Shelley Defence

Poetry and Language in Shelley's Defence of Poetry
Author(s): John Ross Baker

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Summer, 1981), pp.
437-449
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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JOHN ROSS BAKER
Shelley's
Poetry and Language in
Defence of Poetry
THIS ESSAY might have been called "Mak- search for examples when Shelley writes
ing Sense in Shelley's Defence," for my aim about what is beyond exemplification.
of "making sense" of Shelley, necessitates, Misreadings of Shelley, however, may
and is in part prompted by, an examination actually be only a part of a pattern accord-
of the conflicting "senses" others have al- ing to which commentators appear to find
ready made of him. The ambiguous title in the rich and diversified contents of the
would point to a few of the problems facing Defence, and Romantic criticism generally,
a theorist who approaches the Defence, whatever sense suits their particular inter-
along with the commentary grown up ests. Thus a recent admiring book on Struc-
around it, expecting this ambitious theoret- turalism finds "important connections" be-
ical statement to be a coherent whole-or tween Structuralism and Romantic theories:
"make sense." Some commentators seem to "much of modern anthropology and lin-
make their own sense that clashes with the
guistics may be said to be contained," for
possibly obscure sense-making that hasexample,
al- in the Defence, for Shelley himself
ready gone on in the text. Though they "has the spirit of a social scientist."1 Yet
may do this wishing to defend Shelley, whatever the kinship to modern anthropol-
some of my own efforts will also be ogy in and linguistics and hence to Structural-
defense of Shelley-but against these otherism, the fact remains-detrimental to the
defenders. Not that all my activities willpresumed
be coherence of the treatise-that the
defensive: only by seeing where the Defence
"spirit of the social scientist" would be the
actually breaks down, or by defending spirit
the of "calculation" that the Defence is
need for more sense or coherence where directed against. If here Shelley is brought
none is forthcoming, can one hope intoto
line with late developments in theory,
assess Shelley's actual achievement. previously he was brought into line, sur-
Having in effect charged Shelley's com-prisingly, with Anglo-American New Criti-
mentators with willfully misreading hilm,cism long after that movement had waned.
I must acknowledge that I, too, mayWhereas
be the analogies implicit in the
providing only one more misreading. Defence
This among poetry, the other arts, and
is especially necessary since, searching for institutions may make one see its
social
systematic consistency, I shall sometimes
author as a proto-Structuralist, recent spe-
have to extrapolate, piecing together strands
cialists, according to Donald H. Reiman in
of argument that do not quite make sensea review of Shelley criticism, no longer
without help. I shall even, when pressed,
read the "Defence as merging poetry with
other forms of human creativity."2 These
specialists
THE LATE JOHN ROSS BAKER was professor of English pointedly avoid the "Platonic"
at Allentown College. reading of earlier commentators like M. H.
438 BAKER
Abrams, who found a "general annulment Defence will begin, then, with th
of distinction between the characters in a
of poetry-a difficult place beca
single poem, between individual poems,Shelley
be- allows so few limits to
it may not be proper even t
tween poems and the products of other
arts, and between the arts and all other definitions.
pursuits of men."3 Though obviously the
specialists would not try to make Shelley
I a
proto-New Critic, they still move him in the
direction of those critics who, trying to A principal difficulty in the Defence lies
avoid "a general annulment of distinction"in the extreme broadness of the definition
between poems and everything else, some- of poetry. This is not an insurmountable
times used "Platonic" to name a species ofdifficulty, though the differences between
bad poetry.4 Reiman himself clearly finds Reiman and the earlier commentators show
his own sense in defense of Shelley when, that indeed Shelley's sense is not self-evident.
If, as W. K. Wimsatt argues, Coleridge and
reacting against "Platonic" readings, he has
the Germans felt "a powerful temptation to
Shelley assert a new, and limited, definition
of poetry: equate philosophy and poetry,"7 Shelley
gives in to the temptation at once when he
Shelley says clearly that the only art that can be
called poetry consists of imaginative "arrange- says, "Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton are
ments of language, and especially metrical lan- philosophers of the very loftiest power."8
guage." Even when he calls Plato and Bacon The surrender leads him to include in
poets, he does so on the basis of the qualities "poetry" the writings not only of Plato an
in their language; and, to make this irreplace- Bacon (977, 983) but even of historians an
able criterion clearer, he states: "All the authors
of revolutions in opinion are not necessarily "authors of revolutions in opinion" (97
poets as they are inventors, nor even as their This "poetry," if brc<td, is yet only "poetry
words unveil the permanent analogy of things in a more restricted sense," the sort of com-
by images . . .; but as their periods are harmo- position (or the aggregate of composition
nious and rhythmical, and contain in themselves ordinary theorists often mean by "poetry
the elements of verse . . ." [ellipses and italics
are Reiman's] .
"those arrangements of language, and
especially metrical language, which ar
Combating "Platonic" readings, Reiman created by" the imagination (977). There
moves Shelley toward those New Critical also, broader still, the "poetry" produced b
definitions of poetry that Elder Olson once "poets in the most universal sense of the
parodied: "Poetry is words which, or lan- word" (976): "poetry, in a general sense
guage which, or discourse which."6 "the expression of the imagination" (975)
Nevertheless, although Shelley does de- In fact, given this initial "expressive" def
fine poetry in the sense Reiman stresses, he nition, Shelley can assert that "poets .
provides also for the "general annulment of are . . . the authors of language and of
distinction" between poems and even non- music, of the dance and architecture, and
linguistic things that might preclude the statuary, and painting; . . . the instituto
more limited definition, for-despite Rei- of laws, and the founders of civil society
man-he clearly says, as I shall show, that and the inventors of the arts of life, and the
many arts (and nonarts) besides that invol- teachers .. . [of] religion" (976). He can
ving "arrangements of language" can be find the "true poetry of Rome . . .in i
called poetry. Obviously, it would appear, institutions" (982), poetry in "the Christi
Reiman and the "Platonic" readers, finding and Chivalric systems" (983), and even
divergent definitions, cannot both be right poetry in certain "systems of thought
unless both capture only a partial truth. though "concealed by . . . facts and ca
But if both make in Shelley a sense that is culating processes" (986).
only partial, what is the full sense, if any, What does poetry not include? Towar
to be found in the Defence? My own at- the end of the Defence appears the culm
tempt to discover the sense made in the nation of what has been implicit all alon
Poetry and Language in Shelley's Defence of Poetry 439
there are hardly any limits to "poetry," for of revolutions in opinion" as poets because
"It is at once the centre and circumference their sentences "contain in themselves the
of knowledge" (986). Indeed, to speakelements
of of verse." But does he really say,
defining poetry-as I have done, and clearly
as or otherwise, "that the only art that
Shelley himself does (975)-may be mislead-
can be called poetry consists of imaginative
ing, for there is little in the Defence 'arrangements of language' "? Does he even
from which to differentiate it. True, as say that poetry is necessarily verbal? Al-
though he calls Plato, Bacon, and "the
"the expression of the imagination," it is
from the beginning contrasted with the
authors of revolutions in opinion" poets
products of the "reason," the "principle "on
of the basis," as Reiman insists, "of the
qualities in their language," this does not
analysis" (975) or the "calculating faculty"
provide the demonstration that Reiman
(985); but even this antithesis dissolves as
imagination and poetry "turn[ing] allpresents it as. One could of course argue-
things to loveliness" (987), extend their though Shelley has the sense not to-that
domain. Thus the benefits for "deluded the "poetry" in "systems of thought" refers
ultimately to "elements of verse" in the
humanity" produced by "mere reasoners"
like Locke and Gibbon come from "the in- writings embodying these systems. One
tervention of [the] excitements" resulting
might also argue, even less plausibly, that
when Shelley finds "the true poetry of
from the poetry in their work (986). With-
out the enabling power of poetry, Rome
"the . . . in its institutions," this involves
invention of the grosser sciences" and"qualities
the of language"-perhaps in the
"application [in economics] of analytical
texts from which are inferred the "immortal
reasoning to the aberrations of society"
dramas" involving Camillus and the others
(982). Such arguments would indeed keep
would be ineffectual. But poetry does more
than enable: poetry is actually, as I have
the Defence from "merging poetry with
indicated, in "these systems of thought."
other forms of human creativity," but only
At this point a cynical reader-or a "mere
at the cost of an interpretation that creates
in Shelley senses as strange as those it is
reasoner"-would conclude: Shelley has ex-
tended the meaning of "poetry" so as designed
to to avoid.
Furthermore, no matter how one inter-
encompass whatever he pleases, or whatever
prets poetry in "systems of thought" and
pleases him; faced with the embarrassment
that certain things in "institutions" "institutions,"
and the plain fact is that Shelley
uses "poetry" to refer to many arts besides
"systems of thought" do happen to please
those
him, he finds in them "poetry" in order to involving language-as well as to
remove them from the realm of reason or activities not ordinarily called art by
"calculation." Shelley or others. Because, as I shall even-
This sense a cynical reader would make
tually argue, the broadness of the definition
of Shelley's definition is only an inten-
bears crucially on the apology for poetry
sification of the earlier "Platonic" stress on Shelley is able to make, it is worth pursuing.
the "general annulment of distinction" inBefore proceeding, however, I must empha-
the Defence. When Shelley specialists like size that I have been taking "poetry" as what
Reiman abandon this "Platonic" reading,is produced by a "poet," and the "poet"
they are ignoring the plain sense foundas a person who produces "poetry." Such,
everywhere; Reiman himself regards the in fact, is the usage established early in the
"Platonic" reading as not only unfashion- Defence. The paragraph in question begins:
able but simply wrong. Because the matter"poets. .. are the authors of language and
bears on Shelley's definition, Reiman's of music, of the dance, and architecture, and
claim-"Shelley says clearly that the only artstatuary and painting" (976). Here, since
that can be called poetry consists of imag-the "authors" of the various arts are
inative 'arrangements of language' "-needs"poets," then music, dance, architecture,
examining. True, as Reiman asserts, Shelleystatuary, and paintings are "poetry." At the
says clearly that he thinks of "the authorsend of the paragraph, as he explains that
440 BAKER
the "poet participates in the eternal,

particular "arrangementsthe of language, and
infinite, and the one," Shelley asserts
especially metrical that
language" (976). The sec-
ond "poetry,"
"grammatical forms" designating also an "expression
time, per- of the
son, and place "are convertible with
imagination," respect
is a species of the first-just
to the highest poetry without injuring
as painting and the other itarts
asare yet other
poetry." The illustration for speciesthis
of "poetry,
idea in a general sense." So
about
"the highest poetry" he would there are, draw-"if the
in fact, many "poetries" as species
limits of [his] essay did not forbid
of the one "poetry,citation"
in a general sense." In-
-from several different arts. Thus,
deed, because just "poetry"
this second as employs
the opening of the paragraph languageunites
in a specialvarious
way, a way appropriate
artists as "poets," so the to conclusion unites
its species, we have here something like a
various arts as "poetry." In addition,
definition of "poetry" in theterms of language,
structure of the clauses plays up the inclu-
for language-particular "arrangements of
siveness of "poetry"; the language"-differentiates
other arts in this this "poetry" from
case could provide for Shelley's pointand
the other "poetries" even
also from (what, to
better illustrations than preserve
"writings" would: I must call)
Shelley's distinction,
nonpoetry,
the choruses of AEschylus, and the book in which
of language
Job, is bent only
and Dante's Paradise, would afford, more than to those utilitarian ends dictated by the
any other writings, examples of this fact .... "calculating faculty." If Shelley's definition
The creations of sculpture, painting, and music of "poetry in a more restricted sense" bears
are illustrations still more decisive. [977; italics
a family resemblance to those New Critical
added]
definitions of poetry in terms of language
Here "sculpture, painting, and music"-no that Elder Olson objected to, this should
less than "writings"-are "poetry." If they not be a surprise: the reservations of Rei-
are not, then how can "creations of sculp- man and other specialists about the earlier
ture, painting and music" provide-for a "Platonic" readings seemed designed to pro-
"fact" about "the highest poetry"-"illustra- vide a meaning of poetry in argreement
tions still more decisive" than "the choruses
with the dominant theory of the time. But
of AEschylus"? Though "poetry" often in-
to reduce all the meanings to just that of
"poetry in a more restricted sense," no mat-
volves "arrangements of language," some-
times it does not involve language at all,
ter how up-to-date it may make Shelley
and here these other "poetries" become the appear, is to oversimplify.
highest of the high. The commentator who
denies that Shelley regards all the arts-and
I1
many other activities-as "poetry" makes
parts of the Defence unnecessarily obscure.Before examining Shelley's view of
language in poetry-or "poetry in a more
Given the "convertibility" of "grammatical
restricted sense"-I must consider further the
forms" in "the highest poetry," the Defence
is already sufficiently problematic. various meanings of "poetry," for they
seem responsible for an occasional potential
But, despite the extreme broadness of the
definition thus far, there is nevertheless still
obscurity, just as they are certainly the
source of the differences between Reiman
more to "poetry." Though "poetry" threat-
and Abrams. Failing to reckon with the
ens to consume virtually all human activities
(all but those issuing totally from the "cal-
different meanings, each commentator takes
culating faculty"), there is another, quite one or the other, but not both, to be
operating throughout.
different, yet almost concurrent meaning-
the one that, in his anti-"Platonic" stance, The apparent obscurity in the Defence
Reiman takes to be operating throughout. comes into view when one asks which
There are actually, then, two "poetries":"poetry" Shelley is writing about at a
"poetry, in a general sense," as "the expres-given moment. What "poetry," for examp
sion of the imagination" (975), and "poetry does he write about in the concluding pa
in a more restricted sense," which employsgraphs? This is, perhaps, to ask about t
"poetry" of the title. Given, near the end, statement to follow about "the vanity of
the optimistic assertion about "the literature translation," Shelley here presents as a
of England . . . aris[ing] . . . from a new "fact" that in "the highest poetry" the
birth" as well as the emphasis in the last "grammatical forms" designating time, per-
paragraphs on writers, the famous phrase son, place are translatable into each other;
"unacknowledged legislators" must refer to that, in other words, if in such poetry one
poets as masters of the special "arrange- substituted "was" for "is," "I" for "thou,"
ments of language" characteristic of "poetry or even "this" for "that," there would be
in a more restricted sense." But, as such, no harm done to this "highest poetry" as
they are also necessarily poets "in a general"poetry." Such, at any rate, is the case if
sense" because all the species of poetry we take, as I see no alternative to doing,
have the characteristic of "poetry, in"convertible"
a to mean "inter-convertible"
or even "inter-translatable."
general sense": all are, in their differing
media, "expressions of the imagination." But what can this kind of "convertibility"
Consequently, at different points, although be? How can it fail to injure the highest as
a single sense may prevail, the general sensewell as the lowest poetry? The answer lies
is always present and ultimately inseparable in what can infer about "the highest poetry."
from the other because no species can lack We can think of this tentatively as a verbal
the defining characteristic of its genus. In poetry that expresses the imagination more
short, the defense of "poetry in a restricteddirectly than any other "poetry." Because
sense" entails, for Shelley, a simultaneous verbal poetry is "the most [nearly] perfect
defense of all the products of the imagina- expression of the faculty itself" (977), "the
tion. If, on the other hand, a composition highest poetry" would approach an imme-
resembles "poetry" in its "arrangements of diate or even unmediated expression of the
language" but is not to Shelley an "expres- imagination and its vision, as if the poetry
sion of the imagination," he withholds fromsomehow got beyond language. (Because of
it, or its author, the name of poetry: the later qualifications I must separate "most
"hoarse Codri of the day" are therefore, in perfect" with a bracketed "nearly" and say
an abusive yet systematically justified term,approach rather than present an unmedi-
only "versifiers" (988). ated expression-as if it were possible to
Although these multiple yet sometimesthink of "expression" as "unmediated.")
simultaneous meanings of "poetry" wouldThis vision would be unqualifiedly monis-
not satisfy a sensible Aristotelian demand tic: "A poet participates in the eternal, the
for different terms for genus and species, infinite, and the one; as far as relates to his
Shelley's usage seems generally clear, conceptions,
if time and place and number
hardly to be recommended as a model. Once are not" (977); later we learn, "All high
poetry is infinite; it is as the first acorn,
one grasps the principle, this usage is also
helpful with a puzzling yet crucial passagewhich contained all oaks potentially" (985;
about verbal "poetry": "The grammatical
italics added). So in "the highest poetry"
forms which express the moods of time, andthe Many of language, with the "grammati-
the difference of persons, and the distinction
cal forms" that insist on time, place, and
of place, are convertible with respect to thenumber, are consumed by the One of the
highest poetry without injuring it as imagination's vision. In this poetry "gram-
poetry" (977). Though the immediate con- matical forms," having no "moods of time,"
text shows that "poetry" sometimes refers to no "difference of person," and no "distinc-
other arts than verbal "poetry," the puzzlingtion of place" to express-having, in short,
element is the word "convertible," glossed no expressive function at all-could indeed
by Abrams as "inter-convertible": in "thebe "convertible." What "injury" could "con-
highest poetry" there is (in Abrams' terms) verting" possibly do to this "highest poetry"
a "general annulment of distinction" in as "poetry" expressive of "the eternal, the
which, as Shelley says, "time and place and infinite, and the one" in which "time and
number are not."9 Despite the important place and number are not"? Though it
442 BAKER
ein-bewusst:
might otherwise seem a strange non sequitur,
heiss ergliihter Brust
Shelley's statement that sculpture, painting,
h6chste Liebeslust!
and music provide "illustrations still more
decisive" for this "fact" about verbal
poetry can now be seen to make quite Butintel-
in each case we would find that at-
ligible sense-at least in terms of Shelley'stempts at "converting" cause considerable
theory. The "poetries" of these other arts,they would prevent the unions, the
injury:
precisely because they lack the grammatical mergings of two into one, that these poems
forms tying language and its poets to time, and appear to celebrate. Simpler
present
place, and number, are for Shelley "illustra-
than the others, the Tristan lines are a tour
tions still more decisive." de force in this mode, as if the poet were
Yet despite the implied superiority of the
looking back to Shelley as well as ahead to
media of these other "poetries," making Nietzsche: they obliterate time by dispens-
them fitter vehicles for "the highest poetry,"
ing with finite verbs-and even normal sen-
only a few paragraphs later Shelley argues tences, which with Shelley we may call
for the superiority of language itself over "periods." The lines indeed insist on "con-
the media of the other "poetries": these verting" "ich" to "du," yet if we reconverted
media "interpose between conception and the already converted pronouns we would
expression" (977) more than language. At destroy "ein-bewusst": once the "conver-
one point, language is inferior; at another sion" has occurred, the "grammatical forms"
point, it is superior. The inconsistency here,are no longer "convertible." The poet, ex-
-the self-contradiction, springs from a pro- ploiting the grammatical resources of his
found ambivalence about "poetry" in its medium, must also accept the limitations of
various senses. But, in order to uncover this the medium if he is to present lovers who
ambivalence, we must continue further themselves want to get beyond language
with the concept of "convertibility" and its ("Ohne Nennen") and life itself. They
relation to Shelley's ideas about the mediawould merge with Shellev's "the eternal,
of the various "poetries." the infinite, and the one." Even so, in this
Now, although Shelley protests that his"poem" the exploitation of the musical
"limits . .. forbid citation," the fact is
medium that lacks the "grammatical forms"
that no exemplification of "convertibility"
tying language to person, time, and place
seems possible. And Shelley, too, must at
ensures that what is done with langua,e
some level know this. In what poetry, high-will be at best, in actual productions, only
est or lowest, could the "grammatical minimally intelligible.
forms" be "convertible"? Of course, one
As I have suggested, the Defence contains
might adduce seemingly exemplary passages two conflicting, even contradictory views of
from Shelley's own "Epipsychidion"the ormedium of poetry. Much of the time
Donne's "The Extasie" or, anachronistical- language is for Shelley hardly a medium at
ly, Act II of Tristan und Isolde: all: unlike the media of the other arts,
which are physical, language is not only
TRISTAN: Tristan du, the expression but also the creation of the
ich Isolde, imagination. As such, it would be a "direct
nicht mehr Tristan! representation of the actions and passions
ISOLDE: Du Isolde, of our internal being," and it would be
Tristan ich, "plastic anid obedient to the control of that
nicht mehr Isolde! faculty of which it is the creation." The
superiority of language to the media of the
BEIDE: Ohne Nennen, other arts is unmistakable: it "is arbitrarily
ohne Trennen, produced by the imagination, and has rela-
neu' Erkennen, tion to thoughts alone; but all other
neu' Entbrennen; materials, instruments, and conditions of mrt
ewig endlos, have relations among each other, which
limit and interpose between conception and nearly perfect." "Most perfect" falls short
expression" (977).10 Even sound, the medi- of perfection.
um of music, is more obviously physical, Or perhaps Shelley's ambivalent attitude
more obviously an Aristotelian material toward the medium can be clarified if one
cause. In the spirit of this view of the verbal notes how it approaches the extreme
medium-or should one say nonmedium?- position of a contemporary Continental
Shelley speaks of "convertibility" in "the theorist. Hegel arranges the various arts in
highest poetry," and, following him, I have an ascending hierarchy as their media be-
spoken of an "unmediated expression." come progressively free of the physical;
Yet, though the primary emphasis is on interestingly, "poetry" is for Hegel "a com-
language as an utterly transparent medium mon thread" through all the arts:
not "interpos[ing] between conception and The true medium of poetical representation is
expression," or as "a mirror which" (in a the poetical imagination and the intellectual
revision of the old metaphor for mimesis)" presentation itself; and inasmuch as this element
"reflects the light" of the imagination, a is common to all types of art it follows that
poetry is a common thread through them all,
secondary, and slighter, emphasis neverthe- and is developed independently in each. Poetry
less subverts the first. Indeed, Shelley argues is, in short, the universal art of the mind, which
for the transparency of the medium in a has become essentially free, and which is not
way that leaves room, but only a little room, fettered in its realization to an externally sen-
for a view that runs counter to the first. In suous material. ... [In poetry] the external me-
dium is wholly suppressed into insignificance.2
contrasting language with the media of the
other arts, he usually makes the difference
A. C. Bradley's objection to Shelley's view
between them one of degree only, not kind.of the medium could apply with even more
Despite the unmistakable thrust towardforce to Hegel's:
transparency, he says that language is a what [the artist] expresses is inseparable from
"more direct representation ... of our in- the vehicle of expression; and . . . he has no
ternal being, and is suspectible of more conceptions which are not from the beginning
various and delicate combinations, than sculpturesque, pictorial, or musical. It is true,
no doubt, that his medium is an obstacle as well
color, form, or motion, and is more plastic
as a medium; but this is also true of language.1s
and obedient to the control of" the imagin-
ation. Even asserting the "interposition" ofYet the Defence nevertheless contains a
other media "between conception and ex-minimal acknowledgment-or at least the
pression," he allows for a little, but againpotential for an acknowledgment-of the
only a little, "interposition" by language.idea summed up so well by Bradley: the
Likewise, "more direct" and "more plastic"medium is an obstacle as well as a medi-
and obedient" do not necessarily mean-in um."14 This potential is enough to allow
fact, cannot mean-"totally direct" andShelley to proceed to a discussion of the
"totally plastic and obedient." The distinc-
language of poetry sharply different from
tion between differences of degree and of that we have been examining, and quite
kind is here so small that I must apologizedifferent from Hegel's.
for the tortuousness to which I am driven When he treats "the distinction between
in expounding it. Perhaps Shelley's apparentmeasured and unmeasured language" (977),
lapse in referring to poetry as "the most he seems to acknowledge that what is "ex-
perfect expression of" the imagination (977)pressed" in a poem is not precisely a reflec-
epitomizes his conflicting views of thetion of the imagination bu.t instead some-
medium. A perfect expression would re-thing that arises, at least in part, from the
quire an utterly transparent medium, anpoet's special manipulations of a language
utterly undistorting mirror; it would not not as transparent as elsewhere he takes it
admit of degrees. Yet once "perfect" is to be. "Sounds as well as thoughts," he says,
qualified with the degree-term "most," the"have relation both between each other and
expression becomes less than perfect, for ittowards that which they represent, and a
can be only "nearly perfect," even if "mostperception of the order of those relations
444 BAKER
has always been found connected making our with

eyes morea than
per- mirrors reflect-
ception of the order of those ing (or relations
windows opening of on) the world;
thoughts." Although one must language, agree with
as manipulated in poetry, is like
Shelley (and Hegel) thatthe language
imagination inis not
making the poem more
physical, here is a recognition than an that
expression
poeticor reflection of
language with its special sounds-the "thought." Indeed, the process of compo-
metrical and rhyming patterns as well as the sition can now be called creative in other
other conventions or "arrangements of than an honorific sense, for the poem is
language" that poets use or devise anew-more than (or at least different from) a
has more than the simple reflective or ex-reflection or expression of the imagination,
pressive capacity earlier assigned to it: to which it is no longer wholly answerable.
sounds, in effect, "interpose between con-The radical novelty arising from the creative
ception and expression" when the poet, as interaction of language and imagination
he must, seeks "a certain uniform and depends not on the poet's prior vision but
harmonious recurrence of sound." on the vision that emerges as he manipu-
The metaphor of "harmony," used so his
lates medium in his search for "a certain
often in the Defence, recalls the remarkable uniform and harmonious recurrence of
Aeolian lyre passage: sound" and certain "arrangements of
Man is an instrument over which a series of language."
Because
external and internal impressions are driven, my extrapolations may not clarify
like
the alternations of an ever-changing wind
how the over
composition of a poem, produced
an /Eolian lyre, which move it by theirwithmotion
the poet's special "arrangements of
to ever-changing melody. But there is a princi-
language," would differ from the compo-
ple within the human being, and perhaps within
sition
all sentient beings, which acts otherwise thanof ordinary
in prose, the nonpoem as
it were, but
the lyre, and produces not melody, alone, I will try to explain. If the process
harmony, by an internal adjustmentofof composition
the were analyzed further to
sounds or motions thus excited to the impres-
include nonpoems, it would be found that
sions which excite them. [975]
they are made through the ordinary writer's
concern with
Here the imagination works in creating our all that Shelley seems to in-
cludeexter-
world, which is not merely alien and under "grammatical forms": the
poet's "arrangements"
nal, nor merely projected. It is neither the do not enter into the
"melody" of what impinges on us process
nor theat all, unless only for "calculating,"
"melody" we project in response, but a purposes. So, in prose as well
pseudo-poetic
"harmony" of both "melodies."asGiven poetry, language operates analogously to
"harmony" as the common element in in perception: the "grammatical
imagination
language and in the perception that forms"
makes in prose helping to shape the
our world, we can extrapolate from thought,theand the "arrangements" doing the
process that makes the world to the same in poetry. It must be added that,
process
despite Shelley's idea of "convertibility" in
that makes the poem. Such extrapolation,
"the highest poetry," the "grammatical
bringing together seemingly disparate
strands of the Defence, is necessary for
forms" a
designating person, time, and place
would enter
grasp of Shelley's position on the medium of into the composition of poetry
poetry. Most of the time he would as wellhave
as of prose, even though a further
poetry, lyre-fashion, a reflection orqualification
expres- is necessary: because of the
sion of the imagination: but when he poet's "arrangements of language" the
introduces the "harmony" of sound he "grammatical forms" may not perform pre-
makes language itself, like "the principle cisely the same function as in prose, but the
within the human being" in the act of modifications in expressive function that
perception, enter into the process of com- these forms undergo would fall far short of
position. The imagination, "the principle the "convertibility" of Shelley's "highest
within," helps shape the world in perception, poetry." Thus, with the poet's "arrange-
ments" excluded from prose, poetry would fashion. But, again, this may still be in
differ in kind, not degree, from prose. This, keeping with the Defence: too nice a dis-
I believe, is consistent with Shelley's re- tinction between poetry and its opposite
marks about the poet's concern with would move the Defence toward "reason,"
"sounds" and his argument about "the which "respects the differences," and away
authors of revolutions in opinion." from imagination, which respects "the
But the analogy between imagination in similitudes of things."
perception and language in composition, Here, nevertheless, if my extrapolations
which licenses my extrapolations, causes dif- are firmly grounded, Shelley has earned the
ficulties, not the least of which is that for theoretical right to his eloquent words on
Shelley imagination operates in both per- "the vanity of translation":
ception and composition. More important, it were as wise to cast a violet into a crucible
even though poetry would differ in kind that you might discover the formal principle of
from prose, the poet's imagination differs- its colour and odour, as seek to transfuse from
for Shelley, as for Coleridge-from our one language into another the creations of a
everyday imagination only in degree, not poet. The plant must spring again from its seed,
or it will bear no flower-and this is the burthen
kind: what theorist could argue that poets of the curse of Babel. [977]
are a different species of people? Conse-
quently, when Coleridge explains the Ironically, despite Bradley's objections,
secondary Imagination, an "echo" of the Shelley's position here is actually that
primary but operative in the .creation of asserted by Bradley: "What [the artist] ex-
poetry, he italicizes the words I need to presses is inseparable from the vehicle of
stress, too: it is "identical with the primary expression." Furthermore, he might say, on
in the kind of its agency, and differing only the basis of the arguments that support "the
in degree, and in the mode of its opera- vanity of translation" passage, what Bradley
tion."15 Shelley, though less explicit, is elsewhere says: "Hence in true poetry"-
equally clear: "Those in whom [imagina- that poetry coming about through the
tion] exists in excess are poets, in the most creative interaction of imagination and
universal sense of the word" (976; italics medium-"it is, in strictness, impossible to
added). Furthermore, with a theory begin- express the meaning in any but its own
ning in speculations about the imagination words, or to change the words without
rather than language, "poetry" must appear changing the meaning." He might also say,
in all sorts of activities, as we have observed again on the basis of the creative role of
in the Defence, and as we can find in Cole- language, and again with Bradley, "If the
ridge: there is "poetry of the highest kind" poet already knew exactly what he meant
in Plato, Taylor, and Burnet, or "All the to say, why should he write the poem? The
fine arts are different species of poetry."16 poem would in fact already be written. For
For Shelley, as for Coleridge, it would only its completion can reveal, even to him,
seem, "What is Poetry? is so nearly the same exactly what he wanted."18 The meaning of
question with, what is a poet? that the the poem is not to be found anywhere but
answer to the one is involved in the solution in these words, in this order-in the words
to the other."'7 Poetry, under these circum- of the poem-not even in the images that
stances, has little chance of being distin- would result if a magic lantern could throw
guished in theory from prose unless, as in the imagination's nerves in patterns on a
the Defence, the medium is separated from screen.
the imagination and given a role in com- As I have noted, the anti-"Platonic" Rei-
position. But, even so, the difference in kind man, finding "poetry" used in only a limit-
argued for on the basis of a theory of ed sense, moves Shelley into line with New
composition, especially a frankly extrapolat- Critical definitions of "poetry." In fact, in
ed theory, provides a way of distinguishing wlhat I have extrapolated about the process
poetry from nonpoetry in only an inchoate of composition, Shelley is unexpectedly close
446 BAKER
to the New Critics. Even if he is the Roman- even the grammar of a language, makes the
tic poet farthest from the New Critics-
medium totally subservient to the poet's
vision. It is as inconsistent with his ideas
Cleanth Brooks, a specialist once said, "ad-
vances upon Shelley equipped only with hisabout "sounds" as it is with the first-hand
standards and his bare fists"19 -a parallelknowledge that probably led him to sense
between him and the New Critics should the recalcitrance of his medium in the
not come as a surprise, after all; for central
first place. Language does, for Shelley, "in
in his major theoretical document, terpose more between conception and expression
than in the other Romantics, is an aim but only in the minimal ways I have show
that can serve as a link to the New Critics. Elsewhere, when he seems to recognize th
Like him, many of them have been distin- recalcitrance of the medium, it is only t
guished defenders of poetry. The Neo- exalt the imagination at the expense of th
Aristotelian R. S. Crane found their efforts
poem. Here, for example, language wou
motivated by a "morbid obsession . .. withseem to "interprose between conception an
the problem of justifying and preserving expression" as much as any physical
poetry in an age of science. This," he said,
medium:
"has resulted in an extraordinary florescence
. . .the mind in creation is as a fading coal,
of modern apologies for poesy."20 And, inwhich some invisible influence, like an incon-
a nearly exhaustive exploration of Newstant wind, awakens to transitory brightness:
Critical theory, Murray Krieger, taking off
this power arises from within, like the colour
from precisely the "need" felt by theseof a flower which fades and changes as it is
developed, and the conscious portions of our
critics "to justify poetry by securing for it
natures are unprophetic either of its approach
a unique function for which modern or its departure. Could this influence be durable
scientism cannot find a surrogate," identifies in its original purity and force, it is impossible
them as "new apologists for poetry." to predict the greatness of the results; but when
Essential to the New Critics' apology, Krie- composition begins, inspiration is already on the
ger shows, is a theory of poetic creation in decline, and the most glorious poetry that has
ever been communicated to the world is prob-
which language can play a formative role.21 ably a feeble shadow of the original conception
It is such a theory that, in portions of the of the Poet. [987]
Defence, Shelley provides. By allowing
language a role in the creation of the poem Because "the mind" has been "in cre-
instead of making it the passive reflector of ation" before "composition begins," compo-
a prior imaginative vision, he even provides sition itself can be at best only "communica-
support for the critical and philosophical tion," not "creation." Earlier the media of
attitudes W. K. Wimsatt and Monroe the other arts were "a cloud which enfee-
bles" and language was "a mirror which
Beardsley argue for in "The Intentional
Fallacy." But this fallacy, the authors reflects the light of" the imagination (977),
point
out in the second section of their but here
essay, islanguage
a no longer "reflects" any
Romantic one-a reminder to melight, thatnotmy even that of the "fading shadow."
extrapolations are from only a"Composition," part of earlier depending on an at
Shelley's account of the language of poetry.
least minimally resistant medium coming to
Though these extrapolations have been
interact with the imagination to produce
designed to bring into relief an important the poem, has now become a hopeless strug-
aspect of the )efence, Shelley is obviously gle, and language itself "a cloud which en-
far from consistent on the medium of feebles." As the defense of the poem, "the
poetry. After his eloquence on "thefeeble shadow" in contrast with the "light"
vanity
of translation," he laments "the burthen of of the imagination, is thus weakened, so is
the curse of Babel" rather than celebrates the defense of all those other products of
the "curse" as an opportunity in disguise, the imagination that Shelley calls "poetry."
and he has already committed himself In on
fact, given the extent to which the
"convertibility." This doctrine, destroying various media "interpose between concep-
447
Poetry and Language in Shelley's Defence of Poetry
tion and expression," even the defense of obedient," the medium obeys the imagina-
the imagination begins to break down; for tion; when otherwise, it would seem to go
the imagination-the "light," the "fading its own way, like a plant. The poet, like
coal"-becomes inaccessible. Though he be- Shelley in his doubts, is also powerless; and,
gins by defining poetry as "the expression of as we have seen, even "the most glorious
the imagination," in the end that "expres- poetry" is only "a feeble shadow" of the
sion" cannot take place. So, despite the ring- imagination.
ingly affirmative final paragraphs, the claims
therein are undercut by the waverings and III
doubts elsewhere.
Shelley is powerless to overcome the"Doubts about the creative power of the
doubts, partly because he rigorouslypoet,"
ex- says a recent student of Shelley's
"myth of metaphor," "are evident every-
cludes the will from the creation (or "com-
position") of poetry. Unlike Coleridge, who
where except in the Defence."22 On the con-
stipulates that the secondary Imaginationtrary, I urge, one of the fascinations of the
Defence-and the source of the difficulties I
"co-exist[s] with the conscious will," Shelley
makes creation all but unconscious: "Poetry
have been exploring as well as a justification
for seeing Shelley at times, despite Reiman,
is not like reasoning, a power to be exerted
according to the external determinationasof a kind of "Platonist"-is the actual pres-
ence of the doubts that keep the treatise
the will. A man cannot say, 'I will compose
poetry' " (986). Now, with the operationfrom
of cohering as a systematic whole. It is
possible, I believe, to sum up the major
the will obviously involved in the account
of poetic creation extrapolated fromconflict
the at the heart of the Defence without
discussion of the medium, I felt free toexcessive
say simplificaton. On one hand is the
that the poet "manipulates his mediumbroad
in or "Platonic" definition of "poetry"
his search for 'a certain uniform and har- as encompassing all the creations of the
imagination in the various arts and other
monious recurrence of sound.' " But Shelley
activities; along with this, indeed dictated by
himself, even when he speaks of "the vanity
of translation" and the "harmonious recur- the centrality of the imagination in the
definition, is the view of artistic media as
rence," carefully excludes the will. Rather
than have the poet seek the "harmonious ideally all but transparent in their obedi-
recurrence," he lets language do the workence to the imagination. With this "poetry"
on its own with the poet as, at most,the a medium sometimes disappears: when
passive overseer: "Hence the language there
of is "poetry" in Roman "institutions"
poets"-not the poets themselves-"has everor in "the Christian and Chivalric systems,"
affected a certain uniform and harmonious what can the medium be? On the other
recurrence of sound." Even the argument hand is the definition of "poetry in a more
about "the vanity of translation," which restricted sense" that, while logically com-
more than anything else in the Defence patible with the other definition as species
would seem to acknowledge the poet's to genus, nevertheless demands a different
manipulation of his language, finally ap- view of the medium. Whereas "poetry, in a
peals to an organicist analogy that again general sense" that includes nonarts, really
excludes the will: "The plant must spring needs no medium at all, "poetry in a more
again from its seed, or it will bear no flow- restricted sense" must have a medium; and
ers." In his ambivalence he has the medium because "poetry in a more restricted sense"
at times "plastic and obedient" in the ways includes music, painting, and sculpture with
we have seen, but he also has it, at other their obviously physical media, Shelley recog-
times, taking over in the creative process. nizes, reluctantly, that his own art, too, has
a medium that is at least analogous to the
In either case, the poet as a conscious, will-
ing artist has no place: when "plastic and media of the others, though he tries to
448 BAKER
2"Shelley,"
minimize its "interposition." in Frank Jordan,
At times, in- ed., The English
Romantic Poets: A Review of Research and Criti-
deed, as with the notion of "convertibility,"
he so minimizes the recalcitrance of lan- cistm, 3rd rev. ed. (New York, 1972), p. 357.
3M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp:
guage as to obliterate the medium al- Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (New
together. Finally, we must suppose, only anYork, 1953), p. 129.
empirical faithfulness to his own art allows 4The most conspicuous uses are in Allen Tate
him to depart so far from what he would ("Three Types of Poetry," in Essays of Four Dec-
clearly like to be able to say about artistic ades [Chicago, 1968], pp. 173-96) and John Crowe
Ransom (The World's Body [New York, 1938], pp.
media. When he thus departs, he moves in
120-28).
the direction of the doubts and waverings
Percy Bysshe Shelley, Twayne's English Au-
noted earlier.
thors Series, No. 81 (New York, 1969), p. 122.
Though these waverings and doubts, even"An Outline of Poetic Theory," in R. S. Crane
if providing occasional moments of illum-
et al, Critics and Criticism, Ancient and Modern,
ed. R. S. Crane (Chicago, 1952), p. 564.
ination, ultimately prevent the treatise from
cohering systematically, elsewhere they 7W. K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, Literary
Criticism: A Short History (New York, 1957), p. 403.
produce different results. The hopes for an
SA Defence of Poetry, in William Heath, ed.,
"expression" that can soar above the earthly
Major British Poets of the Romantic Period (New
restrictions of language are at times dra-
York, 1973), p. 978. Subsequent page references are
matically juxtaposed in the poetry with a parenthetically in the text.
noted
despair deeper than anything in the 9 The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 128-29. I should
Defence. What reason, the "calculating add that Abrams appears to gloss the term in this
faculty," is unable to make coherent in theway. In discussing Shelley's "Platonic literary his-
tory" he uses "inter-convertible" and then moves
Defence can approach imaginatively con-
on to quote the passage (which occurs earlier than
trolled oxymoron as shaped into poetry.
the "history") in which Shelley uses "convertible."
Mary Shelley, for understandable reasons,I am not sure, in other words, precisely what cor-
called "Epipsychidion" her husband's roboration Abrams provides.
"Italian Platonics," but the poem is 10 Stressing, like Saussure, the arbitrary relation
occasionally more than that: between signifier and signified, Shelley may again
seem a distant forerunner of Structuralism.
And we will talk, until thought's melody I When Shelley finds in language a "direct rep-
Become too sweet for utterance, and it die resentation of ... our internal being," he provides
In words, to live again in looks, which dart an instance of that historical process traced by
With thrilling tone into the voiceless heart, Abrams in The Mirror and the Lamp in which
Harmonizing silence without a sound. theories of poetry as imitation give way to theories
of poetry as expression: language, rather than mir-
... Woe is me! roring or representing the external world, is now
The winged words on which my soul regarded would as mirroring the internal "lamp" itself.
pierce The terminology of the mirror describes the func-
Into the height of Love's rare Universe, tion of the lamp.
Are chains of lead around its flight of fire- 2 "Introduction," The Philosophy of Fine Art,
[11.560-90] trans. F.P.B. Osmaston, in Hazard Adams, ed.,
Critical Theory Since Plato (New York, 1971), p.
According to the Defence, Shelley would 530. "The manuscript notes for Hegel's lectures on
aesthetics," Adams points out, "were published in
have to say that here "the most glorious 1835, four years after his death. The lectures were
poetry . . . is probably a feeble shadow of first given in 1820"-the year before Shelley wrote
the original conception." With this "con- the Defence.
ception" by his own account not available, '3 "Shelley's View of Poetry," in Oxford Lectures
to prove him right I copy out the line on Poetry (1909; rpt. Bloomington, Ind., 1961), p.
158.
omitted above:
4 This minimal acknowledgment is seldom no-
I pant, I sink, I tremble, I expire! ticed. Earl J. Schulze, for example, after quoting
Shelley's discussion of the medium, says flatly, "lan-
guage is plastic, and words the direct representation
'Robert Scholes, Structuralism in Literature: An of the activity of the poet's mind. The obedience
Introduction (New Haven, 1974), pp. 179, 172. of language to thought allows poetry to express
. ." (Shelley's Theory of Poetry: A Reappraisal 20"The Critical Monism of Cleanth Brooks," in
[The Hague, 1966], p. 104). Critics and Criticism, p. 105.
l Biographia Literaria, ed. J. Shawcross, 2 vols. 21 The New Apologists for Poetry (Minneapolis,
(London, 1907), 1:202. 1956), pp. 6, 64-76. In Theory of Criticism: A Tra-
'6Biographia Literaria, 2:11; "On the Principles dition and Its System (Baltimore, 1976), pp. 78-80,
of Genial Criticism," in Shawcross ed. of Biographia Krieger discusses Shelley's conflicting views of ar-
Literaria, 2:220. tistic media with a different emphasis from mine:
7 Biographia Literaria, 2:12. he sees Shelley maintaining more consistently than
s""Poetry for Poetry's Sake," in Oxford Lectures I do that language does not "mediate," but he
on Poetry, pp. 19, 23. notes how Shelley's idea about translation is echoed
"9Richard Harter Fogel, "The Imaginal Design in such modern theorists as Ransom and Sigurd
of Shelley's Ode to the West Wind" (1948), in The Burckhardt.
Permanent Pleasure: Essays on Classics of Romanti- 22John W. Wright, Shelley's Myth of Metaphor
cismn (Athens, Ga., 1974), p. 61. (Athens, Ga., 1970), p. 7, n. 13.

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Poetry and Language in Shelley's Defence of Poetry

Author(s): John Ross Baker

the "poet participates in the eternal,

has always been found connected making our with

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