Compufers & Svu~tures Vol. 53. No. 2. pp. 343-350.

1994
Elsevier Science Ltd
Pergamon 00457949(94)E0206-H Pnnted in Great Britain.
0045-7949/94s7.w + 0.00

SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION

LINE TOWERS

M. J. Alamt and A. R. Santhakumarj§

TDepartment of Civil Engineering, Bangladesh Institute of Technology, Chittagong-4349, Bangladesh
IDepartment of Civil Engineering, Anna University, Madras-600 025, India

(Received 30 June 1993)

Abstract-Even though methods to estimate system reliability are being studied extensively, the practical
inclusion of system reliability at the level of complex structures has not received much attention. In this
paper, an attempt has been made to implement the system reliability theories and methods with respect
to the transmission line tower using second-order bounding and equivalent linear safety margin
approaches. The paper also discusses important issues related to the non-linear forcedeformation
behaviour of the tower members under buckling failure. The critical safety margins (failable members)
are identified by automatic failure mode generation by matrix formulation with the aid of the member
replacement technique. A complete computer program has been automated to compute the reliability of
transmission towers. Practical towers used to assess the reliability and illustrate the effectiveness of the
methods lead to the adaptation of a system-based reliability analysis procedure.

1. lNTRODUCTION based reliability method which incorporates some

line-based system reliability concepts indirectly [3].
In recent years, there has been a continuous develop-
This paper describes the system reliability analysis
ment of system reliability theories and methods
methods, namely the second-order bounding tech-
capable of analysing large complex structural sys-
nique and equivalent linear safety margin with re-
tems [l]. Even though methods to estimate system
spect to latticed transmission line towers. A brief
reliability are being developed and studied exten-
introduction to the modelling of the tower elements,
sively [2], the practical inclusion of system reliability
tower system and loading responses is given with
to the design of complex systems has not received
respect to the fundamental structural systems. Atten-
much attention. The new generation of reliability-
tion is focused on the idealizations/restrictions
based structural design methods, which have been
that have been imposed by the methods applied
proposed in recent years, for transmission line struc-
on the structural models. Importance is given to
tures [3,4] are essentially component-based, and do
the semi-brittle model of the non-linear force-
not take full advantage of the advances in structural
deformation relation of component failure under
system reliability. There is no direct control, however,
buckling while using the member replacement tech-
of the reliability of a complete structure. The system
nique to identify the critical failable members. The
level reliability of the structure with respect to the
complete system reliability analysis of a transmission
initial failure of any of the structural members is less
tower is composed of four steps: linear structural
than (or equal to) the component reliability. Thus, as
analysis, estimation of component (element) re-
regards initial failure, system effects due to the mul-
liability, automatic identification of critical failable
tiple failure modes reduce the system reliability as
members with their safety margins and system re-
compared to the component reliability. However, a
liability analysis.
redundant structure can be quite safe after an initial
The main computer module SYSRELIA developed
failure mode. System effects due to redundancy or
in FORTRAN 77 for the evaluation of the system
reserve strength thus increase the reliability with
reliability of towers incorporating the above two
respect to the initial failure of any component, and
perhaps even as compared to the component re- methods, uses the exportable output of the linked
liability. Keeping this view in mind, the International module COMRELIA. The linked module
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) has proposed a COMRELIA was used to calculate the component
system level reliability approach for the design of reliability indices and direction cosines of the safety
transmission line structures [5]. The ASCE Trans- margin for each tower member [6]. The identification
mission Line Loading Guide describes a component- of most failable members (critical members) has been
carried out using the computer program STAT-I [7].
The program TLTOWER has been used to find out
QAuthor to whom correspondence should be addressed. the probabilistic loadings and load effects on each

CAS 53/2-H 343

344 M. J. Alam and A R. Santhakumar
member using the IEC and ASCE recommended
loads and loading conditions [8].
2. STRUCTURAL SYSTEM RELIABILITY MODELS
At the present stage of probability calculation
techniques, a formulation in terms of a functional
relationship between the load history and the state of
the structural system is not practicable for life size
structures. Simplifications are obtained if the system
state at each point in time depends only on the
present values of the physical variables. Further
simplifications are, of course, achieved if the re-
liability problem can be described by a fixed surface
in load space. Two important types of such models
are the limit state surface of a time-independent
elastic structural system with respect to initial failure
(first non-elastic behaviour) and the limit state sur-
face corresponding to the plastic collapse of a rigid
ideal plastic structural system.
However, it is only for reliability models of the
random variable type that a practicable calculation of
the reliability is presently possible for large reliability
problems, i.e. problems described by, say, at least a
100 basic variables. Thus, in order to deal with large
size structures, formulations in terms of random
variables are preferred. The limitations on the capa-
bility of present reliability calculation methods intro-
duce a number of idealizations in structural system
reliability formulations. Important idealizations are
as follows.
Mechanical model for tower element
The structural system is described by a discrete
model in which local failure may take place only in
a finite number of points. The structure is assembled
by a number of members, each of which is assumed
to behave according to some load-deformation
model. In Fig. 1, typical loadcleformation behaviour
for truss elements are shown. In most system re-
liability models the strengths are assumed random,
whereas the geometry and stiffness are deterministic.
FORCE KOMPRESSION)
A
V 7 FORCE (TENSION)
FORCE ITENSION)
(a) OENERAL MODEL (b) WCTILE
Fig. 1. Typical force-deformation
Finally, in many system reliability models the struc-
tural elements are replaced by forces at the failure of
the element. Often this implies that unloading of
failed elements is not accounted for. In the present
study, ideal plastic (ductile) force-deformation for
tension failure members and semi-brittle non-linear
force-deformation for compression failure under
buckling are taken into consideration for the tower
elements. The value of the post-buckling reduction
factor (q) depends on the slenderness ratio of the
member and suggested values of q range from 0.5, for
a ratio of 150, to 0.35, for a ratio of 75 [9] and are
incorporated in the present analysis while using the
member replacement technique.
Limit state
The states of the structure are classified into safe
states and failure states. Different criteria for this can
be applied. Failure of a structure is characterized
according to (1) the type, (2) the extent, and (3) the
cause of the failure. Each of the criteria may be quite
idealized. The term system reliability models refers
usually to models of failure involving several struc-
tural elements. Of course, initial failure also has an
important system reliability aspect, as mentioned in
the introduction.
Load model
As compared to element (component) level struc-
tural reliability where a worst case loading situation
can be established for each element, a corresponding
concept is not natural for a complete structural
system. Different load patterns, directions, etc., must
be taken into account and for each failure mode a
worst (extreme) loading situation may be set up.
Response
Only static system reliability analyses have been
performed as regards to the progressive failure of
structures with random properties. As regards initial
failure, some dynamic analyses for deterministic sys-
tems have been carried out under special conditions,
FORCE (COMPRESSION)
v FORCE (TENSION)
k) SEMI-
AN0 BRITTLE MODEL BRITTLE MODEL
behaviour of truss elements.
 System reliability analysis of transmission line towers
such as broken wire conditions, to get the critical
responses of the system.
System model
The modelling used here is based on the assump-
tion that the total reliability of the structural system
can be sufficiently accurately estimated by consider-
ing a finite number of failure modes as dominating
and then combining them in complex system re-
liability theories. It is assumed that structures consist
of a finite number of elements and that these struc-
tural elements are connected by a finite number of
joints. For each of the structural elements a number
of different failure modes exist and system failure will
in general only occur when a number of element
failures occur simultaneously. A transmission tower
structure, in a conservatively theoretical sense, can be
taken as a parallel system (redundant), although
strictly speaking, it falls somewhere in between the
series (non-redundant) and parallel types. For
example, consider the situation where, for some
reason or other, the main supporting leg of the tower
collapses and the event is theoretically descriptive of
a total failure, and a series type, though in reality
such a thing rarely happens. A parallel classification
can be modelled as a transmission tower failure
occurs only at a limit state defined by many members
reaching theirs. In the present case, towers are mod-
elled as a series system consisting of the primary
members alone. With this assumption, the failure of
any primary component in the tower is assumed to
cause the failure of the tower where the components
are failure modes and failure modes are modelled as
parallel systems.
Probability calculation
The calculation of the exact reliability correspond-
ing to a selected model for the limit state behaviour
of a structural system must, in general, be determined
within some approximation. Bounding techniques,
failure tree analysis, equivalent safety margin analy-
sis, etc., can be used for reliability evaluation of large
complex systems. However, in many cases, approxi-
mate results obtained by FORM/SORM or by con-
sidering some approximate event formulation must
be introduced to calculate a reliability measure. In the
present study, the failure mode approach (FMA) has
been implemented by two methods, namely the
bounding technique and the equivalent safety margin
method.
3. FIRST-ORDER LINEAR ELASTIC ANALYSIS
In structural analysis, the actual complex structure
and loading are modelled mathematically, using sev-
eral simplifying assumptions. In the analysis of a
transmission tower, the non-linear (second order)
effect (geometric) is not taken into consideration
and the tower is analysed as a space truss.
Moments produced by the continuity of members are
345
generally not considered since each leg mem-
ber/segment is assumed pinned between two joints.
Redundant members are not included in the analysis
since they have very little effect on the forces in the
load-carrying members.
The loadings on the transmission towers are con-
sidered probabilistically under an extreme value dis-
tribution of the wind. The load criteria which govern
the critical member/component load effects are fully
based on IEC recommendations and ASCE manu-
als [3, 5, lo]. Thus the transfer model from wind
speed to wind load in addition to other loads has been
automated in the computer program TLTOWER [8].
4. ELEMENT LEVEL RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
In order to avoid lengthly expressions, a brief
overview of the component level reliability analysis is
given based on the extreme type-1 distribution (non-
normal) and normal distribution for strength. The
failure of a component with random strength R and
subjected to a random load effect Q can be
represented by the event
R-Q<O. (1)
Again, we can write eqn (1) as
R - F[WIND] < 0, (2)
where F[ .] represents a complicated function, not
available analytically. Equation (2) can be rewritten
as
g[R, WIND] < 0, (3)
where g[ . ] is a function of the two variables con-
sidered. The failure of a component is therefore
equivalent to the function g[ .] taking zero or nega-
tive values. g[ .] is called the failure function. The
design point technique is a numerical procedure for
calculating the probability that g[ .] becomes nega-
tive. The details of this technique is described else-
where [ll]. COMRELIA is a component reliability
analysis program which uses the design point method
(DPM) [6]. It is capable of performing component
reliability analysis or the design of any type of
transmission structural component made of steel and
subjected to any type of loading as per IEC rec-
ommendations and ASCE loading guides [5, lo]. The
output of the program COMRELIA gives the re-
liability indices with the direction cosines at the
design point and can be exported to the main com-
puter module SYSRELIA to compute the system
reliability of a transmission line tower.
5. IDENTIFICATION OF CRITICAL FAILABLE MEMBERS
(MEMBER REPLACEMENT PROCEDURE)
For complex structural systems, the total number
of mechanically possible failure modes and sequences
346 M. J. Alam and A. R. Santhakumar
is very large, but only a small fraction of these are
likely to occur and a crucial step in the process is to
identify the most-likely-to-occur modes and se-
quences. Currently, matrix formation with member
replacement technique is available that can efficiently
help to identify these modes. The failure criteria of a
statically indeterminate truss structure are systemati-
cally generated by using a matrix method [12]. In the
case of a highly statically redundant structure, failure
in any one member does not necessarily result in
structural failure. Structural failure is defined to
occur when the structure is turned into a mechanism.
A failure mode is generated as in the following
manner. When any one member fails, redistribution
of the internal forces arise among the members in
survival and the member next to fail is determined.
After repeating the similar process, structural failure
results when the member upto some specified number
Pk, e.g., members r,, r2, , and rpk are lost. The
formation of a mechanism is determined by investi-
gating the singularity of the total structural system
stiffness matrix [K’Pk’]formed with (n - Pk) members
in survival. That is, a criterion for structural system
failure is given by
1[IP’] I = 0,
where I[. ]I = the determinant of a matrix [ .I.
Now introduce the expression for the safety margins
for the members in survival after some members are
in failure. For instance, when members r,, rz.. , tower. Both the methods are based on a first-order
and r,, have failed, their stiffness matrices are put
to zero and their post-failure strengths are applied to
the nodes as artificial forces, corresponding to the
type of failure. When a member of a ductile material
fails in tension, the yield strength of the member
is taken as the residual or post failure strength while
for a semi-brittle material failing in compression, the
post failure strength is some percentage of the ulti-
mate strength of the element. The post-buckling
reduction factor (r~) used here is as in [9]. Then, a
stress analysis of the structure is carried out once
again by using the matrix method, and the internal
forces of the members in survival are determined as
follows:
S,(r,,r2,...,rp)= i &jL,(P)+ C h,R,,
/=I q = i.j
where suffix (r,, r2,. , r,,) denotes a set of failed
members and the sequential order of failure. Conse-
quently. the safety margins are given by
Z,(r,,r* ,.... r,,)bC,.,A,-S,(r,,r2,...,rp).
Structural system failure occurs when all of the Pk
members, e.g., r,, r2,. . and r,,, are subjected to
failure. Hence, a criterion for structural system failure
can be also expressed by using the safety margins of
the failed members:
Z,(rl,rz ,..., r,_,)<O @=1,2...P,). (7)
The automatic generation of failure modes or
identification of the most failable members for the
tower has been done using the SPACE TRUSS
ANALYST program (STAT-I) [7]. This is a first-
order elastic space truss analysis program incorporat-
ing the member replacement technique.
6. SYSTEM LEVEL RELIABILITY OF TRANSMISSION
TOWER
The system failure event may be formulated as the
union and/or intersection of individual events, the
latter corresponding to the failure of a component or
a failure of the system. The union of events is used
in a series system, where the system fails if any of its
component fails or any of the potential failure modes
occurs. On the other hand, the intersection of events
is used in a parallel system, where the system fails
only if all its constituent components fail. It is not
uncommon for practical structures to exhibit the
behaviour of a combination of series and parallel. In
(4) the present investigation, the tower system considered
as a series system and the two approximate methods
namely the equivalent hyperplane method and second
order Ditlevsen’s bounds method have been applied
to compute system reliability of the transmission
approach and the only difference is in the compu-
tations of the probability of a union of events. In the
equivalent hyperplane method, an equivalent hyper-
plane approximating the system failure surface is
obtained while in the Ditlevsen’s bounds method, an
upper and a lower bound to the system failure
probability are obtained. The main features of the
methods are discussed below.
6.1. Second-order Ditlevsen’s bounds method
In this method, the method of second-order
bounds, Ditlevsen’s bounds [13] are used to estimate
the system reliability. The bounds for the probability
of the union of events, say Ai, i = 1, n, can be given
in terms of the probability of each event and the
pairwise intersections. The expressions for the lower
(5)
and upper bounds are respectively:
II (8)
+ i 0, P(A,) - 2 P(A,fl A,)
,=2 iQi
(6)
P
 System ~~iabj~ity analysis of transmission line towers 347

MAIN SYSTEM ANALYSIS PROGRAM DITLEVSEN’S BOUNDING AND

~~~~LENT MARGIN METHOD UXWJTE THE RELlABtLlfY OF

A STRUCTURAL AND LOAD ELASTIC ANALYSIS TO CALCULATE

MEMBER LOAD PROBABILISTICALLY USING IEC AND LOADINGS AND
COMBINATION FOR OVERHEAD TRANSMISSION

SPACE STRUCTURAL IS A ANALYSIS PROGRAM THE

MEMBER TECHNIQUE TO THE MOST FAILABLE MEMBERS THE
STRUCTURE

RELIABILITY ANALYSIS USING THE POlNT METHOD MI

ALGORITHM
2. Schematic of program the system analysis.

The depend on the order in which the
events are considered. It is recommended that the
events be arranged in the order of increasing re-
liability to produce narrower bounds [14]. The pair-
wise intersections of events are calculated using the
bivariate normal cumulative density function (CDF)
using the correlations calculated as:
Pij = {ailTIaj)9
where {ui) is the vector of direction cosines for the
failure hyperplane for component i, aI that of com-
ponent j and p,, the correlation between the safety
margins of components i and j.
indices and p is the correlation matrix of the com-
ponent safety margins. Again, we can write from eqn
(12) as in [14]:
The following procedure is used in this method:
(10)
(i) The direction cosines and the reliability indices
of the most critical failable components are arranged
in order of increasing reliability.
(ii) Equivalent linear safety margins for the union
of pairs of most critical failable components are

6.2. Equivalent linear safety margin method

As mentioned earlier, many lattice transmission
towers can be modelled as series systems consisting of 1 7.62m
the primary members alone. With this assumption,
the failure of any primary component in the tower is
assumed to cause the failure of the tower. The system
probability of failure is the union of the events of t
s.lem
component failures. The probability of failure of a
tower, prScan be expressed as using the linear tangent
hy~~lanes defining the failure of the components
t
calculated using the computer program COMRELIA
wem
as:
34.15 m
,,

pfS=P
[i~,(hYW+-Bi~~”
1y (11) I T

where [a,) is the vector of direction cosines for the

failure hyperplane for component i (from the output M-06 m 1
of COMRELIA), {Z} is the vector of basic random s !blem
variables in standard normal space and pi is the
reliability index for component i (from the output of
COMRELIA). Equation (11) can be simplified to:

Pr,=I--n(&Pk (12)

where, @,( * ) is the CDF of the multivariate standard

normal distribution, /3 is the vector of reliability Fig. 3. A 230 kV double circuit medium angle tower.
348 M. J. Alam and A. R. Santhakumar

(0) (b) (C) Cd)

Fig. 4. Tower with primary member tags.

found. The pairs are: components 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, those components are considered ((n - 1)/2 pairs + 1,
etc. The reliability index p’ of the union of the failures if n is odd), and n/2 equivalent linear safety margins
of critical components i and j failure is obtained as are determined. These n/2 hyperplanes can be paired
follows: again and combined with n/4 hyperplanes. The re-
sulting single linear safety margin represents the
B’ = -@-‘fl - @2(BirBj; Pij)l, (14) failure of the tower. The probability of failure of the
tower is then @[-/I’].
where /I, and 8, are the reliability indices of the The main computer program SYSRELIA uses the
components i andj and pij the correlation between the above two methods to perform a system reliability
safety margins of components i and j. analysis. The reliability indices and their direction
(iii) In the initial operation, if there are n critical cosines used in this program are important from the
failable components in the structure, n/2 pairs of output of COMRELIA. The schematic layout of the

Table I. Member groups with their statistical strength properties

Nominal Mean Nominal Mean
strength strength strength in strength in
Member Members Section in camp. in camp. tension tension
group in group (mm x mm x mm) W)- W)- (W (W
14 55 x 55 x 5 29.47 38.78 68.90 90.66
5-12 70 x 70 x 5 38.62 52.13 88.90 116.97
13-24 90 x 90 x 8 106.42 140.02 180.60 237.63
25-36 110x 110x 10 189.64 249.52 275.62 362.66
37-40 110x 110x 10 212.67 279.83 275.62 362.66
41-44 130 x 130 x 12 320.05 421.11 390.60 513.95
4548 150 x 150 x 12 384.43 505.82 453.60 596.84
8 49&l 50 x 50 x 5 25.66 33.76 62.34 82.02
9 65-88 55 x 55 x 5 31.68 41.68 68.90 90.66
10 89-112 65 x 65 x 5 35.80 47.10 82.03 107.93
11 113-120 75 x 75 x 6 58.73 77.27 113.40 149.21
12 121-128 65 x 65 x 5 31.87 41.93 82.03 107.93
13 129-136 70 x 70 x 5 33.98 44.71 88.90 116.97
14 137-160 50 x 50 x 5 24.55 32.30 62.34 82.02
15 161-172 50 x 50 x 5 13.40 17.63 62.34 82.02
16 173-180 65 x 65 x 5 17.13 22.54 68.90 90.66
17 181-188 70 x 70 x 5 18.04 23.74 88.90 116.97
18 189-194 50 x 50 x 5 12.77 16.80 62.34 82.02
 System reliability analysis of ~nsmission line towers 349

program SYSRELIA with its auxillary programs and Insulator string length = 2500 mm
routines comprising the structural system reliability Insulator string weight =12OON
analysis package is presented in Fig. 2. No. of insulator discs = 13.

7. EXAMPLE The primary member tags of the tower are as

The tower shown in Fig. 3 is a medium angle steel
lattice transmission tower and part of an existing
230 kV line [15]. The specifications of the line and
tower are given as:
Type
Angle of deviation
Normal span
Mean wind pressure on
tower
Mean wind pressure on
conductor/earthwire
Earthwire data
Diameter of earth wire
Area of earth wire
Weight per metre run
Ultimate tensile strength
Maximum working tension
Young’s modulus of
elasticity
Coefficient of thermal
expansion
Conductor data
Diameter of conductor
Area of conductor
Weight per metre run
Ultimate tensile strength
Maximum working tension
Young’s modulus of
elasticity
Coefficient of thermal
expansion
Insulator data
Insulator skirt diameter
Insulator skirt diameter
shown in Fig. 4. The members of the tower are
grouped with respect to their sectional properties and
are tabulated along with the nominal and mean
strengths in Table 1. The nominal strengths of the
steel angle members are calculated using the formulae
in [lo, 161.
= Double circuit The inffuence coefficients were obtained by first
medium angle order linear structural analysis under different load-
=30” ing conditions. Accordingly, component load effects
=350m were obtained using the computer program
= 1400 N/m* TLTOWER. A detailed description of the
TLTOWER is given eisewhere[8]. The governing
=410 N/m2 load considered is wind load at a probabilistic ex-
treme annual mean wind speed of 25 m/set at the site
of tower for a 50 years return period at optimum risk
level of 0.63, having a coefficient of variation, (COV)
= 10.65 mm of 0.17 following Extreme type I distribution [17].
= 74 mm2 During the reliability analysis of members, due to the
= 5.45 N/m transfer model of wind speed to load effect, the COV
=62,510 N for the wind load effect on members was taken as
= 25,000 N double of that of the wind speed [18].
= 19,330,OOON/cm2 The reliability indices of the tower components
were calculated using the program COMRELIA and
=0.0000115/“c a summary of the output according to the member
grouping is tabulated in Table 2, mentioning the
critical loading conditions. Results from Table 2
indicate that the leg members are most critical due to
= 26.797 mm broken wire loading conditions and these member
=423.57 mm* groups will contribute substantially to the total sys-
= 12.76 N/m tem failure of the tower, followed by the diagonals
=95,100 N and bracings. The buckling failure under com-
= 38,040 N pression governs the failure of most of the failable
= 7,570,OOON/m2 members. In most cases, there is a member that has
the lowest safety index. However, there are a few
= o.oooo21sl/0c notable exceptions. The governing members are
assumed to be the leg members, although some
diagonals and bracings have a somewhat tower safety
index. This ass~ption was made because
= 254 mm buckling of the leg member will definitely result in a
= 254 mm collapse of the tower, whereas the buckling of the

Table 2. Critical members with governing load and failure sequences

Member tag Failure sequence with most Governing load
Members range critical failable members cases
Leg/body l-48 39-+35+23-r 11 Broken wire conditions
verticals
Diagonals 49-l 12 85-93-69 Broken wire conditions

Diagonal 113-136 117-+125-+133-t127+122-+130 Normal and broken wire

bracings condition

Cross 137-160 152~144-rl60-rl57~149~141 Normal and broken wire

bracings condition

Horizontal 161-188 18S-r176+188 Normal and broken wire

bracings condition
350 M. J. Alam and A. R. Santhakumar
Table 3. System reliability index or probability of failure of tower
System reliability index
Method
Equivalent safety margin
Ditlevsen’s bounds
diagonals/bracings may not lead to tower failure.
The reliability indices of critical failable members
and their directional cosines are obtained using
COMRELIA.
Before proce~ing to the system reliability evalu-
ation, program module STAT-I was used to identify
the most failable members using the member replace-
ment technique and correspondingly the safety indi-
ces with their direction cosines were identified and
calculated to formulate the safety margins of each
most failable member to process further for system
reliability evaluation.
Using the main module SYSRELIA the system
reliability index and corresponding system failure
probability of the sample transmission tower are
found as shown in Table 3. From Table 3 it can be
noted that the system reliability index according to
both the bounding technique and the equivalent
safely margin method are more or less the same. The
failure return periods of the sample tower are calcu-
lated as 56 years and 42 years respectively. But the
return period considered was 50 years. So for the
bound technique, the tower system is somehow mar-
ginal.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this investigation is to demon-
strate the applicability of recent ‘state of the art’
system reliability analysis techniques to practical
design problems such as those encountered in the
design of overhead transmission line structures.
More precisely, the ASCE guidelines for trans-
mission line loading emphasizes the two factors,
namely CRF (component reliability factor) and LRF
(line reliability factor), without giving much weight to
the system reliability of a tower which depends on a
series of factors such as type of system considered
(series or parallel). non-linear force-deformation be-
haviour of members in compression under buckling
failure, methods chosen to calculate component and
system reliabilities, correlation between member re-
sistances, correlation between component failure
events and so on. In the present study, all these
factors have been taken into consideration to show
the applicability of the methods in practice. The
methods considered here can be used confidently
for overhead towers to find the system reliability
and then to compare with the target system reli-
ability factor for a more reliable and engineered
transmission line design.
System probability of
fB..1 failure (P,)
2.10 1.786 x IO-’
1.98 2.385 x IO-’
REFERENCES
1. A. Karamchandani, Structural system reliability analy-
sis methods. Report No. 83, John A. Blume Earthquake
Engineering Center, Department of Civil Engineering,
Stanford University. July (1987).
2. A. Karamchandani. F. Y. Guenard and K. Ortiz,
SHASYS, a software package for component and
system reliability analysis. Report No. 78, Department
of Civil Engineering. Stanford University, May
( 1986).
3, ASCE, Committee on Electrical Transmission Struc-
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