TC 53_R

5TH IILS NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

IN THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT

OF THE REPUBLIC OF AMPHISSA
AT AMPHISSA

SPEACIAL LEAVE PETITION No. ****/2021, WRIT PETITION No.****/2021

UNDER ARTICLE 136 AND 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF AMPHISSA, 1950

CASE CONCERNING THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION W.R.T.

UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL CONVERSION OF RELIGION
ORDINANCE, 2020

IN THE CLUBBED MATTERS OF

DANIEL &Ors……………………………………………………………….PETITIONER

v.
1. STATE OF AMPHISSA
2. UNION OF AMPHISSA……………………………………………….RESPONDENTS

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

COUNSEL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................ ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................... iv

STATEMENT OF FACTS ................................................................................................... v

ISSUES INVOLVED ......................................................................................................... vii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ........................................................................................ viii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ............................................................................................... 9

I. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THIS

COURT IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT. ...................................................................... 9
A. No Exceptional and Special Circumstances Exist and Substantial Justice Has Been
Done in the Present Case. .............................................................................................. 9
B. No Interference in the Decision of the Lower Courts. ........................................... 10

II. WHETHER SECTION 498A AND 340 OF AMPHISSIAN PENAL CODE

HAVE BEEN VIOLATED BY DANIEL AND HIS FAMILY. ................................... 10
A. Ingredients of Section 498A of APC are Fulfilled. ............................................... 11
B. Ingredients of Section 498A of APC are Fulfilled. ............................................... 11

III. WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION ORDINANCE, 2020 CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
11
A. The Ordinance Does Not Violate Article 25 of the Constitution. .......................... 12
B. The Act Provides for Public Order. ...................................................................... 12

PRAYER............................................................................................................................. 14

i
 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES, REGULATIONS & ORDINANCE

Constitution of Amphissa,
1950…………………………………………………………………….8
Amphissan Penal Code,
1860…………………………………………………………………9,10
U.P Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020…………………..11,12

CASES
Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravinder Kumar Suri, AIR 2005 SC 15…………………..9
Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, 1950 SCR 594………………………………………11
A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2007 SC 1546………………9
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, AIR 1989 SC
1972……………..……………………………………………………………………………9
DCM v. Union of Amphissa, AIR 1987 SC
2414………………………………………………...9
Mathai Joby v. George, (2010) 4 SCC 358………………………………………………….9
M.C Mehta v. Union of Amphissa, AIR 2004 SC
4618…………………………………………..9
Mehar Singh v. Shri Moni Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, AIR 2000 SC 492………..10
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196…………………………..…………….8
Panchanan Misra v. Digambar Mishra, AIR 2005 SC 129…………………………………10
Pawan Kumar v. State (1998) 3 SCC 309…………………………………………………..11
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169……………………………………………………9
Ramjilal Modi v. State of U.P., (1957) SCR 860 (3)…………………………………..…..11
Rev Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1977 SCR 611………………………………12
ShivanandGaurishankarBaswati v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, (2008) 13 SCC
323…..…………………………………………………………………………………………8
State of H.P. v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277……………………………….9
Union of Amphissa v. Era Educational Trust, AIR 2000 SC
1573………………………………9
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2004 SC 3467………………………….9

ii
BOOK
Justice Khastgir, Criminal Major Acta. Ed 2020, Kamal Law House, Kolkata……………10
M.P Jain, Amphissan Constitutional Law, 16thed, Lexis Nexis Butterworth, 2011,
5776…………9

iii
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

I. S.L.P. No. _____/2021

The petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution of
Republic of Amphissa.

II. W.P. No. _____/2021

The petitioner has approached this Hon’ble Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
Republic of Amphissa.

iv
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Republic of Amphissa is located in the South Asian Region of Asia.It achieved
independence in 1947. Now, the Republic of Amphissa is a democratic country with a
written Constitution which came into force in 1950. It has 28 States and 8 Union
Territories. The Constitution has adopted Parliamentary system wherein President is
the executive Head of the government.
2. Republic of Amphissa is the most ethnically and religiously diverse country in the
world and its history is dotted with numerous religious conflicts and riots.
3. In March 2019 certain newspapers published a report about Love Jihad which is an
activity of certain Organizations under which young Muslim men and boys in the
state target young girls belonging to non- Muslim communities for conversion to
Islam by feigning love. The news report stated that there has been 3,000- 4,000
conversions in the past four years having the nature of Love Jihad in the Republic of
Amphissa.
4. The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020,
is a law enacted by the Government of Uppam Pradesh, Amphissa. The ordinance
makes conversion non-bailable with up to 10 years of jail time if undertaken through
misinformation, unlawfully, forcefully, allurement or other allegedly fraudulent
means and requires that religious conversions for marriage in Uppam Pradesh to be
approved by a district magistrate. The law also encompasses strict action for mass
conversion, including cancellation of registration of social organization involve in
mass religious conversion.
5. On 10th January, Prabha, a jain by religion and Daniel who belonged to a family
practicing Islamic faith married each other under Special Marriage Act, 1956.Prabha
decided to convert to Islam, out of her love and respect for Daniel’s family and faith
and hoping that his family would be more willing to accept their marriage if she
undertakes such a gesture. And Prabha’s conversion was kept a secret from her
parents.
6. After marriage the couple lived in a separate apartment for two months and on 11 th
March went to visit Daniel’s home in Lunnow. On 15th March a two weeks lockdown
was announced in the state due to rise in cases of Covid.In the midst of this, Prabha’s
younger brother fell down from stairs and was put to bed-rest. Prabha strongly wished

v
 to visit him several times but Daniel’s family did not allow her to go during due to
limited transportation options and on an apprehension, that Prabha may contract
Covid-19 while travelling.
7. Being frustrated, after 2 months, Prabha called up her parents and asked them to pick
her up. Upon knowing about the details of their marriage and the conversion, they
suspected that Daniel and his family had forced Prabha to convert into a different
religion and were now forcefully restraining her against her will.
8. An FIR was filed in Rainbow Police Station against Daniel’s family under Section
498A APC, section 340 of APC as well as under the Uppam Pradesh Anti-Conversion
Ordinance and soon, his family members were arrested on 20 th May, 2021.
9. The Magistrate denied bail to Daniel’s family and issued a non-bailable warrant
against Daniel under section 498A. Daniel and his familypreferred a Special Leave
Petition before the Supreme Court and also filed a writ petition challenging the
validity of Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion
Ordinance, 2020.

vi
 ISSUES INVOLVED

-I-

WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT

IS MAINTAINABLE.

-II-

WHETHER SECTION 498A AND 340 OF AMPHISSAN PENAL CODE HAVEBEEN

VIOLATED BY DANIEL AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS.

-III-

WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

CONVERSION OF RELIGION ACT, 2020 IS CONSTUTUIONALLY VALID.

vii
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE THE

COURT IS MAINTAINABLE.
It is humbly submitted that SLP under Article 136 of Constitution of Amphissa is not
maintainable as special leave cannot be grantedwhen substantial justice has been done and no
exceptional or special circumstances exist forcase to be maintainable [A]; also, the Supreme
Court should restrict itself to interfere in thedecisions of lower court [B].

II. WHETHER SECTION 498A AND 340 OF AMPHISSAN PENAL CODE HAVE
BEEN VIOLATED BY DANIEL AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the ingredients of Section 498A
and 340 of Amphissan Penal Code have met and therefore, there is a violation of section
498A and340. There is a violation in this case because: [A] ingredients of Section 498A are
fulfilledand [B] ingredients of Section 340 are fulfilled.

III. WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

CONVERSION OF RELIGION ACT, 2020 IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that U.P Prohibition of
UnlawfulReligious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 is constitutional in nature. This is because:
[A] thereis a violation of Art. 25; [B] the Act provides for public order.

viii
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

I. WHETHER THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION BROUGHT BEFORE

THIS COURT IS MAINTAINABLE OR NOT.
It is humbly submitted that the Special Leave Petition against the orders of the Magistrate
is not maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution of Amphissa. Article 136 empowers
the Supreme Court to grant in discretion Special Leave to appeal from any judgment, decree,
determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or
tribunal in the territory of Amphissa.1
It is humbly submitted that SLP is not maintainable as special leave cannot be granted
when substantial justice has been done and no exceptional or special circumstances exist for
case to be maintainable [A]; also, the Supreme Court should restrict itself to interfere in the
decisions of lower court [B].
A. No Exceptional and Special Circumstances Exist and Substantial Justice Has
Been Done in the Present Case.
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the SC will not interfere
with the concurrent finding of the courts below unless the findings are perverse or vitiated by
error of law or there is gross miscarriage of justice.
Article 136 does not confer a Right of Appeal, but merely, a discretionary power to
the Supreme Court to be exercised for satisfying the demands of justice under exceptional
circumstances. 2 The SC observed in the Pritam Singh v. State,3in explaining how the
discretion will be exercised generally in granting SLP: the wide discretionary power with
which this court is invested under it is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only
and as far as possible a more or less uniform standard should be adopted in granting special
leave in the wide range of matters which can come up before it under Article 136. 4
Circumspection and circumscription must induce the court to interfere with the decision
under challenge only if the extraordinary flaws or grave injustice or other recognized grounds
are made out.5
It is contended by the respondents that the appellant must show that exceptional and
special circumstances exists and that if there is no interference, substantial and grave injustice

1
Art. 136, Constitution of Amphissa, 1950.
2
N. Suriyakala v. A. Mohandoss, (2007) 9 SCC 196.
3
AIR 1950 SC 169.
4
Ibid.
5
ShivanandGaurishankarBaswati v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills, (2008) 13 SCC 323.

9
will result and the case has features of sufficient gravity to warrant review of the decision
appealed against on merits. Only then the court would exercise its overriding powers under
Art. 136.6 Special leave will not be granted when there is no failure of justice or when
substantial justice is done, though the decision suffers from some legal errors.7
Although the power has been held to be plenary, limitless, 8 adjunctive and
unassailable, 9 it has also been held that the powers under Article 136 should be exercised
with caution and in accordance with law and set legal principles. 10

B. No Interference in the Decision of the Lower Courts.

If it appears prima facie that the order in question cannot be justified by any judicial
standard, the ends of justice and the need to maintain judicial discipline require the Supreme
Court to intervene;11 the SC in this case pointed out the errors of the High Court but did not
interfere in the decision of the High Court. The SC does not interfere with the conclusion
arrived at by the High Court if it has taken all the relevant factors into consideration and there
has been no misapplication of the principle of law. 12
Normally, in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136, the SC does not interfere
with the findings of the fast concurrently arrived at by the lower court unless there is a clear
error of law or unless some important piece of evidence has been omitted from
consideration. 13 Though Article 136 is conceived in widest terms, the practice of the Supreme
Court is not to interfere on questions of fact except in exceptional cases when the finding is
such that it shocks the conscience of the court.14

II. WHETHER SECTION 498A AND 340 OF AMPHISSIAN PENAL CODE

HAVE BEEN VIOLATED BY DANIEL AND HIS FAMILY.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the ingredients of Section 498A and
340 of Amphissan Penal Code have met and therefore, there is a violation of section 498A

6
M.P Jain, Amphissan Constitutional Law, 16thed, Lexis Nexis Butterworth, 2011, 5776.
7
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research v. K.G.S. Bhatt, AIR 1989 SC 1972; State of H.P. v. Kailash
Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277; Mathai Joby v. George, (2010) 4 SCC 358.
8
A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2007 SC 1546.
9
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2004 SC 3467.
10
M.C Mehta v. Union of Amphissa, AIR 2004 SC 4618; Aero Traders Private Limited v. Ravinder Kumar Suri,
AIR 2005 SC 15.
11
Union of Amphissa v. Era Educational Trust, AIR 2000 SC 1573.
12
DCM v. Union of Amphissa, AIR 1987 SC 2414.
13
Mehar Singh v. Shri Moni Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, AIR 2000 SC 492.
14
PanchananMisra v. Digambar Mishra, AIR 2005 SC 129.

10
and 340. There is a violation in this case because: [A] ingredients of Section 498A are
fulfilled and [B] ingredients of Section 340 are fulfilled.

A. Ingredients of Section 498A of APC are Fulfilled.

Cruelty consists in (i) any lawful conduct as was likely to drive such woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health whether mental
or physical; (ii) harm to such woman with a view to coercing her to meet unlawful demand
for property or valuable security or on account of failure of such woman or any of her
relations to meet the lawful demand; (iii) the woman subjected to such cruelty by her husband
or any relation of her husband. 15
In the present case, Daniel and his family prevented Prabha from visiting her brother
while he was on bed rest. For 2 months, they had restricted Prabha from leaving the house. It
was held by the SC that cruelty includes mental cruelty. 16

B. Ingredients of Section 498A of APC are Fulfilled.

Section 340 envisages that: (i) the accused lawfully restrains a person; (ii) such
restraint prevented the victim from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits; (iii) the
victim had every right to proceed beyond the circumscribing limits. 17
For wrongful confinement proof of actual physical obstruction is not essential. It must
be obvious that there was at least such an impression that she was not free to depart and that
she would be forthwith restrained, if she attempted to do so.18It must be noted here that her
wanting to meet her brother was a reasonable demand and they had prevented her from
proceeding beyond a circumscribing limit. Meeting family members in the time of need was
not restricted during the lockdown.

III. WHETHER THE UPPAM PRADESH PROHIBITION OF UNLAWFUL

RELIGIOUS CONVERSION ORDINANCE, 2020 CONSTITUTIONALLY
VALID.

15
Justice Khastgir, Criminal Major Acta. Ed 2020, Kamal Law House, Kolkata.
16
Pawan Kumar v. State (1998) 3 SCC 309.
17
Justice Khastgir, Criminal Major Acta. Ed 2020, Kamal Law House, Kolkata, pg 402.
18
Ibid.

11
 It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that U.P Prohibition of Unlawful
Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020 is constitutional in nature. This is because: [A] there
is a violation of Art. 25; [B] the Act provides for public order.

A. The Ordinance Does Not Violate Article 25 of the Constitution.

While upholding the validity of the Freedom of Religion Acts of Madhya Pradesh and
Odisha, in Stanislaus (1977), the Supreme Court had held that the “right to propagate” a
religion did not include the “right to convert”.The Supreme Court said that the act of
religious proselytization is not protected by Article 25 of the Constitution.
Reference may also be made to the decision in Ramjilal Modi v. State of U.P. 19 where
this Court has held that the right of freedom religion guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution is expressly made subject to public order, morality and health, and that "it
cannot be predicted that freedom of religion can have no bearing whatever on the
maintenance of public order or that a law creating an offence relating to religion cannot under
any circumstances be said to have been enacted in the interests of public order". It has been
held that these two Articles in terms contemplate that restrictions may be imposed on the
rights guaranteed by them in the interests of public order.
Reference may as well be made to the decision in Arun Ghosh v. State of West
Bengal, 20 where it has been held that if a thing disturbs the current of the life of the
community, and does not merely affect an individual, it would amount to disturbance of the
public order. Thus, if an attempt is made to raise communal passions, e.g. on the ground that
someone has been "forcibly" converted to another religion, it would, in all probability, give
rise to an apprehension of a breach of the public order, affecting the community at large. The
impugned Acts therefore fall within: the purview of Entry I of List II of the Seventh Schedule
as they are meant to avoid disturbances to the public order by prohibiting conversion from
one religion to another in a manner reprehensible to the conscience of the community.

B. The Act Provides for Public Order.

The Acts therefore dearly provide for the maintenance of public order for, if forcible
conversion had not been prohibited, that would have created public disorder in the States.
The expression "Public order" is of wide connotation. It must have the connotation which it is

19
(1957) S.C.R. 860 (3).
20
(1950) S.C.R. 594.

12
meant to provide as the very first Entry in List II. It has been held by this Court in Ramesh
Thapper v. The State of Madras that "public order" is an expression of wide connotation and
signifies state of tranquility which pre- vails among the members of a political society as a
result of internal regulations enforced by the Government which they have established".
In the Rev Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh’s case Supreme Court questioned
whether the right to practice and spread one’s faith also included the ability to convert. The
Court upheld the authenticity of the first laws against conversion: the 1968 Madhya Pradesh
Dharma SwatantrayaAdhiniyam, and the 1967 Orissa Freedom of Religion Act. The Court
found, as summarized by Professor Laura Jenkins, that “restrictions on efforts to convert are
constitutional because such efforts impinge on ‘ freedom of conscience ‘ and ‘ public order.
‘” In one of its findings, the Court held that propagation only indicated persuasion / exposure
without coercion and that the right to propagate did not include the right to convert any
person. This holding was summed up by the Court as follows:
“It has to be remembered that Article 25(1) guarantees “freedom of conscience” to
every citizen, and not merely to the followers of one particular religion, and that, in turn,
postulates that there is no fundamental right to convert another person to one’s own religion
because if a person purposely undertakes the conversion of another person to his religion, as
distinguished from his effort to transmit or spread the tenets of his religion, that would
impinge on the “freedom of conscience” guaranteed to all the citizens of the country alike.”21

21
1977 SCR 611.

13
 PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly requested that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:

1. That the SLP is not maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution of Amphissa,
1950.

2. That the Section 340 and Section 498A of Amphissan Penal Code have been violated.

3. That the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2020 is
constitutionally valid.

And pass any such order, writ or direction as the Honorable Court deems fit and proper, for
this the Respondents shall duty bound pray.

ALL OF WHICH IS MOST RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

14