01 Francisco vs CA must retire and submit a person who can replace him.
That
Rule 97 Sec. 2 When is the Guardian Removed or Allowed to
Resign
Ponente J. Guerrero | (Fabia)
RECIT READY
Facts:
This case is about a 72 year old guardian named Feliciano
Francisco who was replaced for failure to submit an inventory
and render accounting. He was replaced on the ground that he is
already of old age and someone older has replaced him
Issue:
WON old age can be considered a factor in determining the
competency of a guardian and be used as a ground to make
him resign
Held:
Yes, the court held that age can be considered a factor in
determining the capacity of the guardian to serve his
function. The delay in the inventory and accounting shows
that the judge was correct in asking the guardian to retire
Doctrine: While age alone is not a controlling criterion in
determining a person's fitness or qualification to be appointed or
be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for consideration.|||
FACTS:
1. This is a case of guardianship where Feliciano (72 years old)
failed to render an accounting and an inventory. There were also
allegations that he misreported a sale of land from 14k to 12k.
Judge relieved him but reconsidered since he believed that 12k is
true. He also said that since the guardian is of advanced age, he
person became Pelagio Francisco who is 5 years older than him
while his appeal for replacement is ongoing.
2. He said that he has been doing it for 12 years and that him being
replaced by an older person made him file a case to question the
validity of old age as a ground to be removed or asked to resign.
ISSUE:
1. WON old age can be considered a factor in determining the
competency of a guardian and be used as a ground to make him
resign
a. Yes, because it is a trust relation and it is for the benefit
of the ward and not the guardian. His old age might
render him unfit to continue.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
1. WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed
decision and resolution of the respondent court dated April 27,
1981 and June 26, 1981, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.|||
2.
RULING:
1. The court held that age can be considered a factor in
determining the capacity of the guardian to serve his
function. The delay in the inventory and accounting shows
that the judge was correct in asking the guardian to retire.
The fact that he was delayed in rendering the accounting and
inventory shows. Sustaining him as a guardian might be
detrimental to the ward. While age alone is not a controlling
criterion in determining a person's fitness or qualification to be
appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a factor for
consideration.|||
 02 LAVIDES v. CITY COURT OF LUCENA (1982)
Rule 92 Guardianship
De Castro J. | FLAMENO
RECIT READY
Facts: Petitioner instituted guardianship proceedings for the
benefit of his 7 minor children in the administration of the estate
of his wife. The estate was valued at P35,000, with each child
receiving P5,000. This was initially granted by the respondent
court, but after the lapse of 7 years, the case was dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction based on the total value of the
estate.
Issue: Whether the basis for jurisdiction in guardianship
proceedings is the total value of the estate or the individual share
of each minor—individual share
Held:
The respondent court erred in dismissing the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. The court must use the value of each
individual share as basis in acquiring jurisdiction. It was also
inequitable considering that 7 years have passed since the
respondent court granted the petition for guardianship.
Doctrine:
The individual share of each minor or incompetent in a
guardianship proceeding is determinative of which court has
jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS:
3. Upon the death of his wife, petitioner Lavides instituted before
the respondent court a guardianship proceeding with respect to
the person and property of their 7 minor children. The estate was
valued at P35,000. Each minor child was to receive P5,000.
4. Petitioner was appointed as guardian by the respondent court.
Petitioner was then authorized to settle the estate extra judicially
and to sell a portion thereof consisting of stocks. The petitioner
sold the said stocks.
5. Petitioner filed a motion for confirmation and approval of a Deed
of Exchange Agreement. While this motion was pending, the
respondent court (with a new judge) reviewed the case, and
finding that the value of the undivided estate was worth at least
P35,000, dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, revoked the
appointment of petitioner as guardian and annulled all
proceedings taken prior to the issuance of the said order.
6. Petitioner now argues that the respondent court erred in using the
TOTAL value of the undivided estate as basis for determining
jurisdiction despite the clear wording of Rule 92, Sec. 1
ISSUE:
2. WON the respondent court erred in dismissing the case for lack
of jurisdiction, on the ground that TOTAL value of the estate
exceeded the jurisdiction of the city court
a. NO, because under the Rules of Court, the proper basis
in acquiring jurisdiction in guardian proceedings
involving multiple wards is the individual share of each
ward in the estate.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of respondent City
Court of December 5, 1978 dismissing the petition and the Order of
December 27, 1978 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
thereof are hereby set aside and the case is remanded to it for further
proceedings. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RULING:
2. Sec. 1, Rule 92—Guardianship of the person or estate of a
minor or incompetent may be instituted in the CFI of the
province, or in the justice of the peace court of the municipality,
or in the municipal court of the chartered city where the minor
 or incompetent person resides x x x provided, however, that the appointment of petitioner, and annulled the
where the value of the property of such minor or incompetent proceedings taken
exceeds the jurisdiction of the justice of peace or municipal i. This in inequitable; will pave a pattern of
court, the proceedings shall be instituted in the CFI. judicial instability.
3. The above provisions clearly grants concurrent jurisdiction
between the municipal and city courts AND CFI in the
appointment of guardians either with respect to the person or
property of the minor or incompetent
a. EXCEPT where the value of the property of such minor
or incompetent EXCEEDS the jurisdiction of the
municipal or city courts, the guardianship proceedings
shall be instituted in the CFI
4. The value of the property of the minor or incompetent
sought to be placed in guardianship determines which court
has jurisdiction. The property referred to is the
INDIVIDUAL estate of the minor when there are multiple
minors sought to be placed under guardianship
a. What determines which court has jurisdiction is the
value of the individual property of each minor or
incompetent
5. In the present case…
a. Each minor would receive P5,000, hence it was well
within the jurisdiction of the city court
b. The case of Delgado cannot be invoked by respondent
i. In the said case, the estate was valued at P7,000
= each minor would receive P2,333.33; said
INDIVIDUAL SHARE was in excess of the
jurisdiction amount for inferior courts
c. Under the present rule, concurrent jurisdiction is
granted, except that where the value of the property
of such minor or incompetent exceeds the jurisdiction
of inferior courts, the proceedings shall, be instituted
in the CFI
d. EXTRA NOTE: 7 years passed when the respondent
court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, revoked