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Secular Advice in Erasmus’s Sacred

Writings
a
Erika Rummel
a
University of Toronto, 27 King’s College Circle, Toronto, Ontario,
M5S 1A1, Canada.
Published online: 07 Nov 2013.

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 The European Legacy, 2014
Vol. 19, No. 1, 16–26, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10848770.2013.859785

Secular Advice in Erasmus’s Sacred Writings

ERIKA RUMMEL

ABSTRACT Research into Erasmus’s political ideas, notably his pacifism, should not be based on sources
like Institutio Principis Christiani, Querela Pacis, or Dulce Bellum, which are rhetorical composi-
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tions and offer clichés rather than Erasmus’s personal opinions. At the very least, these sources should be
checked against Erasmus’s theological writings, in which he presents specific and cogent arguments for his
views and allows us to put them into their proper context.

The question of the legitimacy of warfare is a prominent subject in Erasmus’s work. In

this essay, however, my concern is not what Erasmus said about war and peace, but in
what context he said it. My approach thus involves an examination of the nature of
the source texts. As my title indicates, I propose to search for Erasmus’s political ideas
in his theological writings, a body of work that, at first blush, seems unlikely to con-
tribute a great deal to the subject. The more obvious sources for Erasmus’s views on
affairs of state are of course texts with a professed political slant. Institutio Principis Chris-
tiani, Querela Pacis, Dulce Bellum, and Panegyricus are the sources that immediately come
to mind. Why do I steer away from these texts? Because they strike me as problematic
sources given their strong rhetorical flavour and (dare I say) banal content. They are
mostly clichés. The Institutio Principis is little more than a collection of aphorisms;
Querela Pacis is a declamation, that is, a showpiece of rhetorical skills; the Panegyricus is
a piece of court oratory the sincerity of which was called into question already in
Erasmus’s time; even Dulce Bellum, which one may argue is a personal comment on a
proverbial expression, has a strong rhetorical slant, as I shall demonstrate. After all,
Erasmus’s stated aim in collecting the adages was to aid “those who wish to practise
composition.”1
Thus, if we read these so-called “political” writings in sequence we get our fill of
commonplaces. Erasmus’s irenic ideas are expressed there in the most repetitive terms.
Three topoi in particular make their appearance over and over again: (1) the argument
from nature: While animals are equipped with claws, teeth, and other weapons of
attack, human beings are equipped with speech, the promoter of friendly relations;
and even animals (according to this cliché) don’t attack members of their own species;
(2) the argument from religion: Christ commanded his followers to love one another;

University of Toronto, 27 King’s College Circle, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 1A1, Canada. Email: erika.rummel@
utoronto.ca

Ó 2013 International Society for the Study of European Ideas

 Secular Advice in Erasmus’s Sacred Writings 17

it is shameful therefore for Christians to go to war against Christians; and (3) practical
reasons: War is costly and destructive, and its outcome uncertain.
How cliché are these arguments? If you look up Erasmus’s De Copia, his manual
of style, you will find the formula for this argumentation spelled out in Method 10.
If you were trying to persuade some king not to undertake a war against the most
Christian King of France, you could construct a line of arguments with propositions
of this sort: to engage in war is not natural to man who was born to feel good will,
but to brute animals to whom nature seems to have given arms... and you don’t find
tigers fighting against tigers or lions against lions; granted that men may wage war, it
is not the mark of Christian men to do so, for the Christian religion is nothing but
peace. ... The evils suffered by those who undertake war are far greater than the
advantages even if victory is attained.2
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Following up on this final line of argumentation that war is disadvantageous and

leads to hardships, let me show you just how closely Erasmus follows his own rhetori-
cal rules. This is what he writes in Dulce Bellum:
The crops [are] trampled far and wide, farms burnt out, villages set on fire, cattle
driven away, young women raped, old men dragged off into captivity, churches
sacked... so many old men are left childless... so many women widowed, so many
children orphaned... and need I speak about the loss of morals... hence the contempt
for piety, hence the neglect of laws.3

Now compare this with De Copia, Method 4 governing the amplification of

arguments. There Erasmus recommends:
We enumerate all circumstances that accompany the business or result from it, for
example, [when talking of the hardship of war we mention] the trampling of the
harvests, the driving away of cattle, the burning of farms and villages on every side,
the abandoned fields, tumbled walls, looted homes, the sacked churches, old men
left childless, children fatherless, mothers widowed, young women shamefully raped,
the morals of the young ruined by licence... the suppression of law, the obliteration
of religion.4

The literal correspondence between the passage in Dulce Bellum and the textbook rule
is obvious. Clearly, Dulce Bellum is not a spontaneous emotional outpouring but a
composition following a set of rules. The undeniably rhetorical character of Erasmus’s
remarks on war and peace raises questions of interpretation. What was Erasmus’s pur-
pose in writing these pieces: were they didactic, i.e., did he want to impress on us his
political ideas, or were they epideictic, i.e., did he want to impress on us his virtuosity
as a writer?
There is good evidence that Erasmus’s contemporaries regarded these writings as
epideictic. An incident that took place at the imperial court in Spain nicely illustrates
the reception of Erasmus’s irenic writings in his own time. In 1527, the English
ambassador to the imperial court, Edward Lee, addressed to Charles V a speech in
praise of peace. Alfonso Valdés, responding on behalf of the emperor, scoffed at the
speech. If the emperor wanted to hear about the merits of peace, he said, he could
read “Erasmus’ Querela Pacis or the essay in the Adages about Dulce Bellum Inexpertis by
the same author, in which all of this is set forth so lucidly that no one could deal with
 18 ERIKA RUMMEL

the subject more felicitously.” In other words, Erasmus had said it all before, and much
better than Lee. Valdés goes on to challenge Lee to show his mettle as a diplomat by
seeing to it that the French King actually kept the peace. “If he could achieve that,
Lee would earn praise for being not only an eloquent but also a capable man.” The
incident, which contrasts speech with political and diplomatic action, suggests that the
Erasmian works cited by Valdés were regarded as literary gems, but without any prac-
tical political impact.5
Now if that is the case, we come to a second question: Is a literary gem a good
source for an author’s political views? Can we assume that rhetorical pieces reflect
Erasmus’s personal opinion? This may not be a crucial question for the intellectual his-
torian who is looking for manifestations of Zeitgeist and for ideas typical of the age,
but it is a crucial question for the biographer and the historian who wants to know
Erasmus’s personal views. And it is a particularly vexing question, considering that
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Erasmus also wrote a speech in praise of war. It is no longer extant, but a reference to
it can be found in his Catalogue of Works. There, Erasmus tells us that he wrote a pair
of speeches for and against war with Venice. The two declamations were addressed to
Julius II, in whose court the question was discussed in 1509, as the pope was making
preparations to join the League of Cambrai. Erasmus reported that the “second speech
[the one in favour of war] won the day.”6 It is unlikely, however, that Julius II looked
to those speeches for advice. He most likely saw Erasmus’s orations in the same light
as Valdés at the imperial court: admirable compositions but of no practical importance.
To return to my question: do rhetorical pieces represent Erasmus’s personal views
or rather, if the opinions voiced in those rhetorical pieces are mutually exclusive,
which of them represents his personal views? Erasmus himself repeatedly warned
readers against taking literary compositions at face value. Declamations, he said, did
not always represent the opinion of the writer. “Who does not know that declama-
tions [are written] for the purpose of exercising one’s ingenuity?” he said. In fact, he
complained that his critics attributed to him the opinions of the characters introduced
in his literary compositions. “If I were to introduce a Turk as speaker, they would
attribute to me whatever he might say,” he said caustically.7 He did not support
Luther just because a character in his Colloquies maintained Lutheran views. He did
not prefer marriage to celibacy just because he had written in praise of marriage. Does
this caution apply to his praise of peace as well? Is he merely taking a rhetorical stance,
and are scholars who portray him as a pacifist on the wrong track?
I would not go as far as to say that the medium invalidates the message. The
rhetorical slant of Erasmus’s writings does not make them worthless as sources. But we
should take his caution to heart: we should not use rhetorical pieces as proof texts
without establishing that the opinions voiced there form a pattern in the author’s
writings and recur in non-rhetorical contexts.
Such considerations persuaded me to turn my attention to Erasmus’s religious
and theological writings. Although they are not entirely free of rhetorical features—
rhetoric is endemic to Erasmus’s style—his theological writings offer the reader three
advantages over his literary writings: (1) they offer specifics instead of generalities; (2)
they are self-referential, that is, they contain an exposition of Erasmus’s meaning; and
(3) they are addressed to a scholarly audience and therefore more cogently argued.
 Secular Advice in Erasmus’s Sacred Writings 19

Let us look at the first advantage: specifics rather than generalities. If we are
searching for Erasmus’s views on conflict resolution, there are two relevant theological
texts: De Bello Turcis Inferendo and De Ecclesiae Concordia. Both are essays embedded in
psalm commentaries, both refer to specific situations. The ideas presented there are
not unique or unprecedented in Erasmus’s works. They can be found in his literary
tracts as well, but they are expressed in more precise terms here. Let me show you the
difference between the two genres. Erasmus suggests arbitration as a means of conflict
resolution in the Institutio, where he says, “If some dispute arises between princes, why
do they not take it to arbitration instead? There are plenty of bishops, abbots, and
scholars, plenty of grave magistrates whose verdict would settle the matter more satis-
factorily than all this carnage, pillaging, and universal calamity.” He suggests a similar
mixed group of arbitrators in Dulce Bellum: “What need is there to fly immediately to
arms? There are so many earnest and learned bishops in the world, so many venerable
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abbots, so many nobles of great age with wisdom of long experience... so many assem-
blies set up, not without reason, by our ancestors. Why are the childish disputes of
princes not settled by means of their arbitration?”8 We note that Erasmus does not talk
about any specific conflict that could be settled or had been settled in this way. The
tone is plaintive. It sounds like wishful thinking, or perhaps nostalgia for a medieval
practice. In De Concordia, by contrast, Erasmus does talk about a specific case—the reli-
gious conflict which the Diet of Augsburg had failed to resolve and which threatened
to turn, and did turn, into an armed conflict between the League of Schmalkalden and
the imperial troops. In De Concordia Erasmus once again suggests a settlement by
arbitration, but he refers readers not to some vague conclave of leading men but very
specifically to a general council, which he and his contemporaries expected to be con-
voked by the pope soon (it took another decade for this to happen—Erasmus pub-
lished De Concordia in 1533; the first session of the Council of Trent opened in 1545).
Erasmus also suggests another way of conflict resolution: concessions and com-
promise. Again he does so in a general way in his literary works, but is much more
specific in De Concordia. In Dulce Bellum, for example, he counsels warring parties to
engage in a colloquy: “You give up half of your [disputed territory], and I will give
up the same of mine. In this way we shall enrich our friendship, which would
otherwise be destroyed, and we shall avoid a great deal of trouble.”9 In De Concordia
he likewise counsels negotiation, using a Greek military term, synkatabasis, a move in
which the armies confronting each other both give up their vantage point and descend
into the open plain to negotiate. He wants the religious parties to undertake such a
synkatabasis, “so that each side may make some concessions to the other.”10 But he
does not leave it at that general level. He goes through the doctrinal points that were
under discussion at the time, one by one, and in each case specifies what is negotiable,
what might be left to the conscience of the individual and what must be submitted to
arbitration by a general council.
The proposals in De Bello Turcico are not quite as detailed, but still a great deal
more specific than the advice we find in his literary tracts. For one thing, Erasmus does
not shy away from references to contemporary persons and events. In the literary
tracts, any references to names or places are usually to antiquity or to classical
mythology, in other words, these names function at the proverbial level. I looked at
the proper names on three random pages in the Institutio Principis and in De Bello
 20 ERIKA RUMMEL

Turcico, respectively. In the Institutio I found references to [Ezekiel], Solomon, Isaiah,

Paul, Plato, Nero, Seneca, Aristotle (several times), Jupiter, Homer, Achilles, and the
emperor Commodus—biblical, historical, and mythological persons; in De Bello Turcico
I found references to Charles, Ferdinand, Paul, Thomas Becket and [William
Warham]—one biblical name, one historical name, and three contemporaries.11 In De
Bello Turcico, then, unlike in the Institutio, we find references to living people and to
specific contemporary events. For example, when Erasmus talks about financing the
Turkish war, he talks about possible misappropriation of funds and specifically men-
tions the indulgences granted to raise money for flood victims in Flanders in 1515:
“There is no need for me to recall where the money disappeared to, but certainly
none of it was put to the use for which it had been collected.” Many people claimed
that funds raised for the war against the Turks had been similarly misappropriated: “I
only wish that all these claims were without foundation.”12 Similarly, he talks about
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power struggles between princes in his literary works, but in De Bello Turcico he refers
specifically to the fear that Charles V may become too powerful, a fear that kept other
rulers from fully supporting him in the war against the Turks: “[The fact] that he
recently crushed the French [Pavia 1525, Landriano 1529] renders him suspect to some
princes.” “The idea of a universal monarchy [under Charles V]... frightens some
people.” Elsewhere he notes that people questioned the religious thrust of the war and
saw it merely as a “struggle for the throne of Hungary between two princes” (i.e.,
Ferdinand and Solyman).13 Such specific and concrete references are practically absent
from Erasmus’s literary works.
There are of course areas in which Erasmus is as vague in De Bello Turcico as in
his literary works, as, for example, in the area of economics. He talks about the danger
of inflation, but falls back on pious hopes. “I have no doubt that the emperor’s sense
of justice will take care of this,” he says with reference to rising sugar prices, but we
notice that he is apologetic about his vagueness. It’s not that he does not want to be
specific but that he can’t be more precise because he lacks the knowledge. “It is not
my place to comment on matters about which I know so little,” he says. Nor can he
give any specific military advice: “I cannot predict the outcome and know too few
details about the enterprise;” and “my studies do not make a good match for the
subject of war.”14 We conclude that in De Bello Turcico Erasmus was as specific as he
could be in a subject area that was not his forte.
Let us now consider the second advantage of theological writings as source texts:
the self-referential remarks, which serve as a kind of commentary. That sort of
assistance is generally absent from Erasmus’s literary writings. We have to rely on our
own interpretation of the text and therefore run the risk of skewing the meaning by
introducing our own sensibilities. Erasmus’s theological writings, by contrast, often
contain an interpretation of his words, an interpretation that was prompted by criti-
cism, for he was often accused by theologians of being an uncompromising pacifist.
While pacifism has a certain cachet in today’s world, it had sinister connotations in the
sixteenth century and was associated with the “heresy” of the Anabaptists, who refused
to bear arms or swear an oath of loyalty to the state. Erasmus therefore had to defend
himself against accusations of heterodoxy, namely of denying secular rulers the right to
go to war. His comments on relevant passages in the New Testament were attacked
by, among others, the Spanish scholar Jacobus Stunica, a collaborator on the
 Secular Advice in Erasmus’s Sacred Writings 21

Complutensian Polyglot, by Albert Pio, Count of Carpi, an amateur theologian, and

by Noel Beda, the chair of the faculty of theology at Paris. These men focused their
accusations on Erasmus’s Annotations and Paraphrases of the New Testament and
obliged him to respond. In his apologias and in his apologetic additions to the Annota-
tions, Erasmus therefore reflects on his own words. He justifies his remarks to his crit-
ics, he explains himself, and in this manner gives what amounts to instructions to us
on how to interpret his writings. Thus he affords us considerable help in reading these
texts, which makes his theological writings more meaningful as sources for his personal
views on war and peace than his literary compositions.
Now, what kind of directions does Erasmus give us, the readers? His first piece of
advice is to pay attention to the purpose of the author or the genre of his writings.
Critics of his Paraphrase on Luke, which contains strong condemnations of war, failed
to consider the genre, he says. Paraphrasing requires the writer to enter into the spirit
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of the original text. Erasmus therefore adapted his words to the gospel message of
peace. His critics ought to have taken into consideration the requirements of the
genre. It was not his task to show “how Christians may be most worldly” and defend
the right to wage wars. Speaking in the person of Luke, it was his task “to recall peo-
ple to the moral archetype,” to the evangelical ideal of peace.15 This explains his cate-
gorical statement in the Paraphrase: “Since Peter was reproved because he drew his
sword against ungodly and criminal men on behalf of his entirely innocent Lord, what
reason can there be from now on for any Christian to repel injury with injury?”16 If
his critics had understood the requirements of the genre, they would not have taken
him to task for speaking in such uncompromising terms. Conveying the idealistic gos-
pel message required, or certainly excused, extreme language.
Erasmus notes the difference between hyperbolic and “serious” argumentation
and acknowledges that the former may lead to misinterpretations. In his apologia to
Alberto Pio, he takes some of the blame for being cast by his critics as a heterodox
pacifist who denies princes the right to go to war. “I admit,” he says, “that I have
phrased some things in rather vehement terms (odiosius) to deter Christians from the
furies of war, since I saw that these wars which we have now experienced for some
years, are largely responsible for the evils in the Christian commonwealth.” “However
when I discuss in earnest serio whether or not war is permitted to Christians, I admit
that it must be conceded to them, either when they are pressed by the utmost neces-
sity or a great advantage (I mean an honest advantage) invites them.”17
When Erasmus contrasts odiosius with serio, he is talking about the difference
between rhetorical and scholarly treatments, between the emotional tone of a declama-
tion like the Querela Pacis or the homiletics of the Paraphrases and the more solid argu-
mentation found in the Annotations or the Psalm commentaries. Some people, Erasmus
says, may see these varying treatments of the same question—in this case, the legiti-
macy of warfare—as a mark of inconsistency. And indeed Alberto Pio called it an
inconsistency indicative of a weak and frivolous mind,18 but Erasmus insists that both
forms of argumentation are valid means of driving home a point. Jerome uses rhetoric,
he says; the bible uses hyperbolae, and so this practice should be excused in his own
works as well.19 Nevertheless, he himself seems to privilege the scholarly over the
rhetorical treatment when he calls the former “serious” and rejects criticism based
 22 ERIKA RUMMEL

solely on the latter, presumably because a rhetorical treatment is not meant to pass a
rigorous examination or rational analysis.
Erasmus’s first advice to the reader, then, is to be aware of the genre and the pur-
pose of the writer, which govern the tenor of the remarks. A second piece of advice is
to pay attention to the overall context; to avoid reading passages in isolation. Thus, in
his response to the censures of the Paris theologians, Erasmus points to the context to
show the agreement between his and their views. The theologians had criticized his
statement on the legitimacy of warfare as being heterodox, yet it did not differ from
theirs if the context was taken into account, “if my whole statement is recited, includ-
ing the circumstances listed.”20
Paying attention to the context, then, includes taking note of the qualifications
contained in a statement. Both Stunica and the Paris theologians in their censures
alleged that Erasmus’s pronouncements on the legitimacy of warfare “suggested that
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war in defense against violence was unlawful... although by divine law defense is a just
reason for war.” Erasmus protested this allegation and suggested that his critics had not
read his statements in full. They may have read excerpts and jumped to the wrong
conclusions (fragmento decerpto et perperam intellecto). He asked them to pay attention to
the circumstances listed in his comments on warfare. He was not condemning war in
principle (in totum ac simpliciter), he told Stunica. He was questioning the motivation of
certain warmongers. He acknowledged that a defensive war came under the definition
of just war, but not so a war “that arose from vindictive feelings.” He complained,
moreover, that his critics were “twisting” his meaning by ignoring the element of
time. Actions that were reprehensible in his own time may have been excusable and
even necessary in the apostles’ time: “If my statement is accepted as it was written, ...
and adapted to the apostles and their time, in which the gospel had to be propagated
by shedding the blood of martyrs,” his critics had to admit that his words were not at
variance with orthodox beliefs about just war.21
Erasmus furthermore urges his readers to consider the person to whom his
remarks refer. In his annotation on Luke 3, for example, he did not deny the right of
secular rulers to go to war, but deplored the involvement of clerics: “Even bishops
were waging war,” he complained, “and do hardly anything else but wage war.”22 In
the Methodus he introduced another distinction: “warfare was permitted to Jews [in the
Old Testament], but not to Christians [in the New Testament].”23 Critics of those
passages, Erasmus said, overlooked the qualifying terms that limited his rejection of
war, namely, the distinction between persons—Jews and Christians, secular rulers and
clerics.
In another directive to the reader, Erasmus discusses the scope of his remarks on
warfare. He intended to include not only military hostilities and physical violence but
also verbal sparring and intellectual strife. In De Concordia he speaks of the “monstrous
consequences of military clashes” and counsels diplomatic action instead; the same
advice, he says, applies to doctrinal quarrels. “The same careful skill should be applied
to matters of doctrine.” We must not listen to people clamouring without restraint
“Heresy! Heresy! Burn them! Burn them!” He furthermore notes that secular wars and
religious quarrels arise from the same sources: “Where ambition, love of money,
obstinacy, mindless partisanship, or hate more mindless still are sovereign… when we
give our approval to things we know do not deserve it, or when to gratify a private
 Secular Advice in Erasmus’s Sacred Writings 23

enmity we condemn even pious sentiments; in fact when everyone looks to himself,
and the rope of contention is pulled in all directions in a tug-of-war, it is impossible
for harmony to be restored.”24 Erasmus’s remarks on conflict resolution, then, apply
equally to military clashes and differences of opinion.
Erasmus discusses the scope of his remarks also in response to Noel Beda’s criti-
cism that his praise of peace was at odds with his own readiness to go to war with the
pen. Erasmus taught that “violence must not be answered with violence, but he is far
from following his own teaching.” Erasmus replied, “Why would he say that? Because
I respond when I am harassed, and yet I myself provoke no one.” He agreed with
Beda that the same rules applied to militant action and militant words: “What differ-
ence does it make whether you attack with force or with the pen, when the intention
and the aim are the same?”25 But his apologias were defensive, he insisted, and thus
fulfilled the requirements of just war.
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These directives, asking readers to consider the genre, context, qualifications,

and scope of his remarks, are useful guidelines to interpreting Erasmus’s comments on
the legitimacy of warfare and make his theological works excellent source texts. I now
come to the third advantage of theological works: the fact that they are addressed to
scholarly readers and therefore more rigorously argued. In his theological writings
Erasmus generally stays away from clichés. Instead he presents his views as personal
statements, anchors them in a rationale and cites authorities to corroborate them.
His annotations on Luke, for example, contain two significant passages on the
legitimacy of warfare. At Luke 3:14 soldiers ask John the Baptist: “What shall we do?”
and he directs them: “Do not extort money, do not accuse falsely, and be content with
your wages.” In his annotation on Luke 3, Erasmus criticized people who attempted
to prove the legitimacy of warfare on the basis of this passage. John, he said, was not
talking to Christians, but to pagans or Jews, if there were any Jews serving as merce-
naries. One must distinguish between persons. In his additions to the notes in the
1519, 1527, and 1535 editions, he shored up this interpretation by citing patristic
texts.
He resumes the discussion in his annotation on Luke 22:36, another passage
that was often used to justify war. That passage reads: “He that has no sword, let
him sell his garments and buy one.” Erasmus’s annotation was fairly long even in
its original form (one-and-a-half pages in the 1516 edition), and ended up cover-
ing four-and-a-half pages in the edition of 1535, in other words, it became an
excursus on the question ‘are Christians allowed to wage war?’ In the original
note on Luke 22, Erasmus argued against the exegesis of Nicholas of Lyra and of
Hugh of St. Cher, who interpreted Christ’s words as permission to use arms in
self-defense. By citing Basil, Theophylactus, and Bede against them Erasmus
insisted that Christ’s reference to the sword must be interpreted figuratively as a
reference to the persecutions the apostles would suffer. In subsequent editions he
shored up this interpretation with additional references to patristic writings, notably
Origen. He also discussed at length Augustine’s definition of just war. In 1527 he
added a summary of his own views on the legitimacy of warfare, which is a
showpiece of careful, nuanced phrasing:
 24 ERIKA RUMMEL

If anyone presses me to state formally my opinion whether or not war is forbidden

to Christians, I shall first ask my interrogator to answer the following question:
What did St. Martin mean when he said: “Let the soldier accept his pay. I am a
Christian, I am not allowed to fight.” Next, let him explain what St. Jerome means
who, among other orthodox writers of old, so often condemns war among Chris-
tians. If they do not deign to respond, I shall say that war does not become apostolic
men, nor should we propagate the Christian religion only with arms, nor should
princes undertake war when it can be avoided by other means. They should, more-
over, conduct a war they have undertaken with a minimum of bloodshed and end it
as quickly as possible. Finally, that function [i.e. the military action] is not compati-
ble with the purity of the gospel, and we must not seek to derive the right [to go to
war] from gospel precepts. Much is conceded to men, which the gospel does not
teach, such as the swearing of oaths and law suits. ... There are many necessary evils
in human affairs, which are tolerated because they prevent greater evils; yet they are
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not approved as gospel teaching. And I would like this [i.e. my words] to be taken
as open to discussion, not as something that has been decided.26
If anyone is interested in Erasmus’s views on just war, this is one of the best passages
to quote. It contains no tiresome clichés, no maudlin language or emotional manipula-
tion, and none of the usual commonplaces. He does not argue from the negative
effects of warfare; he does not argue from nature; on the contrary, in his reply to the
theologians of Paris defending this passage, he discards that commonplace: “If by ‘nat-
ural law’ they mean natural instinct, it is often considered more praiseworthy not to
obey it.”27 He does not argue categorically that Christian should not battle with
Christian; rather, he introduces the distinction between spiritual and secular advice,
between ideals and practices. He does not rely on the inherent persuasiveness of com-
monplaces, but argues from authority. But in doing so, he clearly has a hierarchy in
mind: the exegesis of scholastic authors like Lyra or St. Cher is trumped by the
exegesis of patristic authors, which in turn is trumped by the gospel message. In the
Annotations, for example, he declares that no one can fault him for “placing the teach-
ing of Christ and the apostles above the teachings of Augustine.”28
The last sentence in Erasmus’s summary is a disclaimer. It is notable that Erasmus
begins his statement with words suggesting that he will make a pronouncement and
ends it with a qualification: “Take my statement as something that is open to
discussion, not as something that has been decided.” One might be inclined to see this
proviso as equivocation, but it has an epistemological basis.
The most important proof text for Erasmus’s epistemology can be found in De
Libero Arbitrio. This treatise, addressed to Luther, is a methodological showcase as well
as a demonstration of conflict resolution.
To settle the conflict between those who assert and those who deny free will,
Erasmus suggests adopting a skeptical stance, that is, examining the arguments on both
sides of the question. Thus he begins by listing scriptural passages for and against free
will and shows that the evidence is by no means clear. In his reply, Luther condemned
the skeptical method as unchristian. The Holy Spirit was no Skeptic, as he famously
said in De Servo Arbitrio. It was “the mark of a Christian to take delight in
assertions.”29
 Secular Advice in Erasmus’s Sacred Writings 25

This hostile reaction prompted Erasmus to explain his method further in the
Hyperaspistes. There he clarified his brand of Skepticism. He was no Skeptic in the
strict sense of the word. When the evidence was ambiguous and therefore did not
allow a decision based on logical criteria, the classic Skeptics, the Pyrrhonians, advo-
cated suspension of judgment; the Academic Skeptics proceeded to judgment on the
basis of plausibility. Erasmus advocated neither suspension of judgment nor a plausible
solution. He proposed a solution based on long- standing usage and consensus. “If tes-
timonies out of Scripture seem equal and judgment hangs in the balance, it seems right
that the authority of the ancients, together with the decisions of the church should
influence us. ... Are we to believe you [Luther] over bishops and popes, whose opin-
ion has been accepted and approved down through many centuries and confirmed
finally by the public decision of the church. Add to this the judgment of the universi-
ties, add the repeated assessment by the theologians, and by the church, add finally a
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precept strengthened by the long time it has endured.” 30 This answer to Luther, using
authority and long-standing consensus as a criterion of doctrinal truth, corresponds to
a passage in De Concordia, where Erasmus suggests the same formula for preserving
peace: Do not “abandon rashly those things handed down to us by the authority of
our forebears” and confirmed “the agreement of many centuries.”31
These elements, then—long-standing usage and the consensus of authorities—are
for Erasmus the basis of agreement. In cases where the evidence is inconclusive,
tradition and consensus become essential decision-making tools. And this explains why
Erasmus shied away in his annotation on Luke from making pronouncements
single-handedly.
To sum up: While Erasmus’s literary works contain an abundance of material on
the subject of war and peace, I prefer his theological works as proof texts. They offer
three advantages: they are more specific; they contain guidelines for interpretation;
and they are more cogently argued. While I would not go as far as to say that Eras-
mus’s rhetorical writings cannot serve as proof texts, I suggest that we test them against
the more solid evidence contained in his theological writings.

ABBREVIATIONS
ASD = Opera Omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1969–).
CWE = Collected Works of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974–).
LB = Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami Opera omnia, ed. Jean Le Clerc, 10 vols. (Leiden: Van
der Aa, 1703–6).

NOTES

A version of this article was presented at the conference on “Erasmus Politicus” at the Eras-
mus University in Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 2008.
1. CWE 9, Letter 1341A:581.
2. De Copia, Amplification Method 10 (CWE 24, 600–601).
3. CWE 35, 403–4, 413.
4. CWE 24, 576.
 26 ERIKA RUMMEL

5. Exhibita, C2 recto-verso. See Erika Rummel, “Political and Religious Propaganda at the
Court of Charles V: A Newly-Identified Tract by Alfonso Valdés,” Historical Research 70
(1997): 23–33.
6. CWE 9, Letter 1341A:1455–57; cf. Dulce Bellum, CWE 35, 435.
7. CWE 71, 91; CWE 9, Letter 1301:51–52.
8. CWE 27, 183; 35, 430.
9. CWE 35, 429.
10. CWE 65, 201.
11. CWE 24, 227–29; CWE 64, 252–54.
12. CWE 64, 248.
13. CWE 64, 257, 264, 256.
14. CWE 64, 264, 257, 265–66.
15. LB 9, 843B.
16. CWE 48, 195.
17. LB 9, 1192F.
18. Viginti et Quatro Libri, fo. 184: ab imbecillitate mentis levitateque contingat.
LB 9, 1193A.
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19.
20. LB 9, 872E.
21. LB 9, 840 E-F, 370B, 616B, 841E-F.
22. ASD 6.5, 498.
23. See Pio’s citation in Viginti et Quatro Libri, 184 verso.
24. CWE 65, 199,197.
25. LB 9, 616A–617C.
26. Annotations, Luke 22:36, text of 1527 (ASD 6.5.594).
27. LB 9, 842.
28. ASD 5.5, 498.
29. Luther’s Works, ed. Jaroslav J. Pelikan and Helmut Lehmann, 55 vols. (St. Louis, MO:
Concordia Publishing House and Fortress Press, 1955–86), vol. 33, 19.
30. CWE 76, 249–50.
31. CWE 65, 201.