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Tutorial Assignment Group 'A' Criminal Law2
Tutorial Assignment Group 'A' Criminal Law2
(a) Drunkenness may impair a man’s power of perception so that he may not be
able to foresee or measure the consequence of his actions as he would if he
were sober. Nevertheless, the law does not allow him to set up self induced
want of perception as a defendce. Even if the appellant alleged he had not
appreciate that what he was doing was dangerous, nevertheless, if a
reasonable man in his place who was not befuddled with drink would have
appreciated if he is guilty.
(b) It may impair a man’s power to judge between right and wrong so that he
may do a thing when drunk which he would not dream of doing when sober.
Though he does not realise that he is doing wrong nevertheless, he is not
allowed by section 29(2)(a) of the Criminal Code to set up his self- induced
want of moral sense as a defence.
(c) It may impair man’s power of self-control so that he may more readily give
way to provocation, than if he were sober.
These are the definitions of the word “intoxication” by going through section 29(5)
of Criminal Code and the case of GODFREY IMASUEN V. THE STATE(supra).
DEFENCE OF INTOXICATION
Anything or any argument that is advanced or presented before the court by the
accused person in order to exonerate himself or herself from being liable from the
Actus Reaus he/she had committed, is called “defence”. Therefore, the defence of
intoxication is a defence available to the accused person on the basis that because
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of the intoxication, the defendant did not understand the nature and gravity of
his/her acts or know what he/she was doing.
This entire section 29 of the Criminal Code will be our point of reference with
regards to the areas where the defence of intoxication serves as a complete defence
to a crime charged, and where it is incomplete defence, and even where it is not a
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defence at all. So, by going through the above mentioned section, we may
conclude that an intoxication will be a defence if:
INVOLUNTARY INTOXICATION
If a charged crime is a specific intent crime, meaning that the criminal defendant
must have had the specific intent to commit the crime in question, involuntary
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intoxication can be a defence to criminal charges, if it prevents the defendants from
forming the intent that is required.
Under section 29(1) of the Criminal Code, intoxication per se does not provide a
defence to a criminal charge as it was decided in the case of Karimu V. State
(1989) 1 N.W.L.R. pt. 96 at 124. It constitutes a defence under subsection (2) of
the same section if by reason of intoxication the accused did not know at the time
of the act or omission that such an act or omission was wrong or did not know
what he was doing:
(a) The intoxication was caused by the malicious or negligent act of another
without his knowledge; and
(b) The accused was by reason of intoxication temporarily insane or othyerwise
at the time of such act or omission.
So also, section 52 of the Penal Code provided that “nothing is an offence which is
done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is, by reason of intoxication caused
by something administered to him without his knowledge or against his will,
incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is neither
wrong or contrary to the law.
In Imasuen V. the State (supra), the court held that, the locus classicus on the
defence of drunkenness or intoxication seems to be Egbe Nkano V. the State
(1980) 3-4 (SC), where Lord Obasike, JSC; expounded the law thus:
“what is intoxication “ in the legal sense? It is best described by its effect on the
human sense of reasoning. It is defect of reasoning arising from drunkenness”.
In Ekwe V. State (1995) JELR 75985 (SC), the court had considered whether
intoxication is a defence to a criminal charge under section 29(2) of the Criminal
Code, in the case of John Imo V. the State (1991) 9 N.W.L.R. (pt.123) 1 at p. 21.
In a unanimous decision, the Learned Justice, Wali JSC; writing the judgement,
held that, “prima facie drunkenness is not a defence to criminal charge, as every
person of the age of discretion is presumed to be sane and to have intended the
natural consequences of his action. But evidence of drunkenness which renders the
accused incapable of forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime,
with other facts proved are taken into consideration in order to determine whether
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he had that intent. Be it noted that mere absence of motive for a crime however
atrocious it may be, in the absence of proof of insanity, or evidence of drunkenness
that produce such degree of madness even for me, as to render the accused
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, can not avail the appellant of the
defence provided in section 28 and 29 of the Criminal Code. This is in the case
Nkwuda Nkwelebe V. the Queen (1963) 1 SCNLR 311. The test to be applied is
whether by reason of drunkenness, the accused person was incapable of forming an
intention of committing the offence.
In Imo V. the State (1991) JERL 43048 (SC), the question when is a defence of
intoxication be a good defence under section 29 of the Criminal Code? Was
proposed , to approach the question correctly, it is necessary to note that under
English Law, part of which has been received and incorporated in the Criminal
Code, drunkenness per se is not an excuse for a crime, Sir Edward Coke told us (1
inst. 247):
Furthermore, he has also to prove either that the state of intoxication was not self-
induced; as was decided in the case of Theophilus V. the State (1996) JELR 45948
(SC0), but was caused without his consent, by malicious or negligent act of another
person (section 29(a) of the Criminal Code) or that the degree of intoxication was
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so high that he was insane, temporarily or otherwise at the time of the act or
omission (section 29(2)(b) of the Criminal Code).
The issue here is how then can one ascertain how involuntary the intoxication may
be taken into account the circumstances which gave rise to the defendant
committing the crime? Also, consent or knowledge may imply that defence of
intoxication would not stand if the defendant gave his consent having full
knowledge of the situation. The English case of DPP V. Beard (1920)A.C. 479;
may have proffered an answer to this where it was held that, so long as the
defendant was drunk and his drunken state so impaired his judgmental abilities
that he was unable to form an intention to commit a crime, intoxication shall be
taken into account for the purpose of determining whether the person charged had
formed any intent, specific or otherwise. Where there is absence of intent, then the
defendant would not be guilty of the offence complaint of. In the case of
Nkwulebe V. the Queen (supra), the court held that, mere absence of motive for a
crime, however atrocious it may be, in the absence of proof of insanity, or evidence
to drunkenness that produces such a degree of madness, even for a time, as to
render the accused incapable of distinguishing wrong from right, can not avail the
defendant of the defence of intoxication as provided in section 28 and 29 of the
Penal Code.
It is worthy to note that, the provisions of the Penal Code did not recognize
voluntary intoxication. It is also suggested that the provisions in section 51 of the
Penal Code as regard insanity be interpreted to include cases where ‘unsoundness
of mind’ is brought about by intoxication even though voluntary. By using
identical phraseology with section 52(i.e involuntary intoxication), one gets the
impression that under the Penal Code, only voluntary intoxication that leads to
temporary insanity is recognized, in other words, insanity as defined in section 51
of the Penal Code can be brought about by involuntary intoxication but not by
voluntary intoxication. This of course, will be absurd. In any case, an accused will
prefer to plead involuntary intoxication rather than insanity, which if accepted, will
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result in his being sent to an asylum for an indefinite period. What ought to have
been included in the Penal Code is a provision similar to section 29(2)(b) of the
Criminal Code; which recognizes the simple fact that, temporary insanity caused
by drink is still insanity and can be pleaded as a defence. The absence of such a
provision in the Penal Code has led to absurd interpretations. With S.S.
Richardson for instance saying ‘drunkenness cannot be pleaded as form of
temporary insanity’.
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In respect of this, most of the jurisdiction allows a defendant to use or plead
voluntary intoxication as a defence to ‘specific’ intent crimes only. Thus, if any
defendant is charged with a ‘general intent’ crime, he cannot plead the defence of
involuntary intoxication at all.
At this juncture, a critical look needs to narrow down the specific and general
intent crimes before embarking on the provisions of the Criminal Code.
GENERAL INTENT
General intent needs only to commit an act which the law makes criminal. Under
this intent, the requirements is that, only that you intent to perform the act, i.e, you
don’t need any additional intention or purpose. It clearly refers to your state of
mind at the time the crime was committed. A general intent crimes only requires an
intend to do an act that law declares to be a crime, even though, the perpetrator
may not know the act is unlawful. On this vein, it requires no further mental state
beyond a willingness to commit a crime. For example, as an offence, is a general
intent crime on the ground that, the prosecution only ought to prove that you
‘intentionally or recklessly touched a person in a harmful or offensive manner’.
Criminal force does not require an additional mental state. You don’t have to intent
to hurt the person in order to be convicted; other examples are: Assault, Rape,
Manslaughter, Arson, etc.
SPECIFIC INTENT
They are crimes that require the individual to have a desire to commit an act, as
well as intent to achieve a specific result. A criminal defendant must have had the
specific intent to commit the crime in question. It is totally refers to the state of
mind of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime. In a nutshell,
these crimes does not only base on doing an unlawful act, but the doing of it with
an additional subjective intent. It must however be noted that, specific intent
crimes are usually indicated in the statute by the use of such words as
‘intentionally’, knowingly, purposely or willfully’. Example of these crimes is:
Murder, Theft, Conspiracy, Robbery, Forgery, etc. hence, it is however worth of
note at this juncture, to eliminate on the position of the law on voluntary
intoxication under the Criminal Code.
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Section 29(2) of the Criminal Code provides that:
(a) The state of intoxication was caused without his consent by the malicious or
negligent act of another person ; or
(b) The person charged was by reason of intoxication insane, temporarily or
otherwise at the time of such act or omission.
This stated provision had been commented on by Okonkwo and Naish, that a
person who commits a crime while drunk could be exempted if, at the time of
committing the alleged offence, he did not form the necessary intent though, he
might have been able to.
In line with section 29 (2) of the Criminal Code, the prosecution ought to adduce
evidence to show that the accused had the capacity to form the necessary intent,
and must go further to prove subjectively that, the accused indeed did in fact, form
that intent without which he will not be liable. Hence, it is pertinent importance to
note that, any case that involves voluntary intoxication, the court ought to look and
examine the weapon used or the body of the victim, and other relevant matters as
indicatives of accused’s malicious intent.
In the case of R. V. Retrief, the East Afrcan Court of Appeal rejected the defence
of voluntary intoxication, on the ground that, the lethal weapon used was obviously
indicative of his malicious intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm. It must also
be noted that, most of the crimes impose on objective liability and therefore, any
person that commits any of them will suffer by reason of his drunkenness. It is well
settled law in both England and Nigeria that, where a person gets drunk voluntarily
in order to have courage to commit a crime, section 29(2) of the Criminal Code
will preclude such person to raise the defence of voluntary intoxication. This
position of the law is well demonstrated in the case of A.G. of NORTHERN
Ireland V. Gallagher (1963) A.C. 349. Where the accused after expressing his
mission to kill his wife, went and consumed a bottle of whisky to get dutch
courage. Lord Denning, the master of the rolls clearly stated it that:
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“…wickedness of his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn him,
coupled with the act he intended to do and did so”.
However, this stated provision had caused a lot of argument among the Jurists as to
whether or not, voluntary intoxication can be an exonerating factor to any criminal
liability; in line with the provisions of the Penal Code. The view that gave birth for
this was that, interpretation of section 44 clearly placed intoxicated man on the
same capacity of knowing the circumstances connected with his act as a sober
man. It vividly presumed a person that drunk to have the same knowledge as if he
was sober without the slightest suggestion that he proves to the contrary.
“The Penal Code requires it to be assumed that a man voluntary drunk had
the same knowledge as he would have had if he had been sober and
intention in many cases is an inference from knowlwdge…”
Accordingly, his Lordship Fatayi Williams JSC (as he then was), also emphasized
on the section 44 of the Penal Code, that, Penal Code does not contain a similar
provision with section 29(4) of the Criminal Code, which regards voluntary
intoxication as an important factor in negating intent.
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However, after embarking on the voyage of argument, it had been rightly and
generally settled that, the voluntary intoxication can serve as an exonerating factor
for all crimes in the Penal Code that have “intent” not knowledge as the requisite
mental element, this is because, the provision of section 44 only refers to the
offence that has “knowledge” as a mental element to be proved. It must however
not to forget that, the mental element to be proved will be listed in the statute that
defines the crime, (intentionally, knowingly, willfully, etc).
In respect of this, where the accused person drunk voluntarily and commits an
offence that has “knowledge” as a mental element to be proved, then the defence of
voluntary intoxication cannot be an exonerating factor. Conversely, where the
offence requires the proof of “intent”, then defence of voluntary intoxication would
come and play a role. In the case of Musa Kwai V. State; where the accused had
drunk, and as a result of that quarreled with his wife who he later struck to death,
the court convicted him of murder as charged, because, the two mental elements
mentioned or required for the offence of murder under the Penal Code are either
“intention or knowledge”.
Lastly, it is worthy to note that, the provision of the Penal Code especially section
52 does not recognise voluntary intoxication as a defence to a criminal liability;
though, it can serve as a mitigating factor but not always.
CONCLUSION
By going through the above mentioned provisions of both Penal Code and
Criminal Code, and the ruling of the decided cases, one may be able to
conclusively understand that, an “intoxication” as a defence to criminal liability
my turn out to be complete, incomplete or even not to be a defence at all. This
however, has to do with the determination of subjective mental element.
Note that, the issue of the identification of the specific intent plays a vital role to
the prosecution to make the accused liable, irrespective of whether the intoxication
happens to be voluntary or involuntary one.
Generally in that, voluntary intoxication does not serve as a defence, though there
are few exceptions as pointed out above. Conversely, involuntary intoxication
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happens to be an absolute defence to a criminal liability even though some few
exceptions were drawn in this paper.
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REFERENCES:
A jurisprudential Analyses
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