Which School of Geopolitics Is Most Useful in Understanding China'S Foreign Affairs?

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WHICH SCHOOL OF

GEOPOLITICS IS MOST
USEFUL IN UNDERSTANDING
CHINA'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS?
PP5607 China and Contemporary Geopolitics

Paula Callejas Ruiz (1933540)


INTRODUCTION

‘Geopolitics is a controversial concept’ Wu (2018). In fact, within the literature, many

different variants of geopolitics can be found. Concretely, the traditional and the critical

have been chosen in this essay as they offer an interesting debate amongst the

geographical scholarship. The first one is understood by Agnew (2009) as ‘the study of

the geographical representations, rhetoric and practices that underpin world politics’,

while the second one does not search to build a theory over how space and politics are

connected but to develop a mode of exposing the grounds for knowledge production and

analysing the articulation of hegemony (Power and Campbell, 2010).

Furthermore, this essay will proceed to analyse the situation of China in terms of foreign

affairs. The reason why traditional and critical geopolitics have been mentioned before is

the necessity of defining both traditions in order to see which of them offer the most

useful interpretation of the foreign approach of China. As dense as China foreign affairs

can be, for the purpose of offering an accurate perspective, this essay will focus its

attention especially on a recent period of China, more concretely, on the post crisis period,

namely, how China stablished its foreign policies from 2008 onwards. The crux of the

matter is, thus, deciding which approach offers the most useful vision of it. Even though

traditional geopolitics is, by far, the most used perspective and owns such a long tradition

and literature which support its solidity, critical geopolitics emerged as a fresh and brand

new perspective that, perhaps, is in harmony with the contemporaneous environment and

current global affairs.

For achieving that level of analysis, the body of this essay will be divided in two main

parts. In first place, a general view of China foreign affairs will be described in order to

convey a general image of how China acts towards the world. In order to do so, concepts

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such as hard power and soft power will be defined in the essay. The second part will

consist in a more theorical approach where both traditional and critical theories will be

broadly explained and described according to China’s foreign affairs.

CHINA’S FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As rising power, China’s actions and decisions in terms of foreign affair are in the

spotlight as they can alter the whole international system. Understanding power as the

ability to influence the behaviour of others with the purpose of achieving goals, it could

be arguably said that hard power is especially focused on military intervention, coercive

diplomacy, and economic sanctions (Wilson, 2008) and soft power is more concerned to

influence the behaviour of the others through attraction (Nye, 2012). This said, in these

section, three main aspects of the Chinese foreign policy which belong to hard power

(economy and military intervention) and soft power (an attempt to reduce the

Westernisation) will be explained with the aim of offering a practical background that

will be framed into theory in the following section.

Beginning with the economy, nowadays the economy of China is considered as the fastest

in the world, whereas the global financial crisis that took place in 2007 provoked

recessions in many western economies, the economic growth of China growth continued

being stable despite the impact that export markets had suffered (Burdekin and Tao,

2012). Indeed, in 2007 with a total of US$ 3.43 trillion of GDP, China was considered as

the fourth biggest economy after United States, Germany and Japan (Chen, 2009).

China’s economy became more integrated with the global economy after the accession to

the WTO (World Trade Organisation). This was followed by foreign direct investment

and an increase in the exportation of exportations. In fact, in 2007, total international trade

reached US$ 2.17 trillion, a number that positioned China on third position behind The

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States and Germany in terms of biggest trading country. This said, China is considered as

one of the greater actors in economic growth (Chen, 2009) and, moreover, it is a crucial

piece in the global trade network. It could be arguably said that China’s trade is closely

linked with East and South Asian economies. On the trade side, this has led other

countries to increase protectionism against China’s exportations and, additionally,

numerous conflicts for trade have arisen. Consequently, China initiated new policies

which included measures to decrease the growth and its super pluses. In conclusion, after

joining WTO, China’s economy escalated greatly which proportionated it an

advantageous position internationally and an increase in hard power. In terms of army,

from 2008, a set of Chinese army involvements such as the violent protests in Tibet, the

contribution to the safety of the Gulf of Aden in Somalia, or the manoeuvre of civilian

vessels in the Yellow and South China Seas, certain insecurities started to appear in the

international system as, even though China had not started any of this conflicts, it was

evident that in the 21st century the Chinese army was increasing its military capability

and it had presence both inside and outside of China (Blasko, 2012). The argument that

China constitutes a threat is based on the fact that its economic growth will fund its

military expansion. At present, the Chinese military is expanding its naval power beyond

the Chinese coast, including oil ports located in the Middle East and shipping lanes of the

Pacific – where the United States was the dominant force (Wong, 2010). This strategy is

named by the Chinese as ‘far sea defence’, and it consists on protecting vital commercial

vessels which are important for the economy and securing Chinese interests in the

resource-rich South and East China Seas (Wong, 2010). Furthermore, naval presence is

considered key in order to stablish and guarantee the national security. Indeed, one-third

of the total Chinese budget destined to the military is spent on the navy. Logically, the

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increase of Chinese sea presence, has triggered tensions not only amongst China’s closest

neighbours but also amongst the rest of the international powers.

Additionally, according to China's ex-president, Hu Jintao, China was suffering a

westernisation which was dividing China as the Western culture was stronger than

Chinese culture (Nye, 2012). As it was mentioned before, the strengthen of the Chinese

economy and the military capability had generated a feeling of mistrust amongst

international arena, consequently, increasing soft power is crucial in order the distress the

tensions between China and the other international actors. For that reason, several

measures such as the creation of several hundred Confucius Institutes around the world

to teach its language and culture or the increase of the enrolment of foreign students in

China. Moreover, in 2009, Beijing announced plans to spend billions of dollars to develop

global media giants and Beijing limited foreign films to only 20 per year (Nye, 2012).

Another key point regarding foreign affair was The Olympic Games hold in Beijing in

2008. Even though The Olympic Games are a useful opportunity to make a public

diplomacy impact, the international opinion towards China was negative as according to

Finlay and Xin (2010), the attempt of showing itself as a better alternative to the Western

ideal of progress was unsuccessful.

Essentially, two different aspects of China have been seen in this section. On one hand,

hard power is represented by economic solidity (achieved by trade) and the military

expansion. On the other, soft power is equally important in order to gain a solid

international position, but it does not seem to have the expected effect in China.

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THE DEBATE BETWEEN GEOPOLITICS AND CRITICAL

GEOPOLITICS

The concepts of critical and geopolitics differ strongly from each other. In fact, discerning

traditional geopolitics from critical geopolitics has occupied an important position in

recent geographical scholarship (Agnew, 2001), especially when, for a long period of

time, the word geopolitics was directly linked with traditional geopolitics. On the one

hand, critical geopolitics studies that geographical space is represented and signified by

political agents as a part of a larger project to accruing, managing and aggrandizing

power. On the other, classical geopolitics ‘treats geographical space as an existential pre-

condition for all politics’ (Wu, 2018).

Even though John Agnew (2003) claimed that the evolution of geopolitics in the sixteenth

century was in a sense, bounded to exploration, the term of geopolitics itself is not used

until 1899, when the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén made use of this concept

for explaining the territorial aspects of the state (Moisio, 2015). Hence, in the beginning,

geopolitics consisted in a theory frame where the state was not only attached to the earth

but also determined by it (Moisio, 2015). Furthermore, even though Mackinder did not

use the word geopolitics, his early works were considered as the first conceptualisations

of classical geopolitical reasoning (Kearns 2009). Indeed, Mackinder’s political map was

constituted through ‘spatial binaries such as sea power/land power and heartland/rimland,

and by cultural distinctions between Western individualist philosophy and Eastern’

(Moisio, 2015). In a sense, classical geopolitics was, therefore, a theory which oversaw

explaining the pivotal interactions of states over the ownership of territories and natural

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resources. After a couple of transitions, (such as the environmental determinist which was

characteristic of the WW2) the new political geography, which began to be influential

during the Cold War, explained the distribution of the world political map as through a

‘set of geographical factors, forces, and resulting capacities of state actors’ (Moisio,

2015). In fact, this geopolitical explanation gained popularity until certain point in which

it became the prominent geopolitical tradition in international relations. In consequence,

according to Agnew (2010) it would be logical to contend that traditional geopolitics can

be broadly defined as being the study of the international scene from a spatial or

geocentric perspective and the understanding of the whole being its ultimate object and

justification. Classical geopolitics is traditionally the most used narrative for China’s

foreign affairs. Following this view, there is a global vision that justifies the world as it

is as a product of survival. In other words, China is seeing as a legitimate actor which

tries to achieve natural material conditions, for example, natural resources, access to the

sea, etc. A good example of this is the previously mentioned effort of protecting their oil

ports which, additionally, shows how political interests have a close relation with natural

claims. Furthermore, in order to achieve a favourable position in the international arena,

China pursues certain interests stabilising relations with the other states. A reasonable

instance of this could be fact that China is a vital actor in the global trade network, as it

is not only closely attached to East and South Asian economies but also with Europe and

United States.

In addition, another example of hard power which can be explained through geopolitics

could be the increase in its military power and naval presence on the sea, seen as a need

for guaranteeing dominance amongst its Asian neighbours and protecting the frontiers.

Moreover, according to traditional geopolitics, the map of the world is considered as a

political map which divides the states; hence, territorial states are sovereign actors which

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attempt to own as much territory as possible. Considered as a country with deep

geographic divisions, its core is habituated by a billion people. Consequently, due to the

enormous size of territory that China encompasses, foreign policies have searched to

expand the ‘core's borders outward integrating these highlands as strategic buffer zones’

(Woon, 2017).

Traditional geopolitics then, offers a complete and theorical background which explains

China hard power (trade with US, military interventions, increasing of the naval power,

the protection of frontiers, etc.) using spatial and power explanations. Nevertheless, when

China foreign affairs were explained in the previous section, apart from economy and

military intervention, soft power constituted an important area that China needs to cover

in order to occupy an important position in the international background, and traditional

geopolitics cannot give a complete and updated explanation of it. For this purpose, in the

following paragraphs the other geopolitics theory, critical geopolitics will be

contextualised.

With theorists such as John Agnew, Simon Dalby, or Gearóid Ó Tuathail, critical

geopolitics emerged after a revival of geopolitics in 1980. Despite of coexisting with more

perspectives, it could be said that critical geopolitics was considered the main approach

which criticized traditional geopolitics. In general, critical geopolitics seeks to explain

the international system through the ways in which elites and publics build the spaces of

political intervention that are, in fact, the main platform for the policies of states and other

actors (Agnew, 2010). With the purpose of offering a deeper vision of critical geopolitics,

this essay will mention three main characteristics of this view. In first place, critical

geopolitics is based on a epistemological critic (Amisio, 2015), new theories which are

valid to understand international problematics such as feminism, cartography or popular

geopolitics arose proving that a reconceptualization of geography is important in order to

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include another values such as identities or cultural differences. Moreover, for critical

geopolitics, there is a strong relationship between discourse and action which is useful in

order to understand that geography and politics are naturally co‐established (Agnew,

2010). Thirdly, geopolitics also consists in traveling theories related to distinct

‘intellectual, spatial, and temporal contexts’ (Dodds & Atkinson 2002). In fact, recently

critical geopolitics has shown that due its cultural character, geopolitical markers (for

instance the concepts of East and West) are ‘suitable for particular purposes by local

intellectuals of statecraft’ (Kuus, 2013). In other words, for critical geopolitics, national

identity-building and the concepts of inclusion and exclusion are constituted through

powerful narratives of national security (Agnew, 2010). In this sense is when critical

geopolitics become useful for explaining China’s foreign affairs. Traditionally, with its

huge size and population, China is seeing as a distinctive country with a recent history

based in humiliation (Agnew, 2013). This could be, in fact, key in terms of understanding

why Chinese political leaders act in order to preserve China's independence, sovereignty

and territorial integrity. Another additional characteristic of China is the manner in which

Chinese academics and intellectuals have attempted to ‘adapt imported ideas of various

sorts indicative of American hegemony’ (Agnew, 2013). In fact, according to Zhang

(2003) in 2000 the majority of institutes and investigations in foreign policy were led by

academics trained in the United states. Consequently, this created a feeling of discomfort

amongst the Chinese intellectual hegemony. In order to stop the lost of the Chinese culture

due to the globalisation and re-stablish the position of China within the world politics,

Chinese policy specialists attempted to extol Chinese national values. Prove of this is the

creation of several hundred Confucius Institutes around the world that was mentioned

before or the extreme nationalist character of Chinese exhibitions in the Olympic games

in 2008. It would be, then, arguably to contend that relations between China and its

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neighbours but also the relations between China and the international system have tended

to be marked by a pragmatic attitude. In other words, even though China has tried to prove

its identity amongst the global scenario, it has not fully escaped from the Western

influence (Agnew, 2013). As a reaction, Chinese foreign policies have been focused on

reverting this situation by re-enforcing its soft power with actions like spending billions

of dollars to compete against big media companies such as Time Warner of Viacom (Nye,

2012). Furthermore, apart from this pragmatism characteristic from Chinese international

relations, there is another situation that generates a feeling of discomfort and it is related

to Chinese economic growth seen as a product of globalisation instead of a national

success. The point is that those export-orientated sectors were funded by foreign direct

investment as it was seen in the previous section. Consequently, the elites are immersed

in a world order where Chinese investment will be consumed by Western, which means

that globalisation is built over interdependence (Agnew, 2013).

Arguably, China positioning in terms of hard power does not differ extremely from the

positioning of any other country. As traditional geopolitics claims, states are immersed in

a survival order where interests are at stake and, in order to maximise their influence

amongst the international arena, natural resources, capabilities, locations or geographical

conditions are exploited. From this perspective, China as any other country, has attempted

to do so and geopolitics has offered an accurate frame which explains this behaviour.

However, despite of the Chinese efforts for protecting their territories, developing a trade

network based in interdependence and being more militarily present, China does not seem

to fit withing the global scenario. This is the reason why, even though is the most used

perspective, geopolitics does not offer the most useful perspective. In the Chinese case,

as it has been shown along this essay, there are several reasons that affect foreign policy

beyond hard power. These reasons are related with cultural practices, history background,

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the manner in which elites build their discourses, etc. Then, critical geopolitics’s

perspective offers a reasonably background which explains why China is different from

the rest and why policymakers take decisions such as limiting foreign films to a total of

20 per year (Nye, 2012). For this reason, it would be reasonable to hold that critical

geopolitics analyses aspects from Chinese foreign affairs that are extremely useful in

order to understand its positioning in the global order as they give an explanation based

on the country past experience, its difficult political and cultural traditions and its identity

(Kristof, 1960).

CONCLUSION

Throughout this essay it had been seen how both hard power and soft power need to be

contemplated in order to analyse China’s foreign relations. Considered as a rising power

in the 21st century, China has been in the spotlight due to the growth in its economy, its

military presence and its attempts of increasing soft power.

With the aim of understanding why China’s decisions about foreign affairs have this

pattern, two currents of geopolitics – traditional geopolitics and critical geopolitics offer

a set of explanations. The crux of the matter was deciding which of them was more useful

for explain the rise of China. As it has been shown, traditional geopolitics have such a

solid trajectory in explaining China’s affairs. In fact, some of the explanations offered by

this theory justify accurately facts related to the hard power such as the naval presence of

China or its trade networks, however, these facts per se do not show the whole Chinese

situation as, despite of being one of the major drivers of the global economy, China is

also focused on a strong soft power campaign. For that reason, this essay claims that, in

order to display a more precise image of China’s foreign affairs, a theory that considers

facts such as national identities and cultural activities is indispensable.

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In conclusion, this essay contends that, even thought geopolitics are useful, critical

geopolitics displays a quite more complete background which considers crucial facts.

To understand completely the behaviour of China towards the international system, it is

necessary to understand its desire of exalting its national identity and cultural activities.

Many examples such as the Olympic games, have justified this behaviour and, indeed,

critical geopolitics have played a vital role in order to analyse them. Whether or not China

will achieve to reverse the Westernisation and gain a position in the international arena

will be seen in a future, what is undoubtedly important is that critical geopolitics will help

to understand it.

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