Republic of the Philippines

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

10th Judicial Region
Branch 32
Surigao City

ENGRACITA S. ZABALA,
Plaintiff-Appelee,

-versus- CIVIL CASE NO. 7822

(MCTC Br.1, Case No. 13-8236)
FOR:”FORCIBLE ENTRY WITH PRAYER
FOR ISSUANCE OF
PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION & DAMAGES”

DIVINA SUNGA,
Defendant-Appellant.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S
MEMORANDUM

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE , by herself, to this Honorable Court, most

respectfully states:

PREFATORY STATEMENT

1. This appealed case stemmed from an ejectment case filed by

plaintiff-appellee herself, which sought to recover material possession of a
one (1) storey building, built on Lot No. 1015-B, located at Navarro corner
Borromeo Streets, Brgy. Taft, Surigao City covered under Tax Declaration No.
J-1491229, with an area of 87.54 sq.m. declared in plaintiff-appellees name;

2. On April 30, 2014, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1,

Surigao City, rendered its Decision in favor of plaintiff-appellee, the dispositive
portion reads:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering defendant Divina Sunga, and all those
claiming rights under her to remove the padlock placed on
the subject property and to peacefully vacate and surrender
its possession to the plaintiff; to pay the plaintiff the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) by way of attorney’s
fees; and to pay the costs of the suit.”

SO ORDERED.”

3. Aggrieved, by the said Decision, defendant-appellant, filed a Notice of

Appeal on May 12, 2014, and her Memorandum on Appeal on June 24, 2014.
Hence, in response thereto, as required by the rules submit her appellee’s
Memorandum.
Page Two (2)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

4. Plaintiff-appellee purchased a one storey building from the

defendant-appellant Divina Sunga and her mother Manuela Sunga sometime
in the 1990’s. This building is found erected on Lot No. 1015-B, located at
Navarro corner Borromeo Streets, Brgy. Taft, Surigao City and covered under
Tax Declaration No. J-1491229, (hereinafter referred to as the subject
property);

5. After having acquired the subject property, plaintiff-appellee

exercised ownership and possession over it and have it rented it first to Fe
Tiu in 1999 until June 1, 2013. Thereafter, the subject property was rented to
MANOLETTE Bakery, until August 23, 2013, when on the latter date,
defendant-appellant forcibly entered the area, threatened the workers of the
bakeshop of something bad will happen to them if they continue with their
renovation works. Not contented with the verbal assault, defendant-appellant
padlocked the door of the building, thereby effectively preventing the
management of MANOLETTE Bakeshop from continuing with the said
renovation works;

6. The matter was reported to the Police authorities, and a complaint

was filed by the plaintiff-appellee with the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Brgy. Taft,
against the defendant-appellant. Conciliation efforts for settlement failed, thus,
on October 16, 2013, the instant case was filed before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities Branch 1, Surigao City.

7. In their answer, the defendant-appellant admitted the act of forcibly

entering the subject property, and the act of padlocking the door of the
building, but justified it in saying that she was just exercising her right over
the subject property being a co-owner thereof, arguing that the said property
was never sold nor relinquished by her predecessor-in-interest in favor of the
plaintiff-appellee. Defendant prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of a cause of action.

8. The Court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiff-appellee

ruling that as between the claims of the parties, it was the plaintiff-appellee
who was able to present substantial and convincing evidence to prove prior
physical possession of the subject property.

DISCUSSION AND ARGUMENTS

ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

9. Defendant Appellant cited the following as errors committed by the

Lower court in the Decision it rendered, that:

First: The Honorable Court a quo erred in not finding that

plaintiff - appellee has illegally rented out the portion
of the subject property to Fe Tiu;

Second: The Honorable Court a quo erred in not finding that the
defendant-appellant has been continuously in
possession of the subject property despite the fact that it
was illegally rented out by plaintiff-appellee to Fe Tiu.
Page Three (3)

10. The first assignment of error charges plaintiff-appellee’s of

illegally renting out the portion of the subject property to Fe Tiu. The lower
court, however, has ruled this issue, as irrelevant and immaterial to the
issue in the instant case. And these findings of facts leading to such a
conclusion by the lower court, should be accorded finality. The only
exception, as enunciated by the Supreme Court is when there appears in the
record some facts or circumstances of weight which it may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated, and which if properly considered would
alter the result of the case. (Clemente vs. Limbaco, 652 SCRA 643).

11. In the instant appeal, the defendant-appellant simply reiterated,

reproduced and, made a rehash of exactly the same arguments and position
she has made in their position paper, without pointing out the facts which the
court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated in ruling in
favor of the plaintiff-appellee. The defendant-appellant is very much fully aware
that the lower court categorically ruled, that even if the the portion of the
subject property was illegally rented to Fe Tiu is true, the fact remains that it
does not help the cause of the defendant-appellant. As correctly pointed by the
lower court, the only issue up for resolution in the instant case, is prior
PHYSICAL or MATERIAL possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership set forth by any of the party litigants.

12. In amplifying, the lower court said:

x x x
“ The argument of the defendant that plaintiff’s
act of leasing a property not owned by her is illegal and
the court should therefore leave her where it found
her is unavailing. If defendant considers plaintiff’s
act of leasing the disputed property illegal, she should
have instituted appropriate legal actions to recover
same like what plaintiff is doing right now, and not
forcibly take the property away when the latter’s tenant
stopped renting the property. In forcible entry cases, it is
immaterial how defendant came into such possession
or by what right she did so. Even usurpers of land
owned by another are entitled to remain on it until they
are lawfully ejected therefrom. A party who can prove
prior possession can recover such possession even against
the owner himself. Whatever may the character of his
possession, if he has in his favor prior possession in
time he has the security that entitled him to remain on
the property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him.”

Even granting that the possession of the plaintiff was

illegal, this circumstance would not have given defendant
license to forcibly recover possession. Such course of
action is precisely what is sought to be avoided by the
rule on ejectment. The underlying philosophy behind
ejectment suits is to prevent breach of the peace and
criminal disorder and to compel the party of possession
to respect and resort to the law alone to obtain what he
claims is his. The party deprived of possession must not
take the law into his own hands. (page 4, of the Decision)”.
Page Four (4)

13. As regards the second assignment of error, the lower court has
ruled that contrary to the claim of the defendant-appellee, the evidences
presented by the parties, both documentary and testimonial, tilted heavily in
favor favor of the plaintiff-appellee. In fact, the lower court has been emphatic
in its ruling when it said:

a. “ From the evidence of the plaintiff, it is undeniable

that on April 12, 1995, she leased from defendant’s mother
a building located at corner Borromeo and Navarro Streets,
Surigao City (area “A”). The term of the lease was for five
(5) years renewable for another five (5) years upon agreement
of the parties.

Subsequently, on August 20, 1996, defendant, her

mother Manuela Sunga, and her siblings Christopher and
Wilma Sunga, executed in favor of the plaintiff a promissory
note in the amount of P50,000.00. To guarantee payment of
the loan, a mortgage was constituted over a building located
on Lot 1015-B under Tax Declaration No. 1855. x x x”

b. “In paragraph (3) (f) of her answer, defendant admitted

that in 1999 plaintiff had the unsold portion of the 94.90 sq.
m. rented to Fe Tiu who renovated the same and made it as
her barbeque station business. She likewise admitted during
the preliminary conference that the plaintiff took over the same
after Fe Tiu vacated the 94.20 sq.m. portion. These admissions
effectively negate defendant’s claim of continuous and unin-
terrupted possession of the disputed property. It proves that
the party in last possession thereof was the plaintiff.

14. The findings of the lower court has even made more clear when it
said:

a. “Apparently, it was the intention of the parties to allow

the plaintiff to enjoy possession of the mortgage property
until full payment of the P50,000.00 loan. In fact, immediately
after the execution of the promissory note in 1996, plaintiff took
possession of the same and had the dividing wall destroyed to
unite this last portion of the property to the one previously
leased by her. Thereafter,plaintiff had the whole property rented
out to Fe Tiu. Had it not been the intention of the parties to
deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff-mortgagor
then the defendant could very well have protested when plaintiff
destroyed the dividing wall and had the entire building rented
out to Fe Tiu.
Page Five (5)

But for fourteen (14) long years since plaintiff exercised acts of
possession over the property, defendant never lifted a finger to
question the same. Instead, what she did was to take the law into her
own hands and justifies the padlocking to her claim of ownership. She
asserts that the remaining portion of the 94.20 sq.m. (particularly
that located along Navarro Street) was never sold or relinquished by
her or any of her predecessors-in-interest to the plaintiff. This
defense, assuming it is true, is misplaced in a forcible entry case
where possession flowing from ownership is not an issue. Possession
in forcible entry cases means nothing more than physicial possession
or possession de facto, not legal possession in the sense contemplated
in civil law. Only prior physical possession, not title, is the issue.”

Anyone of them who can prove prior physical possession de facto, may
recover such possession even from the owner himself. (Gachon vs. Devera,
Jr. 274 SCRA).