ACADEMIA Letters

Post-Trump America: Prospect for American Democracy

jon kofas

After four years of the Trump presidency, there are questions about the US, not necessarily
as a ‘model’ or ‘the greatest’ democracy, but about the deeper structural problems at the root
of the political turmoil behind “Trumpism” whose legacy will remain, just as Goldwater’s
legacy sparked conservatism after the election of 1964. The difference is that in 1964, despite
the disaster of the Vietnam War, the US was experiencing upward social mobility. In 2020,
downward social mobility is symptomatic of serious structural problems that make it appear
more like a Third World country.
The concept of “Third World” came out of the Cold War, especially after the Bandung
Conference in Indonesia in 1955. Twenty-nine Asian and African countries formed the non-
aligned bloc, distancing themselves from both US-led bloc and USSR bloc. In international
political economy, ‘Third World’ was a concept that some scholars used to characterize eco-
nomically underdeveloped or ‘periphery’ nations. Whereas China and India were once in
the periphery, given their poverty levels and lack of economic development, in the last three
decades China has moved to the core of the world capitalist system. Once the domain of the
US-led ‘First World’ Western countries, along with their Asian allies Australia and Japan, the
core capitalist countries pursue global economic integration under their aegis.
China’s rapid rise to economic preeminence, based not on nominal value of GDP, but
purchasing power parity (PPP) and future prospect, coincided with a commensurate decline
of the US at the core of the capitalist world system, despite the fall of the Soviet bloc. While
on the surface it appears that gradual economic decline is divorced from a broader institutional
degradation, the Trump administration is a symptom of institutional corrosion stemming from
contradictions in the political economy promising the American Dream for all, while catering
to the wealthiest ten percent.
An overview of disputed elections world-wide in the last three decades shows that in every

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by Academia Inc. — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: jon kofas, midyia50@yahoo.com

Citation: Kofas, J. (2021). Post-Trump America: Prospect for American Democracy. Academia Letters, Article
231. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL231.

1
case such disputes take place either in quasi-authoritarian countries presenting themselves as
“democracies” and/or mostly underdeveloped or semi-developed capitalist nations in Africa,
Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe. The US is the only advanced capitalist country on
this list. This is a manifestation of a much deeper crisis than it appears at the political level
on which the media and most analysts focus, rather than viewing it as a symptom of structural
decay.
For ideological, political or nationalist considerations, many analysts see ‘Trumpism’, akin
to a variety of ‘native Fascism’, as a political anomaly; a unique case of personality cult; at best,
the Republican Party moving closer to authoritarianism. The erosion of a liberal bourgeois
consensus is not the cause but the symptom of a broader structural problem that drives people
toward more extreme political solutions, invariably toward the right where there is cultural
and political sense of safety than the left which the elites fear. Such was the case in both Italy
in the twenties, and in Germany in the early thirties. When the elites support institutional
decay, as they did under Trump because they see benefits to their narrow interests against
society’s interests, the public questions bourgeois institutional legitimacy. Furthermore, it
readily accepts a more blatant form of authoritarianism on the promise it can deliver a ‘stronger
society’, even if in image only – “Make America Great Again”. Upon his appointment as
Chancellor in February 1940, Hitler cited as a political imperative to “make Germany great
again” using Polizeistaat as the instrument.
While it is valid to draw comparisons between Trumpism and Fascism, this does not ex-
plain how the political system, operating within a larger institutional context, is lapsing toward
“Third Worldism”; a process taking place slowly in the past four decades and at the root of
the problem. From academics to the average voter, there is a sense something is wrong and it
must be the individual in charge, the party backing him, the wealthy donors behind him, the
intractable political opposition and/or roughly half of the voters who endorsed one side or the
other. People cannot agree on what is at fault, just as they cannot agree on a solution to satisfy
both the masses and the privileged elites behind the political parties. In March 2018, Tyler
Cowen wrote in Politico “Fascism Can’t Happen Here”, ‘because the American government
is so large and unwieldy’. The same argument could have been made about Germany in the
1920s. He further insisted that fascists cannot control the bureaucracy, an assertion based on
the assumption that the police and military are devoid of pro-Fascist proclivities.
America’s gradual erosion of liberal democracy coincided with the lapse from the core,
manifesting signs of ‘Third Worldism’ not just in the political arena under Trump, but in the
socioeconomic structure and widening income gap. At the zenith of its power after WIWI
ended, the US experienced three decades of economic growth that contributed to upward
socioeconomic mobility. Inequality in taxable income has increased substantially over the last

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by Academia Inc. — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: jon kofas, midyia50@yahoo.com

Citation: Kofas, J. (2021). Post-Trump America: Prospect for American Democracy. Academia Letters, Article
231. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL231.

2
four decades, falling disproportionally on workers and the middle class. Combined with the
erosion of the social welfare safety net and massive transfer of income to the corporate welfare
state from Reagan to the present, the scale of the income gap, downward social mobility, and
rising poverty or near poverty levels are signs of the path toward “Third Worldism” that result
in a more authoritarian regime.
According to the Rand Corporation, income growth for the population below the 90th
percentile has dropped, while the richest 1% has experienced unprecedented capital accumu-
lation. “From 1975 to 2018, the difference between the aggregate taxable income for those
below the 90th percentile and the equitable growth counterfactual totals $47 trillion. We fur-
ther explore trends in inequality by applying this metric within and across business cycles
from 1975 to 2018 and also by demographic group.” https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_
papers/WRA516-1.html
The structural economic problems have reverberations in the political arena in the form
of polarization, as was the case in interwar Europe, especially Italy and Germany. Based
on election results of 2020, about half of the population accepts that some sort of ‘illiberal’
(Fascist) regime is the solution; a conclusion coming after neoliberal bourgeois democracy
rooted in globalization resulted to “Third Worldism”. Similar to the US today, Italians in the
1920s and Germans in the early 1930s abandoned bourgeois democracy, opting for Fascism
and Nazism as a means of preventing their countries from the slope toward socioeconomic
weakness.
Disagreeing on modalities and scale, progressives and establishment Democrats are con-
vinced that reversing the path to ‘Third Worldism’ and Fascism rests with a stronger centrist
and/or center-left political system, and only modest policy changes to the status quo. In short,
let’s strengthen bourgeois democracy under the neoliberal model of “finacialism” where all
focus is on accommodative monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy to keep a strong stock mar-
ket. This model is precisely what led to ‘Third Worldism’ that brought Trump to the political
arena as the savior only too anxious to impose an authoritarian capitalist model.
The social contract within which individuals operate affords the opportunity for institu-
tional decadence. Just as true, from the 16th century during the nascent stage of capitalism
to the present, the core of the world capitalist system has shifted. The American Century,
from presidents Wilson to Nixon, began to wane as Western Europe and Japan recovered,
followed by the rise of China with India trying to compete for a spot in the core of what is
clearly the Asian century. Simplistic arguments that a systemic problem can be addressed
with superficial reforms within a corrosive system only postpones the inevitable path toward
‘Third Worldism’ and authoritarianism.
From Solon the Lawgiver in ancient Athens, to Martin Luther in the 16th century, and all

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by Academia Inc. — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: jon kofas, midyia50@yahoo.com

Citation: Kofas, J. (2021). Post-Trump America: Prospect for American Democracy. Academia Letters, Article
231. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL231.

3
those seeking social justice, the starting point is elimination of individual “bad actors”, not
elimination of the system within the individuals operate. The more astute reformers eventually
realize that the problem rests with the constitutional/political framework on which the social
contract is based. Unless there is structural change, new “bad actors” will find ways to operate
on the edge of the law or just over it for their own self-interest, and/or that of the privileged
elite. As much as the general population as scholars, there is a tendency to focus on the
immediate, most visible and obvious problem at hand, overlooking the broader structure of
the problem. This is in part because the institutional structure has the stamp of legitimacy of
the legal and political system. Hence, it is beyond reproach, backed by the mainstream media,
political and socioeconomic establishment. People conform to survive even if they know the
decadence of the system within they operate, as Palmiro Togliatti pointed out in his analysis
of why Italian workers backed Mussolini’s Fascists Party.
In a recent book entitled Donald Trump and the Prospect for American Democracy, Arthur
Paulson argues that America is not so democratic and economic inequality has made it even
less so. If we hold measure American democracy against the Scandinavian countries, even
much of Western Europe, it is not so democratic, but it has not been since the early Cold War.
Complicating America’s complex downward path toward ‘Third Worldism’ and authoritari-
anism, it is still in the core of the world economy and the world’s preeminent military power
using such power as economic leverage.
There is almost a universal recognition among Americans that the US has the potential for
economic success shared more equitably across all socioeconomic groups (American Dream),
but the regime catering to the privileged elite is driving the country toward ‘Third Worldism’.
Whether Republican or Democrat, most people will support the status quo, not realizing that
its dysfunction is at the root of “Third Worldism”. No matter the erosion of ‘bourgeois democ-
racy’, rising inequality and declining social justice, the media, politicians from both parties,
and most academics will continue to praise the status quo to keep the masses coopted behind
the two parties. As divided as they are about policy differences and governing modalities,
the entrenched socioeconomic elites behind the political establishment agree on the goal of
maintaining the status quo. Therein are the seeds of continued institutional decline and au-
thoritarianism.

Academia Letters, February 2021 ©2021 by Academia Inc. — Open Access — Distributed under CC BY 4.0

Corresponding Author: jon kofas, midyia50@yahoo.com

Citation: Kofas, J. (2021). Post-Trump America: Prospect for American Democracy. Academia Letters, Article
231. https://doi.org/10.20935/AL231.