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G.R. No.

190529               April 29, 2010

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI), represented by its Secretary-General


GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) seeks in this petition for certiorari1 and in the
motion for reconsideration it subsequently filed to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI, and the Resolution dated
December 9, 2009 denying PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-004 (MP). Via these
resolutions, the COMELEC delisted PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

BACKGROUND

Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act,
provides:

Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The COMELEC may motu proprio or upon
verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the
registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:

xxxx

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per
centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]

The COMELEC replicated this provision in COMELEC Resolution No. 2847 – the Rules and
Regulations Governing the Election of the Party-List Representatives through the Party-List System
– which it promulgated on June 25, 1996.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009
Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations
affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this Resolution that any
national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or
through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.

PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the
admission ad cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List
System Act. Among other arguments, PGBI asserted that:
(1) The assailed resolution negates the right of movant and those similarly situated to invoke
Section 4 of R.A. No. 7941, which allows any party, organization and coalition already
registered with the Commission to no longer register anew; the party though is required to
file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation
of its desire to participate in the party-list system; since PGBI filed a Request/Manifestation
seeking a deferment of its participation in the 2007 elections within the required period prior
to the 2007 elections, it has the option to choose whether or not to participate in the next
succeeding election under the same conditions as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed;

(2) The Supreme Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 177548 – Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections – cannot apply in the
instant controversy for two reasons: (a) the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from
PGBI’s; (b) MINERO, prior to delisting, was afforded the opportunity to be heard, while PGBI
and the 25 others similarly affected by Resolution No. 8679 were not. Additionally, the
requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 179271
(Banat v. COMELEC) and the exclusion of PGBI and the 25 other party-list is a denial of the
equal protection of the laws;

(3) The implementation of the challenged resolution should be suspended and/or aborted to
prevent a miscarriage of justice in view of the failure to notify the parties in accordance with
the same Section 6(8) or R.A. No. 7941.2

The COMELEC denied PGBI’s motion/opposition for lack of merit.

First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A.
7941.3 The provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or
organization does not participate, the exemption from registration does not arise and the party,
organization or coalition must go through the process again and apply for requalification; a request
for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.

Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in
2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which
expressly gave the adversely affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.

As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to
have been filed out of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in
Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously filed months after the deadline.

PGBI came to us in its petition for certiorari, arguing the same positions it raised with the COMELEC
when it moved to reconsider its delisting.

We initially dismissed the petition in light of our ruling in Philippine Mines Safety Environment
Association, also known as "MINERO" v. Commission on Elections (Minero);4 we said that no grave
abuse of discretion exists in a ruling that correctly applies the prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Applying Section 6(8) of RA 7941, the Court disqualified MINERO under the following reasoning:
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at
all in the 2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in
the two preceding elections. COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.

PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI
claimed that the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing
jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to
follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913
on October 19, 1994. It cited the following excerpts from the Records of the Senate:

Senator Gonzales: On the other hand, Mr. President, under ground no. (7), Section 5 – there are
actually two grounds it states: " Failure to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or its
failure to obtain at least ten percent (10%) of the votes case under the party-list system in either of
the last two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered"

In short, the first ground is that, it failed to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections. The
second is, failure to obtain at least 10 percent of the votes cast under the party-list system in either
of the last two preceding elections, Mr. President,

Senator Tolentino: Actually, these are two separate grounds.

Senator Gonzales: There are actually two grounds, Mr. President.

Senator Tolentino: Yes, Mr. President.5 [Underscoring supplied.]

PGBI thus asserts that Section 6(8) does not apply to its situation, as it is obvious that it failed to
participate in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections. Implied in this is that it also failed to
secure the required percentage in one (1) but not in the two (2) preceding elections.

Considering PGBI’s arguments, we granted the motion and reinstated the petition in the court’s
docket.

THE ISSUES

We are called upon to resolve: (a) whether there is legal basis for delisting PGBI; and (b) whether
PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

OUR RULING

We find the petition partly impressed with merit.

a. The Minero Ruling

Our Minero ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence, it cannot sustain
PGBI’s delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or
coalitions under the party-list system.

First, the law is clear – the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
sectoral party, organization or coalition if it: (a) fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding
elections; or (b) fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.6 The word
"or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies, as a
disjunctive word.7 Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting.

Second, Minero is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as
PGBI’s cited congressional deliberations clearly show.

Minero therefore simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-
participation of a party-list organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2%
threshold party-list vote. What Minero effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not
participate in an election necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure,
this is a confused interpretation of the law, given the law’s clear and categorical language and the
legislative intent to treat the two scenarios differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of
these two different and separate grounds for delisting is therefore a strained application of the law –
in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the contemplation of the framers of the law and
hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.8

What we say here should of course take into account our ruling in Barangay Association for
Advancement and National Transparency v. COMELEC9 (Banat) where we partly invalidated the 2%
party-list vote requirement provided in RA 7941 as follows:

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling
that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

The disqualification for failure to get 2% party-list votes in two (2) preceding elections should
therefore be understood in light of the Banat ruling that party-list groups or organizations garnering
less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in the allocation of additional seats.

We need not extensively discuss Banat’s significance, except to state that a party-list group or
organization which qualified in the second round of seat allocation cannot now validly be delisted for
the reason alone that it garnered less than 2% in the last two elections. In other words, the
application of this disqualification should henceforth be contingent on the percentage of party-list
votes garnered by the last party-list organization that qualified for a seat in the House of
Representatives, a percentage that is less than the 2% threshold invalidated in Banat. The
disqualification should now necessarily be read to apply to party-list groups or organizations that did
not qualify for a seat in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it registered.

To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these
grounds cannot be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the disqualification for failure to
garner 2% party-list votes in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the Banat
ruling, to mean failure to qualify for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. This, we declare, is how Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and
applied. We do so under our authority to state what the law is,10 and as an exception to the
application of the principle of stare decisis.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which
provides, thus:

ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines.

The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the
rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent
to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument.11 The doctrine is grounded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus:

Time and again, the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the
same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case
should be applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful
countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same
questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue.12

The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in a
particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system from the doctrine of stare
decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside.13

As our discussion above shows, the most compelling reason to abandon Minero exists; it was clearly
an erroneous application of the law – an application that the principle of stability or predictability of
decisions alone cannot sustain. Minero did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the
intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in general. Clearly, we cannot allow PGBI to be
prejudiced by the continuing validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, we now abandon Minero and
strike it out from our ruling case law.

We are aware that PGBI’s situation – a party list group or organization that failed to garner 2% in a
prior election and immediately thereafter did not participate in the preceding election – is something
that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA 7941. From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap
in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to address. We cannot and do not address matters
over which full discretionary authority is given by the Constitution to the legislature; to do so will
offend the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed exists, then the present case should
bring this concern to the legislature’s notice.

b. The Issue of Due Process

On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not
violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution
No. 8679. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing x x x.14 We find it obvious under the
attendant circumstances that PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this
Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint on due process grounds.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly ANNUL COMELEC
Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned, and the
Resolution dated December 9, 2009 which denied PGBI’s motion for reconsideration in SPP No. 09-
004 (MP). PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list group or organization in the coming May
2010 elections.

SO ORDERED.

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