CLARET SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY VS.

SINDAY
G.R. NO. 226358, OCTOBER 09, 2019

FACTS:

Afterwards, in July 2010, Sinday worked as a filing clerk at Claret's

Human Resources Department, where she updated employees' files,
delivered memoranda different departments, and assisted in school
programs. In April 2011, she was posted back as a releasing clerk. She
held this position until July 14, 2011.

Before her job as releasing clerk expired, Sinday applied for work at 1 of
Claret's departments, Claret Technical-Vocational Training Center
(Claretech), which taught vocational and technical skills to
underprivileged students. On July 15, 2011, she started her new work as
secretary, preparing materials, assisting in the delivery of
correspondence to other departments, and encoding and filing
documents, among other tasks.

Sinday claimed that Fr. Manubag, the institution director of Claretech,

signed a January 10, 2013 letter, approving the request of Head of
Operations Timmy Bernaldez and Program Coordinator Rosario
Butaran to classify her as a regular employee. She was classified under
the hon-teaching or non-academic school employees.

However, in May 2013, Claret asked Sinday to sign a Probationary

Employment Contract covering the period of January 16, 2013 to July 15,
2013. When the contract expired, Sinday asked Leticia Perez, the Human
Resources head of Claret, regarding her employment status, but she was
told that her tenure would expire on July 31, 2013 because of the
change in school administration. Sinday also spoke to her supervisor,
Rosario Butaran, and the latter told her that her dismissal was due to
cost-cutting, particularly the need to reduce the employees from 3 to 2.

Desperate for work, Sinday continued to work for Claret and was
employed on August 1, 2013 as a substitute teacher aide at Claret's Child
Study Center. When the permanent teacher aide returned on October
25, 2013, Sinday stopped working for Claret.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is illegally dismissed.

RULING:

Since the termination of respondent's employment was rendered

without regard to due process, this Court finds respondent to have been
illegally dismissed.

Court of Appeals correctly found that respondent is a regular

employee.The acid test in determining regular employment is "whether
there is a reasonable connection between the employee's activities and
the usual business of the employer." This is corollary to Article 295 of
the Labor Code, which provides that the nature of work must be
"necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer"
to consider the employee as regular.

Indeed, the "repeated engagement under contract of hire is indicative of

the necessity and desirability" of the employee's work in the employer's
business.

No notice was served on respondent informing her of the grounds of her

termination. She was not given the opportunity to be heard. Without
complying with procedural due process requirements, petitioner could
not have validly terminated respondent's services. Theft is a serious
accusation which must be sufficiently supported by evidence. Here,
petitioner failed to act on the allegation by conducting an investigation
and immediately acting on the report. Without any proof, this Court
cannot give credence to petitioner's claims.

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION VS. REYNOLD CALUMPANG

G.R. NO. 219435,  JANUARY 17, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioner Allied Banking Corporation and Race Cleaners, Inc. entered

into a Service Agreement whereby RCI will provide Allied with
messengerial, janitorial, communication, and maintenance services.
On Sept. 28, 2003, respondent Reynold Calumpang was hired as a janitor
by RCI and was assigned at the bank’s Tanjay City Branch.

Petitioner observed that whenever respondent went out on errands, it

takes a long time for him to return to the branch. It was eventually
discovered that during these times, respondent was also plying his
pedicab and ferrying passengers. The Bank Manager also found out that
respondent has been borrowing money from several clients of the
branch. He was then told by the Bank Manager that his services was no
longer needed.

Thereafter, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and

underpayment of wages against petitioner before the NLRC. In his
position paper, respondent asserted that the four-fold test of employer-
employee relationship is present between him and the bank. He averred
that he was a regular employee of the Bank assigned as a janitor of the
branch with a salary P4,200 payable every 15 days each month, and
assigned such other tasks essential and necessary for the Bank’s
business.

He alleged that petitioner engaged his services and exercised direct

control and supervision over him, through the Branch Head, not only as
to the result of his work but also as to the means and methods by which
the same was to be accomplished. As regards the payment of salary,
respondent claimed that it was the Branch that directly paid his salaries
and wages. As for the power of dismissal, respondent further alleged
that it was petitioner Bank, through its Branch Head, who terminated his
services.

Petitioner denied the existence of any employer-employee relationship

between itself and respondent. It asserted that respondent was clearly
an employee of RCI by virtue of the Service Agreement which clearly
indicated in Article XI thereof that there would be no employer-
employee relationship between RCI’s employees and the Bank. It further
averred that RCI is a qualified job contractor because of its capitalization
and the fact that it exercised control and supervision over its employees
deployed at the branches of the petitioner in accordance with Rule VIII-
A, Sec. 4, pars. (d) & (e) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code.
ISSUE: Whether there exists an employer-employee relationship
between the Bank and the respondent

RULING:

Permissible job contracting or subcontracting has been distinguished

from labor-only contracting such that permissible job contracting or
subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to
put out or farm out to a contractor the performance or completion of a
specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period,
regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or
completed within or outside the premises of the principal, while labor-
only contracting, on the other hand, pertains to an arrangement where
the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places
workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal.
As a general rule, a contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor,
unless such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the
substantial capital, investment, tools and the like.

In the present case, petitioner failed to establish that RCI is a legitimate

labor contractor as contemplated under the Labor Code. Except for the
bare allegation of petitioner that RCI had substantial capitalization, it
presented no supporting evidence to show the same. Aside from this,
petitioner’s claim that RCI exercised control and supervision over
respondent is belied by the fact that petitioner admitted that its own
Branch Manager had informed respondent that his services would no
longer be required at the Branch. Moreover, respondent’s work is
related to petitioner’s business and is characterized as part of or in
pursuit of its banking operations.

A finding that a contractor is a labor-only contractor, as opposed to

permissible job contracting, is equivalent to declaring that there is an
employer-employee relationship between the principal and the
employees of the supposed contractor, and the labor-only contractor is
considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer.
In this case, petitioner bank is the principal employer and RCI is the
labor-only contractor. Accordingly, petitioner and RCI are solidarily liable
for the rightful claims of respondent.
 REDENTOR Y. AGUSTIN VS. ALPHALAND CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 218282, SEPTEMBER 09, 2020

FACTS:

Via a letter dated July 6, 2011, respondent Alphaland Corporation

(Alphaland) offered to employ petitioner as Executive Chef, with a gross
monthly salary of P122,500.00. The offer came with a six-month
probation period. Agustin signed the letter to signify his acceptance of
the job offer. 

On November 4, 2011, barely four months from commencement of his

employment, Agustin received a Notice of Termination.10 He was
informed that regular employment status cannot be granted to him
because he failed to meet the standards set forth by the company for his
position. Also stated is the immediate effectivity of Agustin's
termination.

Agustin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Alphaland and

prayed for reinstatement and payment of backwages. He alleged that
the standards set forth by Alphaland in order to qualify as regular
employee were not made known to him at the time of his engagement. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Agustin was a regular employee of Alphaland

RULING:

Yes. First, The LA, NLRC, and later on the CA uniformly found that
Agustin was hired from the management's standpoint as a probationary
employee but was not informed of the reasonable standards by which
his probationary employment was to be assessed. The standards set are
too general and failed to specify with clarity what is expected of Agustin
as an Executive Chef. Consequently, the lower courts found that
Agustin's dismissal was illegal.
Section 6 (d) of the Implementing Rules of Book VI, Rule I of the Labor
Code

(d) In all cases of probationary employment, the employer shall make

known to the employee the standards under which he will qualify as a
regular employee at the time of his engagement. Where no standards
are made known to the employee at that time, he shall be deemed a
regular employee.

Considering the foregoing, the probationary period set in the contract of

employment dated July 6, 2011 is therefore purposeless. In no case was
Agustin hired on a probationary status by Alphaland. As of July 6, 2011,
Agustin became part of Alphaland Corporation as a regular employee of
the company without a fixed term of employment.

Second, Agustin served as a consultant prior to being hired as an

Executive Chef allegedly on a probationary status.
Agustin's dismissal, through a Notice of Termination dated November 2,
2011, took effect upon notice. Pursuant to Article 294 of the Labor Code,
an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to the following reliefs: (1)
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; (2)
full backwages, inclusive of allowances; and (3) other benefits or their
monetary equivalent. Agustin is thus entitled to backwages reckoned
from the time he was illegally dismissed on November 4, 2011, with a
P122,500.00 monthly salary, until his reinstatement. 

DIONELLA A. GOPIO VS. SALVADOR B. BAUTISTA

G.R. NO. 205953, JUNE 06, 2018

FACTS:

On September 26, 2008, respondent was hired as a Project Manager for

Shorncliffe (PNG) Limited (Shorncliffe) in Papua New Guinea through Job
Asia Management Services (Job Asia), a single proprietorship owned by
petitioner Dionella A. Gopio (Gopio), which is engaged in the business of
recruitment, processing, and deployment of land-based manpower for
overseas work. Bautista's contract stated that his employment shall be
valid and effective for 31 months with a net monthly salary of
P40,000.00. On October 4, 2008, he arrived at his workplace in Papua
New Guinea.

On July 6, 2009, or just nine months after his deployment in Papua New
Guinea, Bautista was served a notice of termination effective July 10,
2009 on the alleged grounds of unsatisfactory performance and failure
to meet the standards of the company. He was paid his salary for the
period July 1 to 10, 2009, annual leave credits, and one-month pay net
of taxes. Thereafter, he was repatriated on July 11, 2009.

On July 27, 2009, Bautista lodged a complaint with the arbitration

branch of the NLRC against Job Asia, Gopio, and Shorncliffe for illegal
dismissal and monetary claims. He claimed that he was terminated
without just cause since there had been no job evaluation conducted
prior to Shorncliffe's. decision to dismiss him from employment.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed

RULING:

Consequently, the Court is not convinced that he was legally dismissed.

The due process requirement is not a mere formality that may be

dispensed with at will. Its disregard is a matter of serious concern since it
constitutes a safeguard of the highest order in response to man's innate
sense of justice. To meet the requirements of due process, the employer
must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices
before termination of employment can be legally effected, i.e.: (1) a
notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions
for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the subsequent notice after due
hearing which informs the employee of the employer's decision to
dismiss him.

We cannot sustain the validity of Article 4.3 of the employment contract

as it contravenes the constitutionally-protected right of every worker to
security of tenure.

Bautista's employment was for a fixed period of 31 months. Article 4.3

took back this period from him by rendering it in effect a facultative one
at the option of Shorncliffe, which may shorten that term at any time
and for any cause satisfactory to itself, to a one-month period or even
less, by simply paying Bautista a month's salary. The net effect of Article
4.3 is to render Bautista's employment basically employment at the
pleasure of Shorncliffe. The Court considers that the provision is
intended to prevent any security of tenure from accruing in favor of
Bautista even during the limited period of 31 months.

The law and jurisprudence guarantee to every employee security of

tenure. This textual and the ensuing jurisprudential commitment to the
cause and welfare of the working class proceed from the social justice
principles of the Constitution that the Court zealously implements out of
its concern for those with less in life. Thus, the Court will not hesitate to
strike down as invalid any employer act that attempts to undermine
workers' tenurial security.

Indeed, while our Civil Code recognizes that parties may stipulate in their
contracts such terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
these terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or policy. The employment contract between
Shorncliffe and Bautista is governed by Philippine labor laws. Hence, the
stipulations, clauses, and terms and conditions of the contract must not
contravene our labor law provisions.

Time and again, we have he]d that a contract of employment is imbued

with public interest. The parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves
and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by
simply contracting with each other. Also, while a contract is the law
between the parties, the provisions of positive law that regulate such
contracts are deemed included and shall limit and govern the relations
between the parties.

PARAGELE VS GMA NETWORK

G.R. NO. 235315, JULY 13, 2020

FACTS: 

The thirty one petitioners in this case are cameramen and assistant
cameramen of GMA network. This is a case of "illegal dismissal, non-
payment of salary/wages, and regularization”. The petitioners claim that
having passed the four fold test for an existence of an employer-
employee relationship, they were regular employees of the respondent
and have been dismissed illegally. They averred that (1) GMA hired them
as camera operators; (2) GMA compensated them for their service; (3)
GMA exercised its power of dismissal, albeit unjustly, over them; and (4)
GMA had control over the means and methods of their work. 

They further explained that with respect to the element of control, their
work schedules were provided by GMA, as well as the equipment they
use and that GMA assigned supervisors to monitor their work and
ensure their compliance with company standards.

Petitioners assert that as camera operators assigned to several television

programs of GMA, they performed functions that were necessary and
desirable to GMA's business as both a television and broadcasting
company. They further contend that their repeated and continuous
employment with GMA after each television program they covered
shows the necessity and desirability of their functions. Hence, they have
already attained the status of regular employees.

Respondent GMA Network on the other hand denies the existence of an

employer-employee relationship as the petitioners were merely "pinch-
hitters or relievers" only hired when there’s a need for additional
workers. GMA also refuted that the petitioners were given
compensation as an employee but rather, it was a renumeration for the
services rendered. In addition, GMA claims that it only monitored the
performance of their work to ensure that the "end result" is compliant
with company standards. Further, GMA explained that petitioners could
not have attained regular status as they have not rendered at least one
year of service as required by law. 

ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an employer-employee relationship

between the parties

RULING: 

Yes, there is an employer-employee relationship between the

petitioners and respondent. First, on the power of hiring, GMA concedes
that it engaged the services of the petitioners. Second, on the payment
of wages, it is not the nomenclature that determines the compensation
received by an employee but the fact that GMA directly compensated
the petitioners for their services. Third, on the power to dismiss, it is
implied and is concomitant with the power to select and engage. Lastly,
on the element of control, GMA exercised control over the means and
methods of the petitioners’ work and not just the end result. They were
subject to GMA’s control and supervision as their shoots and recordings
were never left to their own discretion and craft. They were also
required to follow the work schedule that GMA provides as well as the
equipment they will use.

Yes, the petitioners were regular employees of GMA. There are 4

categories of employees,  namely: (1) regular; (2) project; (3) seasonal;
and (4) casual employees. Article 295 of the Labor Code states that an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. However, this
may also be the case for a project employee. The test for determining
whether an employee is a regular employee or a project employee is to
distinguish whether or not the "project employees" were assigned to
carry out a "specific project or undertaking," the duration (and scope) of
which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that
project. That such job is within the regular or usual business of the
employer and not identifiably distinct or separate from the other
undertakings of GMA. The repeated engagement of petitioners over the
years reinforces the indispensability of their services to GMA's business.
The clear constant necessity for their services made the court certain
that they were GMA’s regular employees. 

NEREN VILLANUEVA VS. GANCO RESORT AND RECREATION, INC.

G.R. NO. 227175, JANUARY 08, 2020

FACTS:

In 2002, respondent hired petitioner as a part-time employee in its

resort, La Luz Beach Resort and Spa (La Luz Resort). She became a
regular employee on February 1, 2003, and was eventually promoted as
head of the Housekeeping Department in 2005 and as head of the Front
Desk Department in 2008.
Sometime in 2013, petitioner was charged with violating company
policies, i.e., abuse of authority, when she rejected walk-in guests
without management approval, and threat to person in authority, when
she threatened the assistant resort manager, respondent Serge Bernabe
(respondent Bernabe), with physical harm. After the conduct of
administrative investigation, GRRI found petitioner guilty of both charges
and was meted the penalty of two days suspension without pay for
abuse of authority and termination for threat to person in authority. The
penalty of termination was, however, reduced to a five-day suspension
without pay subject to the agreement that petitioner would be under
strict performance monitoring and that any further violation which
would warrant suspension would be elevated to immediate dismissal.
After serving her suspension, petitioner resumed her task as a
receptionist.

In the early part of 2014, petitioner was transferred from the Front Desk
Department to the Team Building Department upon the advice of
respondent Bernabe. Thereafter, in March 2014, GRRI implemented a
reorganization in La Luz Resort and issued a Notice of Employees' Lateral
Transfer (Notice to Transfer) to five of its employees, including
petitioner. Through the Notice to Transfer, they were informed of the
reorganization and were advised that they would be laterally transferred
to another department effective immediately. Petitioner was transferred
from the Reception Department to Storage Department without
diminution in rank and benefits.

However, petitioner refused to sign the Notice to Transfer and remained

at the reception area for two days before reporting to her new station
on March 4, 2014. Petitioner also sent an e-mail addressed to the
management on March 9, 2014 asking questions regarding her transfer.

On March 10, 2014, a Memorandum was issued to petitioner directing

her to explain within 24 hours from notice why she should not be
penalized for insubordination for her repeated failure to sign the Notice
to Transfer. In her handwritten letter dated March 11, 2014, petitioner
explained that she refused to sign the Notice to Transfer pending
answers to the questions she sent to the management via e-mail.
GRRI also issued petitioner a Notice of Preventive Suspension on March
14, 2014 placing her under preventive suspension until March 21, 2014
pending resolution of the charge against her. Petitioner, however, failed
to report back to work after the lapse of the period of her preventive
suspension on March 22, 2014 until March 26, 2014.

Thus, on March 26, 2014, GRRI's Human Resource (HR) department

issued petitioner another Memorandum directing her to report to the
HR department within 24 hours and to explain her absences without
leave. Upon reporting thereat, petitioner was handed the Termination
Notice dated March 21, 2014 advising her that the management found
her guilty of "inhuman and unbearable treatment to person in authority;
abuse of authority; serious misconduct - insubordination by not
accepting her memorandum of re-assignment by the Executive
Committee; and gross and habitual neglect of duties AWOL" and had
decided to terminate her from employment effective immediately.

Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
(i.e., underpayment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay, rest day
premium and service incentive leave pay, unfair labor practice, damages,
and separation pay).

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed 

RULING:

Insubordination or willful disobedience requires the concurrence of the

following requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have
been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a
"wrongful and perverse attitude"; and (2) the order violated must have
been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain
to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Both
requirements are not present in this case.

As stated by petitioner in her handwritten explanation, she withheld her

signature on the Notice to Transfer because she was awaiting answers to
the questions she raised to the management via e-mail. She cannot be
forced to affix her signature thereon if she does not really fully
understand the reasons behind and the consequences of her transfer.
While her action is willful and intentional, it is nonetheless far from
being "wrongful and perverse." In addition, respondents failed to prove
that there is indeed an order or company procedure requiring a
transferee's written conformity prior to the implementation of the
transfer, and that such order or procedure was made known to
petitioner.

Given the foregoing, there is no basis to dismiss petitioner on the ground

of insubordination for her mere failure to sign the Notice to Transfer.

While there may be no basis to dismiss her on the ground of gross and
habitual neglect, petitioner is still guilty of having committed a violation.
It is here that totality of infractions may be considered to determine the
imposable sanction for her current infraction. To be sure, the totality of
an employee's infractions is considered and weighed in determining the
imposable sanction for the current infraction. It presupposes that the
employee is already found guilty of the new violation, as in this case.
Apropos, it is also worth mentioning that GRRI had already previously
warned petitioner that the penalty for her next infraction would be
elevated to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of petitioner, on the basis of
the principle of totality of infractions, is justified.

STANFILCO VS. TEQUILLO

G. R. NO. 209735, JULY 17, 2019

FACTS:

Stanfilco is a duly organized domestic corporation that operates a

banana plantation in Lantapan, Bukidnon. Tequillo was a farm associate
who worked on Stanfilco’s plantation until he was terminated for
mauling his co-worker, Resel Gayon, and consuming intoxicating
beverages within company premises and during work hours. Every week,
Stanfilco hosts a company-initiated employee gathering (“Kaibigan
Fellowship”). In one of the fellowships, Gayon, who was sent to assist
Tequillo at an assigned area of the farm, chanced upon the group who
are on a drinking spree at the farmshed area of Stanfilco’s premises, and
was eventually prevailed upon to join them. At the time, Tequillo was
expressing resentment towards Stanfilco’s refusal to provide him with a
performance incentive. Since Gayon was not yet a regular employee,
Tequillo advised him not to work at the plantation, warning the former
that he, too, might meet the same fate, and not receive any incentive for
his efforts. Gayon then told Tequillo to air his grievances to Stanfilco’s
higherranking employees. Irked by this suggestion, Tequillo proceeded
to maul Gayon. In explanation to Stanfilco as to why no disciplinary
action should be taken, Tequillo admitted to mauling Gayon but averred
that the act was done in self-defense and during the administrative
hearings, the explanations were found to be unsatisfactory and Stanfilco
eventually terminated Tequillo on the ground of serious misconduct. The
latter filed before LA a complaint for illegal dismissal. The LA rendered a
Decision in favor of Stanfilco which was appealed to the NLRC. The NLRC
promulgated a Resolution reversing LA’s decision stating that Tequillo
was illegally dismissed since he was not performing official work at the
time the mauling happened and followed that his act could not be work-
related. CA affirmed the NLRC’s Resolution, finding that no grave abuse
of discretion tainted said resolution. According to CA, the act of mauling
Gayon was not work-related, and at most amounted only to simple
misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mauling of a co-employee during the time of

company activity where the employee did not attend but within the
company premises constitutes serious misconduct

RULING:

YES. Employees termination may be justified on the ground of serious

misconduct—a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. As a ground for
dismissal, it must be serious—it must be of such grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the act
constituting misconduct must be connected with the duties of the
employee and performed with wrongful intent. Physical violence
between and among employees may constitute serious misconduct
regardless of whether such violence occurred during working hours and
within company premises. Although the Court has recognized that
workplace violence may constitute serious misconduct, it has also held
that not every fight within company would automatically warrant
dismissal from service. Jurisprudence requires that the confrontation be
“rooted on workplace dynamics” or connected with the performance of
the employees’ duties. The determination will depend on the underlying
cause of or motive behind said violence. The fact that the act
complained of in this case, particularly the mauling of Gayon, took place
at the plantation and while the Kaibigan Fellowship was being held is of
no moment. The work-relatedness of and wrongful intent behind
Tequillo’s violent conduct cannot be questioned. Tequillo himself
admitted that he mauled Gayon out of emotional disturbance, which
was ultimately caused by Stanfilco’s refusal to provide the former
employee with a productivity incentive. It remains undisputed that
Stanfilco’s refusal to furnish said incentive was due to Tanquillo’s failure
to meet his work quotas. Worse, Gayon had said or done nothing to
sufficiently provoke the attack. Therefore, while it may be true that
Tequillo acted out of resentment towards Stanfilco, the same
resentment was essentially attributable to his own work-related neglect.
It follows then that the attack was connected to the sub-standard
performance of Tequillo’s duties, that it was fundamentally rooted in his
confounded notion of workplace dynamics.