7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.

org/tools/scmh
The following DFMEA excerpt is for the design of a simple a machined Fuel-Air
Bracket that forms part of an assembly. This example is intentionally aligned with
the Case Study on the same part that is covered in AS13004 (Process Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (PFMEA) and Control Plans), in order to show the linkage
between the DFMEA and PFMEA processes.

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev.
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.
ope and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)
 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh
Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
✘

Classification
Actual Action Action Action Action
Doc (Line) SEV *
Item Function Requirement Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Prevention Controls OCC Current Detection Controls DET RPN Recommended Action(s) Responsibility Target Date Actions Taken & Results Completion Results Results Results Results
# OCC
Date SEV OCC DET RPN

This line item is an example where the action has been

1 Fuel Air Bracket
completed. The "Action Results SEV", "Action Results OCC",
"Action Results DET', and "Action Results RPN" are
documenting actual improvements.
Increased high cycle fatigue Bracket design standard work
Tube Conduct high cycle fatigue
stresses on fuel tube, early document XYZ (2)
Prevent excessive Test - Engine XYX durability locating and tube wear analyses at Note that the SEV and DET scores did not change, the action
Fuel tube lateral motion constrained Fuel tube lateral motion > x fuel tube cracking, part leaks, Tube locating hole allowable diameter DD Month
lateral motion of 10 6 testing with post-test 8 60 480 hole RSS worst-case Person T In progress Not done 10 2 8 160 was to improve the preventative controls which reduced the
to < x mm mm resulting in fuel leak leading defined as too large Analysis - tube high cycle fatigue YYYY
fuel tube # XYZ hardware inspections (8) diameter combination of max hole ID, OCC score.
to fire, explosion or safety and wear / chafing (conducted at
- 1KC min tube OD.
hazard (10) nominal dimensions only) (6)
The tube locating hole diameter has been preliminarly defined
as a key characteristic and noted in the "Classification"
column. When the action is complete the KC detemination can
be re-evaluated

2 Fuel Air Bracket
Materials thermal expansion Conduct thermal growth Completed. Thermal growth This line item is an example where the action has been
property database (both bracket analysis for tube / bracket analysis at worst-case completed. The "Action Results SEV", "Action Results OCC",
Increased high cycle fatigue and tube are standard materials) hole at RSS worst-case combination of max hole ID, "Action Results DET', and "Action Results RPN" are
stresses on fuel tube, early combination of max hole ID, min tube OD shows minimum documenting actual improvements.
Prevent excessive Test - Engine XYX durability
Fuel tube lateral motion constrained Fuel tube lateral motion > x fuel tube cracking, part leaks, Bracket thermal growth defined as > Bracket design standard work min tube OD. DD Month risk of iduced tube stress. DD Month
lateral motion of 10 4 testing with post-test 8 40 320 None Person X 10 2 4 80
to < x mm mm resulting in fuel leak leading tube thermal growth document XYZ (2) YYYY YYYY Note that the SEV score did not change. The defined actions
fuel tube # XYZ hardware inspections (8)
to fire, explosion or safety Conduct accelerated stress Accelrated testing at worst addressed both the preventative controls and the detection
hazard (10) Analysis - Components thermal test to determine limits of case hole ID/tube OD controls..
growth (conducted at nominal max hole ID, min tube OD configration confirmed
dimensions only) (4) configuration analytical results.

Increased bending loads on

3 Fuel Air Bracket
fuel tube and fuel tube fittings, Fuel tube system tolerance
This line item is an example where the decision was made that
Apply minimal early fuel tube cracking stackup analysis (2)
Tube locating hole positional variation Engine XYX build process will no action would be assigned. The risk was determined to be
lateral static loads Lateral static load < X N Lateral static load > X N and/or fitting failures. Tube / 10 2 6 20 120 None None (deemed ALARP) N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 2 6 120
callout error detect (6) "As low as reasonably possible" (ALARP). Therefore, the
to fuel tube # XYZ fitting leaks, resulting in fuel Bracket design standard work
scoring did not change.
leak leading to fire, explosion document XYZ (2)
or safety hazard (10)

4 0 0 0
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59 0 0 0

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.

07:13:24 07/12/2021 3 of 24
 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh

The following DFMEA partial example is for an oil tube mounted on the exterior case of a turbofan engine. It is par
one of the main shaft bearings of the engine. While the excerpt here covers only a couple of failure modes for the
DFMEA might also include the end fittings and seals, as well as any mounting brackets or clamps (unless those item
DFMEA).

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev.
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.
 of a turbofan engine. It is part of the oil supply system to
ouple of failure modes for the tube itself, a complete
s or clamps (unless those items were covered by a separate

Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)

 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh

Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

✘

Classification
Actual Action Action Action Action
Doc (Line) Potential Cause(s) of Current Prevention Current Detection SEV *
Item Function Requirement Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure SEV OCC DET RPN Recommended Action(s) Responsibility Target DateActions Taken & ResultsCompletion Results Results Results Results
# Failure Controls Controls OCC
Date SEV OCC DET RPN

Oil leakage from tube results

in reduced oil delivery to
bearing X. Increased bearing
distress, increased debris
generation detected by oil This line item is an example where the action has not
Mounting bracket
debris monitoring system On Engine Test # NNN, add been completed. The "Action Results SEV", "Action
Contain oil over spacing selected as
Does not contain oil at up would lead to early engine Standard Design strain gauges to critical Results OCC", "Action Results DET', and "Action Results
full range of Contain oil at up to X too far apart -
to X kPag / T C, or over removal from service (7) Document # XYZ (2) Engine Test # XXX tubes to measure actual DD Month DD Month RPN" are all projected improvements. Once completed,
1 Oil Tube engine operating kPag / T C over design 8 insufficient tube 4 9 32 288 None Person X Not completed 8 4 7 224
design life of Y operating Tube HCF Analysis (9) loads, confirm stress YYYY YYYY the actual changes will be recorded.
conditions, design life of Y operating hours support.
hours In extreme, could result in per ABC tool (4) models and adequacy of
life
engine IFSD if oil leakage support design. Note that the SEV and OCC scores did not change, the
rate is severe (8). action was to improve the detection.

Not expected to result in core

compartment fire (no hot
surfaces near this tube)

Oil leakage from tube results

in reduced oil delivery to
bearing X. Increased bearing
distress, increased debris
generation detected by oil
debris monitoring system Standard Design
Contain oil over
Does not contain oil at up would lead to early engine Document # XYZ (2)
full range of Contain oil at up to X Tube minimum None - no tests of This line item is an example where the decision was
to X kPag / T C, or over removal from service (7) Tube FEA
2 Oil Tube engine operating kPag / T C over design 8 allowable bend radius 2 min radius 10 16 160 None None N/A N/A N/A 8 2 10 160 made that no action would be assigned. Therefore, the
design life of Y operating conducted at
conditions, design life of Y operating hours defined as too small hardware (10) scoring did not change.
hours In extreme, could result in minimum bend
life
engine IFSD if oil leakage radius (2)
rate is severe (8).

Not expected to result in core

compartment fire (no hot
surfaces near this tube)

Oil leakage from tube results

in reduced oil delivery to
bearing X. Increased bearing This line item is an example where the action has been
distress, increased debris completed. The "Action Results SEV", "Action Results
generation detected by oil OCC", "Action Results DET', and "Action Results RPN"
debris monitoring system Standard Design are documenting actual improvements.
Contain oil over Perform FEA on min wall
Does not contain oil at up would lead to early engine Tube minimum Document # XYZ (2) KC -
full range of Contain oil at up to X None - no tests of thickness tube to Completed. Part has
to X kPag / T C, or over removal from service (7) allowable wall Tube FEA Tube DD Month DD Month Note that the SEV and DET scores did not change, the
3 Oil Tube engine operating kPag / T C over design 8 6 min thickness 10 48 480 demonstrate design Person Y X% margin to 8 2 10 160
design life of Y operating thickness defined as conducted at thicknes YYYY YYYY action was to improve the preventative controls which
conditions, design life of Y operating hours hardware (10) capability at allowable containment, life.
hours In extreme, could result in too thin nominal wall s reduced the OCC score.
life extremes
engine IFSD if oil leakage thickness (6)
rate is severe (8). The tube thickness has been defined as a key
characteristic and noted in the "Classification" column.
Not expected to result in core This information is to be transfered to the PFMEA.
compartment fire (no hot
surfaces near this tube)

Oil leakage from tube results

in reduced oil delivery to
bearing X. Increased bearing
distress, increased debris
This line item is an example where the action has not
generation detected by oil
Standard Design been completed. The "Action Results SEV", "Action
debris monitoring system
Contain oil over Document # XYZ (2) Perform crack growth Results OCC", "Action Results DET', and "Action Results
Does not contain oil at up would lead to early engine
full range of Contain oil at up to X Tube crack growth None - no tests of modeling with 2X allowable RPN" are all projected improvements. Once completed,
to X kPag / T C, or over removal from service (7) Allowable flaw size DD Month
4 Oil Tube engine operating kPag / T C over design 8 modeling conducted 3 flawed hardware 10 24 240 None flaw size in critical location Person Z In Progress 8 2 10 160 the actual changes will be recorded.
design life of Y operating defined as too large YYYY
conditions, design life of Y operating hours with maximum (10) to demonstrate design
hours In extreme, could result in
life allowable flaw size robustness Note that the SEV and DET scores did not change, the
engine IFSD if oil leakage
in critical location (3) action was to improve the preventative controls which
rate is severe (8).
reduced the OCC score.
Not expected to result in core
compartment fire (no hot
surfaces near this tube)

Oil leakage from tube results

in reduced oil delivery to
bearing X. Increased bearing
distress, increased debris
Include pressure sensor in This line item is an example where the action has not
generation detected by oil
oil loop during Rig Test # been completed. The "Action Results SEV", "Action
debris monitoring system
Contain oil over Standard Design XYZ and Engine Test # Results OCC", "Action Results DET', and "Action Results
Does not contain oil at up would lead to early engine Oil pump-induced
full range of Contain oil at up to X Document # XYZ (2) YYY to measure actual RPN" are all projected improvements. Once completed,
to X kPag / T C, or over removal from service (7) cyclic pressure loading Engine Test # XXX DD Month
4 Oil Tube engine operating kPag / T C over design 8 Standard gear pump 6 9 48 432 None pump pressure pulses. Person Q Not completed 8 3 6 144 the actual changes will be recorded.
design life of Y operating higher than expected (9) YYYY
conditions, design life of Y operating hours ripple assumptions
hours In extreme, could result in (higher than modeled)
life (6) Adjust tube life models to Note that the SEV score did not change. The defined
engine IFSD if oil leakage
reflect measured pressure actions are directed to improve the preventative controls
rate is severe (8).
pulse data. and the detection controls.
Not expected to result in core
compartment fire (no hot
surfaces near this tube)

Increased flow resistance,

reduced oil delivery to bearing Oil system pressure
X. Increased bearing distress, drop calculation
Impart minimal Minimum allowable None - no tests of This line item is an example where the decision was
Contributes total Contributes total increased debris generation standard method #
5 Oil Tube pressure drop to 6 tube ID defined as too 3 min ID hardware 10 18 180 None None N/A N/A N/A 6 3 10 180 made that no action would be assigned. Therefore, the
pressure drop < X kPag pressure drop > X kPag detected by oil debris XXX conducted at
oil supply system small (10) scoring did not change.
monitoring system would lead RSS extreme
to early engine removal from tolerance (3)
service. (6)

Increased flow resistance,

reduced oil delivery to bearing
X. Increased bearing distress,
Impart minimal Oil system pressure This line item is an example where the decision was
Contributes total Contributes total increased debris generation Total line pressure Engine Test # XXX
6 Oil Tube pressure drop to 6 drop calculation 1 9 6 54 None None N/A N/A N/A 6 1 9 54 made that no action would be assigned. Therefore, the
pressure drop < X kPag pressure drop > X kPag detected by oil debris drop excessive (9)
oil supply system standard method (1) scoring did not change.
monitoring system would lead
to early engine removal from
service. (6)

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07:13:24 07/12/2021 6 of 24
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57 0 0 0
58 0 0 0
59 0 0 0

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.

07:13:24 07/12/2021 7 of 24
 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh
Example of the DFMEA performed on a sub-system. In this case a fire extinguishing system on an engine

From the FAA document, "Fire Protection Systems"

The engines have their own fire extinguishing systems, which usually have a pair of fire extinguishing bottl
(Halon 1301 or Hydrofluorocompounds) to the engine.

The fire detection system from each engine displays the status in the cockpit, which warns of any engine f
is shut off and an explosive cartridge is fired in the fire extinguishing bottle, releasing the agent into the en
© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev.
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.
ng system on an engine

air of fire extinguishing bottles (or a pair for each engine), which supply extinguishing agent

which warns of any engine fire. In case the pilot pulls the fire handle, the fuel flow to the engine
easing the agent into the engine.
Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)
 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh
Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis

Classification
Doc (Line)
✘ SEV *
Actual Action Action Action
Item Function Requirement Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Prevention Controls OCC Current Detection Controls DET RPN Recommended Action(s) Responsibility Target Date Actions Taken & Results Completion Action Results
Results
SEV Results Results
# OCC
Date OCC DET RPN

Comments

Fire and Overheat

Detection System Load transferred into Vent pipe from
Support Fire-Ex Ventilation Inlet Pipe Stress Analysis -
Installation Ref xxxxxx Ventilation Compromised 8 Fire-Ex on activation is not considered 6 None Identified 10
Pipes undersupported Displacement
Routing and in design (missing requirement)
Support

16 48 480 Capture requirement N E One 5/31/2021 8 2 10 160 Missing requirement (load case) means prevention control (analysis) is weak.
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Pipe is under-supported by Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a Flexible Hose under-constrained Ensure during
Support Fire-Ex
Installation Ref xxxxxx chosen mounting fire 8 when in transportation configuration Existing experience/standards 6 None Identified 10 transportation hose is either
Pipes
Routing and arrangement leading to damage removed or stowed FMEA method identifies that consideration needed of transportation. Action addresses
13 Support 48 480 appropriately N E One 5/31/2021 8 2 10 160 risk.
Fire and Overheat
Fire and Overheat Detection
Detection System Support Fire and Rules from Fire and Overheat
Fire and Overheat Detection Loss of Fire Detection (8) Excessive clipping of the Firewire System fault detection in
Installation Overheat Ref xxxxxx 8 Detection System Supplier 2 6
System over-constrained leads to strain and breakage Control System during during
Routing and Detection System followed (2)
system degradation testing (6)
1 Support 16 96 none N/A N/A N/A 8 2 6 96
Fire and Overheat
Fire and Overheat Detection
Detection System Support Fire and Rules from Fire and Overheat
Fire and Overheat Detection Loss of Fire Detection (8) Insufficient clipping to support the System fault detection in
Installation Overheat Ref xxxxxx 8 Detection System Supplier 2 6
System Under Supported firewire in the design Control System during during
Routing and Detection System followed (2)
system degradation testing (6)
2 Support 16 96 none N/A N/A N/A 8 2 6 96
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Support Fire and Fire and Overheat Detection Detection of Fire Route of Fire and Overheat Detection Requirement clear from
Installation Overheat Ref xxxxxx System detection areas - compromised (8) 8 System does not achieve the Product System and Validated 1 Not Applicable - Prevented 1
Routing and Detection System coverage insufficient coverage required by Analysis (1)
3 Support 8 8 none N/A N/A N/A 8 1 1 8
Fire and Overheat
Accommodation of Door
Detection System Support Fire and Route does not allow for enough
Kinematics on Rear Core Loss of Fire Detection (8) Visually Observable During
Installation Overheat Ref xxxxxx 8 harness loop to accommodate door Digital Mock Up checks (3) 3 6
Zone Fire & Overheat Build (6)
Routing and Detection System opening
5 Detector insufficient 24 144 none N/A N/A N/A 8 3 6 144
Support
Fire and Overheat
Accommodation of Door
Detection System Support Fire and
Kinematics on Rear Core Loss of Fire Detection (8) Route does not allow for use of Known design point for
Installation Overheat Ref xxxxxx 8 1 Not Applicable - Prevented 1
Zone Fire & Overheat flexible harness at the transponder harness technology (1)
Routing and Detection System
7 Detector insufficient 8 8 none N/A N/A N/A 8 1 1 8
Support
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a
Support Fire-Ex Number of clipping points used on the Stress Analysis -
Installation Ref xxxxxx Pipes are over constrained fire 8 2 Engine Test 6
Pipes pipe is excessive Displacement
Routing and
9 Support 16 96 none N/A N/A N/A 8 2 6 96
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Pipe is under-supported by Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a
Support Fire-Ex Number of mounting points used for Stress Analysis -
Installation Ref xxxxxx chosen mounting fire 8 3 Engine Test 6
Pipes Pipes is insufficient Displacement
Routing and arrangement
10 Support 24 144 none N/A N/A N/A 8 3 6 144
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex
Contain Fire-Ex Pipe leaks/bursts - not Incorrect joint concept chosen - flange Read across from other
Installation Ref xxxxxx Compromised 6 7 None Identified 10
Agent contained doesn't seal application Risk that potential design error goes undetected - hence rig test included in
Routing and
35 Support 42 420 Test rig N E One 5/31/2021 6 7 5 210 programme.
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Pipe is under-supported by Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a Flexible Hose is too long which
Support Fire-Ex
Installation Ref xxxxxx chosen mounting fire 8 causes clips to fail under load when Digital Mock Up checks 2 None Identified 10
Pipes
Routing and arrangement Fire-Ex is activated
11 Support 16 160 none N/A N/A N/A 8 2 10 160
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex Clipping chosen does not adequately
Support Fire-Ex Orientation of hose end is
Installation Ref xxxxxx Compromised 6 constrain hose vector resulting in Digital Mock Up checks 2 Engine Test 8
Pipes under-constrained
Routing and clearances or tearing from strain
14 Support 12 96 none N/A N/A N/A 6 2 8 96
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex nozzles are too far from clipping
Support Fire-Ex
Installation Ref xxxxxx Nozzles are under supported Compromised 6 points and deflect when pressurised Digital Mock Up checks 2 None Identified 10
Pipes
Routing and under fire-ex activation
17 Support 12 120 none N/A N/A N/A 6 2 10 120
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex Clipping points are attached to
Support Fire-Ex
Installation Ref xxxxxx Pipe under-supported Compromised 6 scenery which is not static relative to Digital Mock Up checks 2 Engine Test 8
Pipes
Routing and the pipes
18 Support 12 96 none N/A N/A N/A 6 2 8 96
Fire and Overheat
Detection System
Transport Fire-Ex Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a Pipe route cant accommodate Stress Analysis -
Installation Ref xxxxxx Flow under-delivered 8 3 Engine Test 8
Agent fire movement Displacement
Routing and
20 Support 24 192 none N/A N/A N/A 8 3 8 192
Fire and Overheat
Detection System
Transport Fire-Ex Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a Pipe route has insufficient clearance Visually Observable During
Installation Ref xxxxxx Flow under-delivered 8 Digital Mock Up checks 3 6
Agent fire and breaks due to clashing/fretting Build
Routing and
22 Support 24 144 none N/A N/A N/A 8 3 6 144
Fire and Overheat
Detection System
Transport Fire-Ex Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a Pipe route has too much pressure
Installation Ref xxxxxx Flow under-delivered 8 Fluids Analysis 3 None Identified 10
Agent fire loss Risk that potential design error goes undetected - hence rig test included in
Routing and
24 Support 24 240 Test Rig N E One 5/31/2021 8 3 5 120 programme.
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex
Transport Fire-Ex Flow unevenly split between Pipe diameter selection creates
Installation Ref xxxxxx Compromised 6 Digital Mock Up checks 2 None Identified 10
Agent nozzles uneven distribution
Routing and
25 Support 12 120 none N/A N/A N/A 6 2 10 120
Fire and Overheat
Detection System
Transport Fire-Ex Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a Flexible Hose too long causing sumps
Installation Ref xxxxxx Pipe blocked 8 Digital Mock Up checks 2 Engine Test 8
Agent fire which lead to blockage
Routing and
26 Support 16 128 none N/A N/A N/A 8 2 8 128
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Geometry doesn't account for
Transport Fire-Ex Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a
Installation Ref xxxxxx Pipe blocked 8 orientation of engine leading to sumps Digital Mock Up checks 2 None Identified 10
Agent fire
Routing and and blockage
28 Support 16 160 none N/A N/A N/A 8 2 10 160
Fire and Overheat
Detection System
Transport Fire-Ex Fire-Ex fails to extinguish a Nozzles are pointed upwards at too
Installation Ref xxxxxx Pipe blocked 8 Digital Mock Up checks 2 Engine Test 8
Agent fire steep an angle, sumps and blockage
Routing and
29 Support 16 128 none N/A N/A N/A 8 2 8 128
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex
Contain Fire-Ex Pipe leaks/bursts - not Pipe route cant accommodate Stress Analysis -
Installation Ref xxxxxx Compromised 6 3 Engine Test 8
Agent contained movement and breaks Displacement
Routing and
30 Support 18 144 none N/A N/A N/A 6 3 8 144
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex
Contain Fire-Ex Pipe leaks/bursts - not Pipe route has insufficient clearance Visually Observable During
Installation Ref xxxxxx Compromised 6 Digital Mock Up checks 3 6
Agent contained and breaks due to clashing/fretting Build
Routing and
31 Support 18 108 none N/A N/A N/A 6 3 6 108
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex
Contain Fire-Ex Pipe leaks/bursts - not Incorrect sealing method chosen for Design Rules and Processes
Installation Ref xxxxxx Compromised 6 1 None Identified 10
Agent contained pylon joint for choosing seals
Routing and
33 Support 6 60 none N/A N/A N/A 6 1 10 60
Fire and Overheat Distribution of Fire-Ex
Detection System Compromised (6)
Deliver Fire-Ex Agent Delivered to Wrong Clear valid requirement from
Installation Ref xxxxxx Fire-Ex Agent Damages other 6 Nozzles Oriented in Wrong Direction 1 None Identified 10
Agent Area System specifying Orientation
Routing and Hardware (5)
36 Support 6 60 none N/A N/A N/A 6 1 10 60
Fire and Overheat Distribution of Fire-Ex
Detection System Compromised (6)
Deliver Fire-Ex Agent Delivered to Wrong Fire-Ex fails to bifurcate around the
Installation Ref xxxxxx Fire-Ex Agent Damages other 6 Digital Mock Up checks 3 None Identified 10
Agent Area heat shield (nozzle direction)
Routing and Hardware (5)
38 Support 18 180 none N/A N/A N/A 6 3 10 180
Fire and Overheat Distribution of Fire-Ex
Detection System Compromised (6) Re-use of pedigree design
Deliver Fire-Ex Agent Delivered to Wrong Nozzle geometry wrong leading to
Installation Ref xxxxxx Fire-Ex Agent Damages other 6 established and verified by 1 None Identified 10
Agent Area plume being too wide/too narrow
Routing and Hardware (5) test on prior project
39 Support 6 60 none N/A N/A N/A 6 1 10 60
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Distribution of Fire-Ex
Deliver Fire-Ex Nozzle plume runs through Keep out
Installation Ref xxxxxx Agent Under Delivered Compromised 6 Digital Mock Up checks 3 None Identified 10
Agent Zone
Routing and
40 Support 18 180 none N/A N/A N/A 6 3 10 180
Fire and Overheat
Detection System Fire-Ex Agent Damages other
Deliver Fire-Ex Heatshield damaged by Fire- Fire-Ex fails to bifurcate around the
Installation Ref xxxxxx Hardware 5 Digital Mock Up checks 3 None Identified 10
Agent Ex heat shield (nozzle direction)
Routing and
41 Support 15 150 none N/A N/A N/A 5 3 10 150
42 0 0 0
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07:13:24 07/12/2021 13 of 24
 47 0 0 0
48 0 0 0
49 0 0 0
50 0 0 0
51 0 0 0
52 0 0 0
53 0 0 0
54 0 0 0
55 0 0 0
56 0 0 0
57 0 0 0
58 0 0 0
59 0 0 0

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.

07:13:24 07/12/2021 14 of 24
 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh

The following DFMEA excerpt is for a compressor blade that is part of one stage of a multi-stage axial
compressor. This example is only covering a few lines while a full compressor blade will consist of many
more line items and features. The example is constructed to highlight a number of key challenges when
conducting DFMEAs, but they might not necessarily occur all on one individual design.
The example assumes the following scenrio:
- the blade is based on a standard design,
- it is running in a compressor that is operating at moderately higher speeds than previous compressors,
- the customer has requested an improved erosion resistance and provided requirements for it.

Aerofoil

Aerofoil to Platform Fillet

Platform

Blade Root Radius

Blade Root

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev.
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.
 multi-stage axial
will consist of many
ey challenges when
n.

evious compressors,
ments for it.

to Platform Fillet

Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)

 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh
Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
✘

Classification
Actual Action Action Action Action
Doc (Line) SEV *
Item Function Requirement Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Prevention Controls OCC Current Detection Controls DET RPN Recommended Action(s) Responsibility Target Date Actions Taken & Results Completion Results Results Results Results Comments
# OCC
Date SEV OCC DET RPN

- Reduction in Compressor
PR -> Higher shaft speeds
and turbine temperatures ->
engine SFC increase (3),
early engine maintenance (7)
Complete loss of ability to
Accelerate Air - Significant Domestic Object
Compressor Isentropic efficiency x @ pressure accelerate air for one blade
1 (absolute Damage to multiple
Blade ratio y and mass flow z due to over platform blade
velocities) compressor components (7)
release
- Reduction in available surge
margin -> Potential for non-
recoverable surge ->
demanded or undemanded
IFSD (8)
- Design standard STD12345 for
mode frequency requirements and
margins (4)
Blade shape does not meet modal
- FEA based optimization of blade
frequency requirements, leading to
8 shape for maximum 1st order
extended operation in 1st order
frequencies (4)
excitation and HCF
- Blade design standard
STD23456 based on similar
engine applications in the past (4)
- Detailed aeroealastic
analysis based on the
complete set of boundary
This is an example of a typical line for a standard case. The
conditions (6)
- Consider rapid prototype uncertainty seen in the RPN here comes from a change in duty
cast blades to expedite cycle compared to earlier designs. The earlier and more
- Frequency response test
4 6 32 192 None frequency response test J. Doe XX JUN YY Under consideration 8 4 4 128 thourough testing suggested allows a de-risking of the design
with prototype cast blades (6)
- Consider HCF test on verification. Done well, it can form the basis of an updated
compressor rig test design standard which might allow a reduction of the OCC
- Engine durability test #xyz
ranking for the next design.
with extended operation in
potential excitation range and
post test inspection (8)

- Reduction in compressor PR
-> Higher shaft speeds and
turbine temperatures ->
engine SFC increase (3),
- Detailed impact analysis with This line demonstrates how changing the cause view from an
early engine maintenance (7)
- Minimum blade thickness maximum required FOD under external event to a design not meeting the requirements helps
Complete loss of ability to Blade impact resistance does not requirements from blade design minimum material conditions to focus the analysis on activities a team can accomplish,
Accelerate Air - Significant Domestic Object
Compressor Isentropic efficiency x @ pressure accelerate air for one blade meet the requirements for FOD standard STD23456 (3) (5) rather than documenting something that is supposedly not
2 (absolute Damage to multiple 8 3 5 24 120 None None identified 8 3 5 120
Blade ratio y and mass flow z due to over platform blade resistance, leading to blade damage under the team's control. It can still mean that the current
velocities) compressor components (7)
release and release on FOD impact - Survey of service performance of - Correlation of impact models measures are the best that can be done, because operating
similar blades in operation (3) from bird strike simulation and conditions and design have a high level of similarity, and
- Reduction in available surge
test back to FOD analysis (8) additional tests would be extremely complex to carrry out.
margin -> Potential for non-
recoverable surge ->
demanded or undemanded
IFSD (8)

- Reduction in compressor - Addition of protective

Potential This line shows how an additional customer requirement can
efficiency -> engine SFC coating per STD98765 to
Blade erosion resistance does not KCs in challenge an exisiting design. It also shows that the highest
Accelerate Air Reduction in air acceleration increase (3) - Blade leading edge geometry for blade definition
Compressor Isentropic efficiency x @ pressure meet the increased erosion - Currently no planned erosion leading Cost impact vs. potential life risk does not have to be a safety risk, it can also be linked with
3 (absolute efficiency due to leading edge 7 standard erosion conditions 5 10 35 350 A. Sample XX NOV YY 7 4 3 84
Blade ratio y and mass flow z requirements for the specific testing (10) edge increase is being studied life cycle cost and customer satisfaction. Identifying those risks
velocities) erosion - Reduction in usable cycles according to STD23458 (5) - Verification of blade with
application geometry early allows for the necessary design changes to be
for compressor blades -> coating in early quantitative
or coating incorporated and testing to be planned.
early engine maintenance (7) erosion component test

- Reduction in available surge

margin -> Potential for non-
- Iterative blade design and This line is an example of a risk that would not make it to
recoverable surge ->
Blade angles and camber line design optimization using CFD according 2 KC: production, but would potentially require a late redesign of the
demanded or undemanded - Verification of compressor
Accelerate Air are incorrectly matched to required to procedure STD45678 (4) Blade - Consider surge margin product, causing significant oncost and delay to the program. It
Compressor Isentropic efficiency x @ pressure Incomplete acceleration of air IFSD (8) stability and surge margin in
4 (absolute 8 operating conditions, leading to 3 7 24 168 inlet and mapping on compressor rig J. Doe XX JUN YY Under consideration 8 3 4 96 also demonstrates in combination with risk 1 that expensive
Blade ratio y and mass flow z along the blade chord early engine performance test
velocities) suction side boundary layer - Surge margin stack-up exit test actions like the addition of a compressor rig to the
- Compressor efficiency does (7)
separation in some operating points calculation according to procedure angles development program can potentially be justified by the broad
not meet efficiency
STD45867 (3) de-risking impact of the action.
requirements -> engine SFC
above targets (3)

This line shows how prevention controls can span beyond a

- Significant Domestic Object - Blade root design according to single component. The assumption upon which the design
Damage to multiple design standard STD23460 (3) - FEA calculation on finalized relies can be found in the prevention and should also be found
compressor components (7) - Tolerance stack-up between design, unsing max. weight in both the casing DFMEA and the higher level sub-system
Complete loss of ability to Potential
Transfer torque Blade root radii specified to small, blade root and disk slot (2) blade, max. speeds and min. DFMEA. An alternative way of documenting this is to add the
Compressor Transfer combined load of driving transfer torque from KCs in
5 from compressor - Reduction in available surge 8 leading to stress peaks and crack - FEA calculation for initial root 3 tolerance gap (4) 4 24 96 None identified 8 3 4 96 containment capability of the casing in the effects column,
Blade torque x and centrifugal load of y compressor to aerofoil due to blade root
disk to aerofoil margin -> Potential for non- initiation shape and stress optimization (3) - Post-test inspection of all showing the rationale for the lower severity score.
under platform blade release radii
recoverable surge -> - Casing design contains under blades in the engine
demanded or undemanded platform blade release, preventing development program (8) The line also shows how a similar analysis can be first used as
IFSD (8) high energy debris release a prevention and then as a detection, depending on the detail
and time in the program.
6 0 0 0
7 0 0 0
8 0 0 0
9 0 0 0
10 0 0 0
11 0 0 0
12 0 0 0
13 0 0 0
14 0 0 0
15 0 0 0
16 0 0 0
17 0 0 0
18 0 0 0
19 0 0 0
20 0 0 0
21 0 0 0
22 0 0 0
23 0 0 0
24 0 0 0
25 0 0 0
26 0 0 0
27 0 0 0
28 0 0 0
29 0 0 0
30 0 0 0
31 0 0 0
32 0 0 0
33 0 0 0
34 0 0 0
35 0 0 0
36 0 0 0
37 0 0 0
38 0 0 0
39 0 0 0
40 0 0 0
41 0 0 0
42 0 0 0
43 0 0 0
44 0 0 0
45 0 0 0
46 0 0 0
47 0 0 0
48 0 0 0
49 0 0 0
50 0 0 0
51 0 0 0
52 0 0 0
53 0 0 0
54 0 0 0
55 0 0 0
56 0 0 0
57 0 0 0
58 0 0 0
59 0 0 0
60 0 0 0

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)
Content developed by the AESQ Strategy Group, a Program of SAE ITC, as part of RM13004. Used by permission.

07:13:25 07/12/2021 17 of 24
 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh
The following DFMEA excerpt is for an identified design risk related to bracket structural capability for the variation of potenti

The identified design risk was input into the DFMEA with potential Key Characteristics assigned to both the "B" dimension and
dimension. An action defined to perform the analysis shown below.

When the action was completed it was determined that the dimension "H" required tighter variation, while dimension "B" va
could be expanded. Dimension "H" became a KC. Dimension "B" was eliminated as a KC. These results were documented in
DFMEA. The DFMEA then becomes a document of record for future reviews of the "H" dimension over the product lifecycle.

A Simple DRA example

Design Risk - Worst Case Variation Results in Negative Ma
The design risk is captured in the DFMEA, scored, and action assigned
© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev.
lity for the variation of potential loads.

to both the "B" dimension and the "H"

ation, while dimension "B" variation

e results were documented in the
on over the product lifecycle.
n Negative Margins
d action assigned to perform variation analysis
Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)
 7.2.19 Revision: New 29 June 2020 Location https://iaqg.org/tools/scmh
Design Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
✘

Classification
Actual Action Action Action Action Action
Doc (Line) SEV * Target
Item Function Requirement Potential Failure Mode Potential Effect(s) of Failure SEV Potential Cause(s) of Failure Current Prevention Controls OCC Current Detection Controls DET RPN Recommended Action(s) Responsibility Actions Taken & Results Completion Results Results Results Results Results
# OCC Date
Date SEV OCC DET RPN RPN

1 DRA The gearbox has The gearbox bracket shall support a Bracket dimensions are (N) Gearbox performance 8 Bracket dimensions (length = L, width Standard material selection 5 Ultimate load testing as part of 7 40 280 KC-1-1 Perform a yield and ultimate J. Doe - Stress 3/1/2017 DRA performed to evaluate 6/1/2017 8 2 4 16 64
Gearbox Support multiple configurations, nominal load of 100 lbs +/- 3 selected such that the degrdation or failure (7) = B, height = H) with inherent criteria qualification testing (post KC-1-2 stress analysis considering Analysis the design at 3 sigma
Bracket - variation based on specific standard deviations without material yeild stress is (E ) Bracket contacts adjacent variation which exceeds material yeild design freeze and prior to 3 sigma variation variation for all parameters.
impacts applications for a exceeding yeild stress of the exceeded at maximum load sheet metal surface, stress at maximum variation stack up. Reuse of standard bracket production launch) (7)
number of platforms, so material. variation. potentially breaking the design A sensitivity analysis found
the point load can vary pressure vessel (8) that the bracket height "H" is
due to the size and the driving factor for
number of attached exceeding yeild stress at max This is an example of documenting a design risk analysis
components. The load load. Dimension "H" was (DRA) within the DFMEA format. In this example the design
mean is 100lbs with a determined to be a KC (KC 1- risk was identified, input into the DFMEA, scored, an action
standard deviation of 2 2) was assigned and the projected scores were entered to
lbs determine the potential reduction in RPN.
Dimension "B" was found to
not be a factor in the bracket Alternately the DRA could be used after the completion of the
design for 3 sigma, therefore DRA to document the completed design improvement
the KC (KC-1-1) was activity.
elminated.

2 0 0 0 0

3 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0
8 0 0 0 0
9 0 0 0 0
10 0 0 0 0
11 0 0 0 0
12 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 0 0
14 0 0 0 0
15 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0
17 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 0
19 0 0 0 0
20 0 0 0 0
21 0 0 0 0
22 0 0 0 0
23 0 0 0 0
24 0 0 0 0
25 0 0 0 0
26 0 0 0 0
27 0 0 0 0
28 0 0 0 0
29 0 0 0 0
30 0 0 0 0
31 0 0 0 0
32 0 0 0 0
33 0 0 0 0
34 0 0 0 0
35 0 0 0 0
36 0 0 0 0
37 0 0 0 0
38 0 0 0 0
39 0 0 0 0
40 0 0 0 0
41 0 0 0 0
42 0 0 0 0
43 0 0 0 0
44 0 0 0 0
45 0 0 0 0
46 0 0 0 0
47 0 0 0 0
48 0 0 0 0
49 0 0 0 0
50 0 0 0 0
51 0 0 0 0
52 0 0 0 0
53 0 0 0 0
54 0 0 0 0
55 0 0 0 0
56 0 0 0 0
57 0 0 0 0
58 0 0 0 0
59 0 0 0 0

© 2020 IAQG  The IAQG is a legally incorporated international not for profit association (INPA) with membership from the Americas, Europe and the Asia Pacific Region (Rev. 08-2015)

07:13:25 07/12/2021 24 of 24