EN BANC A.M. No.

10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED

"RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors 1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.
Facts:

SC
Allegations of plagiarism were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R. Bagares
against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed by Filipino comfort
women to compel certain officers of the executive department to espouse their claims for
reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses committed
against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent
the comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion
for reconsideration.

37 members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a
statement on the allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Court’s
decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law,
headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo in
the face of allegations of plagiarism in his work.

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice
Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet
arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners, as
well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most
basic values of decency and respect.

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective
comments except to discredit the Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the
case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan
the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision.
This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the
oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

Issue:

Whether or not the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-signatories in the
questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar.

“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm
does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless
possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating
but not offensive.

“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the
limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech.”

A final word
In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on
any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously
propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This
Court is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the
same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All
lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of
the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the
Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this
sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law
school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his
Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo
V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T.
Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba,
Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria
J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose
C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found
UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly
duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due
respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to
influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of
justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of
violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more
mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and
professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these
proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct
to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons
1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.”

Dissenting Opinion:

(1) Serreno, J.

This Court, as complaining party, must state plainly how its ability to view the motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision can be affected in any way by the UP Law Faculty’s
statement. It must also state plainly how its ability to enforce its future orders would be eroded
by the release of the UP Law Faculty Statement. The milieu in which the Vinuya decision was
received by the public is well-known. It is not as if any outrage at the Vinuya decision was
caused by the UP Law Faculty Statement alone. It is also incredible how the Court can claim that
its honesty, integrity and competence could be eroded by an extraneous act of any person
other than itself. Either one is honest, has integrity, or is competent – or he is not. No one can
undermine those qualities other than the one in whom they inhere.
Even more important to keep in mind is the apparently redemptive intent of the UP Law Faculty
when it issued its statement. The statement is headlined by the phrase “Restoring Integrity.” In
the second paragraph, the Faculty says: “Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy
that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass
without sanction, as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system.”
In the next paragraph, it says: “The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral
authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its members,
is beyond reproach.” In the same paragraph, it further says: “It is also a very crucial step in
ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of all controversies: a position
that requires competence and integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance
with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.”

Carpio Morales, J.

The Resolution demonstrates nothing but an abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could
hardly be characterized as judicious. This knee-jerk response from the Court stares back at its
own face, since this judicial act is the one that is “totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash
act of misplaced vigilance.”