Bixler V Scientology: Return To Show Cause

Case No.
B310559
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE
CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER, CEDRIC BIXLER-ZAVALA,
JANE DOE #1 & JANE DOE #2,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
Respondent,
CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL,
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER & CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE INTERNATIONAL,
Defendants and Real Parties in Interest.
RETURN TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ON PETITION
Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.

FOR WRIT OF MANDATE; MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
Appeal from the Superior Court of Los Angeles County
Case No. 19STCV29458 – Hon. Steven J. Kleifield, Department 57
WINSTON & STRAWN LLP JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER &

*WILLIAM H. FORMAN (SBN: 150477) MITCHELL LLP
whforman@winston.com ROBERT E. MANGELS (SBN: 48291)
DAVID C. SCHEPER (SBN: 120174) rem@jmbm.com
dscheper@winston.com *MATTHEW D. HINKS (SBN: 200750)
MARGARET E. DAYTON (SBN: 274353) mhinks@jmbm.com
pedayton@winston.com 1900 AVENUE OF THE STARS, 7TH
333 SOUTH GRAND AVENUE, 38TH FLOOR FLOOR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90071-1543 LOS ANGELES, CA 90067-4308
(213) 615-1700 • FAX: (213) 615-1750 (310) 203-8080 • FAX: (310) 203-0567
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS AND REAL ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST CHURCH OF PARTY IN INTEREST RELIGIOUS
SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL & TECHNOLOGY CENTER
CELEBRITY CENTRE
INTERNATIONAL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .... 8

II. DEMURRER ............................................................................. 13
III. ANSWER.................................................................................. 15
IV. ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS .............................................. 23
A. The Parties, Their History With Each Other, and the
Agreements to Arbitrate ................................................... 23
B. Petitioners’ Lawsuit .......................................................... 28
C. The Church Defendants’ Motions to Compel
Arbitration ......................................................................... 30
D. The Criminal Case Against Masterson and Petitioners’
Failure to Seek a Stay ....................................................... 31
E. Opposition, Replies, and Further Briefing on the
Arbitration Motions ........................................................... 32

F. The Trial Court’s Order Compelling Arbitration ............. 36
G. Proceedings in This Court and the Supreme Court ........ 40
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF ............................................................. 41
VI. VERIFICATION ...................................................................... 42
VII. MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES ......... 43
A. Standard of Review ........................................................... 43
B. Enforcement of Religious Arbitration Agreements Is
Common ............................................................................. 46
C. The Arbitration Order Does Not Violate Petitioners’
First Amendment Rights .................................................. 49
1. Enforcing a Private Arbitration Agreement Does
Not Constitute State Action and Thus Cannot
Violate the First Amendment ................................... 49
2. Courts Have Rejected Petitioners’ Argument That
Enforcing Religious Arbitration Agreements
Violates the First Amendment.................................. 53
3. Petitioners’ “Religious Ritual” Argument
Contradicts the Record and Violates the Religious
Abstention Doctrine ................................................... 56
1
4. Petitioners’ Proffered Authorities Are Out of Date
and Inapposite ........................................................... 61
D. The Rule Advanced by Petitioners Violates the First
Amendment ........................................................................ 65
1. Petitioners’ Argument Impermissibly
Discriminates Against Religions .............................. 66
2. The First Amendment Prohibits Petitioners’
Attempt to Re-Write the Terms for Joining
Scientology ................................................................. 70
E. The Arbitration Order Does Not Violate Marsy’s Law
or the Protective Order ..................................................... 73
1. Petitioners’ Arguments Are Untimely ...................... 73
2. Marsy’s Law Lends No Support to Petitioners’
Efforts to Avoid Arbitration ...................................... 75
3. The Arbitration Order Does Not Violate the
Protective Order ........................................................ 80

VIII. CONCLUSION ...................................................................... 84
2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Abbo v. Briskin
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1995)
660 So.2d 1157 ........................................................ 54, 55, 56, 58
Abd Alla v. Mourssi

(Minn.Ct.App. 2004) 680 N.W.2d 569 ...................................... 41
Braunfeld v. Brown
(1961) 366 US 599 ..................................................................... 62
Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Med. Grp.

(2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1401 .................................................... 62
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of

Hialeah
(1993) 508 U.S. 520 ......................................................... 4, 60, 61
Church of Scientology v. City of Clearwater

(11th Cir. 1993) 2 F.3d 1514..................................................... 64
Concerned Citizens Coalition of Stockton v. City of

Stockton
(2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 70 ........................................................ 68
Davis v. Prudential Sec.

(11th Cir. 1995) 59 F.3d 1186................................................... 44
Desert Outdoor Advert. v. Superior Court

(2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866 ...................................................... 38
Dial 800 v. Fesbinder

(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32 .................................. 1, 39, 48, 49, 55
Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co.

(9th Cir. 1998) 144 F.3d 1182................................................... 44
3
Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools, Inc.
(S.D.Ind. Aug. 26, 2009, No. 1:08-cv-1714) 2009
WL 2750099............................................................................... 40
Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP v. Superior Court

(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1214 .................................................... 68
Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fishman

(1991) 125 N.J. 404 ............................................................. 41, 48
Elmore v. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. Co.

(7th Cir. 1986) 782 F.2d 94....................................................... 41
Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers

(D.Colo. 1999) 53 F.Supp.2d 1101 .............. 41, 47, 48, 55, 62, 63
In re Episcopal Church Cases

(2009) 45 Cal.4th 467 ................................................................ 53
Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Revenue

(2020) 140 S.Ct. 2246 ................................................................ 60
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Air Fla. System, Inc.

(9th Cir. 1987) 822 F.2d 833..................................................... 43
Fritelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP

(2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 35 ........................................................ 52
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pa.

(U.S. June 17, 2021) __ S.Ct. __, 2021 WL 2459253 ............... 61
Gen. Conf. of Evangelical Methodist Church v.

Evangelical Methodist Church of Dalton, Ga., Inc.
(N.D.Ga. 2011) 807 F.Supp.2d 1291 ........................................ 40
Ghertner v. Solaimani
(2002) 254 Ga.App. 821 ............................................................ 49
Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants

Assn.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013 .............................................................. 44
Gressett v. Superior Court

(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 114 ...................................................... 38
4
Homestake Lead Co. v. Doe Run Res. Corp.
(N.D.Cal. 2003) 282 F.Supp.2d 1131 ....................................... 62
Jabri v. Qaddura
(Tex.App. 2003) 108 S.W.3d 404 .............................................. 41
Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church

(Ill.App. 2005) 825 N.E.2d 1206 ............................................... 40
Kovacs v. Kovacs
(1993) 98 Md.App. 289 .............................................................. 49
Krueger v. Superior Court

(1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 934 ............................................................7
Lizarraga v. City of Nogales

(D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007), 2007 WL 4218972 ............................. 71
Lopez v. Bartlett Care Center, LLC

(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 311, 317 ................................................ 36

In re Marriage of Weiss
(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106 ........................................................ 54
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rights

Com.
(2018) 138 S.Ct. 1719 ................................................................ 61
Medical Bd. of Calif. v. Superior Court

(1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1458 ..................................................... 67
Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah

(D.C. 2005) 869 A.2d 343 .................................................... 41, 57
Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma

(9th Cir. 2013) 723 F.3d 984......................................... 43, 44, 45
Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.

(E.D.Cal. 2014) 52 F.Supp.3d 1070 .......................................... 39
Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru

(2020) 591 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct. 2049 ..................................... 52, 64
5
Parsons v. Superior Court
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 ............................................... 67
Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market

Development (US), LLC
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 223 ................................................................ 51
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary

Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church
(1969) 393 U.S. 440 ................................................................... 52
Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind

(1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1282 ...................................................... 43
Roberts v. AT&T Mobility LLC

(9th Cir. 2017) 877 F.3d 833..................................................... 43
Santos v. Brown
(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 398 ...................................................... 70

Shelley v. Kramer
(1948) 334 U.S. .......................................................................... 44
Sieger v. Sieger
(N.Y.Sup.Ct. June 29, 2005, No. 6975/98) 8
Misc.3d 1029, 2015 WL 2031746.............................................. 57
Sotnick v. Sotnick
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) 650 So.2d 157 .................................... 55
Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Fla., Inc.

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2013) 122 So.3d 986 ...... 40, 45, 46, 47, 48, 55
St. Mary v. Superior Court

(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762 .........................................................6
State v. Deal
(Minn. 2007) 740 N.W.2d 755 .................................................. 71
State v. Lee
(Ariz.Ct.App. Jan. 13, 2011) 245 P.3d 919 .............................. 70
Tabarrejo v. Superior Court

(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 849 ...................................................... 11
6
Thomas v. Westlake
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605 ...................................................... 32
Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior Court

(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 482 ........................................................ 75
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer

(2017) 137 S.Ct. 2012 ................................................................ 61
Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co.

(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171 .................................................... 37
Watson v. Jones
(1872) 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679.......................................................5
Zummo v. Zummo
(Pa.Super.Ct. 1990) 574 A.2d 1130 ........................ 54, 55, 56, 58
Statutes

Civ. Code § 1708.7 .......................................................................... 21
Civ. Code § 1708.8 .......................................................................... 21
Federal Arbitration Act ................................................................. 29
Marsy’s Law ............................................................................ passim
Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 ................................................ 66
Other Authorities
Ariz. Const., art. II, § 2.1(A) .......................................................... 70
Cal. Const., art. I, § 28 ....................................................... 66, 69, 70
7
I.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
“I changed my mind” is not a defense to enforcement of a
contract. But Petitioners’ argument is just that. They propose a
radical new rule that allows a party to disregard her voluntary
agreement to arbitrate before a religious tribunal if she later
claims to have changed her religious beliefs. No court has so
ruled. To the contrary, this Court, and countless others
throughout the United States, routinely enforce religious
arbitration agreements and enforce judgments from religious

arbitration panels. Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
32, 50 (recognizing that “American courts routinely enforce
money judgments and other orders by” religious arbitration
panels).
As if sensing the brazenness of their argument, Petitioners
invent a record to conjure harm, claiming that the trial court
“forced” them into participating in a “religious ritual,” and assert
– with no support – that enforcement of private arbitration
agreements constitutes state action that violates the First
Amendment. Neither the factual assertions nor the legal
argument survives the first touch with reality.
8
First the facts. The trial court found that Petitioners
entered into agreements to arbitrate, and that their claims
against the Church Defendants 1 fall within the scope of those
agreements. Petitioners neither challenge these conclusions in
this Court nor object to arbitration on the grounds of
unconscionability, duress, or unfair surprise. Instead, Petitioners
protest that arbitration before a religious tribunal is a religious
“ritual.” The Petition does not explain what Petitioners mean by
that term, or why it matters, so the whole “religious arbitration is

a ritual because it is religious” argument dissolves into a
tautology.2 In any event, the trial court found “no evidence” for
Petitioners’ pejorative characterizations of Scientology
arbitration. The trial court sustained all objections to Petitioners’
declaration on this score, finding it “filled with unsupported
1 “The Church Defendants” means Defendants and Real Parties

in Interest Church of Scientology International, Church of
Scientology Celebrity Centre International, and Religious
Technology Center.
2 As explained in Section C.3. of the accompanying Memorandum,
Petitioners’ attempt to characterize Scientology arbitration as a
“ritual” is unavailing also because courts may not adjudicate
what are the doctrines and rituals of a religion. That is left solely
to the highest tribunal within a religion.
9
assumptions, foundational deficiencies, irrelevant matters,
improper opinions, and arguments.”
Petitioners fare no better on the law. Enforcement of a
private arbitration agreement is not state action and thus cannot
violate the Constitution. Courts therefore routinely enforce
religious arbitration agreements, just like they enforce private
agreements that limit other constitutional rights. Non-
disparagement and confidentiality agreements restrict free
speech, and every secular arbitration agreement waives the right

to a civil jury under the Seventh Amendment. But that does not
make these routine agreements void, and it does not make their
enforcement state action. Thus, Petitioners’ First Amendment
argument simply does not apply.
While the trial court’s order compelling arbitration involves
no state action, the true irony of Petitioners’ proposed rule is that
it amounts to an assault on the First Amendment. Their position
is that the Free Exercise Clause requires courts to adopt a unique
rule – at odds with all other arbitration rules – that renders
certain arbitration agreements unenforceable at the election of
one party simply because the parties agreed to arbitration before
10
a religious body. This proposed rule of decision violates the First
Amendment in two ways.
One, the First Amendment prohibits rules of decision that
“regulate or prohibit conduct because it is undertaken for
religious reasons.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 532. But that is precisely what
Petitioners propose here: a rule uniquely hostile to religious
arbitration just because it is religious.
And two, Petitioners’ proposed rule amounts to a court-

ordered re-drafting of the terms on which persons join the
Scientology religion. As a condition for joining Scientology,
prospective parishioners give an “irrevocable” assent to be bound
by the Scientology ethics and justice system in “any dispute” that
“should arise” between them and the Church Defendants.
Petitioners now ask the Court to re-write these terms to be
terminable at the will of a parishioner. Contrary to Petitioners’
suggestion, this case is not about Petitioners’ freedom to leave
their faith. Rather, as Petitioners admit, they have already left.
It is about whether a court may force a religion to change the
terms on which it accepts followers. The First Amendment
11
forbids any such interference. Watson v. Jones (1872) 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 729-731.
Because the First Amendment lends them no support,
Petitioners try to evade arbitration by pointing to Marsy’s Law
and a protective order entered in a criminal case against
Defendant Daniel Masterson. But Petitioners did not properly
raise these arguments in the trial court, and for this reason
alone, they should gain no traction here. Even if this Court were
to consider the untimely arguments, this Court should still reject

them because neither has any relevance to the relief sought here.
The Petition seeks reversal of the trial court’s order requiring
Petitioners to pursue their claims – if at all – in arbitration,
rather than in court. But nothing in Marsy’s Law or the
Protective Order says anything about where Petitioners must
bring their claims.
In short, the trial court found that Petitioners freely
executed arbitration agreements and that their claims fall within
the scope of those agreements. Petitioners’ unsupported claims
about “religious rituals” and distortions of religious liberty law do
not change that result. The Petition should be denied.
12
II.
DEMURRER
The Church Defendants demur to the Petition because
counsel, not any Petitioner, verified it. (See Petition at p. 25.) A
petitioner’s counsel may verify a petition only when “the
underlying facts concerning the issues in the petition . . . are all
ones within the personal knowledge of [the petitioner’s] counsel,”
like the procedural history of a case. St. Mary v. Superior Court
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 771, fn. 14. But here, the Petition
makes unsupported assertions about (a) Scientology arbitration

procedures (see, e.g., Petition at pp. 8, 11, 17, 22), (b) other
alleged doctrines of Scientology (id. at pp. 7, 11), and (c) the
alleged agency relationship between Masterson and the Church
Defendants (id. at pp. 11, 17), that are not within the personal
knowledge of counsel. Nor are they contained anywhere in the
evidentiary record. Instead, as shown below, Petitioners tried to
introduce evidence on these subjects in the trial court. 3 But the
trial court sustained the Church Defendants’ objections to
Petitioners’ evidence, and Petitioners do not challenge the trial
court’s rulings. The Petition attempts to back-door this “evidence”
3 See Section C.3. of the accompanying Memorandum.
13
into the record by making unverified allegations on matters that
Petitioners lost in the trial court.
Thus, this Court should sustain the Church Defendants’
demurrer and deny the Petition. See Krueger v. Superior Court
(1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 934, 939-940.
14
III.
ANSWER
The Church Defendants answer the Petition and allege as
follows:
1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 contain legal argument requiring
no response.4
2. In response to paragraph 3, the Church Defendants
deny that Petitioners correctly identified the Exhibits to their
Petition. Although the Petition correctly states that the Church
Defendants filed arbitration motions on January 6, 2020, the trial

court never ruled on those motions because Petitioners filed a
First Amended Complaint that mooted the January 6 motions. In
response to the First Amended Complaint, the Church
Defendants filed new arbitration motions with new supporting
declarations on April 1, 2020. (See 7 DEO 1521 – 11 DEO 2550.) 5
The trial court ultimately granted the April 1 motions in a
4 The Church Defendants respond to Petitioners’ legal arguments

in the accompanying Memorandum.
5Citations to “DEO” refer to the Exhibits submitted by the
Church Defendants in support of their March 5, 2021
Preliminary Opposition. Those exhibits are cited by volume and
page number, e.g., “7 DEO 1521” refers to page 1521 of volume 7.
15
written order on December 30, 2020 (“Arbitration Order”), and
Petitioners now challenge that order.
Petitioners thus make these errors in the Exhibits:
a. The Exhibits include the wrong motions to compel
arbitration. The Church Defendants filed four
arbitration motions on April 1: (a) a motion by Church of
Scientology International (“CSI”) and Church of
Scientology Celebrity Centre International (“CC”)
against Petitioners Bixler, Bixler-Zavala, and Jane Doe

#1 (7 DEO 1521), (b) a motion by CSI and CC against
Jane Doe #2 (9 DEO 2021), (c) a motion by Religious
Technology Center (“RTC”) against Bixler, Bixler-
Zavala, and Jane Doe #1 (9 DEO 2517) and (d) a motion
by RTC against Jane Doe #2 (4 EP 968). Petitioners’
Exhibits failed to include the first three motions, and
instead included their January 6 counterparts. (See 1
EP 64 - 4 EP 967.) The Petition thus omits critical
evidence cited in the Arbitration Order, including
testimony that non-believers may participate in
Scientology arbitration and that no profession of faith or
16
participation in religious ceremony is required by
Scientology arbitration. (6 EP 1504.)
b. Petitioners include two declarations that were never filed
in opposition to the April 1 motions: the Declaration of
Hana Whitfield and the Declaration of Bobette Riales.
(See 4 EP 1188 [proof of service].) Nor does Petitioners’
opposition to the Church Defendants’ April 1 arbitration
motions refer to these declarations. (4 EP 1072-1093.)
Instead, Petitioners filed these declarations in

opposition to the January 6 arbitration motions.
Because Petitioners elected not to rely on these
declarations in opposing the Church Defendants’ April 1
arbitration motions, the trial court did not cite to or
consider those declarations in the Arbitration Order.
c. Petitioners misrepresent the filing date for the
Declaration of Michael Rinder. Although the opposition
refers to a Declaration of Michael Rinder, Petitioners
filed no such declaration in support of the opposition. (4
EP 1188 [proof of service]; 6 EP 1499 [Arbitration Order
recognizing that there “was no ‘Rinder Declaration’
submitted with the opposition”].) The trial court directed
17
Petitioners to file the missing Rinder Declaration, which
they later did. (6 EP 1499-1500.)
3. The Church Defendants admit the allegations of
paragraphs 4 and 5.
admit that the real parties in interest include CSI and RTC.
Although not listed by Petitioners, CC is also a real party in
interest because the order challenged by Petitioners also granted
CC’s motion to compel arbitration. (Petition ¶ 13; 6 EP 1496-

1510.) Defendant Daniel Masterson is a real party in interest as
the trial court ruled that he could participate in the arbitration,
and thus has an interest in this writ proceeding. See Tabarrejo v.
Superior Court (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 849, 859. Because
Defendant David Miscavige has not been served and has not
appeared, the Church Defendants deny that he is a real party in
interest to this Petition.
respond that this paragraph merely summarizes the allegations
in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), and thus contains legal
argument. If a response is required, the Church Defendants deny
18
that they engaged in or are in anyway liable for the conduct
alleged in the FAC.
admit that CSI and CC moved to compel arbitration on January
6, 2020, but as noted above, that motion is not the subject of this
Petition. Rather, the Church Defendants filed the operative
motions on April 1. (See Answer ¶ 3.a, ante.) The Church
Defendants also admit that RTC filed its operative arbitration
motions on April 1, 2020 but deny that Petitioners’ Exhibits

include the operative motions. (Ibid.)
The Church Defendants admit that Petitioners executed
multiple agreements (“Agreements”) over many years pledging
their commitment to Scientology ecclesiastical justice procedures
as a condition to participate in Scientology religious services. (7
DEO 1562-1568, 1608-1686 [Agreements].)
The Church Defendants deny that the arbitrators are
“mandated to treat Petitioners as enemies of Scientology.”
Petitioners misstate the Church’s doctrine, and they have never
presented any admissible evidence – either in the trial court or in
this Court – supporting this contention.
19
The Church Defendants deny that it “is not in dispute” that
they are “agents” of Daniel Masterson or that “any and all
persons who will participate and/or arbitrate this matter are
Masterson’s agents (and vice versa).” Masterson is a Scientology
parishioner; he is not now and has never been a minister or
employee of the Church Defendants. The trial court did not find
any agency relationship between Masterson and the Church
Defendants. The trial court found that Masterson could
participate in the arbitration because Petitioners alleged that he

was the Church Defendants’ agent. (6 EP 1509.)
admit that the Los Angeles District Attorney charged Masterson
with sexually assaulting Bixler, Jane Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe
No. 2 between 2001 and 2003. The Church also admits that the
criminal case is ongoing.
The contention that these charges “form[] the factual
nucleus of Petitioners’ civil claims” is a legal contention requiring
no response. In any event, Petitioners have not sued Masterson,
the Church Defendants, or anyone for sexual assault. Rather,
Petitioners alleged, purely on “information and belief,” that the
Church Defendants started to harass them in 2016, after they
20
accused Masterson of sexually assaulting them a decade earlier.
(1 EP 19 ¶ 58; 1 EP 27 ¶ 92; 1 EP 33-35 ¶¶ 134-149; 1 EP 40
¶ 172; 1 EP 52 ¶ 249.)
admit that the Superior Court overseeing Masterson’s criminal
case entered a protective order on September 18, 2020
(“Protective Order”).
The Church Defendants deny that the Protective Order
says anything about Masterson’s “agents” or the Church

Defendants. (4 EP 1071.) The Church Defendants also deny that
the Protective Order contains any statement or findings of “harm
or harassment” by Masterson or that it says anything about the
harassment allegations in this civil case. (Ibid.) The rest of
paragraph 10 contains legal argument requiring no response.
admit that Petitioners proceeded with discovery after entry of the
Protective Order and that Masterson asserted his privilege
against self-incrimination. The Church Defendants admit that
they did not agree to the terms of Petitioners’ requested stay.
admit that Masterson moved for a stay.
21
admit that the Court issued the Arbitration Order on December
30, 2020. The Church denies Petitioners’ characterization of the
Arbitration Order, which speaks for itself.
admit that Petitioners brought this writ within 60 days of the
Arbitration Order. The rest of paragraph 14 contains legal
argument requiring no response.
13. Paragraphs 15 through 26 contain legal argument

requiring no response.
deny Petitioners’ characterization of the Arbitration Order, which
speaks for itself. The Church Defendants also deny that
Masterson made any statements about arbitration on the cited
pages of the record. The rest of paragraph 27 contains legal
15. Paragraphs 28 through 30 contain legal argument
deny Petitioners’ characterization of the Arbitration Order, which
22
speaks for itself. The rest of paragraph 31 contains legal
17. Paragraph 32 through 36 contain legal argument
IV.
ADDITIONAL ALLEGATIONS
A. The Parties, Their History With Each Other, and the

Agreements to Arbitrate
18. CSI is a nonprofit religious corporation and the
“Mother Church” of the Scientology religion. (4 EP 976.) CC is a
Church of Scientology that ministers to parishioners such as

artists, politicians, leaders of industry, sports figures, and others
seeking privacy in the exercise of their faith. (Ibid.) RTC is also a
Church of Scientology, the central function of which is to ensure
the orthodoxy of the Scientology religion. (Ibid.)
19. Masterson is a parishioner of Scientology. Petitioners
allege that between 2000 and 2003, he assaulted Petitioners
Bixler, Jane Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe No. 2. (1 EP 22, 34, 51.)
Petitioners also allege that Masterson served as a volunteer
23
“Field Staff Member” who, like many other parishioners,
proselytized for the Church. (1 EP 20 ¶¶ 59, 62.) 6
20. Petitioner Chrissie Bixler alleges that she “became
involved in the Church of Scientology in 1997” through her
romantic relationship with Masterson. (1 EP 21 ¶ 66.) Bixler
continued her participation in Scientology services through 2012,
years after her relationship with Masterson ended. (7 DEO 1606;
1 EP 23 ¶ 75.)
21. Petitioner Cedric Bixler-Zavala is Bixler’s husband.

(1 EP 7 ¶ 3.) Bixler-Zavala began participating in Scientology
services in 2010 – after he married Bixler and after Masterson
allegedly assaulted Bixler. (7 DEO 1607.)
22. Petitioner Jane Doe No. 1 was a Scientologist from
childhood and continued to participate in Church services well
6Petitioners repeatedly state that the Church Defendants have

“admitted” that Masterson is their “agent.” (Petition at p. 36.)
That is false. The Excerpts of Record that Petitioners cite in
support say no such thing. – 5 EP 1247, 1308, 6 EP 1509 –
contain no such statement. Neither 5 EP 1247 nor 5 EP 1308
even mention Masterson. 6 EP 1509 is the Trial Court’s Order,
which notes that Plaintiffs have alleged that Masterson is an
agent of the Church Defendants. The Petition also cites 5 EP
1220 and 1290 for this proposition. (Petition at pp. 11, 38.)
Neither cite mentions Masterson. The only source for Petitioners’
agency allegation is the conclusory allegations of agency in the
unverified FAC.
24
into adulthood. (1 EP 33 ¶ 130.) She knew Masterson socially. (Id.
¶ 132.)
23. Petitioner Jane Doe No. 2 became a member of the
Church of Scientology when she was a child. Jane Doe No. 2
allegedly “ceased practicing” Scientology in 2004, when she was
around 25 years old. (1 EP 50 ¶ 235; 1 EP 51 ¶ 245.)
24. Petitioners executed multiple Religious Services
Enrollment Agreements (“Agreements”) over many years
pledging their commitment to Scientology ecclesiastical justice

procedures as a condition of participation in Scientology religious
services. (6 EP 1501-1504 [Arbitration Order]; 7 DEO 1562–1568,
1608–1686.) Each Petitioner affirmed in bolded capitals at the
end of the Agreements, “I also understand that I am not eligible
for any Scientology religious services unless I sign this contract.”
(See, e.g., 7 DEO 1644 [Exemplar Agreement].)
25. A tenet of the Scientology religion is that
parishioners and Scientology churches must resolve all disputes
between them exclusively through the Scientology internal
Ethics, Justice, and binding religious arbitration procedures. (7
DEO 1555 ¶ 20.) Scientologists agree to abide by Scientology
Ethics and Justice Codes as a condition for participation in the
25
religion. (Id. 1554 ¶ 17.) Issues that arise in disputes between
Scientology parishioners and the Church require applying
Scientology doctrine, including the Church’s ethical code of
conduct, and Scientologists believe that only they have the
background in Scientology necessary to understand and apply
those doctrines. (Id. 1555 ¶¶ 20-21.) The justice codes and
procedures are an inherent part of the religion and derive from
its core beliefs. (Id. 1552 ¶ 12.) Scientology scriptures thus
mandate that “we must use Scientology … justice in all our

affairs.” (Ibid.)
26. Among the ecclesiastical principles that Petitioners
assented to is that “should any dispute, claim or controversy
arise” between them and the Church Defendants, such dispute
would be resolved through a religious arbitration according to
Scientology religious procedures. (6 EP 1501-1503.) 7 Petitioners
further agreed that they were “forever” waiving their recourse to
7 For Petitioners’ individual agreements to these arbitration

terms, see 7 DEO 1642, 1649, 1656, 1663, 1670, 1677, all at ¶ 6.d
(Bixler); 7 DEO 1684 ¶ 6.d (Bixler-Zavala); 7 DEO 1566 ¶ 6.d
(Jane Doe No. 1); 7 DEO 1610, 1615, 1620, 1625, 1630, 1635, all
at ¶ 9 (Jane Doe No. 2).
26
civil courts in their dealings with the Church Defendants
(7 DEO 1642 ¶ 6.a [Exemplar Agreement].)
27. The Agreements provide that when Petitioners seek
to assert a claim against the Church Defendants, they must
submit a request for arbitration to the International Justice Chief
(“IJC”) and designate one arbitrator to hear and resolve the
matter. (6 EP 1501, 1503 [Arbitration Order]; 7 DEO 1642
¶¶ 6.e.i, ii [Exemplar Agreement].) The Church would then
designate a second arbitrator, and the two designated arbitrators

would select a third. (6 EP 1643 ¶¶ 6.e.iii, iv [Exemplar
Agreement]; 6 EP 1501-1503 [Arbitration Order].)
28. Contrary to the repeated claim made in the Petition
that the arbitrators must be Scientology ministers or “ministers
of the religion” (see, e.g., Petition at p. 8), the Agreements say no
such thing, and Petitioners cite nothing in the record supporting
this contention. To the contrary, the Agreements require that the
arbitrators be “Scientologists in good standing.” (7 DEO 1642
¶ 6.e [Exemplar Agreement]; 6 EP 1501-1503 [Arbitration
Order].)
27
29. Once selected, the three arbitrators will hear the
dispute and make a “binding” decision. (7 DEO 1642 ¶ 6.e
[Exemplar Agreement].)
B. Petitioners’ Lawsuit
30. On August 22, 2019, Petitioners filed a Complaint
against Defendants in Los Angeles Superior Court. Another
individual – Bobette Riales – is a plaintiff in the civil case, but
she was never a member of the Church and did not sign an
arbitration agreement.
31. On February 28, 2020, Petitioners and Riales filed a

first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants reiterating
the same causes of action as the initial complaint: “(1) stalking in
violation of Civ. Code § 1708.7, (2) physical invasion of privacy in
violation of Civ. Code § 1708.8, (3) constructive invasion of
privacy in violation of Civ. Code § 1708.8, (4) intentional infliction
of emotional distress, and (5) loss of consortium.” (6 EP 1497.)
Petitioners alleged, purely on “information and belief,” that
starting around 2016 Defendants had engaged in acts of
harassment against them for accusing Masterson of committing
acts of sexual assault in 2000-2003. (1 EP 19 ¶ 58; 1 EP 27 ¶ 92; 1
EP 33–35 ¶¶ 134–149; 1 EP 40 ¶ 172; 1 EP 52 ¶ 249.)
28
32. Contrary to repeated assertions in the Petition,
Petitioners (and Riales) have sued no Defendant, including
Masterson, for rape or sexual assault. All the causes of action
concern alleged acts of harassment in the past few years, as the
trial court found. (6 EP 1506 [“The charging allegations of the
causes of action themselves are limited to the alleged harassment
Plaintiffs experienced after they came forward regarding the
alleged sexual violence”].)
33. Petitioners now assert that their claims are purely

civil and will not “require a court to make a doctrinal finding.”
(Petition at p. 34.) But that is not how they pled their claims. The
FAC devoted dozens of paragraphs to describing what Petitioners
allege are doctrines of the Church, including unfounded (and
untrue) allegations that they are “enemies” in the eyes of the
Church and can be targeted for retribution and harassment. (1
EP 14-18.) Petitioners have relied on these untrue and
defamatory allegations of Church doctrine as the “evidence” to
support their claims of harassment. (4 EP 1079-1080.)
34. The Church Defendants categorically deny the
charging allegations in the First Amended Complaint. Not one of
the charging allegations, all made “on information and belief,”
29
contains a single fact showing that the Church Defendants
caused or are responsible for the harassment Petitioners
supposedly experienced.
C. The Church Defendants’ Motions to Compel

Arbitration
35. On April 1, 2020, the Church Defendants moved to
compel arbitration of Petitioners’ claims. (7 DEO 1521; 9 DEO
2021; 4 EP 968; 11 DEO 2517.) The motions assert that
Petitioners’ harassment claims fall within the Agreements’
arbitration provisions. (4 EP 1008-1014; 7 DEO 1535-1536; 9

DEO 2035-2036; 11 DEO 2531-2533.)
36. In support of their arbitration motions, the Church
Defendants submitted declarations explaining that “one need not
be a practicing Scientologist to participate in these [arbitration]
procedures. For example, a party to a Church arbitration
procedure is not required to make a profession of faith, undergo
Scientology auditing, or participate in any religious ceremony or
service as part of presenting a dispute to the arbitrators.” (7 DEO
1555-1556 ¶ 23; 9 DEO 2055-2056 ¶ 23.) Even though the trial
court cited this specific evidence in rejecting Petitioners’
characterization of Scientology arbitration as a “ritual,” (6 EP
30
1504), Petitioners omitted it from the excerpts of record they
submitted to this Court. (See Answer ¶ 3.a, ante.)
D. The Criminal Case Against Masterson and

Petitioners’ Failure to Seek a Stay
37. Two months after the Church Defendants moved for
arbitration, the Los Angeles District Attorney charged Masterson
with sexually assaulting Bixler, Jane Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe
No. 2 between 2001 and 2003. The District Attorney’s charges
against Masterson do not involve any of the charging allegations
of the FAC. (Compare 4 EP 1028 [criminal docket] with 6 EP

1506 [Arbitration Order summarizing civil allegations].)
38. On September 18, 2020, the superior court entered a
protective order in Masterson’s criminal case (“Protective Order”).
(4 EP 1071.) The Protective Order used mandatory form CR-161,
which states that Masterson must have no “personal, electronic,
telephonic or written contact” or contact “through a third party,
except an attorney of record,” with the protected persons (i.e.,
Bixler, Jane Doe No. 1, and Jane Doe No. 2). Although
Petitioners claim that the Protective Order prevents contact by
the Church Defendants, the order does not mention the Church
Defendants or Scientology. (4 EP 1071.)
31
Petitioners did not seek a stay in response to either the
filing of criminal charges against Masterson or the issuance of
the Protective Order. For example, in September 2020 – months
after prosecutors charged Masterson – Petitioners served a
deposition notice, document requests, and interrogatories on
Masterson and his criminal defense attorney. (Petition at pp. 12;
11 DEO 2668-2672.)
39. Petitioners waited until February 2, 2021 – after they
lost the arbitration motions – to file their written motion

requesting a stay of proceedings. (RE 2796-2806.) 8 The trial court
set that motion for hearing after this Court resolves the Petition.
(RE 2808.)
E. Opposition, Replies, and Further Briefing on the

Arbitration Motions
40. On September 24, 2020, Petitioners opposed the
arbitration motions. The opposition admitted that Petitioners
intended to enter into the Agreements and made no claim that
they signed under any duress or coercion. (4 EP 1086:20-21.) The
opposition referred to a Declaration of Michael Rinder, but no
8“RE” refers to the single volume of Exhibits submitted by the

Church Defendants with this Return. Those exhibits are cited by
page number, e.g., “RE 2796” refers to page 2796.
32
such declaration was filed or served with the opposition. (4 EP
1188 [proof of service]; 6 EP 1499 [Order] [“There was no ‘Rinder
Declaration’ submitted with the opposition”].) The opposition
relied extensively on the unfiled Rinder Declaration for the
assertion that Scientology arbitration was a “religious ritual,”
that Scientology doctrine bound arbitrators to treat Petitioners
with hostility, and other highly inflammatory statements about
Scientology arbitration. (4 EP 1077:6-9; 4 EP 1079:8-24; 4 EP
1080:1-4.) Indeed, the only source cited in the opposition for the

assertion that Scientology arbitration is a “religious ritual” is the
Rinder Declaration.
41. Petitioners’ opposition did not mention “Marsy’s Law”
or the Protective Order – two arguments Petitioners now raise in
this Court. (4 EP 1072-1093.) Nor did the opposition mention any
need to stay the potential arbitration. (Ibid.)
42. On October 19, 2020, the Church Defendants filed
their replies. (5 EP 1242-1363.) The Church Defendants also
objected to the Rinder Declaration, on various grounds, including
that Rinder had no basis to opine on the nature of Scientology
33
arbitration as he had never participated in or witnessed one. 9 (5
EP 1277-1302; 5 EP 1319-1339.)
43. Three days later, Petitioners filed an unauthorized
sur-reply. There, Petitioners argued for the first time that the
Court should deny arbitration based on “Marsy’s Law” or the
Protective Order issued in the Masterson criminal matter. (5 EP
1403-1404; 11 DEO 2578-2581.) The Church Defendants objected
to the unauthorized sur-reply. (11 DEO 2583-2587.)
44. The trial court held a hearing on the arbitration

motions on November 6, 2020. Petitioners’ “primary” argument
was that enforcement of the Agreements violated the First
Amendment because the Petitioners were no longer “believers” in
Scientology. The trial court explored the implications of counsel’s
argument:
THE COURT: So let’s get back to my -- to

my illustration here or my hypothetical about
the person who leaves the employment where, I
believe, that they’re still subject to the
arbitration agreement in the employment
9As noted above, Petitioners did not file a Rinder Declaration in

support of their opposition. (See Answer ¶ 3.c, ante.) The Church
Defendants assumed that Petitioners intended to refer to the
Rinder Declaration previously filed in March 2020, and the
Church Defendants thus objected to that declaration. (5 EP
1277.) Petitioners later refiled the March 2020 Rinder
Declaration in support of their opposition. (6 EP 1500.)
34
contract. Are you saying that the rule is
different for a church member that if they have
an arbitration agreement, even if the conflict
arises while they are a church member, once
they say, “I’m leaving the church, I don’t believe
anymore,” that at that point, they’re no longer
subject to thearbitration agreement?
MS HAMILTON: That’s right, your honor.

This Court could not -- may not, under the
First Amendment, enforce an agreement
against someone who has chosen to
choose a different belief.
(5 EP 1393-1394 (boldface added).)
45. Petitioners also asserted that arbitration would

violate Marsy’s Law and the Protective Order – the same
arguments Petitioners raised for the first time in their
unauthorized sur-reply. The Court rejected the arguments,
stating, “Well, I would have to be convinced that [the Protective
Order] somehow prevents me from ordering an arbitration…
There are civil cases that are brought between parties where
there are stay away orders. I don’t think this would be unusual in
that respect.” (5 EP 1406:15-21.) The Court also noted that it had
not granted leave to Petitioners to file a sur-reply, and it would
not read a sur-reply filed without leave. (5 EP 1404:17-20.) After
35
further argument on the merits of the arbitration motions, the
trial court took the matter under submission. 10
F. The Trial Court’s Order Compelling Arbitration
46. The trial court granted the arbitration motions in a
15-page written order. (6 EP 1496.) The trial court found that
“the existence of the arbitration agreements is not in dispute”
and that the Church Defendants could enforce them. (6 EP 1504.)
47. The trial court also found that Agreements required
arbitration of Petitioners’ claims: “The plain words of the contract
are that all claims against Scientology will be sent to arbitration.

All of the arbitration agreements apply to any dispute, and are
not limited to claims that arise from the contracts. The
agreements in the motion to compel cover the instant dispute.” (6
EP 1508.)
48. The Petition challenges neither the trial court’s
findings of the existence of Agreements, nor that the scope of the
arbitration provisions encompasses their claims.
10At the trial court’s request, the parties submitted further

briefing on the Federal Arbitration Act. (6 EP 1497; 5 EP 1434-
1443; 11 DEO 2591-2597; 11 DEO 2613-2623.)
36
49. The trial court also specifically rejected Petitioners’
arguments that Scientology arbitration is a “religious ritual” and
that enforcement of the Agreements violates Petitioners’ First
Amendment rights:
 Petitioners relied on the Declaration of Michael Rinder
as “evidence” that Scientology arbitration is a “religious
ritual,” that Petitioners are “enemies” of the Church,
and that they would be subject to harassment by
Scientology arbitrators. (4 EP 1117, 1123 ¶ 19.) The

Church Defendants objected to that declaration. (5 EP
1277-1297, 1319-1339.) The trial court ruled: “Upon
review of the declaration[,] Defendants’ objections to the
declaration are sustained. The declaration is filled with
unsupported assumptions, foundational deficiencies,
irrelevant matters, improper opinions, and arguments.”
(6 EP 1500.) Petitioners have not challenged the trial
court’s ruling sustaining the objections to the Rinder
Declaration.
 The trial court found that there was “no evidence” to
support Petitioners’ argument that the arbitration
would require them to participate in a religious ritual:
37
“On the general First Amendment claims, Plaintiffs are
correct that the Court cannot compel an individual to
participate in a religious ritual. However, Plaintiffs
have submitted no evidence to indicate this would
happen if the arbitrations were ordered. Nothing in
the arbitration agreements describes any religious
rituals.” (6 EP 1504) (boldface added.)
 The trial court credited the evidence submitted by the
Church Defendants describing Scientology arbitration as

a procedure open to non-believers: “Indeed, the
declaration of Lynn Farny [Secretary of CSI] states that
there are no ceremonies, professions of religious belief,
or other religious components” as part of the arbitration.
(6 EP 1504.)
 The trial court found no “coercion” in violation of the
First Amendment: “Plaintiffs state that they are no
longer ‘believers’ in Scientology, and therefore cannot be
compelled to participate in a church arbitration. There
is nothing to indicate that a condition of the
arbitration agreement was that the individual
signatory must be a ‘believer’ in order to be bound
38
by it. To the extent that the arbitration has a religious
component, that was something agreed to by the
signatory. Hence, ordering the signatory to participate
is not coercive. Plaintiffs have not shown that
ordering them to religious arbitration would
require the[m] to practice a ritual in violation of
their religious freedoms.” (6 EP 1504) (emphases
added.)
50. The Petition ignores these findings.

51. The trial court also ordered that Masterson could
participate in the arbitration because Petitioners alleged that
Masterson was the Church Defendants’ agent. (6 EP 1509 [citing
Thomas v. Westlake (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 605, 614].) Although
Petitioners now suggest that the Church Defendants admitted to
an agency relationship between Masterson and the Church
Defendants, the Church Defendants made no such admission.
Instead, the Church Defendants argued that Petitioners’
allegation was reason enough to allow Masterson to participate in
the arbitration. Masterson’s right to compel arbitration thus
arises from Petitioners’ allegation that Masterson is an agent of
the Church Defendants, not from any finding or admission that
39
an agency relationship exists, as the cited authority makes clear.
Thomas, supra, 204 Cal.App.4th at p. 614.
G. Proceedings in This Court and the Supreme Court
52. On February 23, 2021, Petitioners brought their
Petition in this Court, which was denied. Petitioners then sought
relief in the California Supreme Court, which transferred the
case back to this Court, with directions to issue an order to show
cause. On June 4, 2021, “[p]ursuant to the Supreme Court’s May
26, 2021 order,” this Court issued an order to show cause.
40
V.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Church Defendants respectfully
requests that this Court deny the entire Petition, that Petitioners
take nothing by their action, and that the Court order any other
appropriate relief as justice may require.
Dated: July 9, 2021 WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
By:
William H. Forman

Attorneys for Defendants and
Real Parties in Interest
Church of Scientology
International & Celebrity
Centre International
Dated: July 9, 2021 JEFFER MANGELS

BUTLER & MITCHELL LLP
By: Mault
Matthew D. Hinks
Attorneys for Defendant and

Real Party in Interest
Religious Technology Center
41
VI.
VERIFICATION
I, William H. Forman, declare as follows:
I am one of the attorneys for Church of Scientology
International and Celebrity Centre International, both of whom
is a real party in interest in this matter. I have read this Return
To Order To Show Cause On Petition For Writ Of Mandate and
know its contents. The facts alleged in this return are within my
own knowledge and I know them to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the

State of California that the foregoing is true and correct and that
this verification was executed on July 9, 2021, at Los Angeles,
California.
By:
William H. Forman

42
VII.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
A. Standard of Review
Petitioners contend that the standard of review here is de
novo. (Petition at p. 26.) That is the standard applicable to
Petitioners’ legal arguments. See Lopez v. Bartlett Care Center,
LLC (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 311, 317.
But de novo review does not apply to Petitioners’ implicit
attack on the trial court’s findings below. Petitioners’ First
Amendment argument rests on an assertion that the religious

arbitration contemplated here is a “religious ritual,” a proposition
Petitioners tried to support in the trial court with the Rinder
Declaration. (See Answer ¶¶ 40, 49, ante.) The trial court
sustained the Church Defendants’ objections to that declaration,
and then concluded that the contemplated arbitration involves no
“religious rituals,” based on its review of the evidence submitted.
(6 EP 1500, 1504.)
Petitioners do not explicitly challenge the trial court’s
factual findings in this Court, although their First Amendment
arguments depend on a factual allegation rejected by the trial
court. Yet in the absence of an express challenge – or any basis to
43
overturn the trial court’s findings and evidentiary rulings – the
trial court’s rulings are undisturbed and binding on appeal.
Fritelli, Inc. v. 350 North Canon Drive, LP (2011) 202
Cal.App.4th 35, 41 (a party who fails to attack the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings on appeal forfeits any contentions of error in
those rulings); Wall Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co.
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1181-82, fn. 5 (where an appellant
fails to challenge the trial court’s rulings excluding evidence, the
appellate court will not consider that evidence when reviewing

the issues raised on appeal).
Even if Petitioners were to challenge the trial court’s
findings, those findings would be subject to the substantial
evidence, not de novo, standard of review. Lopez, supra, 39
Cal.App.5th at p. 317. Under that deferential review, this Court
“must accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and
inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are
substantially supported.” Id. at p. 318, quotes omitted. A single,
admissible declaration constitutes substantial evidence in
support of a trial court’s decision. Ibid.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s transfer to this court and
directive to issue an order to show cause amount to a
44
determination that writ relief is the only adequate avenue for
review. But the order does not mean that Petitioners are correct
on the merits of their Petition or that that they have satisfied the
standards for writ relief (not review). Desert Outdoor Advert. v.
Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 866, 872 (“The Supreme
Court’s transfer order does not mean petitioners are correct on
the merits or that a writ should issue, but rather we should
reconsider the matter and file an opinion”). Thus, after issuing
the order to show cause, this Court may “reach the same result as

[it] did upon [its] first consideration of the case.” Ibid.; see also
Gressett v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 114, 117, fn. 2
(denying writ on merits after Supreme Court’s grant and transfer
order: “The Supreme Court’s order directing that an alternative
writ be issued . . . does not stand for the proposition that the
Supreme Court has determined that petitioner was correct on the
merits, or justified, . . .); Turner v. Superior Ct. (1998) 67
Cal.App.4th 1432, 1434, fn. 1; Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v.
Superior Ct. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1389, fn. 4 (1992). For
the reasons below, it should do so here.
45
B. Enforcement of Religious Arbitration Agreements Is
Common
The Petition pretends that the “unenforceability of a
religious arbitration” agreement “is a novel issue…of widespread
interest to litigants and courts alike.” (Petition at p. 15.) Not true.
For decades, courts have enforced religious arbitration
agreements like the ones here—agreements to arbitrate disputes
by reference to religious principles or law and before a tribunal of
religiously-qualified arbitrators.
Courts express no angst or reservation that enforcing such

provisions or confirming awards issued by religious panels
violates the First Amendment. To cite just a few examples:
 Dial 800, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 50 (affirming
enforceability of judgment to be rendered in religious
arbitration where arbitrators were rabbis and decision would
follow Jewish law);
 Ortiz v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (E.D.Cal. 2014) 52 F.Supp.3d
1070, 1075 (enforcing employer/employee arbitration under
the Institute for Christian Conciliation’s Rules of Procedure
for Christian Conciliation);
46
 Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Fla., Inc. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2013)
122 So.3d 986, 992 (applying “presumption in favor of
arbitration” with equal force to “private religious arbitration,
which is exceedingly common in our pluralistic religious
society”);
 Gen. Conf. of Evangelical Methodist Church v. Evangelical
Methodist Church of Dalton, Ga., Inc. (N.D.Ga. 2011) 807
F.Supp.2d 1291, 1294, 1301 (enforcing church rules that
“believers should resolve disputes among themselves or within

the Church wherever possible,” and “by means of Christian
conciliation, mediation or arbitration”);
 Easterly v. Heritage Christian Schools, Inc. (S.D.Ind. Aug. 26,
2009, No. 1:08-cv-1714) 2009 WL 2750099, at *4 (finding
teachers at Christian school agreed to resolution of differences
by “following the biblical pattern of Matthew 18:15-17,” and
waived right to file lawsuit);
 Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church (Ill.App.
2005) 825 N.E.2d 1206, 1213 (enforcing Lutheran Church
doctrine mandating church-based arbitration of disputes);
47
 Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah (D.C. 2005) 869 A.2d
343, 359-364 (reversing order dismissing synagogue’s action to
compel arbitration before a Beth Din, a rabbinical court);
 Abd Alla v. Mourssi (Minn.Ct.App. 2004) 680 N.W.2d 569, 574
(confirming arbitration award under Islamic law);
 Jabri v. Qaddura (Tex.App. 2003) 108 S.W.3d 404, 412-414
(ordering Islamic arbitration to determine the enforceability of
a marriage contract);
 Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers (D.Col. 1999) 53

F.Supp.2d 1101, 1113 (“it may not be proper for a district
court to refer civil issues to a religious tribunal in the first
instance, [but] if the parties agree to do so, it is proper for a
district court to enforce their contract”);
 Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fishman (1991) 125 N.J. 404,
416-417 (New Jersey Supreme Court declining to reach a Free
Exercise challenge to religious arbitration because the party’s
consent to the tribunal precludes such a challenge).
As these decisions from this Court and others around the
nation show, enforcement of religious arbitration agreements is
an unexceptional, commonplace occurrence. The only novelty
48
here is the lengths Petitioners will go to avoid the arbitration
they agreed to. As discussed below, these efforts are unavailing.
C. The Arbitration Order Does Not Violate Petitioners’

First Amendment Rights
Petitioners’ primary argument is that the Arbitration
Order forces them to participate in a religious ritual in violation
of their First Amendment rights. (Petition at p. 26-35.) This
argument fails because (a) enforcing a private arbitration
contract does not constitute state action and thus cannot violate
the First Amendment, (b) Petitioners presented no competent

evidence that the arbitration contemplated by the Agreements
constitutes a “religious ritual,” and Petitioners use of the term is
a meaningless conclusion, and (c) it is solely the province of the
Church Defendants, and not the Court or Petitioners’ counsel, to
determine Scientology religious rituals and doctrines.
1. Enforcing a Private Arbitration Agreement Does

Not Constitute State Action and Thus Cannot
Violate the First Amendment
Petitioner’s First Amendment argument fails in the first
instance because “most rights secured by the Constitution are
protected only against infringement by governments,” not by
private actors. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., (1982) 457 U.S. 922,
49
936. As a result, a “threshold requirement of any constitutional
claim is the presence of state action.” Roberts v. AT&T Mobility
LLC (9th Cir. 2017) 877 F.3d 833, 837. “Without a limit such as
this, private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever
they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions
with the community surrounding them.” Lugar, supra, 457 U.S.
at p. 937.
Petitioners cannot satisfy this threshold requirement
because it “is well established that judicially enforcing

arbitration agreements does not constitute state action.” Roberts,
supra, 877 F.3d at p. 838, fn. 1; see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Air Fla. System, Inc. (9th Cir. 1987) 822 F.2d 833, 842, fn. 9
(“[W]e do not find in private arbitration proceedings the state
action requisite for a constitutional due process claim”); see also
Rifkind & Sterling, Inc. v. Rifkind (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1282,
1291 (enforcement of private arbitration award is not state
action). In the First Amendment context, enforcement of terms in
“private agreements or contracts” that “could not be enacted by
the government has not ordinarily been considered state action.”
Naoko Ohno v. Yuko Yasuma (9th Cir. 2013) 723 F.3d 984, 998-
1001 (rejecting argument by a church that foreign judgment was
50
obtained in violation of Free Exercise Clause, and thus United
States courts should not enforce it). 11
Petitioners try to avoid this result by invoking Shelley v.
Kramer (1948) 334 U.S. 1, 19-22, but that case has no application
here. “Although the United States Supreme Court has held [in
Shelley] that judicial effectuation of a racially restrictive
covenant constitutes state action, it has largely limited this
holding to the facts of those cases.” Golden Gateway Center v.
Golden Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1034,

citation omitted. In other words, “Shelley’s attribution of state
action to judicial enforcement has generally been confined to the
context of discrimination claims under the Equal Protection
Clause.” Naoko Ohno, supra, 723 F.3d at pp. 998-999 (collecting
authority). In declining to extend Shelley to a case involving the
free speech clause of the California Constitution, the California
Supreme Court explained that such extension “would effectively
eviscerate the state action requirement.” Golden Gateway Center,
11 See also Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. (9th Cir. 1998)
144 F.3d 1182, 1202-03; Davis v. Prudential Sec. (11th Cir. 1995)
59 F.3d 1186, 1191-1192, overruled on other grounds by E.E.O.C.
v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (9th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d
742, 745; Elmore v. Chicago & Ill. Midland Ry. Co. (7th Cir.
1986) 782 F.2d 94, 96.
51
supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1034; see also Naoko Ohno, supra, 723
F.3d at p. 999 (“If, for constitutional purposes, every private right
were transformed into governmental action by the mere fact of
court enforcement of it, the distinction between private and
governmental action would be obliterated,” quotes omitted).
As a result, Shelley has no application to a religious
arbitration agreement voluntarily executed by the litigants. For
example, in Spivey, supra, the court enforced an agreement to
resolve disputes through religious arbitration after noting that

Shelley involved the enforcement of a covenant “against third
parties who had not agreed to its terms, which contrasts with the
arbitration agreement voluntarily entered between” the litigants.
Spivey, supra, 122 So.3d at p. 993, italics added.
In short, First Amendment protections apply only where
there is “state action.” The enforcement of a private arbitration
agreement is not state action. Because the Arbitration Order is
not state action, the Court should deny the Petition on that basis
alone.12
12In the California Supreme Court, Petitioners argued that “[a]

court’s decision to enforce” an agreement by the parties to
consign disputes to religious arbitration is a “delegation of a core
52
2. Courts Have Rejected Petitioners’ Argument
That Enforcing Religious Arbitration
Agreements Violates the First Amendment.
Petitioners are not the first litigants hoping to evade
religious arbitration by invoking the First Amendment. Others
have tried, but their challenges have been unsuccessful. The
Church Defendants are unaware of any case in which a party
avoided religious arbitration simply because they no longer
“believe” in the religion – and Petitioners cite none. Instead,
courts facing challenges to religious arbitration agreements
routinely enforce them.

For example, in Spivey, supra, 122 So.3d at p. 988, the
plaintiff in a wrongful death case objected to arbitration of her
government function to a religious entity, and it therefore

violates the First Amendment.” (Petition at p. 28.) In support,
Petitioners cited to Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet (1994) 512 U.S. 687, 710 and Larkin v.
Grendel’s Den, Inc. (1982) 459 U.S. 116, 126. Both cases hold that
state statutes that “delegate [a State’s] civic authority to a group
chosen according to a religious criterion” violate the
Establishment Clause. Kiryas Joel, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 698;
Larkin, supra, 459 U.S. at p. 123. Here, the State has not
delegated anything; Petitioners’ Agreements with the Church
Defendants designate the forum for their dispute. As set forth
above, “[i]t is well established that judicially enforcing arbitration
agreements does not constitute state action.” Roberts, supra, 877
F.3d at p. 838, n.1. Indeed, no religious arbitration agreement
could be enforced under Petitioners’ argument, yet courts
routinely enforce them. Section B, ante.
53
claims against a drug rehabilitation center “in accordance with
the Rule[s] of Procedure for Christian Conciliation (rules) of the
Association of Christian Conciliation Services” as required by the
decedent’s arbitration agreement. Like Petitioners, the plaintiff
in Spivey invoked the First Amendment and claimed that she did
“not wish to proceed through an arbitration process that invokes
religious principles.” Id. at 992. The court rejected the argument,
noting that the “presumption in favor of arbitration” applies with
equal force to “private religious arbitration, which is exceedingly

common in our pluralistic religious society.” Ibid. Spivey also
noted that “most major religious denominations have some
method of private dispute resolution within their domains, some
going back hundreds of years.” Ibid. Accordingly, Spivey joined
earlier court decisions in enforcing the arbitration agreement. Id.
at 995.
Likewise, in Encore, supra, 53 F.Supp.2d 1101 at p. 1111
the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes using “the Holy
Scriptures” as “supreme authority.” The plaintiff later argued
against arbitration, claiming that compelling arbitration would
“violate their agents’ and employees’ rights to the free exercise of
their religion under the First Amendment.” Id. at p. 1112. The
54
district court rejected the argument, holding that although “it
may not be proper for a district court to refer civil issues to a
religious tribunal in the first instance, if the parties agree to do
so, it is proper for a district court to enforce their contract.” Id. at
1113, italics added.
Similarly, in Elmora Hebrew Center, Inc. v. Fishman (1991)
125 N.J. 404, 416-417, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to
reach a Free Exercise challenge to arbitration before a religious
tribunal because the party’s consent to the tribunal precludes

such a challenge. Elmora, like Spivey and Encore, rejects an
explicit challenge to religious arbitration on First Amendment
grounds. But these cases are in no way unique. Rather, they
show that courts uniformly enforce voluntary, private agreements
to arbitrate before religious tribunals.
This Court need look no further than to its own precedent
to find this principle. In Dial 800, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p.
48, the trial court denied a motion to compel arbitration in part
because it was “concerned that it would ultimately lack power to
confirm an arbitration award that was rendered by a religious
arbitral tribunal.” This Court reversed, holding that a decision by
a religious tribunal would still be enforceable “in California
55
secular courts.” Id. at p. 50. In reaching this result, this Court
noted that “American courts routinely enforce money judgments
and other orders” issued by religious arbitration panels. Ibid.
Dial 800 thus disproves Petitioners’ assertion that “no
California court has ever ruled on whether an arbitration that
violates the First Amendment is enforceable.” (Petition at p. 13.)
While Dial 800 did not enforce an arbitration over a specific First
Amendment objection, this Court still enforced – over objection –
a religious arbitration agreement where (1) the arbitrators would

be religious ministers and (2) the arbitration would follow
principles of religious law. In so holding, this Court rejected the
same kind of objection to religious arbitration that Petitioners
make here. Dial 800, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 50.
3. Petitioners’ “Religious Ritual” Argument

Contradicts the Record and Violates the
Religious Abstention Doctrine
Rather than engage with the weight of authority barring
their argument, Petitioners repeatedly assert that Scientology
Arbitration is a “religious ritual” and hope that this rhetoric will
fix the problem. It does not. Calling Scientology arbitration a
“ritual” – without even explaining what that means – does not
change what it is: a proceeding applying religious law to address
56
claims before a panel of arbitrators versed in the religion’s law. (6
EP 1502-1503 [Arbitration Order describing procedures,
including requirement “that the arbitration be conducted in
accordance with Scientology principle”].) If that is a “ritual,” then
so too is every other religious arbitration ordered by the courts.
Petitioners’ self-serving label of “ritual” does not alter the law
that enforcement of arbitration before religious fora is both
Constitutional and routine.
This mislabeling is not just lawyer’s rhetoric but is a sub

rosa rejection of the express findings by the trial court that
Petitioners “have not shown that ordering them to religious
arbitration would require the[m] to practice a ritual in violation
of their religious freedoms.” (6 EP 1504.) As shown above (see
Answer ¶¶ 40, 49, ante), Petitioners relied exclusively on the
Rinder Declaration for the assertion that Scientology arbitration
was a “religious ritual,” that Scientology arbitrators were
supposedly bound by Church doctrine to treat Petitioners with
hostility, and other highly inflammatory statements about
Scientology arbitration. (4 EP 1077:6-9; 4 EP 1079:8-24; 4 EP
1080:1-4.) The trial court rejected that Declaration, finding it
“filled with unsupported assumptions, foundational deficiencies,
57
irrelevant matters, improper opinions, and arguments.” (6 EP
1500.)
But even though Petitioners lost the battle to introduce
their incompetent evidence on so-called Scientology rituals, and
even though they do not challenge the trial court’s order doing so,
they continue to make the “ritual” argument, this time based
solely on the Agreements themselves. (Petition at p. 28.) This
sleight of hand does not change the record. As the parties
opposing arbitration, Petitioners bore the burden of establishing

any defense to enforcement with competent evidence. Pinnacle
Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236. They produced “no evidence” to
support their invented “religious rituals.” (6 EP 1504.) The trial
court also ruled, “[t]o the extent that the arbitration has a
religious component, that was something agreed to by the
signatory.” (Ibid.) In other words, these are voluntary religious
arbitration Agreements, period. Because Petitioners seek to
imply there is something impermissibly “ritualistic” beyond that
(whatever that would be), their evidence failed in its entirety, and
they are now bound by the trial court’s unchallenged evidentiary
rulings. Fritelli, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 41.
58
The religious “ritual” argument is not just immaterial and
unsupported: it is deeply pernicious and anti-Constitutional. It
requires the Court to supplant Scientology’s own interpretation of
the rituals of its religion with the Court’s judgment as to what
are and are not Scientology rituals. Courts have long recognized
that the First Amendment strictly forbids judicial usurpation of a
religion’s authority to interpret and determine its doctrines.
Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440, 450 (holding that

determining and interpreting the tenets of a faith is never a
proper exercise for a civil court; such an exercise “requires the
civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion—the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance
of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment
forbids civil courts from playing such a role”). See also Our Lady
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U.S. __, 140 S.Ct.
2049, 2060 (“[T]he Religion Clauses protect the right of churches
and other religious institutions to decide matters of faith and
doctrine without government intrusion,” quotation omitted).
California state courts recognize and apply these principles. In re
Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 472 (“State courts
59
must not decide questions of religious doctrine; those are for the
church to resolve”).
Against this weight of authority, Petitioners offer no
countervailing case law. Instead, they argue that “the question of
whether enforcing the religious arbitration agreement violates
Petitioners First Amendment rights . . . does not require a court
to make a doctrinal finding.” (Petition at p. 34.) But Petitioners
betray this argument by their insistence that the arbitration
required by the Agreements is a “religious ritual.” (See, e.g.,

Petition at pp. 26 [claiming the arbitration is a “religious
ceremony”], 28 [arguing that the Agreements require
“participation in a religious ritual”], 29 [same].) That question, as
shown, is effectively meaningless – enforcement of arbitration
before a religious tribunal does not violate the First Amendment.
But it also unnecessarily asks the Court to make a determination
of Church doctrine and to reject the Church Defendants’
statement that arbitration is not a ritual of the Scientology
religion, and is even available to non-Scientologists. (7 DEO
1555-1556 ¶ 23; 9 DEO 2055-2056 ¶ 23.) That request invites
manifest error. The “religious ritual” argument is an unsupported
and unsupportable argument on which relief cannot be granted.
60
4. Petitioners’ Proffered Authorities Are Out of
Date and Inapposite
Having found no arbitration cases in support of their efforts
to undercut the Arbitration Order, Petitioners turn to a trio of
family law cases that have nothing to do with arbitration: In re
Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 117 (Weiss); Abbo v.
Briskin (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 4th Dist. 1995) 660 So.2d 1157, 1159
(Abbo); and Zummo v. Zummo (Pa.Super.Ct. 1990) 574 A.2d
1130, 1146-1148 (Zummo). (Petition at p. 32.) In each of these
cases, a married couple agreed to raise their children in a

particular religion, but after divorcing, one of the parents sought
to expose the child to an alternative faith, leading the other
parent to seek a court order enjoining that exposure. Weiss, at p.
109; Zummo, at p. 52; Abbo, at p. 1158. The cases are readily
distinguishable.
First, none of these cases have anything to do with
arbitration, and no court has ever cited them in support of a
decision rejecting arbitration on religious grounds. Instead, each
case turned on whether exposure to alternative faiths would
endanger the child’s welfare – a question the reviewing courts
answered in the negative. But no minor child’s interests are at
61
issue here. Instead, Petitioners agreed on behalf of themselves
and no others to arbitrate their disputes with the Church
Defendants. As a result, this Court should hold them to that
voluntary decision. Encore, supra, 53 F.Supp.2d at pp. 1112-1113
(holding where “the parties agree” to refer disputes to a “religious
tribunal” it “is proper for a district court to enforce their
contract”).
Second, Weiss and Abbo are from jurisdictions where later
decisions explicitly rejected challenges to religious arbitration.

Compare Weiss, at p. 111 with Dial 800, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 50
(California court enforcing religious arbitration) and compare
Abbo, at p. 1158 with Spivey, 122 So.3d at pp. 991-995 (Florida
court enforcing religious arbitration). Still other later cases have
made clear that the analysis in Zummo is inapplicable to the
enforcement of arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Sotnick v.
Sotnick (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1995) 650 So.2d 157, 160 (quoting
Zummo and noting that although Court will not force parents to
raise children in a particular faith, religious arbitration
agreements remain enforceable).
Third, the relief sought in Weiss, Zummo, and Abbo differs
critically from the trial court’s order here. In each of those cases,
62
litigants asked the court to compel a parent to participate in a
religious practice or to refrain from doing so. See Abbo, at p. 1159
(trial court prohibited mother from interfering “in the
development of the child’s Jewish religious training and
upbringing” by having child “attend mass on Sunday” or “attend
parochial school or catechism classes” with step-siblings); Weiss,
at p. 110 (father sought order enforcing child’s “loyalty to the
Jewish faith and its practices” and prohibiting child’s “being
indoctrinated in the Christian faith or being enrolled in any

activity “that would be contrary to his Jewish faith”); Zummo, at
p. 1146 (trial court forbade parent from “tak[ing]the children to
religious services contrary to the Jewish faith”). This placed the
Weiss trial court, for instance in the impossible position of
potentially enforcing civil contempt orders for the litigants’
failure to practice religion. The proposed relief also would have
entangled the trial court in monitoring the adequacy of the
performance of a religious practice, so as to ensure that the child
demonstrated sufficient “loyalty” to comply with a court order.
In contrast, the issue here is a forum selection clause.
Despite the Petition’s apocalyptic tone, the trial court ruled that
Petitioners may not proceed in civil court with their claims
63
because they agreed to proceed in Scientology arbitration. That
ruling does not require a court to apply religious doctrine,
monitor religious conduct, proscribe religious conduct, or
otherwise lead to entanglement in religious issues. 13 The state
did not compel Petitioners to do anything. They may proceed – or
not – with the arbitration as they choose. No court personnel will
drag Petitioners to a Scientology arbitration, and no civil
contempt order will follow if they choose not to pursue their
claims in the agreed-upon forum. Petitioners are as free as ever

to exercise their religious rights and their conscience. If the
13Courts do not “entangle” themselves in religious disputes by

enforcing religious arbitration agreements. Meshel v. Ohev
Shalom Talmud Torah (D.C.Ct.App. 2005) 869 A.2d 343, 354 (“a
civil court can resolve appellants’ action to compel arbitration
according to objective, well-established, neutral principles of law.
Although the underlying dispute between the parties goes to the
heart of the governing structure of Ohev Sholom and therefore
may be beyond the jurisdiction of a civil court, the resolution of
appellants’ action to compel arbitration will not require the civil
court to determine, or even address, any aspect of the parties’
underlying dispute”); Sieger v. Sieger, (N.Y.Sup.Ct. June 29,
2005, No. 6975/98) 8 Misc.3d 1029, 2015 WL 2031746, at pp. *50-
51 (cited by Petition at pp. 11-12) (“To do so [compel religious
arbitration] under the circumstances of this case would violate
the First Amendment because the engagement contract does not
contain a provision that expressly provides for the resolution of
disputes before a Beth Din [Rabbinical Court], which would allow
the court to decide the issue on neutral principles of contract law,
without reference to any religious principles” [italics added]).
64
exercise of that conscience means that they will not appear in a
Scientology arbitration, then so be it. Petitioners’ quandary
results from their own decisions and has nothing to do with cases
about court-compelled and monitored religious practice or judicial
entanglement in religious affairs. Thus, Weiss, Zummo, and Abbo
do not apply.
D. The Rule Advanced by Petitioners Violates the First

Amendment
As shown in the preceding sections, neither the law nor the
facts support Petitioners’ argument that the trial court’s order

violates the First Amendment. But the problem with Petitioners’
arguments goes deeper than simply being wrong. Adoption of the
rule advocated by Petitioners would violate the First Amendment
rights of the Church Defendants and of all religions that use
religious arbitration agreements. This is because Petitioners’ rule
both (1) discriminates against enforcement of religious
arbitration agreements because of their religious character and
(2) requires the Court to alter the terms of joining the Scientology
religion, thus impinging on the Church Defendants’ rights to self-
governance and to maintain religious doctrine.
65
1. Petitioners’ Argument Impermissibly
Discriminates Against Religions
As Petitioners admitted in the trial court, their “primary”
argument is that they should be free to ignore their contractual
commitment to arbitration because they have ended their
relationship with Scientology. The trial court confirmed this with
Petitioners’ counsel: while an employee who “who leaves the
employment [is] . . . still subject to the arbitration agreement in
the employment contract,” the court asked, was Petitioners’
position that “the rule is different for a church member . . .

once they say, ‘I’m leaving the church, I don’t believe anymore’.”
“That’s right,” was counsel’s unequivocal response. “This
Court could not -- may not, under the First Amendment, enforce
an agreement against someone who has chosen to choose a
different belief.” (5 EP 1393-1394, boldface added; see also
Petition at p. 32 [arguing that Petitioners are free of their
arbitration agreements because of “their right to change their
religious minds”]; Petition at p. 28 [same].)
Thus, Petitioners claim that the rule for enforcing religious
arbitration agreements is “different” from the rule for enforcing
secular arbitration agreements because of the “change of mind”
66
defense. Petitioners argue that this peculiar restraint on religious
arbitration is required by the First Amendment. But they have
the law exactly backwards, because the First Amendment
prohibits rules that single out religious practices for disfavored
treatment just because they are religious.
The Free Exercise Clause “protects religious observers
against unequal treatment” and against “laws that impose
special disabilities on the basis of religious status.” Espinoza v.
Montana Dept. of Revenue (2020) 140 S.Ct. 2246, 2254, quotes

omitted. “At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise
Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or
all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993) 508 U.S. 520, 532.
As the Supreme Court made clear in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, “the government, if it is to respect the Constitution’s
guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are
hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act
in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the
illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.” Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civ. Rights Com. (2018) 138 S.Ct.
67
1719, 1731. “Applying that basic principle,” the Supreme Court
has “repeatedly confirmed that denying a generally available
benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty
on the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state
interest of the highest order.” Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer (2017) 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2019, quotes
omitted.14
As shown above, courts uniformly apply the First
Amendment’s non-discrimination principle to religious

arbitration agreements: where parties execute an arbitration
agreement, courts enforce the terms of that agreement even if
they call for arbitration under religious law and before religiously
qualified arbitrators. (See Section B, ante.) In addressing a
challenge to a religious arbitration agreement because it was
religious, Encore, supra, identified the danger of denying the
protections of contract law to agreements just because of their
14A law targeting religion may pass constitutional muster if it

satisfies “strict scrutiny,” i.e., “if it advances interests of the
highest order and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests.”
Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, Pa. (U.S. June 17, 2021) __ S.Ct.
__, 2021 WL 2459253, at p. *8. Petitioners address none of these
requirements – they articulate no compelling government
interests justifying their proposed rule and they fail to address
whether any alternative rule could satisfy those interests.
68
religious content: “[r]efusal to enforce the parties’ arbitration
agreement could itself arguably constitute an impermissible
entanglement [with religion,] impedance of the practice of religion
or creation of an unjust bias against religion, thereby depriving
[defendant] of its free exercise rights.” Encore, supra, 53
F.Supp.2d at p. 1113 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown (1961) 366 US
599, 607), italics added.
In short, Petitioners’ rule would mean that courts cannot
enforce religious arbitration agreements after a party decides to

leave the religion, unlike other arbitration agreements that
survive the underlying contractual relationship. 15 And there is no
reason the rule would be limited to that circumstance. A party
could also decide that she no longer wishes to be bound by what
Petitioners call the “religious ritual” of arbitration and declare
that practice of the religion offends her faith, while still
remaining otherwise a practicing member of a religion. That not
only runs contrary to all of contract law, which depends on court
15 Anarbitration clause “that fixes no temporal boundaries to its

application” applies to future disputes arising under the
agreement. See Homestake Lead Co. v. Doe Run Res. Corp.
(N.D.Cal. 2003) 282 F.Supp.2d 1131, 1140 (applying FAA);
Buckhorn v. St. Jude Heritage Med. Grp. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th
1401, 1407.
69
enforcement of agreements that at least one of the litigants would
rather disavow, but would target religious arbitration
agreements as unenforceable because they are religious. The
First Amendment forbids that “unjust bias against religion.”
Encore, supra, 53 F.Supp.2d at p. 1113.
2. The First Amendment Prohibits Petitioners’

Attempt to Re-Write the Terms for Joining
Scientology
Implementation of Petitioners’ rule also violates the First
Amendment because it impedes on the Church Defendants’ rights
to set the terms for joining the Scientology religion. Churches

have a constitutional right to accept or reject members on
whatever basis they wish. They may also impose conditions upon
membership free from government intrusion. See Watson, supra,
80 U.S. at pp. 729-731 (“All who unite themselves to [a church] do
so with an implied consent to [its] government, and are bound to
submit to it. … We cannot decide who ought to be members of the
church. . . . [W]hen they became members they did so upon the
condition of continuing or not as they and their churches might
determine, and they thereby submit to the ecclesiastical power
and cannot now invoke the supervisory power of the civil
tribunals”); Our Lady of Guadalupe School, supra, 140 S.Ct. at p.
70
2060 (”State interference in that sphere [i.e., matters “of faith
and doctrine”] would obviously violate the free exercise of
religion, and any attempt by government to dictate or even to
influence such matters would constitute one of the central
attributes of an establishment of religion. The First Amendment
outlaws such intrusion”); Church of Scientology v. City of
Clearwater (11th Cir. 1993) 2 F.3d 1514, 1544 (striking down city
ordinance requiring church to disclose to its members
expenditures from donations: “The City may not intervene on

behalf of such dissidents. If they remain dissatisfied with the
church’s voluntarily assumed disclosure policy then they may
attempt to reform that policy from within, they may acquiesce in
the policy despite their objections or they may leave the church”).
Petitioners signed the Agreements requiring arbitration as
a condition of receiving Scientology services. (7 DEO 1554 ¶ 17.)
They acknowledged that in determining whether to accept them
for participation in the religion, the Church Defendants “will rely
on the acknowledgments, agreements, representations and
promises which I have made herein.” (7 DEO 1643 ¶ 8 [Exemplar
Agreement].) An “irrevocable” agreement to “forever” waive civil
proceedings and be bound by Scientology Ethics and Justice
71
Codes in “any dispute” with Churches of Scientology is a
condition for participation in the religion. (7 DEO 1642 ¶¶ 6.a, b
[Exemplar Agreement]; 7 DEO 1554 ¶ 17.) The justice codes and
procedures are an inherent part of the religion and derive from
its core beliefs. (7 DEO 1552 ¶ 12.)
Petitioners seek nothing less than to have this Court annul
the unmistakable conditions on which the Church admits persons
to the Scientology religion. Their departure from the religion
alters not at all the “irrevocable” promises they made that the

Church Defendants required as condition to join the religion. Of
course, persons can leave Scientology at any time – as Petitioners
did. But as the trial court found, the promise to use Scientology
law in any dealings with the Church Defendants did not depend
on remaining a Church member or a “believer” in Scientology. (6
EP 1504.) Under Watson and its progeny, a Court cannot re-write
the terms for initiation into a religion – be it a baptism, a bar
mitzvah, or an agreement for religious services – any more than
it can amend other doctrine. Granting the Petition would do
exactly that.
72
E. The Arbitration Order Does Not Violate Marsy’s Law
or the Protective Order
Petitioners also contend that the Arbitration Order violates
the Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008, Cal. Const., art. I, § 28,
also known as “Marsy’s Law,” and the Protective Order issued in
Masterson’s criminal case. (Petition at pp. 35-39.) As explained
below, the arguments are both untimely and meritless.
1. Petitioners’ Arguments Are Untimely
It is unclear whether Petitioners argue that Marsy’s Law
and the Protective Order forbid arbitration of Petitioners’ claims

for all time or if they merely require a court to stay arbitration
while Masterson’s criminal case is pending. The Petition
inconsistently asserts both positions. (Compare Petition at p. 36
[“arbitration cannot be compelled against the Petitioners”] with
id. at p. 39 [asking this Court “to stay arbitration”].) Regardless
of which relief Petitioners seek, the request is not properly before
this Court.
If Petitioners now contend that Marsy’s Law and the
Protective Order permanently forbid arbitration of their claims,
then Petitioners failed to properly raise that argument in the
trial court. Although the district attorney charged Masterson and
73
the criminal court entered the Protective Order before Petitioners
opposed the Church Defendants’ arbitration motions, Petitioners
failed to even mention Marsy’s Law or the Protective Order in
their opposition. Instead, Petitioners waited to raise those issues
for the first time in an unauthorized sur-reply. (11 DEO 2578-
2581.) The Church Defendants objected to the unauthorized sur-
reply, and because the arguments were not timely raised, the
trial court refused to consider them. (See id. 2583-2587
[objection]; 5 EP 1402-1404 [hearing in which the Court declined

to entertain the untimely arguments]; 6 EP 1496-1510
[Arbitration Order refused to address them].) In so holding, trial
court merely held Petitioners to the rules, and this Court should
not reverse that decision. Parsons v. Superior Court (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 6-7 (declining to consider evidence and
argument presented for the first time in writ proceedings)
(disagreed with on other grounds by Borsuk v. Appellate Div. of
Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607); Medical Bd. of Calif.
v. Superior Court (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1458, 1462 (on a writ
petition, the Court’s “concern is whether the respondent court
acted properly on the record before it” [italics added]).
74
If, on the other hand, Petitioners seek only a stay of
arbitration, their Petition is premature, because the trial court
has not yet ruled on this request. Although Petitioners first
raised Marsy’s Law and the Protective Order in their
unauthorized sur-reply, they did not request a stay of arbitration
in that filing. Instead, Petitioners waited until February 2, 2021
– a month after they lost the arbitration motions – to file a
written motion seeking a stay of arbitration under Marsy’s Law
and the Protective Order. (RE 2796-2806.) That motion remains

pending, because the trial court set it for hearing after this Court
resolves the Petition. (RE 2808.) A writ petition should not reach
issues that the trial court has not yet addressed. Concerned
Citizens Coalition of Stockton v. City of Stockton (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 70, 83; Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP v. Superior
Court (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1236-37.
2. Marsy’s Law Lends No Support to Petitioners’

Efforts to Avoid Arbitration
Petitioners’ Marsy’s Law argument also fails on substance
because the law applies only in criminal cases, not civil cases.
The law’s opening section states that the “rights of victims of
crime and their families in criminal prosecutions are a subject of
75
grave statewide concern.” Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(a)(1), italics
added. The next section provides: “Victims of crime are entitled to
have the criminal justice system view criminal acts as serious
threats to the safety and welfare of the people of California. The
enactment of comprehensive provisions and laws ensuring a bill
of rights for victims of crime, including safeguards in the criminal
justice system fully protecting those rights and ensuring that
crime victims are treated with respect and dignity, is a matter of
high public importance.” Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(a)(2), italics

added. Similarly, Section 28(a)(3), which enumerates the 17
substantive rights provided to victims, specifically frames those
rights as occurring in the criminal justice system: “The rights of
victims pervade the criminal justice system. These rights include
personally held and enforceable rights described in paragraphs
(1) through (17).” Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(a)(3), italics added.
Thus, by its plain wording, Marsy’s Law enumerates only
rights afforded “in the criminal justice system.” It provides those
rights to “victims” – not “plaintiffs” – and contemplates that those
rights will apply only to a criminal defendant. These rights
include, for instance, the right to have victim’s safety factor in
bail determinations, the right of the victim to reasonable notice of
76
the arrest of and charges against the defendant, and the right to
notice of the conviction and incarceration of the defendant. Cal.
Const., art. I, § 28(a)(3), pars. 3, 6, 12. It is thus no surprise that
California courts have limited the law’s reach to criminal cases
against criminal defendants. See, e.g., Santos v. Brown (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 398, 420-421 (declining to apply Marsy’s Law to
executive clemency proceedings because they did not qualify as
criminal justice proceedings).
Having no California authority in support of their

argument, Petitioners resort to out-of-state authority
interpreting different laws. For example, they rely on State v. Lee
(Ariz.Ct.App. Jan. 13, 2011) 245 P.3d 919, but that case
considered the application of Arizona’s Victim Bill of Rights – not
Marsy’s Law – to discovery in a civil case. Although Petitioners
assert that the Arizona law is “nearly identical” to Marsy’s Law,
this is untrue, because the preamble to the Arizona Bill does not
limit its application to criminal justice proceedings. Ariz. Const.,
art. II, § 2.1(A). Furthermore, State v. Lee concerned different
facts: there criminal defendants sought to depose their criminal
victims in a civil forfeiture action in which the victims were not
parties. But here, Petitioners seek to invoke protections against
77
examination and discovery in a civil action they brought against
civil defendants. Lee does not apply.
Petitioners’ other Arizona case, Lizarraga v. City of Nogales
(D.Ariz. Nov. 29, 2007), 2007 WL 4218972, at p. *3, is likewise
inapposite. Lizarraga did not consider the application of Marsy’s
Law, or any similar victims’ rights statute, to a civil proceeding.
Furthermore, in Lizarraga the charging allegation in the civil
case – sexual assault – was identical to the criminal case. But
that is not the case here: Masterson’s criminal charges concern

events between 2001 and 2003, while the charging allegations in
this civil suit concern events allegedly occurring more than a
dozen years later. (6 EP 1506.)
Petitioners also point to State v. Deal (Minn. 2007) 740
N.W.2d 755, a case from Minnesota that also says nothing about
Marsy’s Law or any analogous “victims’ rights” law. Rather, in
Deal the State of Minnesota intervened in a civil case to stay a
deposition by the criminal defendant of his victim who was not a
party to the civil case. No prosecutor or other state official has
sought to intervene in this civil case, and thus Deal does not
apply.
78
Petitioners’ conduct before filing the instant Petition
reveals that their Marsy’s Law argument is nothing but a cynical
gambit to delay arbitration. When the Los Angeles County
District Attorney announced its charges against Masterson on
June 17, 2020, Petitioners did not move for a stay. They
continued to actively litigate their case. They filed a Case
Management Conference (“CMC”) Statement on August 20, 2020,
stating that they could complete discovery in a year. (11 DEO
2555.) Where the CMC required them to list any motions they

expected to file, they said nothing about a stay motion and
instead left the space blank. (Ibid.) Petitioners then began
discovery in September 2020, serving a notice of deposition on
Masterson and issuing a subpoena to his criminal lawyer for his
files – actions contradictory to their position that Marsy’s Law
forbids proceedings in this case. (Petition at pp. 12; 11 DEO 2668-
2672.) Only after the Church Defendants filed replies in support
of their arbitration motions did Petitioners mention Marsy’s Law.
They did not move to stay under Marsy’s Law until February 2,
2021 – after they lost the motions to arbitrate. These are not the
actions of persons who believe that a civil proceeding presents an
imminent threat to their Marsy’s Law rights. Rather, they show
79
that these litigants will use anything as pretext to undo
their contractual obligations.
3. The Arbitration Order Does Not Violate the

Protective Order
The Petition asserts that “the Court has issued a protective
order in the criminal case to prevent any contact by defendant
Masterson” or his alleged “agents,” the Church Defendants, with
“Petitioners in this case, which would be violated if the Court
compels arbitration.” (Petition at p. 36.) Based on that reading,
Petitioners seek to reverse the Arbitration Order.

But the reading is wrong, for four reasons. First, the
Protective Order does not mention any Church Defendant. (4 EP
1071.) Nor is it directed at “agents” of Masterson. It instead
prohibits Masterson from using third parties (excluding
attorneys) to contact the protected persons. Petitioners make no
showing here that Masterson has used or would use the Church
Defendants to contact anyone on his behalf.
Second, Petitioners’ contention that the Church Defendants
admitted to being Masterson’s agent (or that the Church
Defendants admitted that Masterson was a Church Defendant
agent) finds no support in the record. Although the Petition
80
points to “Defendant RTC’s Reply in Support of Motions to
Compel Religious Arbitration at 10” in support of this assertion,
(a) Petitioners failed to include that reply in their Exhibits and
(b) rather than admitting to agency, the reply instead asserts – in
bold and italics – that Petitioners “have alleged that Masterson
is an agent of Defendants; and as an alleged agent, Masterson
may enforce the Agreements.” (Compare Petition at p. 38 with 11
DEO 2570:11-13, some italics omitted.) The trial court relied on
that allegation of agency, not any admission by the Church

Defendants, in the Arbitration Order. (6 EP 1509.)
Third, the Protective Order says nothing about arbitration,
and it contains no language suggesting it “would be violated if the
Court compels arbitration,” as Petitioners now maintain.
(Petition at pp. 19, 36.) It is also silent on any “irreparable harm
Petitioners would experience by being forced to interact with
defendant Masterson,” despite what Petitioners now claim. (See
Petition at p. 19.) As the trial court noted at oral argument,
“[t]here are civil cases that are brought between parties where
there are stay away orders. I don’t think this would be unusual in
that respect.” (5 EP 1406:15-21.) Petitioners identify no error in
this reasoning.
81
Fourth, although Petitioners purport to fear appearing at
arbitration “without any reasonable conditions to protect them,”
they cite no evidence that this will happen. (Petition at p. 38.)
Moreover, even if the Protective Order required special
procedural safeguards for Petitioners here, the arbitration panel
should determine those procedures in the first instance. See
Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 482, 488. Because Petitioners have not started
arbitration against the Church Defendants, they have not even

tried to raise these alleged concerns with the arbitrators. 16
In the end, Petitioners’ invocation of the Protective Order is
mere pretext. Although every civil case that proceeds in tandem
with a criminal case carries some risk of violating a criminal
protective order, mere risk is not a bar on civil cases moving
forward. And more critically here, that risk offers no reason to
invalidate Petitioners’ agreement to arbitrate their disputes. The
potential for contact or confrontation between Petitioners and
Masterson – most likely begun by Petitioners, as they initiated
16The Protective Order does not apply to Petitioner Bixler-

Zavala, and for that added reason he cannot invoke its
protections in this civil case. (See 4 EP 1071.)
82
discovery against Masterson – is in no way unique to the arbitral
forum and would exist equally in a civil suit adjudicated in the
superior court. Finally, by their conduct Petitioners have already
admitted that they can depose Masterson without violating the
Protective Order. (5 EP 1204-1205; 5 EP 1216.) There is no
reason to treat proceeding with the arbitration any differently.
83
VIII.
CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Petition should be summarily
denied.
By:
William H. Forman


By: Abed
Matthew D. Hinks

84
CERTIFICATE OF WORD COUNT
Pursuant to Rules 8.485(a) and 8.204(c)(1) of the California
Rules of Court and in reliance on the word count of the computer
program used to prepare this Preliminary Opposition, counsel
certifies that the text of this brief was produced using 13 point
font and contains 13,857 words.
By:
William H. Forman


By: Abulllf
Matthew D. Hinks

1
PROOF OF SERVICE
C.C.P. §1013(a), 2015.5
I, the undersigned, hereby declare under penalty of perjury
as follows: I am a citizen of the United States, and over the age of
eighteen years, and not a party to the within action; my business
address is 333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90071-
1543. On this date, I served the interested parties in this action
the within documents: RETURN TO ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE;
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT via the Court’s online True

Filing system as follows:
Robert W. Thompson
Thompson Law Offices
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94019
Email: bobby@tlopc.com
Marci A. Hamilton
36 Timber Knoll Drive
Washington Crossing, PA 18977
Email: hamilton.marci@gmail.com
Andrew Brad Brettler

Lavely & Singer
2049 Century Park East
Suite 2400
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
1
I, the undersigned, also hereby declare under penalty of
perjury as follows: I am a citizen of the United States, and over
the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the within action;
my business address is 333 South Grand Avenue, Los Angeles,
CA 90071-1543. On this date, I forwarded the within documents:
RETURN TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ON PETITION
FOR WRIT OF MANDATE; MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
by U.S. Mail to:
Los Angeles County Superior Court (via USPS)

Central District, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Dept. 37
111 North Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012
Executed at Los Angeles, California on July 9, 2021.
Pamela Tanigawa

Bixler V Scientology: Return To Show Cause

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Civ. Code § 1708.8 .......................................................................... 21

Federal Arbitration Act ................................................................. 29

Marsy’s Law ............................................................................ passim

Victims’ Bill of Rights Act of 2008 ................................................ 66

Ariz. Const., art. II, § 2.1(A) .......................................................... 70

Cal. Const., art. I, § 28 ....................................................... 66, 69, 70

“I changed my mind” is not a defense to enforcement of a

contract. But Petitioners’ argument is just that. They propose a

radical new rule that allows a party to disregard her voluntary

agreement to arbitrate before a religious tribunal if she later

claims to have changed her religious beliefs. No court has so