BILL OF RIGHTS

SEE — Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, July 21, 2003

‣ In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative from the
actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following the EDSA revolution until the
adoption, on March 24, 1986, of the Provisional (Freedom) Constitution. During this period, the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law, because no constitution limited the extent and
scope of such directives and orders. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary
right under the Bill of Rights, because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights at the time. However, the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

RULE — THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND LIBERTY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY
‣ SEE — Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization vs PBMC, 50 SCRA 189,202-3 (1973)
‣ The right to life and property do not enjoy identical protection from the Constitution. The primacy of human rights
over property rights is recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions.
‣ The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN GENERAL

‣ RULE — Judicial actions must be judged by a person with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge

SEE — Castillo vs Juan, 62 SCRA 124

‣ In this case, the Judge, on two separate occasions, in the secrecy of his chambers met with the petitioners of
the weakness of their cases, the likelihood of a verdict of acquittal in favor of the accused, and impressed upon
them that it would be to their advantage to settle, as the most he could do on their behalf was to have such
accused indemnify them. These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting
its evidence, one of the petitioners not having testified as yet.
‣ Court held that the Judge must be disqualified otherwise it would violate of due process.
‣ In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial
to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him to indulge or even to give
the appearance of catering to the at times human failing of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from
reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters.

‣ A judge should strive to be at all times "wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due
process requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of
rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness
and as to his integrity.”
‣ SEE — Webb vs People, 276 SCRA 243
‣ A party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free,
disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. This right must be weighed with the duty of a
judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and
prejudice the movant must prove the same by clear and convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden and
petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof.
‣ To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and
result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on
the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the
part of the judge.
‣ As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently
expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice.
‣ Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable
error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as
to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be
insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross
and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
‣ A series of adverse rulings of the respondent judge, even if they were palpable errors, is not enough.

‣ SEE — Lai vs People, G.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015

‣ This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded 'the cold neutrality of an impartial judge' as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not
only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision
will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated
they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in
invoking his action for the justice they expect.
‣ The evil sought to be prevented by the rules on disqualification had no relation whatsoever with the judge's
degree of participation in the case before becoming the judge. He must be reminded that the same compulsory
disqualification that applied to him could similarly be demanded of the private prosecutor or the defense
lawyer, if either of them should be appointed as the trial judge hearing the case. The purpose of this stricture is
to ensure that the proceedings in court that would affect the life, liberty and property of the petitioner as the
accused should be conducted and determined by a judge who was wholly free, disinterested, impartial and

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS

‣ SEE — Government of Hongkong v. Hon. Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007
‣ In this case, the Supreme Court modified its earlier ruling (in Government of the U.S. v. Purganan) that the
constitutional right to bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. The Court said that it cannot ignore the
modern trend in public international law which places primacy on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which proclaims the right to life, liberty
and all the other fundamental rights of every person) is not a treaty, the principles contained therein are now
recognized as customarily binding on all members of the international community. If bail can be granted in
deportation cases, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there
is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the
innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
‣ However, the standard to be used in granting bail in extradition cases should be “clear and convincing evidence”,
which is lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. It is imperative
that the potential extradite must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that —
a. He is NOT a flight risk; and
b. He will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court

JURISPRUDENCE WHICH INVALIDATED LAWS OR REGULATIONS FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
‣ City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12,2005
‣ In an effort to curb immorality, the city of Manila passed an ordinance which disallows the operation of sauna parlors,
massage, parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance
halls, motels and inns in the Ermita- Malate area. Court held that such ordinance is invalid as it was an arbitrary
blanket prohibition. The enumerated establishments may be lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral
welfare.
‣ The means employed for the accomplishment were unreasonable and unduly oppressive. The worthy aim of fostering
public morals can be achieved through less restrictive means of private rights. It can be attained by reasonable
restriction rather than absolute prohibition. The closing down, transferring or conversion of the businesses under the
Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. The prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare, not will it eradicate the social ills of
prostitution, adultery and fornication, nor will it arrest the spread of STD in Manila.
‣ The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the
community. That these are used as arenas to consummate illicit sexual affairs and as venues to further illegal
prostitution is of no moment. Sexual immorality, being a human frailty, may take place in the most innocent of places. There are
no “pure” places where there are impure men. The problem is not the establishment but the deplorable
human activity that may occur within its premises. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it
cannot for that reason alone be punished.
‣ There is a clear invasion of personal or property rights. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution,
fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend
or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are
other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
‣ White Light Corp v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009
‣ A Manila ordinance prohibits motels, etc. from offering short- time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates
for such abbreviated stays. The ordinance was invalidated as violative of the right to property of motel operators and
of liberty of potential clients as not all who avail of “short time” were in pursuit of immoral activities.
‣ We cannot discount other legitimate activities that the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate
uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the
time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up
and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or
groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having
sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
‣ Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)
‣ An Executive Order issued by President Marcos read: "Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth,
no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture.” The original Executive Order was for prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos,
except under certain conditions, for the purpose of preserving them for the benefit of small farmers. The amendment
was invalidated by the Supreme Court which held that outright confiscation is not reasonably related to the purpose.
The prohibition of interprovincial transport of carabaos (means) could NOT possibly prevent their indiscriminate
slaughter (purpose) considering that they can be killed anywhere. Retaining carabaos in one province will not prevent
there slaughter there, any more that moving them to another province. Moreover, it is unduly oppressive. The owner of
the property is denied the opportunity to be heard and the property is immediately confiscated and distributed.
‣ Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 848 (1988)
‣ The rule of the Professional Regulatory Commission which restricts reviewees from attending review classes, briefing
conferences or the like, and receiving any hand out, review material, etc. was unreasonable and arbitrary and violative
of the academic freedom of schools
‣ Balacuit v. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182 (1988)
‣ The City of Butuan issued an ordinance prescribing that children between the ages of 7 and 12 should be charged
only half the admission price in movie houses. It was held as an invalid exercise of police power, for the benefit of
parents then the cost is passed on to cinema owners. Court held that there is no discernible relation between the
ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.

JURISPRUDENCE WHICH INVALIDATED LEGISLATION FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION

‣ Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Service, G.R. No. 167614, March 24,2009
‣ A law provides that "In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined
by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less." Other employees, however, are given full coverage for the
unexpired term. The Court held that it violate the equal protection clause for being discriminatory against overseas
workers in a matter involving fundamental right.
‣ Biraogo v. Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
‣ Executive Order No. 1 created the Truth Commission with power to investigate graft and corruption committed during
the Arroyo administration. It violates equal protection for focusing only of what happened during the arroyo
administration and does not comprehend previous administrations.
EQUAL PROTECTION CANNOT BE INVOKED BY ACCUSED AGAINST INEFFICIENT PROSECUTION RESULTING IN INEQUALITY
‣ SEE — People vs Alvarez (2012)
‣ While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they
are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty
of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such
instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society
‣ Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person
has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime. Likewise, if the failure of prosecutors to
enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the
result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many
persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown.

DOCTRINE OF RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY

‣ RULE — A PROVISION OF LAW WHICH IS INITIALLY VALID, MAY BECOME SUBSEQUENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL, ON THE
GROUND
THAT ITS CONTINUED OPERATION WOULD VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
‣ SEE — Central Bank Employees v. Bangko Sentral. G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004
‣ Statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. The
constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with
applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of
facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because
of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity,
even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
conditions.
‣ In this case, with the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental
financial institutions (GFIs) removing limitations on employees, the continued operation of the limitation on Central
Bank employees under Section 15(c), Article II of the Central Bank law constitutes indirect invidious discrimination
on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). This is a case of relative
unconstitutionality.

RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

What is the rationale and purpose behind the right against unreasonable searches and seizures?
‣ SEE — 20th Century Fox Film Corporation vs Court of Appeals (1988)
‣ It is deference to one's personality that lies at the core of this right but it could be also looked upon as a
recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily one's home, but not necessarily thereto confined. What is
sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry to his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of
objects he wants around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except under the
circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his
dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life.
‣ Authorities characterize the constitutional right as the embodiment of a `spiritual concept: the belief that to value
the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to
value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social
need, and then only under stringent procedural safeguards.

IN THE DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE, THE JUDGE MUST PERSONALLY EXAMINE IN THE FORM OF SEARCHING
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE

SEE — Bache & Co. vs Ruiz (1971)

‣ In this case, there was no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant and
his witness. While it is true that the complainant's application for search warrant and the witness' printed-form
deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any
question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause
against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that
notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken.
‣ The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant was thus
limited to listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission
of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal
examination.
‣ If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy
Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It wasprecisely on
account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty of the
issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how much time would
be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can be seen from the record of
the proceedings quoted above.
‣ SEE — Silva vs Presiding Judge of RTC of Negros Oriental (1991)
‣ In this case, Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
‣ Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in
a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. The deposition did not
only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The questions propounded to the witnesses were in
fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all that the witnesses
had to do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.
‣ In issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirement that he
must determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
‣ BUT SEE — Soliven vs Makasiar (1988)
‣ What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
‣ Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall — (1) Personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of probable cause.
‣ Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their
courts.
‣ NOTE — To harmonize, the conclusion is that the judge is required to “personally” examine the complainant and his
witnesses by “searching questions and answer” only in cases for the issuance of a search warrant. This is in accord
with the Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Arrest cases, this procedure need not be followed, it is enough that the judge
follows the procedure in the Soliven Case.

What if the address indicated in the search warrant was erroneous (example — address indicated is #10
Grace St. but the actual place to be searched was really #11 Grace St.) Is this defect fatal?
‣ YES. Unless, aside from the address, the search warrant also has a particular description of the place to be
searched.
‣ SEE — Yao vs People, G.R. No. 168306, June 19, 2007
‣ The long standing rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other
places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement. Moreover, in the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be
searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held that the executing officer’s prior knowledge as to the
place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer
is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had been issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued
the warrant intended the compound described in the affidavit.

Does the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor bind the judge?
‣ NO. SEE — Lim vs Felix, 194 SCRA 292
‣ The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge, not for the fiscal or prosecutor. Only the judge
alone makes the determination. The preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge, it
merely assists him to make a determination of probable cause. In itself, the certification of the prosecutor is
actually ineffectual. It is the report, affidavits, TSNs and other supporting docs that are material to assist judge
in his determination.
‣ Judges and Prosecutors should distinguish between preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the
offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one
proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant of arrest is made by the Judge.
‣ The preliminary investigation proper –– whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is
guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, riggers and
embarrassment of trial –– is the function of the Prosecutor.
‣ The Constitution requires personal determination by the judge. If he relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor, as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
personally determined probable cause. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge
commits a grave abuse of discretion.
‣ A judge may rely on the fiscal’s certification of existence of probable cause, but this does not bind the judge to
issue a warrant of arrest. The issuance of the warrant is not a mere ministerial function, but calls for the
exercise of judicial discretion. This is also stated in the Rules of Court, under which, the judge must satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant.

Is the standard of determining probable cause the same in both Search Warrants and Warrants of Arrests?
‣ NO. SEE — Webb vs De Leon, 247 SCRA 632
‣ The quantum of evidence for probable cause to exist in search and arrest cases are quite different.
1. In search cases — it must be established that the items sough are seizable because they are connected to a
criminal activity and that these items will be found in the place to be searched.
2. In arrest cases — there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested committed it regardless if evidence of the commission of the crime will be found in that person’s control.
‣ NOTE — that under our Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest may be issued upon filing of information whereas
the procedure for issuing search warrants is more defined.

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE; CARDINAL NORMS TO OBSERVE

‣ THE GENERAL REQUISITE OF PROBABLE CAUSE IS STILL REQUIRED NOTWITHSTANDING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE
EXCEPTIONS,
THIS IS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENT OF “REASONABLENESS”
‣ SEE — People vs Aruta (1988)
‣ The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample
upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search and
seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure
can be lawfully conducted.
‣ In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent any
probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person arrested.
Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or actual belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.
‣ THE FACT THAT THE AUTHORITIES HAVE HAD THE AMPLE TIME AND OPPORTUNITY TO PROCURE A SEARCH WARRANT IS A
DEFENSE
‣ People vs Amminudin (1988) (Gangplank case) — The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting
declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon. His name was known. The vehicle
was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing.
No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not necessary.”
‣ People vs Racho (2010) — Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do
away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their
office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the
appellant's physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same
day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample
opportunity to apply for a warrant
‣ Spouses Veroy vs Layague (1992) — Under the circumstances it is undeniable that the police officers had ample
time to procure a search warrant but did not. In a number of cases decided by the SC, warrantless searches were
declared illegal because the officials conducting the search had every opportunity to obtain a search warrant.
‣ MHP Garments vs CA — The progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores of
private respondents shows there was sufficient time for petitioners and the PC raiding party to apply for a judicial
warrant. Despite the sufficiency of time, they did not apply for a warrant and seized the goods of private respondents.
In doing so, they took the risk of a suit for damages in case the seizure would be proved to violate the right of private
Respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. In the case at bench, the search and seizure were clearly
illegal.

CUSTOMS SEARCH IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF CUSTOMS LAWS

SEE — People vs CFI of Rizal (1980)

‣ Considering now the critical area of the dispute, under the law, the authority of persons duly commissioned to
enforce tariff and customs laws is quite exceptional when it pertains to the domain of searches and seizures of
goods suspected to have been introduced in the country in violation of the customs laws.
‣ This Court had occasion to recognize this power granted to persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Code, who in order to discharge their official duties more effectively —
‣ ". . . may at anytime enter, pass through, or search any land or inclosure of any warehouse, store or other
building not being a dwelling house.” (Sec. 2208)

‣ (to) open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he has reasonable
cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable or prohibited article or articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law, and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid." (Section 2211)
‣ Thus, in the extraordinary events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or seizure, or when the
latter cannot be performed except without warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or
seizure becomes purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved,
including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which
the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.
‣ SEE — Papa vs Mago (1968)
‣ The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the
Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect
searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other
movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and
tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when
he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines
contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of
holding or conveying such article as aforesaid.
‣ The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said a search warrant. The Code authorizes persons having police
authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or
aircraft and any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the
Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant
issued by a judge or justice of the peace."
‣ It is our considered view, therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement
of customs laws.

STOP AND FRISK

SEE — Esquillo vs People (2010)

‣ The act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.
The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who
manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed
weapons. The apprehending police officer must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer's
experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the
arrest for this principle to apply.
‣ What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has
weapons or contraband concealed about him.

SEE — Terry vs Ohio

‣ Where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and
presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to
conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment
‣ SEE — Posadas vs CA (1990)
‣ The Court held that there were many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the
Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously.
They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live
ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade.
‣ In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the bag only
after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly
in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to
simply shrug his shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
‣ NOTE —Philippine Jurisprudence has already expanded this scope of the Stop and Frisk Doctrine by including not
just weapons but also the seizure of illegal drugs in the event of a stop and frisk. (SEE Manalili vs CA 1997)

VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST

ARRESTS IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO

SEE — Umil vs Ramos, G.R. No. 81567, October 3, 1991

‣ Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as
it can be said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
‣ The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and other
crimes and offenses committed in the furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of
nationwide magnitude.
‣ The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing nonviolent
acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory
offense.
‣ The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the
determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest
and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or
any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society and its government and
duly constituted authorities.

HOT PURSUIT ARREST

ARREST OF ESCAPED PRISONERS

RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF SPEECH, OF THE PRESS AND THE RIGHT TO

PEACEABLE ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
SEE — Near vs Minnesota (1931)
In determining the extent of the constitutional protection, it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it
is the chief purpose of the guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication. The general principle that the
constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press gives immunity from previous restraints has been approved in
many decisions under the provisions of state constitutions. The preliminary freedom, by virtue of the very reason
for its existence, does not depend, as this Court has said, on proof of truth.

JURISPRUDENCE INVALIDATING PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON SPEECH

‣ Adiong v. Commission on Elections, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)
‣ Relying on Section 11 of Republic Act 6646, the Comelec prohibited the posting of decals and stickers of candidates
on "mobile" places, public or private.
‣ The Supreme Court declared Sec. 11 and such prohibition unconstitutional for infringing freedom of speech and for
being an undue delegation of rule making authority. The prohibited acts were found to present no substantial danger
to government interest. The prohibition therefore did not satisfy the requirements of the clear and present danger rule.
Moreover, the prohibition was found to suffer from over "breadth." It encompassed the use of privately owned
property such as a vehicle. It therefore was an unreasonable restriction on the use of property. Finally, the
constitutional objective to give rich and poor candidates equal opportunity was not seen as served by the prohibition
of decals.
‣ ABS-CBN v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133486, January 28, 2000
‣ In the exercise of its authority to regulate the holders of media franchises during the election period the Comelec
banned "exit polls." It contends that"an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of
selecting interviewees, which further makes the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit
poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec is ever present
‣ Supreme Court declared such regulation unconstitutional. It said that exit polls (random polling of voters as the come
out of the booths, and the dissemination of their results through mass media) constitute an essential part of the
freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly
and credible elections. The ban does not satisfy the clear and present danger tale because the evils
envisioned are merely speculative.

‣ SWS v. Comelec, G.R. 147571, May 5, 2001

‣ Section 1 of R.A. 9006, the Fair Election Act, says: "Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published
fifteen (15) days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published seven (7) days before
an election." The provision as well as the implementing resolution of the Comelec is challenged as violative of freedom
of expression. The Comelec, however, justifies the rule as necessary to prevent the manipulation and corruption of
electoral process by unscrupulous and erroneous surveys just before election.
‣ The Supreme Court declared such provision unconstitutional. As prior restraint, the rule is presumed to be invalid. The
power of the Comelec over media franchises is limited to ensuring "equal opportunity, time, space and the right to
reply" as well as to reasonable rates of charges for the use of media facilities for "public information and forums
among candidates." Here the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute and substantial. Nor does the rule pass the
O’Brien test because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc. and
(2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government

RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION

IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
‣ SEE — Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54, 72, September 12,1974
‣ The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must,
therefore, yield to the former.
‣ Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and liberty, and has a preferred position in
the hierarchy of values
‣ It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger.

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION

‣ Information which is required to be disclosed as it is covered under the right —
1. The refusal of the Comelec to reveal the names of the nominees for party-list seats violates the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. (Ba-Ra 7941 v. Comelec 2007)
2. It is incumbent upon the PCGG, and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders
of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not
necessarily to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common '
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage." Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government 1998)
3. Information, for instance, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.
From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary
information leading to such definite proposition. (Chavez v. PEA 2002)
4. Decisions and opinions of a court are matters of public concern or interest. Access to court records may be permitted
at the discretion and subject to the supervisory and protective powers of the court, after considering the actual use or
purpose for which the request for access is based and the obvious prejudice to any of the parties. (Hilado, et al. v.
Judge 2006)
5. Civil service eligibilities of members of the civil service (Legaspi vs CSC)

6. National board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general,
and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these
exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters
pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further
improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. We do realize that there may be valid reasons
to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience
of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, administration, and checking of
these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration.
(Antolin vs Domonodon 2010)

JURISPRUDENCE ON THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

‣ Bel air Village Association v. Dionisio (1989)
‣ A land buyer buys a lot with an annotated lien that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the homeowner's
association. Such annotation does NOT violate the right freely to join or not to join associations. The fact that the
obligation is annotated in the title does not make it a government act forcing one to join an association. Rather, the
buyer freely buys the lot knowing that the purchase will entail an obligation.
‣ United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union vs Laguesma (1998)
‣ The first sentence of Article 245 of the Labor Code provides that: "Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist
or form any labor organization. Such provision is valid because the right under Art. 3, Sec. 8 is subject to the condition
that its exercise should be for purposes 'not contrary to law. The rationale is because if these managerial employees
would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interest. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial
employees in the Union membership.
‣ Occefia v. COMELEC (1984)
‣ Batas Big. 222 prohibits any candidate in the Barangay election of May 17, 1982 from representing or allowing himself
to be represented as a candidate of any political party and prohibits a political party, political group, political
committee from giving aid or support, directly or indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against a barangay
candidate's campaign for election. This is valid. The right is not absolute and the prohibition found in the law is
couched in very narrow terms. The law is intended to meet a clear and imminent danger of the debilitation of the
electoral process and also the danger of disenabling barangay officials from adequately performing their function as
agents of a neutral community.