to
the Wall Street Crash, as the need to cut public expenditure exposed
the great difference between the parties . The SPD favoured cutting
expenditure on arma1nents, which was resisted by the DVP; in turn,
their suggestion to cut welfare spending was rej ected by the SPD .
Heinrich Bruning from the Centre Party replaced Muller, but he did
II Key term
not have the support of most of the Reichstag so he relied on the
support of Hindenburg and p residential decrees to govern. He held an
Presidential decrees: the Weimar election in September 1 930 to try to increase support for a democratic
Constitution established a coalition, but the result was a huge increase in support for the NSDAP
democratic republic with and the KPD .
an elected Head of State,
the president. Although the Bruning struggled t o find any solution to the problem of
intention was for parliamentary unemployment, optimistically hoping it would blow over. Once
government, in the event of this failed to happen, he looked for other solutions . His proposed
national crisis, Article 48 gave the customs union with Austria would have broken the terms of
president the power to rule by the Treaty of Versailles and his plan to create j obs by getting the
decree. Between 1 929 and 1 932, unemployed to work on the bankrupt East Prussian estates was
over 1 00 decrees were passed, rej ected by Hindenburg. Bruning had also led Hindenburg to
compared with only 29 laws believe that his victory in the April 1 932 presidential election would
enacted by the Reichstag. The be a foregone conclusion. Hindenburg felt humiliated that the
president also had the power to combined votes for the extremist candidates, Hitler and the KPD
choose the chancellor.
leader Ernst Thalmann, almost equalled his share of the vote. He
II
C h a pter 5 N azi ideology a n d the esta blishment of the N azi State •
II Key p rofile
•
• Section 3 N azi G ermany
• Activity So u rc e 4
M a ny busin ess m en rem
Source analysis a i n e d u n c o n vinc e d by
H itl er's (oft e n deli ber
vaguen ess on eco n
o m ic pol icie s a n d c ate )
Read the sources o n the attraction deg ree of sc epti cis o n tin ued to g re et N
m . N eve rth ele ss, in azis m with a
a n d strengths of H itler a n d the p oliti cal c ris is, a ttit 1 9 32, in the con text
u d es we re s h i fti n g. of the grow i ng
N azi Party. ba n ke rs h a n d e d a p e A s m a ll n u m be r of b u s i n
titio n to H in d e n b u r essm e n a n d
g o n 1 9 N o vem be r
II I dentify the strengths of fa ls ely gave the p re
s i d ent the i m p res sion 1 9 3 2, w h ic h
H itler a n d the N azis. a m o ngst the busi n of a far w ider ba sis of
ess co m m u n i ty for s u p p o rt
H it ler.
Organ ise your notes under Th e P rogra m m e the
subheadings. If you find this G e rm a n Worke rs ' Pa r
ty, 1 92 0,
Ada pte d from Ma ry
difficult, use the headings in F u l b roo k, Hitler, 2 004
H int 1 . If you need further
help, use the questions in Hint
2 to guide your note-making.
� n s, 19 3 0
r p oliticia
in g N azis an d othe
ad
Ages of le �
d
8 3 ye ar s ot
in d e nbu r g
P re si de nt
H ye ar s otd 65
e n b er g
Atfre d H ug otd
5 1 ye ar s
P ap e n y e ar s otd
Fr a nz v on 41
te r
Ad o tf H it 37 y e ar s o td
G oe ri n g d
H er m an n 3 3 ye ar s ot
oebbets
jo se p h G
II H i nt 1
Possi b le subheadings: Source 6
Support of business The 1 93 2 p residential election cam p a ig n
Support of the army W h i le h i s opponents trave lled by tra i n a n d struggled t o cover the country,
Propaganda: modern images H itler trave lled by plane i n a ca mpaig n n a med the ' F u h rer Over Germany'.
Propaganda: the Nazi message The i mage of H itler desce n d i ng from the skies was common in n ewsreel
H itler's abilities and image films. H itler visited 20 c i t i es in 7 d ays.
The Nazi Party
· �'
·, n cr e aSI n gt
a s t h e � \o st
2 i s w s s iv e \ .
t he N a 9 r o gr e miC
o u r c e 7
a nt a g e ol
o m 1 9 2 p
a b \ e e co n o
s a dv r th e st
�
to th e hi ch f ce . I n
o r\<.in g he a r
m� ' w r ovi d e l<.e p\a
ls o w e o l t c r a c� to p n t c o u\d ta
A
attitu
d o e e.
r ab\e ar d em o,' r e a
r m am p r o gr
am m
! av o u \N e•m m me u ch a
ab i\it� ol o gr a ci n g s .
l aith i
n th e wh, ch
an "r . I pr o du H r s t o ry
u n d er · nte nu o n o M od e rn
tr am e
w o r \<.
ar h iS , p o w e r' '
mb e r
20 02
d e c\e s e to s e pte
t\ er m a it\ er' s ri i e W ,
1 931 1-\ '
l
rd on ,
' 1-\ Rev
R. Go
a p t e d tr o m
Ad
Fig. 1 0 The attraction and strengths of Hitler and the Nazi Party
II
the esta blish men t of the N azi State
•
C h a pte r 5 N azi i deology and
.
exp\o lt
N a ri s w er e
able to
slllp ,
• H i nt 2
s . l ll e \e ad er
w o n 1 07 se at o l d � n am l c Answ er the follow ing questions to
� n til e
N aris
combi
n ati o n a\\� til
e .
and a l
ele ctio u gll a e sp e o 3 0 N aZI identify the streng ths of H itler
1 9 3 0 s s tl lr o
pr o p a g t il e 1 9
In til e u cce ki\\ at u cll as
ina� s tlleir s a\\i e S s so and the N azis.
tr ao r d o r an d n - air r l lle� a\
tllis ex or a t e o p e p e o ple . t. Read Source 4 in Figure 10.
1-\it\e r' s
gilt s a s a n
s si o n cre a
te d b � t il
� n e ar\� 20
0 ,o o o
l e le cto r al
s p or
u p II
e b o
nd o u s
imp r nd e d ar e as � . su cll Who were suppo rting H itler
tr e me as atte ll ab\e e r m an a
s s w lli cll w e a r\ � 1 d entl a n t n o rtll G t ast
on g r e
o tll eir
cl
P r otest n i a an
d and the Nazis by the end of
p art� c t e nti o n t ar e as ol . P o me r a w e re
\ at u r al s e n e � 1 932?
aret u in til e
r
o u nd
po an� . l ll
p aid c tr o n g st , a r G e r m
ari s w
er e s tile e a cr o ss tlle lf
l lle N an d i n ns a\\ a ts , b ut Why were they suppo rting
g - 1-\ o \stein , i n r u r a\ tow � a n d stu d e n b
esw i g er\
as s cll\ str o n il e eld H itler?
re a\so s se s , t s.
. l ll e� w e i d dle cla r m w orke r t o ry
' M od ern H is
s si a r m nd t a
pr u \ o w e s a Read Sources 5 and 6.
p u l a r w itll til
e
e r s w e re tar m
e r
t o p ow e r , e r 2. 0 0 2. fJ
po
e d t o\\ow it \e r 's ri se , S e pte mb
mo st d
ev o t
or d on .
' 1-\
R ev i e W a What do you notice abou t
m R. G
e d tr o the age of the leadi ng Nazis
Ad a pt
com pare d with the othe r
Sou rce 9 polit ician s?
pe r a n d low er
ng sup port from bot h the u p
j ust as the N azis were w i n n i wor ki n g clas s.
b Wha t i mpression did the
sign ifica nt s u ppo rt from the
m i dd le clas ses, they a lso won ' F uhre r Ove r Germ any'
DAP 's succ ess in gai n i n g
as u n i m port ant, the N S cam paig n give of the Nazi
U su ally i gno red or d i s miss ed was the o n ly pa rty
a d e i t u n i q u e i n G e r m a ny. It Party?
a wor ki n g-cl ass follow i n g m
be a pa rty of a l l the peo ple.
t h at cou ld gen u i ne ly cla i m to c Why was the image of H itler
Nazi Vote r, 1 985
Ada pted from T. C h i lders, The descendi ng from the skies
signi fican t?
Source 10
I t i s i m porta nt to rea lise that the i m pact o f p ropaga n d a was
IJ Read Source 7.
not s i m p ly the
res u lt of Goebbe l's skill i n exploiti n g symbols and ra llies, great a Whi ch grou p was incre asingly
as this was,
o r H itler's u n d e n i a b le ta lents as a spea ker. It was a lso the resu supp ortive of the N azis?
lt of the fact
that the N a z i m essage reached pa rts of Germany oth e r p a rties
d i d not reach b Why were they supp ortin g
and that they ta rgeted specific i nterest g roups with specific
messag es. The the N azis?
N S DAP got its spea kers, even some of its m aj o r figu res o n occas
ru ral d istricts a n d small towns which h a d often been neglect
ions, i nto II Read Sources 8 and 9.
ed by the older
politica l p a rties. F u rthermo re, the p ropaga n d a section of the a Who supp orte d the N azis?
party tra ined
its speake rs to a d d ress loca l issues, such as the p roblem of Thin k abou t class , regio n and
agricult u re in age .
c h leswig- Holstei n , or the t h reat to small shopkee pers i n H
a n over created by
the build i ng of a new Woolwo rth's store. b Why was the Party Congress
Adapted from D. G e a ry, Hitler and Nazism, 1 993 a pow erfu l piece of Nazi
prop agan da?
Source 11 c Out of all the Ger man
polit ical part ies, what could
By the e n d of 1 93l N orth hei m's N azis could look back o n a busy yea r.
the Nazi s alon e claim ?
The n u m be r of meetings was n ot greater than in the p revious yea r, but
the c h a ra cter had changed. In the fi rst p la ce, the N S DA P was a ble to U Read Sources 1 0 and 11 .
d raw on the pool of Reichstag d elegates e lected the p revious yea r, for a Why was N azi prop agan da
loca l m eeti ngs. No fewer than five Reichstag de legates appeared o n supe rior to the prop agan da
N azi p latforms i n N orth e i m i n 1 93l i n a d d ition t o the lead e r of the Nazi of rival part ies?
parliamentary g ro u p i n the P russian parlia m e nt. This was a rich selection for
b How had the 1 930 elec tion
a town of ten thousa nd. F u rthermore, the N S DA P was beg i n n i n g to play
help ed Naz i prop agan da?
upon the m i lita ristic yea rni ngs of N o rtheim's citizens. D u ri n g the yea r they
p rovid ed t h ree former officers as speake rs a n d staged five p a ra m i litary
parades. F i n a lly, 1 931 saw the begi n n ing of Nazi 'eve n i ngs of entertai n ment':
i n fused with as much pageantry as politics, but with varied appeal a n d
a d isti n ct change o f pace from t h e usua l t h ree t o five h o u rs o f speeches.
The N azi record becomes even more asto u n d i ng when one considers that
N orth e i m h a d only a bout sixty a ctua l mem bers of the N S DA P.
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
However, the president was old and trying to keep the republic
together was beyond him. The army let it be known that they favoured
the appointment of Hitler to protect the State from Communismi
the former president of the Reichsbank, Hj almar Schacht, made it
known that the business and financial world saw Hitler as the lesser
of two evils . Otto Hindenburg was a close ally of von Papen and he
persuaded his father to go along with von Papen's plani the former
chancellor saw a way to control Hitler and restore power to himself
and the aristocracy. Hitler would be chancellor, but there would only
be three Nazis in total in the 1 2 -man coalition cabinet, and von Papen
himself would be vice chancellor. The elite would gain access to the
mass support of the Nazi movement and either Hitler would solve the
economic problems or the Nazis would lose support as they too were
defeated by circumstances. Hitler was appointed chancellor on 3 0
January 1 93 3 . Von Papen triumphantly proclaimed 'We've boxed him
ini we've hired him as our act . '
I M ay 1 92 8 Sept 1 93 0
I J uly 1 932 N ov 1 932
I M a rch 1 93 3
H i ndenburg 1 9.4
H itler (NSDAP) 1 3 .4
Thalmann 5.0
• Activity Activity
Ta lking point Statistica l analysis
There is h istorical debate as to Study Tab les 2, 3 a n d 4.
whether H itler's rise to power
was the result of the economic II D ra w a gra p h s howing the changing political fortunes of the political
problems Germany was facing or parties between M ay 1 92 8 and M a rch 1 93 3 .
whether the strength of H itler a n d EJ Expla i n the changes to a partner i n your class.
the N azis w a s responsible.
II Which party's support was the m ost stab le? Expla i n why.
II Look for evidence to support
II Where d i d N azi a n d com m u n ist support com e from ?
one of these views a n d
evidence t o challenge the
a lternative view.
EJ As a group, debate the two
d ifferent viewpoints.
II
C h a pter 5 N azi i deology a n d the esta blishment of the N azi State •
Between January 1 933 and August 1 934, German democracy was finally ·
•
• Section 3 N azi G ermany
II Key p rofile
E rnst Roehm
Ernst Roehm ( 1 8 8 7- 1 934) was the closest to a friend that Hitler
had. He was an ex-First World War soldier who revelled in war,
joining the Freikorps after the war had ended. He took part in the
Munich Putsch, although he was released on probation after his
trial and moved to Bolivia. Hitler asked him to return and take
charge of the SA in 1 930. By 1 934, his power was so great that
Hitler was persuaded it was necessary to execute his old friend
during the Night of the Long Knives.
Hitler now needed to secure his control over the means of armed force.
The SA had been at the forefront in the struggle for power. Led by one of
Hitler 's oldest comrades, Ernst Roehm, the organisation had grown in
size to around 5 00,000 men. Roehm had a vision of a force of 1 million
Stormtroopers forming the basis of a new German army. Hitler was not
so sure. Roehm and the SA represented the socialist wing of the party
and they now sought a social and economic 'second revolution' . Hitler
had never intended such action, and as he negotiated with business and
financiers, the SA was an embarrassment. Equally, the army detested
the force, and Hitler could see that the untrained thugs of the SA would
be no match for the officer corps of the Wehrmacht. The SA leadership
was also rumoured to be rife with homosexuality and Roehm himself
II
Chapter 5 N azi ideo logy a n d t h e esta blish m e nt of t h e Nazi State •
was a homosexual. Von Papen spoke out against the Nazis in a speech
in June 1 934 and Hitler feared a conservative revival.
Goering and Himmler persuaded Hitler that action must be taken
against the SA leadership. The army would supply the weapons and
Hin1mler 's SS would carry out the strike. Between 30 June and 2 July,
the Night of the Long Knives was carried out. Roeh1n was arrested and
shot, alongside 200 others who were identified as a threat including
former chancellor von Schleicher and his wife. Von Papen was placed
under house arrest. A law dated 3 July justified the murders as necessary
in defence of the State. Hitler secured his control of the SA, and
gained the support of the army, business and n1ost Germans who were
delighted that the extremists had been defeated. All that remained was
for Hindenburg to make way for Hitler; he died on 2 August and Hitler
combined the positions of chancellor and president in the new office
of Fuhrer of Germany. The army swore an Oath of Loyalty to Hitler 's
person, in the same way that they had sworn an Oath of Loyalty to the
kaisers . The dictatorship was complete.
II Key p rofiles
H erman n G oe ring
Hennann Goering ( 1 8 93- 1 946) was a First World War fighter pilot
who commanded the famous von Richthofen Flying Circus and
achieved celebrity status as a result of the adulation the German
press heaped on war heroes. He j oined the NSDAP in 1 922 and
took part in the Munich Putsch, fleeing Germany in its aftern1ath.
He was elected to the Reichstag in 1 928 and was one of three
Nazi members of the cabinet following Hitler 's appointment as
chancellor. Goering played a leading role in the Night of the Long
Knives, which allowed him to remove Roeh1n as a rival. He took
the positions of Cmnmissioner for the Air and Head of the Four
Year Plan Office, as well as creating the political police of Prussia
that was later integrated into the Gestapo (the secret police) under
Hi1nmler. Goering was a popular figure with the German people,
and his public profile and commitment to Hitler made him an
effective nu1nber two in Nazi Germany. He was captured by
American troops in May 1 945 and found guilty on all counts at the Fig. 12 Hermann Goering
Nuremburg Trials, where he was sentenced to death. He committed
suicide with poison that was sn1uggled into his cell a matter of
hours before his intended execution.
• S u m m a ry q uestions
•
6 G erman totalitarianis m in the 1 9 3 0s
• t h e i ntolera n ce of d i ve rsity
with refe ren ce to a nt i
S e m itism! gypsi es! asoci a ls
a n d co m peti n g politica l
i d eologi es
Ill
Chapter 6 German totalitarianism in the 1 93 0s •
II Key p rofi le
•
• Section 3 Nazi Germany
• The logical conclusion of Hitler 's belief that people were not
equal was the racism that was crucial to National Socialism. This
racism meant the intolerance of other 'inferior ' ethnic groups
essentially Jews, although gypsies and Slavs (particularly Poles
and Russians ) also suffered greatly because of these beliefs . Hitler
believed in a Herrenvolk ( master race) that must be protected
from Untermenschen ( sub-humans ) . Nazism was intolerant of
inferiority as much as it was of diversity. Hitler 's belief in racial
struggle came from his belief that either the German race would
control and enslave the inferior races to the east or the German
nation itself would be crushed. Racial intolerance was a life or
death struggle for Hitler.
Anti- Semitism
The most notorious element of Hitler and the Nazis' intolerance
of diversity was the anti-Semitic policies that were followed by the
German State. The origins of Hitler 's anti-Semitism are not wholly
clear. Fanciful theories have suggested that Hitler took revenge on
the race of the doctor who had failed to save his mother, yet he
seems to have been grateful for the care Dr Bloch gave Klara Hitler
before her death in December 1 90 7 . Hitler referred to his years in
Vienna between 1 90 7 and 1 9 1 3 as the formative influence on his
life . He was an admirer of the charismatic anti-Se1nitic mayor of
Vienna, Karl Lueger, and collected Ostara, although this magazine
focused nwre on racial theories in general than on anti-Semitism
in particular. Hitler did identify in Mein Kampf the point at which
he started to consider the question of Jews in Germany, describing
a meeting with a kaftan-clad Jew with black hair locks . It seems
reasonable to see Hitler 's anti-Semitism as one of a confused set of
general ideas formulated before the First World War.
The First World War was in so n1any ways the defining point in
Hitler 's life, and his struggle to understand the defeat of Germany
saw him accept the ideas of those who blamed 'outsiders', including
socialists and especially Jews . Hitler had no difficulty finding anti
Semitic literature to fuel his anger. Julius Langbehn's popular
Rembrandt as Educator ( 1 8 9 0 ) identified Jews as poison in German
society, who had to be exterminated. Houston Stewart Chamberlain
furthered the idea of alien races as a biological threat to German racial
purity. His book, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century ( 1 8 9 9 )
stressed the i1nportance o f racial purity. Hitler was greatly influenced
by the book and deeply moved when he met Chamberlain in 1 923 .
Hitler 's hatred of Communism was linked to his anti-Semitism by
II Cross- refere nce
Alfred Rosenberg and this connection intensified Hitler 's view that
Jews were a world plague who had to be removed, first from Germany
To recap on Alfred Rosenberg, see and then from the rest of the world . Whether this was the origins of
pages 96-97. the eliminationist anti-Semitism of the Nazi Final Solution is still
debated by historians .
II A closer Loo k
The origins of the Holocaust are still the source of intense debate
between historians . Some believe that there exists a straight line
between Hitler 's anti-Seinitism, as expressed in the programme
of the NSDAP from 1 920 and in Mein Kampf, to the decision
to murder European Jews . Historians like Lucy Dawidowicz
II
Chapter 6 German totalitarianism in the 1930s •
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
II
Chapter 6 German totalitarianism in the 1 930s •
Fig. 2 Onlookers grin while jews are forced to perform menial tasks after the Anschluss, 7938
•
• Section 3 Nazi Germany
II A closer look
The Anschluss
II
Chapter 6 German tota litarianism in the 1 93 0s •
In 1 5 hours, 1 7 7 synagogues had been destroyed. Around 7, 500 Jewish Fig. 4 Reinhard Heydrich
owned stores were looted and destroyed. Some 9 1 people lost their lives
and 30,000 Jewish men were sent to concentration camps.
The origins of the pogrom are revealing. Two leading Nazis had something
II Cross- referen ce
Concentration camps are introduced
to gain by promoting such a dramatic action that would win favour with
on page 1 26.
Hitler. Joseph Goebbels was keen to win back his place in Hitler 's favour
following his affair with a racially inferior Czech actress. Hermann Goering
had gained control over the economy in 1 936 through the Four Year Plan
Office, but his attempts to re-arm and provide high living standards were
II Cross- refere n ce
creating an economic crisis. He saw the opportunity to further exploit the H ermann Goering is profiled on
page 1 09.
Jewish community and a fine of 1 billion marks was charged, with the
6 million marks paid out by insurance companies to be given to the State.
II Key p rofi le
j oseph Goebbels
Dr Joseph Goebbels ( 1 8 9 7- 1 945 ) joined the NSDAP in 1 922 and
was initially on the socialist wing of the party and a critic of Hitler.
However, he was mesmerised by Hitler at the 1 926 Bamburg
Conference and became a dedicated supporter. He was made
Minister of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment in March 1 933
and his understanding of propaganda played a key role in the Nazis'
successful consolidation of power. He was married with six children
and his family was considered to be the image of the perfect Nazi
family. Goebbels was a personal favourite of Hitler. After Hitler had
committed suicide, Goebbels and his wife killed their children and
then committed suicide. Fig. 5 joseph Goebbels
•
• Section 3 N azi G e rm a ny
it was the first act of repression that was fully reported in Britain. It is
true that actions were carried out by the SA and few ordinary Germans
j oined in, but there was no resistance and the Catholic and Protestant
churches failed to condemn the violence. Emigration increased . Within
days, a decree forced all Jews to transfer retail businesses to Aryan
hands and Jewish children were expelled from German schools . German
Jews could no longer hope that Nazism would lose its venom and many
had no way of earning a living anyway now that their businesses had
been destroyed.
On 30 January 1 939, Hitler celebrated the sixth anniversary of his
appointment as chancellor by giving a speech to the Reichstag in which
he made clear the extent of Nazi intolerance. He argued that if the
international Jewish movement brought war on Europe and Germany, he
would ensure that this led to the 'annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe'.
Once war had begun in September 1 939, a curfew was introduced for all
Jews, emphasising that they were not part of the nation, and Heydrich
gave orders that ghettos should be set up in German-occupied Poland. In
October, the deportation of Austrian and Czech Jews to Poland began and,
fron1 November, Jews in German-occupied Poland were forced to wear
an armband or yellow star. The final horrific stages of Nazi intolerance of
racial diversity were to follow, from deportations to ghettos and internment
camps, to 1nass murder in the extermination camps built across Poland .
• Activity • Activity
Review the text on the II Use the i nfo rmation above to copy a n d comp lete the table below.
h istoriogra phy of the H o locaust.
I d entify evidence from this chapter Year Events
t hat can be used to s u pport the
1 933
i ntentionalist and the functionalist --
1936
--
1 9 37
--
1 938
1939
fJ Exp lain why N azi Germany was not i m med iately i ntolerant of its j ewish
population.
Activity
Revision exercise
-
Explain why the Nazis persecuted gypsies. ( H int: you could consider
ideological reasons, cultural reasons and the pressu re from German
citizens.)
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
Asocials
The desire to create the Volksgemeinschaft required the exclusion of
racial aliens from the people's community. The largest group were Jews,
and the Sinti and Roma communities were also easily identifiable and
viewed with discomfort where they lived side by side with the 'normal'
German population. A final group were the social outsiders whose
behaviour or physical appearance led the Nazis to believe that they were
degenerate or biologically inferior. The 1 genus' (genes) was regarded as
deeply valuable and therefore those who were 1 degenerate' ( lacking the
right genes) were dangerous to the nation. The community of 1national
comrades' needed to be inoculated from the plague of these 1Social
outcasts' who were considered to be congenital criminals .
• Activity
Cha llenge you r thinking
II Study the list below. Identify which groups are ' national comrades' who wou ld fall within the Volksgemeinschaft
and which groups are 'asocials' who fall outside this people's com m u n ity.
fJ Explain why each group you p laced in the 'asocials' list was seen as da ngerous by the Nazis. Use this information to
com plete the table.
National comrades
II
C h a pter 6 G erma n totalita rianism in the 1 930s •
The main groups targeted by the Nazis were people who were homeless,
work-shy or juvenile delinquentsi those with disabilities or learning
difficulties, or those who refused to use their bodies for the good of the state.
Homeless groups
The hmneless were a grave concern to the Nazi regime. Large groups
of homeless people were seen as a threat to public order, although
it was recognised that a mobile l ab our force was required as p art of
the plan to help kick-start the economy and end the depression. As a
result, a distinction was drawn b etween those who were fit to work and
those who were deliberately homeless because they wanted to avoid
employment. Mass arrests of beggars and the hmneless took place in
September 1 93 3 . The Law against D angerous H abitual C riminals and
concerning Measures for S ecurity and Correction of D ece1nber 1 93 3
was also applied t o the homeless ( as well a s gypsies on many occasions ) .
The Preventative Detention D ecree of 1 93 7 was also used against the
hmneless, illustrating the view that the insistence of the liberty to roa1n
free implied a mindset that rej ected the need to put the state first. For
this reason, being hmneless became a matter for the police rather than
for the welfare services . M any tramps were forcibly sterilised .
The 'work-shy'
Overlapping with hom_elessness were those whom the Nazis considered
to be 1Work-shy'. They were no longer tolerated after 1 9 3 6 when full
e1nployrnent was reached and a larger labour force was required. A round-up
in Berlin before the 1 93 6 Olympic Ga1nes ensured the i1nage of National
Socialism was not undermined. Two out of the 1 0 work companies in
Dachau concentration camp were made up of the work-shy. In the summer
of 1 938, approximately 1 1 , 000 beggars, tramps, pimps and gypsies were
rounded up under the code name 1Work-shy Reich' and sent to Buchenwald
concentration camp, where they were forced to wear a black triangle.
•
• Section 3 N azi Germany
II A closer look
II
Chapter 6 German totalitarianism in the 1 930s •
homosexuals were not subj ect to such harsh treatment, but women
were increasingly forced from their professional j obs to take up the
role of wife and mother. Lesbians who refused to accept this role were
easily identifiable and many were sent to Ravensbri.ick, the all-female
concentration camp .
juvenile delinquents
The Nazi concern with juvenile delinquents was two-fold. By definition,
youths who were involved in criminal activities were not integrated into
the State through party youth organisations. There was also an increase
in crimes committed by youths in the years before the war. Although
overall criminal convictions fell from just under 500,000 to 300, 000
between 1 933 and 1 939, juvenile offences increased from 1 6, 000 in 1 933
to over 2 1 , 000 in 1 940 . Therefore, in 1 93 9 the Reich Central Agency for
the Struggle Against Juvenile Delinquency was established, followed by
a youth concentration camp in Moringen near Hanover where inmates
were subject to biological and racial examinations.
National Socialism had accepted the theory of eugenics that had become
popular in the 1 920s, which argued that racial stock could be improved
by selective breeding. The idea that the nation's stock could be improved
•
• Section 3 Nazi Germany
found favour because of concerns about declining birth rates and the
loss of the best male physical specimens in the First World War. In
August 1 929, Hitler had argued in a speech that 'If Germany were to
get a million children a year and were to remove 700, 000-800,000 of
the weakest people then the final result might even be an increase in
our strength. ' The economic depression created a huge burden on the
State in terms of welfare payments and the prospect of saving money
by sterilising those with hereditary defects only enhanced the appeal of
eugenics to the Nazis.
In July 1 933, Hitler pushed through a law perm_itting the compulsory
sterilisation of those with hereditary defects . These included
schizophrenia, which is not hereditary, and 'feeble-mindedness' and
'chronic alcoholism', which were not clearly defined. Furthermore, the
hereditary courts that made the decisions often detennined fitness on
the basis of being 'work-shy ' or a fonner member of the KPD. Between
1 934 and 1 945, between 320,000 and 3 5 0,000 people were sterilised
under the law.
From 1 939, the Nazis murdered those with defects and illnesses,
1neaning that in the eyes of the State they had nothing to contribute
to the Volksgemeinschaft. Initially, Hitler approved a request from the
parents of a baby with learning difficulties to be killed and ordered
all similar cases to be treated in the sa1ne way. Approximately 5, 200
disabled children were killed. In August 1 939, Hitler decided to extend
the programn1e to adults and under the T-4 Euthanasia Program1ne
around 72,000 were killed before the progra1nme was abandoned in 1 94 1
following protests frmn the Catholic Church. The numbers involved were
so great that the Nazis had experimented with the use of poison gas and,
once the T-4 programme had ended, the methods used were adopted in
the pursuit of the Final Solution.
II Cross- refere n ce The SPD split, with some 1nembers continuing to work in Germany
before they were found, arrested and sent to concentration camps.
More information on the Concordat
between the Catholic Centre
of 1 9 3 3
Others fled Germany. Their headquarters were in Prague until the Nazi
Party and the Nazi Party is given on annexation of the city in March 1 93 9 . The leaders then fled to Paris,
page 1 08. where many were captured once France fell in 1 940 .
The Catholic Centre Party gave up their political rights in the Concordat
of 1 933 in the belief that they would be able to protect their religious
liberty. Their success was mixed. The Catholic youth groups were forced
to integrate with the Hitler Youth in 1 936 and the pressure of deputy
chancellor von Papen in July 1 933 was not enough to stop sterilisation
for those with hereditary illness becoming law. The papacy failed to
criticise the anti-Semitic measures of the 1 930s and give a moral lead
to any anti-Nazi movement, essentially because it was not anti-Nazi.
However, it did succeed in forcing the abandonment of the euthanasia
campaign, which it found morally reprehensible. However, this success
II
Chapter 6 German tota lita rianism in the 1 930s •
Fig. 7 A poster advertising Triumph of the Will, a propaganda film from the 1934 Nazi
Party rally in Nuremberg
was rare because the Nazis set out to ensure that other ideas were
crushed. This was to be achieved in two ways. Those who were too young
to have fully formulated ideas or were uncmnmitted to any cause were to
be indoctrinated through propaganda. Those who could not be influenced
or won over were to be ruthlessly repressed.
Goebbels as Minister of Popular Enlighternnent and Propaganda coordinated
the Nazis' attempts to link people to the regime. He believed in appealing
to emotion rather than reason and always sought to reinforce existing
prejudice rather than trying to transfonn people's views. Furthermore, he
tried to control all aspects of forms of 1nass cmnmunication as the means
of reaching the population. As a result, all German broadcasting was
brought under Nazi control through the Reich Radio Company. Around
1 3 per cent of e1nployees were dismissed on political and racial grounds.
Cheap, shortwave single-charmel radios were produced by the regime, and
by 1 939 70 per cent of German households had access to one of these
Volksempfangers (1people's receivers' ) . In August 1 933, Goebbels, in a speech
when opening a radio exhibition argued that 1The purpose of radio is to
teach, entertain and support people. '
The press i n Germany was brought under Nazi controL through Eher
Verlag, the Nazi publishing house, buying up two-thirds of German
newspapers. The Editor 's Law of October 1 933 made the editor
•
• Section 3 Nazi Germany
responsible to the Propaganda Ministry for all the content of their paper.
The Volld.scher Beobachter, the Nazi newspaper, reached a circulation
of over 1 million as teachers, civil servants and university professors
felt it prudent to buy and carry a copy, although overall circulation fell
by 1 0 per cent during the period 1 933-39 due to the sterility of the
content. Film was Goebbels's particular obsession. He hated obvious
propaganda films like Hitlerjunge Quex ( 1 933) in which a member of
the Hitler Youth was murdered by Communists. He preferred to provide
entertainment through glitzy and glamorous escapist films such as The
Patriots ( 1 93 6 ) .
Goebbels had much t o celebrate i n the newsreels that accompanied
feature films. Nazi economic policy saw great success . By 1 936, there
were only 400, 000 unemployed compared to 6 million at the end of
1 93 2 . Standards of living improved for most non-Jewish Germans .
In the harsh winter of 1 93 5-6, the party organised the Winter Relief
charity and the government subsidised the price of food. Cheap
consumer goods like Volksempfangers were available in the shops.
The Strength Through Joy movement organised leisure activities
and provided cheap holidays both abroad and at home, and May Day
became a national holiday.
II
C h a pter 6 German totalita rian ism in the 1 93 0s •
•
• Section 3 Nazi Germany
II
Chapter 6 German totalitarianism in the 1 930s •
Everyone who has the opportunity to observe it knows that the FUhrer
Activity
can hard ly dictate from above everything which he intends to realise
sooner or later. On the contrary, up till now everyone with a post in Source analysis
the new Germany has worked best where he has, so to speak, worked Study Source 4.
towards the FUhrer. Very often and in many spheres it has been the case
in previous years as well - that individuals have simply waited for orders II I n less than 2 0 words, explain
what is meant by 'working
and instructions. U nfortunately, the same will be true in the future; but towards the FUhrer'.
in fact it is the duty of everybody to try to work towards the FUhrer along
the lines he would wish. Anyone who makes mistakes will notice it soon fJ H ow do you think the idea of
enough. But anyone who really works towards the FUhrer along his lines 'working towards the F u h rer'
developed among Nazi
and towards his goal will certainly both now and in the future one day
officials?
have the finest reward in the sudden legal confirmation of his work.
•
• Section 3 Nazi Germany
Fig. 9 The Fuhrer as the heir to Germany. The cult was developed by images that linked Hitler to great Germans of the past. Left to right:
Frederick the Great, Otto von Bismark, Paul von Hindenberg, Adolf Hitler
Through your study of this section you should be aware of the development
of Nazi ideology with reference to the key themes of Nationalism, Socialism,
race and anti-Semitism, and the Volksgemeinschaft. You should understand the
importance of the economic problems facing Germany, the appeal of Nazism
and the Nazi Party and the failure of other politicians in explaining why H itler
was made chancellor. You should be clear that H itler was not elected chancellor
and have an understanding of why Hindenburg would not appoint him
chancellor in 1 932 but did in 1 933. You should understand how H itler destroyed
democracy in the period from january 1 933 to August 1 934 and have reached a
judgement as to the relative importance of the different methods used by H itler.
Having studied the section, you should be in a position to assess the reasons
for the development of the intolerance of diversity in Nazi Germany and be
able to reach a j udgement on the extent of intolerance of the different groups
in German society and politics. You should understand the methods used to
promote the Volksgemeinschaft.
You should u nderstand the natu re of the Fuhrer myth, how and why it
developed and the place it held in Nazi ideology. Through your u nderstanding
of the intolerance of diversity and the H itler myth, you should also be able to
reach a judgement on how far Nazi Germany was totalitarian in the 1 930s.
II
C h a pter 6 German tota litaria n ism in the 1 930s •
•
In trying to consider a common understanding of totalitarianism in the
Soviet Union, Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, this chapter considers
three issues. The common roots of the development of totalitarianism
will be explored, with reference to the impact of the First World War.
The way in which historians and the world view the different flavours of
totalitarianism will then be considered. Finally, the extent in which these
states were truly totalitarian will be assessed.
• Activity
Revision exercise
Copy the following chart for each q u estion, then shade each one to show
which classes or races were central to the ideology of:
II Stalin in the U S S R
fJ M ussolini i n Italy
II H itler in Germany.
II
Conclusion •
•
• Section 4 Conclusion
II
Conclusion •
•
• Section 4 Conclusion
II
Conclusion •
• Activity
Revision exercise
II Review the key features of a totalitarian State in Chapter 1 .
Copy and com plete the table below to com pare the
totalitaria nism of the three regimes.
The one-party State j a n u a ry 1918 and the abolition of the Constitu ent
Assem b ly and the resignation of the last non
Bols hevi ks from the government i n M a rch 1918
The mono poly over
the means of mass
com m u n i cation
The c u lt of personality
II When you have completed both ta bles, mark on the line below where you
wou ld positio n each State to indicate you r judgement on the extent of
their totalitarianism. Explai n why you have reached you r judgement.
•
G lossary
II
Bib liograp hy
Swain, G. ( 20 0 3 ) Stalin's rise to power. Modern History Clark, M. ( 1 9 8 4 ) Modern Italy 1 8 7 1-1 982, Longman.
Review, February. Mack Smith, D. ( 200 1 ) Mussolini, Orion.
Whittock, M. ( 1 9 9 7 ) Stalin 's Russia, Collins Educational. The translated text of The Doctrine of Fascism is
available at www. worldfuturefund. orglwffmaster/Readingl
Teachers and extension Germany/mus solini. htm
Amis, M. ( 2003) Koba the Dread, Vintage.
DVD
Antonov-Ovseyenko, A. ( 1 9 8 1 ) The Time of Stalin:
Portrait of Tyranny, Harper & Row. Zeffirelli, F. ( dir. ) ( 1 99 9 ) Tea with Mussolini.
Applebaum, A. ( 2004) Gulag: A History, Penguin.
3 Nazi G e rmany
Arch Getty, J. ( 1 9 8 5 ) Origins of the Great Purges,
Cambridge University Press. Students
Thurston, R . ( 1 9 9 6 ) Life and Terror in Stalin 's Russia Boxer, A. ( 1 9 9 7 ) Hitler's Domestic Policy, Collins
1 934-1 94 1 , Yale University Press. Educational.
Volkogonov, D. ( 20 0 0 ) Stalin : Triumph and Tragedy, Haffner, S. ( 2002) Defying Hitler, Weidenfeld &
Orion. Nicolson.
For a chronology of Stalin's life, including film and Pine, L. ( 20 0 0 ) Nazi family policy. Modern History
pictures, go to www. stel. ru/stalin/j oseph_ 1 93 5 - 1 9 5 3 . htm Review, April.
•
• Bibliography
Farmer, A. ( 1 99 8 ) Anti-Semitism and the Holocaust, A good starting point for Nazi ideology is
Hodder & Stoughton. www. schoolshistory. org.uk/ASLevel_History/
Grunberger, R. ( 1 9 7 1 ) A Social History of the Third sourcematerial_earlynaziideology.htm
Reich, Penguin.
Novels
Kershaw, I. ( 1 999) Hitler 1 889-1 936, Penguin.
Fry, S. ( 1 99 7 ) Making History, Arrow.
Kershaw, I. (2000) Hitler 1 936-1 945, Penguin.
Harris, R. ( 1 992) Fatherland, Arrow.
Rees, L. (2005) The Nazis: A Warning From History,
BBC Books.
Ill
Acknowledge m e nts
The author and p u blisher wou ld also Like to Hitler, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002i pp94-9 5 Extract
from the German Workers' Party 2 5 -point programme,
than k the followi ng for perm ission to
1 9 20. Adapted from J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism
reproduce material: 1 91 9-1 945: A Documentary Reader, vol. 1 , Exeter,
1 9 8 3 i p l OO Adapted from W S. Allen, The Nazi Seizure
Sou rce texts:
of Power, Grolier Publishing, US, 1 9 8 4i p l 04 The
p l 5 Sarah Butler and Raj eev Syal, £1 . 2bn payday for the programme of the German Workers' Party, 1 9 20. Adapted
toga tycoon, Times Online, 21 October 2005i pp l 6- 1 7 from Mary Fulbrook, Hitler, Collins Educational, 2004i
V I . Lenin, What is to be Done � , 1 902. From V I . Lenin, p l 04 Adapted from R . Gordon, 'Hitler 's rise to power ',
Collected Works, 4th English edition, quoted on www. Modern History Review, S eptember 2002i p 105 Adapted
marx2mao. comi p20 Lenin's Political Testament, from R. Gordon, 'Hitler 's rise to power ', Modern History
25 December 1 922. Quoted in M. Lynch, Stalin and Review, September 2002i p l 0 5 Adapted from T Childers,
Khrushchev, Hodder Arnold H &S, 1 9 90i p26 J. V Stalin, The Nazi Voter, University of North Carolina Press,
Concerning Questions of Leninism, 25 January 1 92 6 . 1 9 8 5 i p l 0 5 Adapted from D. Geary, Hitler and Nazism,
From J . V Stalin, Problems of Leninism, 1 9 7 6, quoted Routledge, 1 9 93i p l 0 5 Adapted from W S. Allen, The
on www. marx2mao .comi p27 N. Bukharin, 'The New Nazi Seizure of Power, Grolier Publishing, US, 1 9 84i
Economic Policy and our Tasks', Bolshevik, 1 June 1 9 2 5 . p l l 4 The Reich Citizenship Law; 1 5 September 1 93 5 .
Quoted o n www. marxists . org/archivei p 3 3 Lev Kopelev. J. Noakes and G . Pridham ( eds . ) , Nazism, 1 91 9-1 945,
Quoted in J . Lewis and P. Whitehead, Stalin: A Tim e for 1 9 84i p l 23 Quoted i n L. Rees, The Nazis: A Warning
Judgement, Thames Methuen, 1 9 90i p34 Extract from From History, BBC Books, 2005i p l 23 Quoted in L. Pine,
a report by M. MacKillop to the British Foreign Office, 'Nazism in the Classroom', History Today, April 1 9 9 7i
May 1 9 3 6 . The National Archives ( PRO ) : FO 3 7 1 120 3 5 0 p l 29 Werner Wilkins, 1 9 34. Quoted in I. Kershaw, The
££ 1 1 , 1 7, 6 1 -62i pp3 7-3 8 Extract from a report by Nazi Dictatorship, Hodder Arnold, 1 993
M. MacKillop to the British Foreign Office, May 1 9 3 6 .
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1 7, 6 1 -62i p4 1 Extract from a report by M. MacKillop
to the British Foreign Office, May 1 93 6 . The National Edimedia Art Archive 42 ( top ) , 52, 79 ( top ), 79 (bottom),
Archives ( PRO ) : FO 3 7 1 /20 3 5 0 ££ 1 1 , 1 7, 6 1 -62i p44 82, 86, 89, 1 28i Getty Images ivi Glasgow University
Extract from Stalin's funeral oration. Quoted in M. Caledonian Collection 26i Courtesy of Stephane Magnenat
Lynch, Stalin and Khrushchev, Hodder Arnold H&S, 8 8i Nelson Thornes 99 (bottom)i Photo 1 2 24, 62, 65, 7 7,
1 9 90i p45 Adapted from A. Alexandrov et al. , Stalin: A l O �i Photo 1 2/Bertelsmann 98i Photo 1 2/Ullstein-Bild 30i
Short Biography, 1 94 7 ( translation published by Foreign Topfoto 1 0, 1 1 (bottom), 1 6, 19 (bottom) , 20 (bottom) , 2 1 ,
Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1 94 9 ) i p48 Extract 4 6 (bottom right), (top left) , 1 1 7 ( top)i Topfoto/Alinari 20
from a letter from Stalin to a Bolshevik Party member, ( top) , 6 7i Topfoto/HIP!Jewish Chronicle Archive, Edimedia
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London Board GCE examination paper, pre- 1 9 93i p 5 2 ( centre), 3 5 , 4 2 (bottom), 4 6 (top centre) , (bottom centre) ,
Mussolini speaking i n 1 9 22. Adapted from a London (top right), ( bottom left) , 5 0 , 5 1 , 5 8, 8 1 , 8 3 , 9 0 , 99 ( top ) ,
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in R. W Breach ( ed. ) , Documents and Descriptions: The
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The Doctrine of Fascism, 1 9 32i p 70 Francesco Archives ) , Ann Asquith and Dora Swick
•
I n d ex
m diversity, intolerance of
Germany 1 1 0-27
30-1
m
Abyssinia 79 Italy 6 7-80
Heydrich, Reinhard 1 1 7, 1 1 8
Acerbo Law 1 923 63 Soviet Union 3 1 -44
Himmler, Heinrich 109
agriculture Hindenburg, Paul von 101, 1 0 2-3,
DNVP ( German National People's
Germany 9 8-9 Party) 1 0 1, 1 0 2, 1 0 7, 1 0 8 1 03, 1 06, 1 09, 1 1 4
Soviet Union 27, 3 1 , 33, 34 Hitler, Adolf 8 8, 89, 9 1
Drexler, Anton 95
Anschluss 1 1 4, 1 1 6 anti-Semitism 1 1 2, 1 13, 1 1 4, 1 1 8
anti-Semitism
Germany 94, 96-7, 1 1 2-1 8
II and Austria 1 1 6
and Fuhrer myth 1 27-30
economic determinism 13
Italy 78 and Nazism 90, 94, 95, 9 7
economy
asocials, i n Germany 1 20-4 rise t o power 9 7-1 06, 1 0 7-9
German 9 8-100
Austria 1 1 4- 1 5, 1 1 6 Hitler Youth 1 22
Italian 7 2-4
Holocaust 1 1 2-13, 1 1 7, 134
Soviet Union 1 2, 2 7-8, 3 1-4
m education 4 2-3, 7 7, 1 23
homosexuality 1 22-3
Balbo, Italo 7 2, 8 1 Hugenberg, Alfred 1 0 1 , 1 02, 1 08
Ethiopia 79
Bismarck, Otto von Ill
ethnic cleansing 6 8
Blackshirts 5 4, 5 8, 6 2 eugenics 1 2 1 , 1 23-4
D
Bolshevik Revolution 1 9 1 7 1 0, 2 6 imperialism 13
Bolsheviks 1 0, 1 2, 1 7, 34-6
Party purges 36-40
D Italy 135
Fascist ideology i n 5 0-5
Facta, Luigi 5 9, 60
power struggle 20-5, 26 intolerance of diversity 6 7-80
Farinacci, Roberto 71, 72, 8 1
Bruning, Heinrich 1 0 2 rise of Fascism 5 5-65
Fascism
Bukharin, Nikolai 20, 25, 3 9, 40
8 1 , 84-6
cult of Mussolini and
D
B development of 5 1-2
ideology 1 9 1 9- 3 9 5 2-5
Jews
Capitalism 1 4, 73, 8 5 German anti-Semitism 94,
intolerance to diversity 6 7-80
Catholic Church 74-6, 85-6, 1 0 8 96-7, 1 1 2-1 8
rise of 5 5-65
Centre Party, Germany 1 0 1 , 1 02, in Italy 7 8
feudalism 13
1 0 7, 1 08, 1 24
films 4 2, 83, 1 26, 1 29
Cheka 1 2
China 2 7
First World War II
Germany and 90-4 Kaganovich, Lazar 37
cinema 42, 83, 1 26, 1 29 Kamenev, Lev 1 9-20, 24, 24-5,
Italy and 56
Cold War 5 3 8, 3 9
and totalitarianism 1 3 2-4
collective leadership 2 1 Kirov; Sergei 3 6-7
Five Year Plans 31, 32
collectivisation 2 7 , 3 3 KPD ( C ommunist Party of
Fuhrer myth 1 2 7-30
Comintern 2 6 Germany) 1 00-1 , 1 02, 1 0 7
Communism 1 3, 1 4, 1 3 2
Fascism and 5 2, 5 4 , 5 7-8,
m Kristallnacht
Glas s )
( Night o f Broken
1 1 6- 1 8
Germans in Italy 80
75, 8 5 kulaks 2 7, 3 3
Germany 88
i n Germany 94, 9 7 , 1 00-1, 1 0 7
development o f Nazism 89-90,
i n Rus sia 1 0, 1 2
s e e also Bolsheviks; Marxism
94-7 D
First World War 90-4 Lateran Treaty 1 9 29 70, 75-6
concentration camps 1 26, 1 27
Fuhrer myth 1 2 7-3 0 leadership
corporatism 5 4, 73-4, 84-5
Hitler 's rise to power 97-106, Fascism and 53-4, 84-5
Croce, Benedetto 7 6
1 0 7-9 Marxism and 48
culture, control of
intolerance of diversity 1 1 0-2 7 Nazism and 1 2 8-3 0
Germany 1 25-6
Gestapo 1 26-7 Lebensraum 96
Italy 76-8
Giolitti, Giovanni 5 6, 5 8 Lenin, V I . 1 1 , 1 2, 1 8, 40, 44
Soviet Union 4 1-4
Goebbels, Joseph 1 1 7, 1 25-6, and Marxist theory 1 6-1 8
on possible successors 20-2
m 1 28, 1 29
Goering, Hermann 9 7, 9 8, 1 0 7, Liberal Italy 5 2, 5 5-7, 69, 7 4
d'Annunzio, Gabrielle 56 Locarno Conference 1 92 5 83-4
1 09, 1 1 7
dictatorships 3, 4 Ludendorff, Erich von 97, 9 8
gypsies, in Germany 1 1 8- 1 9
II
Index •
II intolerance o f diversity
power struggle 1 924-9
3 1-44
1 8-28
personality, cult of 44-8
Squadre 5 8, 59, 62, 71
Pius XI, Pope 75, 76, 85