THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 9067, January 31, 2018

MARJORIE A. APOLINAR-PETILO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ARISTEDES A.

MARAMOT, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

A lawyer is a disciple of truth because he swore upon his admission to the Bar that he
would do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, and that he would
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. His violation of the Lawyer's Oath
through the commission of falsehood can be condignly sanctioned.

Antecedents

In her complaint-affidavit,1 complainant Marjorie A. Apolinar-Petilo (Marjorie) alleges

that the respondent consented to, abetted and participated in the illegal act of falsifying
a public document in violation of Article 171(4) in relation to Article 172(2) of
the Revised Penal Code; and that he thereby violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01
and 1.02 of Canon 1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The public document in question was the deed of donation2 executed in favor of

Princess Anne Apolinar-Petilo (Princess Anne) and Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar
(Mommayda) who were only 12 years old and 16 1/2 years old, respectively, at the
time of its execution.3 Asserting that the respondent had known of the minority of the
donees, Marjorie insists that he was thereby guilty of falsification first in his capacity as
a lawyer by preparing the deed of donation and indicating therein that both donees
were then "of legal age"; and as a notary public by notarizing the document. She claims
that he, being Mommayda's counsel in the latter's adoption case, was aware of the
untruthful statements he made in the deed of donation because he thereafter submitted
the deed of donation as evidence therein.4

In his answer, the respondent states that Margarita Apolinar (Margarita) and her sister-
in-law Justina Villanueva-Apolinar (Justina) went to his law office sometime in 2000;
that Margarita was a grandaunt who owned a parcel of land in Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro that she wanted to donate to Princess Anne, Marjorie's own daughter, and
Mommayda, the adopted daughter of Justina; that upon learning of Princess Anne's
minority, he advised that she had to be represented by either parent;5 that not one to
be easily turned down, Margarita persisted, and prevailed over him; that he thereupon
prepared the deed of donation but left the date, the document number and page
number blank; that he reserved the notarization for later after the parties had signed
the document; that he allowed Margarita to bring the deed of donation to Manila where
she was supposedly proceeding in order to procure the signature of Princess Anne
thereon and as a way of avoiding additional travel expenses; and that Justina had
mentioned to him at the time that Margarita was then suffering from colon cancer and
had only a little time to live.

The respondent recalled that a month afterwards Margarita and Justina returned to him
with the signed deed of donation; that he then noticed that the document did not bear
the signatures of Princess Anne's parents; that Margarita again offered to procure the
signatures on the document; and that Margarita and Justina did not anymore return
with the document until the time when he had to enter the instrument in his notarial
book for his monthly report.

Margarita eventually died on April 13, 2003. Later on, with issues about her properties
left unresolved, the relationship among her relatives quickly turned sour, and the deed
of donation again came to the fore. In 2004, Justina and her husband Tomas went to
see the respondent and confided to him that they were entangled in a court battle with
Marjorie, their niece, over Margarita's properties, including the apartment in Manila
where they had been occupying since 1980. They then learned from the respondent
that because Mommayda's birth certificate had been simulated, they needed to legally
adopt her in order to enable her to inherit from them. Hence, they filed a petition for
the adoption of Mommayda, which did not sit well with Marjorie.

Claiming that her successional rights as a niece or heir to Tomas vis-a-vis would be
adversely affected by the adoption of Mommayda, Marjorie vigorously opposed the
petition for adoption, and argued for its dismissal on the basis that Tomas and Justina
were not morally capable of adoption as shown by their simulation of the birth of
Mommayda. Marjorie also brought several criminal cases in the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor on the ground of the simulation of the birth and falsification of the birth
certificate of Mommayda in violation of Articles 347, 359, 183 and 184 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Marjorie's opposition to the petition for adoption and her criminal charges were
dismissed. Also dismissed were her opposition to the petition of Tomas and Justina for
the correction of entry in Mommayda's birth certificate, as well as Marjorie's motion to
recall the social worker for cross examination in the adoption case. The respondent
claims that Marjorie -exasperated and dissatisfied with the outcome - then turned
against him and instituted the complaint for his disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.6

The respondent submits that there was nothing illegal in the deed of donation; that as
the sole owner of the donated land, Margarita had an absolute right to dispose of her
property by donation; that no law prohibited donations to minors; and that the filing of
the petition for judicial partition was an express if not implied ratification of the defect
in the donation; and that in regard to the submission of the simulated birth certificate
in evidence, the purpose of filing the petition for adoption was to rectify the simulation
and to convert the relationship between Mommayda and her adopting parents into a
legal one.7

During the mandatory conference set by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, Marjorie admitted that a petition for judicial partition
involving the donated land was meanwhile filed; that a compromise agreement8 was
reached; and that Princess Anne sold her share to Mommayda.9
In his position paper,10 the respondent asserts that the complaint was pure harassment
calculated only to besmirch and malign his reputation; and that the complaint was also
a premeditated tactic to prolong or pre-empt the adoption case considering that a
favorable ruling thereat would adversely affect Marjorie's rights as an heir of
Mommayda's parents.

In his resolution dated May 22, 2008,11 the IBP Commissioner recommended that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the undersigned Commissioner

finds respondent Atty. Aristedes A. Maramot to have violated the Notarial Law, his act
having undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents; and,
respectfully recommends his suspension from notarial practice for a period of one (1)
year while the other complaints against him are recommended dismissed for lack of
merit.12

In his motion for reconsideration,13 the respondent submitted that he did not employ
any falsity because it was only Margarita - the donor - who had in fact attested to the
execution of the deed of donation in the notarial acknowledgement of the deed of
donation; that it was inconsequential even if Princess Anne had signed the deed of
donation not in his presence; that in conveyances, only the person encumbering or
conveying needed to personally appear, sign and acknowledge the deed before the
notary public; and that Princess Anne and Mommayda's names were placed in the
document merely for them to accept the donation.

The respondent pleads for the mitigation of his liability considering that he has
exhibited candor in admitting his offense. He represents that his act was not gross
enough as to justify suspension; that the complainant had thereby suffered no damage,
but had actually benefitted from the act; that he had notarized in good faith; and that
with this offense being his first in his 12 years as a law practitioner and as notary
public, humanitarian considerations should be considered in his favor because he had
children to support and had been his family's sole bread winner.

In her comment on the respondent's motion for reconsideration,14 Majorie avers that

Princess Anne could not have signed the instrument in Manila because her daughter
was then studying in Victoria, Oriental Mindoro.

In Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendations of the Commission on Bar
Discipline, but modified the penalty by recommending the immediate revocation of the
respondent's notarial commission and his disqualification from reappointment as a
notary for two years, thus:15

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and

APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
"A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and for Respondent's violation of the Notarial Law, Atty.
Aristedes Maramot is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year, immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission if presently Commissioned and
Disqualified from reappointment as Notary Public for Two (2) years.16
The IBP Board of Governors denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration through
Resolution No. XIX-2011-424 dated June 26, 2011,17 thus:

RESOLVED to unanimously DENY Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, there being

no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Board and it being a mere reiteration of
the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus,
for lack of substantial ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution
No. XVIII-2008-337 dated July 17, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.18

On September 6, 2011, the respondent filed in this Court his Comment on the IBP
Board of Governor's Resolution No. XVII-2008-337 and No. XIX-2011-424 dated August
16, 2011.19

In its Report dated June 27, 2012,20 the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended to
treat the comment as a petition for review.

On February 15, 2012, the respondent filed an amended comment dated December 5,
2011.21

On July 23, 2012, the Court resolved: (1) to direct the respondent to furnish the IBP a
copy of his amended comment and submit proof of its service within ten (10) days; and
(2) to require the complainant to file her comment thereon within 15 days from
receipt.22

Accordingly, the complaint submitted her comment on November 9, 2012, opposing the
respondent's prayer for reconsideration and asking the Court to uphold the Resolutions
of the IBP Board of Governors.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors.

A.
As a Lawyer

Every lawyer before entering his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Bar and
an officer of the Court, professes as a natural course the promises contained in the
Lawyer's Oath, to wit:

I do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I
will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients, and I impose upon
myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
The letter and spirit of the Lawyer's Oath are oftentimes forgotten or taken for granted
in the course of the lawyer's practice of law. To give teeth thereto, the Court has
adopted and instituted the Code of Professional Responsibility to govern every lawyer's
relationship with his profession, the courts, the society, and his clients.

Pertinent in this case are Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1; and Rule 10.1 of Canon
10, which provide:

CANON 1 - x x x

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - x x x

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

The respondent prepared the deed of donation. At the time of his preparation of the
document, he actually knew that Princess Anne was a minor; hence, his claim of having
then advised that her parents should represent her in the execution of the document.
Mommayda was likewise a minor. His awareness of the latter's minority at the time was
not disputed because he was also representing Mommayda in the latter's adoption
proceedings aside from being Mommayda's neighbor. Nonetheless, he still indicated in
the deed of donation that the donees were of legal age. His doing so, being undeniably
dishonest, was contrary to his oath as a lawyer not to utter a falsehood. He thereby
consciously engaged in an unlawful and dishonest conduct, defying the law and
contributing to the erosion of confidence in the Law Profession.

The respondent's explanation that it was only Margarita who actually acknowledged
that the deed of donation was her own free act and deed does not extricate him from
responsibility. The deed of donation, whether or not acknowledged by the donees,
should not bear any false statement upon a material fact. The ages of the donees were
material because they bore on their capacities to render the donation efficacious. That
neither Princess Anne nor Mommayda acknowledged the deed of donation did not cure
the defect.

The respondent justifies himself by stating that the persistence of the donor Margarita
prevailed upon him to prepare the deed of donation as he had done; and adverts to the
donor's assurance that she would herself procure the signatures of the parents of
Princess Anne on the document. He also submits that the execution of the deed had
redounded to the advantage of the minors; and that there was no law that prohibited
the donation in favor of minors.

The respondent cannot be relieved by his justifications and submissions. As a lawyer,

he should not invoke good faith and good intentions as sufficient to excuse him from
discharging his obligation to be truthful and honest in his professional actions. His duty
and responsibility in that regard were clear and unambiguous. In Young v.
Batuegas,23 this Court reminded that truthfulness and honesty had the highest value for
attorneys, thus:

A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he
will do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court and he shall conduct
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good
fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an officer
of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts
of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts,
on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's
rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.24

The respondent posits that a donation could be made in favor of a minor. Such position
was not a factor, however, because whether or not a minor could benefit from the
donation did not determine the merits of the complaint for his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law. Neither was his claim that the filing of the petition for judicial
partition amounted to the ratification of the deed of donation a factor to be considered
in his favor. The decisive consideration is whether or not he committed a falsehood in
his preparation of the deed of donation. Sadly for him, the answer is in the affirmative.

Relative to the respondent's submission of the false birth certificate of Mommayda in

the proceedings for her adoption, we adopt with approval the following findings and
recommendation made by the IBP Commissioner absolving the respondent, viz.:

The Certificate of Live Birth of Ma. Mommayda Villanueva Apolinar is certainly a

simulated one where it was made to appear that she was the biological child of Spouses
Tomas V. Apolinar and Justina P. Villanueva when she was not. It was not shown,
however, that respondent has a hand when its contents were given to the employee of
the Local Civil Registrar of Victoria, Mindoro Oriental. From the face of the document, it
appears that Tomas Apolinar himself gave the details and he signed the Certificate of
Live concerned.

When the respondent used the document in the adoption case of Ma. Mommayda
Villanueva Apolinar by the Spouses Tomas and Justina Apolinar (docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. R-04-5396, RTC, Branch 40, Calapan City, Mindoro Oriental), the respondent
did not misrepresent that Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar is the biological daughter of the
petitioners. In fact, there was nothing that was misrepresented in the allegations in the
petition. This led to the filing of another case for the correction of entry in the birth
certificate of the same Ma. Mommayda V. Apolinar docketed as Spec. proc. CV-05-
5445. It was alleged therein that Leini Villanueva Guerrero and Johnny Ortega are the
biological parents of Ma. Mommayda Apolinar.25

B.
As a Notary Public
The respondent is also being hereby charged with having executed the notarial
acknowledgment for the deed of donation despite Princess Anne not having actually
appeared before him.

The respondent explains that he did not employ any falsity or dishonesty, and that he
did not make untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment.

In this respect, the IBP Commissioner observed that:

It cannot be denied that the respondent violated the Notarial Law when he, by his own
admission, notarized the Deed of Donation which was signed by at least one of the
parties, namely: the donee, Princess Anne Petilo, who signed not in the presence of the
Notary Public but somewhere in Metro Manila. This fact the respondent has admitted in
his Answer (records, P. 22 Statement of Facts, par. 3). For this reason, notaries public
are once again reminded to observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of
this form of conveyance would be undermined. Hence a notary public should not
notarized a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and
truth of what are stated therein (Serzo vs. Flores, A.C. No. 6040 [formerly CBD 02-972,
July 30, 2004] citing Fulgencio v. Martin, 403, 403 SCRA 216, 2200221).26

The IBP Commissioner obviously rendered his foregoing observations on the

assumption that Princess Anne had herself acknowledged the instrument not in the
presence of the respondent as the Notary Public. But, as borne out by the
acknowledgment, only Margarita's name was indicated as the person appearing before
the respondent during the notarization of the instrument, to wit:

BEFORE ME, on the date and at the place afore-cited personally appeared Margarita V.
Apolinar with her CTC indicated below her name and signature, issued at Victoria,
Oriental Mindoro, all known to me the same person who executed the foregoing
instrument and she acknowledged to me that the same is her own free act and deed
(Emphasis supplied)27

Nonetheless, the respondent's denial of having employed any falsity or dishonesty, or

of making untruthful statements in executing the notarial acknowledgment does not
necessarily save the day for him. There is no question that a donation can be accepted
in a separate instrument. However, the deed of donation in question was also the same
instrument that apparently contained the acceptance.28 The names of Princess Anne and
Mommayda as the donees, even if still minors, should have been included in the
notarial acknowledgment of the deed itself; and, in view of their minority, the names of
their respective parents (or legal guardians) assisting them should have also been
indicated thereon. This requirement was not complied with. Moreover, Princess Anne
and Mommayda should have also signed the deed of donation themselves along with
their assisting parents or legal guardians.

The omission indicated that the deed of donation was not complete. Hence, the notarial
acknowledgment of the deed of donation was improper. Rule II Section 1 of the Rules
on Notarial Practice provides that:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document; x x x x

We cannot approve of the recommended penalty of suspension for one year. The
circumstances peculiar to the complaint call for lenity in favor of the respondent, but
who must nonetheless be sternly warned against a repetition of the offense at the risk
of suffering a more stringent penalty. We hold that the penalties commensurate to the
offense is suspension from the practice of law for six months.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ARISTEDES

MARAMOT guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of Canon 1 and
Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Rules on
Notarial Practice; SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six months effective from
notice of this decision, with revocation of his notarial commission and disqualification
from being re-appointed as Notary Public for two years effective upon receipt; and
warns him of a more stringent penalty upon repetition of the offense.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Leonen, and  Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

Martires, J., on official business.
 FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10145, June 11, 2018

OLIVER FABUGAIS, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERARDO C. FAUNDO JR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

In both their professional and personal lives, lawyers must conduct themselves in such
a way that does not reflect negatively upon the legal profession.

Factual Antecedents

This is a Complaint1 filed by complainant Oliver Fabugais (complainant) against Atty.

Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. (respondent lawyer), for gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer for having allegedly engaged in illicit and immoral relations
with his wife, Annaliza Lizel B. Fabugais (Annaliza).

In her Sinumpaang Salaysay,2 then 10-year old girl Marie Nicole Fabugais (Marie

Nicole), daughter of complainant, alleged that sometime in October 2006, she, along
with her mother, Annaliza. Ate Mimi (Michelle Lagasca), and a certain Ate Ada (Ada
Marie Campos), stayed in a house in Ipil, Zamboanga-Sibugay, that belonged to
respondent lawyer, whom Marie Nicole referred to as "Tito Attorney." Marie Nicole said
that when night-time fell, respondent lawyer slept in the same bed with her and her
mother and that she saw respondent lawyer embracing her mother while they were
sleeping.

Marie Nicole further recounted that the next morning, while she was watching television
along with her mother, Ate Mimi and Ate Ada, respondent lawyer who just had a
shower, and clad only in a towel or "tapis,"  suddenly entered the room; that she (Marie
Nicole) along with her Ate Mimi and her Ate Ada, were told to step outside the room
(either by respondent lawyer, or by her mother Annaliza), while her mother and
respondent lawyer remained inside the room.

Because of these developments, complainant filed a case for the declaration of nullity of
his marriage with Annaliza, with prayer for the custody of their minor children. In said
case, respondent lawyer entered his appearance as collaborating counsel for Annaliza.3

Complainant moreover narrated that, on February 17, 2007, while he was driving his
motorcycle along the San Jose Road in Baliwasan, Zamboanga City, respondent lawyer,
who was then riding in tandem in another motorcycle with his own driver, slowed down
next to him (complainant) and yelled at him angrily, "Nah, cosa man?!" ("So, what
now?!"); that he (complainant) also noticed that respondent lawyer kept following and
shouting at him (complainant), and even challenged him to a fistfight, and threatened
to kill him.4

Complainant further alleged that respondent lawyer also harassed his sister on
February 27, 2007 by chasing and trailing after her car.5

In his Answer,6 respondent lawyer asserted that the chasing incident actually took place
on February 16, 2007, and that it was in fact complainant himself who stared
menacingly at him (respondent lawyer) while he was riding a motorcycle in tandem
with his driver. Respondent lawyer sought to reinforce this assertion through the
affidavit of respondent lawyer's driver, Romeo T. Mirasol,7 and two other individuals.8

Respondent lawyer denied that he had had any immoral relations with Annaliza. He
claimed that he was merely assisting Annaliza in her tempestuous court battle with
complainant for custody of her children. Respondent lawyer asserted that when Marie
Nicole's maternal grandmother, Ma. Eglinda L. Bantoto, sought out his help in this case,
he told them that they could hide in his (respondent lawyer's) parents' house in Ipil.9

Respondent lawyer claimed that the cordial relationship he had had with Annaliza could
be traced to her being the stepdaughter of his (respondent lawyer's) late uncle, and
also to her having been his former student at the Western Mindanao State University in
Zamboanga City. Respondent lawyer insisted that he was incapable of committing the
misconduct imputed to him for three simple reasons to wit: because he is a good father
to his three children, because he is a respected civic leader, and because he had never
been the subject even of a complaint with the police. He claimed that complainant filed
the instant complaint simply "to harass him from practicing his legitimate profession,
and for no other reason."10

Upon recommendation of the IBP-ZAMBASULTA Chapter Board, this case was forwarded
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors (BOG) in April 26,
2007.11 And, in an Order dated August 2, 2007 this case was then consolidated with a
similar case filed by the same complainant against the same respondent.12

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation,13 IBP Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B.

Funa (Investigating Commissioner) found respondent lawyer guilty of violating Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended his suspension from
the practice of law for one (1) month.

The Investigating Commissioner noted that on the accusation that respondent lawyer
had chased complainant in his motorcycle on February 17, 2007, this accusation had
not been fully substantiated with convincing evidence. He opined that "there [was]
doubt as to whether the incident did occur with the [respondent lawyer's] presence and
participation. [Since] the motorcycles were moving fast and the parties were wearing
helmets[, the] identity of respondent [lawyer] could not be [categorically]
established."14

The Investigating Commissioner likewise found no sufficient evidence to establish that

respondent lawyer harassed complainant's sister.

However, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent lawyer to have acted

inappropriately with Annaliza which created the appearance of immorality, viz.:
As can be gleaned from the records or the hearing, no categorical sexual activity took
place between respondent and complainant's wife. One would need to inject a bit of
imagination to create an image of something sexual. But as can be read, no sexual
activity took place based on the witness' account.

However, it would be erroneous to conclude that respondent's behavior was in total and
complete accord with how a lawyer should behave, particularly in the presence of a
minor. Was respondent's behavior toward a woman, in the presence of her minor
daughter of 11 years, proper and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession? It
is clear that there was impropriety on the part of respondent.

In Tolosa v. Cargo (A.M. No. 2385, March 8, 1989), the Court held that creating the
appearance that a lawyer is flouting with moral standards is sanctionable. Thus, while
the charge of immorality, viz[.], adulterous relationship, was not factually established,
certain behavior of the respondent did not escape notice of the Court.

In this case, while sexual immorality was not established, respondent should be held to
account for his inappropriate behavior which created the image or appearance of
immorality especially in the presence of a minor girl. Respondent's act of lying in bed
with another married woman, while he himself is a married man, in the presence of the
woman's daughter could raise suspicions, as in fact it did. x x x.

Respondent should have been considerate of the feelings and perceptions of other
people, particularly of minor children.15

The Investigating Commissioner, thus, recommended respondent lawyer's suspension

for one (1) month for violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-BOG

The IBP-BOG in its Resolution No. XIX-2011-30216 adopted and approved the findings
and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Sometime in 2011, complainant's counsel Atty. Mario Frez (Atty. Frez) filed a Notice,
Manifestation, and Motion for Withdrawal17 from this case, stating that complainant had
passed away on June 12, 2011; and that he was not sure whether complainant's heirs
were still willing to pursue the disbarment case against respondent lawyer since he has
had no contact with the complainant since June 1, 2009; and he has had no information
as to the whereabouts of complainant's heirs.

Notwithstanding the Motion for Withdrawal filed by Atty. Frez and considering the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondent lawyer in 2013, the IBP-BOG issued
on June 21, 2013 a Resolution18 denying respondent lawyer's motion for
reconsideration.

Pursuant to Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, this case is before us for
final action.

Our Ruling
We find substantial merit in the findings of facts of the IBP. And we reject respondent
lawyer's highly implausible defense that the complainant filed the instant case for no
other reason but simply "to harass him from practicing his legitimate
profession."19 There is absolutely nothing in the record to support it.

It bears stressing that this case can proceed in spite of complainant's death and the
apparent lack of interest on the part of complainant's heirs. Disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers are sui generis in nature; they are intended and undertaken primarily
to look into the conduct or behavior of lawyers, to determine whether they are still fit to
exercise the privileges of the legal profession, and to hold them accountable for any
misconduct or misbehavior which deviates from the mandated norms and standards of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, all of which are needful and necessary to the
preservation of the integrity of the legal profession. Because not chiefly or primarily
intended to administer punishment, such proceedings do not call for the active service
of prosecutors.20

We first rule on the accusation relative to the chasing incidents. This Court agrees with
the IBP's findings that the evidence presented by complainant upon this point was
insufficient to establish the fact that respondent lawyer had committed the alleged acts
against the complainant and his sister.

We now turn to the accusation in regard to the immoral acts claimed to have been
committed by respondent lawyer with complainant's wife Annaliza. The issue to be
resolved here is this: Did respondent lawyer in fact commit acts that are grossly
immoral, or acts that amount to serious moral depravity, that would warrant or call for
his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law?

"Immoral conduct" has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of
the community.21 This Court has held that for such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, the same must be "grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt and false as
to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree."22

It is not easy to state with accuracy what constitutes "grossly immoral conduct," let
alone what constitutes the moral delinquency and obliquity that renders a lawyer unfit
or unworthy to continue as a member of the bar in good standing.23

In the present case, going by the eyewitness testimony of complainant's daughter Marie
Nicole, raw or explicit sexual immorality between respondent lawyer and complainant's
wife was not established as a matter of fact. Indeed, to borrow the Investigating
Commissioner's remark: "[o]ne would need to inject a bit of imagination to create an
image or something sexual."24

That said, it can in no wise or manner be argued that respondent lawyer's behavior was
par for the course for members of the legal profession. Lawyers are mandated to do
honor to the bar at all times and to help maintain the respect of the community for the
legal profession under all circumstances.25 Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and
support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility further provides:

A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
the discredit of the legal profession.

"There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned
morality is more imperative than that of the law."26 As officers of the court, lawyers
must in fact and in truth be of good moral character. They must moreover also 
be seen or appear to be of good moral character; and be seen or appear to – live a life
in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.27 Members of the bar
can ill-afford to exhibit any conduct which tends to lessen in any degree the confidence
of the public in the fidelity, the honesty, and the integrity of the legal profession.28 The
Courts require adherence to these lofty precepts because any thoughtless or ill-
considered actions or actuations by any member of the Bar can irreversibly undermine
public confidence in the law and, consequently, those who practice it.29

The acts complained of in this case might not be grossly or starkly immoral in its
rawness or coarseness, but they were without doubt condemnable. Respondent lawyer
who made avowals to being a respectable father to three children, and also to being a
respected leader of his community apparently had no qualms or scruples about being
seen sleeping in his own bed with another man's wife, his arms entwined in tender
embrace with the latter. Respondent lawyer's claim that he was inspired by nothing but
the best of intentions in inviting another married man's wife and her 10-year old
daughter to sleep with him in the same bed so that the three of them could enjoy good
night's rest in his airconditioned chamber, reeks with racy, ribald humor.

And in aggravation or the aforementioned unseemly behavior, respondent lawyer

apparently experienced neither qualms nor scruples at all about exploding into the
room occupied by a married man's wife and her 10-year old daughter and their two
other women companions clad with nothing else but a "tapis" or a towel. Of course,
respondent lawyer sought to downplay this boorish impropriety by saying in his Motion
for Reconsideration that he was wearing a malong and not tapis  at that time. And, of
course, this plea will not avail because his scanty trappings gave him no license to
intrude into a small room full of women. Respondent lawyer could have simply asked
everyone in the room to step outside for a little while. Or he could have donned his
clothing elsewhere. But these things seemed to have been totally lost to respondent
lawyer's density. Indeed, respondent lawyer seemed to have forgotten that there are
rules other men – decent men, – live by.

Respondent lawyer's defense that he was a "respectable father with three children" and
that he was a "respected civic leader" to boot, flies in the face of a young girl's
perception of his diminished deportment. It does not escape this Court's attention that
the 10-year old Marie Nicole called respondent lawyer "Tito Attorney." Indeed, by
calling respondent lawyer as "Tito Attorney" Marie Nicole effectively proclaimed her
avuncular affection for him, plus her recognition of his being a member of the legal
profession. We believe that Marie Nicole must have been a bit disappointed with what
she saw and observed about the manners, predilections and propensities of her "Tito
Attorney." In fact, a close examination of Marie Nicole's testimony cannot fail  to show
that in Marie Nicole's young mind, it was clearly not right, appropriate or proper for her
"Tito Attorney" to be sharing the same bed with her and her mother, and for her
mother to remain alone in the same room with her "Tito Attorney," while this "Tito
Attorney" was dressing up. In all these happenings, a modicum of decency should have
impelled this "Tito Attorney" to behave more discreetly and more sensitively, as he
could not have been unaware that Marie Nicole was observing him closely and that she
could be forming her impressions of lawyers and the legal profession by the actions and
the behavior of this, her "Tito Attorney."

In deciding, upon the appropriate sanction to be imposed upon respondent lawyer in

this case, this Court is ever mindful that administrative disciplinary proceedings are
essentially designed to protect the administration of justice and that this lofty ideal can
be attained by requiring that those who are honored by the title "Attorney" and counsel
or at law are men and women of undoubted competence, unimpeachable integrity and
undiminished professionalism, men and women in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.30 This Court moreover realizes only too well that the power to disbar or
suspend members of the bar ought always to be exercised not in a spirit of spite,
hostility or vindictiveness, but on the preservative and corrective principle,  with a view
to safeguarding the purity of the legal profession. Hence, that power can be summoned
only in the service of the most compelling duty, which must be performed, in light of
incontrovertible evidence of grave misconduct, which seriously taints the reputation and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the Bar.31 It goes
without saying moreover that it should not be exercised or asserted when a lesser
penalty or sanction would accomplish the end desired.32

In the context of the circumstances obtaining in this case, and hewing to jurisprudential
precedence, and considering furthermore that this is respondent lawyer's first offense,
this Court believes that a one-month suspension from the practice of law, as
recommended by the IBP, would suffice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent lawyer Atty. Berardo C. Faundo, Jr. is

hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) month, reckoned from receipt
of a copy or this Decision. He is hereby WARNED to be more careful and more
circumspect in all his actions, and to be mindful of the kind of example be holds up,
especially to impressionable young people, lest he brings upon himself a direr fate the
second time around.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Berardo C.
Faundo, Jr. as a member or the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 12062, July 02, 2018 - HEIR OF HERMINIGILDO* A. UNITE, REPRESENTED BY
HIS SOLE HEIR, FLORENTINO S. UNITE, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAYMUND P. GUZMAN,
Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 12062, July 02, 2018

HEIR OF HERMINIGILDO* A. UNITE, REPRESENTED BY HIS SOLE HEIR,

FLORENTINO S. UNITE, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAYMUND P.
GUZMAN, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Petition for Disbarment1 filed on December 9,

2014 by Florentino S. Unite (complainant), as the sole heir of Herminigildo A. Unite
(Herminigildo), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), against respondent
Atty. Raymund P. Guzman (respondent) for violation of Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), his oath as a lawyer, and the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice (Notarial Rules).2

The Facts

In his Petition for Disbarment, complainant alleged that on December 19, 2012,
respondent notarized a Deed of Self Adjudication with Sale and/with Deed of Absolute
Sale3 (Deed) executed by Jose Unite Torrices (Torrices), claiming to be the sole heir of
Herminigildo, in favor of one Francisco U. Tamayo (Tamayo), covering a parcel of land
located in Ballesteros, Cagayan and covered by a title4 under Herminigildo's name.
According to complainant, the Deed was executed with only Torrices's community tax
certificate (CTC) as evidence of identity.5 Complainant asserted that he is the only
surviving heir of his father, Herminigildo, as Torrices is his cousin. As a result of
respondent's acts, the Deed was recorded in the Registry of Deeds, which caused the
cancellation of his father's title and the issuance of a new one in the name of
Tamayo.6 Complainant added that on October 20, 2014, he filed a complaint for the
annulment of the Deed and Tamayo's title, with liquidation/accounting and damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Ballesteros, Cagayan, Branch 33, docketed as Civil
Case No. 33-471-2014.7 In support of his Petition, complainant attached copies of the
Deed, Certificate of Death of Herminigildo,8 his birth certificate,9 the marriage contract
of his parents,10 Tamayo's Transfer Certificate of Title,11 and the Complaint12 in Civil
Case No. 33-471-2014 with its annexes.13
In his Answer,14 respondent denied the charges against him and claimed that he
complied with the requirements of the Notarial Rules. Particularly, he verified the
identity of the parties to the Deed from their current government identification
documents with pictures and CTCs.15 He further inquired from the parties, especially
from Torrices, their capacity to execute the Deed.

In reply16 to respondent's Answer, complainant pointed out, among others, that: (a) a

CTC is no longer considered a competent evidence of identification as it does not bear
the photograph and signature of the individua1;17(b) the other documents presented by
Torrices as proof of being the sole heir did not cure the absence of the required
competent evidence of identity;18(c) and the pendency of Civil Case No. 33-471-2014
does not bar the instant administrative action.19

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated April 21, 2015, the IBP Investigating

Commissioner (IBP-IC) found respondent administratively liable for violation of the
Notarial Rules. The IBP-IC held that respondent failed to confirm the identity of the
parties to the Deed through the presentation of competent evidence of identity as
required by the Notarial Rules, pointing out, in this regard, that a CTC is not one of the
enumerated evidence of identity under the Rules.21 Accordingly, the IBP-IC
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months and be disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period
of one (1) year.22

In a Resolution23 dated June 20, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the above-
findings but reduced the recommended penalty imposed on respondent to reprimand,
"considering that [r]espondent personally knows the affiant and the [CTC] then will
suffice."

Dissatisfied, complainant moved for reconsideration,24 which the IBP Board of

Governors denied in a Resolution25 dated April 20, 2017.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP correctly found
respondent liable for violation of the Notarial Rules.

The Court's Ruling

The Court affirms the findings and adopts the recommendations of the IBP with
modifications.

Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the act of notarization is impressed
with public interest. Notarization converts a private document to a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity.26 A notarial
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credence.27 As such, a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of his duties in
order to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the notarial
system.28 In this light, the Court has ruled that notaries must inform themselves of the
facts they certify to; most importantly, they should not take part or allow themselves to
be part of illegal transactions.29

Under Section 2 (b) (1) and (2), Rule IV of the Notarial Rules, a notary public should
not notarize a document unless the signatory to the document is "in the notary's
presence personally at the time of the notarization," and is "personally known to the
notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity."30 Section 12, Rule II of the same rules, as amended by the February 19,
2008 En Banc  Resolution in A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, defines "competent evidence of
identity" thus:

Section 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. – The phrase "competent evidence of

identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:

(a)

At least one current identification document issued by an official agency

bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; such as but not limited
to, passport, driver's license, Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau
of Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voter's ID, Barangay
certification, Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social Security
System (SSS) card, Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seaman's book, alien certificate of
registration/immigrant certificate of registration, government office ID, certification
from the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP), Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or

(b)
The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows
the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the
notary public documentary identification. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, respondent, as duly found by the IBP-IC, clearly failed to faithfully observe
his duties as a notary public when he failed to confirm the identity of Torrices through
the competent evidence of identity required by the Notarial Rules. This fact is clear
from the Deed itself which shows that Torrices presented only his CTC when he
appeared before respondent. Jurisprudence31 provides that a community tax certificate
or cedula is no longer considered as a valid and competent evidence of identity not only
because it is not included in the list of competent evidence of identity under the Rules;
more importantly, it does not bear the photograph and signature of the person
appearing before notaries public which the Rules deem as the more appropriate and
competent means by which they can ascertain the person's identity.
While respondent argues that, apart from the CTC, he required all the parties to the
Deed to present at least two (2) current government identification documents and
conducted further interviews to ascertain their capacity and personality to enter into the
transactions, the Deed itself, however, belies this contention. Had respondent indeed
required – and had the parties presented – current government identification
documents at the time of the Deed's notarization, respondent should have reflected
these facts on the Deed's. acknowledgement portion in the same manner that the Deed
reflected Torrices' CTC. By notarizing the Deed notwithstanding the absence of the
competent evidence of identity required by the Notarial Rules, respondent undoubtedly
failed to properly perform his duty as a notary public.

In this regard, the Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governor's finding that
respondent personally knows the affiant, hence, the CTC suffices. Under Section 2 (b),
Rule IV of the Notarial Rules quoted above, a notary public may be excused from
requiring the presentation of competent evidence of identity of the signatory before him
only if such signatory is personally known to him. In this case, the acknowledgment
portion of the Deed does not state that Torrices is personally known to respondent,
as the Rules require; rather, it simply states that Torrices is known to
me (respondent), thus:

"Personally came and appeared before me on this ___day of  ____ at [sic] Tuguegarao
City, Cagayan, Jose U. Torrices with his CTC No. appearing below his signature known
to me and to me known to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument
and who acknowledged to that the same is her [sic] free act and voluntary
deed."32 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, nowhere in the Deed did respondent declare that Torrices is personally
known to him so as to excuse the presentation of any of the enumerated competent
evidence of identity. Moreover, it should be clarified that the phrase "personally known"
contemplates the notary public's personal knowledge of the signatory's personal
circumstances independent and irrespective of any representations made by the
signatory immediately before and/or during the time of the notarization.33 It entails
awareness, understanding, or knowledge of the signatory's identity and circumstances
gained through firsthand observation or experience which therefore serve as guarantee
of the signatory's identity and thus eliminate the need for the verification process of
documentary identification. In this case, if indeed respondent personally knows
Torrices, as the IBP Board of Governors surmised, there would have been no need for
respondent, as he asserted in his Answer, to require the parties to present at least two
(2) current government identification documents and conduct further interviews to
ascertain their capacity and personality to execute the Deed.

Lastly, as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might erode
the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal
profession.34 By notarizing the subject Deed, he engaged in an unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, or deceitful conduct which makes him liable as well for violation of the CPR,
particularly Rule 1.01, Canon 1 thereof which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

As herein discussed, respondent's failure to properly perform his duty as a notary public
resulted not only in damage to those directly affected by the notarized document, but
also in undermining the integrity of the office of a notary public and in degrading the
function of notarization.35 He should thus be held liable for such negligence not only as
a notary public but also as a lawyer. Consistent with jurisprudence,36 he should be
meted out with the modified penalty of immediate revocation of his notarial
commission, if any, disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for a
period of two (2) years, and suspension from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Raymund P.

Guzman GUILTY of violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby: SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months; REVOKES his incumbent commission as
a notary public, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary
public for a period of two (2) years. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same
offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The suspension in the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, and

disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public shall take effect
immediately upon receipt of this Resolution by respondent. He is DIRECTED to
immediately file a Manifestation to the Court that his suspension has started, copy
furnished all courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as
counsel.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6927, March 14, 2018 - TOMAS N. OROLA AND PHIL. NIPPON AOI INDUSTRY,
INC., Complainants, v. ATTY. ARCHIE S. BARIBAR, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 6927, March 14, 2018

TOMAS N. OROLA AND PHIL. NIPPON AOI INDUSTRY,

INC., Complainants, v. ATTY. ARCHIE S. BARIBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The case stemmed from a Complaint1 dated October 17, 2005 filed before this Court by
complainants Tomas N. Orola (Orola) and Phil. Nippon AOI Industry, Inc. (Phil. Nippon)
against Atty. Archie S. Baribar (Baribar), for allegedly inventing numerous offenses
against them, procuring documents with forged signatures, representing a person not
his client, and notarizing a document without the person appearing before him as
required by law, in violation of his lawyer's oath and Rule 138, Section 20 (c), (d) and
(g) of the Rules of Court.

Complainants alleged that Baribar filed a baseless labor case on behalf of his twenty-
four (24) clients against them. Orola denied any connection with AOI Kogyo Company
Ltd.-Japan which was allegedly not paying labor benefits. In the appeal filed before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Baribar included certain individuals who
were not original complainants. Complainants further averred that Baribar notarized the
Motion for Reconsideration on September 19, 2005 without the personal appearance of
Docufredo Claveria (Claveria) since the records of the Bureau of Immigration show that
he was overseas at that time. It was also mentioned that Baribar has a prior
administrative case, which demonstrates his penchant for committing acts inimical to
the image of the legal profession.

In his Comment,2 Baribar denied all the allegations against him. He claimed that the
administrative complaint was a mere harassment suit filed by a political opponent's
brother whose wounded family pride caused them to pursue imaginary causes of action
against him. During the campaign for 2004 congressional elections, Orola's family's
employees approached him to represent them; however, he suggested that they file the
case after the elections to avoid misinterpretation. The labor complaint was not
baseless since it was supported by a joint affidavit of his clients against Orola and Phil.
Nippon.
Sometime in March 2004, he prepared an "Authority to Represent" document. He
requested Claveria, Apolonio Akol, Jr. (Akol) and Connie Labrador (Labrador) to obtain
the signatures of the others who live in different municipalities of Negros Occidental. On
September 6, 2004, he personally met 24 of the 27 signatories, asked them to produce
their residence certificates and confirm their signature in the document. He confirmed
the identities of the others who were unable to bring their residence certificates through
their leaders. He overlooked the notarization of the document and was only able to
notarize the same on April 15, 2005 because of the renovation of their law office from
October 2004 to February 2005. He averred that his mistake to strike through the
names of four individuals in the Authority to Represent and verification of the labor
complaint left the impression that the latter were parties to the appeal.

Akol and Labrador signed the verification of the motion for reconsideration in his
presence. He then asked them to secure Claveria's signature. Thereafter, he received
the verification on the last day of filing, and did not hesitate to notarize the same since
he personally knew Claveria and was familiar with the latter's signature. He claimed
that he acted in the best interest of his client and in good faith.

In a Resolution3 dated November 22, 2006, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or
decision.

On October 30, 2008, IBP Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco (Commissioner Limpingco)

submitted his Report recommending, thus:

Given the foregoing circumstances, it is therefore recommended that respondent Atty.

Archie Baribar be REPRIMANDED, that his incumbent notarial commission, if any, be
REVOKED, and that he be prohibited from being commissioned as a notary public for
three (3) years, effective immediately, with a stem warning that [a] repetition of the
same or similar conduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.4
In his report, Commissioner Limpingco stated that an attorney should not be
administratively sanctioned for filing a suit on behalf of his client, or for availing of
proper procedural remedies, since the choice of legal strategy or theory is his sole
concern. Complainants may or may not be liable in the labor case, but the
administrative proceeding is not the proper forum to resolve the issue. An examination
of the joint affidavit reveals that one Romulo Orola merely stated that he did not
authorize any lawyer to represent him, and that he never appeared before Baribar to
subscribe any document. Thus, it was not established that he procured documents with
forged signatures. Baribar was careless in failing to remove the names of four
individuals in the pleadings. He and his clients could not have gained any kind of
possible benefit or advantage to the said error.

Lastly, Baribar did not deny that Claveria was not present when he notarized the
document on September 19, 2005. When he asked Akol and Labrador to obtain the
signature for him, he effectively admitted that it was not his intent to require Claveria's
personal presence before him. The Notarial Law mandates that a notary public shall not
perform a notarial act if the person involved as a signatory to the instrument is not in
his presence personally at the time of notarization.
The Board of Governors adopted the findings of the IBP Commissioner, but modified the
recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2009-17, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex "A"; and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and for performing a notarial act without requiring the
personal appearance of the person involved as signatory to the document at the time of
the notarization, Atty. Archie S. Baribar is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for one (1) year and DISQUALIFICATION from being commissioned as notary public
for two (2) years.5
Baribar moved for the reconsideration of the above decision, but the same was denied.
Resolution No. XX-2012-619 reads:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY  Respondent's  Motion for Reconsideration there being
no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere
reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into
consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVIII-2009-17 dated February 19,2009 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
The Court's Ruling

The Court grees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

In this case, the Bureau of Immigration certified that Claveria departed from the
Philippines on April 27, 2005, and that his name did not appear in its database file of
Arrival from April 28, 2005 to October 17, 2005.6 Baribar also readily admits that
Claveria was not present when he notarized the Motion for Reconsideration on
September 19, 2005. He explained that he asked the other two affiants, Akol and
Labrador, to obtain Claveria's signature. He notarized the signed verification he
received as he personally knew Claveria and was familiar with his signature.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or routinary act. It. is impressed with

substantial public interest, and only those who are qualified or authorized may act as
such. It is not a purposeless ministerial act .of acknowledging documents executed by
parties who. are willing to pay fees for notarization.7 Notarization of documents ensures
the authenticity and reliability of a document. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in court without
further proof of its authenticity. Courts, administrative agencies and public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and
appended to a private instrument.8

A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the
same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to
attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.9 It is his duty to demand
that the document presented to him for notarization be signed in his presence.10 The
purpose of the requirement of personal appearance by the acknowledging party before
the notary public is to enable the latter to verify the genuineness of the signature of the
former. It may be added, too, that only by such personal appearance may the notary
public be able to ascertain from the acknowledging party himself that the instrument or
document is his own free act and deed.11
The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice stresses the necessity of the affiant's personal
appearance before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1 and Rule IV, Section 2 (b)
provide:
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - "Acknowledgment" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally
complete instrument or document;

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the

notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document
was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document,
declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act
and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the
authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - ...

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization;
and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.
The responsibility to faithfully observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an
a knowledgment or jurat is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer
because of his solemn oath under the Code of Professional Responsibility to obey the
laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. Lawyers commissioned as
notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the duties of their offices, such
duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.12

As a lawyer, Baribar is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the integrity of the legal profession.

As to the penalty, Baribar alleges in his Supplication dated June 24, 2009 that his
penalty was grossly disproportionate and inequitable. He cites the 1995 case of Gamido
v. New Bilibid Prisons (NBP) Officials13 where the Court imposed a fine of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) to the lawyer who notarized the jurat in the verification of the
petition in the absence of his client who was then an inmate in the NBP and thus was
unable to sign before him.

Jurisprudence provides that a notary public who fails to discharge his duties as such is
meted out the following penalties: (1) revocation of notarial commission; (2)
disqualification from being commissioned as notary public; and (3) suspension from the
practice of law-the terms of which vary based on the circumstances of each case.14 In
this case, the IBP Commissioner recommended the penalty of reprimand and
prohibition from being commissioned as notary public for three (3) years. The Board of
Governors, however, modified the penalty imposing one year of suspension from the
practice of law and disqualification from being commissioned as notary public for two
(2) years.

There are instances where the Court imposed the penalty of revocation of notarial
commission and disqualification from being commissioned for one year. In Villarin v.
Atty. Sabate, Jr.,15 the Court suspended respondent's commission as a notary public for
one year for notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss with Answer when
threof the affiants thereof were not before him and for notarizing the same instrument
of which he was one of the signatories. In Coquia v. Atty. Laforteza,16 the Court revoked
respondent's notarial commission and disqualified him from being commissioned as a
notary public for a period of one year for notarizing a pre-signed subject document
presented to him and failing to personally verify the identity of all parties who
purportedly signed the subject documents as he merely relied upon the assurance of
Luzviminda that her companions are the actual signatories to the said documents.

In this case, Baribar asked Akol and Labrador to  acquire Claveria's signature in the
Verification of the Motion for Reconsideration and subsequently notarized the pre-
signed document upon receiving it. We agree with the IBP Commissioner that Baribar
did not intend to require Claveria's personal appearance before him. It is also noted
that he admitted that in another notarized document, he merely relied on the
assurances of his clients' leaders that the others who were unable to pr sent competent
evidence of identity were the actual signatories of the document.

Clearly, Baribar failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.
His acts also show his offhand disregard of the Notarial rules as to requiring the
personal presence of the affiants and the presentation of competent evidence of
identity. He must now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. To deter further violations, the Court deems it proper to impose the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year, revocation of
incumbent commission as a notary public, if any, and disqualification from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Archie S. Baribar GUILTY of breach of

the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Accordingly, the Court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1)
year; REVOKES his incumbent commission, if any; and PROHIBITS him from being
commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the IBP and
the Office of the Bar Confidant, be notified of this Decision and be it entered into
respondent's personal record.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

March 24, 2015

A.C. No. 10132

HEIRS OF PEDRO ALILANO represented by DAVID ALILANO, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO E. EXAMEN,Respondent .

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint  for disbarment filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) by the
1

heirs of Pedro Alilario against Atty. Roberto E. Examen for misconduct and malpractice for falsifying
documents and presenting these as evidence in court thus violating the Lawyer's Oath,  Canons 2

1,  10  and 19,  and Rules 1.01,  1.02,  10.01,  and 19.01  of the Code of Professional Responsibility
3 4 5 6 7 8 9

(CPR).

Pedro Alilano and his wife, Florentina, were the holders of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-
23261 covering a 98,460 sq. m. parcel of land identified as Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D located in
Paitan, Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat. Pedro and Florentina died on March 6, 1985 and October 11,
1989, respectively.

It appears that on March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984 Absolute Deeds of Sale  were executed
10

by the Spouses Alilano in favor of Ramon Examen and his wife, Edna. Both documents were
notarized by respondent Atty. Roberto Examen, brother of the vendee. Sometime in September
1984, Spouses Examen obtained possession of the property.

On January 12, 2002, the heirs of Alilano filed a suit for recovery of possession before the Regional
Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat against Edna Examen and Atty. Roberto Examen.  It was during this
11

proceeding that Atty. Examen introduced into evidence the March 31, 1984 and September 12, 1984
Absolute Deeds of Sale.

On November 15, 2003,  the heirs of Alilano filed this complaint alleging that Atty. Examen, based
12

on Barretto v. Cabreza,  violated the notarial law when he notarized the absolute deeds of sale since
13

a notary public is prohibited from notarizing a document when one of the parties is a relative by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or affinity within the second civil degree. It is also alleged
that Atty. Examen notarized the documents knowing that the cedula or residence certificate number
used by Ramon Examen was not actually his but the residence certificate number of Florentina. Atty.
Examen also falsely acknowledged that the two witnesses personally appeared before him when
they did not. Lastly, it is alleged that despite knowing the infirmities of these documents, Atty.
Examen introduced these documents into evidence violating his oath as a lawyer and the CPR.

In his defense, Atty. Examen pointed out that there was no longer any prohibition under the Revised
Administrative Code for a notary public to notarize a document where one of the parties is related to
him by consanguinity and affinity.  With regard to the use of Florentina’s residence certificate as
14

Ramon’s, Atty. Examen said that he was in good faith and that it was office practice that the
secretary type details without him personally examining the output.  In any event, he reasoned that
15

the use of another’s residence certificate is not a ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription
based on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 dated January 26, 2004 where it was proposed that the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Section 1,
Rule VIII, be revised to include a prescription period for professional misconduct: within two years
from the date of the act.16

In its Report and Recommendation,  the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) found Atty.
17

Examen liable for breach of the Notarial Law and introducing false Absolute Deeds of Sale before
court proceedings. It stated that there was ample evidence to support the complainants’ contention
that the Spouses Alilano did not voluntarily and knowingly convey their property, i.e. denials under
oath by attesting witnesses and NBI Report by Handwriting Expert Jennifer Dominguez stating that
Pedro Alilano’s signature in the September 1984 Absolute Deed of Sale was significantly different
from the specimen signatures. It also noted that Ramon Examen’s residence certificate number,
date and place of issue were also falsified since the residence certificate actually belonged to
Florentina Pueblo. It thus recommended that the penalty of disbarment be imposed.

The IBP Board of Governors (BOG) in its June 26, 2007 Resolution  adopted the IBP CBD’s report
18

but modified the penalty to suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and a
suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial Commission for a period of two years.

Atty. Examen moved for reconsideration. In its Notice of Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion
for reconsideration. It also modified the penalty imposed to suspension from the practice of law for a
period of one year and disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public for a period of two
years.19

We agree with the IBP that Atty. Examen is administratively liable and hereby impose a modified
penalty.

In disbarment cases the only issue that is to be decided by the Court is whether the member of the
bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not.  It is not therefore the proper venue for the
20

determination of whether there had been a proper conveyance of real property nor is it the proper
proceeding to take up whether witnesses’ signatures were in fact forged.

NO PRESCRIPTION OF ACTIONS FOR

ACTS OF ERRING MEMBERS OF THE BAR

In Frias v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada,  the Court En Banc opined that there can be no prescription in bar
21

discipline cases. It pointed out this has been the policy since 1967 with the Court’s ruling in Calo, Jr.
v. Degamo  and reiterated in Heck v. Santos  where we had the chance to state:
22 23

If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they
took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately
come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative
liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of
law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the

time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint,
erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This
categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them
from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial
Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution
of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer…. (Italics
supplied)24

We therefore ruled in Frias, that Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the IBP CBD was
void and had no legal effect for being ultra vires and thus null and void.
25

This ruling was reiterated in the more recent case of Bengco v. Bernardo,  where the Court stated
26

that putting a prescriptive period on administrative cases involving members of the bar would only
serve to embolden them to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of
being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.

Atty. Examen’s defense of prescription therefore is of no moment and deserves scant consideration.

THE SPANISH NOTARIAL LAW OF 1889 WAS REPEALED BY THE

REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917

Prior to 1917, governing law for notaries public in the Philippines was the Spanish Notarial Law of
1889. However, the law governing Notarial Practice is changed with the passage of the January 3,
1916 Revised Administrative Code, which took effect in 1917. In 2004, the Revised Rules on
Notarial Practice  was passed by the Supreme Court.
27

In Kapunan, et al. v. Casilan and Court of Appeals,  the Court had the opportunity to state that
28

enactment of the Revised Administrative Code repealed the Spanish Notarial Law of 1889. Thus:

It is petitioners’ contention that Notary Public Mateo Canonoy, who was related to the parties in the
donation within the fourth civil degree of affinity, was, under Articles 22 and 28 of the Spanish
Notarial Law, incompetent and disqualified to authenticate the deed of donation executed by the
Kapunan spouses in favor of their daughter Concepcion Kapunan Salcedo. Said deed of donation,
according to petitioners, became a mere private instrument under Article 1223 of the old Civil Code,
so that under the ruling laid down in the case of Barretto vs. Cabreza (33 Phil., 413), the donation
was inefficacious. The appellate court, however, in the decision complained of held that the Spanish
Notarial Law has been repealed with the enactment of Act No. 496. We find this ruling to be correct.
In the case of Philippine Sugar Estate vs. Poizart (48 Phil., 536), cited in Vda. de Estuart vs. Garcia
(Adm. Case No. 212, prom. February 15, 1957), this Court held that "The old Spanish notarial law
and system of conveyance was repealed in the Philippines and another and different notarial law
and system became the law of the land with the enactment of Act No. 496."  (Emphasis supplied)
29

In this case, the heirs of Alilano stated that Atty. Examen was prohibited to notarize the absolute
deeds of sale since he was related by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree with the vendee,
Ramon. The prohibition might have still applied had the applicable rule been the Spanish Notarial
Law. However, following the Court’s ruling in Kapunan, the law in force at the time of signing was the
Revised Administrative Code, thus, the prohibition was removed. Atty. Examen was not incompetent
to notarize the document even if one of the parties to the deed was a relative, his brother. As
correctly observed by the IBP CBD:

At the time of notarization, the prevailing law governing notarization was Sections 231-259, Chapter
11 of the Revised Administrative Code and there was no prohibition on a notary public from
notarizing a document when one of the interested parties is related to the notary public within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or second degree of affinity.
30
Note must be taken that under 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, Rule IV, Section 3(c), a notary
public is disqualified among others to perform the notarial act if he is related by affinity or
consanguinity to a principal within the fourth civil degree, to wit:

SEC. 3. Disqualifications. – A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

xxxx

(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of

the principal within the fourth civil degree.

That Atty. Examen was not incompetent to act as a notary public in the present case does not mean
that he can evade administrative liability under the CPR in conjunction with the provisions of the
Notarial Law.

NOTARIES PUBLIC MUST PERFORM

THEIR DUTIES DILIGENTLY AND
WITH UTMOST CARE

In Nunga v. Atty. Viray,  this Court stated:

31

…[N]otarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public
interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The
protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be
prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It
must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a
public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the
authenticity thereof. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For
this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of their duties.  (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
32

Thus under the prevailing law at the time of notarization it was the duty of the notary public to comply
with the requirements of the Notarial Law.  This includes the duty under Chapter 11, Section 251 of
1âwphi1

the Revised Administrative Code:

SEC. 251. Requirement as to notation of payment of cedula [residence] tax. – Every contract, deed,
or other document acknowledged before a notary public shall have certified thereon that the parties
thereto have presented their proper cedula [residence] certificates or are exempt from the cedula
[residence] tax, and there shall be entered by the notary public as a part of such certification the
number, place of issue, and date of each cedula [residence] certificate as aforesaid.

Under Chapter 11, Section 249 of the Revised Administrative Code provided a list of the grounds for
disqualification:

SEC. 249. Grounds for revocation of commission. – The following derelictions of duty on the part of
a notary public shall, in the discretion of the proper judge of first instance, be sufficient ground for the
revocation of his commission:

xxxx

(f) The failure of the notary to make the proper notation regarding cedula certificates.
 xxxx

In Soriano v. Atty. Basco,  the Court stated that notaries public are required to follow formalities as
33

these are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected. Thus, the Notarial Law requires them to certify
that a party to the instrument acknowledged before him has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence certificate) and to enter its number, place of issue and
date as part of the certification. Failure to perform his duties results in the revocation of a notary’s
commission. The Court said:

As a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, respondent is mandated to discharge with fidelity the
sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed
with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect for the legal solemnity of an oath in an
acknowledgment are sacrosanct. He cannot simply disregard the requirements and solemnities of
the Notarial Law.  (Emphasis supplied)
34

Here, based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear that the residence certificate number
used by Ramon Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both Absolute Deeds of Sale was not
in fact the residence certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate number.  Atty.
35

Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that it was office practice to have his secretary type
up the details of the documents and requirements without him checking the correctness of same.

A notary public must discharge his powers and duties, which are impressed with public interest, with
accuracy and fidelity.  Good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance in situations since the duty to
36

function as a notary public is personal. We note that the error could have been prevented had Atty.
Examen diligently performed his functions: personally checked the correctness of the documents. To
say that it was his secretary’s fault reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions of a
notary public for it is he who personally acknowledges the document. He was behooved under
Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative Code to check if the proper cedulas were
presented and inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him reflected the correct details.
This Court cannot stress enough that notarization is not a routinary act. It is imbued with substantive
public interest owing to the public character of his duties  .
37

Atty. Examen posits that the failure of a notary to make the proper notation of cedulas can only be a
ground for disqualification and not the proper subject for a disbarment proceeding. We disagree.

In violating the provisions of the Notarial Law, Atty. Examen also transgressed the his oath as a
lawyer, provisions of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. – A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly and willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

By his negligent act of not checking the work of his secretary and merely perfunctorily notarizing
documents, it cannot be said that he upheld legal processes thus violating Canon 1 of the CPR.
Neither can it be said that he promoted confidence in the legal system. If anything, his acts serve to
undermine the functions of a diligent lawyer. He thus ran afoul Rule 1.02 of the CPR. We cannot
stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal

SEC. 241. Powers of notary public. – Every notary public shall have power to administer all oaths
and affirmations provided for by law, in all matters incident to his notarial office, and in the execution
of affidavits, depositions, and other documents requiring an oath, and to receive the proof or
acknowledgment of all writings relating to commerce or navigation, such as bills of sale bottomries,
mortgages, and hypothecations of ships, vessels, or boats, charter parties of affreightments, letters
of attorney, deeds, mortgages, transfers and assignments of land or buildings, or an interest therein,
and such other writings as are commonly proved or acknowledged before notaries; to act as a
magistrate, in the writing of affidavits or depositions, and to make declarations and certify the truth
thereof under his seal of office, concerning all matters done by him by virtue of his office. profession
and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the integrity of the legal profession.  A lawyer’s mandate includes thoroughly going over
38

documents presented to them typed or transcribed by their secretaries. 39

The Court notes that the case between the parties is not the first that reached this Court. In Edna
Examen and Roberto Examen v. Heirs of Pedro Alilano and Florentina Pueblo,  Atty. Examen and
40

his sister-in-law questioned via a petition for certiorari  the propriety of three Court of Appeals’
41

Resolutions relating to a case involving Lot No. 1085 Pls-544-D this time with respect to its fruits.
There the Court of Appeals (CA) after giving Atty. Examen 90 days to file his appellant’s brief,
denied a second motion for extension of time merely on the basis of a flimsy reason that he had
misplaced some of the transcript of the witnesses’ testimonies. The CA did not find the reason of
misplaced transcript as good and sufficient cause to grant the extension pursuant to Section
12,  Rule 44 of the Revised Rules of Court. It stated that it was a "flimsy and lame excuse to
42

unnecessarily delay the proceedings."  The CA was of the opinion that defendant-appellant’s, herein
43

respondent, motion was "a mockery of the procedural rules."  This Court denied the petition for
44

various procedural defects. 45

With respect to the penalty imposed, given that Atty. Examen not only failed to uphold his duty as a
notary public but also failed to uphold his lawyer’s oath and ran afoul the provisions of the CPR, the
Court deems it proper to suspend Atty. Examen from the practice of law for a period of two years
following this Court’s decision in Caalim-Verzonilla v. Pascua. 46

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto E. Examen is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for TWO (2) YEARS. In addition, his present notarial commission, if any, is hereby REVOKED,
and he is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as a notary public for a period of two (2) years from
finality of this Decision. He is further WARNED that any similar act or infraction in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent’s personal record as an attorney, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 12041, November 05, 2018 - JULIAN T. BALBIN AND DOLORES E. BALBIN,
Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR. Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 12041, November 05, 2018

JULIAN T. BALBIN AND DOLORES E. BALBIN, Complainants, v. ATTY. MARIANO

BARANDA, JR. Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a complaint1 dated September 1, 2012 filed by

Spouses Julian T. Balbin (Julian) and Dolores E. Balbin (Dolores; collectively,
complainants) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against respondent
Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr. (respondent) for violations of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and the Notarial Law.2

The Facts

Complainants alleged that in January 2003, they entered into a loan agreement with
Rapu-Raponhon Lending Company3 (RLC). To secure the loan, the latter's Manager,
Charles M. Guianan (Charles), asked them to affix their signatures on two (2) blank
documents, specifically a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage4 and a Promissory Note,5 both
dated January 24, 2003 (subject documents). Respondent notarized the subject
documents on January 29, 2003.6 When complainants failed to pay the loan, RLC
foreclosed the mortgage.7 Aggrieved, they filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 4 (RTC) for the annulment of the subject documents, claiming that
they were made to sign the two (2) blank documents as security for the loan but they
never received the loan proceeds.8 However, in a Joint Decision9 dated July 6, 2009, the
RTC dismissed the case for failure of the complainants to substantiate their
allegations.10 While the civil case was pending on appeal,11 complainants filed the
present administrative case against respondent, faulting him for notarizing the subject
documents without Dolores' presence, which he admitted in open court before the RTC,
to wit:

Atty. [Joventino S.] Sardaña:

Q – Did you appear before a Notary Public at the time that this was acknowledged
before a Notary Public?
Atty. Baranda:
Already answered, she did not.

Atty. Sardaña:
There was no answer yet.

Atty. Baranda:
We will admit that [Dolores] did not appear before a notary public.

Atty. Sardaña:
There is an admission from the defendant's counsel that the plaintiffs as signatories to
this Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note did not appear before a Notary Public.

x x x x12 (Emphasis supplied)

Complainants further suggested that respondent was in conflict of interest, and

therefore, disqualified from notarizing the subject documents because respondent was
the counsel of RLC, which was their counter-party in those documents.13

For his part, respondent admitted that Dolores was not present when he notarized the
subject documents in the presence of Julian, Charles, and the two (2) other witnesses
to the instruments.14 He argued, however, that he was not in conflict of interest when
he notarized the subject documents on January 29, 2003 because he was retained as
RLC's counsel only on May 4, 2004, or after complainants filed the civil case against
RLC.15 He also added that there was no conflict of interest because complainants have
never been his clients.16

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Modified Report and Recommendation17 dated June 20, 2013, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be reprimanded for his carelessness and
misdeclarations in the notarial certificates in the subject documents.18 He noted that
since Dolores was not present during the notarization, respondent should have
indicated in the acknowledgment of the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage and the jurat of
the Promissory Note that only Charles and Julian appeared before him and
acknowledged their execution of those documents.19 Nevertheless, the Investigating
Commissioner found no merit in complainants' allegations that respondent was
disqualified from notarizing the subject documents on the ground of conflict of
interest.20

In a Resolution21 dated August 9, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and

approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation with
modification as to the penalty to be imposed upon respondent, to wit: (a) immediate
revocation of his notarial commission; (b) disqualification from being commissioned as
a notary public for two (2) years; and (c)  suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months.22

Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration23 by expressing his sincere apology

for his carelessness as a notary public and asking for compassion and understanding,
noting that he is already seventy (70) years old and has been a notary public and in the
practice of law since 1977.24 In a Resolution25 dated March 1, 2017, the IBP Board of
Governors denied the motion and modified the period of suspension from the practice
of law to six (6) months.26

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for the acts complained of.

The Court's Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Board of Governors.

Settled is the rule that a notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the same persons who personally appeared before him to
attest to its contents and truth.27 The physical presence of the parties to the instrument
is required to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of their signatures
therein and the due execution of the documents.28 Pertinently, Section 1 of Act No.
2103 or the Notarial Law provides:

Section 1. x x x

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized
by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall
certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act
and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to
keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.

Under Section 2 (b), Rule IV of the prevailing 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,29 "[a]
person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document x x x is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization[.]"30

In the present case, respondent explicitly admitted that he violated the foregoing
requirement by notarizing the subject documents despite the fact that one of the
parties-signatories thereto, Dolores, failed to personally appear before him. As such, he
should be held administratively liable for his professional indiscretion. Notaries Public
have been repeatedly reminded that they must be mindful of the significance of the
notarial act when performing their duties. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, or
routinary act.31 Rather, it converts a private document into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by
law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face and, for this reason, notaries public are
mandated to observe with the utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties.32 In this light, lawyers commissioned as notaries public have been
reminded that compliance with the Notarial Law is in line with their solemn oath under
the CPR to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of any.33

As regards the penalty to be imposed, recent jurisprudence shows that when a

document is notarized despite the non-appearance of a party or an affiant before the
notary public, the Court generally imposes the following penalties upon the
latter: (a)  immediate revocation of his notarial commission, if still
existing; (b)  disqualification from being appointed as a notary public for a period of two
(2) years; and (c)  suspension from the practice of law – the terms of which vary based
on the circumstances of each case.34 In Ferguson v. Ramos,35Malvar v.
Baleros36 and Yumul-Espina v. Tabaquiero37 the erring lawyers were suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months; while in Orola v. Baribar38 Sappayani v.
Gasmen,39 and Isenhardt v. Real,40 the suspensions imposed were for a period of one
(1) year.

Here, the Court finds that suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months would
suffice, considering respondent's prompt admission of his error, his expression of
sincere apology for his carelessness, the fact that he is already in the twilight years of
his life, and complainants' admission that Dolores placed her signatures on the subject
documents, thereby raising no dispute on the due execution thereof.41

Finally, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent was not disqualified from
notarizing the subject documents by the mere fact that he subsequently became
counsel of RLC, which was one of the signatories thereon. No such prohibition appears
in both the Notarial Law and its present iteration.42

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Mariano B. Baranda, Jr. GUILTY of

violating the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
effective immediately, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six
(6) months; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a notary public, if any;
and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his
receipt of this Resolution to enable it to determine when his suspension from the
practice of law, the revocation of his notarial commission, and his disqualification from
being commissioned as notary public shall take effect.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for its information and guidance, and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.