~SPEARHEAD~ BRANDENBURGERS The Third Reich’s Special Forces i 2 ON r,t 13)=SPEARHEAD~ BRANDENBURGERS The Third Reich’s Special Forces Ian Westwell ET rin§, Allana Des Try Sok ‘Maps and artwork on pags 78-8: Mark Frankia Artwork o pages 70-1, 74-5: an Soemondt Thanks o George ary, Chris EN Tey Neil of TRH Pitre an oh Grestam fo provi other satve rate Fest published 2003 IsBN 0 71102979 2 [Al rights reserved. No part ofthis book may be reproduced or transmitted in any for or by any means elecronie or mechani including photocopying recording or by ary information storage and ‘eereal system, without permission a wring from the publishers (© Compendium Publishing 2003, Polblihed by lan Alan Publishing an imprint of lan Alan Publishing Led, Hersh, Surrey KTI2 ARG Printed by lan Alin Printing Le Hersham Surrey KTI2 4RG Code 0311/82 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data [NCIP catalogue record forth book ssa from the Bish Library "Note: Webs information provided inthe Reference section was correct when provided bythe author The publisher ean acaptno responsibilty for thi information becoming incorrect. CONTENTS Origins & History . Ready for War Insignia, Clothing & Equipment ” 80 -90 oy 96ORIGINS & HISTORY Above ety deel a te esr bara Fer the most part, Naxi Germany went to war in 1939 expecting to win Is bate and ‘campaigns through the use af large conventional forces employing Blikig tacts. Lite thought had been given to, or nteest shown in, developing small unit capable of ‘conducting what are now commonly refered to as special operations. tough the major branches ofthe armed forces virtually ignored such units — and, indeed, doubted ther worth, the Abwehr (German inteligence sence) was mae responsive to such ideas and sucestly raised just such a formation on the eve of war Members ofthis multinational ‘dandestne force were commonly known as the‘Brandenbuges’ after thelr chit base at Brandenburg-an-der-Havel in west Berin, and performed roles similar to those enducted by Britain's Spedal Ar Service or Commandos They sored several noteworthy coups in the early campaigns of Word War Il ye the utimate fat ofthe Brandenburgers id not revolve around events onthe bateeld but ay wth the much muir word of the imernal power plts ofthe Tid Reich The Abwehr was formally established as 2 section of the Ministry of War on 21 January 1921, jst oer tre years after the Armistice that had ended World War | omcins & wistony and lite more than two since the Treaty of esl, which amang its provision had ‘outawed the eatin of @ Geran military ineligence organisation and emasaated the county's regular amed forces. Pest-1918 Europe was unstable and impoverished: Gernany itself was ven by politcal unrest and menaced by newly Independent and ‘expnsions Poland on is easter border. The Pols had launched several attempts to annex pars of the German provinces of Prussia, Siesia and Saxony but Nad been thwarted thanks ony tothe intervention of reiorps units — bands of right-wing former Wold War I servicemen The head of the new Abwety, naval Captain Konrad Pat, was constrained by an acute lack of funds for much ofthe interwar period and the rmeigre resources that were avalable were spit betwen jst two departments — Easem and Western. Abwehr personel fr these department, particulary the former, wer attached tothe seven military dts into which postwar Germany was divided and their main objecive was to assess the military capabties and intentions of neighbouring counts. The activites ofthe Abwebr remained modest throughout the late 1820s and early 1930s as Geary was cipled by economic hardship an pola upheaval, but its fortunes were transformed by Adolf Hite’ assumption of power on 30 January 1933, Under a new commander, 47-year-old Captain Wiel Caras, from 1 anwar 1935, the Abwetr, which had developed plans for expansion during the lean yeas ofthe intewar ped, received much greater funding and was transiomed in size between 1936 and 1938. On top of hs, ts areas of responsibilty expanded wel beyond the ‘rgnal defensive remit In February 1938 the Ministry of War was subsumed within the (Obstommando der Welvmacht (OKW/igh Command of the Armed Forces), the supreme planing body of the ita, and a year later Canars was made head of ‘rasformed organisation known as the Amt Ausind/Abwehr (Forign lntligence (ff), which was seen as a key department within the OKW. Abwetr Iason offers were also attached tothe armed forces at vitally evry level In the case ofthe army thistetche fram the Oberkomimando es Heees(OKH/ High Command ofthe Ay) alle way down to dvsonal eel inthe eld anda similar atte was followed inthe aire and navy. Canas, who had a background in dandestine operation during World War was wel-taveled and spoke several languages, ha sucestly overated the Somewhat moribund sence ftom his offces onthe Tepituter in Brin and, having ‘ered Hitlers confidence, was rewarded with a series of rapid promotions, reaching the ‘ankof adil in 1940, The much-etpanded Abwehr consisted of several sections, whose efforts were co-edited and administered by Abteilung (Department) Z under Maj-Gen Hans Oster, Cana’ deputy and an officer later revealed to be deeply imvlved inthe ant-Nazi resitance movement. Amsgroppe Ausland was exabshed to oversee over intligence atering by military attaches and diplomats overseas, but tree other Abelungen onlucted mare dandestne operations that went fr beyond the remit ofthe Abwefr in the 1920s and eary 1930s. Department | was responsible fr foegn espionage, the las world of spies and spying and Department I was ven a counter epionage role, Combating foreign subversion and spying newer in both Germany and, during Word Wart, German-ocupied lands. Unlike other intligence sence ofthe time, however, ‘he Abwehrwas not noted in one highly rut area of inelgence gathering — that of inerceting and decoing the enemy's radio transmissions These operations were generally et separate bodies within the a force, amy and navy. Party because ofthis rater awkward dision of responsible regarding radio intecepion, both AbteiLngen | nd Il performed wit mixed results immediatly before and during Word War Il. Abtelung | was, perhaps, the las sucessful, not leat because itd ite experience fo nded time to develop, foreign spy networks before 1939,c 7 eT 1941. Abteilung I under Col Egbert von ins oe [— te 4 om) — ‘example, it uncovered and then smashed leechaeee jee pie Europe-wide spy network run by the acer fe eens ie Ned ‘cost the lives of some 200,000 German Hom) | —1-Dbesee Onna Wino) —! | pees fd eel on resid alle} es on al department's bureau chief in the oe eee ‘conducted the Englandspie! (England a Game) between March 1942 and Ps. a Aor ih ence of eis ue tien Thee eh pt gh th Pa Lich sedi ei pind et, an a ‘Na lon alms and be afr Wr ar an Sus ifort es ing in sen, So age i ase ih ned ‘eaten te ae radioing plausble but misleading inetigence back to their contrllers on the other side of the Channa. The operation, codenamed ‘Nardpt North Pol), cst the lives of 58 ther Bish agents, numerous Dutch resistance workers, and around 50 Royal Ai Force personel engaged in fying support missions. However it was ABteung Il that had the most agressive role in furthering Nac Germanys politcal and miltary ambition, both immediately before and during Word War I Among other exits prior tothe outbreak ofthe confit the department was lnvoved ina none-oo-succesul dsnformaton campaign in Asta, where local Nais under Artur SessInquart were demanding, and on 13 March 1938 gained, Anschluss (sion) with Nazi Gemany. More succestly, ts agents promoted unrest among members of the tre-miln-stong Voksdetsche (etinic German) community in (Geechoslovaka that was used asa pretext for Hie’ sucesul attempt to annex the ‘Sudetenland region in the north and west ofthe county, 2 move that was effectively ‘ber-stamped by Britain and France at Munich in late September 1938. Despite the ‘Abwehrs invoverent in the Catch escapade, the plan to annex the Sudeteniand ‘actualy appalled Canis ashe belved, wrongly ast tuned out that the css would lead toa British decoration of war against Germany. Fr abi period around this ime he even dalied with a band of conspirators plating to overthrow Hite This Schwarze ‘apele (lack Orchestra) comprised arstocas, diplomats and other senor ofces, including his own deputy Oster. twas Abteilung I that ao contained the ity secretive and specialised troops who were cemmonly nown as Brandenburgers, men who ere trained to fat in smal bans in the foretont of bate and whose poory recorded expla, which took them to every theatre of war where German reglr forces were deployed, remain shrouded In mysery. Te germ ofthe idea for this uit dated bac tothe interwar period andthe musings of Word War I veteran, Capt Theodore-Gottied von Hippel, who was subsequently to inthe Abwebr. LUkemany fcr inthe much diminished postwar armed forces, he struggled to explain Germany's ‘eta in Word War | and, fly expecting a second routd of Bood-leting, sought to uncover the mens to prevent a similar outcome. Hippel miliary experience during 1914-18 was in ‘clrial East Aca, where a small force comprising ro more than few thousand German-ffceed local Askars under Col Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck had outwitted much larger Brtsh-led forces and, undefeated to the end, only surrendered on 25 Noverber 1918, when news ofthe Armistice fnaty reached them. Tis brilliantly conducted campaign of regular warfare, of querila-tpe opeations, had brought significant results, not leas: the tying down bya comparative Randul of mer of thousands of enemy troops that coud have beer better employed elsewhere. Hippel's background with Letow-Vorbeck made him the idecl candidate to undertake an offilly sancioned study of sinilar imeguar operations Conlct by the vivius powers, espedally thse of the flamboyant British offcer Li-ColT. €. Laweence in Arabia, Lawrence of Arbie's campaign against the Tush forces garisoning Arabia, Palestine and Syria between lune 1916, when the Brish- inspired revolt by lacl Arabs broke out, and late October 1918, when Turkey sgned an armistice, was and is regarded as 2 defining moment in querilasyle wartare. Studying the acon in et and reading Lawrence's own wtng, Hippel ldertifed several aspect ofits conduc that might rove of benef to German in any future confi. In 4 strategy paralicing that of Letow-Vorbec, Lawences smal force had ted down thousands of Turish troops, had paralysed the resins scanty ranks and, unlike the totaly isolated Letiow- Vorbeck, had cooperated to considerable efect With offesives by larger conventional forces,specaly during the Bate of Meiddo in September 1918. Hippel reasoned that simiar forces could be empaye in 3 conventional European war inthe van fo inded far in advance of, an offersiv. Wel tained and matted, thir role would be to operate in smal highy mobile bands, to stke fast and hard at targets that were of great itary Value — suchas enemy headquarters — or thas that might be destroyed to impede attacks by regular forces, such as river or canal bridges. Stealth and suprise were vital tothese hit-and-run missions, bu the Brandenburgers also employes methods that came close to, and sometimes used the line of internationally accepted miltary conduct and law. Whether by good fortune or intent Hippel’ thoughts melded well with the rapidly teolving strategy ofthe fast-maving Bitareg attacks that woul ring Nazi Germany reat victories Between 1939 and 1941 Hippel had the ear of Cana, whom he considered a rend, and the Abwehr commander concurred wth his suborinate’s ings. The admiral was aware thatthe amy’ senior generals would inal ikelhood oppose the fomation of sucha specialist unt, party one that was independent of them and answerable to the Abweh alone, but knowing that he enjoyed His confidence and sufcient status within the ORW hierarchy, Canal juged,comecty as events tured out, that the Brandenburgrs would indeed be raised and maintained under the Abwehr umbrela and operate drecy under the OKW, Canais was probably les aware ofthe impact tat simmering rivalry between the Abwetrand the SS, the guardians of Naonal Scalsm, wuld have on he fortunes ofthe Brandenburger, The Abwehr was at heart an agen for gathering and