MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS government assumption of power by stating that the "new

government was installed through a direct exercise of the

FACTS:
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided
to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and
ISSUE: Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is
outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close
legitimate.
bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong
HELD:
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a
operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics where
per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending
only the people are the judge. The people have accepted the
the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and
Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire
the execution of the contracts, the MPHC matched the bid
country; It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and
price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to
law a de jure government; and The community of nations has
the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which GSIS refused to
recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that
GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid, MPHC
SALONGA VS PANO
came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
FACTS:
The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been
alleging that no prima facie case has been established to
identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become
warrant the filing of an information for subversion against
a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
Philippine heritage and culture. Respondents assert that it is
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass,
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a
oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic
self-executing provision and requires implementing
opposition in the Philippines. The counsel for Salonga was
legislation
furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen.
Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March1981, charging Salonga,
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Constitution,
along with 39 other accused with the violation of RA 1700,
particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
his counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charges for failure of
the prosecution to establish a prima facie case against him,
HELD:
to which denied. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify
executing provision. It is complete in itself and becomes
the filing of an information against him. He states that to
operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-
Philippines today
executing. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
ISSUE: Whether the above case still falls under an actual
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
case
constitution are self-executing
HELD
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHIL. VS AQUINO.
No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a
FACTS:
consensus on the Court’s judgment had been arrived at, and
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued
a draft ponencia
Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and Vice President
was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if
Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation
any, when The court is constrained by this action of the
No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft
ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures
and to place it once again in the Court’s crowded agenda for
further deliberations. insofar as the absence of a prima facie
case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned,
this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the
action of the prosecution
TIJAM VS SIBONGHANOY
FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of
money in the sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of
interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against
Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was
originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint,
the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the
Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in
which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P
2,000.00. The case has already been pending now for
almost 15 years, and throughout the entire proceeding the
appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the
receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.
Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of
any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified
the case to the Supreme Court along with the records of the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
during the pendency of the appeal will prosper due to laches
HELD:
party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of
estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches. The doctrine of laches or of "stale
demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of
stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a
mere question of time but is principally a question of the
inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be
enforced or asserted.
ZANDUETA VS DE LA COSTA CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Petitioner Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of
first instance, and was presiding over the 5th Branch of the
CFI of Manila. When the judiciary was reorganized pursuant
to CA No. 145 (the Judicial Reorganization Act), Zandueta
received a new ad interim appointment as judge of first
instance with authority to preside over the CFI of Manila and
Palawan. After taking his new oath, Zandueta performed
several acts pertaining to the office. Meanwhile, the CA
disapproved his ad interim appointment. The President then
appointed respondent De la Costa as judge of first instance
with authority to preside over the 5th Branch of the CFI of
Manila and Palawan, and his appointment was approved by
CA. Zandueta now prays to declare De la Costa to be
illegally occupying the office of judge of the 5th Branch of the
CFI of Manila, and himself to be entitled to continue
occupying said office.
ISSUES: WON Zandueta entitled to repossess the office
occupied by him under his former appointment
HELD
No. There is incompatibility between his former and latter
appointments; consequently, he is deemed to have
abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his
former appointment. The territory over which Zandueta could
exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his latter
appointment is wider than that over which he could exercise
and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his former
appointment. Hence, there is incompatibility between the two
appointments. In accepting the latter appointment and
qualifying for the exercise of the functions of the office
conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in
discharging the same, disposing of both judicial and
administrative cases corresponding to the CFI of Manila and
of Palawan, Zandueta abandoned* his former appointment,
and ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office
occupied by him by virtue thereof.
YNOT VS INTERMIDIATE APPELEATE COURT
FACTS:
Then Pres. Marcos issued EO 626-A to strengthen EO 626,
which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos.
Ynot transported 6 carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to
Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. Ynot sued for recovery,
and the Iloilo’s RTC issued a writ of replevin. After
considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the
confiscation. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
petitioner, for 1) lack of authority and 2) EO’s presumed
validity. (Later affirmed by IAC)
ISSUES: Whether EO 626-A is constitutional
HELD
EO 626-A did not pass the sufficient standard test, In the
instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered
confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when
ordered by the trial court. The measure struck at once and
pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to
be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play. Also, The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
AYALA VS DE ROXAS
FACTS:
Petitioner applied to the defendant city engineer for a license
to construct a terrace over “the strip of land 3 meters in width
between the main wall of her house and the edge of the said
canal of Sibacon or San Jacinto, which strip of land belongs
exclusively to her”; but the defendant refused to grant the
license or authorize the plaintiff to build the terrace, because,
as the plaintiff has been informed, the sole reason wherefore
the license was denied is because “the said defendants
pretend to compel the plaintiff to leave vacant and without
any construction whatever thereon the said strip of 3 meters
in width which is a portion of the ground belonging to her, in
order to use the same as the wharf or public way so that the
plaintiff will only be able to use the said strip in the same
manner and for the same purposes as the public in general,
thus losing the enjoyment, use, and exclusive possession of
the said strip of the property which the plaintiff and the former
owners thereof have enjoyed quietly and peacefully during
more than seventy years. Additionally, it was agreed
between both parties that the strip above referred to had not
been expropriated in whole or in part by the municipality of
Manila, and that neither had the latter offered any
compensation for the same to the owner thereof.
ISSUE: Whether the non-issuance of a license to the
petitioners is tantamount to a taking that requires just
compensation
HELD
YES, What the defendants have therefore done is to prevent
the plaintiffs from continuing to enjoy, use, and freely dispose
of such strip of their ground, as they had been doing up to
the time when they applied for a license to construct a
terrace over said strip, and the defendants prevented it with
the intention of establishing a public easement provided for in
an ordinance of their own which they consider is pursuant to
the provisions of the Law of Waters and of the Civil Code in
force. he question involved here is not the actual
establishment of an easement which might be objected to by
an action in court, but a mere act of obstruction, a refusal
which is beyond the powers of the city of Manila, because it
is not simply a measure in connection with building
regulations, but is an attempt to suppress, without due
process of law, real rights which are attached to the right of
ownership.
PEOPLE VS FAJARDO
FACTS:
Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation
of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of the Municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a
building without permit from the mayor. After his incumbency,
Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the
gasoline station near the town plaza. His request was
repeatedly denied due to the reason that it “hinders the view
of travelers from the National Highway to the public plaza”.
Appellants proceeded with the construction of the building
without a permit, because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a
typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased property.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police
power in its regulation of property.
HELD
NO. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the
grant of power to the mayor. It is an arbitrary and unlimited
conferment. The subject ordinance fails to state any policy, or
to set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action.
The standards of the ordinance are entirely lacking making it
unreasonable and oppressive, hence, not a valid ordinance.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general
welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to
the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate
them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance
of the community.
NAPOCOR VS GUITEREZ
FACTS:
National Power Corporation a GOCC vested with Eminent
Domain power-initiated negotiations for right of easement to
construct transmission lines to several lots. The
commissioners appointed recommended P1.00/sqm
easement fee for Gutierrez lot. This was countered by
Gutierrez with P10.00/sqm as disturbance compensation.
Court countered with P5.00/sqm. The lower court granted
P10.00/sqm but this was appealed and was reduced to
P5.00/sqm. Still not satisfied NPC appealed to CA. CA
sustained the decision of the lower court. NPC contend that
full ownership is retained by the private respondents and they
are not totally deprived of the use of the land. They can
continue planting the same agricultural crops, except those
that would result in contact with the wires. On this premise,
petitioner submits that if full market value is required, then full
transfer of ownership is only the logical equivalent.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay
simple easement fee or full compensation for the land
traversed by its transmission lines.
HELD:
While it is true that plaintiff are only after a right-of-way
easement, it nevertheless perpetually deprives defendants of
their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the
plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely a
taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-
Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC
against the use of the land for an indefinite period deprives
private respondents of its ordinary use.
MCIAA VS MARCOS
FACTS:
Petitioner Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA) was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6958 and
since the time of its creation, the petitioner enjoyed the
privilege of exemption from payment of realty taxes in
accordance with Section 14 of its Charter. However, on
October 11, 1994, Mr. Eustaquio B. Cesa, the Officer-in-
Charge of the Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of
land that is owned by the Petitioner. Petitioner objected to
Cesa's demand, claiming that such demand is baseless and
unjustified since Section 14 of RA 6958 exempts the
petitioner from payment of realty taxes. Petitioner also
asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, citing Section 133 of the
Local Government Code of 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not MCIAA is exempted from paying its
realty taxes?
HELD:
NO, The SC held that, tax exemptions or incentives granted
to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons,
including government-owned and controlled corporations,
Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they
are withdrawn upon the effectivity of LGC, except upon the
effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA No. 6938,
non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. the
petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section
133.
ERMITA MALATE HOTEL OPERATORS VS CITY OF MNL
FACTS:  
On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed
Ordinance No. 4760 with the following provisions questioned
for its violation of due process refraining from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a
prescribed form in the lobby in open view; prohibiting
admission o less than 18 years old; usurious increase of
license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200%
respectively (tax issue also); making unlawful lease or rent
more than twice every 24 hours; and cancellation of license
for subsequent violation. The lower court issued preliminary
injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari.
ISSUES: WON The ordinance compliant is with the due
process requirement of the constitution
HELD
Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation
of constitutional due process for being reasonable and the
ordinance is enjoying the presumption of constitutionality
absent any irregularity on its face. As such a limitation cannot
be viewed as a transgression against the command of due
process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it
was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or
illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and,
according to the explanatory note, are being devoted.
Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the
amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon
the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed
and injunction lifted.
GALMAN VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
An investigating committee was created to determine the
facts on the case involving the assassination of Ninoy
Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports showed
that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as
the assassin of late Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as
the fall guy as opposed to the military reports. Majority
reports recommended the 26 military respondents as
indictable for the premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman
which the Sandiganbayan did not give due consideration.
The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a
resolution charging the 26 military accused as principal to the
crime against Aquino but was recalled upon the intervention
of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the
accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder
charge and to implement the acquittal as planned so that
double jeopardy may be invoked later on. The petitioners
filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the
Sandiganbayan and gross violation of constitutional rights of
the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing
the prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and
prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal
ISSUES: Whether or not there was due process in the
acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.
HELD
The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived
of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
their case which grossly violates the due process clause. The
court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial
where the authoritarian President ordered the
Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor
the trial which was undertaken with due pressure to the
judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of
jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process
during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void
and double jeopardy cannot be invoked. More so the trial
was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of
collusion between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the
rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.
PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS
FACTS:
he accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the
duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents
to be represented.
ISSUE: Does membership in Congress exempt an accused
from statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated
persons in general.
HELD
NO, The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond
the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The
accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should
be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates
accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF EDUC. VS QUISUMBING
FACTS:
International School Alliance of Educators (the School) hires
both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty,
classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-
hires.In which, the School grants foreign-hires certain
benefits not accorded local-hires including housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, home leave travel
allowance and a salary rate 25% more than local hires
based on “significant economic disadvantages” The labor
union and the collective bargaining representative of all
faculty members of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires.The Union
claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the
School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of
higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial
discrimination.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Union can invoke the equal
protection clause to justify its claim of parity.
HELD:
Yes. The Labor Code’s and the Constitution’s provisions
impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons
who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort
and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid
similar salaries. the Court finds the point-of-hire classification
employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in
the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an
invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-
hires.

ALLADO VS DIOKNO CASE DIGEST
FACTS:
Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza,
were both implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping
and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist.
An information for the said crime was filed against the
petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by
Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was among those
who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the
petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno,
ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was
recommended. Petitioners, contending that their arrests was
effected whimsically as there is no probable cause,
questioned their arrests
ISSUES: Whether or not probable cause is present to
warrant the order of arrest against the petitioners.
HELD:
No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest
against the petitioners. Based on the evidence thus far
submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there
probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand
trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however
brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a
warrant for their arrest — facts and circumstances strong
enough in themselves to support the belief that they are
guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this
has not been met.
COLUMBIA PICTURES VS JUDGE FLORES
FACTS:
As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture
Association of America, Inc., NBI agents conducted
surveillance operations on certain video establishments,
among them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for
“unauthorized sale, rental, reproduction and/or disposition of
copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual
Property Law). In the course of the implementation of the
search warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found
and seized various video tapes of copyrighted films owned
and exclusively distributed by petitioners as well as other
appliances and machines. FGT moved for the release of the
seized television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders,
tape head cleaners, accessories, equipment and other
machines or paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject
warrant. It argued that as a licensed video reproducer, it had
the right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which
are not illegal per se, but are rather exclusively used and
intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale,
lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease
distribution, circulation or public exhibition of pirated video
tapes.”
ISSUE: Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the
search warrant
HELD:
NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
immediate return of some of the items seized by virtue of the
search warrant. Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the
test of legality. This is more so because the Court has
previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same
kind of search warrant. GT Video Network, Inc. is a
registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain
instances and under special instructions . . . reproducer of
videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its
possession, maintain and operate reproduction equipment(s)
and paraphernalia(s).”
PEOPLE VS RUBIO
FACTS
The administrative Code, section 1434, grants police power
to internal revenue agents acting pursuant to this authority,
the chief secret service agent and a supervising agent of the
bureau of Internal revenue gave testimony under oath before
Judge revilla, in which they specified the premises situated at
Calle Juan Luna, District of binondo, City of Manila, occupied
by Jose rubio, manager of the Simple Trading Corporation,
which it was desired to search upon probable cause thus
being shown, a search warrant was issued . On the same
day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place
indicated in the warrant, searched the premises, and took
there from books, invoices, and documents belonging to the
Simplex Trading Corporation of which Jose Rubio was the
manager. Thereafter, as indicated, a motion was presented
on behalf of Rubio to secure a pronouncement of nullity of
the search warrant, which motion, after receiving memoranda
in support and in opposition but without taking evidence, was
denied.
ISSUE: WON the searched warrant was illegal and void for
failure to particularly describe the things to be seized
HELD:
NO, while the place to be searches and the property to be
seized under a search warrant must be particularly described
in the warrant, yet the description is required to be specific
only in so far as conditions will ordinarily allow. By the nature
of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather
general, it is not required that a technical description be
given, as this would mean that no Warrant could issue.
PEOPLE VS SUSAN CANTON
FACTS:
That on February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously has in her possession NINE HUNDRED
NINETY-EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO
NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
prescription or license.
Unsatisfied with the decision of the trial court, SUSAN
imputing to the trial court the following errors: (1) in justifying
the warrantless search against her based on the alleged
existence of probable cause; (2) in holding that she was
caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest; (3) in not ruling that the frisker
went beyond the limits of the “Terry search” doctrine; (4) in
not ruling that SUSAN was under custodial investigation
without counsel; (5) in admitting to the records of the case
the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which was not
testified on or offered in evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt; (6) in justifying under the rule on
judicial notice its cognizance of the medical report that has
not been offered in evidence; and (7) in applying the ruling in
People v. Johnson.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and
subsequent seizure of the regulated drugs, as well as the
arrest of Susan were violative of her constitutional rights.
HELD:
No, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6235, “ Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline
or air carrier concerned shall contain among others the
following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his
hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and
seizure of, prohibited materials or substances. Holder
refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the
aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract between
the passenger and the air carrier
PEOPLE VS JOHNSON
FACTS:
Leila Johnson was arrested at the airport after she was found
to have in her possession more than 500 grams of shabu
when she was initially frisked by a security personnel at a
gate in the airport. The security personnel felt something
hard in respondent’s abdominal area and when asked she
said that she had to wear 2 girdles because of an operation.
Unconvinced, the security personnel went to her supervisor.
Subsequently, after a thorough search on respondent,
packets of shabu were seized from her. Accused
(respondent) was subsequently convicted and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua.
In the present appeal, respondent contended that the search
made upon her was not valid and that her constitutional
rights were infringed when such search was conducted.
ISSUE: WON THE SEARCH IS VALID
HELD:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as
she was never placed under custodial investigation but was
validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during
the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures.Persons may lose the
protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting
a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such
recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
VIVA PRODUCTIONS VS COURT OF APPEALS
AQUINO SARMIENTO VS MORATO
PRESLEY VS BELL-AIR ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
Spouses Almendras were the registered owners of the
property while Presley as lessee of the property, is the owner
and operator of Hot Pan de Sal Store. A complaint for
specific performance was filed by Bel-Air Village Association,
Inc. against the spouses (deceased, substituted by petitioner)
for violating a Bel - Air Subdivision restriction that the subject
house and lot shall be used only for residential and not for
commercial purposes, and for non-payment of association
dues to them. The RTC rendered decision in favor of
respondent which was affirmed by the CA Motion for
reconsideration was denied hence this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the deed of restriction can be
enforced by BAVA against the petitioner.
HELD:
No. The contractual stipulations on the use of the land even if
said conditions are annotated on the torrens title can be
impaired if necessary, to reconcile with the legitimate
exercise of police power. Like all contracts, subject to the
overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater
number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise
of police power. The jurisdiction of the court guarantees
sanctity of contract and is said to be the 'law between the
contracting parties,' (Civil Code, supra, art. 1159) but while it
is so, it cannot contravene 'law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy.' (supra, art. 1306). Above all, it cannot
be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely
to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common
good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever
necessary.
Jupiter Street has been highly commercialized since the
passage of Ordinance No. 81-01. The records indicate that
commercial buildings, offices, restaurants, and stores have
already sprouted in the area. The Court saw no reason why
the petitioner should be singled out and prohibited from
putting up her hot pan de sal store.
BALOLOY VS HULAR
FACTS:
his is a petition for review on certiorari on the decision of the
CA. The respondent Alfredo Hular filed a complaint for
quieting of title of real property with damages against the
children and heirs of Iluminada Baloloy and petitioners
Reynaldo and Adelina. The respondent alleged in his
complaint that his father, Astrologo Hular, was the owner of a
parcel of residential land located in Juban, Sorsogon, within
area of 287 square meters, and that such lot was part ofLot
No. 3347 of the Juban Cadastre. The respondent alleged that
Iluminado Baloloy, the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest,
was able to secure a Free Patent over the property through
fraud on March 1, 1968, on the basis of which the Register of
Deeds issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.P-16540
in his name. Subsequently, the respondent later discovered
that in the cadastral survey of lands in Juban, the property of
his father, which actually consisted of 1,405 square meters
was made toform part of Lot No. 3353, the property of
Iluminado Baloloy.According to the respondent, even if the
residential land was made to form part of Lot No. 3353
registered under the name of Iluminado Baloloy, he had
acquired ownership of the property by acquisitive
prescription, as he and his predecessors had been in
continuous, uninterrupted and open possession of the
property in the concept of owners for more than 60 years
ISSUES: Whether all the indispensable parties had
beenimpleaded by the respondent in the trial court
HELD:
It is the contention of the respondent that the subject property
was sold by Lagata to his father, Astrologo Hular, in1961.
Hence, when his parents died intestate, they were survived
by their children. Article 1078 of the Civil Code provides that
where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such
heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased.
Until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot
be determined and every co-owner exercises ,together with
his co-participants, joint ownership over the proindiviso
property, in addition to the use and enjoyment of the same
PEOPLE VS VELLARDE
PEOPLE VS TALIMAN
PEOPLE V TALIMAN, GR 109143, October 11, 2000
FACTS:
The appellants assailed the trial court's decision finding
them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The victim
was Renato Cuaño (hereinafter referred to as "Renato").
Prosecution witness Ernesto Lacson (hereinafter referred to
as "Lacson") was the uncle and employer of Renato, who
was the caretaker of his gravel and sand truck. On July 21,
1990, Renato came to see Lacson and informed him that
armed and hooded persons 4 were asking for money
amounting to six thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The amount
was reduced to six hundred pesos (P600.00) and finally to
two hundred pesos (P200.00). On July 22, 1990, Lacson
arrived home from church. His wife handed him a letter
delivered to her by a child. In the letter, purportedly members
of the N.P.A. demanded eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00)
from him. On the same day, at around eight o'clock in the
morning (8:00 a.m.), Lacson instructed Renato to take his
passenger jeep and to proceed to his "gold field" in Nalisbitan
to get his collectibles from the field. This was the last time
Lacson saw Renato alive. Also on the same day, Lacson told
his employee, prosecution witness Elizer Obregon
(hereinafter referred to as "Elizer"), to go to the crossing of
Nalisbitan, the place mentioned in the letter to investigate
who the persons demanding money were. Elizer complied
and reached the place at around five o'clock in the afternoon
(5:00 p.m.) of the same day. Upon reaching the place, Elizer
saw Renato and spoke with him. In the vicinity, Elizer saw
accused Basilio Baybayan, Pedro Taliman and Amado
Belano. At that time, accused Sgt. Pedro Taliman and C1C
Basilio M. Baybayan were members of the Camarines Norte
Constabulary/Integrated National Police Command. Elizer
saw two other civilians in their company. Elizer then saw
accused Pedro Taliman and Basilio Baybayan take Renato to
a hilltop, where he was guarded by accused who were
armed. Elizer heard one of the accused say that Renato must
be taken as "he must be acting as a lookout (for Lacson)."
Elizer then proceeded to Bagong Silang and reported to
Lacson that Renato was taken by accused Pedro Taliman,
Basilio Baybayan and Amado Belano. A custodial
investigation was conducted. Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was
mayor of Labo, Camarines Norte. He went to the police
station upon invitation of police corporal Cereno to "assist"
accused during their custodial investigation. Accused
executed extrajudicial statements, confessing to the
commission of the crime. It was during this custodial
investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin confessed to
prosecution witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he
participated in the killing of Renato because Renato did not
give them the money they were demanding. This confession
was given without the assistance of counsel and was not
reduced to writing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the oral waiver of the accused of his
right to counsel during the custodial investigation was valid.
HELD: NO. Even assuming that the right to counsel was
orally waived during custodial investigation, 43 still the defect
was not cured. The Constitution expressly provides that the
waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This, accused-appellants did not do.
PEOPLE VS JARA
FACTS:
There were no extrajudicial confessions admitted in
evidence. But circumstantial evidence was presented to
support a verdict of conviction that Jara was the mastermind
of the killing of his wife and the latter’s friend: 1.), Jara
resented his wife for having a relationship with a girl, the
other one who was killed. 2.) At the canteen where they
work, whenever Jara committed even the slightest mistakes,
his wife scolded and cursed him. 3.) One of the waitresses
observed that Jara shed no tears and his face did not show
any indication of sorrow when he saw the lifeless body of his
wife. 4.) the hammer used in the killing is an instrument with
which Jara is familiar. 5.) During the investigation at the
scene of the crime, blood stains were found splattered in the
trousers and shirt worn by accused Jara. His eyeglasses
were also smeared with blood. When asked to explain the
presence of said blood stains, accused Jara told the police
that before he learned about the killing, he was with his
stepdaughter Minerva Jimenez in the public market dressing
chickens.
ISSUE: Whether or not such evidences are sufficient to
overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of Jara
HELD:
Yes. No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity
of circumstantial evidence which will suffice for any case, but
that matters not. For all that is required is that the
circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he
is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt. The circumstances constitute an unbroken chain
leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to
the guilt of the Jara beyond reasonable doubt. Mere denials
of the accused as to his participation in the crime are only
self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh
circumstantial evidence clearly establishing his active
participation in the crime.
PEOPLE VS TARUC
FACTS:
In November 1998 accused-appellant Francisco Taruc was
charged before the RTC of Bataan with the crime of murder
in connection with the death of Emelito Sualog. RTC found
Taruc guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct
participation of the crime of MURDER and with the attending
aggravating circumstance of treachery, was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH. The case was brought to the
Court of Appeals for automatic review pursuant to A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC. However, the PAO lawyer concerned informed
the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant escaped from
prison on 23 August 2002. Said PAO lawyer claimed that he
had no means of knowing the current whereabouts of the
accusedappellant. Thereupon, the PAO lawyer asked the
Court of Appeals to direct the Warden of the Provincial Jail in
Balanga, Bataan, to file a certification as to the accused-
appellant’s escape. The Court of Appeals granted PAO’s
Motion for Extension of Time to File Appellant’s Brief in view
of the ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Flores,
making the review of death penalty cases mandatory. The
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming with
modification of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
Accused-appellant appealed on questions of law and fact.
Hence, this petition
ISSUES: Whether or not, the accused-appellant has right to
appeal his conviction even when he escaped from jail and
eluded arrest.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that by escaping prison,
accused-appellant impliedly waived his right to appeal.
Although Rule 124, Section 8 particularly applies to the Court
of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme Court by
Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.There are certain fundamental rights which cannot
be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of
appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the
benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he
pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication.
When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to
the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his
right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The
accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court or is
otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the
judgment against him. While at large, he cannot seek relief
from the court, as he is deemed to have waived the appeal.
Thus, having escaped from prison or confinement, he loses
his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to
its jurisdiction, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek
relief from the court. Accused-appellant, in the case at bar,
has remained at large for most of the proceedings before the
RTC, as well as for the entirety of the pendency of his appeal
before the Court of Appeals, and even until now when his
appeal is pending before this Court. He cannot so
audaciously hope that his appeal before this Court would
succeed.
LAVIDES VS CA
FACTS:
Lavides was arrested for child abuse under RA 7620. His
arrest was made through an entrapmentoperation where he
was found in his hotel room with Lorelie, 16 year old
daughter of the complainant, wearing onlya t-shirt and an
underwear. An information for violation of Art. III, §5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 was filed thereafteragainst petitioner in the
RTC-Quezon City. Petitioner, among others, filed an
application for bail before the RTC.RTC granted his right to
post bail with conditions. One of these conditions makes
petitioner's arraignment aprerequisite to the approval of his
bail bonds. Petitioner also filed a motion to quash the
informations against himbut was denied
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the condition
imposed by respondent Judge that the approval of
petitioner's bailbonds "shall be made only after his
arraignment" is of no moment and has been rendered moot
and academic by thefact that he had already posted the bail
bonds and had pleaded not guilty to all the offenses
HELD: YES, In requiring that petitioner be first arraigned
before he could be granted bail, the trial court apprehended
that ifpetitioner were released on bail he could, by being
absent, prevent his early arraignment and thereby delay his
trialuntil the complainants got tired and lost interest in their
cases. Hence, to ensure his presence at the
arraignment,approval of petitioner's bail bonds should be
deferred until he could be arraigned.
US VS. JUDGE PURUGANAN
FACTS:
ursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United
States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the
Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez
sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited
the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court
in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of
9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ,
this Court issued its October 17, 2000, Resolution.By an
identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes
-- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held
that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the
United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ,
filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition
for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No.
01192061.
ISSUES:
WON an extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing before ISSUE:
issuance of warrant of arrest. WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being
vague?
HELD:
NO. It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069, our HELD:
Extradition Law, uses the word”immediate” to qualify the NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide
arrest of the accused. This qualification would be rendered or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity
warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the opposing will be sustained. The amended information itself closely
parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable
them time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the
Arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered petitioner is alleged to have committed.
immediate. In Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. A
hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks
determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
-- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the
witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process for
notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
of arrest. fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
FACTS:
ormer President Estrada and co-accused were charged for
Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received
billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of
overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby
unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and
to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the
Philippines.
Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law
since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already
punishable under The Revised Penal Code.
Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8
separate Informations against petitioner.
Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of
preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but
was denied. Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable
cause for the offense of plunder exists to justify the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of the accused.