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Theoretical Terms in Science

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Stanford Encyclopedia A simple explanation of theoreticity says that a term is theoretical if and
only if it refers to nonobservational entities. Paradigmatic examples of
of Philosophy such entities are electrons, neutrinos, gravitational forces, genes etc. There
is yet another explanation of theoreticity: a theoretical term is one whose
meaning becomes determined through the axioms of a scientific theory.
The meaning of the term ‘force’, for example, is seen to be determined by
Newton’s laws of motion and further laws about special forces, such as the
law of gravitation. Theoreticity is a property that is commonly applied to
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson
both expressions in the language of science, and referents and concepts of
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such expressions. Objects, relations and functions as well as concepts
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https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html thereof may thus qualify as theoretical in a derived sense.

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Several semantics have been devised that aim to explain how a scientific
theory contributes to the interpretation of its theoretical terms and as such
determines what they mean and how they are understood. All of these
semantics assume the respective theory to be given in an axiomatic
fashion. Yet, theoretical terms are also recognizable in scientific theories
which have as yet resisted a satisfying axiomatization. This is due to the
fact that these theories contain general propositions that have the logical
form of universal axioms.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Theoretical terms pertain to a number of topics in the philosophy of
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The Metaphysics Research Lab science. A fully fledged semantics of such terms commonly involves a
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moreover, may involve an account of how observation is related to theory
Theoretical Terms in Science in science. All formal accounts of theoretical terms deny the analytic-
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Holger Andreas synthetic distinction to be applicable to the axioms of a scientific theory.
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The recognition of theoretical terms in the language of science by Carnap
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 Theoretical Terms in Science Holger Andreas

thus amounts to a rejection of an essential tenet of early logical empiricism 1. Two Criteria of Theoreticity
and positivism, viz., the demonstration that all empirically significant
sentences are translatable into an observation language. The present article 1.1 Reference to Nonobservable Entities and Properties
explains the principal distinction between observational and theoretical
terms, discusses important criticisms and refinements of this distinction As just explained, a theoretical term may simply be understood as an
and investigates two problems concerning the semantics of theoretical expression that refers to nonobservable entities or properties. Theoreticity,
terms. Finally, the major formal accounts of this semantics are expounded. on this understanding, is the negation of observabilty. This explanation of
theoreticity thus rests on an antecedent understanding of observability.
1. Two Criteria of Theoreticity What makes an entity or property observable? As Carnap (1966: ch. 23)
1.1 Reference to Nonobservable Entities and Properties has pointed out, a philosopher understands the notion of observability in a
1.2 Semantic Dependence upon a Scientific Theory narrower sense than a physicist. For a philosopher, a property is
2. Criticisms and Refinements of the Theory-Observation Distinction observable if it can be ‘directly perceived by the senses’. Hence, such
2.1 Criticisms properties as ‘blue’, ‘hard’ and ‘colder than’ are paradigmatic examples of
2.2 Refinements observable properties in the philosopher’s understanding of observability.
3. Two Problems of Theoretical Terms The physicist, by contrast, would also count quantitative magnitudes that
3.1 Theoretical Entities can be measured in a ‘relatively simple, direct way’ as observable. Hence,
3.1.1 The realist view the physicist views such quantities as temperature, pressure and intensity
3.1.2 Non-realist views of electric current as observable.
3.1.3 The Pythagorean view
3.2 Theoretical Functions and Relations The notion of direct perception is spelled out by Carnap (1966: ch. 23) by
4. Formal Accounts two conditions. Direct perception means, first, perception unaided by
4.1 The Ramsey Sentence technical instruments and, second, that the perception is unaided by
4.2 Indirect Interpretation inferences. These two conditions are obviously not satisfied for the
4.3 Direct Interpretation measurement of quantities like temperature and pressure. For the
4.4 Defining Theoretical Terms philosopher, only spatial positions of liquids and pointers are observed
5. Conclusion when these quantities are measured. To an even higher degree, we are
Bibliography unable to observe electrons, molecules, gravitational forces and genes on
Academic Tools this narrow understanding of observability. Hence, expressions referring to
Other Internet Resources such entities qualify as theoretical.
Related Entries
In sum, a property or object is observable (in the philosopher’s sense) if it
can be perceived directly, where directness of observation precludes the

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 Theoretical Terms in Science
use of technical artifacts and inferences. Notably, Carnap (1936/37: 455;
1966: 226) did not think his explanation of the distinction to be
sufficiently precise to result in a sharp line between observational and
theoretical terms. He rather views the theory-observation distinction as
being introduced into a ‘continuum of degrees of observability’ by choice.
Prominent criticisms of the theory-observation distinction will be
discussed in Section 2.1.
1.2 Semantic Dependence upon a Scientific Theory
The above explanation of theoreticity may be felt unsatisfactory as it
determines the property of being theoretical only via negation of the
property of being observable (Putnam 1962). This explanation does not
indicate any specific connection between the semantics of theoretical
terms and corresponding scientific theories. There is, however, also a
direct characterization of theoreticity that complements the criterion of
non-observability: an expression is theoretical if and only if its meaning is
determined through the axioms of a scientific theory. This explanation
rests on what has come to be referred to as the contextual theory of
meaning, which says that the meaning of a scientific term depends, in
some way or other, on how this term is incorporated into a scientific
theory.
Why adopt the contextual theory of meaning for scientific terms? Suppose
the notion of meaning is understood along the lines of the Fregean notion
of sense. The sense of a term be understood as that what determines its
reference (cf. Church 1956: 6n). It is, furthermore, a reasonable
requirement that a semantic theory must account for our understanding of
the sense and, hence, our methods of determining the extension of
scientific terms (cf. Dummett 1991: 340). For a large number of scientific
terms these methods rest upon axioms of one or more scientific theories.
There is no way of determining the force function in classical mechanics
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without using some axiom of this theory. Familiar methods make use of
Newton’s second law of motion, Hooke’s law, the law of gravitation etc.
Likewise, virtually all methods of measuring temperature rest upon laws
of thermodynamics. Take measurement by a gas thermometer which is
based on the ideal gas law. The laws of scientific theories are thus essential
to our methods of determining the extension of scientific terms. The
contextual theory of meaning, therefore, makes intelligible how students
in a scientific discipline and scientists grasp the meaning, or sense, of
scientific terms. On this account, understanding the sense of a term means
knowing how to determine its referent, or extension, at least in part.
The contextual theory of meaning can be traced back at least to the work
of Duhem. His demonstration that a scientific hypothesis in physics cannot
be tested in isolation from its theoretical context is joined with and
motivated by semantic considerations, according to which it is physical
theories that give meaning to the specific concepts of physics (Duhem
1906: 183). Poincaré (1902: 90) literally claims that certain scientific
propositions acquire meaning only by virtue of the adoption of certain
conventions. Perhaps the most prominent and explicit formulation of the
contextual theory of meaning is to be found in Feyerabend’s landmark
“Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism” (1962: 88):
For just as the meaning of a term is not an intrinsic property but is
dependent upon the way in which the term has been incorporated
into a theory, in the very same manner the content of a whole
theory (and thereby again the meaning of the descriptive terms
which it contains) depends upon the way in which it is
incorporated into both the set of its empirical consequences and the
set of all the alternatives which are being discussed at a given time:
once the contextual theory of meaning has been adopted, there is
no reason to confine its application to a single theory, especially as
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the boundaries of such a language or of such a theory are almost
never well defined.
The accounts of a contextual theory of meaning in the works of Duhem,
Poincaré and Feyerabend are informal insofar as they do not crystallize
into a corresponding formal semantics for scientific terms. Such a
crystallization is brought about by some of the formal accounts of
theoretical terms to be expounded in Section 4.
The view that meaning is bestowed upon a theoretical term through the
axioms of a scientific theory implies that only axiomatized or
axiomatizable scientific theories contain theoretical terms. In fact, all
formal accounts of the semantics of theoretical terms are devised to apply
to axiomatic scientific theories. This is due, in part, to the fact that physics
has dominated the philosophy of science for a long time. One must
wonder, therefore, whether there are any theoretical terms in, for example,
evolutionary biology which has as yet resisted complete axiomatization.
Arguably, there are. Even though evolutionary biology has not yet been
axiomatized, we can recognize general propositions therein that are
essential to determining certain concepts of this theory. Consider the
following two propositions. (i) Two DNA sequences are homologous if
and only if they have a common ancestor sequence. (ii) There is an inverse
correlation between the number of mutations necessary to transform one
DNA-sequence S1 into another S2 and the likelihood that S1 and S2 are
homologous. Notably, these two propositions are used to determine,
among other methods, relations of homology in evolutionary biology. The
majority of general propositions in scientific theories other than those of
physics, however, have instances that fail to be true. (Some philosophers
of science have argued that this so even for a large number of axioms in
physics [Cartwright 1983]). Formal semantics of theoretical terms in
scientific theories with default axioms are presently being developed.
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2. Criticisms and Refinements of the Theory-
Observation Distinction
2.1 Criticisms
The very idea of a clear-cut theory-observation distinction has received
much criticism. First, with the help of sophisticated instruments, such as
telescopes and electron microscopes, we are able to observe more and
more entities, which had to be considered unobservable at a previous stage
of scientific and technical evolution. Electrons and α-particles which can
be observed in a cloud chamber are a case in point (Achinstein 1965).
Second, assume observability is understood as excluding the use of
instruments. On this understanding, examples drawing on the use of cloud
chambers and electron microscopes, which are adduced to criticize the
theory-observation distinction, can be dealt with. However, we would then
have to conclude that things being perceived with glasses are not observed
either, which is counterintuitive (Maxwell 1962). Third, there are concepts
applying to or being thought to apply to both macroscopic and
submicroscopic particles. A case in point are spatial and temporal relations
and the color concepts that play an important role in Newton’s corpuscle
theory of light. Hence, there are clear-cut instances of observation
concepts that apply to unobservable entities, which does not seem
acceptable (cf. Putnam 1962).
These objections to the theory-observation distinction can be answered in
a relatively straightforward manner from a Carnapian perspective. As
explained in Section 1.1, Carnap (1936/37, 1966) was quite explicit that
the philosopher’s sense of observation excludes the use of instruments. As
for an observer wearing glasses, a proponent of the theory-observation
distinction finds enough material in Carnap (1936/37: 455) to defend her
position. Carnap is aware of the fact that color concepts are not observable
ones for a color-blind person. He is thus prepared to relativize the
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distinction in question. In fact, Carnap’s most explicit explanation of
observability defines this notion in such a way that it is relativized to an
organism (1936/37: 454n).
Recall, moreover, that Carnap’s theory-observation distinction was not
intended to do justice to our overall understanding of these notions.
Hence, certain quotidian and scientific uses of ‘observation’, such as
observation using glasses, may well be disregarded when this distinction is
drawn as long as the distinction promises to be fruitful in the logical
analysis of scientific theories. A closer look reveals that Carnap (1966:
226) agrees with critics of the logical empiricists’ agenda, such as
Maxwell (1962) and Achinstein (1965), on there being no clear-cut theory-
observation distinction (see also Carnap’s early (1936/37: 455) for a
similar statement):
There is no question here of who [the physicist thinking that
temperature is observable or the philosopher who disagrees, H. A.]
is using the term ‘observable’ in the right or proper way. There is a
continuum which starts with direct sensory observations and
proceeds to enormously complex, indirect methods of observation.
Obviously no sharp line can be drawn across this continuum; it is a
matter of degree.
A bit more serious is Putnam’s (1962) objection drawing on the
application of apparently clear-cut instances of observation concepts to
submicroscopic particles. Here, Carnap would have to distinguish between
color concepts applying to observable entities and related color concepts
applying to unobservable ones. So, the formal language in which the
logical analysis proceeds would have to contain a predicate ‘red1 ’ applying
to macroscopic objects and another one ‘red2 ’ applying to submicroscopic
ones. Again, such a move would be in line with the artificial, or ideal
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language philosophy that Carnap proclaimed (see Lutz (2012) for a
sympathetic discussion of artificial language philosophy.)
There is another group of criticisms coming from the careful study of the
history of science: Hanson (1958), Feyerabend (1962) and Kuhn (1962)
aimed to show that observation concepts are theory-laden in a manner that
makes their meaning theory-dependent. In Feyerabend’s (1978: 32) this
contention takes on the formulation that all terms are theoretical. Hanson
(1958: 18) thinks that Tycho and Kepler were (literally) ‘seeing’ different
things when perceiving the sun rising because their astronomical
background theories were different. Kuhn (1962) was more tentative when
expounding his variant of the theory-ladenness of observation. In a
discussion of the Sneed formalism of the structuralist school, he favored a
theory-observation distinction that is relativized, first to a theory and
second to an application of this theory (Kuhn 1976).
Virtually all formal accounts of theoretical terms in fact assume that those
phenomena that a theory T is meant to account for can be described in
terms whose semantics does not depend on T. The counter thesis that even
the semantics of putative observation terms depends on a quotidian or
scientific theory, therefore, attacks a core doctrine coming with the logical
empiricists’ and subsequent work on theoretical terms. A thorough
discussion and assessment of theory-ladenness of observation in the works
of the great historians of science is beyond the scope of this entry. Bird
(2004), Bogen (2012) and Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene (2009) are
entries in the present encyclopedia that address, among other things, this
issue. Schurz (2013: ch. 2.9) defines a criterion of the theory independence
of observation in terms of an ostensive learning experiment, and shows
how such a criterion helps answer the challenges of theory-ladenness of
observation.
2.2 Refinements
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There is a simple, intuitive and influential proposal how to relativize the
theory-observation distinction in a sensible way: a term t is theoretical
with respect to a theory T, or for short, a T-term if and only if it is
introduced by the theory T at a certain stage in the history of science. O-
terms, by contrast, are those that were antecedently available and
understood before T was set forth (Lewis 1970; cf. Hempel 1973). This
proposal draws the theory-observation distinction in an apparently sharp
way by means of relativizing that distinction to a particular theory.
Needless to say, the proposal is in line with the contextual theory of
meaning.
The distinction between T-terms and antecedently available ones has two
particular merits. First, it circumvents the view that any sharp line between
theoretical and observational terms is conventional and arbitrary. Second,
it connects the theory-observation distinction with what seemed to have
motivated that distinction in the first place, viz., the investigation how we
come to understand the meaning of terms that appear to be meaningful in
virtue of certain scientific theories.
A similar proposal of a relativized theory-observation distinction was
made by Sneed in his seminal The Logical Structure of Mathematical
Physics (1979: ch. II). Here is a somewhat simplified and more syntactic
formulation of Sneed’s criterion of T-theoreticity:
Definition 1 (T-theoreticity)
A term t is theoretical with respect to the theory T, or for short, T-
theoretical if and only if any method of determining the extension of t,
or some part of that extension, rests on some axiom of T.
It remains to explain what it is for a method m of determining the
extension of t to rest upon an axiom ϕ . This relation obtains if and only if
the use of m depends on ϕ being a true sentence. In other words, m rests
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upon ϕ if and only if the hypothetical assumption of ϕ being false or
indeterminate would invalidate the use of m in the sense that we would be
lacking the commonly presumed justification for using m. The
qualification ‘or some part of that extension’ has been introduced in the
present definition because we cannot expect a single measurement method
to determine the extension of a scientific quantity completely. T-non-
theoreticity is the negation of T-theoreticity:
Definition 2 (T-non-theoreticity)
A term t is T-non-theoretical if and only if it is not T-theoretical.
The concepts of classical particle mechanics (henceforth abbreviated by
CPM) exemplify well the notions of T-theoreticity and T-non-theoreticity.
As has been indicated above, all methods of determining the force acting
upon a particle make use of some axiom of classical particle mechanics,
such as Newton’s laws of motion or some law about special forces. Hence,
force is CPM-theoretical. Measurement of spatial distances, by contrast, is
possible without using axioms of CPM. Hence, the concept of spatial
distance is CPM-non-theoretical. The concept of mass is less
straightforward to classify as we can measure this concept using classical
collision mechanics (CCM). Still, it was seen to be CPM-theoretical by the
structuralists since CCM appeared reducible to CPM (Balzer et al. 1987:
ch. 2).
Suppose for a term t once introduced by a scientific theory T1 novel
methods of determination become established through another theory T2 ,
where these methods do not depend on any axiom of T1 . Then, t would
neither qualify as T1 -theoretical nor as T2 -theoretical. It is preferable, in
this situation, to relativize Definition 1 to theory-nets N , i.e., compounds
of several theories. Whether there are such cases has not yet been settled.
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 Theoretical Terms in Science
The original exposition of the theoreticity criterion by Sneed (1979) is a
bit more involved as it makes use of set-theoretic predicates and intended
applications, rather technical notions of what became later on labeled the
structuralist approach to scientific theories. There has been a lively
discussion, mainly but not exclusively within the structuralist school, how
to express the relativized notion of theoreticity most properly (Balzer
1986; 1996). As noted above, Kuhn (1976) proposed a twofold
relativization of theoreticity, viz., first to a scientific theory and second to
applications of such theories.
Notably, Sneed’s criterion of T-theoreticity suggests a strategy that allows
us to regain a global, non-relativized theory-observation distinction:
simply take a term t to be theoretical if and only if it holds, for all methods
m of determining its extension, that m rests upon some axiom of some
theory T. A term t is non-theoretical, or observational, if and only if there
are means of determining its extension, at least in part, that do not rest
upon any axiom of any theory. This criterion is still relative to our present
stage of explicit axiomatic theorizing but comes nonetheless closer to the
original intention of Carnap’s theory-observation distinction, according to
which observation is understood in the narrow sense of unaided
perception.
3. Two Problems of Theoretical Terms
The problem of theoretical terms is a recurrent theme in the philosophy of
science literature (Achinstein 1965; Sneed 1979: ch. II; Tuomela 1973: ch.
V; Friedman 2011). Different shades of meaning have been associated
with this problem. In its most comprehensive formulation, the problem of
theoretical terms is to give a proper account of the meaning and reference
of theoretical terms. There are at least two kinds of expression that pose a
distinct problem of theoretical terms, respectively. First, unary predicates
referring to theoretical entities, such as ‘electron’, ‘neutrino’ and
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‘nucleotide’. Second, non-unary theoretical predicates, such as ‘homology’
in evolutionary biology and theoretical function expressions, such as
‘force’, ‘temperature’ and ‘intensity of the electromagnetic field’ in
physics. Sneed’s problem of theoretical terms, as expounded in (1979: ch.
II), concerns only the latter kind of expression. We shall now start
surveying problems concerning the semantics of expressions for
theoretical entities and then move on to expressions for theoretical
relations and functions.
3.1 Theoretical Entities
A proper semantics for theoretical terms involves an account of reference
and one of meaning and understanding. Reference fixing needs to be
related to meaning as we want to answer the following question: how do
we come to refer successfully to theoretical entities? This question calls
for different answers depending on what particular conception of a
theoretical entity is adopted. The issue of realism and its alternatives,
therefore, comes into play at this point.
For the realist, theoretical entities exist independently from our theories
about the world. Also, natural kinds that classify these entities exist
independently from our theories (cf. Psillos 1999; Lewis 1984). The
instrumentalist picture is commonly reported to account for theoretical
entities in terms of mere fictions. The formalist variant of instrumentalism
denies theoretical terms to have referents at all. Between these two
extreme cases there is a number of intermediate positions.[1]
Carnap (1958; 1966: ch. 26) attempted to attain a metaphysically neutral
position so as to avoid a commitment to or denial of scientific realism. In
his account of the theoretical language of science, theoretical entities were
conceived as mathematical ones that are related to observable events in
certain determinate ways. An electron, for example, figures as a certain
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distribution of charge and mass in a four-dimensional manifold of real
numbers, where charge and mass are mere real-valued functions. These
functions and the four-dimensional manifold itself are to be related to
observable events by means of universal axioms. Notably, Carnap would
not have accepted a characterization of his view as antirealist or non-
realist since he thought the metaphysical doctrine of realism to be void of
content.
In sum, there are three major and competing characterizations of a
theoretical entity in science that are in line with the common theoreticity
criterion according to which such an entity is inaccessible by means of
unaided perception. First, theoretical entities are characterized as mind and
language independent. Second, theoretical entities are mind and language
dependent in some way or other. Third, they are conceived as
mathematical entities that are related to the observable world in certain
determinate ways. We may thus distinguish between (i) a realist view, (ii)
a collection of non-realist views and (iii) a Pythagorean view of theoretical
entities.
Now, there are three major accounts of reference and meaning that have
been used, implicitly or explicitly, for the semantics of theoretical terms:
(i) the descriptivist picture, (ii) causal and causal-historical theories and
(iii) hybrid ones that combine descriptivist ideas with causal elements
(Reimer 2010). Accounts of reference and meaning other than these play
no significant role in the philosophy of science. Hence, we need to survey
at least nine combinations consisting, first, of an abstract characterization
of the nature of a theoretical entity (realist, non-realist and Pythagorean),
and, second, a particular account of reference (descriptivist, causal and
hybrid). Some of these combinations are plainly inconsistent and, hence,
can be dealt with very briefly. Let us start with the realist view of
theoretical entities.
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3.1.1 The realist view
The descriptivist picture is highly intuitive with regard to our
understanding of expressions referring to theoretical entities on the realist
view. According to this picture, an electron is a spatiotemporal entity with
such and such a mass and such and such a charge. We detect and recognize
electrons when identifying entities having these properties. The
descriptivist explanation of meaning and reference makes use of
theoretical functions, mass and electric charge in the present example. The
semantics of theoretical entities, therefore, is connected with the semantics
of theoretical relations and functions, which will be dealt with in the next
subsection. It seems to hold, in general, that theoretical entities in the
sciences are to be characterized in terms of theoretical functions and (non-
unary) relations.
The descriptivist account, however, faces two particular problems with
regard to the historic evolution of scientific theories. First, if descriptions
of theoretical entities are constitutive of the meaning of corresponding
unary predicates, one must wonder what the common core of
understanding is that adherents of successive theories share and whether
there is such a core at all. Were Rutherford and Bohr talking about the
same type of entities when using the expression ‘electron’? Issues of
incommensurability arise with the descriptivist picture (Psillos 1999: 280).
A second problem arises when elements of the description of an entity
given by a predecessor theory T are judged wrong from the viewpoint of
the successor theory T ′ . Then, on a strict reading of the descriptivist
account, the corresponding theoretical term failed to refer in T. For if there
is nothing that satisfies a description, the corresponding expression has no
referent. This is a simple consequence of the theory of description by
Russell in his famous “On Denoting” (1905). Hence, an account of
weighting descriptions is needed in order to circumvent such failures of
reference.
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 Theoretical Terms in Science
As is well known, Kripke (1980) set forth a causal-historical account of
reference as an alternative to the descriptivist picture. This account starts
with an initial baptism that introduces a name and goes on with causal
chains transmitting the reference of the name from speaker to speaker. In
this picture, Aristotle is the man once baptized so; he might not have been
the student of Plato or done any other thing commonly attributed to him.
Kripke thought this picture to apply both to proper names and general
terms. It is hardly indicated, however, how this picture works for
expressions referring to theoretical entities (cf. Papineau 1996). Kripke’s
story is particularly counterintuitive in view of the ahistorical manner of
teaching in the natural sciences, wherein the original, historical
introduction of a theoretical term plays a minor role in comparison to up-
to-date textbook and journal explanations. Such explanations are clearly of
the descriptivist type. The Kripkean causal story can be read as an account
of reference fixing without being read as a story of grasping the meaning
of theoretical terms. Reference, however, needs to be related to meaning
so as to ensure that scientists know what they are talking about and are
able to identify the entities under investigation. Notably, even for
expressions of everyday language, the charge of not explaining meaning
has been leveled against Krikpe’s causal-historical account (Reimer 2010).
The same charge applies to Putnam’s (1975) causal account of reference
and meaning, which Putnam himself abandoned in his 1980.
A purely causal or causal-historical account of reference does not seem a
viable option for theoretical terms. More promising are hybrid accounts
that combine descriptivist intuitions with causal elements. Such an account
has been given by Psillos (1999: 296):
1. A term t refers to an entity x if and only if x satisfies the core causal
description associated with t.
2. Two terms t ′ and t denote the same entity if and only if (a) their
putative referents play the same causal role with respect to a network
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of phenomena; and (b) the core causal description of t ′ takes up the
kind-constitutive properties of the core causal description associated
with t.
This account has two particular merits. First, it is much closer to the way
scientists understand and use theoretical terms than purely causal
accounts. Because of this, it is not only an account of reference but also
one of meaning for theoretical terms. In purely causal accounts, by
contrast, there is a tendency to abandon the notion of meaning altogether.
Second, it promises to ensure a more stable notion of reference than in
purely descriptivist accounts of reference and meaning. Notably, the kind
of causation that Psillos’s hybrid account refers to is different from the
causal-historical chains that Kripke thought responsible for the
transmission of reference among speakers. No further explanation,
however, is given of what a kind-constitutive property is and how we are
to recognize such a property. Psillos (1999: 288n) merely infers the
existence of such properties from the assumption of there being natural
kinds.
3.1.2 Non-realist views
Non-realist and antirealist semantics for theoretical terms are motivated by
the presumption that the problem of theoretical terms has no satisfying
realist solution. What does a non-realist semantics of theoretical terms
look like? The view that theoretical entities are mere fictions often figures
only in realist portrays of antirealism and is hardly seriously maintained
by any philosopher of science in the twentieth century. Quine’s
comparison of physical objects with the gods of Homer in his 1951 seems
to be an exception. If one were to devise a formal or informal semantics
for the view that theoretical entities are mere fictions, a purely descriptive
account seems most promising. Such an account could in particular make
heavy use of the Fregean notion of sense. For this notion was introduced,
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among other objectives, with the intent to explain our understanding of
expressions like ‘Odysseus’ and ‘Pegasus’. One would have to admit,
however, that sentences with names that lack a referent may well have a
truth-value and as such deviate from Frege. Causal elements do not seem
of much use in the fiction view of theoretical entities.
Formalist variants of instrumentalism are a more serious alternative to
realist semantics than the fiction view of theoretical entities. Formalist
views in the philosophy of mathematics are ones which aim to account for
mathematical concepts and objects in terms of syntactic entities and
operations thereupon within a calculus. Such views have been carried over
to theoretical concepts and objects in the natural sciences, with the
qualification that the observational part of the calculus is interpreted in
such a way that its symbols refer to physical or phenomenal objects.
Cognitive access to theoretical entities is thus explained in terms of our
cognitive access to the symbols and rules of the calculus in the context of
an antecedent understanding of the observation terms. Formalist ideas
were sympathetically entertained by Hermann Weyl (1949). He was driven
towards such ideas by adherence to Hilbert’s distinction between real and
ideal elements and the corresponding distinction between real and ideal
propositions (Hilbert 1926). Propositions of the observation language were
construed as real ones in the sense of this Hilbertian distinction by Weyl,
whereas theoretical propositions as ideal ones. The content of an ideal
proposition is to be understood in terms of the (syntactic) consistency of
the whole system consisting of ideal and real propositions being asserted.
This is the defining property of an ideal proposition.
3.1.3 The Pythagorean view
We still need to discuss the view that theoretical entities are mathematical
entities that are related to observable events in certain determinate ways.
This theory is clearly of the descriptivist type, as we shall see more clearly
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when dealing with the formal account by Carnap in Section 4. No causal
elements are needed in Carnap’s Pythagorean empiricism.
It is fair to characterize the Pythagorean view in general by saying that it
shifts the problem of theoretical terms to the theory of meaning and
reference for mathematical expressions. The question of how we are able
to refer successfully to electrons is answered by the Pythagorean by
pointing out that we are able to refer successfully to mathematical entities.
Moreover, the Pythagorean explains, it is part of the notion of an electron
that corresponding mathematical entities are connected to observable
phenomena by means of axioms and inference rules. The empirical surplus
of theoretical entities in comparison to “pure” mathematical entities is thus
captured by axioms and inference rules that establish connections to
empirical phenomena. Since mathematical entities do not, by themselves,
have connections to observable phenomena, the question of truth and
falsehood may not be put in a truth-conditional manner for those axioms
that connect mathematical entities with phenomenal events (cf. Section
4.2). Carnap (1958), therefore, came to speak of postulates when referring
to the axioms of a scientific theory.
How do we come to refer successfully to mathematical entities? This, of
course, is a problem in the philosophy of mathematics. (For a classical
paper that addresses this problem see Benacerraf (1973)). Carnap has not
much to say about meaning and reference of mathematical expressions in
his seminal “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”
(1956) but discusses these issues in his “Empiricism, Semantics, and
Ontology” (1950). There he aims at establishing a metaphysically neutral
position that avoids a commitment to Platonist, nominalist or formalist
conceptions of mathematical objects. A proponent of the Pythagorean
view other than Carnap is Hermann Weyl (1949). As for the cognition of
mathematical entities, Weyl largely followed Hilbert’s formalism in his
later work. Hence, there is a non-empty intersection between the
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Pythagorean view and the formalist view of theoretical entities. Unlike
Carnap, Weyl did not characterize the interpretation of theoretical terms by
means of model-theoretic notions.
3.2 Theoretical Functions and Relations
For theoretical functions and relations, a particular problem arises from
the idea that a theoretical term is, by definition, semantically dependent
upon a scientific theory. Let us recall the above explanation of T-
theoreticity: a term t is T-theoretical if and only if any method of
determining the extension of t, or some part of that extension, rests on
some axiom of T. Let ϕ be such an axiom and m be a corresponding
method of determination. The present explanation of T-theoreticity, then,
means that m is valid only on condition of ϕ being true. The latter
dependency holds because ϕ is used either explicitly in calculations to
determine t or in the calibration of measurement devices. Such devices,
then, perform the calculation implicitly. A case in point is measurement of
temperature by a gas thermometer. Such a device rests upon the law that
changes of temperature result into proportional changes in the volume of
gases.
Suppose now t is theoretical with respect to a theory T. Then it holds that
in order to measure t, we need to assume the truth of some axiom ϕ of T.
Suppose, further, that t has occurrences in ϕ, as is standard in examples of
T-theoreticity. From this it follows that, in standard truth-conditional
semantics, the truth-value of ϕ is dependent on the semantic value of t.
This leads to the following epistemological problem: on the one hand, we
need to know the extension of t in order to find out whether ϕ is true. On
the other hand, it is simply impossible to determine the extension of t
without using ϕ or some other axiom of T. This mutual dependency
between the semantic values of ϕ and t makes it difficult, if not even
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impossible, to have evidence for ϕ being true in any of its applications (cf.
Andreas 2008).
We could, of course, use an alternative measurement method of t, say one
resting upon an axiom ψ of T, to gain evidence for the axiom ϕ being true
in some selected instances. This move, however, only shifts the problem to
applications of another axiom of T. For these applications the same type of
difficulty arises, viz., mutual dependency of the semantic values of ψ and
t. We are thus caught either in a vicious circle or in an infinite regress
when attempting to gain evidence for the propriety of a single
measurement of a theoretical term. Sneed (1979: ch. II) was the first to
describe that particular difficulty in the present manner and termed it the
problem of theoretical terms. Measurement of the force function in
classical mechanics exemplifies this problem well. There is no method of
measuring force that does not rest upon some law of classical mechanics.
Likewise, it is impossible to measure temperature without using some law
that depends upon either phenomenological or statistical thermodynamics.
Though its formulation is primarily epistemological, Sneed’s problem of
theoretical terms has a semantic reading. Let the meaning of a term be
identified with the methods of determining its extension, as in Section 1.2.
Then we can say that our understanding of T-theoretical relations and
functions originates from the axioms of the scientific theory T. In standard
truth-conditional semantics, by contrast, one assumes that the truth-value
of an axiom ϕ is determined by the semantic values of those descriptive
constants that have occurrences in ϕ . Among these constants, there are
theoretical terms of T. Hence, it appears that standard truth-conditional
semantics does not accord with the order of our grasping the meaning of
theoretical terms. In the next section, we shall deal with indirect means of
interpreting theoretical terms. These proved to be ways out of the present
problem of theoretical terms.
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4. Formal Accounts
A few notational conventions and preliminary considerations are necessary
to explain the formal accounts of theoretical terms and their semantics.
Essential to all of these accounts is the division of the set of descriptive
symbols into a set Vo of observational and another set Vt of theoretical
terms. (The descriptive symbols of a formal language are simply the non-
logical ones.) A scientific theory thus be formulated in a language
L(Vo , Vt ). The division of the descriptive vocabulary gives rise to a related
distinction between T- and C-axioms among the axioms of a scientific
theory. The T-axioms contain only Vt symbols as descriptive ones, while
the C-axioms contain both Vo and Vt symbols. The latter axioms establish
a connection between the theoretical and the observational terms. TC
designates the conjunction of T- and C-axioms and A(TC) the set of these
axioms. Let n1 , … , nk be the elements of Vo and t1 , … , tn the elements of
Vt . Then, TC is a proposition of the following type:
(TC) TC( n1 , … , nk , t1 , … , tn )
As for the domain of interpretation of L(Vo , Vt ), Ramsey (1929) assumes
there to be only one for all descriptive symbols. Carnap (1956, 1958), by
contrast, distinguishes between a domain of interpretation for
observational terms and another for theoretical terms. Notably, the latter
domain contains exclusively mathematical entities. Ketland (2004) has
emphasized the importance of distinguishing between an observational
and a theoretical domain of interpretation, where the latter is allowed to
contain theoretical entities, such as electrons and protons.
TC is a first-order sentence in a large number of accounts, as in Ramsey’s
seminal “Theories” (1929). Carnap (1956; 1958), however, works with
higher-order logic to allow for the formulation of mathematical
propositions and concepts.
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4.1 The Ramsey Sentence
The Ramsey sentence of a theory TC in the language L(Vo , Vt ) is obtained
by the following two transformations of the conjunction of T- and C-
axioms. First, replace all theoretical symbols in this conjunction by higher-
order variables of appropriate type. Then, bind these variables by higher-
order existential quantifiers. As result one obtains a higher-order sentence
of the following form:
(TCR) ∃X1 … ∃Xn TC(n1 , … , nk , X1 , … , Xn )
where X1 , … , Xn are higher-order variables. This sentence says that there
is an extensional interpretation of the theoretical terms that verifies,
together with an antecedently given interpretation of the observation
language L(Vo ), the axioms TC. The Ramsey sentence expresses an
apparently weaker proposition than TC, at least in standard truth-
conditional semantics. If one thinks that the Ramsey sentence expresses
the proposition of a scientific theory more properly than TC, one holds the
Ramsey view of scientific theories.
Why should one prefer the Ramsey view to the standard one? Ramsey
([1929] 1978: 120) himself seemed to have something like a contextual
theory of meaning in mind when proposing the replacement of theoretical
constants with appropriate higher-order variables:
Any additions to the theory, whether in the form of new axioms or
particular assertions like α(0, 3) are to be made within the scope of
the original α, β, γ. They are not, therefore, strictly propositions by
themselves just as the different sentences in a story beginning
‘Once upon a time’ have not complete meanings and so are not
propositions by themselves.
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α, β, and γ figure in this explanation as theoretical terms to be replaced by
higher-order variables. Ramsey goes on to suggest that the meaning of a
theoretical sentence ϕ is the difference between
1. (TC ∧ A ∧ ϕ)R
and
2. (TC ∧ A)R
where A stands for the set of observation sentences being asserted and (...)
R for the operation of Ramsification, i.e., existentially generalizing on all
theoretical terms. This proposal of expressing theoretical assertions clearly
makes such assertions dependent upon the context of the theory TC.
Ramsey ([1929] 1978: 124) thinks that a theoretical assertion ϕ is not
meaningful if no observational evidence can be found for either ϕ or its
negation. In this case there is no stock A of observation sentences such
that (1) and (2) differ in truth-value.
Another important argument in favor of the Ramsey view was given later
by Sneed (1979: ch. III). It is easy to show that Sneed’s problem of
theoretical terms (which concerns relations and functions) does not arise in
the first place on the Ramsey view. For by TCR it is only claimed that
there are extensions of the theoretical terms satisfying each axiom of the
set A(TC) under a given interpretation of the observational language. No
claim, however, is made by TCR as to whether or not the sentences of
A(TC) are true. Nonetheless, it can be shown that TCR and TC have the
same observational consequences:
Proposition 1 For all L(Vo ) sentences ϕ , TCR ⊢ ϕ if and only if
TC ⊢ ϕ, where ⊢ designates the relation of logical consequence in
classical logic.
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Hence, the Ramsey sentence cannot be true in case the original theory TC
is not consistent with the observable facts. For a discussion of empirical
adequacy and Ramsification see Ketland (2004).
One difficulty, however, remains with the Ramsey view. It concerns the
representation of deductive reasoning, for many logicians the primary
objective of logic. Now, Ramsey ([1929] 1978: 121) thinks that the
‘incompleteness’ of theoretical assertions does not affect our reasoning.
No formal account, however, is given that relates our deductive practice,
in which abundant use of theoretical constants is made, to the existentially
quantified variables in the Ramsey sentence. One thing we lack is a
translation of theoretical sentences (other than the axioms) that is in
keeping with the view that the meaning of a theoretical sentence ϕ is the
difference between (TC ∧ A ∧ ϕ)R and (TC ∧ A)R . As Ramsey observes,
it would not be correct to take (TC ∧ A ∧ ϕ)R as a translation of a
theoretical sentence ϕ since both (TC ∧ A ∧ ϕ)R and (TC ∧ A ∧ ¬ϕ)R
may well be true. Such a translation would not obey the laws of classical
logic. These laws, however, are supposed to govern deductive reasoning in
science. A proper semantics of theoretical terms must take the peculiarities
of these terms into account without revising the rules and axioms of
deduction in classical logic.
There thus remains the challenge of relating the apparent use of theoretical
constants in deductive scientific reasoning to the Ramsey formulation of
scientific theories. Carnap was well aware of this challenge and addressed
it using a sentence that became labeled later on the Carnap sentence of a
scientific theory (Carnap 1958; 1966: ch. 23):
(AT ) TCR → TC
This sentence is part of a proposal to draw the analytic-synthetic
distinction at the global level of a scientific theory (as this distinction
proved not to be applicable to single axioms): the analytic part of the
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theory is given by its Carnap sentence AT , whereas the synthetic part is
identified with the theory’s Ramsey sentence in light of Proposition 1.
Carnap (1958) wants AT to be understood as follows: if the Ramsey
sentence is true, then the theoretical terms be interpreted such that TC
comes out true as well. So, on condition of TCR being true, we can recover
the original formulation of the theory in which the theoretical terms occur
as constants. For, obviously, TC is derivable from TCR and AT using
modus ponens.
From the viewpoint of standard truth-conditional semantics, however, this
instruction to interpret the Carnap sentence appears arbitrary, if not even
misguided. For in standard semantics, the Ramsey sentence may well be
true without TC being so (cf. Ketland 2004). Hence, the Carnap sentence
would not count as analytic, as Carnap intended. Carnap’s interpretation of
AT receives a sound foundation in his (1961) proposal to define theoretical
terms using Hilbert’s epsilon operator, as we shall see in Section 4.3.
4.2 Indirect Interpretation
The notion of an indirect interpretation was introduced by Carnap in his
Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (1939: ch. 23–24) with the
intention of accounting for the semantics of theoretical terms in physics. It
goes without saying that this notion is understood against the background
of the notion of a direct interpretation. Carnap had the following
distinction in mind. The interpretation of a descriptive symbol is direct if
and only if (i) it is given by an assignment of an extension or an intension,
and (ii) this assignment is made by expressions of the metalanguage. The
interpretation of a descriptive symbol is indirect, by contrast, if and only if
it is specified by one or several sentences of the object language, which
then figure as axioms in the respective calculus. Here are two simple
examples of a direct interpretation:
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‘R’ designates the property of being rational.
‘A’ designates the property of being an animal.
The predicate ‘H’, by contrast, is interpreted in an indirect manner by a
definition in the object language:
∀x(Hx ↔ Rx ∧ Ax)
Interpretation of a symbol by a definition counts as one type of indirect
interpretation. Another type is the interpretation of theoretical terms by the
axioms of a scientific theory. Carnap (1939: 65) remains content with a
merely syntactic explanation of indirect interpretation:
The calculus is first constructed floating in the air, so to speak; the
construction begins at the top and then adds lower and lower
levels. Finally, by the semantical rules, the lowest level is anchored
at the solid ground of the observable facts. The laws, whether
general or special, are not directly interpreted, but only the singular
sentences.
The laws A(TC) are thus simply adopted as axioms in the calculus without
assuming any prior interpretation or reference to the world for theoretical
terms. (A sentence ϕ being an axiom of a calculus C means that ϕ can be
used in any formal derivation in C without being a member of the
premises.) This account amounts to a formalist understanding of the
theoretical language in science. It has two particular merits. First, it
circumvents Sneed’s problem of theoretical terms since the axioms are not
required to be true in the interpretation of the respective language that
represents the facts of the theory-independent world. The need for
assuming such an interpretation is simply denied. Second, the account is in
line with the contextual theory meaning for theoretical terms as our
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understanding of such terms is explained in terms of the axioms of the
respective scientific theories (cf. Section 1.2).
There are less formalist accounts of indirect interpretation in terms of
explicit model-theoretic notions by Przelecki (1969: ch. 6) and Andreas
(2010).[2] The latter account proves to formally work out ideas about
theoretical terms in Carnap (1958). It emerged from an investigation into
the similarities and dissimilarities between Carnapian postulates and
definitions. Recall that Carnap viewed the axioms of a scientific theory as
postulates since they contribute to the interpretation of theoretical terms.
When explaining the Carnap sentence TCR → TC, Carnap says that, if the
Ramsey sentence is true, the theoretical terms are to be understood in
accordance with some interpretation that satisfies TC. This is the sense in
which we can say that Carnapian postulates contribute to the interpretation
of theoretical terms in a manner akin to the interpretation of a defined term
by the corresponding definition. Postulates and definitions alike impose a
constraint on the admissible, or intended, interpretation of the complete
language L(V) , where V contains basic and indirectly interpreted terms.
Yet, the interpretation of theoretical terms by axioms of a scientific theory
differs in several ways from that of a defined term by a definition. First,
the introduction of theoretical terms may be joined with the introduction
of another, theoretical domain of interpretation, in addition to the basic
domain of interpretation in which observation terms are interpreted.
Second, it must not be assumed that the interpretation of theoretical terms
results in a unique determination of the extension of these terms. This is an
implication of Carnap’s doctrine of partial interpretation (1958), as will
become obvious by the end of this section. Third, axioms of a scientific
theory are not conservative extensions of the observation language since
they enable us to make predictions. Definitions, by contrast, must be
conservative (cf. Gupta 2009). Taking these differences into account when
observing the semantic similarities between definitions and Carnapian
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postulates suggests the following explanation: a set A(TC) of axioms that
interprets a set Vt of theoretical terms on the basis of a language L(Vo )
imposes a constraint on the admissible, or intended, interpretations of the
language L(Vo , Vt ). An L(Vo , Vt ) structure is admissible if and only if it (i)
satisfies the axioms A(TC) and (ii) extends the intended interpretation of
L(Vo ) to include an interpretation of the theoretical terms.
In more formal terms (Andreas 2010: 373; Przelecki 1969: ch. 6):
Definition 3 (Set  of admissible structures)
Let o designate the intended interpretation of the observation
language. Further, MOD(A(TC)) designates the set of L(Vo , Vt )
structures that satisfy the axioms A(TC). EXT(o , Vt , Dt ) is the set of
L(Vo , Vt ) structures that extend o to interpret the theoretical terms,
where these terms are allowed to have argument positions being
interpreted in a domain Dt of theoretical entities.
MOD(A(TC)) ∩ EXT(o , Vt , Dt ) ≠ ∅ ,
1. If then
 := MOD(A(TC)) ∩ EXT(o , Vt , Dt );
2. If MOD(A(TC)) ∩ EXT(o , Vt , Dt ) = ∅ , then
 := EXT(o , Vt , Dt ).
Given there is a range of admissible, i.e., intended structures, the
following truth-rules for theoretical sentences are intuitive:
Definition 4 (Truth-rules for theoretical sentences)
ν : L(Vo , Vt ) → {T, F, I}.
1. ν(ϕ) := T if and only if for all structures  ∈ ,  ⊨ ϕ ;
2. ν(ϕ) := F if and only if for all structures  ∈ ,  ⊭ ϕ;
3. ν(ϕ) := I (indeterminate) if and only if there are structures
1 , 2 ∈  such that 1 ⊨ ϕ but not 2 ⊨ ϕ.
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The idea lying behind these rules comes from supervaluation logic (van
Fraassen 1969; Priest 2001: ch. 7). A sentence is true if and only if it is
true in every admissible structure. It is false, by contrast, if and only if it is
false in every admissible structure. And a sentence does not have a
determinate truth-value if and only if it is true in, at least, one admissible
structure and false in, at least, another structure that is also admissible.
A few properties of the present semantics are noteworthy. First, it accounts
for Carnap’s idea that the axioms A(TC) have a twofold function, viz.,
setting forth empirical claims and determining the meaning of theoretical
terms (Carnap 1958). For, on the one hand, the truth-values of the axioms
A(TC) depend on empirical, observable facts. These axioms, on the other
hand, determine the admissible interpretations of the theoretical terms.
These two seemingly contradictory properties are combined by allowing
the axioms A(TC) to interpret theoretical terms only on condition of there
being a structure that both extends the given interpretation of the
observation language and that satisfies these axioms. If there is no such
structure, the theoretical terms remain uninterpreted. This semantics,
therefore, can be seen to formally work out the old contextual theory of
meaning for theoretical terms.
Second, Sneed’s problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise
in the present semantics since the formulation of this problem is bound to
standard truth-conditional semantics. Third, it is closely related to the
Ramsey view of scientific theories as the following biconditional holds:
Proposition 2 TCR if and only if for all ϕ ∈ A(TC), ν(ϕ) = T .
Unlike the Ramsey account, however, the present one does not dispense
with theoretical terms. It can be shown rather that allowing for a range of
admissible interpretations as opposed to a single interpretation does not
affect the validity of standard deductive reasoning (Andreas 2010). Hence,
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a distinctive merit of the indirect interpretation semantics of theoretical
terms is that theoretical constants need not be recovered from the Ramsey
sentence in the first place.
The label partial interpretation is more common in the literature to
describe Carnap’s view that theoretical terms are interpreted by the axioms
or postulates of a scientific theory (Suppe 1974: 86–95). The partial
character of interpretation is retained in the present account since there is a
range of admissible interpretations of the complete language L(Vo , Vt ).
This allows for the interpretation of theoretical terms to be strengthened
by further postulates, just as Carnap demanded in his 1958 and 1961. To
strengthen the interpretation of theoretical terms is to further constrain the
range of admissible interpretations of L(Vo , Vt ).
4.3 Direct Interpretation
Both the Ramsey view and the indirect interpretation semantics deviate
from standard truth-conditional semantics at the level of theoretical terms
and theoretical sentences. Such a deviation, however, was not felt to be
necessary by all philosophers that have worked on theoretical concepts.
Tuomela (1973: ch. V) defends a position that he calls semantic realism
and that retains standard truth-conditional semantics. Hence, direct
interpretation is assumed for theoretical terms by Tuomela. Yet, semantic
realism for theoretical terms acknowledges there to be an epistemological
distinction between observational and theoretical terms. Tuomela’s (1973:
ch. I) criterion of the theory-observation distinction largely coincides with
Sneed’s above expounded criterion. Since direct interpretation of
theoretical terms amounts just to standard realist truth-conditions, there is
no need for a further discussion here.
4.4 Defining Theoretical Terms
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In Weyl 1949, Carnap 1958, Feyerabend 1962 and a number of further
papers we can identify different formulations of the idea that the axioms of
a scientific theory determine the meaning of theoretical terms without
these axioms qualifying as proper definitions of theoretical terms. This
idea has become almost constitutive of the very notion of a theoretical
term in the philosophy of science. Lewis, however, wrote a paper with the
title “How to Define Theoretical Terms” (1970). A closer look at the
literature further reveals that the very idea of explicitly defining theoretical
terms goes back to Carnap’s (1961) use of Hilbert’s epsilon operator in
scientific theories. This operator is an indefinite description operator that
was introduced by Hilbert to designate some object x that satisfies an open
formula ϕ . So
εxϕ(x)
designates some x satisfying ϕ(x) , where x is the only free variable of ϕ
(cf. Avigad and Zach 2002). Now, Carnap (1961: 161n) explicitly defines
theoretical terms in two steps:
(AT(0) ) t̄ = εX̄TC(X̄, n1 , … , nk )
where X̄is a sequence of higher-order variables and t̄ a corresponding
instantiation. So, t̄ designates some sequence of relations and functions
that satisfies TC, in the context of an antecedently given interpretation of
Vo . Once such a sequence has been defined via the epsilon-operator, the
second step of the definition is straightforward:
(AT(i) ) ti = εx(∃u1 … ∃ un (t̄ = ⟨u1 , … , un ⟩ ∧ x = ui ))
Carnap could show these definitions to imply the Carnap sentence AT .
Hence, they allow for direct recovery of the theoretical terms for the
purpose of deductive reasoning on condition of the Ramsey sentence being
true.
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Lewis (1970) introduced a number of modifications concerning both the
language of the Carnap sentence and its interpretation in order to attain
proper definitions of theoretical terms. First, theoretical terms are
considered to refer to individuals as opposed to relations and functions.
This move is made coherent by allowing the basic language L(Vo ) to
contain relations like ‘x has property y’. The basic, i.e., non-theoretical
language is thus no observation language in this account. Yet, it serves as
the basis for introducing theoretical terms. The set Vo of ‘O-terms’ is best
described as our antecedently understood vocabulary.
Second, denotationless terms are dealt with along the lines of free logic by
Dana Scott (1967). That means denotationless terms, such as an improper
description, denote nothing in the domain of discourse. Atomic sentences
containing denotationless terms are either true or false. Most notably, the
free logic that Lewis refers to has it that an identity that contains a
denotationless term on both sides is always true. If just one side of the
identity formula has an occurrence of a denotationless term, this identity
statement is false.
Third, Lewis (1970) insists on a unique interpretation of theoretical terms,
thus rejecting Carnap’s doctrine of partial interpretation. Carnap (1961) is
most explicit about the indeterminacy that this doctrine implies. This
indeterminacy of theoretical terms drives Carnap to using Hilbert’s ε -
operator there, as just explained. For Lewis, by contrast, a theoretical term
is denotationless if its interpretation is not uniquely determined by the
Ramsey sentence. For a scientific theory to be true, it must have a unique
interpretation.
Using these modifications, Lewis transforms the Carnap sentence into
three Carnap-Lewis postulates, so to speak:
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 Theoretical Terms in Science
(CL1) ∃y1 … ∃yn ∀x1 … ∀ xn
(TC(n1 , … , nk , x1 , … , xn ) ↔ y1 = x1 ∧ … ∧ yn = xn ) →
TC( n1 , … , nk , t1 , … , tk )
(CL2) ¬∃x1 … ∃xn TC(n1 , … , nk , x1 , … , xn ) →
¬∃x(x = t1 ) ∧ … ∧ ¬∃x(x = tn )
(CL3) ∃x1 … ∃xn TC(n1 , … , nk , x1 , … , xn ) ∧
¬∃ y1 … ∃yn ∀x1 … ∀xn
(TC(n1 , … , nk , x1 , … , xn ) ↔ y1 = x1 ∧ … ∧ yn = xn ) →
¬∃x(x = t1 ) ∧ … ∧ ¬∃x(x = tn )
These postulates look more difficult than they actually are. CL1 says that,
if TC has a unique realization, then it is realized by the entities named by
t1 , … , tk . Realization of a theory TC, in this formulation, means
interpretation of the descriptive terms under which TC comes out true,
where the interpretation of the Vo terms is antecedently given. So, CL1 is
to be read as saying that the theoretical terms are to be understood as
designating those entities that uniquely realize TC, in the context of an
antecedently given interpretation of the Vo terms. CL2 says that, if the
Ramsey sentence is false, the theoretical terms do not designate anything.
To see this, recall that ¬∃x(x = ti ) means, in free logic, that ti is
denotationless. In case the theory TC has multiple realizations, the
theoretical terms are denotationless too. This is expressed by CL3.
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CL1–CL3 are equivalent, in free logic, to a set of sentences that properly
define the theoretical terms ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n):
(Di) ti = ιyi ∃y1 … ∃yi−1 ∃ yi+1 … ∃yn ∀x1 … ∀xn
(TC(n1 , … , nk , x1 , … , xn ) ↔
y1 = x1 ∧ … ∧ yi = xi ∧ … ∧ yn = xn )
ti designates, according to this definition schema, the i-th component in
that sequence of entities that uniquely realizes TC. If there is no such
sequence, ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is denotationless. Even so, the definitions of
theoretical terms remain true if the complete language L(Vo , Vt ) is
interpreted in accordance with the postulates CL1–CL3, thanks to the use
of free logic. Hence, all L(Vo , Vt ) interpretations that extend the
antecedently given interpretation of L(Vo ) can be required to satisfy all
definitions Di .
A few further properties of Lewis’s definitions of theoretical terms are
noteworthy. First, they specify the interpretation of theoretical terms
uniquely. This property is obvious for the case of unique realization of TC
but holds as well for the other cases since assignment of no denotation
counts as interpretation of a descriptive symbol in free logic. Second, it
can be shown that these definitions do not allow for the derivation of any
L(Vo ) sentences except logical truths, just as the original Carnap sentence
did. Lewis, therefore, in fact succeeds in defining theoretical terms. He
does so without attempting to divide the axioms A(TC) into definitions
and synthetic claims about the spatiotemporal world.
The replacement of theoretical relation and function symbols with
individual terms was judged counterintuitive by Papineau (1996). A
reformulation, however, of Lewis’s definitions using second- or higher-
order variables is not difficult to accomplish, as Schurz (2005) has shown.
In this reformulation the problem arises that theoretical terms are usually
not uniquely interpreted since our observational evidence is most of the
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 Theoretical Terms in Science
time insufficient to determine the extension of theoretical relation and
function symbols completely. Theoretical functions, such as temperature,
pressure, electromagnetic force etc., are determined only for objects that
have been subjected to appropriate measurements, however indirect. In
view of this problem, Schurz (2005) suggests letting the higher-order
quantifiers range only over those extensions that correspond to natural
kind properties. This restriction renders the requirement of unique
interpretation of theoretical terms plausible once again. Such a reading
was also suggested by Psillos (1999: ch. 3) with reference to Lewis’s
(1984) discussion of Putnam’s (1980) model-theoretic argument. In that
paper, Lewis himself suggests the restriction of the interpretation of
descriptive symbols to extensions corresponding to natural kind
properties.
One final note on indirect interpretation is in order. Both Carnap (1961)
and Lewis (1970) interpret theoretical terms indirectly simply because any
definition is an instance of an indirect interpretation. For this reason,
Sneed’s problem of theoretical terms (Section 3.2) does not arise. Yet, the
pattern of Carnap’s and Lewis’s proposals conforms to the pattern of a
definition in the narrow sense and not to the peculiar pattern of indirect
interpretation that Carnap (1939) envisioned for the interpretation of
theoretical terms. This is why the indirect interpretation semantics has
been separated from the present discussion of defining theoretical terms.
5. Conclusion
The claim that there are scientific terms that are semantically dependent
upon a scientific theory goes back to Duhem and Poincaré. Such terms
came to be referred to as theoretical terms in twentieth century philosophy
of science. Properties and entities that are observable in the sense of direct,
unaided perception did not seem to depend on scientific theories as forces,
electrons and nucleotides did. Hence, philosophers of science and
36 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Holger Andreas
logicians started to investigate the distinct semantics of theoretical terms.
Various formal accounts resulted from these investigations, among which
the Ramsey sentence by Ramsey (1929), Carnap’s notion of indirect
interpretation (1939; 1958) and Lewis’s (1970) proposal of defining
theoretical terms are the most prominent ones. Though not all
philosophers of science understand the notion of a theoretical term in such
way that semantic dependence upon a scientific theory is essential, this
view prevails in the literature.
The theory-observation distinction has been attacked heavily and is
presumably discredited by a large number of philosophers of science. Still,
this distinction continues to permeate a number of important strands in the
philosophy of science, such as scientific realism and its alternatives and
the logical analysis of scientific theories. A case in point is the recent
interest in the Ramsey account of scientific theories which emerged in the
wake of Worral’s structural realism (cf. Ladyman 2009). We have seen,
moreover, that the formal accounts of theoretical terms work well with a
theory-observation distinction that is relativized to a particular theory.
Critics of that distinction, by contrast, have commonly attacked a global
and static division into theoretical and observational terms (Maxwell
1962; Achinstein 1965). Note finally that Carnap assigned no ontological
significance to the theory-observation distinction in the sense that entities
of the one type would be existent in a more genuine way than ones of the
other.
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analytic/synthetic distinction | Carnap, Rudolf | definitions | empiricism:
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Notes to Theoretical Terms in Science
1. To mention only two of these intermediate positions: van Fraassen
(1980) accepts a realist semantics for scientific statements but contests that
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 Theoretical Terms in Science

science is aiming at true theories. Dummett’s antirealism suggests

replacing the notion of truth by provability or warranted assertibility
(Dummett 1978; Wright 1993). This alternative to realist semantics has
never been worked out for scientific theories in due detail, however.

2. An important difference between Przelecki (1969: ch. 6) and Andreas

(2010) is that only the former requires those sentences that indirectly
interpret a symbol to be analytic. This requirement is not in line with
Carnap’s (1958) view that the analytic-synthetic distinction is not
applicable to the single axioms of a scientific theory. Przelecki’s (1969)
account, however, is more general than that of Andreas (2010) in that it
does not assume a complete interpretation of the basic language L(Vo ) .
The merits of both accounts can easily be combined.

Copyright © 2017 by the author

Holger Andreas

44 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy