Charles F. Walker - The Tupac Amaru Rebellion

The Tupac Amaru Rebellion
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THE
TUPAC AMARU
REBELLION
Charles F. Walker
TH E BE L K N A P PR E S S OF H A R VA R D U N I V E R S I T Y P R E S S
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
2014

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Copyright © 2014 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Walker, Charles F., 1959–
The Tupac Amaru rebellion / Charles F. Walker.
pages cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-674-05825-5 (alk. paper)
1. Peru—History—Insurrection of Tupac Amaru, 1780–1781.
2. Tupac-Amaru, José Gabriel, –1781. I. Title.
F3444.W35 2014
985' .033—dc23 2013037830

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To four wonderful historians, with whom I so very much
wish I could share this book:
Alberto Flores Galindo
Friedrich Katz
Enrique Tandeter
Eduardo Mendoza Meléndez

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It is unlikely that in the history of revolutions, another will appear
that is more justified or more unfortunate. Spanish America had
become in those times the theater of the most extensive tyranny,
but the yoke lay most heavily on the necks of Peruvian Indians.
—Gregorio Funes
There is a general belief that the declaration of Peru’s indepen-

dence, proclaimed by Gabriel Tupac Amaru, was suffocated by
his capture and death in May 1781, in Cuzco’s main plaza; this
is a historical error that needs to be overturned, and only a few
people have scoured the archives, collecting the precise sources
and rebuilding the real and true facts.
—Modesto Basadre

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Contents
List of Maps xi
Introduction: The Execution of Antonio de Arriaga 1
1. The Andes in the Atlantic World 18

2. From Pampamarca to Sangarará 40
3. A World without the Catholic Church? 65
4. The Rebellion Goes South 86
5. The Siege of Cuzco 109
6. In Pursuit of Tupac Amaru 130
7. Torment 152
8. The Other Side of the Lake 168
9. Southern Campaigns 180
10. The Pardon and the Cease-Fire 202
11. The Rebellion in Limbo 219
12. Ordered by the Catholic King 243
Conclusion: The Legacy of Tupac Amaru 267
Chronology of the Rebellion 281

Notes 283
Acknowledg ments 339
Index 341
Illustrations follow page 108

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Maps
Western South America 8

Colonial Lima 28
The Rebellion’s Core Area 42
The Southern Campaigns 90
The Siege of Cuzco 114
The Royalist Advance, 1781 134
Katarista Violence 170
Battle Areas near Lake Titicaca 225
The Distribution of Rebel Body Parts 248
The Prisoners’ Journey: Cuzco-Lima and Callao-Europe 252

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The Tupac Amaru Rebellion

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Introduction
The Execution of Antonio de Arriaga
O N NOV EM BER 4, 1780, José Gabriel Condorcanqui Noguera, who

increasingly used the Inca royal name Tupac Amaru, had lunch
with Antonio de Arriaga at the house of Carlos Rodríguez, the priest of
Yanaoca. If a Hollywood producer had asked central casting for colorful
individuals who personified political relations in the colonial Andes, he
would have been delighted with this trio. Tupac Amaru was the kuraka
or cacique, the ethnic authority in charge of collecting the head tax
(“tribute” was the colonial euphemism) and keeping order in Yanaoca
and two other small towns, Pampamarca and Tungasuca, fi fty miles
southeast of the ancient Inca capital Cuzco. The Incas still loomed large
in this area. Quechua-speaking Indians constituted the vast majority of
the population, and they venerated their ancestors, defeated by the
Spanish in the sixteenth century, and those like José Gabriel Tupac
Amaru who claimed bloodlines from the Inca royalty. Well-educated
and bilingual, the forty-two-year-old José Gabriel moved easily between
the Spanish and Indian worlds. In fact, this was his role as kuraka.1
Arriaga was the corregidor, the Spanish authority who collected taxes,
arranged the despised labor draft for the massive Potosí mines six hun-
dred miles to the south (today Bolivia), and oversaw regional affairs.
Arriaga was a nobleman born in 1740 in the Basque country in north-
ern Spain whose family had strong connections to Spain’s American
empire, as members of the all-important Council of the Indies in Ma-
drid and as merchants.2 Originally from Panama, Father Rodríguez
was Yanaoca’s parish priest. He, along with another priest, Antonio

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2 The Tupac Amaru Rebellion
López de Sosa, had been Tupac Amaru’s first teachers. Impressed by

the young boy’s intelligence, they had remained close to him. These
priests’ nurturing took hold: José Gabriel would remain pious and in-
tellectually curious throughout his life. Thus, as was usually the case,
Tupac Amaru the kuraka was indigenous or mestizo, Arriaga the cor-
regidor a Spaniard, and Rodríguez a creole, the term used for people of
European descent born in the Americas. These three authorities, kuraka,
corregidor, and priest, formed the triumvirate that maintained order
throughout the Andes under Spanish rule. Two other priests, Arriaga’s
scribe and assistant, and numerous servants also accompanied them at
the meal. José Gabriel’s wife, Micaela Bastidas, did not join them.
Arriaga and Tupac Amaru knew each other well. Arriaga had a web
of economic activities and, as tax collector and foremost authority, he
enjoyed capital and power and had even lent Tupac Amaru money. Al-
though the two had previously bickered over the labor draft or mita to
Potosí, they shared an amicable meal that day, celebrating the day of
Saint Charles (San Carlos), Father Rodríguez and the King of Spain’s
saint day. After Arriaga enjoyed a short siesta, Tupac Amaru invited
him to spend the evening at his house in Tungasuca. Arriaga insisted
that he had to be back in Tinta, his home and the largest town in the
area, about seven miles from Yanaoca, and began the four-hour jour-
ney by foot and horse over several precipitous hills. The imminent ar-
rival of tribute money, the Indian head tax that fi lled colonial coffers,
encouraged him to return.
Tupac Amaru and a few young men accompanied the corregidor for
a bit and then feigned that they were returning to Tungasuca. Instead,
they rushed ahead to a hiding place on a peak, shocking Arriaga and
his entourage when they leapt into their path. Arriaga fled into a canyon,
hiding behind an apacheta, an indigenous sanctuary or sacred place made
of stones. An Indian, however, spotted him and Tupac Amaru tied him
up. They waited several hours until late that evening and then they
took their prisoners in chains to Tungasuca. They forced Arriaga, his
scribe Felipe Bermúdez, and two black slaves into a cell in the base-
ment of Tupac Amaru’s house.3
Tupac Amaru compelled the stunned Arriaga to write letters to his
treasurer in Tinta requesting money and arms, with the peculiar pre-
text that he was planning an expedition against pirates on the coast.
Tupac Amaru himself then went to Tinta and used Arriaga’s key to

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Introduction 3
take seventy-five fusils or light fl intlock muskets, a small number of

standard muskets, gunpowder, bullets, some militia uniforms, mules,
silver, 22,000 pesos of tribute money, gold, and other goods.4 He also
wrote messages in the name of Arriaga to mayors and powerful indi-
viduals demanding that they convene in Tungasuca. Numerous military
figures and entrepreneurs such as the Spaniards Juan Antonio Figueroa
and Bernardo La Madrid fell into the trap. Kurakas also received in-
structions to send their Indians; thousands assembled in Tungasuca,
streaming in for days. The rebels posted sentinels on the road to Cuzco
to keep the news from authorities there. They also kept Arriaga’s
whereabouts a secret. The masses congregating in Tungasuca did not
know the corregidor was a prisoner in Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bas-
tidas’ basement.5
When Tupac Amaru placed a painting of the Crowning with Thorns
in Arriaga’s cell and sent father López de Sosa to take confession, Ar-
riaga knew that he was in deep trouble. Flabbergasted by the events
and conscious that his life was in danger, Arriaga offered his entire
fortune to the Pampamarca parish in exchange for freedom, but to no
avail. López de Sosa and three other clerics accompanied the corregidor
in his cell on November 9.6 Tupac Amaru explained to those assembled
on the nearby plain that he had orders from the powerful Visitor Gen-
eral, José Antonio de Areche, that were approved by the High Court
(the Audiencia) of Lima. In the coming months, Tupac Amaru often
referred to orders or permission that he had from Madrid authorities,
including even the King. He did not, of course, but many of his follow-
ers believed him or at least felt that Tupac Amaru was fulfi lling the
King’s wishes: that if “His Majesty” only knew about the situation in
the Andes, he would understand. Rumors spread that Arriaga was to be
punished; the astonished crowds wondered why. Many believed that it
was God’s will.7
On November 9, moving on horseback, Tupac Amaru ordered Euro-
peans, mestizos, and Indians to line up in military columns. He was
elegantly dressed: black velvet coat and knee-breeches, a ruffled shirt, a
vest, linen, silk stockings, gold buckles at his knees and shoes, and a
Spanish beaver hat. His attire often included more indigenous flour-
ishes such as the uncu or tunic and a gold chain with the Inca sun. His
hair cascaded down his back.8 Tupac Amaru repeated these maneuvers
on the tenth, instructing the thousands present to follow him to a nearby

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knoll where a gallows had been set up. Some of his followers waved a
white flag with a red cross.9 A mestizo read a proclamation in Spanish
and Quechua: “Through the King it has been ordered that there no lon-
ger be alcabala [sales tax], customs houses, or the Potosí mita and that
Don Antonio de Arriaga lose his life because of his destructive behav-
ior.” One witness claimed that Tupac Amaru called Arriaga “harmful
and tyrannical” and pledged to raze “obrajes [textile mills], halt the mita
to Potosí, the alcabala, customs tax, and the reparto de mercancias [the
forced sales of goods], and free Indians so as to live in union and har-
mony with the creoles.”10 Another witness quoted him as saying that
he had “superior orders” to abolish taxes and customs houses, to expel
corregidors and textile mill owners, and that his actions were not against
God or the King; he wanted “Indians and Spaniards” to live as broth-
ers.11 The crowd understood that it was witnessing a momentous event.
Indians heard, in their own language, about the abolition of the forced
sales of goods and the hated labor and sales taxes, and witnessed the
condemnation of the maximum Spanish authority in the region. Mes-
tizos and creoles ner vously wondered whether these seemingly wel-
come changes might lead to turmoil and dangerously independent In-
dians. Spaniards did not fully understand what they were seeing but
feared for their lives.
A town crier led the procession to the gallows, announcing that they
were fulfi lling the King’s wishes and repeating the pledge that customs
houses, alcabalas, and the mita would henceforth be abolished. Tupac
Amaru ordered the town crier to speak in Quechua, a language never
used in official events or in documents.12 The three priests accompa-
nied Arriaga, surrounded by soldiers. Once at the gallows, the soldiers
took Arriaga’s staff from him and forced him to replace his military
uniform with the simple, penitentiary habit of the Franciscan order.
Arriaga’s black slave, Antonio Oblitas, was forced into ser vice as the ex-
ecutioner. On the fi rst try, as he heaved to elevate Arriaga, the rope
snapped and slave and master fell to the ground. Oblitas received sev-
eral ropes to carry out his task and people close to the gallows, some of
them Arriaga’s allies, tugged to strangle him. All commentators noted
the tomblike silence. One witness claimed that some Indians passed by
Arriaga’s cadaver and sneered in Quechua, “Jew, didn’t you used to do
this? [Judio manachu caita rurahux canqui?]13 As would be the case
throughout the uprising, Micaela had an active role. One account men-

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Introduction 5
tioned that she “surpasses her husband in spirit and malevolence: she
knew all about the execution of Arriaga and despite the weakness of
her sex, she carried out that unjust hom icide, transporting bullets used
by the guards in her shawl.”14
Speculation on why Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas had executed
Corregidor Arriaga circulated like an Andean thunderstorm through the
crowd that fateful November 10 and people have not stopped asking the
question since. Then and today, people gave reasons that range from
the personal (a grudge) to the macropolitical (the weakening of Span-
ish rule). The biography of Tupac Amaru is, of course, central to the
explanation. He had witnessed the worst forms of Spanish exploitation
of indigenous people and found himself increasingly hard pressed to
fulfi ll his duties as intermediary between the Quechua and Spanish
world. José Gabriel’s work as a merchant and muleteer took him through-
out the Andes, while his legal battles to regain a marquisate (a noble
title) had forced him to spend eight months in the viceregal capital of
Lima in 1777, where he made important contacts and gained a deeper
understanding of Peru. He had the respect of Cuzco’s Indians, reasons
to loathe the Spanish, and the experience and worldliness to organize
an uprising.
In broader terms, in 1780 colonial authorities continued to escalate
the Bourbon Reforms, a series of measures that increased taxes and labor
demands on indigenous people while reducing their autonomy. Spanish
reformers sought to restrict the pact created in the sixteenth century
that granted Indians certain rights, including a high degree of cultural
and political autonomy and the control of communal land, in exchange
for subordination and a slate of taxes. They increased labor and tax de-
mands and debated about how (or whether) to assimilate the native
population and convert Indians, a category that implied political and
cultural independence, into Spanish subjects. In practice, this meant that
Indians throughout the southern Andes faced higher and new taxes,
the revival of older and despised practices such as the Potosí mita, and an
assault on their ethnic authorities, the kurakas.
The reforms also sought to reduce the power of the church. Tensions
between secular and religious authorities escalated in the 1770s and
came to the surface throughout the rebellion. Arriaga himself had bat-
tled priests over protocol and fi nances. The fact that Tupac Amaru had
been involved in these events helps explain the rebellion itself and the

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sympathy of some priests for the rebellion. Not surprisingly, many par-
ish priests opposed the colonial government’s efforts to control and tax
their parishes. At the same time, dozens of priests remained in their
parishes and fought the rebels “behind the lines,” casting them as apos-
tates and heathens, bolstering royalists’ spirits. The “Catholic Church,”
a term that should not be conceived of in the singular, provided sup-
porters and opponents. The uprising emerged from and brought into
view these and other deep tensions in the southern Andes of Peru.15
By late 1780, Tupac Amaru’s forces had defeated the Spanish in sev-
eral confrontations. He and his followers entered small towns and In-
dian villages to gain recruits and provisions. They sought to kill all cor-
regidors (most, however, fled before the rebels arrived) and to imprison
landowners despised by local Indians. The rebels razed the small textile
mills present throughout the area, which served as virtual prisons for the
Indian workers, distributing the cloth to shocked locals. Tupac Amaru
and other leaders spoke Quechua to the indigenous masses and rumors
spread that he embodied the return of the Incas, as indicated in his name,
a link to one of the last Inca rulers, Tupac Amaru I (1545–1572). A wide-
spread belief in the possible return to Inca rule nourished the uprising.
These assaults were just the beginning; the uprising rapidly spread
across the Andes. The colonial state collapsed in much of the area that
stretched from Cuzco to Puno, near Lake Titicaca in the south, as au-
thorities dared not attempt to collect taxes or enforce the mita. With
the adjoining Upper Peru or Charcas under fire from a coalition of up-
risings often called the Kataristas, and revolts inspired by the events
around Cuzco springing up to the north and south, the Spanish faced
the greatest military challenge since the sixteenth century, with what
became the largest rebellion in colonial history. Although authorities
initially underestimated the uprising, they realized by the end of 1780
that their control of Peru and beyond was in danger.
The Experience of Rebellion
The Tupac Amaru rebellion is not an untold story. Generations of histo-

rians have written on it, ranging from epic tales in the nineteenth cen-
tury to social-scientific works of the late twentieth.16 This book builds
on the torrent of studies in the last forty years or so, including two
major multivolume document collections as well as works on specific

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Introduction 7
topics such as prior uprisings in the 1770s, confl ict in towns and cities
far from the Tupac Amaru base in Cuzco, and the history of the textile
mills.17 Two phenomena coincided around 1970 to prompt fascination
with Tupac Amaru and boost the number of studies: the interest in ru-
ral revolts because of the Vietnam War and other anticolonial struggles
and, in Peru, the unique Juan Velasco Alvarado “revolutionary mili-
tary regime” (1968–1975), which cast José Gabriel Tupac Amaru as the
forefather of its revolution and of Peruvian independence from Spain.
It was during those years that the 86-volume Colección documental de la
independencia peruana (1971–1976, originally projected to have 106 vol-
umes) was released and Colección del bicentenario de la revolución de Tupac
Amaru undertaken (the seven tomes were published in 1980–1982). These
provided thousands of pages of transcribed and indexed documentation
on the uprising.18 Nonetheless, despite this outpouring of studies, no
accessible account of the Tupac Amaru rebellion exists in English,
while those in Spanish are outdated and out of print.19
Yet the book is not simply a revised overview, a retelling of a well-
known story with some new citations and documents. It seeks to make
several novel arguments regarding the uprising and to contribute to
broader debates about violence and geography. The first contribution is
seemingly mundane, a question of chronological scope or time frame,
but important. Virtually every study focuses on the period from Arriaga’s
execution in November 1780 to mid-1781, when the Spanish captured
and executed important rebel leaders. The executions are fascinating
and ghastly events that nonetheless serve poorly as bookends or start-
ing and stopping points for an analysis of the uprising. Many of the
most intriguing and influential moments of the rebellion occurred after
April 1781, when Tupac Amaru’s cousin Diego Cristóbal and others
took over the leadership of the rebellion. The uprising became increas-
ingly bloody as it shifted to the south in the area near Lake Titicaca. It
was here that the full force of the rebels emerged as they swept through
the altiplano and linked with insurgents in Upper Peru. Their control of
South America in danger, the Spanish divided between soft- and hard-
liners, with the latter ultimately winning. They imposed draconian mea-
sures against indigenous people that marked the region for decades,
until the wars of independence (1808–1825) and beyond. Only through
an examination of the overlooked events of 1782 and 1783 can the up-
rising and its legacy be understood.20

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Equator
COLOMBIA
Quito
ECUADOR
Manaus
a
P E R U
Jaén
Chachapoyas
B R A Z I L
A
Cajamarca
N
Trujillo
D
E
Huaraz
S
10° Huánuco
Cerro de Pasco M
Tarma T
Callao S
Jauja
Lima Huanta
Huancavelica Anta Paucartambo
Cañete Huamanga Pampamarca
(Ayacucho) Cuzco Tinta
Surimana Sicuani
Tungasuca Yanaoca Lake
Yauri
N Juliaca Titicaca Sorata B O L I V I A
Puno Achacachi
Arequipa La Paz
Sica Sica Cochabamba Santa Cruz
P A C I F I C Oruro
Chayanta
Lake
Poopó La Plata
O C E A N Potosí
PARAGUAY
modern borders Tarija
20°°
0 250 miles
0 250 km
Tropic of Capri
corn CH I L E A RG E N T I NA
80° 70° 60°
Western South America
I also provide the first full portrait of Micaela Bastidas. Authors have
always cast her as an important secondary player, in part because of the
lack of sources to flesh out her character. I have found rich material on
her and place her, as was the case then, in the limelight. Prior to the
uprising, Bastidas was an active partner in Tupac Amaru’s work as a
merchant-muleteer. She collected debts, hired field hands and muleskin-
ners, planned the long journeys to northern Argentina, and represented

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Introduction 9
José Gabriel in his frequent absences. As is common today in the Andes,

the woman, Micaela, oversaw the family’s fi nances. All of these skills
prepared her well for her role as a rebel leader, particularly to manage
logistics. More than accompanying or backing her husband, she led the
uprising alongside him.
The book also rethinks the role of the Catholic Church in the upris-
ing. Most studies on this theme have focused on priests who supported
the rebels. This reflects, I believe, the massive documentation generated
by the trials against priests such as López de Sosa and Bejarano who
stayed with Tupac Amaru, as well as the inclination of historians (par-
ticularly in the 1970s and 1980s) to search for rebel heroes, including
men of the cloth.21 I argue that the Catholic Church, particularly Cuz-
co’s Bishop, Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, was fundamental in the
repression of the rebellion. He excommunicated Tupac Amaru and de-
manded not only that parish priests remain in the areas controlled by
the rebels but that they proselytize against the uprising. Tupac Amaru
and Micaela Bastidas did not know what to do. Highly religious, the
two rebel leaders could not conceive of a world without the Church and
could not come up with an effective plan to silence these royalists. The
stories of the priests who remained behind enemy lines will shake up
studies of late colonial Spanish America and add to the rich storyline.
I attempt to tell the entire story of the uprising, from its onset to its
legacy. I return to the events themselves, probing why people supported
the royalists or rebels, why some sought to remain neutral. I aim to give
the reader a feel for the lived experience of the uprising.22 The idea is
not only to extend the analysis chronologically but also to explore how
people understood and participated in the uprising. The flurry of stud-
ies published in recent decades has overlooked the fascinating events of
the rebellion in their totality. I want to immerse the reader in the ter-
rifying guerrilla campaigns, the relentless propaganda war, the grue-
some repression of the revolt, and the rebellion’s long aftermath, re-
vealing the fear and indecision on both sides and the ever-narrowing
room for neutrality and negotiation. I shed new light on Tupac Amaru
and Micaela Bastidas, while also addressing the role of common people
who fought for or against the uprising or sought to remain on the side-
lines. I hope to help answer the vital questions about this and other
rebellions: Why did they fight? What did they seek? Why did they suc-
ceed so brilliantly at fi rst but ultimately fail?

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Gore and Gorges
Two topics or phenomena form the backbone of this study: violence and
geography. Violence is at the center of any mass uprising and this book
probes why and how people kill. The Tupac Amaru rebellion provides
rich, grim material. Not only did the death count reportedly reach
100,000 (the Viceroyalty of Peru had about 1.8 million people) but the
stories are gruesome. Colonial forces exterminated hundreds of indig-
enous fighters at a time, displaying heads on pikes, while rebels report-
edly committed atrocities including raping dead women, drinking the
blood of the recently killed out of skulls, and throwing children in Lake
Titicaca to drown.
The analysis builds from the argument by Stathis Kalyvas, in his work
on Greek civil wars, that “clearly, the relation between political actors
and underlying populations must be problematized rather than assumed
away.”23 Leaders and followers constantly negotiate the terms of their
relationship and the ways of war. Too many studies of Andean uprisings
have assumed that rebel and royalist fighters followed their leaders
without question; their loyalty is taken for granted or overlooked rather
than scrutinized. I pay par tic ular attention to why and how violence
intensified over time. The initial efforts on both sides to respect those
remaining neutral fell by the wayside and atrocities mounted. The
fighting moved toward a “total war,” in which the limitations on who
was to be attacked and who was to be mobilized disappear.24
Prior to the twentieth century, people followed largely unwritten
rules while conducting war. The understanding of how women and
children should be treated, whether enemy combatants deserved Chris-
tian burial, and whether soldiers merited the right to ransack varied
greatly according to local or imperial military culture and the particu-
larities of the war itself.25 Rules applied, but could change dramatically
in the course of a struggle. This was the case in Peru, where the rebel-
lion quickly pushed its followers and enemies into uncharted territory.
This book sheds light on this new terrain, where restraints or limita-
tions on violence eased or even disappeared.
Colonial authorities had little experience in repressing such a mas-
sive uprising, which eventually stretched across the Andean core of South
America. They did not count on a standing army in Lima or Cuzco and
relied, at least initially, on militias. These had proven adequate in putting

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Introduction 11
down local revolts. In riots or upheavals prior to 1780, militias took

advantage of their arms advantage (Indians and blacks were not al-
lowed to own fi rearms), moved into a town, captured and executed the
leaders, and returned to Lima once order had been restored. The Tupac
Amaru rebellion demanded a much greater effort than this.26
In the eighteenth century, indigenous people of Cuzco and the Lake
Titicaca area had sued authorities, run them out of town, mutinied,
and even taken over towns. Submission did not characterize Indian-
state relations. The Tupac Amaru rebellion, however, was a much larger
enterprise. With no precedent (the fighting occurring at the same time
in what became the United States was, from the perspective of Peru, a
poorly reported, distant phenomenon), rebels invented the rules as the
uprising grew. In fact, debates about violence—who was to be killed
and how— proved to be a major point of contention among both the
rebels and the royalists. This book traces the changing nature of vio-
lence in the uprising.
While a mass uprising fought over a vast terrain was unprecedented,
violence was not. It formed part of an indigenous person’s daily life,
part of the fabric of colonial society. Authorities ranging from corregi-
dors to kurakas arrested, detained, whipped, struck, and threatened in
order to ensure that Indians paid their taxes and worked for the state,
the church, and others. But the colonial state did not have a monopoly
on violence. Estate owners counted on jails and gallows to ensure order
and compliance; textile mills had become privately run jails, as the
owners locked up Indians to make them work in abysmal conditions.
Rebels destroyed the gallows and jails, or turned the world upside down
by placing the powerful in them. Nor was violence unidirectional. Lo-
cal people, Indians and others, proved highly capable of hitting, whip-
ping, raping, and coercing one another, as the bulging trial records in
Cuzco’s historical archive demonstrate.27 Drinking often played a part.
Yet this does not mean Andean society was uniquely violent. Europe in
this period also was the site of countless forms of aggression, both from
the state and the upper classes and within the lower classes.28
One tendency in the rebellion stands out: aggression on both sides
increased and became more ghastly as the uprising moved away from its
base in Cuzco and the months passed. In the initial weeks after the execu-
tion of Arriaga, Tupac Amaru made sure that rebels only attacked Span-
ish authorities. He shielded rich creoles or others whom the indigenous

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fighters might have understood as the enemy. Across time and space,
this changed. Both sides began to slaughter their opponents and neu-
trality became impossible. By mid-1781, neither took prisoners— they
killed those they captured. In fact, the atrocities began to mirror one
another. Royalists would hang rebels and display their body parts; reb-
els would humiliate and brutalize captives. By late 1781, rebels near
Lake Titicaca reportedly pierced eyes and drank blood out of skulls.
Each side increasingly saw the other as barbarians, as bad Christians,
which justified greater violence.
Violence spiraled out of control because of three overlapping factors:
leadership, chronology, and geography. First, Tupac Amaru and Micaela
Bastidas sought to control their combatants’ aggression. Stressing that
the fight was against evil Spaniards, they protected creoles, mestizos,
and even affluent Indians from rebel wrath. They managed to do this
quite effectively in the core area where they were in charge. When the
rebellion expanded (and, of course, when José Gabriel and Micaela were
no longer the leaders) this proved more difficult, and rebels attacked non-
Europeans. In fact, this aggression broadened from Europeans to all non-
Indians, in some cases. Whereas Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas
protected mestizos and creoles, some rebels in the second phase attacked
people for simply wearing European dress or speaking Spanish. This also
proved true of the royalist commanders—they were less and less capable
of controlling the fury of their followers (or willing to).
Second, as the uprising spread each side abandoned the restraints
that had kept them from killing “civilians,” victimizing women, or ran-
sacking stores and estates. Violence begets violence, and as each side
ramped up the aggression the other acted in kind. The transformation
was not just tactical or a byproduct of the search for revenge. Each side
increasingly envisioned and cast the other as heretics, as fallen Christians
who deserved to die. This ideological transformation justified greater
violence, which in turn reinforced the interpretation of the opponent as
a heathen or barbarian. What began as an uprising developed into a
guerrilla war and then deteriorated into a vicious bloodbath.
Geography or space was the third factor: important changes can be
seen depending on where the fighting took place. As the rebellion’s
center shifted from Cuzco toward Lake Titicaca, the violence worsened.
This has much to do with the time frame outlined above—Tupac Amaru
and Micaela Bastidas could not control their forces and, over time, aggres-

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Introduction 13
sion accelerated— but also with different populations and their relation
to the colonial state and each other.
In Cuzco, the state and the Catholic Church had a stronger presence
than in the Titicaca area. Tupac Amaru himself had pleaded his case in
the courts, lobbied corregidors, bishops, and patriarchs, and used his
power as a kuraka to improve his lot and that of the Indians he repre-
sented. He had gone to school at the prestigious “School for Kurakas” in
Cuzco’s center and rubbed elbows with people ranging from common
Indians to Cuzco patricians. Demographics (more intermediate groups
such as mestizos) and the economy (more active trade networks) meant
that different ethnic groups knew each other and coincided in daily life
more in Cuzco than in the Titicaca region. This contact or exchange
could, arguably, build bonds and fortify empathy that decreased the like-
lihood of violence. The towns Tupac Amaru represented as a kuraka and
which served as rebel centers—Tungasuca, Surimana, and Pampamarca—
stood just fifty miles from Cuzco. Even the more humble residents took
the much-traveled valley route to conduct business or to visit acquain-
tances in the former Inca capital.
In contrast, the Spanish state and even the Church had a lesser pres-
ence in the south, around Titicaca. These institutions existed to oversee
Spanish rule and the exploitation of Indians. Yet they also could shield
Indians from behavior considered abusive or abhorrent. These “safety
valves” were not as heavy on the ground away from Cuzco, and Indians
and Spaniards had less contact or interaction, helping to explain why
violence was cruder. Indians had fewer qualms about attacking all Euro-
peans, particularly after more than a year of warfare, a point when the
Spanish took no prisoners and assumed all Indians were bloodthirsty
rebels. The Spanish falsely framed this in terms of civilization—the In-
dians of the South were more “savage” or “barbaric.” Instead, southern
Indians had less attachment to the colonial system than their brethren
in Cuzco, yet suffered brutal exploitation. The war itself had erased any
empathy— a key impediment to the use of coercion—the Indian insur-
gents might have had with the Spanish.29
This spatial or cultural argument should not be exaggerated or over-
simplified. The opposite argument may be equally true— a strong (colo-
nial) state presence meant greater exploitation and thus a stronger
likelihood for tension and violence. The city of Cuzco and the surround-
ing area were certainly violent before the uprising. Eminent scholars

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continue to debate whether modernity and the “civilizing process” re-

duce, increase, or modify violence.30 Nonetheless, Tupac Amaru and
Micaela sought to limit aggression against Europeans and envisioned a
postinsurrection utopia free of European exploiters. Rebels farther to
the south attacked a far wider group and showed partic ular cruelty in
the towns that they seized along Lake Titicaca. This contrast reflects the
other two factors outlined here— the leadership and changes over
time— but also a different social reality to the south.
Geography, or topography, marked the uprising; not only the battles
but also the animosity between the two sides. In fact, ideas about na-
ture, the Andes, shaped how each side viewed and fought against the
other. This study stresses these ideas’ centrality for understanding the
bloodshed and more generally, colonialism.31 The Spanish incessantly
complained about the towering mountains and craggy passes that the
rebels used to their great advantage. They wondered how people could
live at over twelve thousand feet above sea level and related this harsh
environment to Indians’ supposed maladaptation to Spanish ways. Just
as the rebels frequently retreated to the hills, a classic guerrilla (a term
that had not yet been invented) tactic, the Europeans believed that the
Inca descendants had also turned their back on or retreated from the
Spanish language and Christianity over the centuries. Indians, in turn,
saw the soldiers, at least those from the coast, as outsiders who deserved
to be pushed back to the sea. They also questioned their Christianity.
Over the last 150 million years or so, plate tectonics created the An-
des. The Nazca Plate below the Pacific Ocean has slipped ever so slowly
under the South American Plate, the grinding impact prompting earth-
quakes and pushing the earth up and to the side (many writers use the
image of a car hood after a collision). Two main ranges, the eastern and
the western (or, in Spanish, the black and the white, as the mountains
closer to the Pacific have considerably less snow), run down much of
South America, their highest peaks rising over twenty thousand feet
above sea level. In several places, mountains running east-west bridge
the two ranges, separating the sierra valleys. Plate tectonics also formed
gorges and lakes, most notably Lake Titicaca, which straddles what is
today the Peru-Bolivia border and is often called “the highest navigable
lake in the world” (by large ships). In Cuzco, the Vilcamayu and Pau-
cartambo rivers run to the northeast, into the Ucayali and from there
the Amazon. The warm valleys to the north and northeast of Cuzco

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Introduction 15
(including the tourist mecca Machu Picchu) were barely touched by the
Tupac Amaru rebellion.
Instead, the rebellion stretched from Cuzco to Lake Titicaca. Towns
such as Tungasuca and Pampamarca stand at about eleven thousand
five hundred feet above sea level, ensconced in broad bluffs above the
Vilcanota Valley. These towns benefited from prime agricultural land,
particularly in comparison to the surrounding sheer highlands or punas
that soar well above the tree line. The correctly named “high prov-
inces” or provincias altas just fi fty miles southeast of Pampamarca tower
above fourteen thousand feet. Europeans could not believe that hu-
mans lived there; the area became a rebel hotbed.
As the rebels and the pursuing colonial armies moved from Cuzco
toward the Titicaca basin to the southeast, altitudes became higher, the
air thinner, the valleys narrower, and the hills steeper and more bar-
ren. In the midpoint between Puno and Cuzco, the two Andean ranges
come together in a snowy crag, the La Raya pass. Train riders today,
often dizzied by altitude sickness, crane their neck to peer upwards to
the glacier peaks and typically deem the terrain lunar. From this gate-
way south, into the Titicaca basin, more than thirteen thousand feet
above sea level becomes the norm. Corn does not grow at this altitude
and livestock (cattle, sheep, goats, llamas, and alpaca) rather than agri-
culture drove the economy. In linguistic terms, Quechua, the lingua
franca of the Incas— and today the most widely spoken indigenous lan-
guage of the Americas with over ten million speakers— predominated
in the Cuzco region. Around and to the south and east of the Lake Titi-
caca basin, what is known as the Collao and today is part of Bolivia,
much of the population spoke and speaks Aymara.32 Throughout the
uprising, royalists complained bitterly about the altitude, the precipi-
tous hills and mountains, and Indians’ rejection of the Spanish and
their language. Rebels used all of these to their advantage.
This dichotomy between a European coast (Lima) and Indian high-
lands (Cuzco) should not be exaggerated. The Spanish had a strong
presence in Cuzco (and Indians typically constituted 10 percent of Li-
ma’s population of about 50,000 at this time). With its population of
30,000 in 1780, Cuzco was Peru’s second city, the key administrative
center between Potosí in Upper Peru and Lima.33 The viceregal state
maintained important institutions and authorities there, and over the
centuries thousands of Europeans settled in Cuzco to work as merchants

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or to purchase haciendas. This Spanish presence weakened as one moved

toward Titicaca: fewer Europeans owned estates or mines or worked as
merchants and the state relied more on indigenous authorities, kurakas,
than Eu ropean bureaucrats. Mestizos, those of mixed Eu ropean and
Indian blood, made up a major part of the city of Cuzco’s population,
about 50 percent according to the imprecise censuses of the era. Although
important, they had less of a demographic weight in the rural areas
toward the south where, in the eighteenth century, the dividing line
between Europeans and Indians remained stark. As the Spanish army
would learn in the course of the uprising, the Collao was more indige-
nous and even more mountainous than Cuzco.
Throughout the Peruvian Andes, Indian towns and communities in
the lower levels specialized in agriculture while those in the higher ar-
eas focused on livestock, both European animals such as cows and goats
and the American cameloids—llamas, vicuñas, guanacos, and alpacas.
But this contrast was not as great as it might seem. The genius of the In-
cas, the remarkable empire that ruled the Andes in the three centuries
prior to the arrival of the Spanish, was their ability to grow a vast variety
of foodstuffs in different ecological niches (potatoes being the most fa-
mous, quinoa the trendiest) and to exchange and distribute goods among
the Andes, the Amazon lowlands, and the coast. These “vertical archi-
pelagos” did not crumble with the Conquest. In the eighteenth century,
indigenous communities in the valleys often maintained pastureland
in the higher reaches and traded actively with producers of coca leaves
and chili peppers in the warmer areas toward the Amazon.34 Tupac
Amaru himself was a muleteer, specializing in the route between Cuzco
and Jujuy in what became northern Argentina. In general, communi-
ties at lower altitudes and closer to the cities such as Cuzco or, in the
Titicaca basin, Puno were more affluent than those in the more remote
areas. However, they also faced greater oversight by authorities such as
corregidor Arriaga. This study highlights some key differences in how
these diverse regions reacted to and participated in the uprising.
In geographical terms, the Tupac Amaru Rebellion encompassed a larger

area than the contemporaneous struggle in North America, the Ameri-
can Revolutionary War. On a darker note, the level of violence approached
that of the ghastly Haitian Revolution a decade later, with up to 100,000
dead.35 The mass rebellion greatly altered Peru and Spanish presence in

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Introduction 17
the Americas, casting a large shadow on the wars of independence that

would emerge in the early nineteenth century. On the one hand, re-
pression was brutal and anti-Indian sentiments flourished (or resur-
faced) throughout the Andes in the following decades. The rebellion
deepened the coast-Andes divide. On the other hand, Indians looked
back at the uprising with pride and earned certain rights, as the Span-
ish dreaded another uprising. It certainly has not been forgotten in
subsequent centuries. In recent decades, José Gabriel Condorcanqui,
Tupac Amaru II, provided the name for two guerrilla groups (the Tu-
pamaros in Uruguay and the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru
in Peru) and one rap singer, Tupac Shakur. The name Tupac Amaru is
everywhere in Peru. I hope to show why it continues to resonate in
Peru, Bolivia, and beyond.

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1
The Andes in the Atlantic World
J OSÉ GA BR I EL CON DORCA NQU I , born on March 10, 1738 in Surimana,

was the son of Miguel Condorcanqui Usquionsa Tupac Amaru and
María Rosa Noguera. Miguel, who died in 1750, was the kuraka of three
towns in the Tinta district, Surimana, Pampamarca, and Tungasuca, a
position José Gabriel inherited. José Gabriel would throughout his life
use multiple last names. Condorcanqui—you are a condor in Quechua—
was his patronym associated with the rights to the kuraka position but
like his father, he also employed the last name Tupac Amaru to under-
line his royal Inca blood. Amarus are mythological winged serpents
while Tupa (as his name was usually spelled) denotes royalty or prox-
imity to the Inca.1 José Gabriel claimed to be a direct descendent of Tupac
Amaru, the fi nal Inca ruler, beheaded by Viceroy Toledo in 1572. These
bloodlines gave him considerable prestige among Quechua Indians,
many of whom believed, two centuries after the Conquest, that the
Tawantinsuyo or Inca rule would return. In addition, José Gabriel oc-
casionally added his mother’s last name, Noguera, which some scholars
believe indicated Catalan roots.2
José Gabriel spent his childhood in Surimana, but accompanied his
father on trips throughout the district and beyond as he fulfi lled his du-
ties as kuraka and plied his trade as merchant. These expeditions con-
tinued when José Gabriel came of age and assumed his father’s position
and profession. After initial classes by Fathers López de Sosa and Rodrí-
guez, he studied in the prestigious San Francisco de Borja School in
Cuzco, run by the Jesuits for the sons of kurakas. The Jesuits provided
him a strong education that also impressed on him his social standing
as future kuraka and someone of royal Inca blood. At school just up the

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The Andes in the Atlantic World 19
hill from Cuzco’s imposing cathedral, he learned Latin and deepened

his Spanish.3
As a kuraka, José Gabriel held rights to land. He also had small min-
ing interests and coca fields in Carabaya, to the south, and owned sev-
eral houses and a small hacienda. His wealth, however, should not be
exaggerated: he owed and was owed a great deal of money and had liens
and mortgages on his property.4 He inherited 350 mules from his father,
which he used to work the Cuzco-to-Upper-Peru circuit, the trade route
that linked Lima and Cuzco with the all-important Potosí mines. He
carried textiles from local mills as well as sugar, coca leaves, and dried
chili peppers on his mules and llamas to sell or trade in the Lake Titicaca
region and Upper Peru. He returned with more mules and other goods
as well as posts and packages. As a muleteer, he gained important con-
tacts throughout the region and had a privileged viewpoint on the ebb
and flow of the colonial economy and the increasing strains it put on the
indigenous population. Over campfires at night or when negotiating a
deal, people told him about the local situation and asked him for news
from Cuzco and beyond. Throughout the colonial period and until the
emergence of four-wheeled vehicles and the diffusion of radios in the
twentieth century, Andean muleteers such as Tupac Amaru served as
the main conduit between rural life and the outside world. People re-
vered him for his Inca heritage and, according to many, his kind man-
ner and willingness to defend the rural poor.
The late 1770s were difficult years for the Andean economy. The open-
ing of Buenos Aires to Upper Peruvian trade (Lima had previously held a
monopoly) meant that producers in Cuzco selling their wares in Potosí
had to compete with products from Buenos Aires and even from Spain.
Moreover, widespread overproduction throughout the Andes prompted
prices to drop. The coarse wool fabric from Cuzco’s mills, for example,
confronted unprecedented competition from European textiles. More-
over, the years 1778 and 1779 brought extremely cold weather to Andean
Peru, damaging crops and making travel more difficult.5 Tupac Amaru
himself experienced this crisis. By 1780, he had considerable means but
mounting debts as well. He also witnessed and heard about widespread
economic malaise, ranging from merchants verging on bankruptcy to
Indian communities that could not pay the increasing tax load.6
Writers have long asked whether Tupac Amaru was an Indian or a
mestizo, a question that would not have been posed in the same way in

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his time. His contemporaries made clear that he was both and that he took
full advantage of his ability to move among the different social groups of
the period. His economic interests and education made him a member of
the colonial middle class, with ties to the upper and lower classes. He had
close connections with distinguished Spanish and creole residents of
Cuzco such as his friend Gabriel Ugarte, but also was comfortable with
the region’s masses, Quechua-speaking Indians. He spoke both Spanish
and Quechua well, wrote graceful Spanish, and thanks to the Jesuits
knew some Latin. The upper classes in Lima saw him as a well-educated
Indian; some understood this as an acceptable case of social mobility
while others saw it as an aberration and threat to the flexible but ulti-
mately real barriers between caste groups in colonial Peru.
Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas were able to carry out the rebel-
lion because of this ability to move among, gain acceptance from, and
recruit different social groups. They attracted, at least initially, Spanish,
creole, mestizo, black and, above all, indigenous followers. In the midst
of the uprising, however, this balancing act became increasingly diffi-
cult. Europeans quickly became concerned about the use of violence
and the ransacking of estates. Some groups never supported the rebels.
For example, some kurakas, particularly those of the Sacred Valley, saw
him as an arriviste with an unimpressive lineage. They questioned both
his claims to royal Inca blood as well as his economic standing, believ-
ing themselves superior on both fronts.7
Many Spaniards and Creoles scoffed at the notion of a “noble Indian,”
and despite business dealings and even friendship with him, wanted noth-
ing to do with his political project. They rejected his requests for support.
On the other hand, while Indians venerated the couple, some abandoned
the movement or pushed for more radical (violent) actions. Doubts about
the leaders’ revolutionary credentials and opposition to the multiclass al-
liance they sought nourished these desertions and insubordination. In a
society as hierarchical as colonial Peru, coalitions that united racial and
class groups strained from the beginning.
As for Micaela Bastidas, she was born in 1744 in Pampamarca. Some
writers have contended that she was from Abancay, west of Cuzco, but
the archival records confi rm Pampamarca, part of the Tupac Amaru’s
family kurakazgo. When I visited this town in 2007, locals proudly
claimed her as their own and showed where she had lived about a mile
outside of town. They maintained that parts of her house had stood

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until recent decades. Her mother was Josepha Puyucahua (look at the
clouds in Quechua) Sisa and her father Don Manuel de Bastidas; they
never married. He died in 1746 and his identity remains unclear. Some
contend that he was a local man with black heritage, inasmuch as a few
documents refer to her as a zamba or one with cinnamon-colored skin,
implying that she had black blood. Others claim that he was a priest,
assigned to nearby Yanaoca.8 Being an illegitimate daughter of either a
partially black father or a priest placed her in an unusual social cate-
gory, particularly in the overwhelmingly indigenous highlands, and
closed doors to her. It certainly excluded her from elite circles. Yet her
wedding certificate listed both her parents as “Spaniards,” a sign of re-
spectability more than birthplace. Racial and class categories in Span-
ish America were quite fluid and someone like Micaela could move
among different sectors comfortably and gain their respect. She had
three brothers, Antonio, Pedro, and Miguel.
Micaela was a devout Catholic throughout her life. She had little
schooling and her Quechua was far superior to her Spanish. In Pam-
pamarca, oral history claims that she was forced to work in an obraje,
the oppressive textile mills. Father Antonio de Sosa married her and
José Gabriel in Surimana on May 25, 1760. They had three children,
Hipólito (born 1761), Mariano (born 1762), and Fernando (born 1768),
all baptized by Father Sosa in Pampamarca.9 The nineteenth-century
English geographer Clements Markham, who knew the Cuzco area well
and wrote widely on the Incas, Quechua, and Andean geography, called
her a “beautiful Indian girl.” He knew this because Dominga Bastidas,
Micaela’s cousin, had survived the uprising and, fi fty years later, de-
scribed her beauty to General John Miller, who was in Cuzco in 1835.
Miller then relayed the description to Markham.10
Micaela was a full partner in José Gabriel’s enterprises. While he was
away in Lima or elsewhere, she managed his business and kuraka af-
fairs, overseeing tax collection and the labor draft and supervising the
men who stepped in for him in his work as a merchant. This helps ex-
plain how she proved to be such an exceptionally able leader of the re-
bellion. She excelled at paying the troops, managing supplies, keeping
discipline, posting sentinels, and watching for spies— all of the intricate
logistics that make up military campaigns. Her proficiency brings to
mind the military axiom, “amateurs talk about strategy, professionals
talk about logistics.” Even before the uprising, she displayed her strong

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nature. One tithe collector claimed that in front of the corregidor Mi-
caela had threatened to “punch him” if he did not relent.11 Her work as
Tupac Amaru’s partner in his political and economic endeavors pre-
pared her well for the uprising.
Micaela’s prominence in the uprising was not a shocking reversal of
gender roles in the Andes. Women participated actively in the cash econ-
omy, particularly in the sale of produce, livestock, and other goods in mar-
kets and fairs. They frequently managed the household economy. Men
believed themselves the representative of the family and saw themselves
in charge. Domestic violence, frequently fueled by alcohol, was rampant.
Nonetheless, women were usually significant partners in the large,
extended families that characterized the period, and led the household
if males weren’t present. In the case of the Condorcanqui-Bastidas
household, Tupac Amaru no doubt spoke for the family and believed that
he had the final say. But, as would occur in the rebellion, Micaela Basti-
das helped make decisions and run the household economy.12
Although Spaniards burnt the portraits of Tupac Amaru that he com-
missioned during the rebellion, we have several descriptions and one
painting. Markham reproduced one royalist’s recollection:
Tupac Amaru was five feet eight inches in height, well proportioned,
sinewy, and fi rmly knit. He had a handsome Indian face, a slightly aq-
uiline nose, full black eyes, and altogether a countenance intelligent,
benign, and expressive. His address, remarkable for gentlemanlike
ease, was dignified and courteous toward superiors and equals; but in
in his intercourse with the aborigines, by whom he was profoundly
venerated, there was sedateness not inconsistent with his legally-
admitted claims (de jure) to the diadem of the Incas. In mind he was
enterprising, cool, and persevering. He lived in a style becoming his
rank, and, when residing at Cuzco, usually wore a black velvet coat and
small-clothes in the fashion of the day, a waistcoat of gold tissue, em-
broidered linen, a Spanish beaver dress hat, silk stocking, and gold
knee and shoe-buckles, and he allowed his glossy black hair to flow in
ringlets which extended down nearly to his waist.13
An anonymous Spaniard stressed his seriousness and deemed Tupac

Amaru “very white for an Indian, although not so very much for a
Spaniard.”14 Descriptions from the rebellion cast him as an elegant fig-
ure on a white horse, dressed in European style with a few Andean
touches such as the uncu or overshirt and the mascapaicha or royal band.
Royalists emphasized his cold, calculating bearing, which in their eyes

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enabled him to oversee the slaughter of innocent Europeans, while

subsequent generations of admirers have presented him as an elegant
and handsome mestizo. Portrayals from the mid-twentieth century gave
him the impossibly large muscles of the Soviet Social Realism school
and, in the 1960s, features that made him a sort of darker-skinned Che
Guevara. Twentieth-century depictions of Micaela cast her as a long-
necked, thin beauty, with European features. Many have whitened her
skin considerably.
The Atlantic World Reaches the Andes
Tupac Amaru moved throughout the Peruvian viceroyalty, from the

legendary silver mines of Potosí to the regal colonial capital of Lima,
where he found himself entangled in new policies and ideas emanating
from Europe. While the rebellion cannot be understood without taking
into account the lives of Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas as well as
those of the indigenous masses of the southern Andes, it also requires
examining changes in Spain and its treatment of its American holdings.
Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, and their followers lived and suffered
the Bourbon Reforms. Their lives provide excellent entryways into lo-
cal Andean society as well as global changes.
In the eighteenth century, warfare and commercial competition with
France and England plus a palpable sense of decline prompted Spain to
change its relations with and demands on its American holdings. Its al-
liance with France against Great Britain in the Seven Years’ War (1756–
1763) proved disastrous. The English occupied strategic Havana and
Manila in 1762, a “devastating blow to Spanish prestige and morale.”15
King Charles III, who ruled from 1759 until 1788, understood that he
had to revamp the military and modernize the administration in Spain
and its colonies in order to keep pace with France and Great Britain. In
1765, he commissioned the lawyer José de Gálvez to conduct an inspec-
tion or “general visit” to New Spain (Mexico), where he remained for
six years. Gálvez then became Secretary of the Indies in 1775 and
dominated the Madrid court on all overseas issues until his death in
1787. Rival factions among the Spanish in Peru maneuvered to gain his
favor. It was Gálvez who received the voluminous information arriving
from Peru about the Tupac Amaru uprising and oversaw the royalist
response.

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Spain closely followed events in Europe and the Americas. Antico-

lonial movements in North America in the 1770s and 1780s troubled
authorities. The Madrid court believed that if victorious, the patriots
would set a bad example for their colonial brethren in Spanish America;
worse yet, if the British maintained control, they might launch new at-
tacks to the south.16 Some authorities even worried that the English
secretly supported Tupac Amaru.17 In reality, the British focused their
attention and resources on keeping as large a claim as possible in Can-
ada and the newly emergent United States. While the English press
printed information about “revolution in Peru” with a certain satisfac-
tion, the Spanish had little reason to worry about British support for
the Andean rebels.
Intent on improving its defenses and extracting more revenue from
the American colonies, the Spanish state centralized its colonial admin-
istration and increased the demands on the population. Dismantling the
Habsburg system (the dynasty that ruled Spain from 1506–1700, which
relied on negotiation and the diffusion of power), it reduced the num-
ber of American-born individuals in the administration, replacing
them with Europeans. The Bourbons, the royal house of French origin
that ruled Spain after 1700, also tightened control of the administrative
units through “visits” and other mechanisms. Visitador Generals such
as Gálvez in Mexico and Antonio de Areche in Peru, who would play a
vital role in the Tupac Amaru drama and appears prominently here,
clashed with viceroys and other authorities, whom they believed too
lax and cozy with local society. The viceregal state increased taxes and
extended them to previously exempt groups, improved collection meth-
ods, and imposed new monopolies. Kurakas such as Tupac Amaru
found it increasingly difficult to meet the growing demands of the state
without jeopardizing their own legitimacy in local society. They pleaded
with corregidors and in the courts for leniency (tax reductions, exten-
sions, or exemptions) and for recognition, stressing their heritage and
the local stability they maintained. The reformers, however, had little
sympathy with kurakas such as Tupac Amaru and saw them as an un-
fortunate vestige of the Inca and Habsburg past. Tupac Amaru’s frus-
tration grew as his efforts to contest the tax and labor demands failed.
Yet even if unsuccessful, this work brought him increasing appreciation
and even veneration by the Indians in his kurakazgo and beyond whom
he defended.

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The military reforms had initially concentrated on improving Span-

ish America’s coastal defenses (authorities understood the British Navy
and seaborne pirates as the primary threats). In 1780, military authori-
ties were in the midst of shifting imperial defense from militias (local
“volunteers”) to a standing army. These reforms reflected the Bour-
bons’ distrust of those born in the Americas and their preference for
professionals. The events in Cuzco accelerated this process.18
Jurisdictional changes in the 1770s weakened Cuzco’s role in Upper
Peru and the Atlantic trade via Buenos Aires, angering bureaucrats,
merchants, estate owners, and peasants throughout Peru. In 1776, the
Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata was created, separating Cuzco from Potosí
and the Titicaca basin. The 1778 “Free Trade” policy opened Buenos
Aires to trade with Spain, reducing Cuzco’s role in the vast Potosí net-
work by directing trade that had flowed through Cuzco via the Pacific
to the Atlantic instead. Authorities also raised fiscal demands. The alca-
bala, a sales tax paid on most goods traded by non-Indians, rose from
2 to 4 percent in 1772 and to 6 percent in 1776. Visitador General Areche
arrived in 1777, implementing the construction of customs houses
throughout the Andes and endeavoring to enforce the tax’s collection.
He also broadened the tax to include products, such as coca leaves, and
social groups, such as artisans, previously exempt from the alcabala.
People in Cuzco despised these changes.
Indigenous people suffered the most from these tax increases. The
colonial state had long relied on the Indian head tax as a main source
of revenue, and the amount collected in Cuzco multiplied by a factor of
sixteen between 1750 and 1820. In addition to increased tribute and sales
tax, Indians continued to confront the odious forced purchase of goods,
the reparto de mercancías or repartimiento. Corregidors, usually aligned with
powerful merchants and producers, required Indians to buy products,
often at inflated prices.19
José Gabriel witnessed and bore the brunt of these reforms from an
early age. He struggled against one of the hallmark reforms in the An-
des, the transfer of the kuraka office from locals, usually families that
had held the office for centuries and often had claims of Inca royal
blood, to outsiders, who in many cases did not even speak Quechua.
Corregidors were unable to implement the changes until the 1790s,
and even then with delays and exceptions, but in previous decades they
obstructed every transfer from father to son and occasionally placed

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outsiders in the position. José Gabriel had fought to assume the kuraka-
zgo that his father had held, succeeding in 1766. Yet in 1769, authorities
in Cuzco took the position away from him, only to return it in 1771.
Confl icts with successive corregidors of the Tinta province, Gregorio de
Viana and Pedro Muñoz de Arjona, prompted these setbacks. In 1768,
Tupac Amaru took Geronimo Cano, a tax collector, to court for his abu-
sive behavior in the forced sale of goods to Indians. This very well might
have hurt his efforts to reclaim the kuraka position.20
Tupac Amaru heard complaints and pleas for help from Indians forced
to buy overpriced goods under the reparto who then scrambled to pay
the head tax and other obligations with the scarce cash that circulated
in indigenous society. He witnessed groups of men and their grieving
families, who generally accompanied the men, leaving for mita work at
the Potosí mines, no one sure that they would return due to the cost of
the journey and the danger in the mines. The new trade policies, which
facilitated the arrival of goods from Buenos Aires and Spain to Upper
Peru, made his work as a merchant-muleteer in the Potosí circuit less
profitable. Like many, he despised the new customs houses installed
under Visitador Areche’s watch. Tupac Amaru had witnessed the erosion
of creoles’ power, the decrease in Indians’ autonomy, and the weakened
position of the Church. He butted heads with Spanish authorities, par-
ticularly the autocratic corregidors and their henchmen who were in
charge of implementing these new policies. Tupac Amaru had objected
to the exploitation and abuse of Indians and, of course, despised the
efforts to replace ethnic kurakas with Spaniards or creoles.21 The Bour-
bon Reforms, as they would later be known, were not an abstraction
for Tupac Amaru and the indigenous people of southern Cuzco; they
were a daily grievance, corroding their social, political, and economic
standing.
Tupac Amaru had an extended battle in the Cuzco courts and then
Lima’s Real Audiencia or high court with don Diego Felipe de Betancur
over which of them was the legitimate descendent of the last Inca, Tupac
Amaru I, and thus entitled to the marquisate of Oropesa, a rich fief dating
from the seventeenth century. Tupac Amaru I had led the final stages of
Inca resistance in Vilcabamba, the lush area toward the Amazon basin.
The Spanish captured him in 1571 and beheaded him the following year.
Tupac Amaru claimed that he descended from Juana Pilcohuaca Coya,
the illegitimate daughter of Tupac Amaru I, who married Diego Felipe

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Condorcanqui, the kuraka of Surimana, Tungasuca, and Pampamarca.

José Gabriel’s father would in this case be the great grandson of this
couple. Betancur contended that Tupac Amaru had fabricated impor-
tant elements of the supporting evidence and consequently was not a
direct descendent. Betancur presented ample material showing his lin-
eage, which was itself of dubious origin. Each side accused the other of
fraud. The Spanish prolonged the trial, preferring not to fi ll the mar-
quisate.22 In April 1777 Tupac Amaru traveled to Lima to plead his case
in the Audiencia. This long trial, which was not over when he hanged
Arriaga in November 1780, clearly troubled him. The colonial courts
had denied what he believed to be his ancestral rights.23
The Last Inca in the City of Kings
In the 1530s, the Spanish created Lima or “The City of Kings,” as it was
also known, to anchor and represent Spanish power in the still Inca-
dominated Peru. The city and its nearby port, Callao, served as the po-
litical and economic center of the Viceroyalty. Home to the viceroy, the
archbishop, the principal religious orders such as the Jesuits, Francis-
cans, and Dominicans, and the aristocracy, in 1780 it had a population of
about 50,000. Indians made up about 10 percent of the city, ranging
from workers in the eastern “Indian district” to kurakas such as Tupac
Amaru conducting business in the capital. Spaniards, blacks, and multi-
racial groups constituted the bulk of the city’s population. The city’s ar-
chitecture and active court life impressed Europeans; eighteenth-century
travelers also commented, usually with disdain or even fear, about the
city’s multihued population and its disobedient ways.24
During his year in Lima, José Gabriel stayed in a second-story room
on Concepción Street, in front of the Concepción Monastery, three blocks
from the Plaza Mayor, the city’s center. His room became the meeting
place of malcontents, mostly from Cuzco, such as Father Vicente Cen-
teno and the mestizo Miguel Montiel y Surco from Oropesa, a town be-
tween Cuzco and José Gabriel’s home base. Montiel had traveled
throughout Peru, visited England, France, and Spain in the 1760s and
1770s, and greatly admired the English. As a merchant in Lima, he had
a small stand in the “Street of the Jews” next to the Plaza and according
to one testimony in his trial for sedition, Montiel maintained that the
Spanish occupation of Peru was illegal, that Tupac Amaru should replace

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iver
Rimac R
The Viceregal
Palace
Cabildo
PLAZA
EL CERCADO
MAYOR
Cathedral
Andrés and Mariano’s
Tupac Amaru’s lodging in 1782
CO
NC
lodging in 1777
EPC
IÓN
city wall
0 1/4 mile
0 1/4 km
Colonial Lima
the king and take the throne, and that “if Indians weren’t enough to
expel the Spanish, the English, who have a superior government, will
help.” He was a fervent reader of Garcilaso de la Vega’s Royal Commentar-
ies of the Incas, the fundamental text for the rebels.25
Born in Cuzco in 1539, the offspring of a conquistador, Sebastián
Garcilaso de la Vega y Vargas, and an Inca noblewoman, Palla Chimpu
Ocllo, Garcilaso de la Vega became a leading figure in Spain’s golden
era of literature. He lived with his mother in Cuzco in his early years,
learning Spanish and Quechua and imbibing vivid stories of the Incas
and the still unfolding Conquest. His was not a story, however, of mestizo

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bliss. His father married a noble Spanish woman and passed on Chimpu
Ocllo to a Spanish foot soldier. Garcilaso decided to use a 4,000-peso
inheritance upon his father’s death in 1560 to travel to Spain. Living in
Montilla and Córdoba until his death in 1616, Garcilaso fi nally pub-
lished his epic Royal Commentaries (Comentarios Reales de los Incas) in 1609
(part 2, General History of Peru, was published posthumously, in 1617).
Garcilaso presented the Incas as dignified, accomplished rulers who
had conquered and even civilized a vast territory. While historians ques-
tion many of his arguments, readers appreciated his lively prose and bold
depiction of the Incas and the Conquest.26
Published in numerous editions, the book circulated widely in
eighteenth-century Peru, nurturing Neo-Inca nationalism.27 José Gabriel
had the education to capture all the nuances of this literary work. He
no doubt appreciated the romantic depiction of the Incas and read with
horror about the betrayal and execution of his ancestor, Tupac Amaru:
“So ended the Inka, the legitimate heir to the empire by the direct male
line from the fi rst Inka Manco Capac to himself.”28 One source claimed
that during the uprising, José Gabriel “nourished himself with daily
readings of the historian, Garcilaso.”29 Garcilaso de la Vega (often called
“El Inca” to differentiate him from another writer) provided José Ga-
briel and others readers a rousing portrait of the grandiose Incas, cast-
ing them as worthy rivals, respectable monarchs who perhaps deserved
a renewed opportunity to lead the benighted Andean people. “El Inca”
Garcilaso tells particularly moving stories of how different Incas such
as “Maita Cápac, the fourth Inca, conquers Tiahuanaco” (book 3, chap-
ter 1) and about other successful campaigns to the south. As will be
seen, these stories of southern expansion would inspire and influence
Tupac Amaru.
José Gabriel met with many dissidents in Lima. Francisco Pineda, a
tamale and pastry vendor identified as a young black man, recalled hear-
ing spirited conversations about “how the reparto oppressed Indians”
when he made his deliveries to Concepción Street, and that corregidors
and their tribute or head tax demands “didn’t leave the poor enough to
maintain their wives and children.”30 Pineda noticed that Tupac Amaru
was ill with tertian fever, malaria, and understood that doctors told
him he would die if he did not get out of Lima. Prosecutors later claimed
that Tupac Amaru met with dignitaries in Lima, including “men of let-
ters,” who encouraged him “to get on with the uprising.”31 According to

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Father López y Sosa, Indians from an adjoining province— probably

Huarochirí—visited him in Lima. Concerned about his illness, they
kneeled and expressed their veneration. They had told a judge in Lima
that he was their “king.” Indians believed him to be a messiah, the last
Inca.32 Micaela Bastidas claimed that the experience in Lima “opened
his eyes.”33
In Lima in July 1777, Tupac Amaru presented an impassioned de-
fense of the Indians of the districts of Canas y Canchis and Quispican-
chi, emphasizing the heavy burden of the mita labor draft. This was not
that unusual an act. Throughout the colonial period, authors wrote care-
ful yet pointed critiques of aspects of colonial rule. The court channeled
Tupac Amaru’s petition to Visitador General Areche, whose power by
this time perhaps surpassed that of the Viceroy. Areche responded on
September 23, 1777 that Tupac Amaru’s petition against the mita was
insufficient and unconvincing. Moreover, he instructed Tupac Amaru
to return to “his towns” and wait for an answer from the superinten-
dent of the mita, who held office in distant Potosí. Tupac Amaru re-
sponded to Viceroy Manuel de Guirior in December 1777, with a biting
critique of the mita.
Tupac Amaru stressed the “unbearable” burden the labor draft
placed on families, as wives, children, and other dependents almost al-
ways accompanied the man forced to work in Potosí and they received
no compensation for the six-hundred-mile journey. The expenses often
forced them to sell their huts and furniture to finance the trip, making
their return unlikely. Because of the decreasing population of the
region— caused, he claimed, in large part by the mita—men were en-
listed more frequently than every seventh year as the law stipulated,
and were forced to stay for longer periods. Tupac Amaru stressed that
Potosí already had a sufficiently large resident labor population and
cited at length the Crown’s Laws of the Indies (the body of laws that over-
saw Spanish control of the Americans and the Philippines) to show
how the system had been perverted since its origin in the late sixteenth
century. He suggested that the mine owners rely instead on blacks, pre-
sumably slaves, and wage laborers. On May 20, 1778, the “Protector of
Indians,” don Francisco Ruiz Cano, who apparently had been friendly
with Tupac Amaru, confi rmed Areche’s earlier rejection of the peti-
tion. Tupac Amaru lost this case at the same time that his legal battle
with Betancur stagnated. He left Lima in mid-1778 dejected, convinced

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that the legal system offered little hope for improving the lot of the In-
dians he represented. The long trip to Cuzco gave him plenty of time to
mull over his frustrating defeat. He met with disgruntled Indians in
Huarochirí, just outside of Lima, a region that had risen up in arms before
and would do so again.34 His anger with the Spanish and his willing-
ness to be seen as an indigenous leader and even the savior of his peo-
ple were on the rise.
Foreshadowings
In the months and years after the uprising, prosecutors scrutinized all
of Tupac Amaru’s activities from 1777 until his death, seeking to dis-
cover how long he had planned the uprising and with whom. They
recognized that as kuraka Tupac Amaru had defended his Indians with
growing passion and had met with a variety of people. The image of
him as an Inca royal destined to represent his people began to take root
throughout Cuzco, in other Andean areas, and even in Lima. Conspira-
cies and revolts in Cuzco as well as Tupac Amaru’s actions foreshad-
owed the violence of the 1780s. In hindsight, investigators wondered
how they could not have seen the rebellion coming and why they had
tolerated Tupac Amaru’s increasing belligerence.
Visitador General Areche arrived in Peru in 1777. Born in 1731 near
Santander, Spain, Areche had studied law and received his fi rst appoint-
ment overseas in the Philippines in 1765. He worked closely with José de
Gálvez, Mexico’s first Visitador General. Both clashed with viceroys, who
saw them as uncouth interlopers with no sense of local reality. The
viceroys, up until this point the maximum representatives of the king
in the Americas, disliked the visitadors’ heavy-handed implementation
of the administrative changes, which they knew sought to undermine
their own power. The visitadors, in turn, saw the viceroys as second-
rate bureaucrats who were too corrupt or too lazy to implement changes
that sought to wrest power away from creoles. Gálvez and Areche
shared a great impatience and even disdain for the residents of Spanish
America. They worried that Spaniards who resided in the Americas
had been corrupted by local society, and they mistrusted creoles, whose
loyalties were not necessarily aligned with Spain. They doubted that a
fi fth-generation creole, say, appreciated and understood Spain. The vis-
itadors also disliked the multiethnic lower classes, questioning their

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assimilation and loyalty. Areche almost immediately fought with Vice-

roy Manuel de Guirior, seemingly over issues of protocol but ultimately
about who was in charge of the viceroyalty, the visitador or the viceroy.
Areche’s arrival actually surprised Viceroy Guirior, who departed Lima
soon after, in 1780.
Areche did not get along any better with the replacement, Viceroy
Agustín de Jáuregui, and their sparring marked the period of the upris-
ing. Jáuregui (1711–1784) had been Governor of Chile until he reached
Lima in July 1780 to assume the office of viceroy. His arrival took his
predecessor, Guirior, by surprise—he did not know he was being re-
placed. Some believed that Visitador Areche had maneuvered to have
Guirior removed.35 Nonetheless, the visitador also battled with the new
viceroy. Jáuregui was one of the older, cautious, bureaucratic viceroys
that Bourbon reformers such as José Gálvez and Areche targeted. Gálvez
and Areche believed that authorities such as Jáuregui were too old and
too tied to tradition to implement the changes that the Bourbons under
the reign of Charles III (1759–1788) sought. They held that he and his
brethren aligned too easily with the American-born and did not have
the will to implement real change. One historian deemed it a battle be-
tween “complacent conservatives and zealous reformers.”36
Some of the precedents were almost comical. In 1776 in the city of
Cuzco, an Indian named Juan de Dios Tupa Orcoguaranca told everyone
he met that they should fear the year 1777 with its numerical or eschato-
logical implications (the number seven having an important biblical
presence) and that Indians should “rise up against Spaniards, begin-
ning with corregidors, mayors and other white-skinned and blonde
people, and kill them.”37 He declared himself an Indian noble and claimed
that in the San Cristóbal parish in the city of Cuzco, Indians were busy
employing the quipu, the Inca knotted cords used to register informa-
tion. Imprudent drinking and boasting got him into trouble. One eve-
ning, he and several other Indians had been drinking heavily and
among discussions about rising up against the Spanish, had fought over
a woman as well as the bill for chicha or corn beer. They became so
drunk that when dancing, one of them fell on top of a guinea pig, ubiq-
uitous in Cuzco households and a key source of protein, and squashed
it. The next day they ate it. Judicial officers in Cuzco learned about
Tupa Orcoguaranca’s subversive rants and arrested him. What seemed
like a drunken party and loose tongues was, from the perspective of

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1781, proof of “formal machination since 1776 of an uprising.” The Span-

ish later recriminated one another for not having followed this lead.38
The trial of Joseph Gran Quispe Tupa Inga confirmed rumors circu-
lated widely in Cuzco that 1777 would be a tumultuous year, that Santa
Rosa of Lima’s prophecy about the end of Spanish rule might well come
true, and that an Inca King might be crowned. Throughout the eigh-
teenth century, the apocryphal story that Santa Rosa (1586–1617), the
fi rst American-born saint, had predicted the fall of the Spanish, in-
spired renegades.39 Quispe, a sixty-year-old illiterate peasant from the
Sacred Valley, had commissioned letters that called for Indians to pre-
pare an uprising and to kill puka kunkas, rednecks, the derogatory Que-
chua term for Spaniards used frequently during the rebellion. He de-
fended himself, rather poorly, by claiming that he was merely trying to
raise money for his sick daughter; yet he also noted that rumors had
spread in chicha bars, chicherias, that the prophecy would begin with
“commotion and sedition by Indians and mestizos rising up against cor-
regidors, killing some and expelling others.” 40 The trial against Quipse
Tupa Inga dragged on until the events of 1780 gave it new significance.
Quispe died in Cuzco’s Royal Jail in December 1780. His lawyer claimed
that he and other prisoners were starving, barely surviving on scraps of
barley bread. At that point, however, it became clear that Cuzco’s au-
thorities had greater concerns.41
The trials of Tupa Orcoguaranca and Quispe Tupa Inga as well as
other rumors from the period indicate that the ingredients for an uprising
were developing, expanding, and feeding off one another: the wide-
spread and growing hatred for the Spanish, the belief that they were di-
vided and vulnerable, the notion that the Incas would return, and the
pursuit of unity and strategies. Tupac Amaru would imbibe and promote
all of these, raising hopes among many.
Some observers claimed that Tupac Amaru himself changed in the
late 1770s. In the two years prior to the uprising, a few residents in Tu-
pac Amaru’s hometowns complained that he had become dictatorial
and presumptuous. No one paid attention to these charges—until after
the rebellion. In 1779, several Spaniards accused Tupac Amaru of au-
thoritarian and violent behavior and alleged that he deemed himself
“the last Inca.” After the rebellion, authorities reviewing the case be-
lieved that Tupac Amaru had given clear signs of his violent nature and
subversive intentions and that an opportunity to prevent the uprising

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had been lost. The Justicia Mayor or local judge of Tinta accused José
Gabriel of detaining and whipping prisoners in his house and calling
for all Spaniards to get out of town. One witness warned, a year before
the uprising, that “it’s not good to have Tupac Amaru around here as
the Indians are very restless due to the news he’s spreading.”42 Some-
one else accused him of meeting with a group of unhappy Indians from
Sicuani in his role as “the last Inca of Peru” to hear their complaints. In
the late 1770s, José Gabriel increasingly stressed his Inca lineage and
the term “the last Inca” surfaced.
Others charged him with whipping “Spaniards with white faces” and
demanding that mestizos not from the region—that is, mestizos forasteros—
leave the province. Esteban Zuñiga, the tithe collector of the Azángaro
province and a resident of Pampamarca, complained that Tupac Amaru
always had disliked and mistreated him. They had once bickered over
some land and had come to blows when Tupac Amaru brought Micaela
Bastidas’s aunt to town for some type of punishment, kicking her and
pulling her hair. When Zuñiga intervened, Tupac Amaru hit and kicked
him. Zuñiga claimed that Tupac Amaru consistently behaved as though
he were the sole authority in town, whipping and imprisoning people
at his whim, and acting with hostility toward mestizos and Spaniards.
The local judge subsequently called Tupac Amaru in for a meeting. The
kuraka, however, brought a letter of support from Pampamarca’s priest,
Antonio López de Sosa, and no punishment followed. Years later, 1785,
when the newly named president of the Cuzco Intendancy, Mata Lin-
ares, reviewed this case, he seethed over how officials had missed so
many signs of serious trouble brewing: “this inattention caused so
much misfortune, set the state so far back that we can’t even calculate
it.” 43 Mata Linares ranted for paragraphs about this lost opportunity to
stop the rebellion before it began.
These small conspiracies in Cuzco and Tupac Amaru’s truculent be-
havior were not the only antecedents. In the late 1770s people organized
and rioted in different Andean cities and towns such as Cochabamba, La
Paz, and, closer to Cuzco, Maras, over the implementation of the tax re-
forms imposed by Visitador Areche. The turmoil did not begin with Ar-
riaga’s execution. In 1780, Arequipa and Cuzco witnessed anti-Spanish
disturbances. On January 1, 1780, satirical posters appeared on the ca-
thedral door in Arequipa that ridiculed the Spanish and threatened the
administrator of the new customs house. On January 5, another one

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targeted Arequipa’s corregidor, Baltasar de Sematnat. It ended on a famil-

iar note: “Long Live the Great Charles III/Death to his evil henchmen/
and bad government.”44 Eighteenth-century rebels frequently claimed to
be fulfilling the king’s wishes by targeting his wayward and corrupt rep-
resentatives. Tupac Amaru himself held that he had the support of the
king. In the following weeks, the posters in Arequipa became more
pointed, complimenting England at a time when Spain was allied with
France and raising the prospect of replacing Charles III with an Inca
king.45 On January 13 and 14, 1780, rioters stormed the customs house,
a symbol of the increasing tax demands, and troops were only able to
control the rebels, described as a motley group of Indians, mestizos, and
whites, after a week of fighting.46 The Spanish had initially believed that
Indians were too cowardly and mestizos too “unfortunate” (desdichada
suerte) to lead an uprising; they would soon learn they were wrong.47
News of the Arequipa disturbances reached Cuzco quickly, just
when officials were inaugurating a customs house. Dissidents surrepti-
tiously placed lampoons that objected to new taxes and the stepped-up
collection. In March, the Cuzco police rounded up conspirators who
planned to attack the new building, the so-called Silversmiths’ Con-
spiracy. Eleven of the twelve arrested were creoles or mestizos and in
their confessions they conceded that the movement sought to incorpo-
rate everyone in the region other than Spaniards. Tupac Amaru’s
brother-in-law, Antonio Bastidas, claimed that when the rebel leader
learned that one leader, the kuraka of Pisac, Bernardo Tambohuacso
Pumayala, had been hanged, “he said that he couldn’t understand how
the Indians had let this happen.”48 Authorities kept a close eye on poten-
tial conspirators and an “ambience of impending civil war” took hold in
the city.49 Corregidor Arriaga accused Bishop Moscoso of abetting the
rebels, deepening the animosity between these two, representatives of
the State and Church. This confl ict flared up just months before the Tu-
pac Amaru uprising.
The Church
Events in early 1780 in the towns that rose above Tinta and Tupac
Amaru’s base brought to the fore the explosive tensions that marked
relations among civil authorities, members of the church, kurakas, and
the Indian masses. In livestock towns such as Yauri and Coporaque,

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where sheep, llamas, alpacas, and cows grazed in the narrow valleys
and steep hills and where Indians worked primarily as shepherds, the
joint church-state governance system shattered, disrupting the fragile
alliances and understandings that held society together and mitigated
violence. The classic eighteenth-century clash between state and church
lay behind the confrontation. Nonetheless, the battle over the state’s
effort to control the church, and the bishop’s maneuvers to manage his
heterogeneous and distant flock, can only be understood in the context
of the local culture and economy.
The story is not simple. In 1779, Cuzco’s Bishop, Juan Manuel Mos-
coso y Peralta, asked all priests along the Royal Highway to present
detailed summaries of the state of their parishes. Bishop Moscoso would
become a leading figure in the Tupac Amaru rebellion and its long after-
math. Born in the southern Peruvian city of Arequipa in 1723 to aristo-
cratic parents, he studied in Lima and Cuzco and was married in 1748.
His wife died three years later in childbirth, their newborn son days
afterwards, causing Moscoso to rethink his plans to take his place along-
side his father as an Arequipa patriarch. Instead, he petitioned to become
a priest. He worked his way up the clerical hierarchy, in Moquegua and
then Córdoba (in what became Argentina), and in 1779 became the
bishop of Cuzco. Several characteristics stand out in his long career: the
use of his considerable wealth for the social work and art of the church;
his frequent spats with authorities; and his taste, according to salacious
accusations, for women, married and single, young and old.50 He and
Corregidor Arriaga had taken a dislike to each other before Moscoso’s
arrival in Cuzco and his nomination had irritated some Spaniards, who
expected a peninsular rather than a creole for the prestigious position.51
His 1779 request for reports from the parishes along the Royal High-
way sought to monitor the priests’ actions and to gain a share of the
revenue they earned from the ser vices they offered to parishioners and
the rental of church land. The bishop’s defenders claimed that he sought
to protect Indians from excessive fees and duties while watching over
the moral activities of his flock, while critics argued that he was simply
trying to extract more revenue from an impoverished area. Parish priests
responded slowly or not at all to his requests and so, in mid-1780, Mos-
coso sent father Vicente de la Puente, the priest of Coporaque, to inves-
tigate father Justo Martínez of Yauri, accused of improperly controlling
vast amounts of land. After weeks of recriminations, tussles, and riots,

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the sides were set. On one side stood Moscoso and Puente, who saw the
locals as uncooperative at best and corrupt and belligerent at worst, and
on the other side were Corregidor Arriaga and his allies, the kuraka
Eugenio Sinayuca, the disobedient Martínez, and other powerful lo-
cals, who saw Moscoso as a meddling outsider who sought money from
their poor district. The church, as always, was divided; priests can be
found on both sides.
In July 1780, Moscoso excommunicated Arriaga. Arriaga’s nephew
and assistant, Eusebio Balza de Verganza, who for years accused Mos-
coso of supporting Tupac Amaru and wreaking havoc, called this “the
most famously scandalous case this Kingdom has ever seen” and deemed
it proof of “the lack of respect priests have for authorities and their con-
tinual insults.”52 Arriaga himself retaliated by sending a secret report to
Viceroy Guirior that implicated Bishop Moscoso in the Silversmiths’
Conspiracy (also called the Farfán de los Godos uprising) in early 1780,
a reaction to the newly established customs house in Cuzco.53
The all-powerful Visitador General Areche seemed to support Mos-
coso and Puente at one point, sharing their disdain for corregidors and
kurakas. Puente accused Arriaga of numerous illicit profiteering schemes,
while the corregidor countered that Father Puente was not only living
sinfully with Maria Josefa Alarcón and their children but that he also
tyrannized and exploited local Indians. Arriaga charged that, “Puente
and other ecclesiastics have shaken up local Indians,” and blamed them
and above all their superiors (namely Bishop Moscoso) for disturbances
in Cuzco and Arequipa along with the uproar over taxes.54 As was so
often the case, accusations about money quickly turned to those in-
volving sex and scandalous lifestyles.55 Moscoso was forced to rescind
Arriaga’s excommunication in September.
The conflict simmered until November when the execution of Ar-
riaga galvanized Europeans and put on hold this and other local strug-
gles. Throughout these disputes, both sides worried that the conflict
could lead to broader indigenous uprisings, but blamed the other side and
refused to relent. In witnessing this infighting among Europeans, the
indigenous population gained an anticlerical and anticorregidor vocabu-
lary. If all revolutions require a prior partition of the upper classes, this
was it, although in a microregional context. Pushed to the side with
Arriaga’s execution in November, the confl ict smoldered for years. Ar-
riaga’s nephew, don Eusebio, relentlessly accused Puente and Moscoso

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of supporting Tupac Amaru. Years later, a former prisoner in Tungas-

uca stated that these events as well as the long, frustrating trial over the
marquisate had sparked the rebellion.56
Preconditions
In the 1770s, Tupac Amaru made important contacts throughout the

massive Peruvian viceroyalty, from the Potosí silver mines, where dra-
gooned Indians moved from the bitter cold down into the dangerous and
infernally hot shafts, to coastal Lima, where Tupac Amaru heard anti-
Spanish ideas and received a cold shoulder from the powers that be. He
and other indigenous people bore the brunt of the efforts by the Spanish
to squeeze more revenue out of the colonies and to tighten control.
Disgruntlement spread beyond the Indians, however, including hard-
pressed mestizos, dissatisfied creoles, and a small number of Spaniards.
Opposition to Spanish rule blossomed and alternative visions and utopias
emerged, most incorporating some form of the return of the Incas.
In 1780, at the ages of forty-two and thirty-six, Tupac Amaru and
Micaela Bastidas seemed to have the connections, abilities, and griev-
ances to lead a revolution. José Gabriel, in particular, rubbed elbows with
Spaniards, creoles, mestizos, and Indians, and both were comfortable in
Spanish and Quechua. Work and legal troubles had taken José Gabriel
throughout the viceroyalty of Peru, and he and Micaela counted on
valuable networks of family, friends, and business partners in the Cuzco
region and beyond. José Gabriel had confronted all of the ramifications of
the Bourbon Reforms: he despised the new tax and labor demands, suf-
fered from the limitations put on ethnic kurakas, and distrusted the
State’s incipient effort to rein in the Church. He also disliked older forms
of exploitation and domination, such as the corregidors’ omnipotence
and Lima’s deaf ear to Andean demands, phenomena that predated the
Bourbons.
At a broader level, beyond the personal, southern Peru also exhibited
the necessary conditions for revolt: increasingly oppressed Indian masses,
disaffected “middle sectors,” and elites divided over changes emanating
from Spain. Divisions within the ruling class are an indispensable pre-
condition for revolution and Peru had several schisms: Spanish-creole
distrust, the church-state confl ict, and tensions between Lima and
Cuzco. All worsened in the 1770s with the arrival of Visitador Areche

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and the jurisdictional changes understood, particularly in Cuzco, as the

“loss” of Upper Peru to Buenos Aires. In addition, the zealous (some
would say fanatical) Bourbon reformers arriving from Iberia had no
qualms about challenging other Europeans: Visitador Areche fought
with Viceroys Guirior and Jáuregui almost from his arrival.
The launching of a revolution requires more than a strong leadership,
economic grievances, and elite political divisions; it requires a platform,
an ideology. Various sets of ideas or notions of change buoyed the reb-
els. Chief among them was the belief that the Incas would return or
that some sort of fairer, more just system with its roots going back to
the Inca period would be put into place. Since the Conquest, different
groups, including non-Indians, had kept alive a belief that the Incas
constituted an alternative to Spanish colonialism. Tupac Amaru’s de-
scent from “the last Inca” greatly augmented his prestige; it is no coin-
cidence that he increasingly adopted that as his last name in the late
1770s. Bolstering the messianic nature of the uprising, followers be-
lieved that Tupac Amaru could not be killed, or had numerous lives,
and that his martyred followers would be resurrected. The belief in
resurrection emboldened his indigenous soldiers.57
The rebels also built on the idea of “bad government,” that people
could take direct action against corrupt or disruptive authorities. Colo-
nial Spanish America had a long tradition of negotiated relations be-
tween the state and the indigenous peasantry. Eighteenth-century in-
surgents often claimed that wayward authorities had broken the pact
which they, the insurgents, sought to rebuild. Tupac Amaru and other
leaders never deviated from their proclamation that they acted on be-
half of King Charles III.58 It is more difficult to discern whether ele-
ments of the Enlightenment, the radical and heterogeneous set of ideas
that marked eighteenth-century politics in Europe and the Americas,
can be found in their program. The rebels never presented a platform.
In fact, the ideological nature of the uprising can only be understood
by examining the events of the rebellion, the words and actions of the
leaders and followers.

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2
From Pampamarca to Sangarará
T H E DAYS A N D W EEKS following Arriaga’s hanging on November 10,

1780 proved that the execution had not been spontaneous. Tupac
Amaru and Micaela Bastidas set up camp in Tungasuca, sent emissaries
to gain support in nearby towns, wrote notes to potential allies, particu-
larly kurakas, and supervised their prisoners, who trembled in their
basement cells aware of the corregidor’s fate. They also posted spies and
sentinels on the roads into Cuzco, hoping to keep the uprising secret as
long as possible and to be well prepared for a counterattack. Tupac
Amaru almost immediately left the base in Tungasuca while Micaela
Bastidas stayed behind, an arrangement that continued throughout the
uprising.
Tupac Amaru’s forays into nearby towns in November 1780 reveal his
objectives, social base, economic program, and military strategy. In light
of the absence of a “program,” the activities and correspondence of Mi-
caela Bastidas and Tupac Amaru are the best entryway into understand-
ing what they sought and how they intended to carry out their objec-
tives. Tupac Amaru and his increasingly large entourage burst into towns
and congregated people by the church, the cemetery, or in the plaza. The
rebel leader then explained to the startled crowds what he planned to do.
Most Indians, apparently, quickly warmed to the ideas he presented, his
promise of a new world or perhaps an ancient one harking back to the
Inca past. Members of the middle groups who stood just above Indians
in Peru’s social pyramid—merchants, shop owners, small landowners,
primarily mestizos but also creoles and even Indians—vacillated. Some
welcomed the prospect of reduced taxes and less corregidor intrusion,
while others agonized about the consequences, concerned that the Indi-

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From Pampamarca to Sangarará 41
ans around were becoming less subservient or about the ensuing pun-
ishment and repression from the colonial state. With a few exceptions,
Spaniards not singled out by the rebels paid little attention to Tupac
Amaru’s assurances, and understanding the danger, made plans to flee.
In the early weeks and months of the uprising, November 1780, the
organization, unity, and rapid growth of the movement shocked the
southern Andes. At the same time, the obstacles Tupac Amaru and Mi-
caela Bastidas faced in maintaining a united front and creating a cohesive
anticolonial program came to the surface. Continuing with the questions
of rebel support and how they organized themselves, I examine the
rebel camp in the town of Tungasuca. Par tic ular attention is paid to the
mystery surrounding a group of European prisoners who passed over
to the rebels. Their “captivating stories” demonstrate the challenge in
constructing a multiethnic movement.
Sources used to interpret the uprising include correspondence, ex-
tensive trials against major participants, accounts written in the after-
math, and documentation that, while not focused on the uprising per
se, sheds light on the context or specific individuals. All of this is in
Spanish and the majority comes from the Spanish perspective. In some
cases, multiple sources on a key moment can be contrasted in order to
present the most plausible course of events and to highlight how differ-
ent people or groups understand them. In many other cases, however,
a single letter or brief testimony is all there is, forcing speculative inter-
pretations. In terms of the quantity of available material, the archives
reproduce the social pyramid—much more is written about educated
Europeans and the rebel leaders than about the mostly illiterate indig-
enous followers and the black royalist soldiers. In fact, the sources almost
never name common fighters. Even if deemed heroic or blamed for an
atrocity, they remain anonymous. This book uses the tidbits or fragments
about Quechua-speaking rebels, the female camp aides, and the foot sol-
diers to tell a broad, social history.
Stream of Followers
Tupac Amaru headed for Quiquijana, the capital of the Quispicanchi

province, on November 11, the day after Arriaga’s execution. A few
thousand Indians as well as a small number of mestizos accompanied
him. One observer noted that the Indians followed Tupac Amaru

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N
Urubamba
Urubamba
Calca Paucartambo
Vi l c a b a m b a
Pisac
Cuzco
Caicay Ocongate
Urcos
Paruro Ausangate
Cotabambas
Rondocán Quiquijana
Acos Acomayo
Tambobamba Accha Pitumarca
Sangarará Checacupe
Pampamarca
Combapata
Surimana
Tungasuca Tinta
Colquemarca
Yanaoca Sicuani
Livitaca
Ap
urim a c R
Santo Tomás La Raya

Velille 4,312 m
iver
Yauri
Coporaque
Ayaviri Azángaro
Pucará Pupuja
Cailloma
Lampa
Lake
Juliaca Titicaca
Condesuyos
Chuquibamba Puno
over 6,000m
4,000–6,000m
500–4,000m
Arequipa 0–500m
lake
0 25 miles
Pacific 0 25 km
Ocean
4,500 m
Cailloma
3,750 m Yauri Yanaoca
Sangarará
3,000 m Cuzco
Calca Urubamba
2,250 m Arequipa
1,500 m
750 m
0m
150 km 300 km 450 km 600 km
The Rebellion’s Core Area

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“willingly” while many of the mestizos and Spaniards were coerced.1

The elegantly dressed Tupac Amaru and other leaders rode horses while
most of the Indian fighters walked. Women accompanied them as camp
aides, but almost no document or description mentions them in any
phase of the uprising. One exception describes a battle in Oruro, in Up-
per Peru, where the women aided the rock-slinging Indian soldiers: “the
women dedicated themselves to continually collecting rocks, particularly
big, sturdy ones they brought from the mines.”2 The only women subse-
quently prosecuted were rebel leaders such as Micaela Bastidas and To-
masa Titu Condemaytu or family members.3 Mules carried provisions
and weapons, although the rebels traveled light in these initial excur-
sions to nearby towns and communities. The term “troops” might be an
exaggeration, since they had little military training and most relied on
lances, pikes, and slings for weapons. They had a few rustic cannons, or
pedreros, made by local artisans, and muskets that they seized from the
enemy. The rebel soldiers struggled to learn how to use the muskets.4
The closest thing they had to a uniform were hay or palm crosses
such as those distributed on Palm Sunday that many of them wore in
their hats. One prisoner admitted that he wore both the cross and a red
embroidery, “the insignias of the rebels.”5 In December 1780, Micaela
Bastidas ordered that they display the crosses in their hats “as a sign that
they are good and true Christians.”6 A small-town mayor reported that
when a group of royalist troops switched over to Tupac Amaru, they “put
on Indian shirts,” presumably coarse wool with rustic buttons, and
placed white crosses in their hats.7 Nonetheless, these Indian combatants
knew the area well, venerated Tupac Amaru, and proved to be brave and
resourceful. They also hated Spanish authorities and the status quo.
On November 12, the rebels destroyed the textile mills of Pomacan-
chi and Parapujio. Tupac Amaru opened up the jail in the Pomacanchi
mill and, after asking if the owner owed anyone money, distributed
some of the cloth and thousands of pounds of wool to his Indian fol-
lowers, his half-brother, Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru, and a priest. One
report noted that “the resentful Indians were about to burn the mill,
cheered on by the prisoners.”8 Indians despised the mills because of the
dreadful working conditions and their use as jails. Also, the obrajes played
a central role in the forced purchase of goods, the reparto, because their
owners acquired wool at artificially low prices and sold cloth for substan-
tial profit. Tupac Amaru used the confiscated funds to pay his soldiers,

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two reales (one-fourth of a peso) per day for Indians and four reales
(half a peso) for Europeans.9 In the coming weeks he used the mill’s jail
for his prisoners.
One astonished observer, Isidro de Montecinos, a salesman from
Cuzco, could not believe the size of Tupac Amaru’s following. He claimed
that the rebel leader left Pomacanchi at three or four p.m. and that “a
rope-like stream of followers” continued well into the night. He calcu-
lated that the columns stretched over seven miles, and included Indi-
ans, mestizos, and Spaniards. Montecinos reported that the Indians
had slings, lances, and sabers and that they were hugging one another
in joy, proclaiming that forced labor and their suffering had ended.10
Tupac Amaru’s main objective, the corregidor Fernando Cabrera, evaded
the fi rst wave of rebels by hiding in a chapel and fled Quiquijana two
hours before Tupac Amaru arrived, indicating the rapid spread of news
or rumors. The rebels destroyed another mill, distributing the cloth and
wool among themselves. They would ransack at least two more in the
following days.11
Don Joseph Alvarez y Nava, a post-office administrator en route to
Lima with satchels of mail from Cuzco, stumbled upon the rebel forces
in Quiquijana. He noted that the “hills were teeming with Indians” and
in town “armed men, mestizos and Spaniards, were taking orders from
their cacique don Joseph Tupac Amaro . . . who was distributing Cabre-
ra’s goods to the sound of drums. The Corregidor had fled to Cuzco.”12
Alvarez y Nava rushed to the priest’s house, where he met a Franciscan
friar and four other priests. They were in shock, even more so when
Tupac Amaru walked into the room. The rebel leader treated them
courteously and granted Alvarez y Nava permission to continue with
his parcels because the rebellion “did not seek to harm anyone or any-
thing, including royal paperwork and fi nances.”
It’s surprising that Tupac Amaru did not confiscate the bundles, to
prevent information about his uprising from reaching Lima and to fi nd
administrative secrets.13 When Tupac Amaru left, another priest came
out of hiding. The diligent postman asked the priests what he should do
and they gave him different opinions—leave the bags and return to
Cuzco or continue to Lima with Tupac Amaru’s permission. Alvarez y
Nava started toward Lima and witnessed Indians ransacking obrajes in
Checacupe, where about twenty-five Indians detained him. They sent a
query to Tupac Amaru who instructed that he be freed. At this point

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Alvarez y Nava took fl ight to Puno, where he wrote to the viceroy about
his adventure.14 His story captures the initial uncertainty about the up-
rising as well as Tupac Amaru’s efforts to gain the support of or at least
mollify members of the Church.
On his return to Tungasuca, Tupac Amaru continued to recruit allies,
intimidate enemies, and gather supplies. In the small town of Guaro, af-
ter services in the town church with the two priests who accompanied
him (those of the town had fled), Tupac Amaru gathered local Indians
and his entourage in the cemetery. He declared that they “didn’t even
know who God was, that they were following false Gods, those of the
thieving corregidors and priests.” This argument, that incessant exploi-
tation by Spaniards impeded Indians from developing true faith, be-
came a leitmotif of the uprising. The rebel leader promised to remedy
this situation and to do away with repartos, the sales tax, the Potosí
mita, payments to priests, and customs houses. He pledged that Indians
would be free and only have to pay the head tax to him.15 With this
speech, Tupac Amaru cast his uprising as a defense or liberation of in-
digenous Catholicism. Nonetheless, although he, Micaela Bastidas, and
other leaders as well as the bulk of his followers proved to be devout
Christians who venerated the Church, the uprising’s opponents cast
them as church-burning heathens, a label that proved difficult to shake.
In this journey back to the base, Tupac Amaru sent his son Hipólito
and his much trusted brother-in-law Antonio Bastidas ahead to make
sure that the route was clear of soldiers and that his Indian supporters
did not pillage. They also obtained or expropriated supplies. Although
the uprising had spread quickly, without a hitch, they understood that
an encounter with a small group of well-armed enemies could be the
end.16 In Andahuaylillas, priests met him on the stairs that lead up to
the town’s spectacular church. After he kissed the cross and prayed at
the main altar, Tupac Amaru descended to the adjoining cemetery where
he made a rousing speech that again called for the elimination of the
reparto, mills, and corregidors and called on the town’s people to sup-
port him.17 One priest, however, Martínez Sánchez, wrote him a letter
questioning whether the Crown had actually sanctioned his activities.
Tupac Amaru answered sharply, ending his letter on this ominous
note: “I can see that you have a great deal of affection for the thieving
corregidores, who, with no fear of God, imposed unbearable work on
the Indians with the reparto, robbing them with their long fi ngers.

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Some priests collaborated with them and they will be expelled from
their jobs as thieves, and then they will know my power.”18
His Program in Action
This initial foray to nearby Quiquijana set the tone for Tupac Amaru’s
military activities in late 1780. He and a large group of followers— the
vague but imposing figure thousands is often used—would enter a small
town and assemble the population. Tupac Amaru would demand that
everyone gather—not difficult due to the excitement of most people as
well as the inability of most Spaniards and other prominent people to
hide— and explain his enterprise in Spanish and Quechua. Indians from
adjoining communities and villages would participate and, if con-
vinced, join the uprising. November is the early part of the rainy season;
agricultural tasks were at a minimum, making it easier for peasants to
leave their fields. He opened jails, burned gallows, ransacked textile
mills, and declared the abolition of the sales tax, reparto, and the mita,
and the end of corregidors. This was his stump speech. For Indians,
these were wildly popu lar and deeply symbolic actions. In the Andes
under Spanish colonialism, powerful individuals used jails, gallows,
and mills to exert their seemingly inescapable power over Indians while
authorities, in cahoots with locals, took advantage of forced sales and
the head and labor taxes to exploit and control the indigenous pop-
ulation and to make money. Coercion and colonialism went hand in
hand.
In these initial weeks, Tupac Amaru repeated in his speeches and
memos the essence of his economic program: the abolition of the mita,
the reparto, sales taxes, and customs houses. He stated that he would
maintain the head tax and rarely mentioned fees destined to the church.
To the great satisfaction of the Indian masses, he spoke to them in Que-
chua. He allowed his troops to ransack the property of corregidors and
unpopular Spaniards but sought to limit the damage on other estates. He
did not consider all haciendas and hacendados evil, worthy of rebel wrath;
some of his more radical followers did. Beyond these negative measures—
the banning of unpopular colonial impositions that had become increas-
ingly intolerable in the prior decade or so and the confiscation of Spanish-
owned estates—he never set out a clear economic plan. These measures
delighted his indigenous followers, intrigued mestizos and creoles, in-

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timidated landowners and prosperous merchants, and infuriated Span-

ish authorities.
Tupac Amaru was a man of action. One of his prisoners, José Este-
ban Escarcena, provided a telling anecdote on the rebel leader’s world-
view and strategy. In Tinta, Escarcena found some bound law books.
When he showed them to the rebel leader, Tupac Amaru responded
“these books are worthless other than to make empanadas or pastries; I’ll
just impose strong laws.” He explained that once in power they would
place one official in every town, who would collect the head tax and
send it to the city of Cuzco. This program would begin in Cuzco but
expand to Arequipa, Lima and Upper Peru. Escarcena also noted that
Tupac Amaru told many people that he would get rid of lawyers and
jails and simplify punishment. Major criminals would be hanged on
the spot while smaller transgressions would be punished by hanging the
perpetrator by one foot from the gallows, placed in every town. This
streamlined system would not only reduce crime but also “get rid of
lawsuits and notaries.”19 These comments and his speeches made his
platform clear, at least in administrative terms: tough laws and the abo-
lition of all taxes, income and labor, other than the head tax.20 This
same passage also clarified who was in charge: “the rebel and his wife
made the decisions, and he [Tupac Amaru] said several times that he
didn’t need advice, he knew well what needed to be done.”21
Tupac Amaru expropriated food, livestock, and other goods from
corregidors and landowners. For his supporters, the sacking and loot-
ing were necessary tactics justified by the level of exploitation that the
Indian majority suffered on a daily basis. In their eyes, these actions
paled next to the quotidian abuse of Indians, and ultimately sought to
right an out-of-sync system that did not even allow Indians to be practic-
ing Christians. For critics, however, looting constituted the lone motiva-
tion for naïve Indians and mestizos to participate in the uprising—they
were greedy, low-end ruffians and criminals, not politically motivated
rebels. Royalist supporters cast the rebel masses as ignorant followers
who did not understand or even care about debates concerning the le-
gitimacy of Spanish rule. Of course, in virtually any uprising opponents
disagree about whether rebel actions are expropriation for a larger
cause or mere theft. It is clear that the rebel leaders understood the im-
portance of provisions. From the beginning they accumulated and kept
track of supplies. While they distributed wool to their followers in some

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of the fi rst rebel actions, they sought to store sufficient food, coca, and
alcohol for what they understood would be a long struggle ahead.
Tupac Amaru insisted that he was obeying royal orders. A per-
plexed Spaniard wrote in the early days “there are still subjects who
think he’s following His Majesty’s orders, which would make him a
faithful subject, but this seems unbelievable as Indians aren’t granted
these rights.”22 Even the letter writer wondered whether Tupac Amaru
might actually have permission from Madrid. In a letter to Cuzco’s
bishop, Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, Tupac Amaru’s cousin and suc-
cessor, contended that “Our King [Charles III] had taken repeated and
wise measures” against the “unbearable” abuse inflicted on Indians by
misguided colonial authorities, but to no avail. Frustrated, His Majesty
thus gave José Gabriel a “royal decree” permitting his actions against
corregidor Arriaga.23 In other words, the king had grown tired of his un-
derlings not following his orders and had supposedly granted Tupac
Amaru permission to act. Tupac Amaru believed, it seems, that he would
have the king’s support to rid Peru of wayward authorities if the mon-
arch were to know the level of exploitation in the Andes. Tupac Amaru
converted this faith in the king’s hypothetical support into the argument
that he had written proof of it, a contention that many people accepted.
Violence did not mark these initial excursions. The Spanish did not
have troops in any of the towns between Cuzco and Arequipa and local
militias, if they existed, did not have arms or esprit de corps and crum-
pled before the fight began. Royalists could not confront these quick
entries into towns and villages. On the other hand, Tupac Amaru im-
prisoned corregidors and abusive Spaniards but rarely executed them
on the spot. In fact, from the beginning, late 1780, he tried to keep
rebel violence in check. This would change.
Tupac Amaru returned to Tungasuca late on November 14. He spent
the next few days organizing his forces and drafting numerous letters
and decrees. He wrote these on paper but the rebels also wrote on can-
vas and even on animal skins. They often hid their messages under
saddles and mule bags.24 On the fi fteenth alone, he penned at least six
edicts, five letters, and three orders or commissions. That day he wrote
the kuraka Diego Choquehuanca, ordering him to arrest the corregidor
of Azángaro (in the district just north of Lake Titicaca). He announced
that corregidors would no longer exist and declared the abolition of
“the mita, alcabalas, customs houses, and other pernicious novelties.”

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He included a decree justifying his actions.25 Diego Choquehuanca and

his son José immediately reported the letter to the corregidor and as-
sured him of their good intentions. His family remained loyal until its
bloody demise.26 In fact, Tupac Amaru largely failed in his efforts to
recruit the kurakas of the Titicaca basin.
Tupac Amaru wrote to the kuraka of Lampa (also to the south, near
Lake Titicaca), Bernardino Sucaragua, in similar terms. The accompa-
nying document began “In as much as the King has ordered me to pro-
ceed in an extraordinary manner against several corregidores and their
lieutenants, based on legitimate reasons that cannot be disclosed at this
moment. . . . I authorize Governor D. Bernardo Sucaragua to do it in
my place.”27 In another letter to Sucaragua Tupac Amaru insisted that
he would respect all Spanish people and members of the Church “who
have become friends of the Peruvian people,” yet would pursue abusive
“Europeans.” He instructed Sucaragua to capture the corregidor of
Lampa.28 Sucaragua disobeyed his orders and, like Choquehuanca, joined
the royalists. Tupac Amaru wrote numerous kurakas throughout the
region with instructions to capture the corregidor and to implement
the abolition of colonial institutions such as the mita and the reparto.
He insisted that he had the support of King Charles III and sought to
allow Indians to become good Christians. His uprising, which began
with the execution of Corregidor Arriaga and stormed though the Vil-
canota Valley in its initial weeks, was fought, he claimed, in the name
of the king and the Catholic Church.
On November 16th, “Don José Gabriel Tupac Amaru Indian of noble-
blood of the Incas and royal family” wrote one of the most intriguing
documents of the uprising: the emancipation of African and Afro-
Peruvian slaves. The document’s title indicated its dual goal to free
slaves and weaken Spaniards: “Proclamation to the people of Cuzco so
that they desert the Spaniards and free the slaves.” It called for all
people of Spanish descent, clergy, and other distinguished people who
had befriended the Peruvian people to join his struggle against the hos-
tilities and abuses of European people, and for everyone including
slaves who had been mistreated by chapetones (the derogatory name for
Spaniards) to abandon them. They would be granted freedom from
their servitude and slavery. It employed a common rhetorical maneuver
by the rebels, inviting all of those who didn’t partake in the more egre-
gious aspects of colonial rule and exploitation to join the rebellion, thus

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narrowing the enemy to abusive Spaniards and their representatives.

Tupac Amaru sought a broad anticolonial alliance and did not want to
scare away all Europeans and priests. He underplayed the incendiary
activities of his movement, his attacks on estates and textile mills. Crit-
ics would discount these statements by contrasting them with his vio-
lent actions. One account labeled his seeming moderation “a mask,” a
strategy that sought to hide his true intentions and ferocious tactics.29
In many ways, both supporters and critics are correct: he did seek a
multiracial movement yet also understood the advantages in the early
days of keeping his military movements and broader plans under wrap.
Why emancipate African slaves? The vast majority of the slave pop-
ulation was on the coast, working in sugar and other plantations or in
the city of Lima. The Andes, in contrast, counted on Indians for laborers
and its products did not merit relatively expensive slaves. In 1790, the
intendancy of Lima had 75 percent of Peru’s slaves, roughly thirty thou-
sand out of a total of forty thousand. Cuzco only had 284.30 Mining, fo-
cused in the Andes and the backbone of the colonial economy, relied on
indigenous workers, coerced (mita) workers, or wage earners. This pat-
tern was found throughout the Americas: Africans and Afro-Americans
concentrated near the coast and the plantation or export economy. More-
over, in Peru people commonly believed that people of African descent
suffered and, more importantly in the calculating eye of the slave-owner,
could not perform well in high altitudes.31 It does not appear that Tupac
Amaru and his retinue had links with the burgeoning abolitionist move-
ments or sentiments then present in North America and Europe.32
Tupac Amaru’s decision was defi nitely strategic and arguably heart-
felt or sincere. The tactical advantage was clear. If slaves started fleeing
their masters, the colonial export economy would crumble and rebel
forces would grow. If the proclamation reached the coast— and we know
nothing about its diffusion— it could tempt plantation and urban slaves,
already defying their masters by running away and other forms of re-
sistance. In August 1781, one account noted that with the rebels’ promise
of freedom, “hacienda slaves are somewhat restless.”33 In Lima, the upper
classes worried more about defiant slaves and truculent free blacks and
mulattoes than they did about highland Indians.34 As an acute observer
who had spent time in Lima, Tupac Amaru presumably understood the
psychological and economic effect of slaves massively fleeing their own-
ers. Although he did not count any blacks in his inner circle, perhaps he

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had made friends with blacks in Lima. Forty years later, in 1820, the Ar-
gentine Liberator and leader of the War of Independence, General José
San Martín, employed the same tactic on Peruvian shores, promising
slaves their freedom if they joined him. San Martín hoped to weaken roy-
alists and to gain soldiers.35 The freedom offer might have also sought to
gain the sympathy of the vast mixed-blood population, those with some
African lineage who although free despised slavery.36 Yet the motivation
was not merely practical. The freedom of slaves, cast here as victims of the
Spanish, resonated with Tupac Amaru’s emphasis on justice and the
struggle against widespread and systemic abuses by Europeans. Tupac
Amaru had witnessed the horrors of slavery in Lima, and abolition fit
well with his call for freedom from European abuse.
Cuzco and the Battle of Sangarará
Despite Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas’s efforts to control rumors

and the flow of information, news of Arriaga’s execution reached the
city of Cuzco quickly. On November 12, 1780, the Quispicanchi corregi-
dor, Fernando Cabrera, who had barely escaped the rebels, reported to
the Cuzco town council about the “horrible excess” in Tungasuca.37 The
corregidor of Cuzco, Fernando Inclán Valdéz, established a war council
or junta that included some of Cuzco’s leading citizens. They raised
money, established barracks in what had been the Jesuit monastery un-
til the order’s expulsion in 1767, and on November 13 sent an emissary
to Lima to request aid. In a November 14 note to Bishop Moscoso, the
junta members requested the Church’s aid in the fight against Tupac
Amaru, who “with a fake decree from His Majesty, has published nu-
merous edicts that call for his followers to kill corregidors, free Indians
from the head tax, and ruin textile mills.”38 Internal divisions and per-
haps fear and incompetence, however, impeded the junta’s efforts, and
it failed to put together an organized front.39 Instead Bishop Moscoso
took over military organization and fundraising. He and other clergy
helped rouse the city against the threat of the rebels. They organized
incessant religious processions, bringing out Cuzco’s traditional saint,
The Lord of the Earthquakes (El Señor de los Temblores), who had pro-
tected the city during the 1650 earthquake, and—more traditional, for
the Spanish—the Archangel Michael.40 Moscoso himself donated
12,000 pesos and other monasteries and religious orders an additional

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18,000. He lent 14,000 pesos of the Church’s money while the San
Jerónimo priest, Ignacio de Castro, lent an additional 40,000 pesos.41
The Bishop organized the city’s clergy into a militia, divided into
four companies.42 He held a meeting with religious leaders on Novem-
ber 13 to devise a plan. The Bishop stressed that the rebel was only ten
leagues or about twenty-six miles away, counted on ten thousand armed
Indians and six hundred mestizos and Spaniards, and thus posed a great
danger to “religion, our king, and the republic.” 43 They discussed the
possibility of confronting Tupac Amaru in the area between Cuzco and
Tungasuca, to persuade him “by any means possible” to abandon his
“depraved project.” The church leaders decided to remain in Cuzco—
presumably to the great relief of the majority of the religious men—
because of the lack of weapons. Instead, they agreed to use the pulpit to
chastise the rebels, to collect information from priests in the rebel area,
and to lobby father Don Antonio López de Sosa, the Tungasuca priest
and intimate of Tupac Amaru. They recognized that the rebel leader
himself was a devout subject of the king who could perhaps be con-
vinced to give up his uprising.44
Don Tiburcio Landa created a company composed of local militia
members, volunteers from Cuzco, and approximately eight hundred Indi-
ans and mestizos procured by the kurakas of Oropesa, Pedro Sahua-
raura and Ambrosio Chillitupa. In the ensuing two years of insurgency,
Indians would almost invariably constitute the majority of combatants
on both sides. This hastily assembled group of counterinsurgents in-
tended to defeat the rebels and claim a reward. On November 17, they
reached Sangarará, a small, frigid town north of Tinta, twelve thousand
five hundred feet above sea level. Indian militias organized by the kurakas
of six small towns joined them.
When the sentinels reported no sign of the enemy, Landa’s com-
pany camped in town rather than on a less vulnerable hillside. They
were more concerned about an impending snowstorm than the enemy.
Tupac Amaru had hidden his forces in order to dupe the royalists into
believing that the rebels had fled or were simply not that numerous.45
At four in the morning, Landa’s troops found themselves surrounded.
One observer said that the approaching troops sounded like “an earth-
quake.” 46 Landa and his troops took refuge in the church. Tupac Amaru
demanded they capitulate and instructed the priest and his aides to
leave. When the royalists disobeyed these instructions, Tupac Amaru

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ordered creoles and women to abandon the church, indicating that an

attack was imminent. Landa and his forces prevented anyone from leav-
ing, and several died in the chaos. Their gunpowder caught fi re, burn-
ing much of the church’s ceiling, and causing one wall to cave in. Des-
perate, they fi red their cannon and charged. Greatly outnumbered and
outpositioned, hundreds of Landa’s troops were killed. One report cal-
culated 576 dead, including more than 20 Europeans. Rebels treated
and freed twenty-eight wounded creoles.47
The survivors who fought for the Spanish gave a detailed account,
blaming Tupac Amaru for the damage to the church and for the blood-
shed. Bartolomé Castañeda contended that upon arrival, Landa secured
the support of Indians from Sangarará. He also claimed that, contrary
to other accounts, the commander realized that the enemy was near and
debated about whether to set up camp on one of the surrounding hills
or in or near the well-fortified church. They chose the church to take
refuge from the cold night, which proved to be a fatal mistake. Tupac
Amaru’s troops slipped into the adjoining cemetery and bombarded the
enemy camped outside the church with rocks from their slings. Landa’s
artillery was useless because of the walls separating them from the cem-
etery.48 One soldier was killed in the stampede into the church. Desper-
ate, many of the soldiers confessed to the harried chaplain, Juan de Mol-
linedo. He could not offer Communion because they could not find the
key to the cabinet with the ciborium. Once the roof was on fire, burning
beams began to fall and the tejas or roof tiles exploded from the heat.
Rebels used stones and spears to kill the troops fleeing the church. Casta-
ñeda saved himself by hiding in a small chapel. He calculated that at least
three hundred of his comrades died, most of them subsequently stripped
of their clothes and weapons by the Tupac Amaru troops. He guessed
that there were six thousand Indians in the surrounding hills and far-
reaching support for the rebels in much of the region.49 Another report
contended that Tupac Amaru kicked the cadaver of Fernando Cabrera,
the corregidor of Quispicanchi who had evaded him days earlier, mutter-
ing, “[T]his guy ended up like this because he was so hardheaded.” (Este
por caveza dura se ve de este modo.) The account also claimed that the exu-
berant rebels beat a royalist kuraka to death in front his family.50
The chaplain, Juan de Mollinedo, provides more details about the
Sangarará battle. In his report, he notes that authorities in Cuzco offered
a reward for Tupac Amaru, dead or alive, which spurred Landa’s company

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to hasten their expedition. Their rush doomed them. They camped the
first night in Huaro and then made the long trek to Sangarará. After
Landa had won the debate about whether to set up base in the church or
outside of town, false alarms woke up the troops several times. Mol-
linedo describes the frustration when the Indians took the adjoining
cemetery and reports that one soldier was blinded by a rock propelled
from a sling. He details the heroics of Landa and other leaders, who
fought on after they were shot. Landa sought to hide royalist cadavers so
his troops wouldn’t lose faith. The fire in the church, blamed in this ac-
count on Tupac Amaru, killed many men, and those fleeing “the vora-
cious flames fell into the hands of the no less voracious rebels. The uni-
versal slaughter, the pitiful groans of the dying, the bloodthirstiness of
the enemy, the flames—in short, everything that occurred that unfor-
tunate day provoked horror and commiseration, sentiments never felt
by the rebels; blinded by fury and thirsty for blood, they only thought of
stabbing all the whites.”51 Mollinedo tabulates 395 dead in combat, plus
an incalculable number incinerated in the church. He puts Tupac Ama-
ru’s forces at twenty thousand Indians and four hundred mestizos, as
well as a sizeable contingent guarding Tungasuca.52
Rebels captured Mollinedo, the presbitero of Oropesa, fleeing the
church with the holy sacraments. Tupac Amaru ordered that the cleric
be given alcohol (aguardiente) for his wounds and be taken prisoner to
Tungasuca. There, Mollinedo oversaw the burial of some royalists, and
Tupac Amaru released him because of his status as a priest. Mollinedo
still had to get past sentinels and rebel troops and describes escaping
half naked, without even a hat on his head. He was detained, coinciden-
tally, just outside of Sangarará but released again and reached Cuzco.
Other royalist prisoners kept in the Pomacanchi textile mill for a longer
period confirmed his story.53 In the small town of Papres, he witnessed
Indians and rebel sympathizers kill the kuraka of nearby Rondocan just
because of his “white face,” despite the fact that he had fought for the
rebels in Sangarará.54 Mollinedo’s story and all of the other reports from
Sangarará prompted panic in Cuzco about the prospect of a caste war.
The Tungasuca Camp Base

The rebels kept Tungasuca as their base. Not only was Tupac Amaru and
Micaela Bastidas’s house there, but the town loomed above the Vilcanota

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Valley, the logical route for enemy soldiers from Cuzco, Puno, or Areq-
uipa. Several prisoners describe Tungasuca in the frenetic first weeks of
the uprising. Friar Juan de Rios Pacheco, a Mercederian, was on his way
from Arequipa to Cuzco with two children in the middle of November
when “mestizos with lances and slings” detained him and took him to
Tungasuca. He mentioned four thousand Indians, more mestizos with
lances and some muskets, three simple cannons, and the gallows. Indians
called him a “puka kunka” or “redneck” in Quechua, which he explained,
“is how they refer to Europeans.” When Micaela Bastidas learned that he
was a priest, she invited him into the house.55 He was surprised to pass
by a mestizo doorman dressed in red and blue with a saber in hand, an
uncommon formality in this rustic setting. He described Tungasuca as
full of “thousands of people of every caste,” mentioning Europeans,
blacks, mulattoes, and Indians. Micaela explained to him their opposi-
tion to “bad government” but not the Church and expressed her confi-
dence that Arequipa and the Upper Peruvian towns of La Paz and La
Plata supported them. At this time they only controlled nearby Tinta,
Quispicanchi, and Chumbivilcas. She claimed to have letters of adhesion
from kurakas from these areas.56
Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas shared power, cajoling yet trust-
ing and confiding in one another. While Tupac Amaru was the leader
who made speeches and signed the bulk of the rebel documents, Mi-
caela Bastidas ran the rebel camp and oversaw provisions. Both rebels
and loyalists feared her wrath. According to one royalist document, her
duties included aiding Tupac Amaru in every way possible: mobilizing
soldiers through stern orders; punishing and even executing anyone
who resisted; recruiting and encouraging the Indians (providing honors
for those who stood out and telling them terrible stories about the Span-
ish to kindle their hatred); promising followers no taxes other than the
tribute and a return to the freedom “of their idolatrous times” (that is,
the time of the Incas); letting everyone know that Tupac Amaru and she
meant to reign; gaining even more obedience than that offered her hus-
band; tearing down decrees from Church doors and replacing them
with her own; closing churches; providing passports; writing letters to
publicize the uprising; and demanding recruits from local leaders, with
the threat of death for any who disobeyed.57 These were not the activi-
ties of a behind-the-scenes underling or obedient wife, but instead those
of a full-blown partner in planning and executing the mass uprising.

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Their inner circle consisted of an extensive list of family members

and friends and colleagues from Cuzco, including Indians, mestizos, and
even a handful of Spaniards. Family supporters included their three sons,
as well as aunts, uncles, cousins, nephews, nieces, in-laws, and more
distant relations. Kurakas, men and some women, from the region that
ran from Cuzco south to La Raya pass, also proved important.58
So who supported the rebels? The rebel documents and those of co-
lonial authorities agree, although from absolutely opposing viewpoints,
that Tupac Amaru initially sought to create a multiethnic, multiclass
movement. He spoke about “living as brothers” with creoles in one de-
cree while Micaela wrote “Europeans treat us like dogs.”59 He sought
the support of creoles, mestizos and blacks and must have looked with
satisfaction at the bustling headquarters in Tungasuca. The Spanish, in
turn, complained that creoles had lost their respect for Spain. Many
blamed these “Europeans born in the Americas” and priests, usually
creoles themselves, with the type of venomous hatred saved for those
considered class traitors.60 Yet both sides understood that as the months
passed, it became an increasingly indigenous uprising, one that often
targeted, to Micaela Bastidas and Tupac Amaru’s dismay, creoles and
mestizos. Tupac Amaru sought to impede a war of extermination, un-
derstanding that he could not win without a broad base of support and
believing that he was destined to lead not only Indians but others as
well. The Spanish realized that over time, they did not have to worry as
much about creoles but rather Indians, who were increasingly prone to
attack and kill anyone they deemed European. This was not reassuring—
Indians made up 90 percent of the population in the southern Andes.
Indians supported Tupac Amaru for a number of reasons. He under-
stood them, lived in their world, and spoke their language. Many runa
or common Indians had met Tupac Amaru in his work as a kuraka or
in his journeys as a muleteer. Others had heard about him, his battles
in Lima to reclaim his Inca legacy and to defend Indians from the odi-
ous mita and other exactions. His speeches and initial actions made
clear that he would abolish taxes, the labor draft, and other exactions,
would eradicate corregidors, and would rule with Indians’ well-being
in mind. His Inca ties gave him prestige as well as a platform— the re-
turn in some new form of Inca rule, a more just society than that of
Spanish colonialism. Supporters understood that he would create a new
society, one rooted in their language and traditions.

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Many supporters believed that Tupac Amaru could resurrect them,

bring them back from the dead if they died in battle. He instructed
them to enter battle “without fear, that on the third day after their
death he would resurrect them.” Spanish observers complained bitterly
about these promises, which obviously increased the troops’ courage,
their willingness to die in battle.61 The promise connected to broader
messianic and millenarian elements of the uprising, to Andean beliefs
about the circularity of time and thus a return to an era free of exploi-
tation by Europeans. Tupac Amaru presented himself as the messiah (a
term he did not use) whose bloodlines and project could bring about
the return of the Incas, or at least a more just system. He built on neo-
Inca currents as well as Andean millenarian ideas of radical upheaval,
such as a cataclysmic Pachacuti.62
More mundane factors explained why some supported him and
others did not. Many Indians followed the lead of their kurakas while
others, particularly the more mobile such as shepherds, stumbled upon
the rebellion and simply decided to join it. Similar explanations can be
used for those who opposed the rebellion. Many presumably did not
agree with his platform; others were forced to fight it by their royalist
kuraka. As will be seen, the fighting could pit one Indian community
versus another.
The question of who formed his inner circle obsessed colonial au-
thorities. They posed it to seemingly every witness in the subsequent
trials. In an effort to isolate and capture Tupac Amaru, in March 1781
Visitador Areche offered rebels a pardon, excluding those individuals
deemed part of the rebel leadership. These included all kurakas “allied
with the movement”; family members (Tupac Amaru, Micaela and her
brother Antonio, three sons, and five cousins); two of the “European
scribes” discussed below, Manuel Galleguillos and Diego Ortigoza as
well as Felipe Bermúdez; and a number of Indian and mestizo support-
ers in the area around Tinta.63 The list points out the obvious— the
centrality of his family in the rebellion. Later Spanish measures would
target a much broader selection of his family, essentially anyone related
to him, no matter what they had done in the uprising.
A group of about a dozen “European” (Spanish or creole) prisoners
also found themselves in Tungasuca. Although initially locked in a cel-
lar alongside Corregidor Arriaga, watched over constantly and kept in
chains, they eventually aided the rebels as scribes, advisors, accountants,

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and even weapon makers. The debate over whether they did this out of
coercion or rebel sympathies has still not been settled. Both rebels and
royalists treated them warily. Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas im-
prisoned them and then granted them increasing freedom and duties,
although never losing their doubts about their loyalty. Colonial author-
ities scrutinized them in long trials, tapping them for information about
the origin and social base of the rebellion and verifying whether the
bewildering prospect of men from Spanish side of society aiding an In-
dian uprising could possibly be true.
Fascinating and enigmatic figures, these prisoners shine light on
both sides of the struggle. They personify Tupac Amaru’s search for a
multiclass and multirace movement, his perhaps foolish belief that land-
owning, Spanish-speaking professionals would join his cause. This strat-
egy arguably reflected a deeply colonial view on his part that an uprising
could only succeed with Europeans. Once the prisoners turned them-
selves over to the colonial authorities, they were treated as sources of use-
ful knowledge but also dangerous mavericks who broke well-rooted and
venerable hierarchies. The court system showed that colonial Peru had an
arsenal of nouns and adjectives to explain Indians’ misdeeds (many dat-
ing from the Reconquest or Crusades)—“heathens,” “apostates,” “child-
like,” and “hateful” stand out—but struggled to explain or even describe
European treachery. Authorities’ shock at their possible treason was
tinged with fear. Their stories take us deep into the rebellion.
Most of them had worked with Corregidor Arriaga and were cap-
tured when they followed his instructions (written under coercion) for
people to assemble in Tungasuca. Juan Antonio “el Gallego” Figueroa,
a forty-year-old from Galicia, had been in Tinta building a bridge. Arriaga
owed him money. Mariano Banda from Cuzco and José Esteban Es-
carcena from Arequipa both worked as scribes or secretaries for Arriaga.
Diego Ortigoza, in contrast, had been in Tungasuca for a decade, for the
last few years teaching Tupac Amaru’s children. He was fi fty-two and
claimed no profession, proving the venerable dictum that underem-
ployed scholars are dangerous. Manuel Galleguillos arrived in Tungasuca
after the other captives, when Indians captured him after Sangarará.
Francisco Molina initially resisted the call by Arriaga to go to Tungas-
uca but heeded threats by Tupac Amaru to appear. Francisco Cisneros
followed Arriaga’s false order and was imprisoned in Tungasuca upon
arrival on November 7.

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Don Bernardo de la Madrid, the owner of the Pomacanchi textile

mill, received a letter on November 5 from his friend Corregidor Arriaga
requesting that he come to Tungasuca. He left that morning, after Mass,
and was greeted by Tupac Amaru himself, who suggested that he join
him at the table for a meal. De la Madrid said that he had already eaten
and became impatient when he was told repeatedly that the corregidor
would soon arrive. Tupac Amaru eventually led him to a room where he
said Arriaga was dressing some wounds. Twenty-five “servants” jumped
the mill owner but he claimed that they could not get him in chains.
Taken to the basement, de la Madrid refused to write a letter inviting his
friend, Don Fernando Cabrera, to come to Tungasuca. The request infu-
riated de la Madrid, who “blinded by rage at seeing myself the prisoner
of a servant of mine who served me as a muleteer taking my cargo to
Potosí [i.e. Tupac Amaru], [I] answered that once I was freed from this
oppression, he would suffer worse consequences than those inflicted on
me. After a while the Rebel ordered them to put me in shackles.”64 In
the following weeks, rebel guards threatened to kill de la Madrid several
times and he did his best to gain the trust of the rebel leaders. He re-
mained scared and indignant, complaining that Tupac Amaru refused
to give him blankets, even though “he owed me 1,500 pesos, money
that I had supplied him on various occasions for his expenses.”65 Once
unshackled, “I accommodated myself to serve the Rebel and his wife
with humility and zeal, behaving as the most humble of blacks. When
the Indian [Micaela Bastidas] would go to Mass I would take her by the
hand, holding the umbrella in the other.”66
The rebels kept the prisoners in locked rooms with guards. At one
point in late November, Tupac Amaru wanted to hang them. Micaela
Bastidas defended the prisoners, stressing their useful knowledge of weap-
ons. On November 26, he wrote her “Be very careful with the prisoners
in our house, and tell Figueroa to make sure that he has all the weap-
ons there ready soon.”67 When Micaela learned that royalists had killed
her cousin, Simón Noguera, she cried with rage and threatened to hang
all of the prisoners.68 The rebel leaders’ concern eased, however, and
they increasingly relied on them to write letters and memos, to take
care of and make weapons, and in some cases to participate in decisions
and key tasks such as paying soldiers. Banda, Cisneros, Escarcena, Gal-
leguillos, and Ortigoza served as scribes. They subsequently claimed
that they did this to save their lives— they had witnessed the fate of

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Arriaga— and that they merely followed orders. The prosecution con-
tended that they participated willfully, influencing what was being
communicated and even dictating letters and orders. Tupac Amaru was
a capable writer but required help because he was so busy and often out
of Tungasuca. Whether Micaela Bastidas could write adequately in
Spanish is unclear. She did not have the schooling that her husband did
and was less likely to pick up the rudimentary training that men of her
intermediate social status often gained in small towns such as Pam-
pamarca. Although bilingual, she frequently spoke in Quechua in dis-
cussions, forcing the Europeans and creoles to rely on a translator.69
In her testimony, Micaela Bastidas deemed Mariano Banda “a major
confidante.” Other prisoners also incriminated him, although their tes-
timonies need to be taken critically— they were trying to save their
own lives and sought to present themselves as secondary figures forced
to help the rebels in minor roles. Ortigoza and Galleguillos maintained
that Banda had paid rebel soldiers. In fact, one historian argues that
perhaps his imprisonment was a ruse and that his participation had
been planned before the capture of Arriaga.70
While they no doubt fudged the truth when defending themselves
by blaming others, they provide a clear portrait of camp in Tungas-
uca. They describe their shock at the execution of Arriaga, their mis-
treatment (guards and chains), and their eventual duties. They indi-
cate that Tupac Amaru was in charge yet always consulted with
Micaela. After Sangarará, they were allowed out of the locked rooms
and even shared meals with Tupac Amaru and family. Micaela ran
the camp in Tungasuca. She kept a close watch on provisions, cajoled
Indians and kurakas to support them, threatened those who wavered,
kept tabs on her husband as he expanded his zone of action toward
the south in late 1780, and to the extent possible scrutinized events in
Cuzco, which she knew would counterattack. People spoke Quechua
and Spanish and an air of ner vous elation can be detected. The lead-
ership knew that they had taken irreversible steps that could radically
change their world or lead to their gruesome deaths. Although they
did not understand this at the time, both outcomes proved to occur.
Followers had experienced an unbelievable turn of events— the death
of exploiters, the abolition of hated institutions, the return of an Inca
leader—yet they also knew that defeat would come at a fantastically
high price.

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Tupac Amaru was not the only one concerned about the loyalty of
these puka kunkas or rednecks. Escarcena noted that the Indians sought
to exterminate Europeans and then do the same to creoles and mestizos.
He argued that they ultimately wanted to “be alone among themselves . . .
living happily with their king (the treatment they gave Tupac Amaru).”71
Francisco Cisneros, one of the detained Spaniards, contended that the
Indians despised him and planned to kill him. Manuel Castelo, a Span-
ish authority imprisoned alongside Cisneros, described Indians breaking
the walls and roof of their prison, Tupac Amaru’s house, in an attempt to
get their hands on Cisneros, Arriaga’s tax collector. The assistant priest of
Coporaque and Tungasuca, Ildefonso Bejarano, maintained that he con-
vinced the Indians to stop the attack.72 While Cisneros used these claims
in his defense, no one countered them.73
Their testimonies mention some unusual events and conspiracies,
not found in accounts of the uprising. Francisco Molina asserted that
Banda had been aware of a plan to poison Europeans in Cuzco city.
Banda contended that a man named José de Palacios had written to
Micaela Bastidas claiming to have a strong potion that would kill the
city’s elite, gamonales, and thus facilitate seizing the city. He had even tried
it out on some unfortunate dogs, with success. Although rebels did not
poison city residents, the threat or rumor played on city dwellers’ fears
of insurrection from the countryside and from within the city.74 Cisne-
ros mentioned that he and some others had tried to kill Tupac Amaru
in November, but could not shake their captors. He also claimed an at-
tempt to capture him in April 1781, when Spanish forces pushed into
Tupac Amaru territory.75
Why Support an Indian Rebel?
In an effort to make the charges against him seem ludicrous, Manuel

Galleguillos posed the question: “Why would a subject of the Spanish
Catholic King support an Indian rebel who had a mortal hatred of Euro-
peans?”76 This is the question that authorities in the trials and scholars
ever since have been asking. Although we probably will never know the
exact proportions of coercion, desperation, or free will (were they forced,
were they trying to gain favor, or did they support the rebels?) that mo-
tivated their actions, the Europeans and creoles did write memos, give
advice, and even took up arms or spied for the rebels. Their defense that

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they actually did these things solely because of coercion seems implau-
sible. Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy posits three explanations: solidarity
with Tupac Amaru, the belief in his decrees that he had royal support,
and the defense of their property. She also stresses that they came from
the intermediate European or creole social groups, not the most power-
ful but not the weakest.77
The trials indicate a good measure of opportunism on their part.
They were imprisoned and no doubt did whatever they could to save
their lives. But their testimony supports authorities’ suspicions that they
did not flee when they had the opportunity and fulfi lled their duties
with a certain level of enthusiasm. While they claimed they did not
have an alternative, they might have been swept up a bit in the heady
times of late 1780. Creoles— and even some Spaniards—had many rea-
sons to dislike the taxes and other measures imposed by corregidors
such as Arriaga. They could have supported Tupac Amaru’s call for the
abolition of despised Spanish institutions and even the execution of
some of the more hated authorities and believed in his emphasis on a
multiethnic, multiclass movement. Almost all Andean social move-
ments included support from wayward mestizos and creoles.78 They
lived in Tupac Amaru’s house— fi rst as prisoners but increasingly, it
seems, as guests— and shared food and decision making with the rebel
leaders.
Was this a case of Stockholm syndrome, in which hostages increas-
ingly sympathize with their captors? Probably, although the metamor-
phosis is not that shocking. The prisoners came from a social group that
Tupac Amaru rubbed shoulders with in his work as a muleteer and
kuraka and hoped to recruit for his movement, thus explaining his pa-
tience with them and rejection of his initial inclinations to execute them.
Before the uprising, Tupac Amaru was likely to socialize with people
such as Banda, Cisneros, and Galleguillos. Ortigoza taught his children
and in a small town such as Pampamarca (population of less than 5,000),
the two literate men must have shared many conversations.
In fact, the relationship might also reflect what has coincidentally
been called the Lima syndrome, in which abductors feel growing sym-
pathy for their hostages. The name derives from the 1996 seizure of the
Japanese embassy in Lima by the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Move-
ment (MRTA, another coincidence) guerrilla group, when the rebels
treated the hostages well, releasing most of them and befriending some.

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This laxness facilitated the storming of the embassy and the death of the
guerrillas. Perhaps Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas grew increas-
ingly fond of the captives, appreciative of their adulation and cognizant
of their value to the movement. Ethnic kurakas and those who claimed
royal Inca blood, such as Tupac Amaru, sought throughout the eigh-
teenth century to gain the respect of creole society.79 Their deference
might have given Tupac Amaru a similar satisfaction to that which he
derived when he redistributed cloth from an obraje or announced the
abolition of the Indian head tax. Tupac Amaru believed that their re-
spect for him was as correct and necessary a societal change as the im-
provement of conditions for Indians. For Spanish authorities, it was
also an equally subversive and troubling change.
The rebels counted on creole supporters. Felipe Bermúdez also
worked for Arriaga in Tinta but once in Tungasuca, his time in rebel
prison did not last long. Whether his capture was a ruse or not is uncer-
tain. He was rapidly named “capitan general” and wrote important let-
ters for Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas. He did not stay behind in
Tungasuca but accompanied the rebel leader in his forays to the south
in the fi nal months of 1780. Tupac Amaru clearly trusted him, in-
structing Micaela at one point that a decision should be made “by only
you and Bermúdez.”80 Antonio Castelo, a mestizo or creole from Sicu-
ani who had lived in Tungasuca for several years, was the other mes-
tizo or creole leader. Hesitant at fi rst over the execution of Arriaga, he
quickly gained authority within rebel ranks and by the end of the year
led one of the three major fronts. He was in heady company: Tupac
Amaru himself and his cousin, Diego Cristóbal, who would soon be-
come the absolute leader, led the other two.
In an important reassessment of creole participation, David Cahill
argues that “rather than the leadership having consisted of a charis-
matic Inca leader and a small nucleus of lieutenants, the rebellion was
rather the creation of a ruling Inca-Creole Junta with Túpac Amaru al-
located the starring role—in effect, a joint venture of the Túpac Amaru
and Castelo families— given that his stature as Inca made him a lodestar
for Indian recruitment.”81 Cahill shows how the Castelo clan’s patri-
arch, Melchor, had ingratiated himself with José Gabriel well before
the uprising and highlights the important military role that the multi-
ple members of the family, not only Antonio, played.82 While correctly
describing the role of creoles in this early phase, Cahill overstates his

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argument when discussing a “joint adventure.” All of the documentation

(correspondence, the trials, contemporary accounts, and the rest) dem-
onstrate that Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas planned and oversaw
the uprising. Although eager to gain creole support, Tupac Amaru was
fi rmly in control.
Within weeks of the shocking execution of corregidor Arriaga, Tupac

Amaru and Micaela Bastidas had set up camp in Tungasuca and prepared
well for a long battle. Tupac Amaru crushed the royalists in the first con-
frontation, Sangarará, and recruited supporters in nearby towns and
communities. He unsuccessfully attempted to capture corregidors, but
in doing so prompted a mass exodus of authorities from the region. His
platform of abolishing hated taxes and labor demands, his seizure and
redistribution of goods found in haciendas and mills, and his presenta-
tion of himself as an Inca descendant, loyal subject of the king, and
devout Catholic resonated well with the indigenous population. Weeks
after the execution, indigenous support and Spanish fear accelerated.
From Tungasuca, Micaela Bastidas oversaw provisions and logistics and
kept discipline.
Indigenous men and women joined him en masse, the men as sol-
diers or guerrillas and the women usually as camp followers. The intrigu-
ing stories of the creoles and Spaniards captured in early November, who
transformed from prisoners to supporters, shed light on the rebellion.
They demonstrated that the rebellion could gain supporters from regional
“middle sectors” but also showed the challenges in recruiting and
maintaining them. Creoles and Spaniards shared Tupac Amaru and
Micaela Bastidas’s dislike for heavy-handed Spanish policies. Nonethe-
less, they hesitated to support a mass movement that sought the expul-
sion if not death of Europeans. This tension between a multiclass and
an indigenous uprising only increased over time. Yet it was not the only
contentious and disruptive dividing line among rebel supporters. The
Church proved to be an equally vexing problem for the rebel leaders.

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3
A World without the Catholic Church?
A in Sangarará and Tupac Amaru’s tri-

F T ER T H E ST U N N I NG V ICTORY
umphant return to Tungasuca in mid-November 1780, he and
Micaela Bastidas worried about attacks from two fronts. They knew
that they had only defeated the fi rst wave sent by the hastily organized
junta in the city of Cuzco, and apprehensively awaited a stronger royalist
offensive from Peru’s second city. They also fretted that colonial troops
would attack from the south, either from the Lake Titicaca area or from
the city of Arequipa to the southwest. Therefore, instead of immedi-
ately attacking Cuzco, the administrative center of the Andes, the rebel
leaders decided to take advantage of their strength and expand to the
south. Tupac Amaru, the apparent architect of the plan, would lead the
combatants while Micaela Bastidas would oversee camp headquarters
in Tungasuca. Other rebel commanders, Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru
and Antonio Castelo, would continue to attack and recruit in the core
area of the Vilcanota Valley and the upper provinces and extend their
forays into the coca-growing lowlands of Paucartambo.
On November 25, Tupac Amaru entered the town of Livitaca in the
provincias altas near Chumbivilcas. This largely monolingual Quechua
area was and is known for its unruly, violent population. Most towns
perch around two and a half miles above sea level and their inhabit-
ants, long associated with livestock, excelled at trekking and riding
long distances. Many supplemented their meager incomes with cattle,
sheep, goat, llama, and alpaca rustling. Outsiders always feared the up-
per provinces’ people and severe topography; the area rapidly became a
rebel hotspot. The small population of Spaniards in Livitaca fled when
Tupac Amaru appeared, whereas, according to one breathless account,

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“even boulders turned into Indians who kneeled and bowed to him.”
The assembled Indians pledged that “you are our God and our Lord; we
ask that there no longer be priests who disturb us.” Tupac Amaru an-
swered that this could not happen: “who would absolve us in the time
of death?”1 This exchange highlights perhaps the greatest, or at least
most unexpected, challenge faced by the rebel leaders: how to reconcile
their religiosity, with widespread indigenous dissatisfaction with the
Church on the one hand and extensive counterrevolutionary efforts by
priests and other members of the Church on the other. This conun-
drum would dog the rebels until the end.
The indigenous masses had a worldview different from that of the
rebellion’s leadership. As will be seen, Indians understood the uprising
as a messianic movement and believed that Tupac Amaru would un-
leash a radical change in the Andean world, turn things upside down,
invert power relations. Indigenous rebels had little patience with efforts
to keep creoles and mestizos in the rebel fold and to temper rebel vio-
lence. These differences or tensions escalated over time, but did not
come to the fore in the initial months. Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bas-
tidas succeeded in keeping peace among the insurgents, as the eupho-
ria of these early months satisfied the more radical vision of much of
the indigenous masses. However, the confl ict between the rebel lead-
ers’ respect for priests and the bishop’s implacable efforts to depict the
rebels as heathen apostates and to use the clergy to defeat them proved
to be a virtually insurmountable obstacle for the rebels.
The stories rapidly spreading throughout the region about the execu-
tion of Arriaga and the rebel victory in Sangarará terrified lowly tax col-
lectors, petty officers, and corregidors. In fact, Tupac Amaru complained
that authorities fled so quickly that he could not capture them. The
Church was a different matter. While the rebellion counted on the sup-
port of a handful of clerics, others remained in their parishes and cam-
paigned bravely and effectively for the royalists. Tupac Amaru could not
convince these clerics to join or leave; nor could he bear executing them.
Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas confronted a formidable
adversary— the Catholic Church had a deep presence in colonial Cuzco.
The city itself, with a population of about thirty thousand, had nine
convents, three monasteries, eight houses for religious women or beate-
rios, and seven Church-run colleges and schools. All of the major male
orders could be found. From the Cuzco cathedral, the bishop presided

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A World without the Catholic Church? 67
over a sprawling diocese divided into over one hundred thirty parishes
or curatos, the number varying due to frequent territorial realignments.
One calculation put the total number of secular and regular priests
(that is, members of religious orders) at about one thousand. In the six-
teenth century, the Jesuits built an imposing church on the Plaza de
Armas equal in grandeur to the cathedral, while the Dominicans, Mer-
cedarians, and Franciscans also constructed magnificent churches.2 Al-
though strongest in larger cities, the Church extended deep into the
countryside, maintaining a greater presence in most cases than the co-
lonial state. Every town mentioned in this book had at least a small
chapel while many, including towns with less than five thousand peo-
ple such as Pampamarca and Checacupe, had splendid churches laden
with spectacular artwork. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Spain
had sent European masters to train indigenous artists in Cuzco, part of
its efforts to indoctrinate the descendants of the Inca Empire. Their
work, the “Cuzco School,” featured vibrant, didactic paintings of reli-
gious scenes. These works of art, which graced the churches and temples
throughout the region and today are victims of thieves and the thriving
international market for stolen colonial treasures, sought to convert and
instruct through the eye, the essence of baroque religiosity.3
Since the sixteenth century, the colonial state had delegated much
administrative work in the Andean hinterland to kurakas such as Tupac
Amaru. Priests and their numerous aides and underlings, however, took
charge of the spiritual realm, and consequently had an important pres-
ence in daily life. The fees for masses, burials, baptisms, and other ser-
vices kept them afloat and, when considered excessive, angered many
local people. They also counted on free labor from local Indians and
profits from church property, rural and urban. These different forms of
income made some local parishes quite profitable.4 The indigenous peo-
ple could very well venerate their priest, but they were also willing to
sue, harass, and even run him out of town if they disagreed with him.5
The Catholic Church was an all-encompassing institution and must
be conceived of in the plural. Hierarchies and divisions characterized its
internal structure, while over the centuries members of the Church
fought over its administration and direction and confronted external
foes. The stratification took many forms. Secular and regular priests un-
derstood their missions in markedly different ways, while priests and
nuns operated in distinct realms, with the former enjoying far greater

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rights. In the uprising, the secular clergy played a particularly impor-

tant role. In economic terms, Bishop Moscoso presided over a vast and
profitable domain from the majestic cathedral in Cuzco while a doctri-
nero in his distant parish hustled to make ends meet. Masses held in
and around Cuzco resembled those of Rome while religious rituals in
the countryside were less orthodox and incorporated native elements.
Nonetheless, over two centuries after the conquest of the Incas, Ca-
tholicism had put down deep roots in Cuzco.
Tensions brewed in the late eighteenth century. Not only was the
Crown attempting to rein in the autonomy of the Church but in Peru and
beyond, some members of the Church demanded that Indians be granted
the right to become priests.6 Bishop Moscoso worried about these and
other strains but also recognized the profound religious devotion that
characterized Cuzco, the city and its largely indigenous countryside.
Excommunicated
Bishop Moscoso excommunicated Tupac Amaru on November 17. The

bishop proved to be a formidable enemy. The confrontation with the
church devastated Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas. It surprised,
pained, and angered them and ultimately weakened their control of
their core area, the Vilcanota Valley. They could not conceive of a world
without the Catholic Church fi rmly rooted in the Andes. They sought a
radical uprising that left the church intact, which proved to be a diffi-
cult if not impossible objective in the colonial Andes. They could not
convince followers, enemies, and most of those in between that the
excommunication was a mistake or illegitimate and thus inapplicable.
In turn, the opposition never tired of casting them as church-burning
excomulgados.
Bishop Moscoso excommunicated Tupac Amaru and his followers
for “having set fi re to pubic chapels and the church of Sangarará; for be-
ing a bandit and rebellious traitor to the King; for seditiously working
against peace; and being an usurper of Royal Rights.” The excommuni-
cation also threatened anyone who aided him or who removed the an-
nouncement from church walls, where it had been posted throughout
the region.7 Moscoso also ordered priests to spread the news by posting
the decree and verbally chastising the rebels in Mass. At this point, late
1780, Moscoso led the efforts in Cuzco to defeat Tupac Amaru. He lent

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12,000 pesos of his own money and even more from the bishopric itself;
organized four militia companies that included over four hundred eccle-
siastics; and ordered priests outside the city to send information about
the rebels and to conduct Masses in Quechua in order to separate Indi-
ans from “the pernicious superstitions that the rebel has planted all over
the place.”8 Although the bishop’s confl ict with Corregidor Arriaga had
earned him some enemies, and became even more controversial after
the corregidor’s execution on November 10, authorities in Cuzco in late
1780 knew that they needed the bishop’s leadership and resources. Those
who subsequently criticized Moscoso for purported links with the rebels
presented his efforts in late 1780 as a smokescreen to conceal his initial
lack of activity against the uprising and even rebel sympathies. This
seems exaggerated— Bishop Moscoso energetically and effectively took
command of royalist efforts in Cuzco.9
With the excommunication, Moscoso sought to exclude Tupac Amaru
from the Christian community. The rebel leader was not permitted to
partake of Church rituals, nor could Christians (as the term “excom-
munication” indicates) “communicate” with him. The horror expressed
by Tupac Amaru indicated how unexpected the measure was, and he
contested the decision passionately in the coming months. He argued
that Moscoso’s decision was illegitimate for three reasons: Indians like
himself were exempt from excommunication; he was not against or an
enemy of “the faith”; and the royalists, not he, had burnt down the
church in Sangarará. Tupac Amaru had a strong case on all three points
but he had no forum in which he might rebut Moscoso— he could only
attempt to minimize the excommunication’s impact.10 Moscoso had
justified the excommunication in a closed assembly with regular and
secular priests. Recognizing that Indians could not be excommunicated,
he contended that the rebellion required extraordinary measures and
that Tupac Amaru and his main followers were more enlightened (más
luces) and more rational (actually, less irrational) than most Indians. He
called them ladinos, people of Indian descent who spoke Spanish.11
With one decree, he converted Tupac Amaru in the eyes of many from
a rebel hero into a heathen.
The excommunication stung. Tupac Amaru believed himself to be a
model Christian and also understood that Moscoso’s decree would be the
single most efficient weapon against him in the propaganda war that was
beginning to rage. To defend himself, he repeated the argument that as

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an Indian he was not subject to excommunication and moreover that

he was innocent of Church burning. As for Micaela Bastidas, she de-
clared in her trial that Tupac Amaru always held that “they were not
subject to excommunication and that God knew their intentions.”12 His
actions throughout his life substantiated the sincerity of his devotion
and he demonstrated his religious fervor and respect for the Church
during the uprising. He sought to have a priest with him at all times
and attended Mass and offered ser vices for the deceased, both support-
ers and enemies, whenever possible. He insisted that corregidors and
the many corrupt and misguided representatives of the king, but not
men of the cloth, were his enemies. The rebellion never sought to break
with the Church; in fact, the leadership went out of its way to protect
priests. In November, Tupac Amaru claimed that he was defending the
“holy faith.”13
Micaela also demonstrated her faith and her understanding of the
consequences of the excommunication. In order to impress a Merce-
darian friar who happened to be in Tungasuca just after the rebellion
began, she had the people of Tungasuca pray at her house and attend
church. She sought to show him that “she was a very good Christian,
telling him that God supported her cause in benefit to the people.”14 In
a December 13, 1780 decree, Micaela noted that “Our Holy Faith is car-
ried with the greatest respect and veneration, which we have to take
forward, and, if possible, die with; respecting in the same way the min-
isters of Jesus Christ, the señores priests, so that God supports us in our
Christian goals.” She then instructed followers to display the cross in
their caps and hats.15 Nonetheless, Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas
could not contest the excommunication edict or contain the damage.
They tried. Anguished by Moscoso’s actions, Tupac Amaru sought to
lessen the excommunication’s impact in his core area, the valleys and
peaks south of Cuzco, in late 1780. He and Micaela ordered their follow-
ers to rip the decree from church doors. Authorities in Cuzco fumed
when they learned that the decree had not been posted in rebel towns
such as Pirque and Rondocan.16 Indians in the rebel-controlled town of
Acos did not allow priests and Europeans to confer, in an attempt to
prevent news of the excommunication from spreading.17 When Tupac
Amaru found out that a priest in Chumbivilcas had preached against
him, stressing to his parishioners Tupac Amaru’s religious limbo, he sent
two trusted comrades, Felipe Bermúdez and Ramón Ponce, to arrest the

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priest. They tore down Moscoso’s decree from the church door, replac-
ing it with one that explained that the priest had been arrested, that
Tupac Amaru knew how to repay his loyal followers, and that they
should not believe anything that the cleric had told them.18
The evidence in the trial against Tupac Amaru included the bando
(decree) that the rebels posted in Chumbivilcas. It stated, “He who re-
moves this will be given the death sentence.” It came from “don José
Gabriel Tupa Amaro Inca, descendent of the natural king of this king-
dom of Peru,” and was intended for “all types of people, Spaniards as
well as common Indians” in the province of Chumbivilcas. After de-
claring the rebellion’s intention of liberating people from corregidors’
abuses and from “ ‘European’ threats,” it continues:
some ecclesiastics, taking advantage of the excommunication imposed
maliciously and fraudulently by some Europeans, attempt to introduce
countless abuses against Christians, trying to perturb their faith . . . we
demand that everyone in this kingdom, Spaniards as well as Indians,
completely disregard their preaching, because they are not only against
God’s law and that of Christianity which we must defend, but the ob-
jective of their advice is to protect the unjust demands they place on us
and the great damage they infl ict. To liberate ourselves from them, we
request that the citizens capture and bring us these clerics, following
the necessary procedure, and those who don’t follow these orders will
be hanged. Those priests who don’t abstain from their lying abuses and
sermons will be committed in a school for the rest of their life, or they
will serve the sentence wherever we end up. Tupa Amaro.19
It is striking that the decree threatened disobedient followers with the

death sentence whereas the wayward priests would merely be commit-
ted to a school. One witness claimed that Tupac Amaru himself ripped
the decree from the church in Yaurisque, replacing it with one of his
own. He searched for the priest who had posted it and when he didn’t
fi nd him, “ransacked his belongings.” He threatened to send priests
who didn’t obey “wherever he felt like.”20
The battle over the excommunication decree heightened rebel senti-
nels’ efforts to control how information, letters, posters, and lampoons
circulated. In a note to authorities in Cuzco, a priest complained that
“the Indians are so malicious that if they fi nd out that priests on this
side of the river are communicating with those of the Paruro province
they say we are opposing the rebels; we can’t even write one another.
The letter that I’m including is from the Acomayo priest who got it to

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me through his assistant, who is very ill [and thus was allowed through
by sentinels]. Otherwise, it’s very dangerous.”21 In another case, the
unfortunate Francisco Lasarte carried letters to Cuzco in his shoe. On a
return trip, the rebels found them and executed him on the spot. 22 De-
spite these efforts, Tupac Amaru fell short in his efforts to impede the
spread of the news about his excommunication.
People reacted to the news in different ways. One royalist account
said that the excommunication made people lose their “fear of the re-
bellion.”23 The priest of Lluzco and Quinota raved about its impact. He
claimed the excommunication had “brought peace to Quinota,” a rebel
hotbed. He described how kurakas and other people listened carefully
when he translated the document into Quechua for them. He followed
up in Mass by promising that even those who had participated in some
rebel activity would be absolved by the bishop’s special measure as long
as they did not recur. He claimed that the decree had also turned the
tide in Colquemarca and Santo Tomás, important towns of the high
provinces.24 The priest contended that excommunication had punc-
tured Tupac Amaru’s mystique and driven fear into pious Indians.
The letter exaggerates. Calm did not suddenly return to these two
towns. Nonetheless, the excommunication gave many people second
thoughts, slowing recruiting into rebel ranks, decreasing enthusiasm,
and increasing desertions.25 It particularly weakened the rebels’ efforts
to cast themselves as judicious reformers who were forced to do what
the king would have done himself had he been aware of the situation,
that is, expel abusive authorities. It also countered the argument made
frequently by Tupac Amaru in late 1780 that the rebellion sought to
fortify Indian religiosity by ridding Peru of the exploitation that kept
Indians from becoming good Christians.
The excommunication weakened the movement. It prompted doubt
among supporters and drove away potential rebels. The decree aided
the royalist propaganda campaign. Yet its impact should not be exag-
gerated. The rebellion continued to grow after the November 1780 ex-
communication. Thousands of insurgents cared more about the upris-
ing’s anticolonial efforts than about the bishop’s maneuver. How
indigenous people felt about the Church and Catholicism varied greatly.
It was a personal question, one that reflected circumstances and con-
text. Popular, emphatic priests held great sway over their communities;
the more abusive earned parishioners’ wrath (as might have been the

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case in Livitaca, where Tupac Amaru was questioned about what he

was going to do with exploitative priests). The rebel masses shared Tu-
pac Amaru’s ideal of rising against the Spanish without breaking with
the Church. Nonetheless, they proved themselves much more willing
to attack Church property and even priests themselves.26
Moscoso’s measure was the centerpiece of the propaganda against
Tupac Amaru after Sangarará, presenting him and his followers as
church-burning heathens, backward and dangerous Indians. One de-
jected rebel in Calca, in the royalist stronghold of the Sacred Valley, de-
scribed how royalists jeered him as an “excommunicated Indian,” telling
him that “he couldn’t go to church to hear mass and that the insurgents
were all sorcerers.”27 Some feared that the excommunication of Tupac
Amaru presented a danger of contagion. When thirty Indians surren-
dered to the royalist kuraka commander, Mateo Pumacahua, in early
January 1781, he executed them, claiming they “were separated from the
church and they would infect his people with their wretchedness and
guilty sins.”28 In January 1781, loyalist Indians would not touch rebel
cadavers or their belongings due to the excommunication.29 Excommuni-
cation had prompted Indians and others to question Tupac Amaru’s faith
and his uprising.
Moscoso coupled the excommunication with a decisive strategy
that historians have largely overlooked: he demanded that priests re-
main in their parishes, doing whatever they could to weaken the reb-
els and, if possible, reporting the situation to Cuzco. In light of the
virtual absence of the state after the rebellion— corregidors fled almost
immediately and the bulk of administrative work fell to kurakas
anyway— parish priests formed a virtual shadow government behind
enemy lines. They maintained the morale of Europeans and others
who distrusted and feared the rebels, insisting on the leaders’ excom-
munication and the sinful and doomed nature of the uprising. Al-
though Tupac Amaru dominated the Vilcanota Valley, the priests and
their supporters never allowed him to have free rein in his own base.
Frustrated and even desperate, Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas
themselves cajoled and threatened the priests, yet ultimately found
themselves forced to ask for their permission to hold masses for the
dead or to bury them. In several cases, the priests refused. The rebel
leaders could tear down posters and threaten those who propagated news
of the excommunication; they would not, however, attack royalist

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priests. This strategy proved decisive, maintaining royalist figures in

an area overrun by the rebels.
Faith behind Enemy Lines
In a December 21, 1780 letter to Viceroy Jáuregui, Moscoso wrote, “I

have instructed my priests to harass, reprimand, and to preach contin-
ually against the rebels.” He continued that they were thereby prevent-
ing “much malevolence” and that he had ordered them to stay in their
parishes, even if they were under threat and wanted to flee.30 The war
junta in Cuzco underlined the importance of this strategy.31 One docu-
ment mentions that Moscoso selected “strong and spiritual” priests
from the city’s monasteries to send to the war zone to preach to the
people about their errors.32
Moscoso had no patience with priests who disregarded his instruc-
tions. One writer said the bishop “breathed fi re” when dealing with
them.33 Father Antonio Areta, the priest of Velille in the center of rebel
territory, despaired to the bishop in a letter that his flock despised him
for his efforts to dissuade them from supporting the rebels and for the
fact that he was European. Areta told him that he was leaving for Lima
or Buenos Aires because of the great danger. Moscoso showed no sym-
pathy and ordered him to stay in Velille and continue his antirebel en-
deavors. He wrote, “I cannot believe in such a metamorphosis in your
flock, just because you spoke with them with Christian liberty and at-
tempted to separate them from the rebel.”34 While he acknowledged
Areta’s courage, Moscoso described others who had faced greater risks.
The priest of Quiquijana had removed the gallows that Tupac Amaru
had placed in the public square, cut down a bridge to impede a rebel
advance, and posted the excommunication decree. Fearful for his life,
Fernández de Córdoba had fled to Cuzco but Moscoso sent him back to
Quiquijana, “to calm the situation in a town openly in favor of the
rebel.”35 The Bishop recognized that while some priests had very few
parishioners left because all the Indians had left (presumably to join
the rebels), people in Sicuani, Omacha, and other towns begged their
priests to stay. He ended by pointing out that Tupac Amaru did not
seem intent on slaughtering Europeans, as Father Areta argued. To prove
his point, Moscoso mentioned the Spaniards who moved around Tun-
gasuca freely as well as the absence of executions after Sangarará. He

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insisted that he himself was staying in Cuzco to avoid disorder and

confusion, reiterating his command that the priest remain in Velille.36
The priests in the war zone were not clear-cut heroes who selflessly
held the line by standing up to the rebels. The situation was more am-
biguous and fluid as clerics and other residents of the small and medium-
sized towns south of Cuzco attempted to figure out the meaning of the
uprising, specifically the danger to them and the best way to save their
lives and those of others. Many individuals sought to be neutral, while
partisanship remained quite open in this early phase of the uprising. In
fact, we know about the priests’ activities because eighteen of them
were tried after the rebellion for having written obsequious letters to
Tupac Amaru or Micaela Bastidas. They had the misfortune that loyal-
ist commanders found their correspondence when they captured the
two leaders. While some of the priests convincingly argued in lengthy
trials that the notes and letters were ploys to gain time and to save lives,
others seemed to sympathize with the insurgents. This correspondence
and the detailed trials about them, which featured elaborate discus-
sions of the language used by the priests, provide unusual glimpses into
daily life during the uprising.
In the Heart of the Fire
Moscoso prosecuted eighteen priests or other religious men (sacristans,

aides, and others) for having written to Tupac Amaru or Micaela Basti-
das. The letters complimented these two leaders and requested favors,
from protection to sugar. The archbishop tried them in Cuzco’s ecclesi-
astic court, the curia eclesiástica, for pledging their support to the rebels
and for consorting with someone who had been excommunicated. The
sycophantic salutations usually got the writer in trouble.
Juan de Luna, a priest in Chamaca, near Velille in the center of
rebel territory, wrote to Micaela Bastidas on February 10, 1781 “to clear
up some false accusations by don Juan de Dios Valencia, the comisionado
or representative of Sr. Don José Gabriel, your majesty’s husband,” which
led to his imprisonment by two hundred Indians in the town of Livit-
aca. Luna explained to Bastidas that his captors misinterpreted his ser-
mons as critiques of the rebels. He argued that he had spoken out
against wretched vices and the horrors of sin and that the rebels’ efforts
were actually addressing these issues, thus carry ing out divine will.

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Father Luna insisted that the prevalence of vice in the area greatly of-
fended God. In this letter, Luna also disputed the rebels’ claim that he
had organized royalist soldiers, contending that he had only brought
them together so that they could confess and take communion. He re-
quested that he not be harassed and signed off by calling himself “her
most reliable server and fond chaplain.”37
Luna testified in 1782. He argued that the letter was part of his ef-
forts to get out of rebel prison, where he was held along with other
priests and religious people. He asserted that the rebels controlled the
paths and roads that led to Cuzco and he thus stayed behind to defend
his people, helping many Spaniards escape the area. He had been forced
to “feign surrender and submission.” Apparently confident, Luna chided
the judge for writing from “the tranquillity of his office,” while he had
been surrounded by “barbarians.” Witnesses supported Luna’s claims,
insisting that Velille and Chumbivilcas in general were firmly rebel terri-
tory, that some priests had been killed in areas such as Paucartambo and
the area near Lake Titicaca, and that he helped Spaniards escape. In his
case, the letter was not particularly damning and he was absolved.38
The prosecution accused the clerics of negotiating with the rebels
rather than fleeing and of communicating with an excomulgado. The
defendants relied on three explanations. When asked why they did not
leave rather than plead with the rebels, they claimed it was impossible.
Rebels had fi lled the roads and paths to Lima with sentinels and spies
and people could not circulate easily. They used a similar line of argu-
ment when accused of dealing with an excomulgado. They argued that
they were unaware of the decree, as it had not reached their town.
With these two justifications, they portray a curious scenario in which
rebels controlled a massive region extending hundred miles south of
Cuzco but could not thwart royalist priests. In the region around Tun-
gasuca, rebels would not break into the sanctuary of the churches or,
even after direct and heated confrontations, attack priests.39
Their third line of defense, alongside the impossibility of fleeing and
their ignorance of the excommunication decree, was fear. The prospect
of death at the hands of the rebels forced them to negotiate and even
fawn but also led them to act in irrational and unusual ways. One defen-
dant wrote, “it would have been different if I had found myself free of the
worries prompted by such unexpected and scandalous events [the upris-
ing]; but when fear rather than reason dominates . . . an overwhelming

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fantasy takes hold that makes you think about the most wretched events
and get overexcited.” 40 In canon law, the rules of conduct that guided
investigations and trials of church members, grave fear is understood as
diminishing actions and thus can be used to justify unacceptable ac-
tions.41 And despite Bishop Moscoso’s reassurances in late 1780, the
clerics had reason to tremble. Don Antonio Chaves, the auxiliary priest
of Sicuani, gave a chilling anecdote. Chaves had written Tupac Amaru
to ask that he send a judge to prevent “extortions” by Indians. The
town’s dignitaries and wealthier merchants had taken refuge inside the
Sicuani church. Rebels frequently pounded on the church door and did
not tire of threatening those inside. One day they intimidated Chaves
by shaking burlap bags with objects inside that made a loud noise. He
was horrified to learn that inside the bags were the heads of royalists
killed by the rebels. He was acquitted.42
Don Carlos Rodríguez, the priest of Yanaoca, wrote Micaela Basti-
das to request fi fty pounds of sugar, for which he sent ten pesos. In this
December 26, 1780 note, he promised to make up the difference if the
ten pesos weren’t enough and that he would like even more sugar if
possible. His justification for the one-sentence letter was, in contrast,
elaborate. Tupac Amaru had threatened the people of Yanaoca if they
did not join him. Locals begged Rodríguez to impede the “rebel, and
even more so his wife, the stronger one.” 43 He said the letter was to
trick the rebels into believing that he and the town supported them, a
ruse he came up with “in the midst of so much confusion, in the very
heart of the fi re, surrounded by barbarians.” He emphasized that he
helped three Spaniards escape and that his town had captured Micae-
la’s brother, Antonio Bastidas. The prosecutors recognized the difficult
situation that Rodriguez y Avila faced but persevered because of his
signoff in the letter to Bastidas, “I pray to our Lord and the Virgin for
your success and that they take care of you for many years.”
Witnesses testified that Rodríguez had acquired much-needed sugar
for Yanaoca and gained time to allow Spaniards to escape. They de-
scribed his face-to-face confrontations with rebels and how he had kept
Yanaoca out of the hands of the insurgents. Every night he had his pa-
rishioners join together in a procession in honor of the Holy Virgin,
clearly a counterrevolutionary ritual. On November 30, Micaela Bastidas
arrived in Yanaoca with two thousand six hundred soldiers. He would
not receive her in royal fashion or allow the rebels to ring the church

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bell. She ordered three artillerymen to shell his house but, according to
his testimony, he didn’t budge. Rodríguez took an even greater risk when
he did not allow the rebels to bury Andrés Noguera (Tupac Amaru’s
cousin) and Hermenegildo Roxas in the Yanaoca church. The rebels of-
fered 300 pesos, he claimed, but he refused. He also raised the rebels’ ire
by allowing local Spanish authorities threatened by rebels to take refuge
in the church. Despite their fury, the rebels did not break down the door
or even demand that he give up the key.
Rodríguez also confronted Tupac Amaru himself, audaciously asking
him whether he didn’t fear God and Hell in light of all the turmoil,
deaths, and theft he had prompted. Tupac Amaru responded that in tak-
ing action against the “thieving corregidors,” he was doing God’s work.
On another occasion, the priest criticized Tupac Amaru for having ran-
sacked the church’s fields. The rebel leader responded that the damage
would be repaid. Witnesses did not corroborate these encounters—they
were not asked— and the priests might have exaggerated. Nonetheless,
the stories indicate the respect that rebels had for the sanctity of the
church. If a Spanish landowner had made such comments, the rebels
would very likely have killed him. Other priests also told stories of rebels
ransacking, burning, and threatening but stopping at the church door.
Backed by Spanish witnesses, Rodríguez was acquitted.
Domingo de Escalante had been the assistant to the priest in Marco-
conga, an annex of Sangarará, but after the events there returned to
his family house in Acos, Quispicanchi, aiding the priest of Pirque. On
February 12, 1781, he sent Micaela Bastidas peaches, prickly pears, and
bread in the name of his mother. In a poorly written letter, Escalante
described how the Indians of Pomacanchi, where rebels had burned a
textile mill and entered repeatedly, had threatened his brother and
damaged his house. He asked her for protection.
In his defense, Escalante claimed that caution and just fear (“recelo y
temor justo”) drove him to write the letter. He noted that while he never
believed the decree published by Tupac Amaru that declared his pre-
rogative as a viceroy and visitador general to punish corregidors, he did
not know about the rebel leader’s excommunication. He explained,
“Indians didn’t allow us to meet or talk about anything or to put up
signs.” He described how rebels controlled all of the roads in the area
and how they targeted all Spaniards, with no respect for gender, age, or
status. They punished them “for no other crime than having a white

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face or for not wanting to join the vile insurgent troops.” He insisted
that “even priests” were arrested and subject to execution. He employed
the widely circulated anti-insurgent litany—Tupac Amaru was a vio-
lent tyrant who murdered, burned churches, and killed his enemies on
a whim— and stressed his own anguished and even irrational emo-
tional state. Several witnesses confi rmed that the rebels had blocked all
roads and threatened priests and Spaniards. He was acquitted.44
Luna, Chaves, and several other priests prosecuted by Moscoso ap-
pear to have been faithful and courageous followers of the bishop’s com-
mand to stay put and preach against the insurgents. They wrote the
letters and notes that got them into trouble but their testimonies and
the many witnesses that backed their stories indicate their loyalty and
unflagging efforts to boost the morale of local people and to disparage
the rebels. Other defendants leave a more ambiguous impression. They
wrote obsequious letters to Tupac Amaru or Micaela Bastidas but their
actions went beyond desperate maneuvers to save their lives or those of
European parishioners. They might have simply felt obliged to show
their support for the insurgents in tangible ways, beyond a mere letter.
It should not be forgotten that they were in the midst of rebel territory,
terrified by dreadful stories or scenes of insurgent violence. But their
seeming ambivalence might have been more than just a tactic used in a
dire time. Some seem to have supported certain measures taken by the
rebels, or at least believed that Tupac Amaru and his followers were
going to control the region for a long period. They certainly did not
enthusiastically follow Moscoso’s command to harass the rebels
implacably.
In late December 1780, don Buenaventura Tapia, an ordained priest
based in San Pablo de Cacha, sent Tupac Amaru the town’s tax rolls along
with his assurances that he would quickly dispatch Indian soldiers, “even
single men and choir members.” Rebel leaders could use the tax rolls to
keep track of recruits and to make sure that the town was sending its
share. Tapia told the recruits that the rebellion fought for the “common
good.” He thanked Tupac Amaru for “cutting from the root” the corregi-
dors’ bad customs and monopoly of resources that caused such “great
poverty,” but excused himself from leaving town to meet in person due
to his “choleric tumors.” In the trial, Tapia blamed panic for this highly
incriminating letter and the remission of the tax rolls, bluntly stating
that he wrote it due to “his fear of Tupac Amaru’s recklessness and rigor.”

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He elaborated, “fear impelled and moved me to write the letter . . . the

extraordinary effects that this class of fear prompts in men, not just un-
prepared, pusillanimous, uninformed ones like myself but even those
strong, informed individuals who had perhaps experienced such serious
conflicts.” He deemed the letter “a pretext or ruse that only the most con-
fused, fearful, or uninformed men could create.” Witnesses acknowl-
edged that he had protected Spaniards and preached against the rebels.
The prosecution rebuked him for the letter but absolved him, noting that
it was written in a context of “coercion, force, and fear.”45 Nonetheless, it
seems clear that he took concrete steps to help the rebels.
The priests frustrated Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas. They
could not force them to follow their commands, particularly when they
were in the sanctuary of the church, nor could they easily contest the
anti-insurgent messages in masses and processions. In fact, Tupac Amaru
had to prevent his troops from taking actions into their own hands.
Another defendant, Don Justo Gallegos, the priest of Layo, had sent
Tupac Amaru some fish and requested that Indians stop harassing him
and his parishioners. On January 20, 1781, Tupac Amaru wrote him
that there was little he could do “as the Indians are out taking revenge
for the Spanish affronts and iniquities and from what I see they are
destroying the church haciendas, who aren’t the guilty ones but rather
the priests who are preaching against us and hoping to obscure our
righteous orders.” 46 This might have been disingenuous on the part of
Tupac Amaru— by claiming that he couldn’t control his Indian follow-
ers he tried to shield himself from some of the blame— but in effect he
did struggle to limit violence and ransacking by his own followers.
However, his anger and disappointment with the priests and their ser-
mons are clear.
Rebel Priests?
The best-known priests in the Tupac Amaru rebellion are those who
apparently supported the rebels from the beginning. Father Antonio
López de Sosa, the parish priest of Pampamarca, had married Tupac
Amaru and Micaela Bastidas and baptized their children. Some main-
tained that he had virtually raised Tupac Amaru and that they were
compadres.47 In his testimony, López de Sosa did not deny their close-
ness and admitted that he had lent Tupac Amaru money at times. Born

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in Panama, López de Sosa was a long-time resident of the area and his
jurisdiction also included Tungasuca and Surimana. He had been at the
dinner at Father Rodríguez’s house that preceded Arriaga’s capture and
remained in Tungasuca after his execution. One witness claimed that
he went in and out of Tupac Amaru’s house, rebel headquarters, at will
and some contended that he had even helped gather wood to build the
gallows.48
The assistant priest, Ildefonso Bejarano, lived in Tupac Amaru’s house
and to the disgust of European prisoners, moved about freely in the
rebel camp. He and López Sosa participated in the preparations for Ar-
riaga’s execution. López de Sosa gave last rites while Bejarano lectured
from the gallows to the thousands present, “see what has happened to
this bad man for having lost respect for priests and the bishop.” 49 They
both had paid lip ser vice to the excommunication but reiterated their
support to Tupac Amaru.
Micaela Bastidas had reservations about their loyalty to the rebel
cause. On November 26, 1780, she wrote Tupac Amaru about how Beja-
rano and Ramón Moscoso, the kuraka of Yanaoca and Bishop Moscoso’s
cousin, reported to the bishop and others in Cuzco on troop numbers.
She pointed out that the fact that Bejarano and López de Sosa closed
the church and wouldn’t give Mass could indicate loyalist leanings. She
closed this letter, “all of this has me worried as we are in the midst of
enemies and we could become victims of a sudden act of treachery.”50
This exchange prompted Bejarano to reassure Tupac Amaru in a highly
incriminating letter dated December 1, the centerpiece of the decades-
long trials against him. He explained to the rebel leaders that city coun-
cil members in Cuzco had deemed them accomplices of the rebel. López
de Sosa thus closed the church and posted the excommunication de-
cree to counter these charges, to appear to be working for the royalists,
“but it was well known how much he [López de Sosa] cares about Your
Majesty [Tupac Amaru].” Bejarano stressed that López de Sosa and he
understood that the rebellion was not “against the faith” and recognized
that “young and old knew that this type of men [abusive Spaniards] has
been very harmful in this kingdom.”51 The letter explains their actions
and confi rms their admiration for Tupac Amaru but does not explicitly
say that they support the rebel. It strikes a middle ground, in which these
priests continue to work with their parish in the midst of rebel head-
quarters but do not pledge support. When they later defended themselves

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in court by asserting that they were only doing their jobs as men of the
cloth and had no alternative but to perform some duties in the elabo-
rate execution of Arriaga, they were stretching the truth but not bla-
tantly lying.
The priests had sided with Bishop Moscoso in his previous battles
with Corregidor Arriaga and believed in greater clerical autonomy from
the viceroy and the Crown. They opposed the regalist efforts of the
Bourbons to hem in the power of the Church. Other than that, the ex-
planations of why they supported the rebels are not that different than
those for other middle-sector individuals. They knew Tupac Amaru
well and understood that he was a devout Christian. In fact, they
trusted and even venerated him. These priests witnessed on a daily ba-
sis the ceaseless exploitation of Indians and understood the toll that the
mita, the reparto, and other taxes took on Indians; they also knew that
these demands reduced the money available for the Church. In addi-
tion, they believed that corregidors and authorities in Cuzco and Lima
served towns such as Tungasuca and Pampamarca poorly. They pre-
sumably understood and welcomed the importance they would have
and the longed-for changes that would take place if the rebellion were
successful; they also must have had a strong inkling of the conse-
quences if it failed.
The trials against López de Sosa and Bejarano lasted for more than a
decade—the Spanish did not know what to do with them. It’s safe to say
that their robes saved them. It is difficult to imagine a layperson getting
away with such open support for the rebels. In their defense, several of
the European prisoners noted the priests’ kindness and deemed them
“good men.” For example, Juan Antonio Figueroa observed López de
Sosa pleading with Tupac Amaru just half an hour before the execution.
However, they also expressed their shock at how López de Sosa and Be-
jarano moved about camp freely and rubbed elbows with the rebel lead-
ership.52 The two priests insisted that circumstances did not allow them
to prevent the execution or alert authorities.
In 1787, López de Sosa was still captive in a Capuchin monastery in
Madrid. He presented medical testimony that he suffered from hypo-
chondria (depression) and from the region’s bad weather. Bejarano had
spent time in Cádiz, Madrid, and Sigüenza (in the center of Spain), re-
stricted to monastic life. In 1790 the King granted him a small daily pen-
sion yet in 1794 Bejarano demanded his freedom, bitterly complaining

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about Sigüenza’s climate, “a land of misery and tears.” He missed his

homeland, “the delicious valley of Paucartambo.”53 Neither returned to
Peru.
Scholars have long debated whether the Catholic Church supported the
Tupac Amaru rebellion. The key is how the question is framed. If it is
asked whether some members of the Church aided the rebels, the an-
swer is yes. As seen here, the clergy from the center of the rebellion met
with Tupac Amaru on a daily basis before and after the uprising began
and did almost nothing to impede the rebels. López de Sosa and Beja-
rano continued their clerical duties in the midst of Arriaga’s execution
and its aftermath. While not weapon-carrying soldiers or radical ideo-
logues, they were close to Tupac Amaru and disregarded the bishop’s
command to condemn the rebellion from the pulpit and to spy on the
rebels. But no one contests that some clerics were on the rebels’ side.54
The trials against the priests and the long-running campaign against
Bishop Moscoso led people past and present to focus on the bishop and
to exaggerate the subversive role of the Church. In part, this reflects the
ageless maxim that the victors write history. Spanish hard-liners, who
took over the royalist side at the very end of the demise of the rebellion
and then oversaw the trials (the major source for scholars) and subse-
quent repression, contended that defiant priests had played an impor-
tant role in the formation and development of the uprising. Visitador
Areche and his replacement, Benito Mata Linares, mistrusted and dis-
liked Bishop Moscoso. They belittled him in correspondence and tried
with great energy and even anger to prosecute him for rebel sympa-
thies. These trials dragged on for almost a decade and the archive rec-
ords are literally voluminous.55 A critic of Moscoso, Arriaga’s nephew
Eusebio Balza de Verganza, published a detailed indictment loaded
with documents, La verdad desnuda o las dos fases de un Obispo, “The Na-
ked Truth or the Two Sides of a Bishop.”56 In 1784, José Raphael Sa-
huaraura Titu Atauchi published Estado del Perú (1784), a defense of
Moscoso, while in 1790 Moscoso released a long summary of his refu-
tation of the charges in Inocencia justificada contra los artificios de la calum-
nia, “Justified Innocence Against Slanderous Tricks.”57 Subsequent
chapters examine his long struggle, from Cuzco to Lima to Spain, to
defend himself against the accusations of supporting the rebels. Read-
ers are led to believe that whether Moscoso supported Tupac Amaru or

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not is the fundamental question, and his accusers made a convincing or

at least spirited argument. This chapter instead stresses the impact of
his measures in late 1780 and early 1781 and their importance for slow-
ing the rebels in their own base.
This battle between the hard-liners and the bishop was based on
both Areche and Mata Linares’s growing disdain and even hatred for
the creole Moscoso, as well as on broader ideological battles in Spain
and the Americas. As we will see, Moscoso’s relatively conciliatory ap-
proach to the second stage of the rebellion dismayed hard-liners. They
gladly channeled the accusation and rumors about Moscoso (not only
regarding rebel inclinations but also scandalous relations with women)
to the king’s inner circle in Madrid. It was personal. But the battle also
reflected the battle over the role of the Church in Spain and Spanish-
American society. Although devout Catholics, hard-liners and royalists
such as Areche and Mata Linares believed that the Church and other
institutions should be firmly under the control of the Crown.58 They
thought that priests had too much autonomy and wealth in Peru and
had lost their monastic discipline. Stories linking priests and nuns with
lovers, often of the lower orders or occasionally even of the same sex,
abounded in eighteenth-century Peru, a virtual trope.59 Moscoso’s ene-
mies shared the view that ecclesiastics were too independent and un-
ruly, particularly creoles, and could even go so far as to raise arms against
the Crown. The story of Moscoso and Arriaga as well as that of the hard-
liners moves from the personal to the structural, Spanish royalists ver-
sus the creole clergy.
In a June 1781 letter, Areche vented that in Peru,
Clerics—secular and regular clergy as well as many creoles— are weak

at heart in terms of Spain’s ownership and possession of these domin-
ions: Your Excellency, there are many Voltaires, many Rousseaus,
many Raynalds and many others who have sacrilegiously opposed in
their writing the authority of Kings, as these clerics are not properly
watched over by the Inquisition, Prelates, or the government, who
must be zealous that such doctrines despised by everyone educated,
rational and Christian— don’t enter, aren’t disseminated or read.
Near the end of the letter he added that in the trial against Tupac Amaru,
they had found “a great deal of correspondence to him from priests and
friars that scandalizes and hurts the ears of even the most robust and
pacific. There you see how they treated him as Your Majesty and the

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submission and respect with which they treated him, calling him Re-
deemer and the New Messiah.”60
Followers of the trial after the rebellion and readers of the transcripts
over two hundred years later can be easily led to believe that defiant
priests subverted the Cuzco countryside along with Tupac Amaru. De-
spite the cases of López de Sosa, Bejarano and a few others, however,
this view is excessive if not erroneous. While Bishop Moscoso knew
Tupac Amaru, sympathized with some of his battles prior to November
1780, despised Arriaga, and had tangled with other Spaniards, he threw
all his weight against the uprising upon news of the corregidor’s execu-
tion and the battle of Sangarará.61 What is key is the impact of the ex-
communication and the decisive aid that priests, following the bishop’s
orders, gave to royalists. If they had not stayed, the rebels would have
had free rein in the massive triangle between Cuzco and its amorphous
borders with Arequipa and Puno. Recruiting and gathering provisions
would have been much easier and church land would have been there
for the taking. Royalists would have not had anyone in the region to
contest rebel ideology. Instead, priests rallied intermediate groups and
planted doubts with the Indian masses about Tupac Amaru’s religious
status, his all-important soul, and the fate of the rebellion.
The question of whether a group or an individual supported the up-
rising is not so black and white. Partisanship was fluid— often due to
opportunism or desperation— and many of the priests were neither
committed rebels nor effective counterinsurgents. As the letters to Bas-
tidas and Tupac Amaru showed, they cowered in fear and shock and
sought to save their lives and those of their parishioners. Many proba-
bly saw good things about both sides or despised them both. Some pre-
sumably did not understand what was happening—few people did in
the confusing fi nal months of 1780. Nonetheless, the work of priests
backed by the bishop in the Tupac Amaru zone vexed and weakened
the rebels. Without them, Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas would
have had a much easier time spreading their message and gaining re-
sources. They could not imagine a world without the Catholic Church;
their struggle to create a new world had to contend with its fervent and
effective opposition.

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4
The Rebellion Goes South
A F T ER T H E NOV EM BER 18victory in Sangarará, many in the rebel

camp believed that they would bolster their forces in their base,
the Vilcanota Valley, and then quickly proceed north, to the city of
Cuzco. Instead, Tupac Amaru had his eyes set on the south, the over-
whelmingly indigenous area toward Lake Titicaca. As is often the case
with military commanders, an uneasy mix of confidence and fear sparked
his thinking. He knew that his message would be well received in a
region that bore a particularly high mita burden for the Potosí silver
mines. At the same time, he understood that he had not yet faced the
main thrust of the colonial military and that much more challenging
battles lay ahead. In the following weeks and months, both rebels and
royalists boasted about their numbers and flaunted their confidence
while privately fretting that a debacle was close at hand.
Tupac Amaru believed that he could control the arid plateau that
stretched from Cuzco to Lake Titicaca and perhaps even expand into
Upper Peru, or Charcas as it was more commonly called. He worried,
however, that the corregidors of five districts in the Lake Titicaca region
would soon receive money, arms, and troops from Arequipa and attack
him from the south, or at least thwart his expansion in that direction.
He thus decided to push toward Lake Titicaca, leaving Micaela Bastidas
to manage the Tungasuca base. Many of his supporters wondered why
the rebel didn’t take Cuzco immediately, before Spanish reinforce-
ments arrived. Commentators and historians would continue to debate
this strategy for centuries.
Micaela stayed behind and took care of provisions, discipline, cor-
respondence, and the countless other tasks that military campaigns

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The Rebellion Goes South 87
require. During her husband’s foray to the south, she increasingly wor-
ried that a swift royalist attack from Cuzco would crush their camp in
Tungasuca. In numerous letters to Tupac Amaru, she expressed her im-
patience with his extended sojourn to and urged him to hurry, stressing
that his family was in danger. In Cuzco, fi fty-five miles away, Bishop
Moscoso directed royalist efforts. His situation and activities displayed
a curious symmetry with those of Micaela. He raised money and mo-
rale, orchestrated religious processions, and communicated with au-
thorities in Lima, his priests throughout rebel territory, and militia
leaders. With only vague and distorted news about events south of the
city, he and much of the city population feared that a siege of the city
was imminent. Europeans began to think that their worst nightmare
was possible: the bizarre hanging of a corregidor and the unfortunate
turn of events in Sangarará could develop into a full-blown war. While
Bastidas looked to the south, anxiously waiting for her husband and
the bulk of their troops to return, royalists in Cuzco impatiently waited
for reinforcements from the north. Both sides sought to win the infor-
mation and propaganda battles, placing spies and messengers, inflating
their strength, and masking their intentions and anxieties.
Contentious Preparations
Panic spread in Cuzco because of alarming reports about rebel actions to

the south and complacency, even incompetence, among the city’s lead-
ers. Bishop Moscoso chided the junta in Cuzco for its delays and divi-
sions but worked closely with its members to prepare the city’s defenses
and to respond to Tupac Amaru. Sangarará had convinced them to
forgo any sort of attack and instead wait for troops from Lima and pre-
pare for rebel incursions or even a siege of the city. The bishop per-
suaded district mayors, kurakas, and the city’s well-to-do to donate to a
defense fund while mayors and kurakas from nearby areas arrived with
militias, usually about two hundred strong. The corregidor of Abancay,
Manuel Villalta, became the city’s military commander. Moscoso en-
listed all of the city’s students as well as priests in militia companies.
Villalta reportedly “shed tears of joy and edification” when he witnessed
the priests marching in Cuzco’s streets.1 In late December, the city
council exonerated Indians who joined the royalists from the reparto
and the sales tax (alcabala), two of the rebels’ major grievances.2

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The city council and Bishop Moscoso did not limit their prepara-
tions to fundraising, military training, and last-minute reforms. One
account described how the entire population of the city, led by Bishop
Moscoso and Franciscan friars, united “to wash away their sins in the
fountain of penance and to take strength from the Holy Eucharist.” The
author declared that “undoubtedly a spectacle has been offered to God
that is capable of disarming his wrath, while the solemn fasting on No-
vember 28–30 has placed this town in the humility that God demands,
whereas before its immoderate haughtiness and excesses prompted his
just indignation.” Panic had reached the point where city dwellers
viewed the uprising not as an unprecedented expression of Indian fury
or of Tupac Amaru’s bloodthirsty quest for retribution, but as divine
wrath.3
News of Arriaga’s execution reached Lima on November 24. Viceroy
Jáuregui called for an immediate emergency meeting with the General
Inspector of the Army, Commander José del Valle, Visitador General
José Antonio de Areche, and members of the high court or Audiencia.
On the 28th, commander Gabriel de Avilés left the city with two hun-
dred members of the free black (“pardos libres”) militia, with instruc-
tions to recruit soldiers along the long march to Cuzco. Peru did not
have a standing army and relied instead on militias. Avilés’s troops had
four hundred muskets, twelve thousand cartridges, and five hundred
sabers. At this point, the viceroy believed that the rebels counted on
twenty thousand men.4 Days later, when the viceroy learned about the
Sangarará debacle, he sent an additional 400 soldiers as well as 6 can-
nons, 1,525 16-caliber muskets, 75 pistols, spears, lances, and other weap-
ons. Mules and foot soldiers carried the load down the desert coast in
the hottest days of the summer. They turned inland around Pisco and
climbed the precipitous Andes. Summer in the Andes means warmer
temperatures, a welcome respite for people used to the temperate coast,
but also rain. The showers and mud made the marching miserable, par-
ticularly the climbing. Del Valle left Lima on December 20 with an ad-
ditional two hundred soldiers.
These and other soldiers from the coast suffered terribly from so-
roche, or altitude sickness. Over millennia, Andean people have adapted,
with enlarged chests and increased lung capacities.5 However, people
from lower elevations begin to feel the flulike symptoms at about eight
thousand feet. The thinner (scientists prefer the term “less dense”) air

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contains less oxygen, causing people to tire quickly, run out of breath,
and become nauseous. Many dehydrate as the altitude consumes more
water vapor in the lungs. Some people can develop potentially fatal
pulmonary or cerebral edemas. Rest relieves the symptoms but these
soldiers continued to march up and down steep mountains, the grim
reports from Cuzco adding to their haste. The route to Cuzco includes
passes that tower fourteen thousand feet above sea level. Cuzco itself is
at ten thousand five hundred feet but most of the fighting took place in
the south, much of it well over twelve thousand feet above sea level.
Bus drivers in the Andes routinely hand out coca leaves or medications
that can alleviate the aches and nausea. Anyone who has flown to an
Andean or other city over ten thousand feet above sea level knows that
after an initial exhilaration, the traveler feels sluggish and has a pound-
ing headache. Hydration and rest help greatly— the royalist soldiers did
not have this option. Soroche would add to their miseries and impede
their fighting in the coming battles.
Well-armed battalions advance slowly in the Andes. The sheer west-
ern face that rises sharply only a few miles inland presented just the ini-
tial challenge. Horizontal ranges that run east-west saddle the interrange
valleys, rapidly breaking up any respite from climbing and descending.
Even today, the roads between Nazca and Cuzco feature almost nonstop
hills and unnervingly steep turns. The Avilés expedition did not reach
Cuzco until January 1, where they waited for the others.6 The three ex-
peditions had orders to recruit among the largely indigenous population
between Lima and Cuzco. No commander provided numbers but they
had to rely on coercion and apparently had only middling success—
hundreds rather than thousands joined them. On December 11, 1780,
Areche wrote to one corregidor demanding that he pay suppliers the full
amount and on time. He confidently predicted that “many would volun-
teer and thus require supplies.”7 His optimism proved unfounded. Indi-
ans did not volunteer massively and many of these indigenous soldiers
deserted when the fighting began and conditions worsened.
On December 7, Lima’s city council abolished the reparto, believing
it the major cause of the uprising, and ordered that corregidors receive
a fi xed salary, hoping that this would discourage them from exploiting
locals. They criticized Cuzco for the divisions and indecisiveness that
Bishop Moscoso reported, contending that the Andean city had been
“pusillanimous.” At the same time, in Lima divisions emerged that would

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The Southern Campaigns
mark the royalist reaction to the uprising and policies well into the
nineteenth century. Incensed that he had not been named to lead the
expedition, Visitador Areche wrote fiery diatribes against the viceroy
and del Valle to his ally in Madrid, the powerful José Gálvez. He de-
cried their incompetence and what he deemed the cowardice of the
Lima population. To Areche’s chagrin, few people in Lima volunteered
to join the expedition to fight the rebels in Cuzco. This should not have
been surprising: it was a five-week journey over mountain passes that

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stretched fourteen thousand feet above sea level. Moreover, people un-
derstood that the pay would be minimal, conditions rugged, the com-
bat brutal, the Andean population hostile, and the enemy relentless. In
late December, Areche himself headed to Cuzco, intending to take over
operations in this early stage. He failed and had to share responsibili-
ties. Yet Areche never gave up in his attempt to undermine Viceroy
Jáuregui and Commander del Valle and to implement his preferred
hard-line policies against the rebels and the Andean people.
Areche teamed with Benito Mata Linares in this struggle. Born in
Madrid in 1752, Mata Linares had been named to Lima’s high court in
1778 and was also Auditor of War.8 He and Areche belittled the viceroy’s
efforts, demanding a greater reliance on fixed units and professional sol-
diers rather than local militias and volunteers. They presented the cre-
oles and corregidors who oversaw the militias as lazy and corrupt and
the lower classes who manned them as untrustworthy cowards. In the
fi nal months of 1780 and early 1781, Mata Linares and Areche won this
battle, at least on paper, as Madrid recognized the drawbacks of the mi-
litias. Nonetheless, royalists did not have the time or resources to make
this transition quickly. Mata Linares joined Areche in peppering Ma-
drid with letters and memos about the viceroy’s errors and the need for
radical change in Peru. In the coming two years they succeeded in
wresting decision making from the viceroy and his allies.9
Going South
On November 22, 1780, Tupac Amaru left Tungasuca to shore up his
support in the nearby towns of Pichigua, Yauri, and Coporaque, where
the kuraka Eugenio Sinayuca had been proselytizing against him. He
followed what was becoming standard procedure: his scouts searched
for enemies and provisions and he gave an impassioned speech from
the church steps about his movement, announcing in Quechua to flab-
bergasted locals that a new day had arrived. Many listeners joined his
movement. On the 25th, Tupac Amaru wrote a proclamation to the
population of Lampa, a large town to the south near Lake Titicaca, an-
nouncing his campaign against “bad government” and abusive Span-
iards and his commitment to creoles. He boasted that he counted on
sixty thousand Indian supporters as well as creoles and people from
outside the area.10

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In this initial foray to the south, Tupac Amaru failed to capture José
Campino, the corregidor of Chumbivilcas, and also saw the royalist
kuraka Eugenio Sinayuca slip out of his hands. On November 27, he
heard disturbing news about an alliance among the corregidors of
Azángaro, Chucuito, Carabaya, Lampa, and Puno, who were awaiting
arms and soldiers from either Arequipa or La Paz. He worried that if
the corregidors received this help and royalists attacked from Cuzco, he
could be trapped. This motivated him to continue his push south. He
asked kurakas in his core area to stall any troops mobilizing from Cuzco
while he was away and instructed Micaela to disseminate an exaggerated
image of their followers’ numbers and resources in order to discourage
such a royalist charge. He also told Micaela on November 26 that he
would be back in “five or six days”—he was off by almost a month.11
Tupac Amaru headed toward an area he knew well because of his
trips to Potosí. He counted on important contacts and allies. His favor-
ite author, Garcilaso de la Vega, perhaps inspired him. Book 2 (“which
describes the idolatry of the Incas and the way in which they glimpsed
our true God”) chapters 19 and 20 of the Comentarios Reales (Royal Com-
mentaries) describes in characteristically epic style how Lloque Yupan-
qui, the third Inca ruler, conquered the Collao in the thirteenth cen-
tury. Garcilaso portrays how Lloque Yupanqui tamed their “wicked”
women and instructed them to follow a single God, the Sun. We can
imagine José Gabriel reading these lines from chapter 20 with glee,
perhaps understanding them as a premonition: “the people of Chucuito
[near Lake Titicaca], though they were powerful and their ancestors
had subjected some neighboring tribes, did not wish to resist the Inca.
They replied on the contrary that they would obey him with love and
goodwill as a child of the Sun, to whose clemency and mercy they were
attached and whose benefits they desired to enjoy by becoming his sub-
jects.”12 It should be remembered that José Gabriel considered himself
“El Inca.” The Royal Commentaries tells multiple tales of Incas based in
Cuzco triumphantly imposing order in the Collao.13 José Gabriel looked
to the Collao with the confident enthusiasm of someone who knew the
region well. In contrast, when pursuing rebel forces there half a year
later, the Spanish would view the region with dread and even disgust.
In reality, Tupac Amaru’s objective, the five corregidors, did not
pose a serious threat to Tupac Amaru and were themselves vulnerable.
The reinforcements and funds they expected from Arequipa, La Paz, or

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Lima never arrived, while much of the Spanish-speaking and more af-
fluent local population in the Titicaca area fled. Moreover, as rumors of
hordes attacking from the north circulated, the Indian masses increas-
ingly abandoned their customary deference and flaunted their rebel
sympathies. The corregidors felt besieged; they knew their lives were in
danger. In late 1780, they strove to hold out against the rebels and save
their own lives.
Although recriminations about the corregidors’ inability to hold the
south continued for months and years, they tried. Desperation seems
the best term to describe their efforts. When he learned about the up-
rising, don Miguel de Urbiola, the Carabaya corregidor, instructed par-
ish priests to prepare with “penance and public processions” and had
his assistants organize the defense of towns such as Crucero and Sandia.
He himself supposedly walked twenty-two leagues (about sixty miles; a
league was often measured by how far a person could walk in an hour)
in a single day “to provide Spaniards and Indians with guns and spears”
that he paid for himself. Nonetheless, rebels eventually burned down
much of Carabaya.14 On November 14, the Azángaro corregidor in-
structed his counterpart in Lampa to organize troops and to hold the
line, because other provinces were “bereft of weapons.”15
Puno’s corregidor, Joaquín de Orellana, left a detailed account of his
frantic efforts to defend the Collao. In November 1780, reacting to the
call by another corregidor to “drown out this fi re before it spreads and
resist with everything,” he proceeded to Lampa with his minuscule mi-
litia of 166 men. Orellana was then ordered to Ayaviri, where rebels al-
most trapped him and he lost his guns and gunpowder. To his dismay,
he then was called on to help much of Puno’s population evacuate; he
had hoped Lake Titicaca’s largest city would be a royalist stronghold. He
had no confidence in the local militias and labeled authorities in Cuzco,
La Paz, and Arequipa “indolent” for not sending aid of any kind. Orel-
lana remained active throughout 1781.16 Authorities in Cuzco, in turn,
criticized the corregidors for having fled so quickly from the rebels.17
After attacking the mining town of Cailloma in late November,
where officials managed to flee with large quantities of money and sil-
ver just before the rebels arrived, the Tupac Amaru forces crossed the
glacier-covered mountains of La Raya, over fourteen thousand feet
above sea level, the towering dividing line between Cuzco and Puno.
Reports of his troop size ranged from ten thousand to sixty thousand.18

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The rebels understood that ahead of them, in the Titicaca basin and
into the Collao, Indians vastly outnumbered Europeans, creoles, and
mestizos, and that desertions and fear had already crippled the colonial
militias. They also knew that the area’s sheep and cattle ranches pro-
vided easy prey for meals— the ranchers could flee to Arequipa or else-
where but could not take their livestock with them. The insurgents
entered the town of Santa Rosa, where Corregidor Urbiola had patched
together a militia with up to two thousand troops. It quickly folded,
however, its members fleeing or passing over to the rebels, and Urbiola
himself barely escaped. On December 4, the rebels passed into the Vice-
royalty of Rio de la Plata, entering the small town of Macara.
That same day, the corregidors of Chucuito, Lampa, Azángaro, Puno,
and Carabaya met in Vicente Oré Davila’s house in Lampa. Colonel Pe-
dro de la Vallina brought frightening news. He had been imprisoned in
Tungasuca but had convinced the rebels that he was a Lima creole, not
a Spaniard, married to the granddaughter of don Diego Choquehuanca,
the kuraka of Azángaro whom the rebels hoped to enlist. All of this
was false. Before releasing him, Tupac Amaru had told Vallina that he
had upwards of thirty thousand Indians and that “Cuzco would be
his.”19 Vallina demanded that the corregidors prepare what could be a
fi nal defense of the Titicaca area. Tupac Amaru had fueled the corregi-
dors’ fear by writing letters that he made sure they intercepted, which
greatly inflated his troop numbers.20 This group of corregidors proved
unable to defeat the rebels in battle. They lamented the absence of
help from La Paz or Arequipa and recognized that they lacked suffi-
cient weapons and soldiers (and critics would contend courage) to hold
the line.
The corregidors probably regretted their one deed that December
day. Weeks before, royalists had captured Tupac Amaru’s nephew,
Simón Noguera, in the Qqueque hacienda near Santa Rosa and taken
him to Lampa on November 24. The twenty-year-old had been sent
ahead of Tupac Amaru’s troops to scout the area. The corregidors over-
saw his execution after their junta on December 4.21 Micaela Bastidas
reportedly burst into tears when she learned of his death; Tupac Amaru
vowed revenge.
Tupac Amaru sent troops to the hacienda where Noguera had been
captured while another group set out for Lampa. The corregidors fled
and deserters bolstered the rebel forces. At this point, people massively

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abandoned the towns in the plateau northeast of Lake Titicaca, many

heading for Arequipa. Tupac Amaru and his troops entered Ayaviri on
December 6 to great fanfare. Priests met them formally, with the cus-
tomary canopy and ceremony, and Tupac Amaru gave a speech, seek-
ing recruits and reassuring creoles and mestizos. He was upset to learn
that the priests of Santa Rosa, Miguel Martínez, and Orurillo, Juan
Bautista Morán, had offered an award for him, “dead or alive.”22
One petrified and anonymous observer of Tupac Amaru’s trium-
phant entrance into Ayaviri declaimed: “the enemy is on top of us, hav-
ing taken the towns of Macari, Santa Rosa, Ayaviri, and Pucará. . . . We
don’t have the people, arms, or ammunition to challenge them.”23
People fled “with only the clothes on their back” and the chaos and fear
disrupted the harvest and distribution of food. Hunger began to take its
toll, particularly on older people and children.24 Confident and moti-
vated by the quest for revenge, the rebels nearly captured the five cor-
regidors. They burned jails, named new local judges and kurakas, and
confi rmed the abolition of the mita, the reparto, and customs houses.
Requiring a massive amount of food, the rebels relied on the region’s
livestock, sheep, cattle, and alpaca. Royalists presented these expropri-
ations as the main incentive for the Indian masses: not only were they
“fooled” by the leadership but “their propensity toward theft helped
seduce them, as they found it easy pickings to ransack ranches (estan-
cias) and estates. They’ve ruined many. In the Collao, some days they
consumed over four thousand sheep.”25 One official from Lampa calcu-
lated that the rebels slaughtered sixty-three thousand sheep and one
thousand six hundred cows, and consumed the entire harvest of corn,
potatoes, and other produce.26 Tens of thousands of soldiers on the
move almost every day ate massive amounts of stew. The rebels could
do as much damage with their stomachs as with their weapons.
At this point, early December 1780, Tupac Amaru had a good idea
of his strengths. He understood that unless discouraged or even coerced
by their kurakas, most Indians supported his call for an end to Spanish
mistreatment. Tupac Amaru promised a new, more just world and he
and his tens of thousands of followers easily toppled colonial forces.
Indians in the Titicaca basin supported the project and believed that he, or
they, could succeed. Although Tupac Amaru did not know what to expect
from the Spanish—he knew they would attack but not from where or
when—he understood that his growing mass of soldiers represented a

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serious threat in open battle. He recognized that they had the advan-
tage in mobility, and could employ hit and run or guerrilla tactics (a
term that would not be invented until the Napoleonic invasion of Iberia
in 1807) with great success.
Diego Choquehuanca, a kuraka from Azángaro who came from a
distinguished family, initially provided the royalists a bit of good news
amidst the gloom of the rebels’ seemingly unstoppable advance in the
Titicaca area. In November 1780, Tupac Amaru had written this elderly
patriarch (estimates of his age range from seventy to ninety) several
letters, explaining his efforts and requesting his support. Choque-
huanca immediately informed the Lampa and Carabaya corregidors
and within days had written several more corregidors as well as the city
council and bishop of La Paz, pledging his opposition to the rebellion.
He instructed his sons— Joseph, a colonel in the militia, and Gregorio,
a priest— to shore up Azángaro´s defenses.27 Furious about Choquehu-
anca’s rejection and believing that he had participated in the execution
of Simón Noguera, Tupac Amaru went after the Choquehuanca family
and their numerous estates with unusual vehemence. Although Diego
Choquehuanca managed to flee to Arequipa, his family paid a heavy toll:
rebels killed another son, a daughter, three cousins, and one grandson,
and razed their estates.28
Choquehuanca was not alone—the southern kurakas spurned Tupac
Amaru. In the words of David Garrett, “the cacical elite of the Titicaca
basin remained resolutely loyal. As news of Sangarará reached Lampa,
the province’s kurakas arrived in its capital with armies of tributaries
to defend the crown.”29 In the midst of the royalist nightmare of late
November and early December, when Arequipa and La Paz failed to
send reinforcements and corregidors fled alongside thousands of des-
perate people, kurakas provided promising bits of good news. They re-
mained loyal, particularly those with aristocratic pretensions, rejecting
Tupac Amaru’s calls for an Inca utopia. This decision would prove fun-
damental for royalist success not only in the south but also in the Sa-
cred Valley north of Cuzco. In fact, as we will see, another kuraka, Mateo
Pumacahua, was at this very time halting rebel advances in Paucart-
ambo and the Sacred Valley.
Tupac Amaru reached Lampa on December 9, greeted by Indians
and “a few vecinos [non-Indians].” According to the nineteenth-century
English geographer Clements Markham, “The Inca entered Azángaro in

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triumph. He rode a white horse with splendidly embroidered trappings,

armed with sword and pistols, and dressed in blue velvet, richly embroi-
dered with gold. He had on a three-cornered hat, and an uncu or mantle
in the shape of a bishop’s rochet, with a gold chain around his neck,
from which a large golden sun was suspended.”30 His speech interrupted
by celebratory musket blasts, Tupac Amaru insisted that he sought to
end the reparto and “other impositions suffered by Indians.”31 His troops
burned the jail and city hall, ransacked other buildings, and rummaged
through the haciendas, textile mills, and mines of the affluent.32
Tupac Amaru wanted to sleep—they had trekked over night from
Ayaviri to Lampa—but his aides warned him, “he who has enemies can’t
sleep.” They set up their tents in a safe position outside of town, where he
rested.33 Throughout the uprising, Tupac Amaru accompanied his sol-
diers, although surrounded by his entourage. Unlike the majority of the
rebels, however, he moved on horseback and slept in a tent. One priest,
while acknowledging the deep fear that the rebel leader prompted, noted
that he was “dressed like a gentleman,” with elegant clothing.34 The priest
testified that the rebels ransacked the church and took everything they
could find from the homes of the town’s Spaniards, with the pretext of a
search for weapons. Lampa had a considerable population of affluent
merchants, who before fleeing had left some of their valuables in the
church. The rebels expropriated these goods.35 They committed “unthink-
able damage” in haciendas and stole all the livestock they could. The
priest lamented that Indians insulted vecinos and refused to pay the fees
on which clerics relied. He deemed this abandonment of the status quo, in
which Indians had to show deference to priests, mestizos, and Europeans,
“the eve of the end of the universe.”36
The testimony of two Indians captured in December provides in-
sight into the rebel followers. The loyalist mayor of Carabuco (on the
northern side of Lake Titicaca, today part of Bolivia) had found them
with straw crosses in their hats, the rebel emblem. Diego Choquehuanca
took their testimony in Quechua. Pascual Gutiérrez Sonco, described as
an Indian from the town of Nuñoa, Lampa, told Choquehuanca that
Indian and Spanish rebels wore the cross and were instructed to kill all
chapetones, a derogatory term for Spaniard. The rebels understood that
there were two types of Spaniards, those who could be recruited and
the enemy, chapetones. Gutiérrez Sonco explained that non-Indian
rebels used paper crosses in their hats while Indians employed straw.

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He had heard that “the Inca [Tupac Amaru] was on his way to conquer
Buenos Aires to be crowned and that he would extinguish all corregi-
dors.” He claimed that some Indians “joined of their own free will and
others because of death threats from their chiefs or mandones.” Gutiér-
rez Sonco had witnessed Tupac Amaru redistribute goods taken from
estates and was awed by the “infi nity” of Indians who were following
the rebel leader.37
Manuel Chuquipata, arrested with Gutiérrez Sonco, added that the
Indians in the Collao, “and the young and the Spaniards had given Tu-
pac Amaru their full obedience and all are in unison in their support,
wearing the cross in their montera, the indigenous headwear; we were
instructed to wear this rather than other types of hats as well as uncus
or a tunic and a sling across our chests.” Tupac Amaru had requested that
his troops use the cross to distinguish themselves and preferred indig-
enous clothing rather than European. Chuquipata pointed out that the
rebel leader had exonerated Indians from the December semester head
tax.38 The document does not note the two Indians’ fate but they were
presumably executed.
Micaela and Tomasa
Tupac Amaru stayed in Lampa for three days, deciding where to con-
tinue. He was tempted to push on to Upper Peru and align with rebels
there. He also considered attacking Arequipa or sieging nearby Puno.
Numerous letters from Micaela, however, persuaded him to return. In
fact, throughout the uprising, she proved to be highly persuasive.39 On
December 6, she chided him for “moving very slowly, touring around
from town to town. . . . I am losing my patience with all of this, and I’m
capable of turning myself over to the enemy so that they take my life,
because I see that you do not take this grave matter seriously, endanger-
ing all of our lives.” 40 One royalist observer described her role with re-
pugnance and amazement, “She filled in for her husband in Tungasuca,
overseeing the expeditions and even mounting a horse to recruit in
Chumbivilcas where she sent repeated orders, with audacity and unique
intrepidation, authorizing the edicts with her signature and going so far
as to begin a plan of invading Cuzco herself, in charge of the troops,
which she would have done if Tupac Amaru hadn’t written about his
victorious return from the south. She thus decided to wait for him.” 41

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Their correspondence in December is among the most touching

documentation of the rebellion. They expressed great affection, refer-
ring to each other with names such as Mica and Chepe (from Micaela
and Pepe, the classic nickname for José) and as “my daughter” and “my
son.” These letters combine affectionate banter and Micaela’s demands
that he stop dilly-dallying and return. On December 10, she chided
him for “having paid little attention to my letters” and for putting her
life in danger (“placing her on the bull’s horns” is her metaphor).42 Au-
thors have used these to cast her as the henpecking wife who also hap-
pened to be a smart, efficient commander. The latter point is true.
José Gabriel and Micaela demonstrated how much they loved each
other not only through terms of endearment but also with recommen-
dations for the other’s safety. In a brief note on November 23 which
came with 600 pesos, some alcohol for the troops, and correspondence,
Micaela ordered him to make sure that he only ate food prepared by his
most trusted comrades. She worried that he would be poisoned.43 On
December 8, he sent a letter (in Spanish, the language of all their cor-
respondence) instructing her what to do if the Spanish troops attacked
from Cuzco— this clearly worried both of them. His elaborate plan
called for her to go to the town of Langui, where their sons Fernando
and Mariano were. If necessary, she could go to the nearby hills of Cha-
camayo, which they considered impenetrable, but rebel troops could
stay in Langui and nearby Layo. While noting that this was unlikely as
their forces controlled the mountains and peaks that separated Tunga-
suca from Cuzco and could use boulders and slings to pick off the en-
emy, he encouraged her to speak with kurakas of nine towns to be
prepared to take to the hills and prepare a counterattack. He instructed
her to proceed to Langui if a Spanish attack occurred, under the pretext
of recruiting more soldiers, but to make sure to shackle the prisoners
well, or to even poison them, “and then we wouldn’t have to worry.” 44
Tupac Amaru closed by reminding her that he had requested some
cannons and that she should keep a handful of soldiers in Tungasuca
even if she and the bulk of their troops abandoned it.
The correspondence to and from Micaela Bastidas highlights her ca-
pacity as a commander. She received reports from towns and sent spies
to check on others and the roads to Cuzco; instructed her followers to
protect livestock, creoles, and priests; trekked to Chumbivilcas to recruit
soldiers; watched over the troops to prevent desertions; and tapped

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various sources to make sure that they could feed and pay soldiers.
Bishop Moscoso complained that her measures “seduced towns,” citing
the “wretched news” from Ccatca, Paucartambo, where Indians had
destroyed several estates and plundered all the livestock, and towns
near the Sacred Valley where rebels had attacked haciendas and
bridges.45 She kept a tight rein in Tungasuca, but also celebrated victo-
ries and made plans for the future. According to one account, “when she
got news of the king’s troops dying she got very happy and handed out
silver or clothes to whoever brought the information. She advised the
Indians to get strong, insisting that even if some of them died, the ben-
efits would be for them and their children. She warned them that au-
thorities in Cuzco wanted to trick them with a pardon, while they
would really barricade the rebels in the main plaza and slaughter or
burn them until no one was left alive. She notified the Indians that if
she and her husband were defeated, they should put Spaniards, men
and women, and priests in a house and set it on fi re.” 46 The last sentence
should be read warily— the testimony was from a creole detained in
rebel camp, Manuel Galleguillos, who wanted to stress the danger he
faced in Tungascua. Yet he closed by noting, “I saw more rebelliousness
in Micaela than her husband, more arrogance and haughtiness, to the
point that she was to be feared more than her husband.” 47 He had little
to gain by underlining her strength and spirit. In fact, no one disagreed
and many echoed this description of Micaela as a dedicated and fear-
some leader.
Her primary concern in late November and early December was that
royalists would push through and attack Tungasuca while Tupac Amaru
was in the south. She sought information from her informants and re-
ceived contradictory intelligence. One spy in Quiquijana reported that
although a few Indians had betrayed the rebels, Spaniards were not
advancing south. Yet Marcos Torre wrote from Acomayo on the follow-
ing day, December 15, that the towns of Paruro, Accha, and Pilipinto
supported the royalists and would soon attack the rebels’ fi rst line of
defense, Acos and Acomayo. He suggested she send troops to attack the
royalist rear guard in Livitaca and requested arms: “we don’t have a
single musket.” 48 That same day Tomás Guaca reported from Pomacan-
chi, where the rebels had ransacked the textile mill a month earlier,
that he couldn’t feed the troops and they were crossing over to the roy-
alists. Antirebel kurakas and mayors were “giving them plenty to eat.” 49

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The ability to feed the troops proved crucial for both sides, aiding re-
cruitment and deterring desertions. Micaela Bastidas wrote that very
day to her husband that “there is news that they [royalist troops] have
left Cuzco; the vanguard is in Urcos and they also want to attack us from
Paruro.”50 This proved to be false but she and others were worried.
Her private correspondence took on the schizophrenic nature of any
commander—panic about being overrun mixed with confidence that
they would soon control the southern part of Peru and the northwest of
the Rio de la Plata viceroyalty. On December 15, she instructed her fol-
lowers to send more troops, while boasting that “everything had gone
well [mayor felicidad] so far and we have in our favor the provinces of
Urubamba, eight parishes of Cuzco, Paucartambo, Quispicanchi, Paruro,
Tinta, Lampa, Azángaro, Carabaya, Pacarcolla, the city of Chucuito, and
others.”51 In a December 6 letter, she outlined her efforts to recruit more
people and “little by little encircle Cuzco, which is well guarded as I noted
in my previous letter.” Here she chided her husband for taking his time—
“walking with lead feet”— and fretted that Indians were returning to the
hills as they ran out of livestock.52 She exuded confidence and concern.
Tomasa Condemaita, the kuraka of Acos, was the other important
female rebel leader. She had received the kurakazgo as a birth right in a
town not far from Surimana, where Tupac Amaru held his. Born around
1740, she presumably knew Tupac Amaru as a child. In the initial days
of the rebellion, rebels threatened to kill her, believing her a royalist
due to her creole husband. She sent her husband and three children to
Cuzco and committed to the rebellion.53 She watched over Acos, pro-
viding troops and provisions and directing skirmishes against the roy-
alists. Early in the uprising, on November 12, noting Indians’ inclina-
tion to steal sheep and “commit excesses” with creoles, she requested
that Tupac Amaru send someone to impose order.54 She shared with
Micaela Bastidas the frustration with Tupac Amaru’s extended sojourn.
On November 30, she wrote Tupac Amaru wondering where he was;
on December 9, she expressed her concerns to Micaela: royalists “could
come [han de venir] and surround us from all over, Quiquijana, and the
hills; they know that the Inca is away and if we are not careful, they
will ambush us. I have been very pained by Don José’s tardiness; let’s
hope God brings him back safely and as soon as possible.”55 In another
note probably from the same day, she described the pressures she faced
from a possible royalist attack as well as from those within the rebel

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camp who doubted her because of her gender: “I am so unfortunate

[desfavorecida] for being a woman.”56 Her fate became entwined with that
of the two rebel leaders she followed faithfully.
Fifty-five miles separated Micaela and Bishop Moscoso. They both
complained about the lack of news due to the turmoil and the great dan-
ger messengers faced, and waited for, if not their saviors, at least their
military superiors: Tupac Amaru in the case of Micaela, and Visitador
Areche and Commander del Valle in that of the bishop. Moscoso la-
mented that he could not fi nd out anything about Tupac Amaru’s south-
ern campaign due to the “confusing chaos.” He bitterly noted that the
rebels controlled the Vilcanota Valley, the “throat of the viceroyalty,” but
also boasted of his own work. He planted spies in and around Cuzco and
sent troops to counter the rebels in Paucartambo. In letters to Lima, he
underlined the effectiveness of the excommunication and the important
information he received from priests and their assistants that he had kept
in rebel territory.57 The bishop also described royalist efforts and even
victories in areas to the north and east of the city, the Sacred Valley and
Paucartambo essentially, and recruitment success just southwest of
Cuzco and Paruro, thus bordering on the rebel base. These sections of his
detailed letters to the viceroy and to the visitador in mid-December were
not hyperbolic bits of inflated good news that sought to whitewash the
generally miserable situation in the south. The royalists had made im-
portant inroads in the north and the dividing line between the rebel
south and the royalist north, which ran roughly east to west somewhere
in between Tungasuca and Cuzco, would mark the rebellion and its re-
pression until the very end. This helps explain Bastidas’s and Moscoso’s
anxiety— each knew that the enemy’s base was a single day’s ride away.
Both sides took extraordinary measures to get letters and notes past
enemy sentinels and to monitor the other side’s activities. Noting fre-
quent ambushes and “interceptions,” Bishop Moscoso relied on the
priest of Ayaviri to carry messages to the south, assuming that a cleric
would not be searched as thoroughly.58 A December 7 letter from Mi-
caela Bastidas to two kurakas in the town of Maras never made it to
them. Authorities captured Ramón Gutiérrez with the letter.59 He told a
rich story at his trial.
A thirty-year-old field worker (labrador) from Urubamba in the Sa-
cred Valley, he had been working in Paucartambo but Indians from the

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town of Qero took him to greet Tupac Amaru in Tungasuca. They were
disappointed to learn that the Inca was in the south, in Lampa, but Mi-
caela Bastidas thanked them for their support and asked Gutiérrez to
take the letter. She hid it, written on coarse cloth by a tall man with an
elegant sleeveless coat, presumably one of the European prisoners, in the
lining of his bag or chuspa, instructing him to take back roads to Maras
and not to go near Cuzco. She told him to tell the Indians not to worry,
that her husband sought only to get rid of corregidors and to destroy
obrajes. The Qero Indians stayed behind. Guards at the Urcos Bridge
searched him superficially and didn’t find the letter. Nonetheless, they
made him pay a bribe of four reales to pass the bridge. He couldn’t find
the kuraka to whom the letter was addressed, Lucas Nuñez de la Torre (a
very Spanish name), and gave it to the authority’s daughter. She found
her father and he quickly had Gutiérrez arrested and sent to Cuzco.
The prosecutors in Cuzco tried to get more information from him
about why Tupac Amaru was in Lampa and who was with the rebels in
Tungasuca but he did not have anything valuable. They gave him the
death sentence and rejected his appeal. Although the trial ends with the
sentence, he was presumably hanged as an “emissary of Tupac Amaru.”60
The Northern Front
While greatly concerned about Tupac Amaru’s advances in the south

and frustrated by the lack of information, Bishop Moscoso commented
with cautious satisfaction about events in Paucartambo and the Sacred
Valley in December. José Gabriel’s cousin, Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru,
led about six thousand followers into the region, Cuzco’s breadbasket
(actually corn— and in Paucartambo, coca). They sought to separate the
city from this important agricultural area and eventually approach it
from the Sacred Valley, creating a pincer movement in tandem with Tu-
pac Amaru entering from the south. The rebels recruited in the high
towns of Ocongate, Caicay and Ccatca and then approached Pisac along
the Vilcanota River.
The royalists understood the significance of a rebel intrusion into a
productive region bordering Cuzco. Commanders particularly worried
that if the rebels proceeded to Abancay, they could cut Cuzco off from
Lima. On December 8, Cuzco sent troops to Paucartambo, led by Lorenzo

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Pérez Lechuga and Francisco Celorio. The former was a veteran of Spain’s
wars in Italy.61 On December 20, aided by the kuraka of Chinchero,
Mateo Pumacahua, and his soldiers, royalists defeated Diego Cristóbal’s
forces near the Pisac Bridge. One priest counted 120 dead rebels as well
as many washed away by the Vilcanota River.62 The royalists slaugh-
tered everyone they captured. The rebels took refuge in Calca and, ac-
cording to several accounts, committed numerous atrocities, “killing
everyone who had a shirt. . . . Raping attractive women and then kill-
ing them, and even raping the dead.” Witnesses also accused the rebels of
murdering children and profaning the Calca church.63 The “killing all
with shirts” reference means that the rebels attacked all Europeans,
broadly defi ned as those who wore shirts, that is, western dress.
Pumacahua (1740–1815) rose to the top of the royalist military com-
mand, recruiting thousands of Indians whom he commanded in nu-
merous victories. For generations his family had held the kuraka office
in Chinchero, a town built on a prominent Inca site on the peaks that
separate Cuzco and the Sacred Valley, renowned today for its dual Inca-
colonial architecture. While he never clarified the reasons why he op-
posed Tupac Amaru so vehemently, he presumably saw the Tungasuca
rebel leader as a lowly kuraka with less prestige and capital than those
of the Sacred Valley and towns such as Chinchero.64 Just like the rebels
they confronted, Pumacahua’s indigenous soldiers knew the terrain
well, moved great distances quickly, and employed hit-and-run tactics.
Pumacahua proved to be an invaluable ally to the royalists. Bishop
Moscoso explained, “once this highly faithful [ fidelisimo] Indian knew
about the wretched insurrection of Tupac Amaru, he charged through
towns, executing with a knife those who wouldn’t join him, burning
their houses. . . . He armed his people and after inspiring them” de-
fended all of Chinchero and the Calca y Lares district.65 On December
23, 1780, Pumacahua’s forces attacked the rebels in Calca, killing hun-
dreds and executing almost everyone they captured.
Cuzco’s city council labeled this bloody defeat of the insurgents a
turning point, a “glorious triumph.” The victory raised morale among
troops and civilians and weakened the rebels. The city council’s ac-
count claimed that the wretched events in Calca, the rebel atrocities,
“showed that Tupac Amaru’s intention was to exterminate all Spanish
and mestizo people, and so those people who might have followed him
stopped doing so, comforted by our union.”66 The widely reported

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events in Calca allowed royalists to cast the rebels as bloodthirsty savages

who would eventually pursue all non-Indians. Royalists used this to
drive a wedge into the rebel coalition and to justify their own violence.
Battles took place even closer to Cuzco, increasing the anxiety of
city residents. On December 21, rebels confronted the royalists on the
Chita Pampa about ten miles northeast of the city, toward the Sacred
Valley. A battalion led by Francisco Laisequilla defeated them. Laise-
quilla returned to Cuzco with twenty-five prisoners and four leaders’
heads on pikes, parading them around the main plaza. One account
called this “very opportune . . . as the common people had never seen
this and it encouraged the entire city.”67 Authorities hanged many of
the prisoners.68 At this point, reinforcements from Anta and Abancay
aided the royalists, boosting city residents’ spirits.
Moscoso underlined the importance of this victory in a town, Chita
Pampa, so close to Cuzco that it forms the outskirts today, believing
that Indians in the “sub-urban towns” sympathized with the insur-
gents. He also recognized several other aspects that made the defeat of
the rebels so important. Diego Cristóbal had to retrench in the hills
above the Sacred Valley, abandoning his plan to encircle the city of
Cuzco from the north. Bishop Moscoso stressed the need to protect the
Apurimac Bridge, near the town of Mollepata well to the east of Cuzco,
and the Calca Bridge and others that crossed the Urubamba River in
the Sacred Valley. December is the high point of the rainy season and
the gushing Apurímac and Urubamba Rivers pushed through narrow
gorges. The bridges, many of them dating from the Inca period, offered
the only way across in the rainy season. Bishop Moscoso worried that if
the rebels managed to take the bridges, they would proceed to the
north, isolating Cuzco. Moreover, troops from Lima would have to take
a longer route and their highly awaited arrival would be delayed. As
one defender of Bishop Moscoso put it, “if Calca and Yucay were lost,
the Rebels would have lots of grain and other food from the haciendas
of that area. If they holed up in Huailcabamba, four families could
make that narrow passage impenetrable.”69 Moscoso also appreciated
the support of northern towns, particularly Anta and Abancay, that
provided large, disciplined, battalions led by kurakas. Building on this
defeat of Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, royalists impeded any sort of
rebel northern front.70

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Violence
The events in the Sacred Valley and the hills above it mark a change in
the use and understanding of violence by both sides. Although sources
are thin and one-sided (we do not have rebel accounts), each side slaugh-
tered the other and desecrated cadavers: the rebels raped cadavers and
the royalists paraded heads on pikes. Neither took prisoners. In the ini-
tial weeks of the uprising, in contrast, rebels stormed into a town and
ransacked estates and mills, but did not pursue all Europeans or kill
most prisoners. Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas sought to prevent
widespread violence and many people near the rebel center believed
they could remain neutral. By the middle of December, however, each
side believed that the other sought to exterminate and thus matched
brutality with brutality. To use an important term in the study of war
and violence, restraints diminished or even disappeared.71 Neutrality
was increasingly difficult.
The change can be explained partially by the passing of time and
the extension of the rebellion. Violence begets violence and Pumaca-
hua’s troops believed they were taking revenge for rebel atrocities; the
rebels probably had a similar justification or motivation. Furthermore,
rebel violence increased or hardened as the uprising expanded geo-
graph ically. Miles away, Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, or other com-
manders had little power to impede the distant rebels from slaying
anyone of European descent or culture, often in brutal fashion. As will
be seen, the worst rebel atrocities took place when no major rebel com-
mander was present. Yet the cruelty in late 1780 was not just a reflec-
tion of deepening hatred and an expanding uprising; it also revealed a
broadening ideological divide between the two enemies. Each side de-
fi ned the other as a vile nemesis who needed to be exterminated.
As historian Jan Szeminski showed, rebels cast the Spaniards as bad
or evil Christians, whose actions placed them outside the church, and
who thus deserved a brutal death. At the same time, insurgents broad-
ened the defi nition of puka kunkas, thus unleashing violence against
anyone with European dress, the Spanish language, or other western
cultural attributes. Whereas Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas differ-
entiated between good and bad Spaniards, more radical insurgents
considered everyone of European descent or culture as evil and thus a
justifiable victim of violence.72

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Similarly, the burning of the Sangarará church and Tupac Amaru’s

excommunication allowed royalists to paint the rebels as non-Christians
or heretics. This validated cruel treatment such as that of Pumacahua
toward the victims of the Calca massacre. The Chinchero kuraka treated
all rebels as heathen excomulgados, and claimed that some of his Indian
followers, despite the cold and their hunger, would not touch the reb-
els’ clothing or food.73 In reality, the broadening of the defi nition of
rebels (or the enemy) as virtually any Indian who did not fight under a
royalist kuraka came not only from the exclusion of the rebel leaders
from the church but from the events of late 1780— the miserable news
coming from the Vilcanota Valley, the Collao, and the Sacred Valley. If
Indians sought to rid the viceroyalty of people of European descent,
royalists responded that they, in turn, needed to attack all Indians. Di-
visions widened and brutal tactics became the norm; violence escalated
in 1780. The following year, 1781, would be worse.
Terror in Cuzco
Tupac Amaru terrified Cuzco’s European population. A report from

the royalists’ headquarters in Cuzco (cuartel general) to Lima from De-
cember 22 complained that the rebels had cut off all communication
and that the city knew nothing about events stretching from Tungas-
uca into the Collao. They had not seen any correspondence from Tu-
pac Amaru in over twenty days and, they correctly noted, Micaela
Bastidas seemed to be in charge of the rebel base. The writer worried
that Tupac Amaru might be in Chayanta (where the Katari brothers
led a violent uprising), “reaching an agreement with the Kataristas or
infesting those provinces and lighting the flame of rebellion through-
out the kingdom.” The writer noted that Indians were better at trick-
ery than open battle (“devemos temer más sus engaños que sus fuerzas por la
guerra”), which can be interpreted as a jab at Indians’ mental capabili-
ties or recognition of their guerrilla tactics. The writer acknowledged
that they were so uninformed about the rebel’s whereabouts that he
could even be in Cuzco, planning an attack.74 Residents of Cuzco felt
surrounded.
A few days later, however, just before Christmas, they learned that
Tupac Amaru had returned to Tungasuca. City residents prepared for
his attack. The usually optimistic Bishop Moscoso gave several reasons

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for additional concern. José Andia, an accountant with the city’s royal
treasury, had absconded with a great deal of money and prominent fig-
ures such as the archdeacon Ximénez Villalva and another priest had
fled the city. The bishop also complained about rebel spies operating in
the city.75 In the rebel camp, Tupac Amaru boasted about his successful
trip to the south. He had gained supporters and provisions, what the
Spanish deemed booty.76 After a month of uncertainty, when only ghastly
rumors reached Cuzco and both sides suffered from the near impossibility
of getting their messages and spies through the corridor between Cuzco
and Puno, the situation became much clearer. Tupac Amaru and Micaela
Bastidas were about to lead an attack on the city of Cuzco.

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A depiction of Tupac Amaru in 50 sol bill in 1977. (Author’s collection)

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Micaela Bastidas. (Augusto Díaz Mori, c. 1980, Pinacoteca Municipal Ignacio Merino,
Municipalidad Metropolitana de Lima)

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The execution of Topa Amaro, 1572. (Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, El
primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno, 1615/1616. Copenhagen, Det Kongelige
Bibliotek)

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Inca Bridge. (From George E. Squier, Incidents of Travel and Exploration in the Land of the
Incas [1877]) Brought to you by | UTSA Libraries
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A letter by the captive
Tupac Amaru written
in his own blood.
(Archivo de Indias,
Cuzco, Leg. 33)

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Garrote reenactment. (Inquisition Museum, Lima, Peru,
photo by José Ragas)

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A 1964 painting of Tupac Amaru’s quartering. (Author’s collection)

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Sicuani Fort, built in the rebellion’s aftermath. (Archivo de Indias, mapas y planos)
Francisco Goya’s Shipwreck, presumably inspired by the 1786 San Pedro de Alcántara, which
killed many prisoners, including Andrés Tupac Amaru. (Album/Art Resource, NY)

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Manuela Tupac Amaru. A member of the Betancur family, which claimed
descent from Tupac Amaru (I), she was not related to José Gabriel Condorcan-
qui. The image was covered up by a religious painting after the rebellion and
only uncovered when taken in for restoration in the late twentieth century.
(MALI-Museo de Arte de Lima)

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Juan Velasco Alvarado and Túpac Amaru, c. 1970. (International Institute of
Social History, Amsterdam)

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Tupac Amaru in a 1957 Mexican comic book. (Author’s collection)

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5
The Siege of Cuzco
C OLON I A L CUZCO possessed all the signature elements of Spanish ur-

banism: a majestic cathedral, a spacious municipality, checker-
board design, elegant housing for the powerful, and prominent shops.
And this was just the main plaza. The Spanish built their city on top of
the Inca capital, believing that Catholic churches put the Incas’ “sites
of heresy” to shame and that their palaces outdid those of the Inca rul-
ers. Their masons— almost always Indians— added brick or adobe
walls and elaborate roofs to preexisting Inca buildings or built more
European-looking structures from the ground up. In the eighteenth
century as well as today, astounding monuments from both cultures
stood side by side. Inca walls, mass blocks of granite crafted to fit together
snugly without any type of caulking, lined streets and alleyways.1
From some perspectives, Inca and Spanish architecture meshed
together nicely, highlighting the imperial vision and technical skills
of both. For example, both the Inca fortress that towers above the city
and the imposing Jesuit Church, La Compañía, receive awed compli-
ments from visitors past and present. From other viewpoints, how-
ever, these two styles clashed glaringly, bringing to light opposing
aesthetics (simple stone versus intricate Baroque) and the brutal power
struggles behind the architecture. This ambiguous duality served as a
metaphor for social and political relations. In the colonial period,
Cuzco could seem like a flourishing bilingual and bicultural center
where people knew and accepted their place and Spanish rule thrived;
in other moments or from other points of view, the strains of colo-
nialism and its cornerstone in the Andes, the oppression of the Indian

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masses, surged to the surface and tensions spread. December 1780 was
such a time.
The Incas built Cuzco (or Qosqo) alongside the Huatanay River, in a
bowl surrounded on three sides by steep hills and ravines, which opens
to the southeast toward the sacred Ausangate glacier and Tupac Ama-
ru’s Vilcanota Valley. In late 1780, Cuzco was both a Spanish and Inca
center. It was Peru’s second city, with a population of thirty thousand
people compared to Lima’s fi fty thousand. The upper classes consisted
of descendants of the conquistadors but also those of different waves
of Spanish immigrants. But it was still also an Inca city. Quechua
was as common as Spanish— even many members of the upper classes
who flaunted their European lineage spoke the Inca language.
Quechua-speaking Indians and mestizos constituted three-quarters of
the city’s population and at any time Cuzco also hosted thousands of
campesinos bringing their wares to sell or seeking short-term employ-
ment. Indians throughout Peru venerated Cuzco, seeing it as the Inca
capital. Here, in the fi nal days of 1780, the city’s population believed
that the long-awaited attack by Tupac Amaru— dreaded by some, anx-
iously awaited by others—was at hand. Everyone understood the im-
portance of Cuzco.2
Tupac Amaru’s return to Tungasuca in mid-December signaled that
such an attack on the city of Cuzco was imminent. Micaela Bastidas
and other rebel leaders understood his southern sojourn as a delay, a
loss of valuable time. City residents, in contrast, had hoped that he
would be defeated in the Collao or that he would extend his campaign
into La Paz and Potosí rather than Peru’s second city, less than sixty
miles from his base. They wanted him away from the city of Cuzco for
as long as possible. While his expedition gave the city’s residents a
month to fortify their defenses, it also provided time for rumors and
anxiety to spread. Well-to-do city residents despaired that Indian bar-
barians, as they saw the rebels, would pillage and rape or that the in-
surgents would siege the city for months, depriving them of food and
water. They looked ner vously at the Indians and mestizos who consti-
tuted the city’s majority. Would the lower ranks join the rebels, sup-
porting the incursion and perhaps looting and wreaking havoc? They
also wondered whether their neighbors would flee the city or surrender
quickly. The city’s upper crust, authorities, and many more dreaded the
arrival of the insurgents.

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Preparations
The war council in Cuzco recognized on December 23 that “he wants to

invade this city” and prepared for an attack.3 By this point, “he” or “the
rebel” referred to Tupac Amaru. The council could keep track of events
in the nearby Vilcanota Valley much more easily than in the distant Col-
lao. On December 24, it informed Viceroy Jáuregui that a cleric who had
been in Tinta told them that Tupac Amaru planned to attack around
Christmas. He also reported the grim news that the rebel leader had been
well received in Lampa and Azángaro, “whose corregidors and white citi-
zens [vecinos blancos] have fled to Chucuito.” 4 The city council and the
war council set up headquarters in what had been the Jesuit College on
the corner of the Plaza de Armas until this order’s expulsion in 1767.
They organized patrols, especially at night, and formed six militia com-
panies. Fearing that the “iniquitous traitor” hoped to recruit its mem-
bers, they kept a close eye on the company made up of noble Indians.
Authorities purchased or requisitioned weapons and ammunition, and
commanded people to place rocks on their balconies to hurl at rebels.
Priests used church towers as sentinel posts.5 Bishop Moscoso instructed
the Dominican priests of Santo Domingo to defend the Santa Catalina
convent if he rang the main bell of the cathedral five times. He deemed
an attack “certain,” but admitted that he did not know the rebel’s exact
intentions.6 City residents shared the bishop’s prognosis—they believed
that the rebels would soon attack, but could not predict the specifics.
Clerics and students received military training. The sight of priests
marching with a purple flag that the bishop had purchased reportedly
boosted morale, especially among the city’s “plebes.”7 The bishop also
spearheaded efforts to raise funds to buy or make arms and outfit the
militias, collecting the considerable quantity of 110,881 pesos in No-
vember and December. He leaned especially hard on the cash-rich
monasteries.8 In their 1784 report, members of the city council boasted
about their efforts to prepare for an attack. Visitador Areche, however,
grumbled in a December 22 letter about the city council’s inefficiency
and soon departed for Cuzco. Authorities in Lima agreed that the war
council in Cuzco was not doing enough and needed commanders, sol-
diers, and other support to confront the uprising.9
The war council feared internal traitors and forbade anyone from
leaving the city in the days before the rebel army’s arrival. They worried

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that the enemy would gain information about the city’s defenses or that
a mass exodus might take place and facilitate an invasion.10 Fear even
affected the religious calendar. The Bishop held Christmas Mass at sun-
set rather than the customary midnight because “such a gathering
could turn into a riot.”11 At the same time that authorities took mea-
sures to make sure that the city’s residents resisted an invasion or siege,
they received distressing news from the south. On December 19, Father
Ignacio de Santisteban Ruiz Cano wrote from Chamaca, in the upper
provinces to the southwest of Tungasuca, that he needed reinforce-
ments, as Indians merely laughed at his exhortations to remain loyal.
Those of his town as well as nearby Velille were joining the rebels:
“They already consider that damned Indian [Tupac Amaru] sovereign.”
In an unusual display of blunt frustration, he closed by noting that if he
had twenty-five men on his side, he would burn Chamaca to the ground,
“as an example to everyone and to show that the voice of our King was
not completely asleep amidst these barbarians.”12 Panic began to take
hold among the city’s powerful: a mass rebel army was on the way, roy-
alist priests could no longer control their towns, and a significant num-
ber of the city’s residents might very well welcome the rebels.
The story of a courageous or foolish team of merchants illuminates
events and the mood at rebel base. On November 15, Agustín Herrera
and María Santos de Valencia, husband and wife, loaded their mules
with over two hundred gallons of wine and left Arequipa to sell their
goods in Cuzco.13 For centuries merchants supplied the highlands with
Arequipa wine and spirits, much of it produced in the Majes Valley.
Today, a popular dance in Cuzco’s countless patron saint festivals com-
memorates these traders, the majeños.14 The couple had bravely ven-
tured into Tungasuca to request a pass from the rebels and, successful,
had reached Cuzco on December 2 or 3. On their return weeks later,
insurgent sentinels had taken them again to Tungasuca to fi nd out
whether to allow them to continue. The rebel leaders chatted with them
amicably and were surprisingly open about their plans. When Tupac
Amaru and Micaela Bastidas asked about defense efforts in Cuzco, Her-
rera and his wife told them that five thousand soldiers as well as weap-
ons had reached the city, an exaggeration, and more were on their way.
Tupac Amaru snickered and said, “I wish there were even more people
in Cuzco so I could capture all of them and their weapons . . . this only
makes me braver.”15 He confided that although he didn’t have the date

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for the attack set, he and his people preferred Saturday, as they had al-
ways succeeded on that day of the week and he had great faith in the
Virgin Mary, venerated on Saturdays.16 He mentioned that he thought
that the viceroy was in Cuzco, which pleased him; it was better “to start
with the head.” Viceroy Jáuregui had not left Lima. This bravado might
have reflected Tupac Amaru’s confidence or have been intended to
boost morale. It very well could have been both: the rebel leader be-
lieved that he could take Cuzco but understood that he would need the
commitment of his troops and support from the towns in the approach
to Cuzco as well as sectors of the city itself.17
Tupac Amaru and Micaela gave the traveling couple a poncho and
silk stockings as parting gifts and asked that they place a lampoon about
the uprising in a corner of Arequipa’s main plaza. Laughing, Tupac
Amaru told them that he didn’t want to kill anyone but just wanted to
spare Indians from Spaniards’ demands. He noted that Indians worked
so hard to pay for the reparto and taxes that they “don’t even learn how
to pray.”18 The rebel leader promised to “take a tour” [dar un paseo] at
some point to Arequipa to learn about events there.19 The couple handed
over the lampoon to authorities upon arrival in Arequipa. Santos de
Valencia reported that Tupac Amaru’s plan was to cut off food and water
for eight days if Cuzco didn’t surrender. If that didn’t work, he’d burn
the city. Another member of their party pointed out that some people in
Tupac Amaru’s camp, including a Bethlemite priest, disclosed that they
had been forced to participate. One priest, “don Justo,” [Father Justo
Gallegos] told him that once the rebels left, the people of the small town
of Layo “would turn their backs on and isolate the rebel.” They had only
feigned support because of coercion.20 Their testimonies portray a confi-
dent leader facing possible discontent in his ranks.
Rebels in the Hills
Hurried by Micaela and by the prospect of troops arriving not only

from Lima but also Buenos Aires, Tupac Amaru led the rebels out of
Tungasuca on December 20.21 One account calculates that forty thou-
sand followers joined him, a seemingly high estimate.22 These numbers
included family members and other supporters— above all women who
set up camp, searched for kindling and additional food, and cooked.23
Royalists sent troops to Angostura, the gateway to Cuzco from the

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Diego Cristóbal’s
failed front
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Sa
The Siege of Cuzco
Vilcanota Valley. They knew that Tupac Amaru wanted to proceed to

the important towns just outside of Cuzco, San Jerónimo and San Se-
bastián, and take the Inca fortress of Sacsayhuaman, which looms over
Cuzco from the north. Tupac Amaru and most of his troops avoided the
enemy by taking a less direct route across the towering mountain peaks
to the south of the Vilcanota Valley, from Colcaqui to Ocoruro. Carrying
light loads and accustomed to the steep topography of the area, the rebel
forces scurried up and down these hills and mountains, so steep that up
until today they have resisted the spread of urbanization. The rebels
avoided towns such as Andahuaylillas and Oropesa and used gunfire as
signals. Despite their numbers, the insurgents moved quickly and si-
lently. Once they reached Cuzco, they turned up their volume by shout-
ing, singing, playing drums, and setting off fireworks and guns. They
succeeded in intimidating all who saw or heard them. Antonio Castelo
took a smaller group through the valley, ransacking haciendas as he
proceeded. Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru returned to the Sacred Valley,
with the intention of attacking the city from the north.
The approach to Cuzco did not go well for the rebels. Tupac Amaru
had expected to recruit widely but failed, primarily because he did not
come into contact with as many Indians as he expected. Not only did
the bulk of his forces skirt the Vilcanota Valley, where the larger towns
were found, but authorities had brought kurakas from nearby towns
into the city— either as volunteers or conscripts—making it impossible
for these ethnic authorities to pass over to the rebels with hundreds of
followers.24 Unlike the areas near Tinta and in the Collao, Indians and
other locals did not join the rebel side en masse when Tupac Amaru ar-
rived. They did not enlist either because they couldn’t— their kurakas
or other authorities prevented them— or didn’t want to. As the follow-
ing weeks would reveal, most Indians in and around Cuzco remained
loyal.
The rebels not only had difficulty adding troops but also began to lose
some of them. In a December 30 letter from the outskirts of Cuzco, Tupac
Amaru instructed Father José de Maruri, a supporter, to tell his commis-
sioners and kurakas in Azángaro to send “Indians, mestizos, and Span-
iards” who had been convoked for his newest campaign.25 The next day,
December 31, he commanded a rebel authority back at the base to take
“the most energetic measures so that the Indians who maliciously stayed
behind in Pampamarca and Surimana be brought to me as prisoners for

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disobedience, and please bring a list of them without losing any time.”26
Some Indians from his home base had failed to join him.
In the fi nal days of December, Tupac Amaru mystified the royalists
by not sending forces to the north, where commander Gabriel de Avilés
approached the city. The rebels perhaps could have routed the tired and
outnumbered royalists, exhausted from the long journey from Lima.
Bishop Moscoso considered this a godsend, or at least a terrible tactical
error, and noted how the arrival of the Spanish commander and his
mulatto militiamen on January 1 raised the spirits of the city.27 Perhaps
Tupac Amaru did not have reliable intelligence about Avilés’s arrival or
feared losing a direct confrontation with Avilés’s well-armed and disci-
plined troops. Above all, it seems that Tupac Amaru envisioned enter-
ing the Inca capital triumphantly, with a few skirmishes but no major
battles. It would not be so easy.
Good news continued for the royalists after Avilés’s arrival. The in-
surgents had sent Antonio Castelo with a smaller contingent along the
Camino Real through the Vilcanota Valley in order to recruit, attack
royalist forces, ransack haciendas, and surround the city from the north.
He might also have been a diversion, allowing the bulk of the rebels to
move quickly through the hills. The priest of Urcos alerted Cuzco of
Castelo’s route, however, and on the evening of January 2, the cavalry
led by Joaquín de Valcárcel and Francisco Laisequilla demolished Cas-
telo’s forces in the town of Saylla, killing four hundred rebels and taking
a flag with Tupac Amaru’s coat of arms. The royalists took advantage of
their horses and slaughtered the rebels, who had little place to hide or
flee in this wide valley. Bishop Moscoso noted that many of the victims
had been important members of the rebellion, so powerful or affluent
that they slept in tents.28 He mentioned that some royalist Indians
would not touch the dead rebels or their belongings because they were
“excomulgados.”29 One partisan gleefully noted that the small number of
rebel survivors took to the hills, “possessed of a great fear.”30 Castelo
and his extensive family would soon betray the rebels. The fact that he
escaped led some historians to believe that his treachery might have
begun with this battle.31
More bad news came from the north, where Diego Cristóbal Tupac
Amaru failed to open a second front. He proceeded from Catca to Pisac,
planning to attack Cuzco from the Sacred Valley. Royalists stopped him
in Huayllabamba and, this time led by Pumacahua, in Yucay. Diego

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Cristóbal could not break through royalist forces on the all-important

Urubamba Bridge. Tupac Amaru was forced to send him reinforce-
ments but to no avail.32 The battle for Cuzco came down to the tens of
thousands of rebels camped south of Cuzco versus the royalist forces,
military, religious, and civilian, preparing in the city and arriving from
Lima. The approach to Cuzco had not been the triumphant climax of
the 1780 fighting that Tupac Amaru had envisioned. His troops had not
been able to march into the city unscathed and Indians near the city
had not passed over to the rebels en masse.
Rhetoric above the City
In the fi nal days of December, residents of the city of Cuzco could see
thousands of troops amassing on the hills to the south and west. Some
reacted to the troop buildup with terror, others with ner vous anticipa-
tion or even delight. People tried to hide their valuables, shelter women
and children, and store food and water. Those who attempted to leave
the city encountered sentinels barring their way. An epic battle seemed
about to begin. Yet Tupac Amaru’s forces did not immediately plunge
into the city or push toward the arriving Spaniards in the plains or pam-
pas to the north. Instead, the rebel leader wrote detailed letters to Bishop
Moscoso, the people of Cuzco, and the city council, announcing his
plans and requesting permission to take the city. He sent the letters to
the junta’s general headquarters with three of his distinguished prison-
ers: Bernardo de la Madrid, Father Ildefonso Bejarano, and the Francis-
can friar Domingo Castro, all of whom quickly passed over to the royal-
ists. The bishop received the letters with shock and indignation; the city
council deemed the letters pretentious and “ridiculous.”33 Critics main-
tained that Tupac Amaru lost valuable time with the correspondence,
allowing Avilés’s forces to arrive and the city to prepare. The letters
themselves are an interesting entryway into his plans and mindset.
In a cover letter included with the longer note to the bishop, Tupac
Amaru complained that Moscoso had not answered his previous corre-
spondence and requested that he post these new communications in
public places. He demanded that the bishop answer him, in coordina-
tion with the cathedral chapter, within twelve hours.34 In the letter,
Tupac Amaru stressed his religiosity and respect for the Catholic Church
and loyalty to the king. He explained that he targeted corregidors,

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customs houses, and other “abuses,” having tired of waiting for some-
one else to defend his people from “theft, hom icides, and insults.” He
labeled the growing wave of exploitation in recent years, “a second
Pizarro,” [Francisco Pizarro, 147?–1541, the conquistador of the Incan
Empire and founder of Lima], a curious phrase as modern historians
have labeled the Bourbon Reforms “the second conquest.”35 Tupac Amaru
reassured Moscoso that the bishop— as well as the monasteries, convents,
and churches that he oversaw—had no need for concern with the upris-
ing. In fact, once the uprising achieved the abolition of Indians’ taxes,
the destruction of customs houses, and a pardon for his actions, Tupac
Amaru promised “to retire to a Thebes, requesting compassion.” He
closed by asking the bishop to send him the necessary titles and papers
for such radical changes, with no apparent sense of irony.36
In his letter to the city council, Tupac Amaru emphasized that in his
struggle “against Indian slavery” he sought to avoid “deaths and hostili-
ties” but that they, the city leaders, had been executing people, hanging
them without proper confession, and committing other atrocities. He
referred to the recent bloody repression in Calca and Chita. He threat-
ened that if they did not allow him to enter the city peacefully, he would
have to do so with “fire and blood.” The rebel leader requested that the
cabildo turn over their weapons and deemed his struggle a “defensive
war.” He also pointed out that the fact that he was the last royal Inca (“la
mia es la única que ha quedado de la sangre real de los Incas”) had motivated
him. His letter resembled a modern public relations campaign in which
he attempted to cast his opponents as the aggressor. As was the case
with his efforts to overturn his excommunication, he had little chance
to convince others. Authorities, of course, did not disseminate his letters
and maintained the upper hand in communications.
Tupac Amaru continued: bad authorities so exploited Indians, “sup-
pressing and dismissing the king’s dispositions,” that his people could
not even know the true God, and did little more than enrich the cor-
regidor and priests through “their sweat and work.”37 He vaguely noted
that once he got rid of the repartimiento and other Spanish institutions,
he would place one Indian and someone of “good consciousness” as
mayor [alcalde mayor] in each province. This person would be in charge
of justice and the Christian training of the Indians and would only re-
ceive a modest salary. He ended by underlining that despite these changes,
the king of Spain would continue to rule.38

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He began his letter to his “beloved compatriots” by emphasizing his

Inca heritage: “Don José Gabriel Tupac Amaro Inca, by the grace of
God descendent of the kings and natural lords of the kingdoms of Peru,
principal branch.” He pointed out that some people had been misrepre-
senting his plans, casting him as an enemy of their “conservation and
freedom.” He sought, to the contrary, the abolition of unjust taxes im-
posed by corregidors and others. While he “ought to take extraordinary
measures against these people” who had misrepresented his project, as
well as those who had hanged and dragged his partisans behind horses,
he offered to pardon them if they turned themselves in with their weap-
ons. The rebel leader underlined the brutality of recent battles in the
Sacred Valley. He demanded that this letter be posted.39 All three letters
were dated January 3, 1781, from the Ocoruro base. Royalists, of course,
did not post them for public viewing.
In an effort to maintain as broad a coalition as possible, the three
letters defi ned his enemies narrowly— Spaniards and corregidors— and
stressed his Christian piety and loyalty to the king. He presented him-
self as an avenger of Spanish abuses and excesses, one who had not
expected or sought this role and who planned to slip away once he ac-
complished his objectives. He also highlighted his Inca bloodlines.40 The
letters can be understood several ways. Recipients in Cuzco saw them as
outrageously pretentious and ridiculous statements that showed that
Tupac Amaru had no sense of reality.
Whereas the recipients ridiculed the letters, subsequent analysts be-
lieved that they provide insight into his ideas and plans— although Tupac
Amaru wrote a great deal, he did not produce a program. They indicate
his efforts to maintain or gain the support of middling mestizos and cre-
oles and, perhaps, his confidence that the city would rise up and support
him. They can be seen as strategic feelers to evaluate his support, a sign
that Tupac Amaru wanted to take the city without bloodshed. Com-
manders encircling cities traditionally provided authorities a last chance
to surrender and to avoid sacking.41 Most analysts, however, have seen
them as a curious but significant waste of time. In writing, sending, and
waiting for a reply, Tupac Amaru squandered several days, allowing city
authorities to prepare and for Avilés’s troops to arrive.

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Quills on the Hills
On January 4, Tupac Amaru moved his forces from Ocoruro to Kayra,

the ridge south of the city. He expected sympathizers to rush forward
from Cuzco and its outlying areas to join him, but this did not happen.
Instead, royalists attacked him that very day and he continued to skirt
the city, moving toward the western peaks above the city, the Puquín
hill.42 Today, the train for Machu Picchu slowly zigzags up these slopes,
the steep incline forcing it to amble slower than those who walk next to
the tracks. People continue to build on all of the hills surrounding the
city. The bowllike ravines that mark the western hills like pockmarks,
however, have proven too steep and too prone to landslides for any
type of construction, providing a bit of open space. Tens of thousands
of rebels converged on these western bluffs. Rebels and royalists clashed
in this difficult terrain.
On January 6, members of the recently arrived mulatto militia
charged up the slippery hill toward Puquín, confident in their firepower
and the element of surprise. Rebels repelled them with their muskets and
motley collection of arms, rushing down the hill to finish them off with
sticks and rocks. Fifteen mulattoes died in the first attempt and twenty-
five more in a second, including Captain Francisco Cisneros. The rebels
insulted the Lima troops in Quechua, which the troops did not under-
stand. Blood ran in the muddy streets of Cuzco. Bishop Moscoso claimed
that these newcomers from Lima did not know the terrain and lacked
backup due to the indolence of royalist commanders.43 A ravine sepa-
rates the steep Puquín hill from the city, making it difficult for either side
to charge. The teeming rain worsened conditions and the mood.
The sight of the flag-carrying rebels perched on the western bluffs
petrified city residents. One person stated that the hills looked like a
massive “porcupine back,” with forty thousand rebels serving as the
quills.44 If this number was correct, the rebel camp outnumbered the
city itself. The viceroy subsequently calculated twenty thousand, pri-
marily Indian volunteers along with eight hundred Spaniards and mes-
tizos, “most of them coerced.” Understanding that desertions had already
diminished rebel forces, he thought that the insurgent leaders would
have difficulty controlling the undisciplined Indian masses.45 Tupac
Amaru wrote that he counted on sixty thousand Indians and six thou-
sand Spanish soldiers.46 Although these calculations never provide de-

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tails, they include women and other camp followers who prepared food
and set up camp but only fought in extreme circumstances.47 With the
scary spectacle of tens of thousands of rebels just above the city and the
failure of the mulatto battalion in the fi rst skirmish, panic and pessi-
mism spread among the city’s royalist population. People prepared for
the rebel masses to take the city in the coming days. They ner vously
checked their provisions and wondered whether they could flee.
Yet this initial victory over the Lima mulattoes was the last for Tupac
Amaru. In the coming days, his troops sought to take control of the
northern entrances into the city and, above all, to occupy the former
Inca capital that stretched below them. They failed on both fronts. While
the arrival of the Lima troops boosted royalist morale, desperation also
prompted them to defend the city energetically and efficiently. Avilés’s
troops guarded the city center and used their artillery to halt rebel ad-
vances. Although the muskets and fusils often backfired, they intimi-
dated the rebels, who relied on lances, slings, and knives. In this period,
gunshot wounds almost invariably killed, although not immediately.
Indian troops from Chinchero led by Pumacahua and from Anta led by
kuraka Nicolás Rosas thwarted rebel efforts to take the northern
entryways.
Small groups of rebels pushed into the city, scrambling to attack iso-
lated royalist soldiers. They tested the defenders’ resolve. Some grabbed
supplies, defaced buildings, and even looted. These insurgents had dif-
ferent fates: some returned to rebel camp to describe the situation and
their own deeds, while others abandoned the rebels and sought to blend
in among the city’s heterogeneous population or turned themselves in
to commanders. Others were not so fortunate. Royalists shot them or
surrounded them and then executed them. Residents watched these
street fights with apprehension, cheering from the safety of their balco-
nies when soldiers captured rebels.
One account claimed that everyone in the city, “from the nobility to
the plebeians,” collaborated. This writer tabulated that royalists counted
on two thousand soldiers, as well as an unspecified number of Indians
from Anta, Chinchero, and Maras and the support of civilians and mem-
bers of the church.48 On January 8, the corregidor of Paruro, Manuel de
Castillo, arrived with eight thousand reinforcements, primarily Indians.
They attacked the rebels from their flanks and rear.49 If the rebels moved
too close to the city, royalists attacked their rearguard. But the city’s

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unity should not be exaggerated. Bishop Moscoso, for example, com-

plained bitterly about people fleeing Cuzco.50
Skirmishes continued in the ravine that separated Puquín from the
city, as small rebel groups sought to break the royalist lines. Women
threw ash to blind the marauding insurgents and brought food and sup-
plies up hill to soldiers. Priests took up arms and summoned everyone
to join in the city’s defense, appealing to numerous saints. One friar re-
called how “moved by celestial impulse,” he left his monastery and
charged uphill toward the rebels, summoning the Virgin Mary and in-
voking the king. A mob of children, merchants, men of all stations, and
women followed him, armed with sticks, rocks, and any other weapon
they could fi nd. He confronted the rebels and attended the wounded.51
Bishop Moscoso surveyed the western front on a mule, coming within
two blocks of the rebel forces according to one sympathetic account.
Another writer claimed that the bishop, despite believing that the rebels
“wanted his head fi rst,” approached the enemy cannons and dared the
gunners to blast him.52
The city, including the Quechua-speaking lower classes, put up a
greater fight than Tupac Amaru expected. Through coercion and persua-
sion, royalists managed to prevent the urban masses from joining the
rebels. One writer claimed that “the mob, the dregs of the plebes, feeble
women, made up the bulk of the antirebel resistance.”53 Authorities had
clamped down on Indians in the outskirts of the city and the indigenous
and mestizo masses in the city had not risen. Authorities watched them
closely and terrified them with stories of the bloodthirsty nature of the
rebels and the horrific consequences for those who disobeyed and sup-
ported the rebels. The parading of rebel heads on pikes after the recent
battles in the Sacred Valley and Chita Pampa had discouraged many.
Propaganda efforts that cast Tupac Amaru as a heathen whose move-
ment would kill all non-Indians—a view supported by events in late
November and December, at least as understood in Cuzco—helped im-
pede the multracial alliance he sought and the support from the city he
needed. To Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas’s great disappointment,
Cuzco’s lower classes did not massively pass over to the rebels.
Micaela blamed priests. In a letter to her husband from late January,
she explained that “the common people were about to pass to our side,
but the sermons by several priests dissuaded them.”54 She also claimed
that Bishop Moscoso was on his way to negotiate with the rebel leaders

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when priests convinced him that he could be shot and killed. She argued
that people had told the bishop “countless falsehoods” about Tupac
Amaru, particularly that he was going to burn the city down. These ru-
mors encouraged Moscoso to enlist “all priests to arm themselves” and
nuns to leave the monasteries.55 Moscoso’s supporters later contested the
view that he had been conciliatory, stressing instead his fervent and ef-
fective military measures. What is beyond doubt is that priests led by
Bishop Moscoso helped convince the city’s masses to reject the rebels.
The royalists benefitted from traitors in the rebel camp. Juan Anto-
nio Figueroa, a Galician taken prisoner in Tungasuca, was in charge of
the insurgents’ dozen or so rustic cannons and their artillery. Most of
the cannons, pedreros, had been made quickly and poorly in Tinta.56 He
aimed the cannons, a brutally effective weapon when fi red from a hill-
side against a cluster of people, high and off target and also sabotaged
their ammunition. He dumped some ammunition into a stream, claim-
ing that the rain had damaged it.57 Another prisoner, Bernardo de la
Madrid, had gained the rebel leaders’ trust. They sent him in the midst
of the siege of Cuzco to negotiate with the royalists. The city’s authori-
ties met him with great joy—most thought him dead— and de la Ma-
drid had no trouble convincing them that that he had been a captive
and had escaped at the fi rst opportunity. In his account, he claimed
that a few days later, on January 8, he charged to the front line to take
thirty-five shots at the rebels. Prosecutors did not charge him.58 Tupac
Amaru and Micaela Bastidas’s misgiving about these European “allies”
proved correct.
The rebels suffered in the miserable conditions in their camp and
dissent grew. The cold rain made for very uncomfortable days and espe-
cially nights for the rebels, most of whom did not have any sort of cover
besides their ponchos. The two sides clashed in bloody hand-to-hand
combat and the guns and cannons added to the carnage. Tupac Amaru
and many of his supporters recognized that the mass uprising from
within the city that he expected and needed was not going to take place
and that taking the former Inca capital might require weeks of fighting.
The nebulous group of creole supporters he believed he counted on in
the city abandoned him, if they ever supported him. Pessimism spread
among the rebels. Many slipped away the night of January 6, ex-
hausted, frightened, and dubious about Tupac Amaru’s leadership or
invincibility.

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Confrontations continued after the January 6 desertions, with roy-

alists enjoying the advantage of access to the city center to gather food,
ammunition, and reinforcements. Rebel supplies, including food,
dwindled. On January 7, the rebels shelled the city with their meager
artillery and confronted the royalists on their flanks. One contempo-
rary wrote in his diary that with this strategy the rebel leader hoped to
convince the urban plebes, many of whom lived on the western out-
skirts of town, to join him. They did not.59 Tupac Amaru held his
ground around Puquín, pushing toward the higher Picchu peak with
little success. Picchu means mountain or peak in Quechua— Machu
Picchu is the “old mountain.” The fact that many Indians fought at the
front lines for the royalists discouraged Tupac Amaru, refuting his be-
lief that he could count on their support. Instead, he realized that he
could only take the city over their dead bodies. He also lacked money to
pay his soldiers and to purchase food, if he had found any for sale. The
hills and ravine that he controlled did not have any harvestable food
and the rebels quickly ran low on supplies.
Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas understood the centrality of pro-
visions. On December 29, he demanded that Eugenio Sinanyuca send
“cows, sheep, and other products from the Collao as well as any remain-
ing cheese, wine, and other provisions.” He instructed Sinanyuca to send
any wine or aguardiente that the majeño merchants brought, as well as
food that arrived from Chumbivilcas in the upper provinces.60 Tupac
Amaru knew that without provisions, particularly food, they would lose.
By early January, his abundant troops had no doubt consumed almost all
the supplies they had left camp with more than a week earlier. Although
Castelo’s group had ransacked numerous haciendas en route to Cuzco,
the entire Tupac Amaru contingent had met more resistance than they
expected and plundered less food than they planned. Once in Puquín,
the women in charge of collecting food and firewood had to risk their
lives and venture farther and farther from camp. Little food grew in the
hills and ravines on the outskirts of the city. Potatoes, the Andean staple,
were not yet ready for harvest and firewood and brush were always
scarce at ten thousand feet above sea level. The rich yellow and purple
corn that flourished in the Sacred Valley or the quinoa and kiwicha
found in the higher elevation zones lay tantalizingly beyond the rebels’
reach. The rebels could see the city’s markets (merchants continued to
enter from the east) but to their great frustration could not reach them.

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On January 8, rebels peppered the city with cannon fi re but failed to

gain any ground. The vast majority of rebels remained on or around the
Puquín hill, their supplies diminishing, hunger and dissent growing. In
contrast, the arrival of the reinforcements from Paruro that day buoyed
royalist spirits. A friar from the Dominican order shocked observers and
heartened (or at least amused) Spanish commanders by shooting at the
rebels from behind a boulder. Volunteers joined the well-disciplined
Lima forces in increasing numbers. Bishop Moscoso credited Figueroa’s
sabotaging of the cannons for saving the day, lamenting, however, that
over sixty royalists were injured and “some dead.”61
On the 9th, Tupac Amaru sent another letter to the city council, with
Francisco Bernales, whom he had captured in Sangarará. He claimed
that rebel forces were on the offensive and threatened that his Indians
were about to take the city at any cost, “ruining it and leaving it in ashes.”
He contended that he could not control them and it was up to the city
council to surrender and avoid a bloodbath. Tupac Amaru was bluffing,
as the royalists had the upper hand at this point. He closed by mention-
ing that he knew that authorities were considering the abolition of the
reparto and the alcabala sales tax. He supported these measures, point-
ing out that mestizos and Spaniards would “gladly” make up the money
lost in tax revenues. The proof lay in the fact that “a high number of
them are under my orders, on their own free will.”62 The city council
never replied.
On January 10, royalist forces pushed into his lines, driving them
back. One account claimed five thousand dead rebels, an exaggeration
that nonetheless confi rms that this was not the hit-and-run confronta-
tions of the previous days but a full-scale battle, ending in a royalist
victory. Two observers describe Tupac Amaru desperately whipping his
soldiers, ordering them to fight. Nonetheless, “they rebelled against
him, treating him as a fraud, especially the Tinta Indians.”63 Many de-
serted, believing the struggle lost and hoping to avoid the repression
they assumed would ensue. On the foggy morning of January 11, the
royalists awoke to see that the rebels had fled the evening before. They
charged the rearguard, capturing a few stragglers and seizing some ani-
mals and Tupac Amaru’s bed. It had a silk headboard and a golden
base, and apparently had belonged to Corregidor Arriaga.64 The inces-
sant rain had bedev iled the Indians but facilitated their fl ight, as royal-
ists could not track them and slipped in the muddy slopes. Prisoners

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who had escaped from Tupac Amaru told one commander that the en-
emy was “broken” (deshecho).65 Bishop Moscoso described with great
satisfaction “the enormous desertions” among rebel troops, but also
chided the royalist commanders for not attacking at this point and al-
lowing the rebels to regroup in Yanacocha.66 Nonetheless, the insur-
gents could not mount another offensive and Tupac Amaru would only
return to Cuzco three months later, in a very different context.
Scholars and others have long debated why Tupac Amaru did not
take Cuzco. Many question his timing, arguing that he should have at-
tacked in November, rather than shore up forces in the south. Others
wonder why he did not move more quickly in December. If he had at-
tacked prior to Christmas, he could have taken the city before Avilés
and his mulatto militiamen reached it. Perhaps he took his time because
he still hoped for Diego Cristóbal to push from the north and distract the
royalists. The more relevant question is why he failed to take Cuzco
when he surrounded it with tens of thousands of rebels in late 1780.
One highly critical review from late January 1781 gave four reasons:
the rebel leadership lacked food and money; the city was well supplied
with soldiers and supplies and also counted on formidable defensive
positions; Tupac Amaru lost confidence and increasingly believed that
taking the city “seemed impossible”; and “people are abandoning him
since they see he can’t even offer a salary to survive on.”67 Generally
sympathetic to Tupac Amaru, most historians have stressed his ulti-
mately naïve belief that the city would capitulate and his refusal to win
by slaughtering thousands of Indians. According to these accounts, he
delayed and finally decided not to push into the city because he under-
stood that a victory was only possible at the cost of the lives of thousands
of Indians, rebels, and royalists.68 Contemporaries found other explana-
tions. One 1781 account, while mentioning rebel desertions, the lack of
support from the city’s lower classes, and Diego Cristóbal’s failure to
arrive, ultimately credited Our Lady of the Rosary, whom “the people
had invoked after every sound of gunfi re with an Ave Maria.” The an-
nual Our Lady of the Rosary feast commemorates the Christian victory,
that of the Holy League, against the Ottoman Empire in Lepanto in
1571. Some attributed the victory, which impeded further Muslim ex-
cursions into Europe, to persistent praying of the rosary. Many Cuzco
residents also felt that, similarly, they had miraculously defeated the
heathen hordes.69

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These are important explanations and the timing question contin-

ues to prompt fascinating counterfactual questions or what-ifs.70 I
would add a new, unpleasant factor related to poor conditions and in-
ternal dissent among his forces: dysentery struck the rebel camp. On
January 18, 1781, Father José de Maruri, who at this point had aban-
doned, at least temporarily, his sympathies for the insurgents, wrote to
the kuraka Diego Choquehuanca from Asillo. He contended that in the
midst of the siege Indians in the south disobeyed Tupac Amaru’s call
for fresh recruits because they knew that those in Cuzco “are suffering
from hunger, without wages, and sleeping outside, in the midst of tur-
bulent weather, which it has been said has caused many to die of diar-
rhea [cursos] and malnutrition [ flaqueza, literally “thinness”] and since
people coming from Cuzco are bringing news of this, Indians from
around here are getting scared.”71 The terms cursos and flaqueza are un-
usual but mean “illness” and “hunger.”72
Conditions in the rebel camp were horrible and thus ideal for wide-
spread dysentery. Tens of thousands of rebels, soldiers as well as the
women in charge of the camp and other accompanying family mem-
bers, rested, slept, and ate in extremely crowded conditions. Supplies
ran low and hunger weakened defenses. The rebels’ spirits fell as they
watched their comrades die or suffer from terrible wounds, the realiza-
tion spreading that the siege would not be quick or perhaps even success-
ful. The constant downpours and chilly nights worsened the situation,
making the ground muddy and life wretched. No one had a change of
clothes. In the late eighteenth century, people did not understand the
relationship between hygiene and infectious disease, and care was not
taken to use sterile water for cooking or to defecate and urinate well
away from the kitchen. In fact, little was known about the cause and
transmission of disease. Although dismissal of indigenous people as
fi lthy and unhygienic is a mainstay of racist condemnations past and
present, sanitary conditions were undoubtedly appalling in a swarm-
ing, dispirited rebel camp. The rain, cold, slippery hills, and constant
enemy fi re impeded the insurgents from adventuring out in search of
food and brush (they were close to streams and could collect rainwater)
and discouraged them from distancing themselves from where they ate
and slept when relieving themselves. While I found only one reference
to stomach disorders, several accounts mention hunger among the in-
surgents as a factor for many of them fleeing. The spread of dysentery

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or other ailments thus seems highly likely. Tupac Amaru had not re-
ceived the support he expected in the city of Cuzco and also witnessed
many of his troops fleeing. Widespread illness aggravated this situation,
giving the royalists a great psychological and physical advantage.73
Retreat
Cuzco residents celebrated their defense of the city with religious pro-
cessions and festivities. Bishop Moscoso blessed the military barracks,
located in the Jesuit college on the corner of the Plaza de Armas, and
declared victory with a rousing “vivat Rex in Aeternum.” Circumventing
trenches and the other remains of the fighting, the Bishop toured the
battle area and visited wounded soldiers. Men and women cheered
loudly from balconies, windows, and doors, fanning their hats, shawls,
and handkerchiefs.74 Some concerns soured the celebrations, however.
Three months of warfare had ruined much of the harvest and authorities
worried about impending food shortages. Rebels had stolen food, razed
haciendas, expelled property owners and overseers, and blocked trade
routes. Castelo’s advance into Cuzco up the valley had been particu-
larly destructive and the rebels still controlled the Vilcanota Valley and
the western entrance into the city. Moscoso himself believed that they
should have pursued the rebels and fi nished them off. He understood
that the uprising was not over and that they had lost an opportunity to
capture the leader and decimate his followers.75
Tupac Amaru retreated to Ocoruro and from there to Acomayo, re-
uniting with Micaela and other family members and allies who had
remained behind. According to one unsympathetic account, “he en-
tered Acomayo with far too much arrogance for a defeated and scorned
aspirant.” He forced the priest to receive him with honors and then
took Mass kneeling, “in pharisaical style.” In what the writer cast as a
sign of divine aversion to the rebel leader, the priest and the church as-
sistants could not open the sacrarium, which had been working fi ne
before his arrival. Tupac Amaru invited himself to lunch at the priest’s
house, where he explained that he had retreated because the royalists
had put Indians on the front lines, “as bait,” and because the mestizos
who had been in charge of his fusils had lost their courage. This expla-
nation has been repeated by the accounts most sympathetic to Tupac
Amaru, placing the blame on his good heart and mestizo treachery

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rather than his tactics or wavering social base. He told the priest that he
would recruit more soldiers and would not give up on his “principal
idea of taking Cuzco.”76
An anonymous royalist made fun of Tupac Amaru’s leadership, jib-
ing that “an army of mice led by a lion is better than an army of lions led
by a mouse.”77 José Rafael Sahuaraura Titu Atauchi, a kuraka whose
1784 Estado del Perú defended Bishop Moscoso from accusations of rebel
sympathies, wrote that “many Indians who had been with Tupac Amaru
in the siege told me on their return that their Inca had cried a great deal
in Yanacocha over not being received as King in Cuzco.”78 In its account,
the city council boasted that the “city managed to free itself from the as-
sault and prevent the Rebel’s twisted plan of taking the city. This was his
desire, because if he had taken possession of the old kingdom’s capital,
the court of his Incas, his perverse ideas would have taken an imaginary
triumphal step. Freed from the anguish that had torn at their souls, the
city’s inhabitants, especially women and nuns, offered their thanks and
praise to God.”79
Yet alongside the celebrations, taunts, and exploration of how or
why they had repelled his attack, royalists understood that the uprising
was not over. The same writer who described the diarrhea and hunger
in the rebel camp mused, “We don’t know what the rebel will do with
himself or the route that he will take but it’s a beautiful opportunity to
hunt him down as soon as possible and so the Cuzco troops will soon
go after him.” This was on the mark: Royalists in Cuzco did not know
Tupac Amaru’s next steps but went on the attack.80

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6
In Pursuit of Tupac Amaru
T H E COU RSE OF BAT T L E seemed to turn at the beginning of 1781. Tu-

pac Amaru abandoned his campaign to take the city of Cuzco, and
to the glee of the city’s royalists, reinforcements from Lima marched up
the Andes destined for Cuzco. After three months of rebel attacks and
territorial expansion, the royalists had taken the offensive. In March,
their organized, well-armed forces, numbering over fifteen thousand,
fanned out from Cuzco toward rebel headquarters down the Vilcanota
Valley. These events from March through May seemed to indicate a com-
plete turn of fortune, from unstoppable rebel growth to royalist domina-
tion. Nonetheless, they form part of a more complicated story. Even with
their intimidating numbers, the royalists still had a challenging struggle
ahead, one that would last into 1783 and beyond. The campaign of early
1781 was crucial, even momentous; it was not the end of the story.
Royalists suffered greatly as they chased Tupac Amaru into his home-
land. The terrain voided many of their advantages: their horses and
heavy armament did not work well as the trails became narrower, steeper,
and higher. Moreover, the altitude and the shortage of food and other
supplies undermined morale, while deaths in battle and, above all, deser-
tion decreased their numerical advantage over the rebels. On the defen-
sive, Tupac Amaru and his major commanders turned to effective and
frustrating guerrilla tactics. Reports from the south, the Lake Titicaca
area, further disturbed the royalists. There, rebels had the upper hand
and the uprising became increasingly violent. Tales of rebels massacring
and beheading prisoners terrified the royalists. Commanders and sol-
diers alike understood that they would need to proceed to the lake, a
prospect they dreaded.

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In Pursuit of Tupac Amaru 131
Tupac Amaru also faced new challenges. The Spanish had a mass,
united army focused on trapping him. It was one thing to storm into
town and topple a small militia; it was another to confront six well-
armed columns. He also faced internal divisions and dissension that
had not surfaced prior to the battle of Cuzco. Micaela and he struggled
to maintain order, to prevent violence against non-Spaniards and non-
combatants, and to make sure that the troops did not sneak home. Dis-
cipline and desertion became a problem for both sides. Moreover, while
the news from Titicaca was positive, the reports of rebel massacres and
bloodletting troubled José Gabriel and Micaela. The insurgents were
winning in the south, but not in the way that the Tinta rebels had en-
visioned. In the midst of the frenzied hunt for José Gabriel and the
other leaders, the nature of the struggle was changing.
Fanning Out
Led by Visitador General Antonio de Areche and Inspector General

José del Valle, approximately fi fteen thousand troops entered Cuzco on
February 24. Headquartered in the Bethlemite convent on the city’s
outskirts, the soldiers paraded through the town the following day,
their leaders celebrated with a mass and a “magnificent banquet.” Areche
publicly recognized royalist supporters such as the priests in Cotabam-
bas who had defended the region from the rebels, and conferred the
rank of captain on Pumacahua and Nicolás Rosas, the kurakas of Chin-
chero and Anta. Days later Areche released a widely distributed decree
that offered a pardon to those involved in Tupac Amaru’s “robberies,
insults, and other grave crimes,” stressing how the rebel leader had
used false affection, unfulfi lled promises, and fear to attract followers.
He instructed those interested in a pardon to give up their arms and
appear in the city of Cuzco. The pardon listed about thirty-five people
excluded from the offer: Micaela Bastidas, Tupac Amaru, his immedi-
ate family, and their inner circle. Areche offered a reward of eighty
pesos a month for life to anyone who turned in a person on the list. He
also promised both the pardon and reward to anyone listed who handed
over Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, their children, and other family
members.1 The visitador sought to divide the rebels, believing that
many would abandon the cause and hoping that some might even turn
on their leaders.2

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The army divided its troops into six columns. The first included 310
dragoons (infantrymen), 100 of them mounted infantry, and 2,000 In-
dians from the Calca highlands. The second column had 950 cavalry
drawn from Lima, Cuzco, and surrounding areas, and 2,000 additional
Indians from Maca, Abancay, and Chinchero. All six columns followed
this pattern; Indians from the Cuzco area greatly outnumbered soldiers
from coastal Lima. Put another way, the composition of the royalist
troops reflected Peru’s demography; most were Indians, followed in order
by mestizos, blacks and black mixed races, creoles, and Spaniards.3 The
army also mirrored social hierarchies. Spanish and creoles led and
other groups, with the exception of kurakas, served as soldiers. The In-
dians had been “volunteered” by their kurakas or dragooned by Span-
ish forces en route to Cuzco. Some, perhaps, had joined on their own
volition. In any case, they remained anonymous except when they got
into trouble. No Spanish report ever named a common Indian who
died fighting for the royalists. Blacks and mulattoes came from Lima.
Some fought for pay, others because they had been forced. All of the
coastal troops suffered with the altitude.
Some rebel deserters joined the royalists because they were dis-
heartened with the uprising, knowing that this would in most cases
exempt them from punishment as insurgents. Some who had aban-
doned the rebel forces found themselves hundreds of miles from home
and joined the royalists for food and, eventually, permission to return
home. Commanders complained about Indian soldiers’ lack of disci-
pline and commitment. In contrast, the indigenous troops led by kurakas
such as Pumacahua had demonstrated their skill and determination in
battle.
The official account tallied 17,116 soldiers in Cuzco in March, al-
though the actual number may have been over 20,000.4 They had over
three thousand fusils, the light fl intlock musket that had replaced the
harquebus, as well as numerous cannons. These proved invaluable in
scattering the enemy, although their transport through the precipitous
Andes required herculean effort.
Leaving one thousand soldiers to defend Cuzco, the Army’s six col-
umns fanned out, intending to converge on the rebel base around
Tinta. The elaborate military chart and map reveal the increased troop
count and precise planning, a vast improvement over the royalist ef-
forts just months earlier.5

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Thousands of uniformed troops, their weapons glistening in the sun,

impressed and intimidated the local population, and their arrival changed
the nature of the confl ict. Royalists had taken the offensive. They
counted on a substantial advantage in weaponry and cavalry (with the
rebels, only the leaders traveled on horse) and were no longer outnum-
bered. Nonetheless, significant obstacles lay ahead. Feeding a larger
army as they pushed farther and farther away from Cuzco proved diffi-
cult. Scant supplies translated into cold, hungry, and consequently lack-
luster soldiers. Moreover, the dramatic, mountainous topography of the
area bedev iled the royalists. When they marched through the narrow
valleys the rebels harassed them from peaks and ambushed them from
all sides. They suffered, particularly those from the warmer coast, from
the cold and thin air at twelve thousand feet above sea level. Also short
on food and air, their horses stubbornly refused to continue and within
weeks all but the commanders were on foot. A little over a month after
parading their gallant horses through the streets of Cuzco, royalists were
forced to abandon or even eat them. Despite organization, arms, and
numbers, the royalists proved not to be the invincible force that many
believed them to be upon their arrival in Cuzco.
On March 1, General del Valle sent José Gálvez, the head of Ma-
drid’s all-important Council of the Indies, a bleak assessment. Del Valle
apologized for the delay in leaving Cuzco and blamed corregidors’ sloth
in providing provisions and pack animals. Royalists in Cuzco grumbled
as the soldiers ate massive amounts and Tupac Amaru slipped away
farther and farther south. Del Valle contended that Tupac Amaru had
convinced the “barbarous, naïve Indians” that his lineage made him
the appropriate person to defend them and that his followers who died
in battle would be resurrected once the struggle was over and would
then “fi nd happiness and the wealth unduly taken from them.” Numer-
ous authorities lamented in the coming months the widespread belief
that Tupac Amaru had the power to save those martyred in his strug-
gle.6 Del Valle described the enemy’s rustic weapons and complained
that they preferred to remain in the highest mountains both because
of their fear of fi rearms and the availability of rocks and boulders,
which they hurled down upon the royalists.7
Del Valle believed that Tupac Amaru wanted to return south, to the
Collao and Lake Titicaca, and also take Paucartambo, an important agri-
cultural area and a gateway to the Amazon. For centuries, the jungle had

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N
Urubamba
Urubamba
Paucartambo
Calca
Vi l c a b a m b a
Pisac
CUZCO
Caicay
Ocongate
Urcos
Cotabambas Ausangate
Paruro
Rondocán
Quiquijana
Acos Acomayo
Tambobamba
Accha Pitumarca
Sangarará Checacupe
Pampamarca
Combapata
Tungasuca Tinta
Yanaoca Sicuani
Colquemarca Livitaca
Apu
rima c River
Santo Tomás
Velille
Royalist campaign routes
lake
0 20 miles Yauri
Coporaque
0 20 km
The Royalist Advance, 1781
constituted a refuge for Cuzco rebels and malcontents. Most notably, in

the sixteenth-century Conquest of the Incas, Manco Inca and his son
Tupac Amaru, José Gabriel’s supposed ancestor, had taken flight from
Cuzco toward Vilcabamba and the Amazon rain forest. This perhaps in-
fluenced Tupac Amaru’s own strategy. The Spanish commander thus
had the columns fan out, the first and sixth columns approaching Pau-
cartambo, but keeping close in order to help one another if attacked.8
The fifth column pushed to the west, into Cotabambas, while column
four moved into Paruro. Columns two and three marched down the val-
ley toward the rebel base. To the dismay of the coastal troops, however,

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del Valle drove his forces over the sheer mountain passes that lead to
Tinta rather than through the pleasant valley path. He knew that in the
narrow canyonlike valley, the rebels would pick his men off with their
favorite weapons, boulders sent careening down hills or rocks from their
slingshots. Instead, royalist troops had to climb precipitous and icy slopes,
their heads pounding due to the thin air.9
Although disappointed by their failure to take Cuzco and concerned
about desertions and the difficulties in supplying their troops, Tupac
Amaru and Micaela Bastidas still led a formidable force. While uni-
formed Spanish troops with cannons, shotguns, and horses intimidated
the people of Cuzco, the rebel forces terrified well-to-do locals. The
breakdown of discipline among the insurgents after the failed siege of
Cuzco, although detrimental in the long run, made them even more fear-
some. In the months to come, rebel leaders complained that their troops
stopped following orders to limit their violence and looting. Unrestrained
rebel hordes, no longer under the control of leaders, constituted a royal-
ist nightmare. Moreover, thousands of rebels still worked in unison and
proved to be fearsome adversaries in the rugged terrain south of Cuzco.
Bishop Moscoso lamented in a January 21 letter that in their return to
Tungasuca, Tupac Amaru and his forces had fought with “blood and
fi re,” especially against Spaniards and mestizos. He worried that they
would return to attack Cuzco.10
In the ever more intense confl ict, Tupac Amaru and Micaela Basti-
das continued their 1780 roles: he the frenetic, mobile commander and
she the logistics chief who stayed closer to base. He remained on the
move, rarely sleeping in the same place two nights in a row, and pre-
pared to shift the fight from Cuzco to the Titicaca area. On January 14,
José Gabriel instructed his commanders in the south, in Carabaya,
Lampa, and Azángaro, to prepare “their Indians,” demanding that they
shelter people from news about the failed attack on Cuzco.11 Micaela
Bastidas managed the building of fortifications, aware that as she had
feared since November, the royalists would attack the rebel base. They
constructed a defensive wall outside of Combapata and dug trenches in
Tinta. She continued to organize the rebels’ provisions, desperately
calling on her followers to send soldiers and food and to maintain dis-
cipline.12 In early 1781, they rebuilt their forces, recruiting wherever
they ventured and encouraging skeptical or frightened supporters.
They threatened deserters and other traitors with death.13

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While all of the rebel troops fought in the name of Tupac Amaru,
admiring him and Micaela, some battled under other commanders.
Micaela did her best to make sure that the troops were paid (from what
they expropriated), in coin or goods. She also strove to guarantee suf-
ficient food, knowing that hungry troops would flee. On February 15,
1781, her brother, Antonio Bastidas, asked her for “coca and alcohol,
the two things that maintain our soldiers.” He also requested jerky and
wheat for his troops and some binoculars “to spot the enemy.” A month
later, a priest in Sicuani complained to Micaela about hunger due to
“extreme poverty.”14 The rebels’ commitment varied: some had given
up everything to fight for the “last Inca” while others saw it as a tempo-
rary struggle and planned to be home for the upcoming harvest. Some
had been forcibly recruited by their kuraka. Much of the rebel base
came from the indigenous towns and hamlets to the south of Cuzco, in
the river valley as well as the high peaks, but Tupac Amaru also re-
cruited more mobile people, indigenous and mestizo, who were not
tax-paying members of an Indian community.15
Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas worried about desertions and
even treachery. Some important supporters had abandoned the rebels,
including the Castelo clan, led by the patriarch Melchor and his son
Antonio, who staged a mutiny in Sicuani after the failed siege of Cuzco.
Antonio had been the rebel leader in the disastrous defeat in Saylla in
late December, when royalists had blocked them from entering the Inca
capital. Once back in Sicuani, they called for other creoles to rise up
against Tupac Amaru and threatened those who remained faithful to
the rebels. Their efforts might have been a last-ditch ploy to avoid roy-
alist repression. They understood that the end was near and thus tried
to convince authorities that they no longer supported the rebels and
could even be valuable in the uprising’s repression.
Both the mutiny and the ploy failed. Rebels killed several members
of the Castelo family in an ambush. The historian David Cahill con-
tends that the Castelo family’s treachery eased Tupac Amaru’s misgiv-
ing about anticreole violence among his supporters and that, after the
mutiny, rebels increasingly targeted the American-born elite.16 The
sixty-year-old Antonio Castelo turned himself in to del Valle in April
but authorities treated him as an insurgent—particularly galling to the
colonial courts because of his social background as someone of Euro-
pean descent— and tried him as a rebel commander and insider. Wit-

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nesses deemed him a recruiter and captain. Castelo claimed that he had
been coerced, but to no avail—he was found guilty and executed.17
Rebel lieutenants reported cases where the local population resisted
participating in or collaborating with the uprising. On January 11, one
Francisco Torres wrote Tupac Amaru, “beloved father of all my heart
and my lord, father of all the poor and all the miserable and helpless,”
that in a small town in Paruro an Indian woman insulted him and re-
fused to hand over mules and wheat. Referring to the requisitioning of
supplies, the brave woman stated, “the Inca does these things only be-
cause he has nothing to show,” a stinging reference to the failed siege.18
Torres mentioned that in another town, locals were organizing against
the rebels, contending that “the Inca had lost all the souls.” This implied
that his troop numbers and general support had decreased, and perhaps,
with the term alma or soul, underlined his soullessness due to the excom-
munication.19 Tupac Amaru instructed Torres on January 17 to bring him
any troublemakers and to continue to seize goods.20 Indians in even the
most prorebel communities no doubt disliked having their goods confis-
cated. Torres, however, was in Paruro and Acomayo, provinces that had
provided many soldiers for the royalists and that were by no means rebel
strongholds. His letter indicates that local people spoke up against the up-
rising even in front of one of the major lieutenants, Torres, and that con-
fidence in the rebels had diminished after the failed siege.
In January and February 1781, the rebels fought on numerous fronts.
Forces led by Diego Cristóbal sieged Paucartambo, ravaging much of the
area. He failed, however, to take Calca in the Sacred Valley, running up
repeatedly against the royalist commander Pumacahua. Diego Cristóbal’s
troops retreated behind the icy glacier peaks of Ocongate and Laura-
marca, the snow-peaked mountains visible from Cuzco’s plaza.21 Tomás
Parvina, who like Tupac Amaru claimed royal Inca heritage, was one of
the rebellion’s major commanders. He had accompanied Tupac Amaru
to the south in November and then in December led the largely unsuc-
cessful forays into the Urubamba Valley, the brutal confrontations in
which the royalist kuraka Pumacahua came out on top. On January 25,
Parvina’s forces ambushed the royalist commander Isidoro Gutiérrez in
Chahuaytiri, a small Indian community that looms above the idyllic
town of Pisac.22 Royalists reported that rebel soldiers ate Gutierrez’s
heart, drank his blood, and proclaimed, “Spanish blood turned out to be
really tasty.”23 The story added fuel to the royalist propaganda that the

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rebels were savages, and no doubt made many soldiers ner vous. Puma-
cahua counterattacked in the following days and Parvina and Diego
Cristóbal lost more than one thousand men.24
Did eating the heart and drinking blood reflect some type of Andean
ritual? Scholars have sought to explain the increasing brutality in terms
of traditions, both pre- and post-Conquest. Jorge Hidalgo showed that
the beheading of one prisoner and the extraction of his heart in Upper
Peru was an offering to the Inca deity of pachamama, mother earth.25
Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy underlined the parallels between rebel vio-
lence and that depicted by Guaman Poma’s fabulous illustrations in his
early-seventeenth-century Corónica Nueva.26 In his important study of
rebel violence against Europeans, Szeminski illuminated how Quechua
people understood the Spanish, particularly the concepts that could lead
to their exclusion from the category of “good Christian.” He also studied
how indigenous people employed alternative notions of history and jus-
tice.27 In seeking to understand the indigenous perspective on the upris-
ing, these views correct the royalists’ interpretation of the brutality as
mere confirmation of the Indians’ savagery and backwardness. None-
theless, the paucity of sources, particularly rebel accounts, makes this
type of interpretation challenging and, beyond these important contri-
butions, even questionable. Andean people varied greatly in 1780 (as
they did in 1480 or 1980) and cannot be lumped together. They also
changed over time. Szeminski used Mochican iconography (a pre-Inca
coastal civilization that flourished from CE 100 to CE 800) to understand
eighteenth-century mindsets.28 Studies that combine an understanding
of contemporary views of power and violence in the Andes (with field-
work in Quechua, a language I do not speak) with a reading of historical
sources can illuminate the indigenous mindset, past and present. The
authors cited above contribute by moving away from Eurocentric inter-
pretations. Yet any interpretation that relates brutality with Andean
traditions and mentalities needs a much greater set of sources and a
deeper understanding of local society than what we count on.
Not all of the battles pitted rebel and royalist soldiers. In some cases,
rebel-leaning towns assaulted those believed to be royalist, or vice versa.
For example, one document refers to the people of Colquemarca, Santo
Tomás, Quillota, and Llusco attacking those of Capi and Collabamba,
“with many dead and great damage done to estates, houses, and live-
stock.” The document noted that the rebels sought to cut down the Hua-

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cachaca Bridge to isolate the region from Cuzco.29 One rebel commander
died in this confrontation and rebels forced a local priest to bury him
with full honors, paying 100 pesos. Bishop Moscoso subsequently initi-
ated proceedings against the priest, who claimed that he had been co-
erced and that once the rebels were gone he had dug up the body and
dumped it in a field.30 Behind these town-versus-town confrontations
lay decades of tensions as well as more ephemeral personal conflicts.31
The Hunt for Tupac Amaru
In early 1781, royalist commanders focused on the pursuit of Tupac

Amaru. Although fleeing the city of Cuzco, rebels protected their base
area aggressively. As the royalists made their way toward Tinta in mid-
March, rebels incessantly harassed them from the high peaks. In re-
sponse, the Spanish charged head-on into these breathtakingly steep
mountains, temporarily dislodging the rebels. In these initial confronta-
tions, neither side could claim victory—the rebels made life miserable for
the royalists and when necessary fled to even more inaccessible zones to
reduce their vulnerability. But by March 18, both sides prepared for
combat.
A snowstorm, low supplies, and fear of a rebel trap had halted the
royalist advance. The lack of provisions proved to be the royalists’ Achil-
les heel. One account complained that from the outset, the troops “expe-
rienced great discomfort, whether from rainstorms, hail, or storms—
frequent in that elevation— or the lack of food and fi rewood, caused
by the rebels’ ability to sever communication with royalist towns.” This
isolation meant that “cold and hunger” threatened the lives of many
soldiers.32
Feeding some fi fteen to twenty thousand soldiers in an area where
traditional agriculture only flourished in the narrow valleys and where
the bulk of the population was reluctant to assist the Spanish bedev iled
General del Valle. Rebels and royalists alike had previously ransacked
the estates, farms, and small plots at lower elevations and had depleted
the herds of llamas, alpacas, sheep, and cows. Indigenous shepherds
took the surviving animals to higher elevations. Native crops such as
quinoa only grew in narrow niches in out-of-the-way elevations, around
thirteen thousand feet above sea level, and in any event constituted an
emergency supplement for the Spanish and coastal troops at best, in

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their eyes hardly qualifying as a true meal. The fundamental Andean

staple, the ubiquitous potato, presented a challenge to marauding sol-
diers. Unlike corn or other grains that were stored in silos or stone gra-
naries, potatoes remained underground until ready for the pot. Com-
munities hid their supplies of chuño or freeze-dried potatoes.
Furthermore, even if supply lines were open to Cuzco, that city
could not offer surplus food to the soldiers. The presence of fifteen thou-
sand troops in the city for a month had already exhausted supplies.
Andean seasons also punished the royalist forces. The rainy season (No-
vember through April), which made every river crossing life-threatening
and the daily march on slippery, muddy trails exhausting, was followed
by a brief fall and then the frigid winter months of June through Au-
gust. In March, for example, commanders complained about the rain;
months later they suffered the bitter cold. As they pushed south, into
higher and higher altitudes, temperatures dropped.
Royalists suffered in the high peaks. Many soldiers had thought that
they had passed the worst in the steep climb from Lima to Cuzco. Higher,
more desolate summits, however, stretched above them in the journey
from Cuzco to Lake Titicaca. Even though they had overcome initial
soroche or altitude sickness, pursuing the enemy among peaks that
loomed over thirteen thousand feet above sea level was exhausting and
terrifying. But oxygen was not the only element in short supply. Just
weeks after leaving Cuzco, Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Villalta com-
plained that his column was out of meat, bread, and fi rewood and were
hard pressed to get by on biscuits, probably unappetizing hardtack. The
severe scarcities resulted not only from the lack of local provisions but
also from shabby planning and reluctance to spend on the part of colo-
nial authorities.33 Adding to the soldiers’ misery was sleep deprivation.
The fear of rebel attack and the cold kept soldiers up at night, often
covered with snow. Illnesses spread.34
On March 18, del Valle led his soldiers onto the Sullumayo peak,
seeking to dislodge the rebels from the mountaintops that loomed over
the valley. Rebel forces harassed them day and night and a punishing
snowstorm and strong wind, along with the alarming lack of food,
made conditions miserable. On March 20, the two sides clashed in Puca-
casa. Royalists decimated the rebel front line, forcing survivors to “step
over cadavers.”35 Bad weather and attacks on their flanks pushed the
royalists back. On the twenty-first, a rebel deserter burst into camp, beg-

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ging not to be shot and promising valuable information. This was Yanu-
ario Castro, a kuraka from Pitumarca, who reported to del Valle that
Tupac Amaru planned a sneak attack that very evening or at dawn. The
rebel leader had ten thousand men, who he had inspired with “many
jugs of firewater (aguardiente), so that they would attack with the fury
that their malevolent leader desires.”36
Del Valle prepared his troops, who after taking their positions quickly
begged to return to their tents rather than die of cold. Although disheart-
ened by his troops’ softness, del Valle admitted that they all prayed for
dawn to come, preferring “to fight a million men” than stand knee-deep
in the snow. They had no hot meal for three days and survived on biscuits
and bits of stale bread.37 One anonymous account described “the days of
cruel snow and cold, the soldiers up all night knee-deep in the snow.”38
At dawn the attack began, with shouts in Quechua of “Viva King Tupac
Amaru.” Two rebel columns attacked the royalist troops and the third at-
tempted to seize their mules and supplies. Tupac Amaru had the advan-
tage. He had lured the royalists into the hills and concealed the where-
abouts and strength of his forces. Nonetheless, the rebels found the troops
ready for battle, not sleeping, as they had expected. The battle pitted del
Valle’s largely black vanguard, the Lima cavalry and dragoons, against
Tupac Amaru’s indigenous fighters. Rebels could not overpower the roy-
alist camp and by 8:00 a.m. most of them had withdrawn. Even with the
warning, del Valle’s troops barely repelled the attack, ultimately relying
on the fortunate arrival of a column led by Juan Manuel Campero.
Disgruntled soldiers complained bitterly to del Valle about their hun-
ger and fatigue. The following night, March 23, del Valle witnessed many
of his troops falling exhausted into the snow, unable to remain awake or
even seated. Noting that the exhaustion caused by days without sleep and
the bitter cold “would have defeated not just my soldiers but the robust
warriors of the King of Prussia,” he began a retreat toward the valley.39
Campero brought desperately needed food and alcohol while a priest col-
lected firewood, clothing, and more food for the starving, frostbitten roy-
alists, who retreated to the Vilcanota River basin. The Spanish had learned
not to confront the rebels in the higher mountain peaks.
Tupac Amaru expressed his frustration over the near miss in Puca-
casa, ridiculing the royalists’ cowardice.40 While the Black militia mem-
bers and Pumacahua’s forces remained loyal to del Valle, Indians who
had joined the royalists after the frustrated siege of Cuzco deserted en

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masse. Del Valle also learned that royalist indigenous troops from Anta,
Abancay, and Huamanga had returned to their towns. He wanted to
track them and execute every tenth man, the diezmado, but realized that
the circumstances made it impossible. He bitterly described the desertion
of “many Indians from among our auxiliary troops from Chinchero and
Anta, who took with them many sacks of coca leaves and wheat and
spread the rumor that I had sent them home and suspended the cam-
paign until Easter.” The commander called for severe reprisals, “because
of the bad consequences their malicious lies can have and because I now
understand that we will get nothing out of this dim, disaffected nation
[Indians] by treating them with contemplation and suavity.” 41 Del Valle’s
opinion of Indians would become even more acidic in the coming months.
After near disaster in Pucacasa, del Valle led his troops down to-
ward the rebel center around Tinta. The rebels had destroyed the Urcos
Bridge, so the royalists lost several days crossing the Vilcanota River, at
its raging peak at the end of the rainy season. Del Valle knew that the
royalists had little chance for success in the remote, high mountain passes,
and instead sought something closer to a classic military engagement in
the Vilcanota Valley. After days in the snowy mountain peaks, he ex-
tolled the valley’s “benign temperature and abundant food.” 42 His ac-
count, however, demonstrates a limited knowledge of the region; he
named only a few of the larger towns found on colonial maps and de-
scribed the challenging topography more than political geography. He
observed that the rebels didn’t take full advantage of the narrow passes
and deep canyons. Although this seemed to surprise him, he generally
minimized the rebels’ talent and intelligence, stressing instead, when
recognizing their military prowess, Indians’ supposed bloodthirsty na-
ture and blind devotion to Tupac Amaru. Del Valle mentioned that the
rebels attacked “from the left and the right” and surrounded them at
night, peppering the royalist camp with light cannons and fusils.
Del Valle’s troops encircled Quiquijana, a rebel stronghold. He ini-
tially calculated that it would take fifteen days and much bloodshed to
take the town, but Quiquijana’s parish priest got a note through to him
that the rebels had fled to join Tupac Amaru elsewhere. Royalist troops
entered the town and found only women and the elderly cowering in the
church. They tearfully begged del Valle for a pardon, pleading that he
not torch their houses and haciendas. The Spanish commander hanged
Luis Pomainga, a distant relative of Tupac Amaru and another sus-

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pected rebel. Del Valle belittled the indigenous population, contending

that “in the hands of a more educated nation, conquering the town
would have taken two months even with veteran and abundant sol-
diers,” whereas he marched in unopposed.43
The fighting in late March frustrated Tupac Amaru. In several letters,
he sneered that the royalists fled like cowards. Pucacasa also made him
overconfident—he had been close to decimating del Valle’s column. Con-
cerned about other areas, the rebel leader sent troops to aid Tomás Parvina
and Felipe Miguel Bermúdez in Chumbivilcas, Diego Verdejo in Cailloma,
and Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, his cousin, in Urubamba. Ramón
Ponce and Vilca Apaza confronted royalists around Puno. The bulk of his
forces retreated to Quiquijana and then Combapata, just north of Tinta,
where they reinforced a wall and trenches to hold off the Spanish.44
In March, Parvina, one of Tupac Amaru’s most trusted commanders,
moved his troops into Chumbivilcas. This towering province had been a
rebel stronghold. Tupac Amaru worried about the extreme use of vio-
lence by both sides, and also feared losing it. On March 13, he sent a de-
cree to the area, expressing his concern about “many excesses, everyone
killing each other, with Spaniards and Indians hurting one another.” 45
He demanded that they live in peace, “as God orders,” threatening death
at the gallows for those who didn’t obey. Once there, Parvina warned his
followers about the grave consequences of desertion, and allowed them
to ransack the property of those he considered deserters. He and Felipe
Bermúdez confronted the royalist column led by Francisco Laisequilla.
On March 21, Spanish forces pushed the rebels, who were virtually out
of guns and ammunition, into a final defense near the town of Santo
Tomás. Del Valle described Parvina and Bermúdez’s courage as they died
fighting, below their cannon, the only significant weapon they had. Del
Valle calculated that the rebels had five thousand to six thousand men
and that the royalists executed over one thousand of them. To save am-
munition, they stabbed them to death. At this point in the uprising, body
counts had jumped from dozens to thousands. We know nothing about
the identity of the dead rebels or their remains. On March 31, royalists
paraded into Cuzco with Parvina’s and Bermúdez’s heads on pikes, dis-
playing these grisly trophies of victory in the Plaza Mayor and then in
the paths that led to Cuzco.46 The royalists had begun to slaughter all
captives and to show off severed heads and other body parts. The use and
display of violence was changing on both sides.

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Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas lost two important command-

ers in an area that had been considered a rebel stronghold. Yet the roy-
alists also had reason to worry. On April 6, Visitador Areche complained
that Chumbivilcas “is more agitated and rebel than ever.” He lamented
that not only had its only judge and some priests fled, but the royalist
officials and parish priests who remained had been at odds, “everyone
just defending their own interests.” 47
Amid the bloody battles of late March, chaos and uncertainty reigned
from Cuzco to Puno and into Upper Peru. Each side stressed the oppo-
nent’s weaknesses and confusion. Del Valle wrote, for example, on
March 19, that “We hear that this damned man [Tupac Amaru]’s own
house is in disarray with grief; that his wife won’t stop crying, that Diego
is suffering from extreme melancholy, and that in Tinta, where he’s
based and where they’ve built trenches for reinforcements, the twelve
hundred soldiers protecting him are eager to turn him over or kill him,
as soon as our troops approach.” 48 Violence and retribution caused the
situation to deteriorate. One Spanish prisoner claimed that a rebel com-
mander had sent Micaela Bastidas the heads of a woman and a young
boy as trophies of his deeds.49 At the same time, reports from the far
south, the Collao, maintained that the rebels were “thoroughly defeated”;
troubling rumors also spread that Tupac Amaru was headed south to re-
group in the Lake Titicaca area.50 Violence escalated. Rebel leaders strug-
gled to control their troops. Antonio Bastidas wrote his sister Micaela in
mid-February that after they entered the town of Urcos, his “Indians”
destroyed houses and burned down the city hall. Indicative of the short-
age of supplies faced by both sides, he requested coca leaves and alcohol,
“the two things that keep our army going.” He also asked for charqui,
llama jerky—the English term comes from Quechua— and wheat to pay
his troops.51 Royalists executed prisoners en masse, dryly noting the
deaths of hundreds or thousands of men, or punished them brutally. For
example, the troops led by Laisequilla who had defeated Parvina en-
countered thirty-eight men on a hillside. They sent a local man to con-
vince them to give up but he was received with a volley of rocks. The
royalists charged the hill and captured the group. They whipped those
“they caught alive” and sliced off pieces of their ears to make a “perma-
nent mark of their iniquity and rebelliousness.”52 This distressing in-
crease in the level of brutality did not reflect the opponents’ supposed
traditions (European cruelty or Indian barbarism) as much as the spiral-

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ing of violence and the conversion of the enemy into a wretched “other”
seen as deserving abuse and death. As was the case in other rebellions
and wars, as casualties and mortalities mounted, combatants on both
sides sought revenge (and the upper hand) and employed increasingly
brutal tactics not seen in the initial combats. Desperation and hatred
deepened and each side killed captives and desecrated cadavers. This fer-
vor fed into and fostered each side’s understanding of the other as non-
Christians or savages, interpretations that justified greater violence.
In the midst of this violence and chaos, Tupac Amaru and Visitador
Areche wrote one another, seeking to explain their plans and, perhaps,
negotiate some sort of accord. Their correspondence resembled a chess
match, as each side tried to inflate its base and narrow that of the en-
emy. Tupac Amaru insisted that he was only fighting against evil Span-
iards while Areche cast the rebels as a small, aberrant band of violent
apostates who would soon be annihilated. Although propaganda pieces,
the letters shed light on both sides and the state of affairs in early 1781.
David and Goliath Correspond
On January 26, Tupac Amaru wrote Father Josef Paredes. He explained

that “European heretics” had been at fault at Sangarará and that he had
actually saved lives. In addition, his Christian faith had stopped him
from taking Cuzco, thus saving it and its numerous churches, monas-
teries, and convents from destruction. He insisted that Bishop Moscoso
erred in pitting the church against him and reiterated his proposal to
abolish the reparto, mita, customs houses, and sales tax, arguing that
exploitative corregidors not only mistreated Indians but also prevented
them from being good Christians. He ridiculed royalists’ confidence in
support from Lima, scoffing “I’ve been in that Audiencia and I’ve seen
that the only thing they’re good for is killing Jews and wolfing down
corn pudding [mazamorras] . . . they also excel at delaying lawsuits and
living off the blood of the poor, which is what happened to me.”53 He
insisted that he had only killed Arriaga, no one else, and signed off as
“the last descendent of the last King of Peru, his last heir.”54 He would
continue this line of argument in his correspondence with the visitador.
On March 5, Tupac Amaru sent Areche a long (twenty-eight para-
graph) letter with a prisoner, the priest Rafael José Sahuaraura Titu
Atauchi. Sahuaraura’s brother, Pedro Sahuaraura Ramos Titu Atauchi,

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a kuraka, had died in Sangarará.55 Tupac Amaru later claimed that his
scribe, Francisco Cisneros, a member of his inner circle, Felipe Bermú-
dez, and Sahuaraura himself had helped him write it.56 José Gabriel
began with a respectful, even obsequious, tone and then explained that
after Arriaga’s death, he went to Cuzco to fulfi ll “His Majesty’s wishes,”
referring to the Spanish king, and withdrew in order to avoid blood-
shed. He did not mention his prior foray to the south or his violent ac-
tions. José Gabriel claimed that he wanted to avoid the examples of the
Roman emperor Vespasian and his son Titus regarding the siege of Je-
rusalem. With this, the rebel leader made it clear that he did not want
Cuzco to be sacked. Turning to the Old Testament, he cited King Saul,
whose defeat and death at the hands of the Philistines at Mount Gilboa
crippled the kingdom of Israel, and compared his own struggle against
the Spanish with that of David and Goliath.57
Tupac Amaru described in great detail how corregidors oversaw a
corrupt web of activities that ignored both Spanish law and Indian
well-being. After expounding on brutal conditions in haciendas and
textile mills and how the scant wages prevented Indians from paying
the head tax, he asked who were the true apostates and traitors: Indi-
ans or corregidors?58 Building on a much-discussed theme in the eigh-
teenth century, he complained that priests did not maintain churches
or their own appearance and focused more on charging exorbitant fees
rather than offering Mass itself. Tupac Amaru also grumbled that these
priests “as foreigners don’t know the language [Quechua], this means
that there are twenty-year-old girls and boys who don’t even know how
to cross themselves.” This was an unusual complaint, for rebels rarely
referred to the need for Quechua-speaking priests. Throughout the let-
ter, he stressed his deep Catholicism and made almost no reference
to the brutal war that he and the recipient, Visitador Areche, were
waging.59
On March 5, 1781, Areche published his decree offering a pardon for
most insurgents and a reward for those who helped capture the upris-
ing’s leaders. He described the rebellion’s sacrilegious nature and de-
structive ways, and explained its mass following in terms of the leaders’
“vain, unjust, and damned” promises to naïve followers as well as in-
timidation through threats and punishment. He demanded that the de-
cree be published in Quechua and Spanish and posted in “every town
and place possible.”60

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On March 12, the day he received Tupac Amaru’s letter, Areche

sent two priests with his response. One of them, Fernando Ramos Titu
Atauchi, Rafael José Sahuaraura’s uncle, read it out loud to José Gabriel,
Micaela, their two sons Hipólito and Fernando, and Diego Cristóbal. It
angered Tupac Amaru so much that he had the two messengers ar-
rested.61 In contrast to most colonial documents that begin with a para-
graph of formulaic salutations, it opens in unusually straightforward
fashion: “I have just read the extensive letter that Your Honor sent me
on the fi fth of this month that sought to convince me that you would
stop hostilities if I were to take certain measures.” He chided Tupac
Amaru for casting the rebellion as justifiable.62 Areche argued that Tu-
pac Amaru was disingenuous or naïve not to recognize the gravity of
his crimes and then contended that he, the visitador, and the colonial
system in general, did all it could to improve the lot of Indians. In fact,
he used a classic bureaucratic line in reference to corregidors’ abusive
behavior: “it was about to be fi xed” (estava cerca de remediarse). He ridi-
culed Tupac Amaru’s declaration that he had royal powers to punish
corregidors and to take other measures and stressed that the rebel
leader had committed murder in the case of Corregidor Arriaga. He
pleaded with God to show Tupac Amaru “his great crimes, to feel the
blows, the calamities, the assaults, the destruction, and sacrilegious
acts that he and his people have committed against the Church (santu-
ario), these destroyed provinces, and obedience to the king.”63 Never
losing an amicable yet cold or condescending tone, he demanded that
Tupac Amaru turn himself in to avoid more bloodshed and dishonor.64
Tupac Amaru considered the letter “delirious.” Commander del Valle,
who found himself increasingly at odds with Areche, also questioned its
tone, believing that it voided any possibility of a negotiated solution.65
This correspondence gave little hint of the warfare raging south of
Cuzco. Little is known about the circulation of the letters other than
the obvious fact that Areche received Tupac Amaru’s, but both writ-
ers sought to present their movement in the best light, attract the sup-
port of the opposition, and test the resolve of the other. They also
fi rmly believed in their prerogatives: Tupac Amaru as the defender of
the indigenous masses and heir of the Incas, Areche as the maximum
representative of the Spanish, alongside (above, in his eyes) the vice-
roy. They both prided themselves on their intellect and leadership
abilities. Supporters in both camps presumably wondered if writing

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long letters was the best use of their time in light of the almost inces-
sant fighting.
Areche’s correspondence also reflected how much Andean people
and topography exasperated him. On March 1, before leaving Cuzco,
he wrote Gálvez in Madrid that Indians believed that the rebellion
“would mean the end of the church, priests, the head tax, corregidors,
repartimientos, obrajes, mitas, customs houses, and chapetones and Euro-
peans. They also think that if they die in the action of crowning [the
Inca], they will resuscitate on the third day.”66 To Areche, the end of
Spanish rule and resurrection were equally absurd beliefs. Although he
noted mass desertions on the rebel side and the increasing reliance on
coercion—hangings and beheadings—to maintain discipline, clear signs
for him of rebel decline, he glumly reported Indians’ primitive Catholi-
cism and deep— but for him, false—memory of the Incas, “forgetting
the oppression they suffered under them.” In his mind, Indians’ shal-
low religiosity and reverence for the Incas would make them difficult to
defeat or to assimilate. Areche explained his shock and disappointment
with the widespread use of Quechua: “It pains me deeply to walk this
land without understanding what is spoken to me, despite the king’s
repeated insistence that the natives be taught Spanish.”67 Only a bloody
uprising forced a high crown official to visit the Andean hinterland and
experience multilingual Peru. Areche not only censured Indians’ ele-
mentary Christianity and Spanish, but also blamed lax policies in Lima,
specifically the viceroy’s inability to crush “insolent malcontents” as
well as those who refused to pay the royal treasury. Areche’s dislike for
Viceroy Jáuregui and his fervent opposition to Quechua, linked to the
belief that Spanish language and culture had to be imposed in the An-
des, marked the struggles within the Spanish camp and disagreements
over policy in the coming months and years.
Capture
Del Valle’s retreat from Pucacasa frustrated Tupac Amaru— he thought

that he had been on the verge of routing the Spanish. It also led him to
believe that the royalists were vulnerable, their numbers and organiza-
tion neutralized by topography, weather, and guerrilla tactics. This led
him to send troops to Chumbivilcas, Cailloma, and Urubamba.68 Yet
the Spanish were hot on their heels. After delays crossing the river in

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Urcos and waiting for the last columns to approach from Cuzco, in late
March royalist forces moved down the valley toward rebel headquarters.
Rebel forces led by Tupac Amaru harassed the Spanish with hit-and-run
attacks, artillery fire, and their one mobile cannon, from Urcos to Com-
bapata. The fifth royalist column, which had pushed to the southwest,
confronted rebels in Paruro, Cotabambas, and the upper provinces, de-
feating and killing Parvina and Bermúdez. After skirmishes in Paruro,
the fourth column joined it.
In late March, as snow and hail began to fall in the higher peaks, the
royalists pushed closer and closer to the rebel base north of Tinta, in the
hills just above the valley where the Salca River feeds into the Vilca-
nota. They recognized that they were outnumbered but also knew, from
deserters, that the insurgents were running low on supplies. Pumaca-
hua’s troops dislodged the rebels from advantageous positions on the
mountainside. On April 4, the royalist second column led by Lieutenant
Colonel Villalta arrived, converging with del Valle’s column. That night,
the rebels attacked Villalta’s column, beheading four sentinels. A fifth
fired his gun and the suddenly awakened royalists rushed into battle
formation. Del Valle, however, ordered that they lie on the ground to
lure the enemy into range. Once the rebel front line was almost on top
of the hail-covered soldiers, the royalists shot their muskets in unison,
killing many and causing the survivors to flee. The rebels left behind
their five cannons.69 In open battle on relatively open, flat ground with-
out the element of surprise working for the rebels, the royalists now had
the advantage. Using their superior cavalry and weaponry, the colonial
forces attacked, moving quickly to surround the insurgents and force
them into the valley. Perhaps a deserter had informed them of the rebels’
strength and exact location.70 A charge by black militia members again
broke the rebel lines and gunshots left “an infi nite number of wounded”
and hundreds dead.71 The royalists were on the offensive.
According to one report, the horrific bloodshed and the loss of can-
nons, weapons, and other supplies stunned Tupac Amaru, who was in
the midst of his troops.72 He raced on horseback and plunged into the
Vilcanota/Combapata River to save himself, nearly drowning. Royalists
took hours to cross the river— the rebels had destroyed the bridge— and
del Valle claimed that Tupac Amaru wrote a frenzied note to Micaela:
“Many brave soldiers are coming after us; we have no alternative but
to die.”73

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The bulk of the royalist troops came through Combapata, where the
rebels had built their fort. Del Valle used five cannons and gunfire to
destroy the wall that the rebels had constructed, forcing the insurgents to
flee. Other than seven prisoners, del Valle found Tinta deserted. Among
the rebel leader’s belongings, they discovered a portrait of Tupac Amaru
on horseback in the midst of the Sangarará victory that Tupac Amaru or
Micaela had commissioned. To the consternation of authorities in Cuzco
and generations of historians, the royalists destroyed the painting,74
Enticed by the promise of a significant reward, royalists rushed south
after the rebel leaders. On April 7, soldiers trapped Micaela, two of her
sons, Hipólito and Fernando, and other family members as they sought
to escape toward La Paz via Livitaca. In hindsight, Micaela had waited
too long for Tupac Amaru. Some accounts claim that their decision to
take valuable but heavy treasure such as gold and silver delayed their
departure from Tinta and slowed down their escape. Micaela admitted
having three pairs of earrings, eleven rings, golden buckles, a golden
necklace, bits of gold, 600 pesos (en plata sellada), four boxes of gold, “a lot
of” silver, and clothing and textiles. The Spanish believed she hid much
more.75
Separated from Micaela since the March battles, Tupac Amaru fled to
Langui, the area south of rebel headquarters that they had always pro-
jected as their escape route. In Langui, Ventura Landaeta, one of Tupac
Amaru’s followers, insisted that he rest before continuing his retreat. He
also urged Tupac Amaru to stay and resist rather than run. Tupac Amaru
realized too late that it was a ruse. Landaeta and another traitor, Fran-
cisco Santa Cruz, restrained him with the aid of local women and the
local priest, Antonio Martínez, until mulatto militiamen, who had
tracked him since his escape in the Vilcanota River, seized him. Tupac
Amaru offered 200,000 pesos for his freedom but to no avail. The soldiers
quickly tied up the rebel leader.76 Just weeks after having nearly routed
the royalists in the snowy peaks, Tupac Amaru was now in shackles.
A well-armed battalion transferred Tupac Amaru and about thirty
prisoners— the estimates vary— to Tinta. Authorities hanged at least
sixty-seven prisoners, lower-level followers, in the following days. Ter-
rified Indians watched these grisly rituals, praying to be incorporated
in the general pardon promised by royalist leaders.77 Royalists killed
hundreds and perhaps thousands more— the number cannot be veri-
fied. The execution of Indians rarely left a paper trail, particularly in

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the towns outside of the Vilcanota Valley. Unlike del Valle and Areche,
who had to inform Cuzco, Lima, and Madrid of their actions, lesser
commanders did not send formal reports and were disinclined to detail
the slaughter of the enemy. Spanish forces seized weapons, ammuni-
tion, food, silver, and items reportedly taken from churches in Langui
and Tinta. Rumors lingered for years about a hidden treasure of gold
and silver.78 Del Valle calculated that he had seized two trunks full of
papers, providing Areche “all you need to fi nd out about the origin of
this raucous uprising.” One commentator wryly noted that these
sources might make his accomplices in the city of Cuzco “lose sleep.”79
On April 8, Tupac Amaru wrote letters from Tinta to his cousin Diego
Cristóbal, Andrés Mendigure, and other commanders asking them to
turn over their arms and to trust del Valle. Few believed in his sincerity
and although common indigenous people turned themselves in, claim-
ing they had nothing to do with the uprising or had been forced to fight,
rebel officers did not fall for the trap.80 Rumors arrived that Diego Cris-
tóbal would attempt to rescue his uncle in the road from Urcos to Cuzco
and royalists reinforced the substantial and heavily armed troops that
watched over their prize captives, all of whom had their arms and legs
tied and chained. On April 14, with Visitador Areche in the lead, the
convoy reached Cuzco. The city, “crazy with happiness,” had been cele-
brating for days. Around the clock church bells helped spread the news.81
Behind royalist euphoria, however, lay trouble. Rebels sneaked into Che-
cacupe after it had been taken by the royalists, killing the local priest,
Spaniards, and women and children who apparently supported the
Spanish.82 The Spanish would greatly regret that Diego Cristóbal, Andrés
Mendigure, and Mariano Tupac Amaru had not been captured. The re-
bellion was not over. Moreover, Areche sought to prevent del Valle from
taking credit for the capture and these two rivals increasingly clashed. In
the months to come, infighting would develop into a broader split be-
tween moderates, who sought negotiations with the rebels, and hard-
liners, who believed exterminating the enemy and Andean culture was
the only solution. This clash would shape not only the outcome of the
rebellion but also the nature and fate of Spanish rule in Peru.

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7
Torment
T H E T R I A L A N D EX ECU T ION of Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, and

their inner circle combined the administrative formality that marked
Spanish-American justice and the public cruelty that characterized early
modern Europe. Overseen by Areche and the newly arrived Visitador
Benito Mata Linares, two hard-liners who would cast a long shadow
on Cuzco and Peru in the coming years, the trial sought to obtain as
much information as possible about the rebellion and to intimidate the
rebels’ followers, real or potential. The Spanish also wanted revenge.
They executed the prisoners in brutal fashion in front of thousands, in-
tending for the spectacle to discourage the indigenous population from
further subversion. In addition, they sought to erase the memory of the
uprising, its leaders, and the movement’s ideas, as symbolized in the
burning of their bodies and the dumping of the ashes into the Huatanay
River.
These were formidable and perhaps contradictory objectives. The
ritual was ghastly and shocked the region. Yet while it certainly intimi-
dated, it failed to silence or make people forget. For many people in
Cuzco, past and present, the May 17 execution converted the rebels
into martyrs rather than ignored apostates and criminals. If Areche
and Mata Linares believed that the execution and those executed would
be forgotten after 1781, they were wrong. Even Peruvians with a foggy
notion of national history have heard of the execution. Today plaques
from the Rotary Club and from Cuzco’s municipality mark the location
of the execution in the bustling Plaza de Armas.

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Seeing My Countrymen and Women Distressed,

Mistreated, Persecuted
Colonial authorities followed standard legal practice, although taking spe-

cial steps because of the significance of the rebel leaders and the perceived
threat that sympathizers might attempt to free the prisoners. Areche had
gone to great lengths to assure the prisoners’ arrival in Cuzco, worried
about the rumors that Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru and Mariano Tu-
pac Amaru would attack. Areche met the convoy in Urcos, seeking to
claim credit for the capture. On April 14, with most of the main streets
of Cuzco shut off and closely guarded, the prisoners reached the Plaza
Mayor. Tupac Amaru, chained to a mule, his ankles shackled and his
arms tied behind his back, wore a velvet gown and a cross, as though
part of an auto-da-fé. His family members were instructed to say good-
bye to one another—they would not see each other again until the exe-
cution, as he and his son Hipólito were kept in isolation.1 Micaela re-
portedly cried. A realist, she had always understood the danger they
faced and knew that the Spanish would treat them harshly.2 Tupac
Amaru remained in a cell adjacent to the Plaza Mayor, in what had been
part of the Jesuit holdings, while the rest of the prisoners were sent to
the former San Francisco de Borja School, which had been converted
into a jail, military headquarters, and at this point a courthouse.
Areche and Mata Linares relied on ten local scribes and notaries to
organize the information and to keep precise records. They called upon
Cuzco lawyers to aid them and to serve as defense attorneys. Despite
hundreds of testimonies and the review of thousands of documents, as
well as complex legal debates about matters such as whether the death
penalty could be applied to minors and whether Indians required dif-
ferent legal procedures, they moved quickly. They handed down ver-
dicts for the nine principal defendants in a month and for the sixty-
nine others in less than three months. More than a hundred prisoners
were released without trial.3
Clearly, Tupac Amaru was the centerpiece and Micaela Bastidas an
important second. Prosecutors scrutinized the documentation found in
Tinta and elsewhere and also brought in dozens of witnesses and forced
defendants to testify against one another, the careo. The Spaniards and
creoles who served as Tupac Amaru’s scribes, discussed in Chapter 3,
played a particularly important role. Royalists trusted the testimony

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of these creoles and Spaniards while these defendants themselves

desperately sought to counter accusations that they had willingly aided
the rebellion. The trial against Tupac Amaru, found in the famous legajo
33-Cuzco in Seville’s Archivo de Indias and fully transcribed in the Colec-
ción documental del bicentenario de la revolución emancipadora Tupac Amaru
(Document Collection for the Bicentennial of the Emancipating Revolu-
tion of Tupac Amaru), begins with documents announcing his capture
and the testimony dating from April 17 of Francisco Molina, Francisco
Cisneros, and other scribes and advisors. The trial material includes his
correspondence and decrees found on the rebels or elsewhere. Prosecu-
tors added documentation as it came to their attention, breaking the strict
chronological organization. Just as historians would do in the following
centuries, the prosecuting team pored over all of the correspondence to
and from Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas to find out who supported
the rebellion as well as its geographical extension and motives.
Mata Linares cross-examined Tupac Amaru on April 19. The defen-
dant identified himself as from Surimana, married to Micaela Bastidas,
the noble Indian kuraka of Pampamarca in charge of the jurisdiction of
Pampamarca, Tungasuca, and Surimana. He immediately denied that
“he had gone against the king or his Crown.” Tupac Amaru described his
conflicts with several corregidors and admitted his great frustration with
them. He had asked several of these authorities what would happen if the
reparto were abolished and they answered glibly, “You would all have
your head tax, the tribute, doubled.” In other words, even if the Spanish
freed Indians from one levy, the reparto, they would compensate by in-
creasing another. He admitted that this exchange had led him to com-
plain to his wife, “What good is it for me to be Tupac Amaro if we can’t
do anything for our countrymen [paisanos]?” 4 Mata Linares immediately
asked him what he meant by this and Tupac Amaru rambled, “If the
kingdom were a hacienda and I had rights to it, and there were Indians
on it and I saw them treated badly, it would be necessary, as a descendent
of the Incas, to defend them so they are no longer treated badly; as such,
seeing my countrymen and women distressed, mistreated, persecuted, I
believed it was my obligation to defend them, to see if I could lead them
out of this oppression.”5
Mata Linares then asked him why he believed himself a legitimate
descendent of the Incas, who gave him this right, to which he responded
the Audiencia or high court. Mata Linares rebuked him, charging that

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the Audiencia had made no such declaration. The questions continued

on April 20 and, after taking Saturday the 21st off, concluded on the
22nd. Tupac Amaru remained evasive, providing names already known
by the Spanish and vague answers about with whom he had planned the
uprising and for how long. When Mata Linares accused him of chal-
lenging the king’s troops, taking the law into his own hands, killing
Spaniards, and committing other crimes, Tupac Amaru insisted that he
was simply defending Indians.6
On April 21, Areche received a report from royalist commanders Do-
mingo Guerra and José Acuña in Tinta. Promising “their best efforts in
inquiring about the frenetic and audacious caudillo,” they included de-
tailed a list found in Felipe Bermudez’s house of “Spaniards in this Prov-
ince.” They also included their own list of the dead, captured, and still-at-
large rebel leaders.7 The list of Spaniards indicated that the rebels had
done intelligence work, tracking which Spaniards remained near Tinta.
The latter list cited twelve dead, four prisoners, and approximately fifty
“still to be captured” by the rebels. Prosecutors incorporated documents
as they arrived.
On the 27th, the face-to-face confrontations with witnesses began.
The prosecutor asked them repeatedly how long Tupac Amaru had
planned the uprising and with whom, seeking information about his
allies in Lima and Cuzco. Tupac Amaru remained vague throughout the
one-month trial and while acknowledging his lawsuit in the Lima high
court and his acquaintance with people across the viceroyalty, he did
not confirm a long-brewing conspiracy or the support of others. He re-
fused to implicate people not already arrested or clearly associated with
him and insisted that his struggle sought to aid the King of Spain by
correcting injustices that corrupt officials participated in or abetted.8
At midday on April 27, a desperate Tupac Amaru wrote a note in his
own blood on a small piece of fabric from the lining of his shirt. He
gave it to the guard with instructions to get it to lieutenant José Casildo.
The note asked for a fi le to remove his shackles. He believed that once
unshackled, if he made it to the yard, the people of Cuzco would come to
his rescue. He estimated that he could then take the city in two hours.9
He offered the guards on duty magnificent bribes of gold and silver
(nineteen large bags or zurrones of silver and ten arrobas, a total of over
two hundred fi fty pounds, of gold), hidden in an estate outside of Tinta
that only he could fi nd— the two men who had helped him bury the

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treasure, he claimed, were dead. He asked that they help rouse royalist
soldiers from Huamanga (an Andean area between Cuzco and Lima)
stationed in Cuzco, who might be convinced to aid his escape. Tupac
Amaru tried to sway the guards by insisting that his first targets would
be Visitador Areche, their commander, and the other “lying señores” of
the barracks.10 The guard, who could not read the note—it was barely
legible and he was presumably illiterate—told his commander and the
following day Mata Linares interrogated Tupac Amaru about it. The pris-
oner acknowledged the letter but denied that he had threatened Areche
and other Spaniards. That day, Tupac Amaru consistently irritated Mata
Linares by rejecting the major charges against him.
Frustrated that Tupac Amaru would not incriminate himself and
others for subversion, hom icide, theft, and other charges, and perhaps
concerned about further escape ploys, Mata Linares ordered on April
28 that he be tortured, el tormento de garrucha. While authorities rou-
tinely hit and underfed prisoners, they had never put to use such an
elaborate device. In the pulley torture or strappado, victims are sus-
pended from a pulley on the ceiling via a rope attached to their wrists,
their arms tied behind their backs. They are dropped and lifted, weights
suspended from their legs adding to the agony. Developed by the medi-
eval Inquisition, its victims have included Machiavelli and defendants
in the Salem witch trials.11
Garrucha
Elaborate forms of torture such as this were uncommon in highland
Peru. The Inquisition had been at the vanguard of implementing hor-
rific forms of bodily punishment, but the Holy Office did not have juris-
diction over Indians and did not maintain much of a presence outside
of Lima. Its active Lima office focused instead on Jews, Protestants, and
witches. Provincial cities and towns had stocks to punish and humili-
ate, while haciendas and textile mills counted on their own jails, stocks,
and other devices to punish.
The lack of formal torture in Cuzco’s jails does not mean, of course,
that prisoners were not mistreated. Authorities frequently beat prison-
ers and kept them hungry. Tupac Amaru’s half-brother, Juan Bautista,
described his mistreatment. When authorities arrested him, they
jammed his pinkies into the trigger guard of a musket and squeezed the

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trigger until his fi ngers bled. They locked him in a fi lthy cell with com-
mon prisoners and constantly insulted and threatened him. The war-
den encouraged the guards to hit him. As a prisoner, Juan Bautista
Tupac Amaru was always hungry, surviving on bits of rotten meat that
could not be sold at the market.12 Yet even this abusive mistreatment
did not approach the sadistic level of suffering infl icted systematically
on Tupac Amaru.
On April 29, Mata Linares entered Tupac Amaru’s cell. He asked him
to reconsider his refusal to name accomplices in Lima and Cuzco and
those with whom he had corresponded, and then posed more specific
questions: whether it was true that he had been planning the uprising
for five years; whether he had mentioned it when he took confession; if
he spoke out against repartimientos in Lima, fostering rebellion; and
whether Mariano Barrera had written to him about a revolt when he
was in Lima, mentioning that “four provinces are with us and we could
move on to Cuzco and destroy the Spaniards.” Authorities worried that
if the rebellion had roots in Lima—which it did not—it could revive
even after the leaders’ execution. Tupac Amaru only acknowledged that
he had complained to his confessor about corregidors’ “extortions” and
mistreatment of Indians; the priests had instructed him to “leave every-
thing to God.”13 Mata Linares asked him several times to answer the
questions, which Tupac Amaru refused to do, and so the judge declared
that the defendant’s obstinacy forced him to resort to torture. He de-
clared that if Tupac Amaru had a leg or arm broken or if he died, it was
his fault, not Mata Linares’s.
The executioner made Tupac Amaru change into a coarse robe and
tied his legs together and his arms behind his back. He tightly fastened a
thick rope to his wrists and ran it through a pulley on the ceiling. He
attached “one hundred pounds of iron or lead” to his legs and lifted him
about six feet off the ground.14 This puts all the pressure on the prison-
er’s internal shoulder sockets; in most cases, it dislocates them.15 Mata
Linares asked Tupac Amaru again about his accomplices, specifically
people whom he had written in Cuzco, and when he declined to an-
swer, the executioner hoisted him up near the ceiling and dropped him,
catching the slack just before he hit the floor. According to one history
of torture, “the shock to the body, of this suddenly terminated fall, was
sufficient to jar every bone, joint, and nerve in the system. In most cases
it entailed dislocation. The process was repeated again and again until

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the culprit confessed or became unconscious.”16 In the case of Tupac

Amaru, it lasted for half an hour, thirty minutes of excruciating pain.
A clerk transcribed Tupac Amaru’s gut-wrenching screams and pleas
for mercy. Modern torture regimes do not provide such a record. The
moans, entreaties, and brief exclamations indicate a man in paralyzing
agony who could not complete a sentence. It begins: “ay, ay, ay, mercy
Lord, ay, ay, I am lost your lord [vuestra señoría], your lord, ay, ay, no
more, no, ay, more, the Indians for Holy Mary, your lord, your lord, ay,
ay, there is no more, I haven’t dealt with anyone, in the name of Holy
Mary’s rosary, take my life which has to be remedied, for Holy Mary, ay,
your lord will have to reckon with God, your lord for Holy Mary, ay, mer-
ciful one, take my life which I haven’t had. . . .”
This constitutes the first five minutes or so of the torture session.
These pitiful moans and pleas for mercy continued, Tupac Amaru hoisted
up and dropped down repeatedly, until “the clock on the table signaled
that half an hour had passed.”17 Tupac Amaru named no one except
the Virgin Mary, Jesus, and Joseph. The brutal, relentless combination
of the slow lift, the weight fully on his upper body, abrupt free fall, and
sudden stop presumably dislocated both his shoulders and probably
broke some bones. One account sympathetic to the rebels written just a
few years later stressed how Tupac Amaru resisted giving names or ad-
mitting his guilt and snarled at Areche: “You and I are the only ones
guilty for the bloodshed. You for oppressing this kingdom with exces-
sive and new taxes, and I for wanting to liberate it from this tyranny
and humiliation.”18 This account claimed that in a letter, Spanish wit-
nesses to the torture had stated, “It was a pleasure to hear the Indian
Rebel’s bones snap and crunch as the rope twisted.”19
Unimaginable Violence
The questioning continued in early May. The Spanish did not torture
Tupac Amaru or any of the other defendants again.20 Tupac Amaru con-
ceded knowing people with whom he had corresponded, hardly a shock-
ing admission, and acknowledged in vague fashion his long-festering
dislike for corregidors’ exploitation of Indians. He gave prosecutors al-
most no valuable information. Micaela Bastidas used a different tactic.
She claimed that Tupac Amaru told her little about the uprising and
that if she had asked him, he would have told her to “go away” [pasear]

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or have hit her. She stated that he had wanted to strike her several
times and that she was too scared to run away. Later in the trial she
testified that Tupac Amaru abused her verbally and physically, by
whipping, kicking, striking, and slapping her and occasionally tying
her to a post.21 Tupac Amaru contradicted her (probably without know-
ing he was doing so), confirming that he consulted with her and admit-
ting that “It’s certain that before the uprising he sometimes whipped,
slapped, or beat her with a stick, but not once it began.”22 She also stressed
her ignorance and blamed the Spanish and creole scribes for the incrimi-
nating communications. Unfortunately for this line of defense, virtually
every testimony underlined her vigor and skill as a commander and her
leadership of the uprising. Several claimed Bastidas was better or fiercer
than her husband. Francisco Molina said “She gives written and verbal
orders with more rigor than the Rebel”; Manuel Galleguillos testified that
“her orders were stronger than those of her husband and her desire was to
kill all the Spaniards with blood and fire”; according to Mariano Banda,
“She gave more orders than anyone.”23 The documentation—including
dozens of her communications, which she probably dictated to someone
else—and the testimonies contradicted her strategy of casting herself as a
secondary character who was only following the orders of her violent
husband.24 Her defense lawyer requested that she be exempted from the
death penalty, and sent instead to a presidio in Africa.25 He was denied.
With the exception of Hipólito, Micaela and José Gabriel’s son, other de-
fendants denied the charges or blamed coercion. When asked about
whether he sought a rebellion, Hipólito admitted, “It’s true that I have
desired it.”26
One piece of evidence prompted additional questioning in the trial
and has intrigued analysts for centuries. Upon his arrest royalists found
a proclamation in one of Tupac Amaru’s pockets, styling him “Don Jo-
seph the First by the Grace of God, Inca of Peru, Santa Fe, Quito, Bue-
nos Aires and the Continent on these South Seas, Duke of the Superla-
tive, Lord of the Caesars and Amazons, with Dominions in the Great
Paititi, Commissary Distributer of the Divine Piety Inheritance”.27 It
stated that “our council” had ascertained in multiple meetings that the
“kings of Castile have usurped the Crown from me and the dominion
of our people for nearly three centuries,” and have “imposed on our
subjects unbearable burdens of taxes, ser vice, duties, customs, sales tax,
monopolies, land taxes, tithes, and fifths [quintos]. . . . The administration

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of justice always favors those who offer and pay the most.”28 The proc-
lamation called for no taxes to be paid to the “European intruders,”
whereas the priesthood should be “honored” with the tithe and other
payments. It ended by demanding that it be posted in cities, towns, and
villages throughout “his dominion.” The proclamation reached Huaro-
chirí outside of Lima, and New Granada—present-day Colombia. Tupac
Amaru, however, denied writing it. He claimed that Micaela had men-
tioned it to him and thought that it might have come from the mayor of
the town of Marcapata.29 For prosecutors, it was a sign that he sought
“not only to rise up but also to rule this vast kingdom.”30 They added
this charge to the accusations.
Tupac Amaru became ill on May 2— probably from the effects of
the torture days before— and this, as well as his efforts to write sup-
porters and organize an escape, encouraged prosecutors to hurry. They
wanted him alive for the execution. He testified several more times,
stressing his work to defend Indians from the brutal and ultimately un-
Christian ways of corregidors and other authorities.31 José de Saldívar y
Saavedra, an additional prosecutor or fi scal, summarized the charges:
hom icide, parricide— as Arriaga was the paternal authority of the area—
and lèse-majesté, the most heinous form of treason. He noted that these
important captures had not stopped the uprising and that nothing else
could be gained from interrogating Tupac Amaru, who had not pro-
vided useful information “not only in the first interrogation but even
during the garrucha torture session, which, even though among the stron-
gest sessions, had no effect on him. Tenacious in his denial, he did not
confess to any of the accusations.”32
Authorities instructed Tupac Amaru to hire a lawyer for the sen-
tencing phase but when he said he did not have one, they named Miguel
Iturrizarra, a lawyer and priest. The defense attorney requested that
Tupac Amaru be absolved or that the punishment be lightened. Yet Itur-
rizarra recognized the “gravity” of the crimes and did not make a con-
vincing case for leniency. In general, the defense attorneys in all of
these cases did not question whether the defendants were guilty—they
assumed this— but instead sought to gain leniency in the sentencing.33
On May 9, prosecutors accused Tupac Amaru of propagating the
news of his uprising in London and Madrid, via a Jesuit. They referred
to an article published in London on October 6, 1780.34 The Jesuits had
been expelled in 1767 and many subsequently wrote piercing indict-

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ments of Spanish rule from Europe. On October 6, 1780, the Chester

Chronicle and General Advertiser published reports seized from a Spanish
vessel about the uprisings in Arequipa, Cuzco, La Paz, and Potosí in the
early months of 1780. Articles about Tupac Amaru would only surface
in the English press in July 1781.35 The prosecution was correct in point-
ing out the attention to Peru in the English press, but erred in blaming
Tupac Amaru and in contending that the articles were about his rebel-
lion. In the trial, Tupac Amaru continued to deny involvement and failed
to satisfy prosecutors’ quest for the names of more accomplices.
News that Tupac Amaru had again managed to write people in
Cuzco while in jail alarmed Mata Linares and others and set off an-
other inquiry into how he had done it and the nature of these contacts.
The prisoner had bribed two sentinels from the Huamanga division,
Fermín Luque and Lino Santiago, to give him pen and paper and to
deliver his notes. In the hastily written messages, he asked José de Pa-
lacios, Micaela Bastidas’ cousin, for twenty-five pesos. He requested the
same from Marcos Carrillo, apologizing for his penmanship as he had
to write with his left as his right hand “was all broken,” as well as Ber-
nardo Carrillo and Pascual Carvajal. All of them refused to help, no
doubt panic-stricken by the arrival of this tangible evidence of possible
rebel sympathies in the midst of a highly publicized trial where the
threat of a death sentence lingered in the Cuzco air. When confronted
with the evidence, Tupac Amaru claimed that he was trying to get back
money owed to him to have something for his young son Fernando.36
To these fi nal inquiries Mata Linares added the question of whether
Tupac Amaru had promised his Indian followers that they would be
resurrected if they fell as martyrs. Francisco Cisneros confi rmed that
the rebel leader had insisted that they not fear death—he would resur-
rect them.37 On May 14, Tupac Amaru again testified, this time declar-
ing who he owed and who owed him money, and how much. His list
rambled for several pages and included more than thirty people, indi-
cating how the Andean economy, particularly those in his profession as
a muleteer-merchant, relied on credit. He was cash poor but owned
numerous properties. He mentioned two houses in Tungasuca as well
as single houses in Surimana, Cuzco, and Pampamarca. His rural prop-
erties displayed the complexity of the late colonial land tenure system.
These included chacritas or small fields in numerous towns and a small
hacienda (“haciendita”) in Tinta that he had rented out to several people.

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The small fields were essentially access rights while the hacienda pre-
sumably, if it followed the normal pattern for the area, had numerous
liens and mortgages. He owned three hundred mules. He did not sign
this testimony, his last, because of a “disconcerted” wrist.38
On May 15, 1781 Visitador Areche pronounced his sentence. He un-
derlined that Tupac Amaru had led a “rebellion or general uprising by
Indians, mestizos, and other castes” planned for over five years and
initiated throughout the Peruvian viceroyalty and that of Buenos Aires,
with the intention of crowning himself king and liberator of “that type
of inhabitant whom he managed to seduce,” that is, Indians. Areche
accused him of Arriaga’s death and of attempted jailbreaks. Areche in-
sisted on the need for a rapid execution since many Indians were “full
of superstitions, which lead them to think that the death penalty is im-
possible for him due to the high nature of his character, believing him a
descendent of the main line of the Incas, as he called himself, and thus
absolute and natural owner of these dominions.” Areche denounced In-
dians and other members of the “plebian castes” for having joined the
uprising due to their ignorance and naïveté and contended that “their
implacable hatred toward Europeans or even all white faces or pukacunkas
as they call them” led to “devastation, insults, horrors, robberies, deaths,
rapes, unimaginable violence, church desecrations, vilification of Span-
ish officials, and made a mockery of our most important weapon, ex-
communication, as they considered themselves immune or outside its
reach.”39 Areche firmly blamed Tupac Amaru and the leadership but also
berated Indians and other lower-class followers for their foolishness and
distance from Spanish ways, which allowed them to be seduced. In the
coming years, he would attempt to remedy this supposed gap between
the worlds of Europeans and of indigenous people, in brutal fashion.
Areche then detailed how Tupac Amaru had usurped power, de-
clared himself Inca, issued orders in the king’s name, interfered in tax
collection, claimed falsely to protect the Church, imposed the death
penalty, and deceived his followers with the illusion that they would
not die because he could resurrect them. The visitador highlighted Tu-
pac Amaru’s commission of a portrait of himself in Inca regalia with
Sangarará as the backdrop. He bitterly noted:
His pretension of royal descent . . . has made such an impression on the
Indians that they believe him, and as simpletons [en medio de su rudeza]
they wrote and talked to him with the utmost submission and respect,

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treating him as their Lord, Excellency, Royal Highness or Majesty,

coming from various provinces to render him proper obedience and
submission, failing to honor the strict obligations of fidelity and reli-
gion that he, as well as all subjects, should have toward their natural
king. This is clear, painful, and evident proof of the misplaced spirit
with which that miserable class is governed, and also how little they
understand subordination and compliance according to the legitimate
power of our adored sovereign.40
In the eyes of Areche, a dishonest and subversive leader connived to

gain the support of the superstitious and backward masses.
Areche’s prose became more straightforward when he reached the
details of the execution. Executioners would largely follow these pre-
cise, macabre orders. After detailing the horrors to be enacted on Tupac
Amaru and his inner circle’s bodies and the confiscation or destruction
of their property and fields, he ordered that all members of his family be
brought to justice. Some participants had not been captured and many
distant relatives had not participated, some living far away from the
rebel center. However, they would not be freed from punishment. Blood
ties to Tupac Amaru made them guilty.41
Areche pledged a number of measures aimed at eradicating the mem-
ory of the Incas. In fact, his measures went farther than this: they sought
to overturn the mode of government in place in the Andes since the late
sixteenth century, the Toledan Reforms. He prohibited people from claim-
ing descent from the Incas and recommended the abolition of the kurakas
office, the linchpin of colonial rule, calling instead for elected mayors
who knew the Spanish language and customs. He prohibited a long list
of items: “pagan clothes,” stressing the images they contain of the Sun,
the Inca symbol; plays or acts that commemorate the Incas; pututos or
conch trumpets; mourning clothes that mark the passing of “their de-
ceased monarchs”; and the use of Inca in one’s name or signature. To
fulfill this cultural project— a de-Incanization of the indigenous Andean
masses in order to “free them from the hatred that they have against
Spaniards”—he called for schools with strict dress and language codes:
“They shall be given a period of four years for the people to speak flu-
ently or at least be able to make themselves understood and to explain
themselves in Castilian.” 42 He closed by banning the manufacture of
cannons and demanding that those found in haciendas and textile mills
be confiscated, with strict punishment for anyone who disobeyed.43

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The following day Areche pronounced measures aimed at keeping

order before, during, and after the execution. Tallow lamps had to remain
lit outside every house and no groups larger than four men or women
were allowed to congregate. He ordered that his decree be posted through-
out the city.44 In addition, he ordered that in the midst of the execu-
tion, “no talk about a pardon should be heard, or anything else that
could rouse the people.” He threatened that anyone who violated this
decree would be executed, without trial.45 On May 16, Mata Linares
interviewed Tupac Amaru to see if he had anything to add to his “con-
fession.” The prisoner provided no new information and said that he
couldn’t sign the document because of his broken hand.46 Ecclesiastical
authorities lifted the excommunication, allowing the prisoners to take
last rites. It is unclear whether they did.47
Prosecutors also sentenced the creoles and Spaniards accused of hav-
ing passed over to the rebels, examined in Chapter 2. Banda, de la Ma-
drid, Escarcena, and Figueroa fled to Cuzco in January while Cisneros,
Galleguillos, Molina and Ortigoza turned themselves in to the Spanish
in late March or April 1781. All faced long trials. Figueroa stressed that
he had sabotaged the rebels’ arms, putting in bad screws in the mus-
kets, dampening gunpowder, and impairing the cannons whenever he
could. In fact, he took charge of the cannons in the siege of Cuzco and
made sure that they fi red off target. He was the only one absolved. Or-
tigoza was given azotes or lashes and banished to an unnamed foreign
presidio, which meant hard labor, for ten years. The others were ban-
ished from between two to six years. Cisneros could not come up with
the bail money and almost had his sentence increased.48 Areche had
used their testimony in the trials against the rebel leaders but wanted
them out of Cuzco as soon as possible.
The Death Knell of Spanish Rule?
On Friday May 18, executioners led Tupac Amaru and the other pris-
oners out of their cells adjoining the Plaza Mayor, guarded by heavily
armed members of the mulatto and Huamanga militias. One observer
noted that the large crowd in the plaza remained quiet and included no
Indians, “at least in their typical dress; if there were any they were dis-
guised in capes and ponchos.” 49 Perhaps Indians found the ceremony
too excruciating to watch or worried that the crowd could become vio-

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Torment 165
lent and attack them. Workers had erected gallows, at this point guarded
by armed mulattoes. Dressed in canvas sacks used to bring yerba mate
from Paraguay, their hands and feet tied tight, the prisoners were dragged
behind horses, their skin scraping on the cobblestone streets. A town
crier declared, “This is the justice that in the name of the King, our
Lord, don José Antonio de Areche imposes. . . . He who does it, pays for
it [quien tal hace; que tal pague).” Diego Verdejo, Antonio Oblitas (the
black servant who had participated in the hanging of Arriaga and pos-
sibly drew a portrait of Tupac Amaru), Micaela’s brother Antonio Bas-
tidas, and Antonio Castelo were the fi rst victims. They were hanged,
their bodies dumped below the gallows. Francisco Tupac Amaru (José
Gabriel’s uncle) and Hipólito (Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas’s el-
der son) had their tongues severed before they were hanged. Soldiers
forced Micaela and José Gabriel to watch. Tomasa Tito Condemayta, at
one point called Tupac Amaru’s “favorite,” was taken to a low chair in
front of the gallows.50 The executioner attached an iron band to her
neck, a garrote, and tightened it with a crank until she asphyxiated in
excruciating fashion. The metal garrote was a novelty in Cuzco: “it was
made for the occasion and we had never seen one here.”51 She was then
hanged, to confi rm her death.
Micaela was then led to the gallows. Executioners slashed her
tongue— some claim that she would not open her mouth and only after
her death was it cut. They then strapped her into the garrote. According
to one account, her neck was too thin for the garrote to work so the
executioners instead strangled her with a rope and kicked her until her
death. While historians disagree about the execution technique, every-
one agrees that it was agony.52
José Gabriel was forced to watch. Executioners then led him to the
gallows and cut his tongue. They tied his limbs to four horses in order
for him to be quartered, “a spectacle never seen before in this city.”53
The horses pushed toward the plaza’s four corners but Tupac Amaru’s
arms and legs did not separate from his torso. Frustrated, Areche or-
dered him beheaded. His youngest son, Fernando, screamed as his wit-
nessed his father’s agony. In the words of the English geographer and
traveler Clements Markham, who visited Peru numerous times in the
mid-nineteenth century, Fernando “uttered a heart rending shriek, the
knell of which continued to ring in the ears of those who heard it to their
dying day. It was the death knell of Spanish rule in South America.”54

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Even the most hardened royalist must have shuddered at this scene.
The boy was made to pass by the gallows and gaze at the bloody, severed
cadaver. His age saved him from the death sentence—he was ten. One
witness described a sudden gust of wind and a downpour that made
people take cover when Tupac Amaru expired. The observer continued,
“this is why Indians say that heaven and the elements felt the death of
the Inca whom the inhuman and impious Spaniards were killing with
such cruelty.”55
The executioners detached the heads and limbs from all of the dead.
They burned José Gabriel and Micaela’s torsos in a bonfi re on the Pic-
chu hill and dumped the ashes into the Huatanay River. Areche had
precise plans how to distribute the body parts, using them as a grisly
warning about the danger of sedition. Tungasuca received an arm from
Tupac Amaru and one from Micaela as well as Hipólito Tupac Amaru’s
head; Tinta, Tupac Amaru’s head; Pampamarca an arm from Antonio
Bastidas; Surimana, an arm from Castelo, whose other arm was sent to
Pampamarca.56
The Second Stage
In the bloody spectacle, executioners tortured and annihilated the bod-

ies of the rebel inner circle. They aimed to demonstrate to the thousands
present and the multitude of people who would hear about it or see the
body parts the high cost of subversion and the extermination of the
leadership. Areche’s sentence also promised a vast campaign against the
Andean culture rooted in the Quechua language and the memory of the
Incas. With the ghoulish executions, Areche sought to disseminate the
idea that the rebellion was fi nished, that the royalists had won.57 Yet the
authorities knew that not only had they been fortunate in capturing
these leaders but that the uprising was far from over. Diego Cristóbal,
Mariano Tupac Amaru, and Andrés Mendigure moved their forces to
the south, abandoning the more conciliatory tactics of Micaela Bastidas
and José Gabriel Tupac Amaru, who consistently sought to gain support
of middle sectors and the Church and thus hemmed in violence. This
concern did not burden the second wave of leaders.
In addition, the rebellion had set an example and broken historic
but fragile codes of agreement and repression. Indians in small towns
began to resist authorities while others attacked more affluent villas.

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Torment 167
Some presumably understood the executions as proof that they should

fight until their death, that they had no possibility of surviving Spanish
justice. By May 1781, while the new leaders coordinated attacks and
oversaw insurgent strategy, rebel followers took an increasingly indepen-
dent path, feeling less obliged to follow orders. They often took matters
into their own hands; violence surged from below. Despite Areche and
Mata Linares’ best efforts, the gruesome ritual on May 18 was not a con-
clusion but the beginning of a bloodier and even more confusing stage.

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8
The Other Side of the Lake
R OYA L ISTS CEL EBR AT EDthe gruesome death of the rebellion’s lead-
ers. Many people in the city of Cuzco believed that the bloody ex-
ecutions meant the end of the uprising. They realized that some of Tu-
pac Amaru’s family had escaped, but remained confident that they
would be captured or simply slip away into the jungle and abandon the
struggle. This would not be the case. And troubling news also arrived
from the far south, the Lake Titicaca area and the Collao. There, a series
of uprisings had upended Spanish rule. Indigenous rebels threatened
much of Charcas (part of present-day Bolivia), and the violence began
to spread into Peru through the Titicaca area. While many in Lima and
Cuzco rejoiced at the death of the rebel leaders, informed royalists
knew that the Upper Peruvian uprisings could extend into Peru. In May
1781, peace was not at hand.
Royalists worried that the rebellion could paralyze Charcas, cutting
off Peru from the La Plata Viceroyalty, including the Potosí silver mines,
and the Pacific from the Atlantic Ocean. Or worse, the rebels in the
Collao could unite with the followers of Tupac Amaru, igniting a strug-
gle that would immediately stretch from Cuzco to Potosí, and poten-
tially much farther. But it was not only the extent of the uprisings but
also the nature of the aggression that was troubling. News reached
Cuzco about beheadings, punctured eyes, abused corpses, and other
“butchery” by bloodthirsty insurgents who sought to exterminate all
Europeans. Building on centuries of obnoxious interpretations of In-
dian “depravity,” these reports perhaps exaggerated. Nonetheless, the
rebels in Upper Peru and the area around Lake Titicaca showed little of
the restraint that José Gabriel and Micaela had managed to impose on

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The Other Side of the Lake 169
their followers near Cuzco. The prospect of an increasingly bloody and

protracted total war, bolstered by an alliance between the Tupac Amaru
forces and the Kataristas, terrified royalists. The astounding, violent
events taking place in Upper Peru must be understood in order to com-
prehend the Tupac Amaru movement.
The Kataristas
From late 1780 until well into 1782, the Tupac Amaru and Katarista
revolutionaries made intermittent efforts to unite, an alliance that royal-
ists sought to prevent at all costs. The efforts to create a Tupac Amaru–
Katarista coalition loom large in most accounts of the Tupac Amaru up-
rising, including this one.1 While the uprising in Peru can be spoken of
in the singular, the Tupac Amaru Rebellion, Charcas was the site of
several related but not unified rebellions. In the Chayanta area of north-
ern Potosí, tensions between Indians and authorities escalated in the late
1770s. Indians increasingly questioned their kurakas, corregidors, and
priests, underlining their corruption and declining legitimacy in local
society. In 1778, Tomás Katari, a humble Aymara from the Chayanta
area, argued these points in the name of the Macha village in the Buenos
Aires high court. Just like José Gabriel after his bitter experience in
Lima, Katari returned home disillusioned with the colonial legal system.
The nonviolent struggle stalemated and what had first been a negotiation
and then a court battle became an increasingly violent revolt in 1780,
just when events near Cuzco were boiling over into a mass uprising.2
On his return from Buenos Aires, Katari was imprisoned, freed by
angry villagers, and imprisoned again. On August 26, 1780, Indians
from throughout the region stormed the town of Pocoata and seized
the corregidor, Joaquín Alós, whom they exchanged for Katari. Late 1780
saw a unique period of indigenous self-rule in Chayanta as Katari and
his followers reinvented relations between indigenous communities
and the colonial state. It did not last. Against the wishes of Katari, vio-
lence broke out. In the community of Moscari, Indians killed their
kuraka and exhibited his head in the outskirts of the city of La Plata. In
mid-December, a militia chief, Juan Antonio Acuña, arrested Katari.
Indians attacked the convoy and Acuña quickly executed Katari. The
attackers killed Acuña and his entourage, leaving their bodies unbur-
ied and piercing Acuña’s eyes.3

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N
Asillo
Lake B O L I V I A
Sorata
Puno Titicaca
Chucuito Achacachi
La Paz Chulumani
PE RU
Sica Sica
Cochabamba Santa Cruz
Oruro Chayanta
Lake
Poopó
PACIFIC La Plata
OCEAN Potosí
modern borders
CH IL E 0 100 miles
0 100 km
Tupiza Tarija
Katarista Violence
The uprising transformed from a utopic self-government experiment

into a fierce Indian-based struggle against colonial domination. Tomás
Katari’s brothers, Dámaso and Nicolás, assumed leadership of the upris-
ing. They formed a mass rebel army that swept through towns and com-
munities. Rebels targeted Spaniards and creoles as well as the symbols
and the mechanisms of colonial exploitation: haciendas, textile mills,
and mestizo villages. They coordinated with other communities and led
the siege of the city of La Plata in February 1781. Dámaso Katari ex-
pressed confidence that Tupac Amaru would aid their cause yet neither
the Katari brothers nor Tupac Amaru survived long enough to put an
alliance into practice.4 Indians loyal to the Spanish captured Dámaso
and Nicolás Katari. Authorities executed Dámaso on April 27, 1781 in
grisly, public fashion in La Plata, and killed Nicolás on May 7, just weeks
before Tupac Amaru’s death.

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Indians were not the only insurgents in Charcas. In the city of Oruro,
affluent creoles banded together with the lower classes and the indige-
nous peasantry to contest the power of Spaniards. While the creoles
owned nearby mines, the Europeans held power as merchants and fi-
nanciers. The Oruro uprising resembled the hierarchical, multiclass soci-
ology of the Tupac Amaru rebellion. In February 1781, the rebels con-
trolled the city and surrounding countryside and frequently mentioned
Tupac Amaru. In the words of one historian, “this unprecedented inter-
racial alliance was built upon mutual expectations of Túpac Amaru’s
approaching government. Creoles and plebeians, as well as Indians,
knew that the Inka had risen up and gone to war in Cuzco. Rumor had it
that he was nearing La Paz and before long would arrive in Oruro.”5
Frightened royalists, of course, also had the Tinta rebels on their minds.
One document from the period nervously mentioned “the fatalities that
occurred in the province of Chayanta and Tinta with an edict issued by
the insurrectionary Tupac Amaru in which he ordered all the corregidores
and chapetones [killed] because his intention was to leave not one re-
maining in this nation.”6 In February 1781, however, tensions between
the more radical Indians and urban plebs on one side and the creoles on
the other tore apart the Oruro coalition. Colonial forces brutally re-
pressed the rebels, including the “class traitor” creoles.7
The rebellion was not over. Beginning in February 1781, Julián Apaza,
an Indian from the community of Sicasica who assumed the name Tu-
pac Katari in honor of both Tupac Amaru and the Katari brothers, led
an uprising of Aymara communities around the city of La Paz. He was
such an obscure figure that the Spanish initially believed Tupac Amaru
was behind the violence.8 Once the Spanish understood that Apaza—
Tupac Katari— led the uprising, they ridiculed him for his social back-
ground. One document deemed him “an Indian of very low condition,
who had labored in the lowest occupations, being one of the poorest of
people during his life. He was of middling stature, with an ugly face,
somewhat deformed in his legs and hands.”9 He spoke Spanish poorly (a
feature that royalists derided but the Indian masses empathized with),
while childhood polio had made one leg shorter than the other and de-
formed his hands. Several accounts refer to his drinking habit. Whether
this was true or fabricated as part of the Spanish propaganda attack is
unverifiable. Royalists cast Apaza as a misfit from the dregs of society
and, once his movement gained force, as a murderous barbarian.10

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These characterizations must be treated critically, a reflection of the

social hierarchies of the era and colonial paranoia. What is certain is
that Tupac Katari and the Tupac Amaru forces collaborated in the Lake
Titicaca area in 1781, seeking to forge a broad Aymara-Quechua or
Collao-Cuzco rebel coalition.
Some important differences between the two rebellions stand out.
The Katarista uprising was a constellation of overlapping revolts and
movements with different leaders and strategies. The Tupac Amaru re-
bellion evolved around José Gabriel, as the absolute leader and, upon his
death, as a guiding symbol. The different Katarista movements, with the
exception of Oruro, did not seek the multiclass coalition that Tupac
Amaru and Micaela Bastidas envisioned, but instead persecuted every-
one, Europeans and Americans, who they believed to be part of the now
illegitimate colonial system. Tupac Amaru lobbied and recruited creoles;
the Kataristas did not. Finally, the Tupac Amaru forces believed deeply
in the uprising as a return to the Incas, which they saw as a utopian time
of self-government and justice. The Incas did not play such an important
ideological role in Charcas. While Cuzco had been the Incas’ center of
the universe, the Collao and beyond was more of a conquered area dur-
ing the Inca Empire. The Aymara did not hold the same glorified image
of the Incas as did Quechua people.11 So while the Amaristas and Ka-
taristas had much in common, representing the diversity of Andean
people, they also had different social bases, tactics, and objectives. These
would create tension and encumber the much-feared alliance.
In early 1781, Tupac Katari oversaw attacks in Sicasica, between
Oruro and La Paz, while his followers stretched the fighting all the way
to Lake Titicaca. In March, his forces began the siege of La Paz. Like Tu-
pac Amaru, Tupac Katari relied heavily on his wife, Bartolina Sisa, as
well as his sister, Gregoria Apaza. They collaborated in planning as well
as the attacks themselves.12 Katari corresponded with Diego Cristóbal,
and the two groups, but not the leaders, began to converge in the area
east of Lake Titicaca and north of La Paz. In March the Kataristas sup-
ported an attack on Puno from the south and also attacked Juli, Acora,
Ilave, and Chucuito. The attack on Juli left four hundred dead.13 Andrés
Tupac Amaru led the Tupac Amaru forces to the east of Lake Titicaca.
The two sides were not actually coordinating these attacks in the
fi rst half of 1781. Each side knew of the whereabouts of the other and
understood how strikes on multiple fronts enfeebled Spanish defenses,

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but did not plan simultaneous actions. And tensions spread, impeding
a coalition. For example, Diego Cristóbal rebuked Katari for assuming
the title of “Viceroy” and “Joseph King.” José Gabriel’s cousin believed
that the Cuzco rebels necessarily had to lead any coalition. Some sources
hint that Diego Cristóbal shared the Spaniards’ derision for Tupac Ka-
tari’s social background. Katari resented this meddling and did not al-
ways receive the Tupac Amaru emissaries in La Paz.14 These tensions
and disagreements about who should lead would continue. Yet the vio-
lence around Titicaca in the fi rst half of 1781 highlighted rebel strength
in the region and the new, dreadful forms of brutality.
Titicaca
In the first months of 1781, Tupac Amaru rebels complained that Indians
in the uprising’s core area south of Cuzco had begun to resist their de-
mands for supplies and soldiers and even expressed doubts about Tupac
Amaru himself. The failed siege of Cuzco had apparently shaken the
resolve of some rebel followers and demystified Tupac Amaru. Royalists
impeded attacks, and most importantly, captured the rebel leaders in
April. Yet the situation was very different farther to the south, the area
around Lake Titicaca extending into Upper Peru. There, insurgents had
royalists on the run and violence escalated. According to corregidor
Joaquín Orellana, the leader of Spanish forces, Indians ransacked
towns, killing all men, women, and children they considered “Euro-
pean.” The Katarista and Amaru rebellions began to overlap. Violence
escalated.
Quechua and Aymara Indians greatly outnumbered Spaniards in
this region, even more so when many Europeans, creoles, and mestizos
fled in late 1780. The Spanish could only count on local militias and
small battalions led by beleaguered corregidors, the defense that had
done so poorly against Tupac Amaru in late 1780. These units fared
even worse in 1781. Those fleeing Collao brought stories to Cuzco about
Indian rebels beheading people, drowning children, mutilating bodies,
and drinking the blood of their victims. In addition to such lurid tales,
Orellana passed along accounts of rebels chasing desperate Spaniards
on horseback for miles and miles, people plunging into frigid Lake Titi-
caca to escape the rebels, and groups of frantic Europeans and mestizos
fleeing toward Arequipa.

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There were three types of insurgents fighting in the Titicaca area:

those with ties to Tupac Amaru, those aligned with the Kataristas, and
those more independent, who recognized one or both of the rebel
groups but remained autonomous. These latter groups built on local
hatreds and did not necessarily heed Tupac Amaru’s calls to respect
those people considered neutral, primarily mestizos, women, and chil-
dren. In general, these more autonomous rebels sought to exterminate
rather than defeat and disarm the enemy. This more vicious form of
combat, with less control by leaders, would characterize the uprising in
the coming year. From Cuzco and well into Upper Peru, the fear of
rebel atrocities and of an alliance between the Tupac Amaru and Tupac
Katari camps spread, intensified by the increasingly wretched stories of
murder and mayhem. A brief account of some of these battles gives an
idea of the new brutality.
Orellana won a rare victory on February 16 in the bloody battle of
Mananchili, near Puno. The royalists benefitted from disagreements
between rebel commanders Andrés Ingaricona and Nicolás Sanca, who
had fought for Tupac Amaru in the Titicaca area since November 1780.
One account sneered that Sanca “who had transformed from a sacris-
tan and singer in the church choir to a colonel in Tupac Amaru’s army,
committed terrible destruction everywhere he went.”15 Both royalists
and rebels slaughtered any opponent they could trap, and reports of
atrocities followed. Neutrality was just about impossible at this point, at
least for men, and, in contrast to the fi rst months of the uprising, each
side executed prisoners. Alarmed by these events, in late February 1781
Tupac Amaru sent his trusted commander Ramón Ponce to the Titicaca
area, hoping to take Puno, put the insurgents under his mandate, and
coordinate with rebels in Upper Peru. José Gabriel himself had misgiv-
ings about the autonomy of the rebel groups around Lake Titicaca and
the new, more brutal forms of violence.
On his way south, Ponce observed that many Indian towns and in-
dividuals supported the uprising but did not necessarily follow Tupac
Amaru’s orders. Around Cuzco, Tupac Amaru could expect his follow-
ers to obey; this was not the case farther south. For example, Ponce
complained that in the towns from Santa Rosa to Carabaya, “they [In-
dians] had been fighting among themselves, without honoring your
royal highness and your royal decrees.”16 On March 5, Ponce despaired
that insurgents from Carabaya, to the north of Lake Titicaca, showed

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no deference to rebel leaders. He requested a decree from Tupac Amaru

confi rming his authority, “so that the Carabaya folks aren’t so extreme
in killing, in destroying houses and haciendas, even slaughtering us
and other towns, intimidating Indians and Spaniards.”17 Ponce con-
fronted Sanca, whom he deemed a violent thief interested in plunder
rather than social justice, and complained that Katarista commanders
killed indiscriminately, attacking even Tupac Amaru’s followers.18 In
early 1781, Tupac Amaru counted on growing support in the south.
Unlike in the Vilcanota Valley, however, the rebels closer to Lake Titi-
caca and Upper Peru did not express their unwavering devotion to him,
expected some autonomy, and proved capable of attacking their allies
as well as royalists. Relations with the Katari commanders were par-
ticularly tense.19
Based in Puno, corregidor Orellana managed to hold off Ponce on
March 11 but then confronted an attack from the south, led by Pascual
Alaparita and Isidro Mamani, who identified themselves as supporters
of “Andrés Inca Tupac Katari,” from Charcas. Orellana and other royal-
ists understood that they faced multiple insurgencies, as rebels from the
north and the south arrived to aid local insurgents. Rebels besieged the
town of Juli, nearly destroying it: “Juli’s plaza and streets are flooded
with blood, cadavers strewn all over the place.”20 The priest of nearby
Zepita provided a long list of “minors and adults,” many of them with
Spanish surnames, beheaded by the rebels. The list included one nine-
year-old and nine other people who could not be identified because
their heads had not been recovered. Rebels threw children into the
chilly lake to drown them and did not spare priests or nuns. Orellana
sent rafts out later that evening to see if he could rescue anyone who
had taken refuge in the totora reed beds that cling to the Titicaca shore.21
According to Orellana, the scene in Chucuito after the March 18 at-
tack was even more appalling, “the worst horror seen since the Con-
quest.”22 When he entered this town, south of Puno and also on the
shores of Lake Titicaca, Orellana encountered at least two hundred cadav-
ers: “No one who had any trace of European background was spared.”23
He saved five cowering, hungry survivors who had hidden for three
days. The rebels had reportedly placed all the heads of executed Span-
ish women on the gallows in the main plaza. Orellana claimed that
Isidro Mamani, the leader of the attack, sat next to the gallows in a
special chair, declared himself governor, and posted a lampoon that

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proclaimed both Tupac Amaru and Tupac Katari. Mamani forced

Spaniards and mestizos out of the San Francisco church in Chucuito and
“ferociously” executed them. He burnt down Chucuito (while the adobe
bricks resist fi re, the thatched roofs do not) and nearby Desaguadero.24
After Mamani failed in his initial attempt to take Puno, Indians in the
town of Acora, “scared about the punishment we were preparing for
them,” captured him in early July and handed him over to Orellana.25
Other testimonies provided additional shocking stories of Indian
savagery. In the town of Juli, troops found three cadavers on the gal-
lows: one kuraka with his heart removed; another dead kuraka tied
upside down, naked; and the latter’s wife left with no blood, inasmuch
as “the Indians drank it.” The same writer also claimed that Indians
had not only ransacked and burned down the Jesuit church in Juli but
that they had fi lled the church’s sacred glasses with their beheaded vic-
tims’ blood, passing it around for everyone to drink.26 These stories
echoed similar ones from Charcas about how the Kataristas killed Eu-
ropeans brutally and drank their blood or ate their hearts. One com-
mander in Chuquisaca (modern Sucre, Bolivia) wrote that “the Indians
don’t want peace, they want to drink fresh, thick corn beer, chicha, out
of skulls.27
Although in precise prose rather than with lurid sensationalism,
these writers also mention royalists beheading six captured spies in sight
of the rebels and executing ninety rebels they encountered. Just as rebel
extremists expanded the definition of European or pukakunka and
slaughtered them, royalists saw virtually all Indians as insurgents and, if
possible, killed them.28 The factors that increased violence are all pres-
ent: the Amaru and Katarista leadership was far away, unable to control
its followers; the war had lasted for over six months, with the body count
mounting; and unlike Cuzco, the Titicaca area counted on less of a Span-
ish (governmental or religious) presence. In this region, the differences
between Spaniards and Indians were starker and the groups who could
mediate between them—mestizos and acculturated Indians, primarily—
much less present, particularly after thousands fled. These factors, as
well as the crushing weight of colonialism in the region, help “explain”
the brutality. But why or how could an individual drink blood, eat
hearts, behead a captive? The brutal context can only partially clarify.
These unverifiable horror stories had numerous effects in Cuzco.
They terrified Europeans and royalist soldiers, making recruitment for

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the “southern campaigns” even more difficult. They also reinforced ef-
forts to cast the rebel as heathen apostates or barbarians who deserved
excommunication and severe punishment. In this sense, these stories
stymied efforts by José Gabriel and Micaela to maintain order, to pres-
ent their troops as disciplined, multiethnic soldiers fighting for the
common good in a fashion permitted within Spanish political practice.
Tupac Amaru could rightly contend that these were not his true follow-
ers. Yet if he sought to control the area, which he did, he needed their
support. Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas could benefit from these
rebels’ increasing power but would also lose support because of the re-
vulsion toward their extreme violence.
The brutal fighting around Lake Titicaca resembled that of Upper
Peru much more than Cuzco. The rebels sought to kill kurakas, whereas
Tupac Amaru had understood them as potential allies. The insurgents
used their numbers and courage— several writers noted how they did
not seem to care about dying— to seize towns, kill, ransack. The wide-
spread belief that those martyred in battle would be resurrected embold-
ened the insurgents. On the other side, the outnumbered Europeans
(Spaniards and creoles) could only survive if they remained united,
recruited Indian followers, and used their fi repower to ward off the
large number of rebels. Fusils and cannons, after all, were still effective
in repelling thousands. Nonetheless, European weapons were not al-
ways enough. In towns such as Juli, Chucuito, and others, royalists
begged for aid from La Paz, Cuzco, Arequipa, and Lima, and described
the region as virtually defeated by April 1781. Even if the sanguinary
tales of drinking blood and eating hearts are set aside as exaggerations
or propaganda, there was no doubt that the rebels were dominating an
increasingly vicious war in the Titicaca area.
The Siege of La Paz
The city of La Paz emerged in the eighteenth century as a commercial

center, an important stop in the economic circuits that stretched from
Buenos Aires on the Atlantic to Lima on the Pacific, with the ever-
important Potosí silver mine in the middle. This trans-Andean trade
route actually consisted of multiple overlapping circuits, from the inter-
oceanic to the more local production by indigenous people of foodstuffs
for cities and towns.29 La Paz had a population of about 25,000 in the

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late eighteenth century, rivaling Cuzco for primacy among Andean cit-
ies. Its unique topography makes it ideal for sieges. Built into a bowl,
actually a wide canyon that holds the Choqueyapu River, the city center
is surrounded by steep hills that lead to plateaus that surpass thirteen
thousand feet above sea level. Like many Spanish-American cities, it
was surrounded by a large wall, with much of the indigenous popula-
tion living on the outside or extramuros. In early 1780, royalist command-
ers had fortified the wall and added trenches. Today, the appropriately
named town of “El Alto” or “the Tall One,” which stretches across the
western plain above the city and constituted the traditional point of
entry for people and goods, serves as the base for frequent strikes that
paralyze the city below. In fact, the Neo-Kataristas who have led im-
portant and creative social movements in the last two decades take
their name and heroes from the 1780s.30
On March 13, 1781, tens of thousands of Indian rebels led by Tupac
Katari surrounded the city, impeding supplies from entering or people
from leaving, unless they joined the insurgents. After a few weeks,
shortages struck even in this well-stocked city. Katari sent representa-
tives to negotiate, requesting that the towns’ people hand over their
weapons as well as corregidors, Europeans, and some authorities. The
city leaders refused. The indigenous population that lived outside the
city’s walls largely joined the rebels. While the siege literally divided the
population into royalists on the inside and rebels on the outside, relations
between the two sides fluctuated between accommodation and implaca-
ble hatred. One diary hints that rebels allowed people they knew to get
food, while sentries even greeted acquaintances over the wall. Other
entries, however, refer to the rebels as bloodthirsty Indians. And rela-
tions worsened as time passed and hunger loomed.31
The two sides battled in April and May but to a bloody stalemate.
Royalists could not break the rebel lines, even when they charged and
killed hundreds with their artillery, while the insurgents could not
take the city center. Rebels entered periodically, destroying parts of the
city’s wall and burning sections of the city. They crept to the city’s walls
in the dark of night to take prisoners or attack sentinels. Royalists used
their fi repower to ward off these nocturnal attacks. Tupac Katari him-
self ventured to the city’s walls several times.
Within a few weeks, the confrontation turned into a siege—the reb-
els focused on blocking supplies. Hunger spread and by the second half of

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April, the city’s residents had turned to cats, dogs, mules, and even
leather for their meals. Hundreds died of hunger or from the illnesses
that spread among the famished population.32 As occurred in Tupac
Amaru’s attack of Cuzco, a royalist soldier pretended to aid the rebels
with their artillery and actually sabotaged it.33 In May the rebels allowed
an Indian market to function just outside of the city’s wall. Some citizens
braved the possibility of enemy fire and the highly inflated prices to buy
desperately needed food. The rebels grabbed a few prisoners but no royal-
ist commander took the bait.34 Desperation, hunger and its soul mate
disease took hold throughout the city. By mid-June many residents
wanted to capitulate, believing that their fate in the hands of the rebels
could not be worse than starving to death. Cadavers littered the streets.
On July 1, however, after 109 days, Commander Ignacio Flores arrived
with well-armed troops who broke the siege. Rebels did not confront
them, but instead moved to a higher peak. Delighted by the arrival of
Flores, many in the city worried that the Indian rebels would strike
again. They were correct. This was only the first siege of La Paz.
By the middle of 1781, royalists in Cusco and Lima looked to the
south with anguish. The Tupac Amaru rebellion had not been defeated,
and news arrived from the Titicaca area and Charcas about wave after
wave of insurgency and increasing violence. The succession of distur-
bances and uprisings dating from 1778 threatened to isolate Peru from
Potosí and the rest of the Rio de la Plata viceroyalty or, far worse, to
burst into Peru and unite with the leaders of the second phase of the
Tupac Amaru uprising. Del Valle and others understood that the region
between Lake Titicaca and the city of La Paz was largely in rebel hands.
The terrain proved just as inhospitable for Spanish forces as the Peru-
vian side of the lake had, while insurgents used violence with greater
frequency and kurakas had less sway over their communities. Peruvian
authorities and much of the population fretted about a bloody caste war
that could stretch from Buenos Aires to Lima. These fears would only
worsen in the course of 1781. Royalist commanders understood that
they had to confront the Titicaca-area rebels, those led by Diego Cris-
tóbal Tupac Amaru and those linked to the Kataristas. They dreaded
this operation. They were right to do so.

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9
Southern Campaigns
B Y L AT E M AY 1781, Tupac Amaru’s and Micaela Bastidas’s heads,

limbs, and other body parts hung from posts for public display in
Tinta, Tungasuca, Pampamarca, and other rebel hotbeds. Spanish vic-
tory seemed assured. The Spanish counted on thousands of soldiers
formed into synchronized columns, which rammed through rebel lines
and seized the leaders. Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas had not so
much directed the rebellion as personified it. They made all major deci-
sions and their followers fought in Tupac Amaru’s name, that of the last
Inca. People in Cuzco celebrated victory over the barbaric rebels. Their
optimism was understandable.
However, defeating Tupac Amaru’s followers after his death proved
difficult, costly, and frustrating. In hindsight, royalist optimism was
overconfidence. The Spanish forces quickly saw their position as con-
quering victors on horseback degenerate into that of hungry, ragged
soldiers marching on foot up and down the stark Andes, fearful of rebel
attacks and aware that indigenous people loathed them. Their numbers
diminished as soldiers deserted at every turn, and supplies, problematic
from the beginning, dwindled as they moved farther and farther away
from Cuzco. Violence escalated as the fighting moved toward the Lake
Titicaca area. Moreover, the troubling news about the Katarista rebel-
lion, the siege of La Paz, and the brutality in the towns near Lake Titi-
caca terrified the royalists. The optimism prompted by the capture and
executions faded quickly.
The rebels employed guerrilla tactics, harassing royalists at night or in
quick hit-and-run attacks. They took advantage of the region’s topogra-
phy, using the steep, glacier-topped hills to torment the royalists with

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Southern Campaigns 181
boulders and then to regroup. The Spanish commanders, trained to fight

in the open plains of Europe, to wage the type of campaign in which
Napoleon would excel (and Tolstoy would portray in War and Peace),
complained bitterly about the rebels’ strategy of using the hills. More-
over, the new insurgent leadership struggled to prevent their own fight-
ers from viciously attacking people deemed Spanish, a term often mean-
ing all non-Indians. Violence on both sides intensified. Neither rebels nor
royalists took prisoners; massacres, the killing of dozens or hundreds of
unarmed people, became more common than military confrontations.
Another tactical change also frightened royalists. The young rebel lead-
ers proved willing to starve out the enemy, sieging several towns and
cities for months. La Paz would not be the only prolonged siege. Violence
spiraled and royalist soldiers understood that they could expect no mercy.
Hungry and panic-stricken, they deserted en masse.
The southern campaign or second phase that began with the May
1781 executions in Cuzco did not only pit royalists against rebels. Inter-
nal struggles emerged in both camps that altered the course of the up-
rising and in fact shaped Peru for decades. Once the Spanish found them-
selves mired in the Lake Titicaca area, with rebel numbers and ferocity
on the increase, they began to fight among themselves, blaming one
another for losses and the inability to fi nish off the insurgents. As is
usually the case, these battles combined personal clashes and individu-
als’ concern over self-advancement (or survival) with broader ideologi-
cal differences, in this case the nature of Indians and Spanish rule in
the Andes. Royalist leaders disagreed about how to end the rebellion,
censuring their opponents within the colonial forces for military defeats,
while lobbying and underlining their own achievements in long letters
and memos to Madrid. The clash between royalist moderates and hard-
liners helps explain the odd twists and turns taken in the second phase
of the uprising.
On the rebel side, no such clear division emerged. Instead, the move
from Cuzco to Puno signified a transformation from the relatively co-
hesive movement led by Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas to some-
thing more like a coalition overseen by Diego Cristóbal, Andrés, and
Mariano. They commanded their own forces but also counted on inde-
pendent groups fighting in the Titicaca area. Commanders such as
Isidro Mamani and Pedro Vilca Apaza emerged from the bloody battles
of early 1781. Mamani, for example, had overseen the siege of Chucuito

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in which dozens of Europeans were killed. Although committed to the

Tupac Amaru forces, these commanders remained autonomous and
could not completely control their “soldiers,” local indigenous men and
women. These individuals defined the enemy in much broader terms
than Tupac Amaru and Micaela had, and were more prone to violence.
Although a direct relative of Tupac Amaru’s, Diego Cristóbal did not have
the prestige and experience to demand that they fight under his aegis.
Moreover, the name and legacy of José Gabriel Tupac Amaru did not
carry the same weight in the Collao as it did for the indigenous people of
Cuzco. Rebel soldiers remained loyal but increasingly independent.
Pacification?
Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, Mariano Tupac Amaru, and Andrés

Mendigure had separated from José Gabriel and Micaela just before
their capture and immediately assumed the leadership, with Diego Cris-
tóbal at the head. They were shockingly young: Diego Cristóbal twenty-
six years old, Mariano eighteen, and Andrés Mendigure seventeen. All
three, however, counted on blood ties that bolstered their standing
among rebel forces. Diego Cristóbal and Tupac Amaru were cousins,
their fathers the brothers Miguel Tupac Amaru and Marcos Tupac
Amaru. Documents and historians often refer to him as José Gabriel’s
brother, or half-brother, a term Diego Cristóbal himself used in official
documents.1 Mariano was José Gabriel and Micaela’s son. Andrés had
rebel ties on both sides. He was the son of Cecilia Escalera Castro, fre-
quently called Cecilia Tupac Amaru and considered a cousin by José
Gabriel, and Pedro Mendigure, a rebel leader himself and Micaela’s
cousin. Andrés increasingly used the last name Tupac Amaru instead
of Mendigure. Miguel Bastidas, Micaela’s much younger brother, also
accompanied them. One of the rare descriptions depicted Diego Cris-
tóbal as thin with a large nose and mouth and small eyes. It lauded his
Spanish and deemed him very serious and capable.2 Other documents
from the period stressed the leaders’ youth and surprising ability as
commanders.
How could such young men take over a massive rebellion at a criti-
cal juncture? Like Tupac Amaru himself, their work as muleteers and
traders had given them contacts throughout the region and prepared
them to live on the move. In addition, the three of them had tagged

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along on trips across the Andes and into towns and small communities
when José Gabriel fulfi lled his duties as kuraka. As members of the
Tupac Amaru-Bastidas clan, they counted on prestige among Indians,
particularly in the rebel hotbed along the Vilcanota basin and toward
Lake Titicaca. Diego Cristóbal wrote Spanish well, although not as styl-
ishly as his cousin.3 They were young, but well prepared. There were
also no other candidates. No commander emerged alongside José Ga-
briel and Micaela and most of their inner circle consisted of family
members. After the leaders’ capture, the rebels who did not find them-
selves in chains agreed that these young men had to take over. And as
kin to the soon-to-be martyred rebel leaders, Diego Cristóbal, Mariano,
and Andrés understood that they had no alternative— the Spanish
wanted to capture and kill them.
Diego Cristóbal, Mariano, and Andrés moved quickly, initially hop-
ing to free the rebel leaders, their family. A week after the devastating
capture of Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, and their inner circle on
April 6, Diego Cristóbal and Andrés led an unsuccessful attack on the
town of Layo. Days later, however, on April 18, they routed a royalist
division in the town of Langui, where Tupac Amaru had been caught.
In a preview of things to come, del Valle reported that Diego Cristóbal
called for the assassination of all “whites and mestizos of any age or
gender and the punishment of all the priests.” Del Valle contrasted this
with José Gabriel, “who had treated them with respect and consider-
ation due to their elevated character.” 4 The Spanish commander also
complained that thousands of royalist troops deserted, “because of their
extreme love for their families and the desire to return to their houses
to gather the harvest.”5 Many royalist soldiers assumed that with the
capture of the leaders, their mission was completed. Both bloodshed
and desertions would continue. April meant autumn in the southern
hemisphere, time for the harvest and to prepare for the cold highland
winter. Yet the war did not wane but instead intensified.
Despite the desertion of many royalist soldiers, rebels concluded that
liberating the heavily guarded captives would be impossible and instead
moved their operations south. In his southern excursion in late 1780,
José Gabriel Tupac Amaru had found great support in the area north of
Lake Titicaca while the Tupac Katari movement had much of the area
stretching from the lake to La Paz and beyond in arms. Diego Cristóbal,
Mariano, and Miguel Bastidas initially set up rebel headquarters in the

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town of Azángaro, just north of Lake Titicaca, in the abandoned house

of Diego Choquehuanca, the affluent kuraka who had spurned Tupac
Amaru’s offer and supported the royalists.6 En route, the rebels re-
cruited soldiers and other followers, including a few priests. They con-
tinued to fight in the name of Tupac Amaru and to invoke the support
of the king of Spain and other elements of their predecessor’s “plat-
form.” Andrés moved to the east of Titicaca to lay siege to the town of
Sorata. They knew the region well and counted on all-important con-
tacts, since Diego Cristóbal had accompanied his cousin, Tupac Amaru,
in the November 1780 southern campaign while Andrés and Mariano
had worked the area in their muleteer trips. This second phase in many
ways continued the fi rst southern campaign, but with new leaders.
Del Valle, Areche, and other royalist leaders did not have experi-
ence in the Titicaca region or the Collao. In November 1780, the early
phase of the uprising, they were still in Lima, while Cuzco municipal
authorities and religious leaders had not left the city, relying instead
on corregidors, with some reinforcements from La Paz and Arequipa,
to battle the rebels. The royalist commanders viewed this region, un-
known to them, with trepidation. They had spent weeks trekking
from Lima up the Andes to Cuzco and they complained bitterly about
the sheer peaks, relentless cold, and logistical challenges. The com-
manders had found the indigenous rural people hostile to their “re-
quests” for food, shelter, and recruits, and to the repression of the
uprising. Both del Valle and Areche despaired at the weak presence
of the colonial state and of the Spanish language in the Andes and
understood that most of the rural population in Cuzco— even those
who remained neutral— preferred the rebels to the royalists. On all
these fronts, the Collao was significantly more daunting for the colo-
nial army.
The Titicaca basin is higher and colder than Cuzco, its food reserves
scarcer, and its pasture areas more isolated. The route from Cuzco to
Puno moved from the green Vilcanota Valley, the heart of rebel terri-
tory, to La Raya, the breathtaking mountain pass over 14,000 feet
above sea level that separates Cuzco and Puno, and then into the arid,
almost lunar Titicaca basin where rebels could use the towering moun-
tains to ambush and hide. In cultural terms, Spaniards saw the Titicaca
inhabitants as even less acculturated and more truculent than Cuzco’s
indigenous people. While some Spanish could laud the Incas and maybe

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even their descendants, they saw the Aymara people as backward, de-
void of the royal tradition of Cuzco and its “Inca Kings.”7 In practical
terms, the coastal troops suffered mightily as the altitudes soared well
beyond two miles above sea level. Even if they had become somewhat
accustomed and overcome the initial misery of soroche, their hearts
would pound, heads ache, and noses sometimes bleed during every hike
over a mountain pass. Some soldiers coughed up blood—they had pul-
monary edemas. Furthermore, the news arriving from Charcas about
multiple uprisings and sieged cities fed their fear. European command-
ers dreaded the expedition to the Collao.
At the Crest of the Highest Peaks
After turning over his invaluable prisoners in April, the royalist com-
mander del Valle headed south, to chase the new rebel leaders. Diego
Cristóbal and company had moved the campaign south, near Lake Titi-
caca where José Gabriel had been so well received in November 1780. To
the great frustration of the Spanish, the rebels would remain mobile. Del
Valle knew that contrary to royalist gloating and overconfidence, the
expedition would be difficult; his unease proved prophetic. The cam-
paign started poorly and did not improve. After losing thousands of men
in Langui—far more to desertion than battle wounds— del Valle re-
turned to Sicuani to recover and recruit and from there moved toward
Lake Titicaca. He left Pumacahua’s forces behind to pursue any flare-ups
in the former core area.8
En route to the Collao, del Valle came across Indians who shouted
from the hills that they were not “cowards like the people of Tinta” and
promised to fight until the end.9 Del Valle managed to take some pris-
oners who told him that the town of Santa Rosa was a rebel hotbed. He
entered the town on April 15, 1781 and ordered every adult male to
congregate in the plaza. To the horror of those assembled, his deputies
executed every fi fth man, the quintado, twenty in all. While del Valle
contended that this bloodshed in Santa Rosa had successfully intimi-
dated potential rebel supporters, critics claimed that it had victimized
innocent people and discouraged Indians from surrendering.10 The
priest of Sicuani wrote that del Valle had taken the lives of a seventy-
year-old man and an Indian who had fought for the royalists. Indians
“took to the hills,” harassing del Valle’s rearguard.11

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Skirmishes continued as del Valle moved toward Puno. On May 5,

royalist troops led by Gabriel de Avilés, the future Viceroy of Peru, killed
hundreds of rebels near the town of Nuñoa. As usual, the account of the
slaughter was laconic, citing the number of dead and nothing more. Co-
lonial soldiers killed some of the rebels in the midst of battle and subse-
quently slew all they captured. Avilés did not take prisoners. Victories or
massacres such as these, however, did not turn the tide. Rebel numbers
increased and, as the struggle pushed south, the terrain became harsher.
Even those people they assumed were allies could turn on them. The
priest of the town of Asillo, José Maruri, greeted them outside of his de-
serted town but they arrested him for his support of José Gabriel, finding
documentation to prove it.12
Rebel forces led by Pedro Vilca Apaza confronted del Valle outside of
Asillo, in Condorcuyo. A ladino (Spanish-speaking Indian) from Mu-
ñani, just north of Lake Titicaca, Vilca Apaza had a long history of con-
fronting abusive kurakas. In 1762, for example, he had tangled in the
courts with Diego Choquehuanca, the patriarch of the kuraka clan who
would subsequently oppose Tupac Amaru. By 1781, Vilca Apaza was a
major rebel figure in the area north and west of Titicaca and into Upper
Peru.13 Waving flags and playing drums and trumpets, the insurgents
“who appeared to count on more than one hundred thousand men,” ac-
cording to one hyperbolic account, intimidated royalist troops with
screams and insults. A Lima squadron attacked the rebels in the open
plain but they fought back and killed fifteen soldiers. Royalist Indian
troops from Anta and Chinchero, part of Pumacahua’s forces who had
rejoined del Valle, shouted a promise of a pardon if they surrendered.
The rebels responded that their goal was to take Cuzco “and free their
idolized [idolotrado] Inca.”14 The royalists attacked in four groups the next
day, May 7, seeking to force the insurgents down the back side of the
mountain. Taking advantage of their cannons and fusils, the royalists
claimed to have killed over six hundred rebels and wounded many more.
The insurgents’ courage shocked del Valle. He provided two examples
to show how different they were from the “simple” and “pusillanimous”
Indians defeated by the conquistadors in the sixteenth century; del
Valle sought to show that his struggle was even more epic than that of
the conquistadors. One Indian pulled a spear out of his chest with his
own hands and continued to fight until he died. When a royalist pierced
a rebel in the eye with a lance, the victim counterattacked with such

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ferocity and determination that only the intervention of another soldier

could save the royalist. The account labeled the victory a miracle.15
Although the royalists secured mules, horses, food, and other sup-
plies left behind, their mood did not improve as they moved into Azán-
garo, the largest town north of Lake Titicaca and the rebel base until
just days before. They found it deserted except for the priest’s assistant,
who told them that he had been forced to destroy the church’s holy ves-
sels as the rebels repeatedly threatened to profane the church and steal
its jewels. The rebel leaders had moved elsewhere and local Indians had
escaped to the hills, adding to the rebels’ ranks. Mestizos and whites
had fled to Puno or even Cuzco and Arequipa. In addition, on May 11,
rebels ambushed del Valle’s troops in the high pass of Puquinacancari.
Men and women tricked the troops into believing they were asking for
a pardon when in fact insurgents pushed boulders from above and
slung rocks at them, the rebels’ weapons of choice. Their courage again
shocked del Valle as many of them fought until death or threw them-
selves over cliffs rather than be captured.16
At this point, early May 1781, Diego Cristóbal was nearby, moving
between Carabaya and the region’s most important city, Puno, which
rebels had surrounded. They remained mobile in order to recruit follow-
ers, gather supplies, and avoid the Spanish. In contrast to the first phase,
the insurgents did not have a natural base to compare with José Gabriel
and Micaela’s well-protected house. The rebels’ mobility frustrated the
Spanish. Some people reported that Diego Cristóbal had slept at a lover’s
house, only about five miles from the royalist Paruro column led by
Isidro de Guisasola. Del Valle wrote bitterly that, “without a doubt, we
would have captured them if the Paruro column had pursued.” He subse-
quently punished Guisasola. Del Valle believed that followers were mas-
sively abandoning the rebels but noted incredulously that “in the towns
they pass through the insurgents tell the people that they are in pursuit
of lions, tigers, and other ferocious animals to devour the Spanish army;
barbarous, out-of-touch fantasies that the idiots of these wretched, unfor-
tunate lands somehow believe.”17 His idea of rebel desertions seemed to
be wishful thinking; his concerns about the rebels successfully recruiting
with the promise of obliterating the Spanish were not off the mark.
Del Valle’s remark about wild animals never seen in the Americas
reminds us about the novelty of the bloodshed and the range of under-
standings of warfare. Sources provide a few glimpses of these unique

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interpretations. The Lampa corregidor, Vicente Oré, expressed his impa-

tience with Indian recruits who did not understand firearms. Some of
the recruits refused to hold a musket, worried that it might conceal “a
hidden poison.” Oré did not clarify whether the poison endangered the
shooter or the target. His impatience expressed both an ethnocentric
disdain for Indians as well as the fact that the vast majority of Indians
had never seen a firearm, except perhaps in a parade or a painting.18
Pedro Quispe, a Tupac Amaru supporter from an Indian commu-
nity near Sicuani and renowned as a curandero or healer for livestock,
used his skills to ward off the royalists. He burned the bones of about
ten Spaniards he and his comrades had killed and mixed the ash with
the charred remains of dog, fox, and cat teeth. Quispe then spread it
around apachetas or sanctuaries in the upper passes. After blowing it
into the air, he chanted a request that it neutralize “hail, frost, and
mestizos.” Quispe believed that this potion would turn any royalist
who stepped on it into ash.19 Although the accounts of the fighting fo-
cus on the clash between the royalists’ ground war and the rebels’ more
mobile tactics, they also provide glimpses of how indigenous people
understood warfare and employed local forms of knowledge.
Del Valle also lamented that he not seen a single man in the trail on
his long trek into the Collao, “all are at the crest of the highest peaks,
their fields sterile and deserted. The towns burnt down, churches closed
with no spiritual activity as the priests, who have destroyed the sacred
vessels because of their fear that the barbarous rebels will profane their
temples, have joined me, worried that they will suffer the outrages and
calamities that others of their class have suffered.” Communications
between columns had become difficult. Indians in Santiago de Pupuja
had cut off the ears, nose, and hands of one royalist messenger, who
carried a letter from Commander Francisco Cuellar.20
Del Valle and his troops had been hungry, cold, and miserable since
leaving Sicuani. As the altitudes increased, agricultural land dimin-
ished. Troops from both sides had ransacked estates and markets and
many peasants and estate owners had not planted or had learned to
hide their valuable food, meat, and other supplies. As the Incas had
shown, the harsh altiplano requires elaborate storage systems. The war
had demolished these. In an August 8, 1781 letter, del Valle com-
plained that the paltry salary he offered his troops was not enough
even for food, particularly “in these deserted and sterile parts [paises];

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the towns I passed through were burnt to the ground, the people hav-
ing fled to the snow-covered peaks with their livestock, horses, grains,
and possessions.” He admitted that he had to “become a good thief” to
feed his troops. Even then, they survived on boiled or roasted lamb and
mutton, with salt the only seasoning. This diet made his troops so ill
with bloody dysentery, they could barely walk.21
Many Indians that del Valle and other royalist commanders “re-
cruited” fled back to their towns. Those he had brought from Lima did
not have this option— it was too far. These troops, mostly blacks and
mulattoes, many dragooned off the streets and from bars, suffered from
the altitude, the relentless chill, the terrible and insufficient food, and
exhaustion. Those who were professional soldiers could not offer their
families in Lima anything. These soldiers, who remained anonymous
even in death, faced a relentless guerrilla war waged by highly moti-
vated, mobile fighters. They were miserable.
Royalists had run out of “alcohol or balms” and had to rely on urine
to treat wounds. They also did not have anyone to fi x their weapons.
Del Valle’s troops “couldn’t stand it when they were so close to their
homes, family, and fields; others couldn’t bear the lack of uniforms or
clothes, the cold, the hunger, and the other chores of warfare, to the
point that they hated military ser vice so much that they would prefer
to desert and face the risk of being killed by the enemy.”22 Finding fresh
recruits was almost impossible. Indians and mestizos who lived near
Cuzco “hid in the sheerest, most hidden hills” to avoid military duty.23
Del Valle and his troops were despondent as they moved toward Lake
Titicaca, with autumn rapidly becoming winter.
Moreover, in late April 1781 Indians in the upper provinces near
José Gabriel and Micaela’s core area rose up in support of Diego Cris-
tóbal.24 Reports also arrived of subversive activity in Tucumán in north-
west Rio de la Plata (part of present-day Argentina), in Chile, and in New
Granada (present-day Colombia). In Tucumán, Jujuy, and Salta, Rio de
la Plata’s Andean north, as well as northern Chile, rebels struck Spanish
forces, invoking the Katari movement.25 In New Granada, creoles and
others took to the streets to criticize tax increases and demand greater
political autonomy. They organized in a común or common, and thus
took the name comuneros. The events in Cuzco had kindled their rebel-
lion.26 Authorities in distant Mexico, in Izúcar de Matamoros in Puebla,
“evoked fear of another Tupac Amaru uprising.”27

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The depleted Spanish columns approaching Lake Titicaca not only

faced insurgents all around them and throughout Upper Peru but in
the area they had just passed in their “pacification” campaign and to
the distant south and north. Panic can be detected in del Valle’s corre-
spondence. He felt surrounded, concerned that the more distant upris-
ings would impede the arrival of the reinforcements he needed and
even mean rebel victory. On May 16, del Valle set out after the young
leaders with his own column. At this point, he sought to expel or even
capture the leadership, liberate Puno from the siege, and cut off ties
with insurgents in Upper Peru. None of these tasks proved easy; in fact,
he failed on all fronts.
The Siege of Puno
On the northern shores of Lake Titicaca at almost thirteen thousand

feet above sea level, Puno constituted the most important city in the
area. Residents oversaw the nearby silver mines of Cancharani and
Layacayata and participated in the active trade route that connected
Lima and Cuzco with Potosí and Rio de la Plata. Estate owners and in-
digenous communities raised sheep primarily for their valuable wool.
In fact, soldiers from both sides subsisted largely on lamb and mutton,
crippling wool production for at least a decade.28 Puno also served as an
administrative center, linking Peru and Upper Peru. While its corregi-
dor, Joaquín Antonio de Orellana, had abandoned Puno when the up-
rising erupted in October 1780, he returned to defend the city and the
region in January 1781. He proved to be a brave commander who left
vivid testimony of his forays throughout the region and his stubborn
defense of Puno against several sieges.
Orellana moved constantly throughout the Titicaca area, attempting
to recruit, raise funds, and defend towns from the rebels. He complained
frequently about the lack of support from La Paz, Arequipa, and Cuzco
and, in late 1780, was disappointed when Areche went directly to Cuzco
rather than taking a long detour to Puno. Coordinating among the cor-
regidors of local provinces such as Azángaro, Carabaya, and Chucuito
proved difficult, as rebels blocked communications and intimidated the
local population. A corregidor-led war council met several times in De-
cember 1780 and seesawed between optimism about the arrival of rein-
forcements, weapons, and money, and pessimism about what increas-

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ingly seemed like an unwinnable total war. Puno’s mestizo and white
population called for an evacuation several times, while Orellana en-
deavored to make it the royalist refuge in the Titicaca area.
Events in Chucuito, the province along the southwest side of Lake
Titicaca and today part of Peru’s border with Bolivia, alarmed royalists
and others in the area. For contemporaries and historians, these at-
tacks led by Tupac Katari commanders Isidro Mamani and Pascual
Alarapita epitomized two chilling changes in the nature of the confl ict:
the overlapping of the Katari and Amaru forces and the mass killing of
civilians by the rebels. In mid-March the rebels took the town of Po-
mata. Days later, on March 25, over seven thousand rebels attacked the
town of Juli, killing, according to one estimate, four hundred Spaniards,
creoles, and mestizos. Commander Orellana found “the plaza and streets
flooded in blood, with cadavers strewn everywhere.” Indian rebels ran-
sacked houses and churches.29 The insurgents attacked Chucuito on
April 3, trapping its militia leader, Nicolás Mendiolaza. According to
several reports, they killed up to one thousand people, burning Men-
diolaza alive and beheading hundreds, and destroyed most houses and
churches. Chucuito was far bloodier than any other battle since Tupac
Amaru had begun the rebellion seven months earlier.30 Accounts men-
tioned rebels throwing children into frigid Lake Titicaca to drown,
chopping women’s heads off and piling them on the gallows, and, in
Juli, drinking the blood of dead women.
In March, Orellana rushed back to Puno, dodging several ambushes.
Royalist spirits tumbled when, en route to Puno, they entered the town
of Icho and found that rebels had beheaded indigenous women due to
their husbands’ support for the Spanish.31 Rebels surrounded Puno—
the Katari forces to the south and those of Diego Cristóbal to the
north— in late March and attacked on April 10. Orellana had prepared
the city well, building fortresses, digging trenches, and arranging can-
nons. He stationed militia units outside the city and had his gunners
prepared to shoot from the towers. Pascual Alarapita and Isidro Ma-
mani recruited for the rebels to the south and east of Lake Titicaca. In-
dians of the town of Acora, however, seized Mamani and handed him
over to the royalists.32 Nonetheless, rebels from Azángaro, Lampa, and
Carabaya— all virtually deserted towns— combined with those of Chu-
cuito to attack Puno. Orellana used his cannons, guns, and cavalry
well, and staved off these repeated attacks in April.

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On May 7, Diego Cristóbal appeared on the bluffs to the west of

Puno. On the following day he dislodged royalist Indians from the Azogue
hill, the source of azogue or mercury that looms over the city, chasing
them into the Santa Barbara fortress. The rebels surrounded the city,
cutting off supply lines. Orellana described the ensuing attack as “un-
believable for anyone who did not witness it.”33 The corregidor used his
fi repower, trenches, and fortresses to ward off the rebels, who greatly
outnumbered the royalists, but was shocked to see that they had
brought crowbars to pry apart adobe walls. The insurgents set houses
on fi re (the roofs had plenty of flammable material) and used the
sounds from their weapons and instruments, as well as gut-wrenching
screams, to intimidate. Attacks continued for several days; some rebel
groups pushed toward the main plaza while others assaulted the weap-
ons depot on the outskirts. Diego Cristóbal tried to lure the royalists out
of the relative safety of the city by sending groups just outside of the
short line of fi re from fusils and cannons, but Orellana refused to take
the bait. On the morning of May 12, royalists happily reported that Di-
ego Cristóbal had departed, leaving behind a parasol he used for the
sun. The rebel leader apparently had decided against an extended siege
in which his forces would starve out the Puno residents or deprive them
of water. Other groups continued the fight but could not take the city.
Orellana received a letter from del Valle dated May 19 that reinforce-
ments were on their way.34 Food was running low.
Del Valle faced constant ambushes and skirmishes in his approach
to Puno from Carabaya. Two of his commanders, corregidors Manuel
Castilla and Francisco Laisequilla, returned toward Cuzco to confront
disturbances in their provinces of Paruro and Chumbivilcas. Authori-
ties there claimed that the Indians in the upper elevations were taking
advantage of the chaos to steal livestock. They also recognized these
groups’ opposition to Europeans and their desire “to take advantage of
the freedoms offered them by their sacrilegious leader, who they vener-
ate.”35 New reports arrived of rebel activity in the peaks of Urubamba,
Calca y Lares, Paucartambo, and Quispicanchi.36 Despite the execution
of Tupac Amaru and his entourage, royalists did not control Cuzco and
del Valle had to dilute his already stretched forces.
Del Valle reached the outskirts of Puno on May 24. To Orellana’s
dismay, he refused to enter the city and instead sent Colonel Gabriel de
Avilés. Del Valle worried that the rebels had set a trap and would return

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once he entered Puno. Orellana insisted that they attack the enemy in
their retreat toward Chucuito, to the south. Del Valle again declined.
Uncertain of what to do, and leery that the rebels would attack Puno
once again with even greater numbers, Orellana called for a meeting or
junta on the twenty-fi fth. Its participants believed that the fate of the
Spanish in South America depended on their meeting.37
Del Valle offered Orellana one hundred armed men as reinforce-
ments to defend Puno. The corregidor immediately rejected this as ri-
diculously insufficient—he had barely survived the previous sieges and
his supplies were dangerously low. Moreover, the rebels were getting
stronger, and locals’ resolve weaker. Orellana insisted that del Valle rec-
ognize Puno’s importance and make it his headquarters.38 Del Valle,
however, had little confidence that his troops could hold the city. The
freezing weather, gory battles, dwindling supplies—which meant scrimp-
ing on meals, uniforms, and pay—had intensified desertion among his
troops. He had left Cuzco with 15,000 soldiers yet four months later less
than 10 percent remained. On May 25, he wrote, “we are down to eight
hundred men, almost all from Lima. Accustomed to that city’s sweet
weather, they can no longer bear to suffer from the bitter frosts that get
worse every day, a discomfort made much worse by the fact that many
are barefoot and their clothes ragged; we are low on bread and they are
so used to this staple that this shortage bothers them greatly. In addi-
tion, our tents have gaping holes.”39 May is winter in the Collao, mean-
ing cold days and painfully frigid nights, particularly for soldiers in
tattered uniforms and tents, accustomed to milder weather. Tempera-
tures drop even more in June, July, and August.
The May 25 junta included del Valle’s key commanders: Gabriel de
Avilés, Joaquín Valcárcel, Matías Baulen, the Marques de Rocafuerte,
Gaspar de Ugarte, José Acuña, Antonio Vivas, and José de Lagos. With
the situation in Puno ominous and news arriving from every direction
about the latest skirmishes, the royalist leaders argued energetically
and bitterly. The participants felt that the fate of the Peruvian viceroy-
alty relied on their decision; they also knew that outnumbered by in-
creasingly belligerent Indians who by and large supported the rebels,
their lives were at risk. Del Valle described the situation and his deci-
sion not to make a last stand in Puno in bleak terms: his troops were
unhappy, tired, hungry, and undisciplined; the provinces in La Paz and
Buenos Aires were up in arms; he did not count on enough troops to

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even make it to La Paz; they faced not only mass desertions but even
the disgrace of defeat; that while the siege of La Paz had ended (which
was not true), Cuzco confronted a similar threat and, as part of Peru,
deserved this group’s par tic u lar attention. He cast the decision as one
between retreating to Cuzco or Arequipa in order to obtain supplies
and troops and to rest in the middle of winter or pushing on to La Paz,
an option he rued. According to Lagos, who was incensed by the pro-
ceedings, Avilés voted for Arequipa or Cuzco, Valcárcel insisted on
Arequipa, and Vivas, Gaspar de Ugarte, Baulen, and Rocafuerte preferred
Cuzco. Baulen presented an expedition to Upper Peru as suicidal: the
rebel provinces en route to La Paz contained three hundred thousand
men who had the canyons and peaks covered. He contended that “not
even a thousand fusils could push through this force.”40 Ugarte and Vivas
seconded him.
Lagos rebutted. He recognized that the rebels had slaughtered whites,
“la gente blanca,” and killed seven hundred people in Chucuito, but ar-
gued that with reinforcements, the royalists would have the upper
hand. When they had counted on two thousand men, six hundred fu-
sils, four cannons, and sixty thousand cartridges and the Indians had
only sticks and slingshots, “they had not feared a thing. WHY NOW?” 41
He maintained that retreating would be a disgrace and that they could
hold Puno, as they had done so far, and then move victoriously toward
La Paz. Lagos argued that they needed to terminate the “contagion”
and that the loss of the region, the “throat” that connected Lima with
Charcas, would be catastrophic, crippling tax revenues, mining, and
trade. He reminded them that Spain was virtually at war with England
and that reinforcements were on their way from Lima and Buenos Ai-
res. Lagos criticized the other members’ “panicky fears” and invoked
the “fi rst conquistadors” as models. He contended that if they fled to
Cuzco, retaking the Puno area “would cost the king years, millions of
pesos, and much bloodshed.” 42 Only Acuña, the corregidor of Cota-
bambas, backed Lagos. The junta voted to return to Cuzco, granting
Puno’s inhabitants three days to prepare.
Orellana described the “great pain” he felt from the order to evacu-
ate and the “confusion, disorder, and sobbing” that the news prompted
among Puno’s residents. He destroyed his cannons so that the rebels
couldn’t seize them.43 On May 27, even sooner than del Valle had
stated, approximately 8,000 men, women, and children began the long,

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chilling journey to Cuzco, including about 1,000 royalist soldiers and

1,246 loyal Indian honderos or slingers. A much smaller contingent headed
for Arequipa.44 Lagos and Orellana reported that rebels assaulted strag-
glers and ventured close to steal supplies. They attacked twice, killing
“many women, children, and some men” cruelly.45 Conditions could
not have been much worse: low on supplies, they faced rebel attacks at
every turn. Members of Puno’s middle class, merchants and small
landowners primarily, had just abandoned their property; some of the
oldest members and the ill did not survive the harrowing journey over
snow-covered mountain passes and through narrow canyons. Diego
Cristóbal presumably could have stopped the exodus by blocking the
passages throughout the mountainous journey, especially around La
Raya. He also could have slaughtered them by attacking in unison. He
did not. Perhaps he took pity on them; he also might have understood
that their trek and arrival in Cuzco would bolster rumors about rebel
domination in the south.
The exhausted group reached Cuzco forty days later, on July 2.
Viceroy Jáuregui himself cited a letter from del Valle that described his
soldiers’ wretched conditions: “Most were dressed in rags, their legs
uncovered and their feet bare, the majority sick, weakened by three
months of surviving on nothing but unseasoned roasted sheep.” 46 They
were down to 1,449 officers and soldiers and the wounded “fi lled Cuz-
co’s hospitals.”47 The civilians were in worse shape. They had withstood
the sieges of Puno and had to leave the bulk of their belongings there.
They had lost many of their loved ones on the journey. By the time they
arrived in Cuzco they suffered from lice and a variety of illnesses, and
were taken immediately to the city’s hospitals.48 Viceroy Jáuregui re-
ferred to them as “the gimpy, the blind, and the wounded.” 49
Del Valle himself was ill and requested that he be relieved. None-
theless, he provided a thorough report on what a new offensive in the
Collao required. He believed that Diego Cristóbal might return to Tinta
and attack Cuzco. Del Valle demanded four thousand fresh troops, ar-
guing that his were exhausted and that mixed-race (pardos) and free
blacks from Lima were “worthless” due to their inability to acclimate to
the altitude. He stressed how the shortage of food, uniforms, and other
supplies had hampered his campaign, and also recognized the escala-
tion of rebel violence. He wrote, “It is not easy to explain the rebels’
mortal hatred, not just toward Spaniards but to all those whose skin

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color makes them look like one, as seen in the cold-blooded cruelty with
which they have killed people in the Collao, [targeting] all people with
any trace of whiteness in their face, without exceptions for sex or age.”50
The ill and dejected soldiers and the downtrodden Puno residents
demonstrated to everyone who saw them on their long trek that del
Valle’s expedition south and the subsequent evacuation of the Lake
Titicaca area had been a stinging defeat for the Spanish. The situation
had changed dramatically in a few months. The battalions that had
captured Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas impressed everyone with
their manpower, precision, and fi repower. Less than two months after
the leaders’ execution, however, the remnants of these troops returned to
Cuzco hungry and poorly dressed, with no victory to speak of since the
April capture. Cuzco residents heard from the Puno refugees about the
royalist officers’ indecision and bickering and, in contrast, the rebels’
strength, courage, and confidence. Stories of sieges, massacres, and es-
capes across the high plains around Lake Titicaca alarmed locals. The
two most prominent Spanish authorities in Cuzco, José del Valle and
Antonio Areche, quarreled and exchanged blame, deepening a division
among the Spanish that would shape events in the near future.
Fear Rather than Desire
On June 29, Areche wrote to Viceroy Jáuregui from Cuzco to explain

his despair—“tears pour from my heart about the depopulation of the
famous village of Puno”— and to present an alternative. He also sought
to lay the blame squarely on del Valle’s shoulders. Areche painted a
bleak picture of abandoned churches throughout the Collao and Indians
losing the little respect they had for Europeans. Without churches and
Indian submission, Spanish colonialism in the Andes was unthinkable
and would rapidly disintegrate. From Quito to beyond Potosí, all along
the great chain of mountains that served as South America’s backbone,
the Church had a much greater presence than the colonial state. Far
more indigenous people had met a priest than a bureaucrat. Majestic
churches laden with stirring baroque art graced the towns of the An-
des, while the local state, the municipalities, had meager offices, if any
at all. Although not a great friend of the church—he blamed it for the
uprising—Areche recognized its overwhelming importance in the
Andes.

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Areche criticized del Valle for not taking control of the areas that he
entered, but recognized that rebel supporters fled quickly, taking to the
impenetrable hills. However, Areche rejected del Valle’s excuse that
he had lacked supplies: “If his troops temporarily did not have food,
shoes, and other goods, it is the commanding officer’s fault for not re-
questing them and planning adequately.”51 Areche called for starving
the rebels out, by preventing them from harvesting potatoes, corn, and
coca, impeding their incursions into towns in search of food, and iso-
lating them from their supply of salt. Beyond this vague plan, he
stressed del Valle’s incompetence, calling for a new military head.52
Del Valle repeatedly justified his actions by stressing the miseries he
faced and the impossibility of victory with hungry, cold, and undisci-
plined troops, in harsh terrain. In a long letter to Viceroy Jáuregui from
July 12 that sought to rebut Areche’s criticism, del Valle described the
bitter cold and snow that killed many of their mules and limited pas-
tureland for the surviving pack animals. His beasts of burden as well as
his troops had been hungry. He also lamented the lack of kindling and
fi rewood in an area well above what is usually considered the tree line.
Del Valle complained about the growing number of desertions among
his soldiers, bemoaning the loss of weapons when they fled, but recog-
nized that it was nearly impossible to retain troops in harsh conditions
when they did not have enough food or adequate uniforms and tents. Del
Valle also emphasized the rebels’ use of hills as points of refuge, recog-
nizing, in effect, what would subsequently be known as guerrilla war-
fare (from the Spanish for “small war”): hit-and-run attacks in which
insurgents took advantage of their mobility and knowledge of the ter-
rain. Del Valle emphasized here and elsewhere how the rebels retreated
into hills, escaping from royalists. He noted bitterly that “there’s not a hill
that can cut off these Indians.”53
In another July letter to Viceroy Jáuregui, del Valle underlined the
rebels’ tenacity and hatred for the Spanish. He described how “Indians
of the upper peaks” [cerros] rejected his offer to pardon them if they gave
up their struggle: “they called us the rebelling thieves and said that we
should ask them for a pardon; they’ve become so haughty that they
think fear rather than desire to enforce the king’s order forces us to offer
peace.”54 This anticipated another tenet of what would be known as
guerrilla warfare: that insurgents had greater motivation or desire than
their repressors. It also expressed the rebels’ continual belief that they

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rather than the royalists represented the king and the defense of justice
and order.
Areche and del Valle sniped at each other constantly for years, with
Areche continuing even after del Valle’s death on September 4, 1782. It
was personal—they disliked each other; each wanted to blame the other
for the Puno debacle and to claim the honor of seizing Tupac Amaru
and Micaela Bastidas. For example, in a letter to Gálvez, Areche com-
plained bitterly that del Valle had received credit for Tupac Amaru’s
capture “in Nuestra Gaceta” and “un capítulo de Cádiz.” Areche con-
tended that he had led the charge and Indian troops and had captured
the rebel inner circle, not del Valle, who was “too slow.”55 In mid-1781
Areche was lobbying to take over operations, claiming that he could
retake Puno with one thousand reinforcements from Arequipa, more
troops from the Callao division, and one thousand muskets. The vice-
roy thanked him for his input but told him that the army commander
(del Valle or his unnamed successor) would be in charge of any cam-
paign. Jáuregui also declined to send more troops from the coast, due
to the threat of attack by the British. Areche took this as a betrayal and
began to deride him in his frequent missives to Gálvez in Spain.56 He
refused to meet with the viceroy when he returned to Lima in August
1781 and made it his mission to take over the antiinsurgency cam-
paign, disparaging del Valle and the Viceroy at every possibility.
This confl ict remained extremely personal— the accusations become
harsher and harsher— but also reflected a deepening divergence over
what actions needed to be taken. Areche, despite his criticism of the
Santa Rosa executions and his occasional calls to understand the reb-
els, believed that del Valle had been too soft. He called for stricter poli-
cies that would isolate and even starve out the rebels and their support-
ers. Del Valle, Jáuregui, and other Cuzco leaders such as Bishop
Moscoso contended that these tactics would not work, that the rebels
controlled the area stretching from Cuzco to La Paz and could resist a
new royalist offensive. They sought some type of negotiation.
While this feud evolved from personal vitriol to programmatic dis-
agreement about military policy, events around Lake Titicaca became
even more disturbing. Not only had the same battalions that had cap-
tured Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas failed to defend Puno let
alone capture Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, but the rebels had become
more violent and fought on multiple fronts. Royalists faced two orga-

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nized groups, those led by Diego Cristóbal and those from the La Paz
area led by Tupac Katari, as well as the fierce local uprisings not con-
trolled by the leadership. News about the siege of La Paz terrified city
dwellers throughout Peru. At the same time that del Valle, Areche, and
Jáuregui sent nasty memos about one another and sought to pull rank,
the rebellion threatened to extend well into the Rio de la Plata viceroy-
alty. Royalists had much more to fear than the loss of Puno.
Each and Every Indian
Colonial authorities understood that by mid-1781 insurgents were using

greater violence against more and more people. They also realized that
the rebel leaders had less control over insurgent fighters. Both changes
petrified them. A letter from Arequipa dated May 2, 1781 summarized
the situation in the Upper Peru (“Chuquisaca, Sicasica, Carcoto.”) in the
following terms: “There is no Tupac Amaru there: furthermore, there is
no true Katari, as the fi rst one died and his successor is an insult to his
name (‘UN INSULTANTE’); but this doesn’t matter. Each and every In-
dian declares himself a Tupac Amaru and he who wants to stand out
among them for his insolence uses this name.”57 In fact, the writer im-
plied that it did matter— every Indian was potentially a murderous in-
surgent and even a leader.
In contrast to the first phase, rebels attacked priests. Diego Cristóbal
and the other leaders sought to prevent their followers from harming
clerics, but had little ability to do so as the rebel center moved away from
Cuzco. He also reacted harshly to clerics who disobeyed him. In an Au-
gust 19, 1781 letter, the rebel leader rejected Father Miguel Morán’s ex-
planation why his parish could not support the uprising: “Your Excel-
lency is trying to cover up with frivolous excuses, as if I were not aware
of everything that occurred in Indian Peru [indiana del Perú]; you can
only give these excuses to the Puka kunka thieves while I, as a noble
Inca, am immune to such rhetoric.” He demanded that the priest stop
intimidating and obstructing Indians, underlining that he could not be
deceived and had thousands of troops to punish royalists.58
In June 1781, on his return to Cuzco, José del Valle sent a list of
twenty-three priests who had been victims. He began with the story of
don Sagardia, parish priest of San Taraco in Azángaro. Insurgents burned
down his parish house and stole his belongings “for having completely

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opposed the rebels’ orders.” Another priest, don Josef Travitaru, had
tried to impede the circulation of insurgent orders and decrees “to stop
this cancer” and requested the corregidor’s aid. The corregidor (pre-
sumably Orellana) led a slaughter of fi fty or sixty rebel “captains,
judges, commanders, and colonels” in the town of Samán, near Azán-
garo. Both priests only survived by fleeing to Puno.59 The list described
priests and their aides who had been robbed, beaten, imprisoned,
dragged by horses, humiliated in numerous ways, stripped, whipped,
and threatened. Several watched as the rebels killed their relatives and
others had been taken prisoner to Tinta, presumably in the fi rst months
of the uprising. Del Valle listed three priests killed by rebels, all from
remote parishes: Juli, in La Paz bishopric, Ocongate in the upper prov-
inces, and Paucartambo, toward the jungle. Rebels dragged a priest’s
assistant from Lampa to the gallows, but del Valle could not confirm
whether he was hanged.
The commander closed his solemn report by describing how rebel
procedures had changed. When entering a town, they tied up the priest
and his aides, threatening to kill them. In contrast, in late 1780 Tupac
Amaru had customarily met with the local cleric, requesting his sup-
port and using the church steps for his speeches.60 At the onset of the
uprising, Bishop Moscoso had instructed his priests to stay behind in
their parishes to proselytize against the rebels, insisting that they would
be safe. By mid-1781, this was no longer the case.
As del Valle led the humiliating exodus of Puno residents to Cuzco,
Diego Cristóbal consolidated his base in Azángaro and sought to move
southeast and link with the Tupac Katari uprising. Andrés Tupac Amaru
had taken charge of the area east of Lake Titicaca. With Vilca Apaza he
oversaw the siege of Sorata, capital of Larecaja and part of the La Paz
bishopric (part of modern-day Bolivia), from May through August. Thou-
sands of rebels surrounded the town, which contained two thousand
refugees from Lampa, Carabaya, and other nearby towns and cities.61
Although organized into companies and possessing weapons, the popula-
tion ran low on food within weeks. After delegates met with rebels they
were allowed to purchase some products, but Father José Eustaquio Cara-
vedo lamented that the inhabitants relied on “the meat of mules, dogs,
cats, mice and other filthy animals.” He labeled the rebels “pirates.”62
Fearing that they would be slaughtered, the besieged residents of So-
rata refused to surrender. In early August, Andrés Tupac Amaru devised

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a plan to flood the town into submission. Diverting three rivers, he built
a dam on the peaks above the town and opened it on August 5. The
flooding water broke the town’s barricades and neutralized its defenses.
Rebels, including Andrés and Mariano as well as Gregoria Apaza, the
sister of Tupac Katari, poured in. Accounts vary on the bloodshed. Those
sympathetic to the Spanish describe rapes and wanton slaughtering of
anyone of European descent or appearance. Others contend that rebels
killed Europeans but pardoned creoles and mestizos. Andrés Tupac
Amaru forced European women to chew coca, wear Indian clothing, go
barefoot, and call themselves Collas or Indians.63 From here Andrés took
his forces toward La Paz, the site of an even more horrific siege.

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10
The Pardon and the Cease-Fire
T H E SI T UAT ION WAS BL EA K for royalists in late August 1781. Rebels

had surrounded the city of La Paz once again and Tupac Amaru
and Tupac Katari forces seemed on the verge of a momentous alliance.
The Amarista rebels controlled the Lake Titicaca area and counted
upon strong pockets of support from Puno to Cuzco as well as in what
became northern Chile and Argentina. As seen, rebels also struck New
Granada. The insurgents’ guerrilla tactics exasperated royalist com-
manders while the threat of long sieges and even caste war terrified
residents of towns and cities. News about the starvation, dehydration,
and slaughter in Sorata and La Paz had spread and more and more Eu-
ropeans and mestizos fled, taking refuge in Lima, Arequipa, or Buenos
Aires. Royalist commanders saw their best battalions collapse, chang-
ing from well armed, disciplined columns into ragged, hungry soldiers
who sought the fi rst opportunity to desert. These commanders had
largely given up recruiting local indigenous people.
At the same time that the two rebel movements overlapped in the
Lake Titicaca area and joined forces in the second siege of La Paz, divi-
sions among the Spanish worsened. Visitador Areche bombarded Lima
and Madrid with hundreds of letters and memos belittling del Valle’s
failed campaign. He added Viceroy Agustín Jáuregui to his defamation
campaign when Jáuregui refused to accept the visitador’s interpreta-
tion of why the royalists had stalled in the months after the capture of
Tupac Amaru and declined to name Areche as del Valle’s replacement.
This infighting appeared to supply one of the prerequisites, according
to generations of theorists, of a successful revolution: the division of the
ruling classes.1 In a mountainous area that seemed designed for guer-

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The Pardon and the Cease-Fire 203
rilla tactics, a unified, multicultural (Quechua and Amaru) movement

backed by the majority of Peru’s population confronted the divided,
increasingly pessimistic Spaniards. The revolution seemed imminent.
Confusion reigned. Royalist commanders and corregidors shared the
pessimism that circulated among their followers. In somber letters and
memos, they made clear their belief that the events of this period, mid-
1781, would decide the fate of Peru and perhaps even Spanish control
of South America. They were correct—the events were epic and decisive.
If the Tupac Amaru and Katarista forces united, the rebels would control
the vast Andean area stretching from Cuzco to Potosí. They could re-
double their attacks on royalist holdouts (such as Cuzco), engulf the
important city of Arequipa, and cripple tax collection and trade routes
between Buenos Aires and Lima. The insurgents would perhaps then set
their sights on these two cities. Much of the population, particularly
Spaniards and creoles, fretted that the starvation and dehydration of the
La Paz siege and the butchery of Lake Titicaca would become standard
practice. They not only worried about dying, but doing so in brutal fash-
ion. At this point, the fate of the rebellion hung in the balance: could
the rebels align, take La Paz, and spread south, north, east, and west, or
could the Royalists make a fi nal stand? Royalists did not fight to regain
a town or stop an advance; they fought to survive.
The struggle or struggles, however, took an absolutely unexpected
and decisive turn in September and October 1781. Curiously, this trans-
formation has received far less attention than the story of Tupac Amaru’s
capture and the mass executions. These events not only altered the
course of the uprising but shaped Spanish policy and ideology in the An-
des for decades. In fierce paper battles, Royalists debated about how to
reconquer Peru and what to do with the indigenous population. These
debates and the implementation of new forms of government and con-
trol, casting aside a two-hundred-year-old system, would weigh on Peru
well past independence in the 1820s.
La Paz: Every Indian Now a Rebel?
In La Paz, royalists managed to break the siege in July only to lose con-
trol a month later. The situation was horrific: people in the city were
starving and losing hope. Commander Ignacio Flores’s arrival on July 1,
1781 had dislodged the rebels, bringing respite to the tens of thousands

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trapped within the city walls. Residents cheered their liberators and
desperately searched for food and medical assistance. They could not
venture too far from the city center, however. Rebels moved to the sur-
rounding peaks and bluffs and continued their hit-and-run tactics. Sur-
vivors were able to eat, to bury or at least dump the dead outside the city
walls, and to restore a bit of order in their residences. But calm did not
return.
Thousands of Flores’s troops deserted in July. Worried about his
vulnerability, Flores fled La Paz on August 4, leaving a company of vet-
eran soldiers behind. On August 7, rebels attacked but could not break
royalist lines. The second siege began. One witness, don Juan Bautista
de Zavala, estimated more than fourteen thousand dead in the two
sieges: most from hunger, some from bullets, and “still others [who]
were beheaded by the rebels in the fields that many attempted to cross,
even though they knew that the rebels would not show mercy if they
looked Spanish in any way.”2 He observed ruefully that “Every Indian
is now a rebel, all die happily for their Inca King, all have forgotten God
and his holy law.”3 Toward the end of August, Andrés Tupac Amaru,
Miguel Bastidas, and other Tupac Amaru commanders arrived in La
Paz. The much-feared alliance of the (new) leaders of the Tupac Amaru
and Tupac Katari movements seemed imminent.
Tensions emerged, however, between the two camps. Andrés and
the others set up their base in El Alto while the Tupac Katari forces
concentrated in Pampajasi, on the opposite side of the city.4 Andrés and
his collaborators were well-educated Spanish and Quechua speakers
from Cuzco, 325 miles away. They fought in the name of the Incas, a
Cuzco-based civilization and empire that had subjugated the Aymara
people. In contrast, Tupac Katari was a humble Aymara speaker who
saw La Paz as his base and resented the outsiders. His qualms increased
when Andrés became romantically involved with Gregoria Apaza, Tu-
pac Katari’s sister. Moreover, one of Katari’s commanders, Tomás Inga
Lipe, passed over to Andrés Tupac Amaru’s side, prompting infighting.
In late August, the Tupac Amaru forces temporarily detained Katari.
Andrés instructed Tupac Katari to call himself governor rather than
viceroy, seeking to limit his power.5 Nonetheless, the two rebel sides
managed to organize an effective second siege of La Paz.
In early October, Andrés Tupac Amaru tried to repeat his triumph
in Sorata and dammed the Choquepayu River in order to flood La Paz.

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He believed that the raging waters would crush the royalist defenses
and break the defenders’ spirit. This time, his project failed because a
retaining wall broke before the water could be diverted into the bowl of
the city. The rebels succeeded, however, in blocking supplies from en-
tering La Paz, so that hunger and illness spread once again throughout
the city. Survivors told stories of parents watching their children and
spouses watching their spouses crumple over and die of malnutrition
“without the strength to even moan.” Alongside the dying and the
dead, “walking skeletons” scavenged for food. People ate dogs that had
survived feeding on the cadavers; some accounts hint at cannibalism.6
The sounds of the besieged city also tormented those trapped inside, as
the screams of rebels threatening to attack the town mixed with the
pathetic groans of children and adults begging for food. The stench from
rotting bodies and feces as well as the pain from hunger and stomach
ailments from the meals of boiled weeds made life even more misera-
ble.7 In early October, rebel representatives met with the city’s leaders,
demanding surrender. Fearful of mass slaughter such as that in Sorata,
La Paz’s patriarchs refused. On October 15, however, desperate with
hunger, the city leaders decided to abandon the city if military rein-
forcements did not arrive in the next few days.8 At this point, followers
of Tupac Katari controlled much of the region from La Paz to Lake Titi-
caca and, to the south, toward Potosí.
On October 17, Commander José de Reseguín reached La Paz with
ten thousand troops (virtually every soldier who could be dragooned
around Buenos Aires) and food, breaking the siege once again. For many
it was too late. Thousands lay dead within the city walls. Andrés Tupac
Amaru handed over operations to Miguel Bastidas and fled to Azángaro.
He presumably preferred the hit-and-run tactics that had worked so well
in recent months to a single confrontation with a well-armed royalist
contingent. Tupac Katari resisted initially, taking to the hills above the
city, but days later sought to join forces again with Miguel Bastidas. They
failed to thwart Reseguin’s offensive and the great alliance and rebel
control of La Paz shattered.9
Royalists took the offensive in Upper Peru, retaking the city of
Oruro and attacking rebels in Cochabamba and other important towns.
The insurgency collapsed where it began, Chayanta.10 Royalist com-
manders offered an amnesty to rebel supporters who gave up the strug-
gle. Tupac Katari’s followers began to abandon him and a prominent

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Amarista commander, Miguel Sonco, declared his support for the Crown
and recruited in Chucuito, a place that had been a rebel hotbed. Tupac
Katari rejected the amnesty and the option of turning himself in to the
royalists, but learned with horror that thousands of his followers had
accepted it in early November.
Royalists claimed that Katari and Miguel Bastidas, who remained in
the area, had broken the agreement (the amnesty offer that Katari never
signed or accepted). Betrayed by one of his own followers, Tupac Katari
was captured on November 9. He was drawn and quartered in La Paz
on November 15, a method that recalls the brutality against José Ga-
briel. Triumphant royalists displayed his head and body parts through-
out the Titicaca area.11 Royalist commanders executed dozens of his
followers, including, a year later, his wife, Bartolina Sisa, and sister,
Gregoria Apaza.12 Miguel Bastidas (Micaela’s much younger brother)
presented himself for a pardon and after years of trials was sent to
prison in Spain.13 Violence and insubordination would continue in
Charcas for months and years, even though the royalists had executed
the leaders and defeated or disarmed the core rebel groups.
Shipwrecked Heart
In his fi nal weeks, Tupac Katari watched some of his most trusted allies
and thousands of his followers turn over their arms. Weeks after being
on the verge of taking La Paz, his movement was on the run and in
disarray. Yet developments on the other side of Lake Titicaca, in Lower
Peru, must have been equally shocking and painful for him. At the
same time that Katari was desperately trying to preserve the rebel hold
on La Paz and rebuild the rebellion, the Tupac Amaru leaders were ne-
gotiating with the Spanish.
Del Valle had returned to Cuzco in July 1781 convinced that the
Spanish would soon lose the war. Indians massively supported the reb-
els, who took advantage of the mountainous terrain, using guerrilla
tactics against the miserable royalist soldiers. The increasing violence
against anyone considered a European caused panic and exodus. People
who could be labeled European because of their wealth, skin color, or
clothing fled the area. The Spanish strained to supply the troops; del
Valle’s soldiers had fought much of the campaign with ripped shoes and
tents and insufficient food— they were frostbitten and hungry. While

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the seventy-year-old del Valle was no doubt attempting to explain his

failure in the south, he correctly believed that the insurgents had the
upper hand.
Del Valle thus proposed an amnesty for all rebel supporters. Citing as
precedent the partial pardon granted in December 1780, del Valle wrote
the viceroy on August 8, 1781 to suggest an amnesty for all fighters ex-
cept the rebel leaders. He later amended the proposal to include leaders
if they accepted the armistice. The viceroy consulted with his advisors
and added a one-year exemption from the head tax, the tribute, in order
to make it more enticing for taxpaying Indians. The fact that no tax col-
lector dared attempt to collect the head tax anywhere in southern Peru
made this a painless, symbolic gesture, although it reassured Indians
that they would not subsequently be charged for the period’s tribute. In
a subsequent justification of his actions, the viceroy argued that the ex-
ecution of José Gabriel had only strengthened the rebels: “It seemed like
they tried even harder to commit atrocities; above all, every day a new
leader emerged, making it impossible to exterminate this class of people
with weapons, without also destroying the kingdom itself.”14 Jáuregui
signed the amnesty or indulto on September 12. Corregidor Francisco
Salcedo delivered it to Diego Cristóbal in Azángaro.15
Visitador Areche initially agreed with the amnesty plan, but as his
relations with del Valle and Jáuregui worsened he became more and
more critical. In fact, he moved from tepid supporter to heated opponent.
Since del Valle’s humiliating return to Cuzco in July, Areche had cam-
paigned with hundreds of letters and memos against the commander. He
blamed del Valle for the defeat in Puno and tried to take credit for the
capture of Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas. Areche believed that as
visitador he deserved more power than the viceroy and the right to over-
see the military campaign. He took advantage of the amnesty to cast
del Valle and Jáuregui as spineless failures who preferred to negotiate
rather than defeat or exterminate the rebels.
Earlier in 1781, Jáuregui had written letters that supported Areche’s
harsh sentence against Tupac Amaru, Micaela, and others but also hinted
at differences of opinion. For example, in a June 13, 1781, letter to Areche
he insisted on the need to gain the support of kurakas and the benefits
of moderation rather than authoritarian measures, lamenting “so much
spilling of blood.”16 Jáuregui agreed with Areche that Indians needed to
learn Spanish, be evangelized, and indoctrinated into European customs,

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but argued that doing it all at once would be counterproductive. Citing

his experience in Chile, Viceroy Jáuregui made it clear that acculturation
(which involved learning Spanish, becoming a good Catholic, and aban-
doning traditional culture) required a deliberate, methodical plan.17
Areche held very different views. In an April 30, 1781 letter to José
Gálvez, he contended that “these Americans require just terror rather
than sweetness.” In other words, Indians would only change through
force.18 Areche believed that the viceroy’s call for moderation was a sign
of weakness and would fail if put into practice. His contempt for del Valle
and the viceroy gushed from his incessant letters and memos.
Areche repeatedly questioned del Valle’s decision to evacuate Puno
and his ability as a commander. The viceroy earned his wrath by not
naming him to replace del Valle and by not meeting him when he vis-
ited Lima in August 1781.19 The amnesty angered Areche but his initial
observations focused on procedure: the visitador criticized the viceroy for
not consulting with the Real Audiencia, the High Court. The fact that the
viceroy had not discussed the proposal with him also greatly frustrated
Areche. These initial concerns turned into a much harsher criticism as
the months passed. Areche wrote an astonishing number of letters and
memos to Gálvez as well as to Jáuregui, del Valle, and Bishop Moscoso to
prove his point. One historian labeled his writing at this point “logor-
rheic,” that is, involving a pathological excess of words.20 Del Valle took
his arguments farther, blaming Peru’s problems on the reforms imposed
by Areche and other Bourbon Reformers. He pointed out that “the new
taxes and the rigorous and irreverent way in which they are exacted
have provoked a notorious negative impact throughout America.”21
In the final months of 1781, Viceroy Jáuregui and Commander del
Valle were much more concerned with Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru’s
reaction to the amnesty offer than with Areche’s ranting. The rebels were
on the offensive and news from the other side of Lake Titicaca alarmed
royalists in Lima and elsewhere. Del Valle wrote Diego Cristóbal on Oc-
tober 10 in a respectful yet threatening tone. He reminded him of what
had happened to his cousin José Gabriel, Micaela Bastidas, and others,
underlining that Diego Cristóbal and the other young leaders were in
danger of a similar fate. Commander del Valle asked that Diego Cristóbal
accept the amnesty offer, posted throughout the Andes.22
Diego Cristóbal answered from Azángaro on October 18th, in a mo-
mentous letter that del Valle must have opened with great apprehension.

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The rebel leader confirmed that he had received the amnesty offer. He
blamed the uprising on abusive authorities in the Americas who dis-
obeyed His Majesty Charles III, particularly “the thieving corregidors.”
Diego Cristóbal noted that in previous wars Spanish authorities had of-
fered peace but then broken their promise, making Andean people cyni-
cal and wary.23 Nonetheless, while blaming chapetones (a derogatory term
for Spaniards, infrequently used in the uprising) who bled the Andean
people “in the name of the king, Our Lord” for the violence, Diego Cris-
tóbal agreed to the amnesty.
The rebel leader admitted that he accepted to save his family and his
own life. However, he questioned del Valle’s role in José Gabriel Tupac
Amaru’s execution, arguing that his cousin should have been sent to
Lima or to Spain so the viceroy or the king “would have learned the truth
about the crimes of the evil Europeans.”24 He added, “I suppose that
you all, accomplices in the iniquities of the evil Europeans, did this to
hide the truth.” Diego Cristóbal claimed that “the fear of death did not
make him hesitate,” but lamented that the offer had not been made
earlier.25 Diego Cristóbal accepted the amnesty offer but defended what
he and his cousin had done. He never wavered in his belief that he and
his cousin upheld justice and the king’s authority.
Numerous reasons explain Diego Cristóbal’s stunning decision to ac-
cept. He had his doubts about the Amaru-Katarista alliance. Relations
between the two rebel camps had always been tense, and the failed siege
of La Paz ruptured the coalition. Moreover, Cuzco and his home region
of the Vilcanota concerned Diego Cristóbal much more than Charcas;
perhaps (this is speculation) he was simply not that interested in a trans-
Andean uprising. Spanish fears that the struggle that had already moved
from Potosí to Cuzco would extend until it stretched from the Atlantic
to the Pacific Oceans—from Buenos Aires to Lima—were perhaps un-
founded; the second wave of Amarista rebels might not have had such a
grandiose vision. Diego Cristóbal was younger than his cousin. He had
not traveled to Lima and had not read Garcilaso de la Vega, an impor-
tant impetus for the widely circulated idea of a return of the Incas under
Tupac Amaru’s leadership. Simply put, Diego Cristóbal might very well
have taken charge of the uprising, replacing his soon-to-be-martyred
cousin, in order to continue a Cuzco-based struggle against unbearable
corregidors, abuse, and exploitation. He did not necessarily envision a
mass, trans-Andean revolution.

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More mundane reasons also influenced him. The tens of thousands

of dead in the sieges of La Paz no doubt weighed on him. His cousin,
whom he venerated, had not wanted to take Cuzco violently, over count-
less dead bodies. Moreover, Diego Cristóbal was exhausted and scared.
While he had driven del Valle out of Puno and seemed to have the up-
per hand, he knew that he was only one effective trap away from im-
prisonment (and he knew what that meant) or one good musket shot
from death. The Spanish victory in La Paz, as well as a large battalion
organized by Ramón Arias that was en route from Arequipa to the Lake
Titicaca area in October, concerned him. He recognized that his family
and inner circle had already paid a high price. Perhaps Diego Cristóbal
also feared that his rebel base would slip away once the rainy season
ended and the harvest began in early 1782 or that, conversely, his fol-
lowers would become more radical and irrepressible. After more than a
year of fighting and six months as absolute leader, a time when he had
always been on the move and had lost much of his family, the offer of
peace and a return to Pampamarca must have sounded enticing.
The viceroy and Inspector del Valle recruited Bishop Moscoso to
convince Diego Cristóbal that the Spanish meant well and that the ar-
mistice was in everyone’s interest. They worried that the rebel leader
might renege or that his followers would simply reject the offer. They
also knew that a minor misunderstanding could prompt a skirmish and
renewed fighting; they had to be diplomatic. In a November 3 letter, the
bishop called Diego Cristóbal and Mariano “my sons” but also repri-
manded them for the rebellion.26 Diego Cristóbal trusted the bishop,
and his letters to him are personal and heartfelt. In a November 5, 1781
letter to Moscoso, at a point when he had nominally accepted the am-
nesty but remained in Azángaro, Diego Cristóbal insisted that the cor-
regidors, bad kurakas, and other misguided authorities had caused the
uprising. Diego Cristóbal returned to his cousin’s argument that these
authorities’ abusive behavior (forcing their charges to work on Sun-
days, for example) hindered Indians from becoming good Christians.
He insisted that “these inhuman men are the cause of this rebellion”
and compared the rebel struggle with that of the “Hebrews.”27 Diego
Cristóbal denied that he was the organizer of the rebellion, maintain-
ing that he was simply trying to halt the bloodshed.
In letters from late 1781 and early 1782, Diego Cristóbal employed a
respectful tone but made it clear that he was still in charge of the Puno

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area and expected involvement in how the amnesty would be imple-

mented. For example, he encouraged the bishop to fi ll any vacant par-
ishes as soon as possible and mentioned that he, as rebel commander,
had assigned some priests to parishes, an unprecedented move in the
colonial Andes. Kurakas from Azángaro, Orurillo, and Asillo wrote to
Moscoso to echo the rebel leader. They decried how their priests had
mistreated and then abandoned them, forcing the kurakas and their
Indians to turn to “our Governor Don Diego Christoval Tupac Amaro for
protection.”28
In these letters, which he signed as Don Diego Christobal Tupac
Amaru Inga, the rebel leader admitted his fear to the bishop. In Novem-
ber he pointed out that Spanish soldiers were congregating in Arequipa
and that corregidors, particularly Francisco Orellana of Puno, wanted
to behead all Indians over seven years old. Diego Cristóbal noted that
some Spanish were already living in peace with Indians but begged
Moscoso to prevent the Spanish from breaking their promises made to
all Indians as well as the rebel leaders.29 On January 3, 1782, he admit-
ted to the bishop that the months of tension over the amnesty and all of
the contradictory advice and rumors he received had made him “des-
perate,” his heart “like a shipwreck.” He thanked the bishop for his sup-
port, which had calmed him, and promised to meet with the Spaniards
on January 20. Diego Cristóbal asked the bishop to help release his sis-
ter, Cecilia Tupac Amaru, from jail in Cuzco, arguing that she should
be covered by the amnesty.30 Father don Antonio Valdez wrote to the
bishop on January 3 and confi rmed that the swirl of rumors and diver-
gent opinions (“a variety of news, always so melancholic”) had bewil-
dered Diego Cristóbal and given him second thoughts. Valdez insisted
that only Moscoso could convince the rebels to meet with the Span-
ish.31 Diego Cristóbal was terrified that he was putting his life and that
of his followers in danger, jeopardizing all that the rebels had won. He
was not mistaken.
The bloody execution of Tupac Katari on November 15 troubled Di-
ego Cristóbal. In a December 5, 1781 letter to del Valle, he explained
that he had “countless reasons to be cautious” (sobrados fundamentos para
los recelos). He immediately described Commander Reseguín’s “betrayal”
of the peace agreement, citing Tupac Katari’s “destruction from the
force of four horses” and the imprisonment of dozens of his followers
on trumped-up charges about plans to renew the rebellion. In this letter,

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Diego Cristóbal also demanded that if he were to face charges, that he

be tried in the higher courts, under the king’s supervision. The news
from La Paz had made Diego Cristóbal and many of his followers skep-
tical and ner vous.32
Opposition to the cease-fire also came from royalists. Mata Linares,
Tupac Amaru’s judge and Areche’s firm ally, disapproved of the corre-
spondence between the bishop and the rebel. As other hard-liners would
insist in the coming months and years, Mata Linares contended that the
rebel leader did not merit any form of deference and that negotiations
with the rebels and the potential recognition of certain rights granted
them undue power and distinction. Mata Linares deemed this foolish
and dangerous. He emphasized not only that it was a bad precedent but
that Diego Cristóbal did not have control over his followers and would
not be able to guide them toward disarming. He lamented the rebel
leader’s “tyranny and bloody spirit.” (genio sanguinario).33 Mata Linares
and Areche had begun their campaign to sabotage the ceasefire.
Bishop Moscoso responded to Diego Cristóbal’s concerns about roy-
alist troops by noting outbreaks of rebel violence and indigenous disobe-
dience in both the Lake Titicaca area and Tupac Amaru’s original base
in the highlands above Tinta. He insisted that royalists also had reasons
to be wary. Reports also arrived about rebel actions in Paucartambo, the
coca-producing area between Cuzco and the Amazon basin. The bishop
implied that royalists would only disarm when rebels did. Moscoso reas-
sured the rebel leader, however, that he would do everything in his
power to protect the lives of Indians and the Tupac Amaru dynasty.34
The next step in the amnesty was a meeting between royalist and rebel
leaders. Both sides worried that the other would break the truce and use
the meeting to slaughter the enemy and capture weapons.
Diego Cristóbal had many reasons for concern. The execution of
Tupac Katari on November 15 distressed him, as did reports of brutal
royalist repression. The news from Charcas strengthened the argument
of his followers who did not trust the Spanish and wanted to reject the
amnesty. Diego Cristóbal also worried about the large Arequipa-based
royalist force led by Ramón Arias, which by the time it had reached
Lampa numbered six thousand soldiers, as well as several of the Lake
Titicaca corregidors who had proven to be dogged opponents of the reb-
els. Their strength made Diego Cristóbal reluctant to meet, since he
worried that they would crush his forces quickly if it were a trap.35 De-

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spite these concerns, the two sides agreed to an initial meeting between
Diego Cristóbal and Ramón de Arias on December 9. Arias’s soldiers
remained ner vous and at midnight on the eighth jumped out of their
tents and grabbed their guns when they heard the sound of enemy sol-
diers. It was a false alarm— just some of their own men moving about.
In fact, Diego Cristóbal did not show up and asked for a few more days.
Diego Cristóbal sent a Franciscan friar to arrange the meeting for the
twelfth. On that day, jittery Spanish troops again became alarmed when
the rebels surrounded the hills above the meeting place. Both sides sent
representatives, priests, to determine an exact meeting spot. Arias fi-
nally met with Diego Cristóbal and requested that he hand over his sup-
porters’ weapons. Dressed elegantly in velvet pants and a lamé coat,
with a golden buckle and dress sword and a gold-tipped staff, the rebel
leader insisted that he would only do so with Commander del Valle and
Bishop Moscoso present. Diego Cristóbal promised to fulfill the terms of
the amnesty but made several demands: that the same corregidors not
be allowed to return; that Arias’ forces leave the area, in order to protect
the little livestock that remained; and that they hand over Indian prison-
ers. The meeting ended with handshakes, flag waving, and both armies
shouting “Long Live the King” and firing their rustic cannons.36
They met again the following day, December 13, in order to exchange
prisoners. A royalist commander opened a bottle of alcohol and took
the first drink to prove that it was not poison. Diego Cristóbal took a small
sip. Arias invited Diego Cristóbal to share a meal the following day, but
the rebel leader declined. Andrés Tupac Amaru remained leery, believ-
ing that it was a “trap, as they had done with the La Paz commander
[Tupac Katari].”37 The royalists left unarmed officers with the rebels as
security and the two sides met again to discuss “pacification.” Diego
Cristóbal insisted that he would only sign a treaty with creole officers,
not Spaniards. Arias rebutted that many of the Spaniards were fi ne
men but granted Diego Cristóbal his wish. The meeting became tense
when Diego Choquehuanca, the Azángaro kuraka, approached. The
rebels had killed two of his sons and forced the remainder of the family
to flee to Arequipa. They now used Choquehuanca’s house in Azángaro
as their base. Diego Cristóbal demanded that Choquehuanca stop star-
ing and denied any blame for his family’s woes. Choquehuanca’s
brother, a priest, demanded that both sides calm down. They managed
to sign a paper in which each side promised not to harm Indians or

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Spaniards and to allow everyone to circulate. Once the paper was signed,
Diego Cristóbal pledged to bring the royalists some meat if they pledged
not to slaughter any of the few milk cows left. The rebel leader demon-
strated great concern about the state of the region’s livestock, under-
standing that local people would starve without cows, sheep, and llamas.
After the customary “Long Live the King” and gunshots signaled the end
of the meeting, Diego Cristóbal handed over a few prisoners.38
At this point, Viceroy Jáuregui, del Valle, and Moscoso worried that
the bloody execution of Tupac Katari would break the rebels’ already
weak resolve. They therefore insisted that Arias respect and even show
deference for Diego Cristóbal. For example, Arias accepted Diego Cris-
tóbal’s demand that the corregidor of Lampa, Vicente Oré, be excluded
from the post. Oré, in turn, had heard from authorities in the Titicaca
area that the rebels’ submission was a farce and they would soon
slaughter royalists. For Oré as well as Areche and other hard-liners, his
termination was a reprehensible slap in the face to a veteran com-
mander, a sign that the viceroy and his followers did not understand
the situation and would play into the rebels’ hands. Oré ridiculed the
agreement with Diego Cristóbal and exclaimed: “We cannot watch pa-
tiently as we become slaves of the Indians. We have lost hope of return-
ing to our houses.”39 Oré was bitter, and eager to unify the opponents
to a negotiated peace. While he exaggerated his pessimistic view of the
situation, he did capture the fact that relations between Indians and
Europeans had changed dramatically. Going back to his house, in both
the real and metaphorical sense, would be difficult if not impossible.40
Divisions among the Spanish increased toward the end of 1781; an
important faction of officers protested vehemently against negotiations.
They believed that the rebels would break the armistice and slaughter
them. One royalist, for example, wrote in January 1782 that “the rebel-
lion continues with greater tenacity, particularly in Chucuito and Ch-
ulamaní.” He criticized Arias for “fooling himself, just like all the other
commanders who have come to the Sierra [offering clemency], all
they’ve done is strengthen the rebellion. In the eyes of Indians, our
clemency just highlights Spanish weakness or cowardice and while our
army is sleeping in Lampa, the rebels are exterminating the few Span-
iards who remain in Chucuito.” 41
Diego Cristóbal had followers who told him the same thing about
the Spanish. These skeptics pleaded with him to continue the fight.

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Loyalists and insurgents were asked to pardon those who had been at-
tacking them weeks before. Indians were supposed to trust royalists
while mestizo, creole, and Spanish townspeople had to put their faith
in the rebels. Each side had large, powerful factions that opposed the
amnesty. Royalists reported new outbreaks of violence, exaggerating or
inventing in some cases, and many believed that Diego Cristóbal him-
self would break the treaty or would fail to control his more violent
followers. On the other side, many rebels believed that the agreement
was either a trap or simply a terrible mistake. They could not compre-
hend handing over their arms when they were dominating the south-
ern Andes. They grieved over the execution of Tupac Katari, hoping
that it wasn’t a sign of their fate. Negotiations continued, however, and
the two sides agreed to meet in Sicuani, back in José Gabriel Tupac
Amaru’s base area, on January 20, 1782, the day of Saint Sebastian, a
soldier-saint venerated in Spain and in the Andes.
Both sides negotiated the 1782 encounter with elevated demands and
great wariness if not outright pessimism, a challenging combination for
any act of diplomacy. The royalists demanded that the rebels demon-
strate their submission to the Crown and confi rm their disavowal of
violence. Rebels expected authorities to exhibit their respect for the
Tupac Amaru dynasty and to reform or replace the corregidor system.
The context could not have been tenser: tens of thousands of dead, a
devastated economy, and large factions, perhaps the majority, on both
sides who believed that continued fighting was inevitable and even
preferable. It was not just a matter of ironing out details, offering guaran-
tees, handing over weapons, and convincing the skeptical. In eighteenth-
century Peru, politics were highly ritualistic. Protocol needed to be
followed about where to meet, what to sign, and how to celebrate or
recognize. For example, whether the rebels would eat at the same table
as the royalists proved to be an important question. A gaffe could lead
to a disagreement that could overturn the cease-fire. Both sides acted
cautiously.
Bishop Moscoso and Commander del Valle, accompanied by over
one thousand five hundred soldiers, reached Sicuani on January 17,
1782. En route, they freed Diego Cristóbal’s sister, Cecilia Tupac Amaru,
from the San Jerónimo jail. They bought her expensive clothing, but she
refused to wear it, contending that she was in mourning, eight months
after the mass executions in Cuzco. This was one of many signs that the

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violence of the previous twelve months would not be quickly forgotten

or forgiven and that peace would not be easily attained.42 Their journey
began in the towns on the outskirts of Cuzco that had aided the royalists
in the siege of Cuzco but then descended into the Vilcanota Valley, to
the towns and communities that had been Tupac Amaru’s base and the
center of fighting in the first stage. The corregidor of Tinta, Francisco
Suárez Salcedo, met them in the new Fort Charles III. This imposing
new building loomed over the Vilcanota Valley, an intimidating site in
an area where no standing military had existed until the rebellion be-
gan less than eighteen months before. They had to wait nervously until
January 26 for the rebel leader and his entourage to arrive.
Diego Cristóbal explained that he had been forced to delay his depar-
ture from Azángaro as his followers begged him not to leave, worried that
he would fall prey to an ambush and leave them defenseless. En route,
from Azángaro over La Raya to Sicuani, Indians expressed their opposi-
tion to the agreement, “as they did not trust the Spanish.” 43 Indians in
Santa Rosa, punished brutally by the Spanish for their support of Tupac
Amaru, cried and pleaded with him not to go. Others in Calca y Lares as
well as Larecaja and Pacages promised him five thousand soldiers and
ample food and supplies if he would take up arms again.44 After passing
La Raya, Diego Cristóbal sent representatives to the royalist camp with
letters demanding proof that it was not a trap and that the Spanish were
acting in good faith. Corregidor Salcedo, on good terms with Diego Cris-
tóbal, reassured him that the route was safe and the agreement sincere.
He went so far as to order his soldiers to unload their guns.
Diego Cristóbal met Bishop Moscoso at his campsite outside of Sicu-
ani on January 26, 1782. They embraced. Bishop Moscoso accompanied
him to meet del Valle. Diego Cristóbal handed the commander a note
pledging his surrender while del Valle and the bishop stressed the favor-
able terms of the armistice for the rebels.45 Soldiers from both sides
watched nervously, following instructions not to use their weapons un-
der any circumstance. Commanders worried that the act of one panicked
soldier could prompt a confrontation and break the truce. The leaders
sealed the pact with festive meals and numerous masses, with Diego
Cristóbal reiterating his respect for the Crown and acceptance of the ar-
mistice, and Spanish authorities guaranteeing his safety and that of his
followers. Bishop Moscoso lifted the excommunication that weighed so
heavily on Diego Cristóbal and the other leaders. Rebel followers ner-

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vously entered Sicuani and when one royalist soldier, the mestizo Matías
Pérez, called some of them alzados or rebels and insulted them, del Valle
quickly moved to punish him. In fact, Bishop Moscoso and Diego Cris-
tóbal themselves intervened to prevent Pérez’s execution.46
Royalists grumbled about how well the bishop, del Valle, and other
proponents of the amnesty treated the rebels. On January 29, 1782,
Bishop Moscoso confi rmed Diego Cristóbal and Manuela Tito Condori’s
marriage. They had married in Azángaro, but for the Spanish, the mar-
riage was not valid due to the excommunication and the context. Del
Valle was the godfather of the wedding and Corregidor Salcedo paid for
an elaborate wedding. Tito Condori was from Pitumarca, near the rebel
center, and she and much of her extensive family was with the insur-
gents from the beginning. They followed Diego Cristóbal and the other
second-phase leaders to the south in 1782, the point when she and Di-
ego Cristóbal fell in love. Unlike Micaela, Manuela apparently did not
lead troops or oversee logistics.47
Critics saw the wedding and all the attention paid to the couple exces-
sive, an affront to royalists.48 One anonymous but lengthy report from
September 1782 also complained that the bishop had allowed Diego
Cristóbal to stay in a room adjacent to his and treated him with great
affection. The writer also lamented that Areche, Major Joaquín Valcár-
cel, Corregidor Salcedo, and other authorities had danced a traditional
dance, cachua, with the bride and groom in the streets of Sicuani and that
the bishop had seated Tupac Amaru’s sister, Cecilia, at the same table as
Spanish and Church dignitaries. These and other “insults” or breaches
of etiquette constituted “unseemly indulgence with the rebels” with the
conclusion that “the government’s excessive humanitarianism with the
rebels is why pacification has taken so long.” 49 The agreement and ensu-
ing rituals in Sicuani infuriated many royalists.
In the following days and weeks, tens of thousands of Indians reached
Sicuani to confirm their acceptance of the amnesty, thirty thousand ac-
cording to Moscoso.50 On February 20, 1782, Viceroy Jáuregui called for
celebratory masses, lanterns, and bell ringing in Lima to celebrate the
peace.51 Andrés (Tupac Amaru) Mendigure arrived in Sicuani weeks later
to confirm his acceptance of the amnesty. Inspector del Valle, Bishop
Moscoso, and Viceroy Jáuregui were ecstatic. On the brink of defeat
months before, they had disarmed the rebels and implemented a truce
with seeming speed and ease.

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But trouble lurked. Convincing all rebel supporters to abandon the

cause would not be easy. Much of the region’s indigenous population
believed that they had had the upper hand and that the Spanish could
not be trusted. Conversely, landowners and authorities such as corregi-
dors were reluctant to return to the area. They worried that any spark
would set off a new uprising and understood that the old economic and
political system, even with a seemingly favorable truce, was gone. More-
over, Visitador Areche remained furious about his exclusion from the
negotiations in the previous months and stepped up his lobbying cam-
paign. He collaborated with skeptical authorities such as the Lake Titi-
caca corregidors and others opposed to the amnesty and collected any
information he could fi nd about possible rebel treachery and new out-
breaks of violence. He flooded his friend José Gálvez in Madrid and the
Madrid court with denunciatory letters about the deference and alarm-
ing privileges granted to the rebels as well as the troubling signs of
violence on the horizon. The fight was not over.

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11
The Rebellion in Limbo
P EOPL E R ECEI V ED N EWS of the cease-fi re with shock, glee, dismay,

and disbelief. Many rejoiced with the end or at least suspension of
bloodshed and the possibility of a return to normality. The viceroy’s call
for bell ringing, masses, and ceremonies in Lima did not go unheeded—
people celebrated.1 A war that seemed to have no end suddenly ap-
peared to have one. However, important factions on both sides bitterly
opposed the agreement and believed that peace would not or should
not hold. Hard-line royalists thought that the rebels needed to be de-
feated militarily and that negotiations and conferences such as the
events in Sicuani foolishly and naively recognized the rebels as equals.
They saw the entire process as humiliating and futile, because they ex-
pected the rebels to break the agreement. Leading figures in Cuzco and
Lima thus sought to sabotage the agreement from the day it was signed.
On the other side, many Indians believed that Diego Cristóbal had
made a grave error. They did not trust the Spanish and felt that they, the
rebels, had the military advantage when Diego Cristóbal accepted the
offer. Many lobbied him to return to arms; others simply did not heed
the agreement and kept fighting.
The situation was unprecedented. Even the rebellion’s fi rst stage
and the fighting itself had antecedents, although on a much smaller scale.
Andean people had revolted before, attacking customs houses, expel-
ling authorities, and experimenting with alternative political arrange-
ments. Most Indians in the Cuzco and Titicaca areas had participated in
or witnessed some form of insubordination. But no one had ever expe-
rienced a mass pardon, with rebel leaders and followers abandoning
the struggle and Spanish forces disarming. Nobody had a script.

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Diego Cristóbal returned home to Pampamarca but as what— a hero,

a villain, or an afterthought? Would he continue as a leader or return
to life as a muleteer in the Vilcanota Valley? He and the other rebel
leaders had to negotiate basic questions such as their income—would
the colonial state grant them a pension and return confiscated land?
The treatment Diego Cristóbal received from Indians only deepened the
uncertainty: many venerated him while others scorned him. On the
other side, many Spaniards rejoiced over the agreement, hoping that
violence would cease, that the economy would recover, and that things
would go back as much as possible to what they had been. Hard-liners,
however, despised the cease-fire and sought to sabotage it. They not only
wanted to overturn the agreement, but to imprison the Tupac Amaru
leaders and rid the area of them. In reports and memos that moved back
and forth between the rebel red zone of the upper provinces, Cuzco,
Lima, and Madrid, these opponents lambasted the cease-fire, stressing
the rebel leaders’ hypocrisy, their followers’ insolence, and the many
dangers the agreement and the tense context posed to Spanish rule in
Peru. In doing so they retooled notions about Indians’ purported back-
wardness, the ideological core of Spanish colonialism. Royalist foes of
the amnesty stressed Indians’ blind willingness to follow seditious lead-
ers and the concomitant need for force on the part of the colonial state,
ideas that endured and shaped Indian-state relations in the coming de-
cades. Important factions from both sides conspired against the cease-
fire, backstabbing their former allies, even before it was signed. The peace
agreement did not mean tranquility; it barely meant peace.
The Return
Andrés Mendigure and Mariano Tupac Amaru had not attended the
Sicuani signings, but soon made their way toward Cuzco. Andrés
reached Sicuani on March 1 to present himself to del Valle and to rec-
ognize the cease-fi re. Once Andrés took an oath of fidelity, Father José
Gallegos absolved him from the excommunication. Andrés promised to
hand over the movement’s cannons and other weapons. Different con-
cerns haunted the two sides: the rebel leaders worried about their ex-
clusion from the Catholic Church while royalist officials made sure that
the rebels relinquished their fi repower. Mariano presented himself to
military officials in La Paz and then returned to Sicuani.2

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The Rebellion in Limbo 221
Authorities released Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru, José Gabriel’s thirty-

five-year-old half brother, from jail in Cuzco. Imprisoned days after
José Gabriel, he suffered in captivity as common prisoners taunted him
and authorities limited his food, stole his goods, pocketed the money
sent to feed him, kept his cell fi lthy, and beat him on occasion. He com-
plained that one blow left a permanent scar. When he was paraded
around Cuzco on a mule shortly after his brother’s execution, soldiers
whipped him. Juan Bautista said that “what was most notable to me was
that these men felt a type of pleasure in my hardship, my mistreatment,
and even found it funny, just like the Conquistadors who hunted down
Indians with their dogs for fun.”3 He observed bitterly that when he
was as a prisoner even Indians treated him with “unbearable disdain.”
Juan Bautista explained that those who believed themselves closer to
the Spanish because of their skin color or economic condition were
particularly pitiless.4
Sentenced to ten years of exile and hard work at a presidio, his free-
dom caught him by surprise. He claimed that Visitador Areche wanted
him dead, while Colonel Gabriel Avilés (a Spanish commander who
later in 1782 would replace José del Valle as General Inspector) de-
fended him; the latter won, at least temporarily. Juan Bautista’s hard-
ships, however, were far from over. Jail had left him in such bad shape
that it took him six days to walk the forty-five miles (fourteen leagues)
home, much longer than the norm in this era. En route, he and his wife
had to confront the taunts of royalists. With his family decimated and
their land and other goods expropriated, they barely had enough to eat
or clothe themselves. Unlike the rebel leaders, Juan Bautista did not
receive a pension, and he complained that his friends abandoned him.
His odyssey, as we will see, would continue, taking him to Spain, Af-
rica, and back to South America.5 Nonetheless, he spent most of 1782 in
Pampamarca, struggling to adjust and make ends meet.
Accompanied by the Tinta corregidor, Francisco Salcedo, Father An-
tonio Valdés, and twelve dragoons or light cavalry, Diego Cristóbal Tu-
pac Amaru and a small group of intimates returned to his hometown of
Tungasuca in late February 1782. Authorities hoped that he would
settle his affairs and proceed to Lima, where he would be separated
from the rebel base and easier to follow, but he resisted this idea. His
family members and acquaintances embraced him, still shocked by the
turn of events. They had expected him either to die in battle or to return

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as a victorious hero, not accompanied by colonial authorities proclaim-

ing a truce. His wife, Manuela Tito Condori, mistrusted the Spanish
and implored Bishop Moscoso to protect her family, describing her situ-
ation as “darkness, confusion, and anguish.” Marcela Castro Puiuca-
hua, Diego Cristóbal’s mother, wrote that the family would not go to
Lima, as many authorities encouraged them to do, but rather to the
“bishop’s mansion.”6 They put their trust in the bishop.
Salcedo convinced Diego Cristóbal to visit some of the more recalci-
trant towns of the provincias altas. On March 29, a little more than a
month after the Sicuani signing, Diego Cristóbal ventured into José
Gabriel Tupac Amaru’s most dependable base, an almost fully mono-
lingual Quechua region of towering snow-covered peaks, where many
had not accepted the cease-fi re. For Salcedo and Valdés, this excursion
demonstrated that the cease-fi re could succeed; they sent glowing re-
ports about Diego Cristobal’s efforts and Indians’ willingness to aban-
don the fight. Critics of the cease-fi re, by contrast, believed that these
events demonstrated that Indians still dangerously idolized Diego Cris-
tóbal and were waiting for him to signal a return to arms.
In Combapata, Diego Cristóbal persuaded Indians to come down
from the peaks, las punas, where they had taken refuge during the
rebellion. This was significant— Indians taking to the punas was a syn-
onym, for the Spanish, of insurgency, of the guerrilla tactics that
had so dogged them in the last eighteen months, and of Indians’ dis-
tancing themselves from colonial structures. Descent or bajar de las
punas was therefore a metaphor for submission or at least the accep-
tance of the cease-fi re. With great relief, Salcedo described how when
they came into town, Indians attended mass, bowed to the Spanish
flag, elected new authorities, and pledged their support for the king.7
In fact, shouts of “Long Live the King” fi lled the air. Diego Cristóbal
tried to convince the Combapata Indians to return everything they
had expropriated during the uprising, particularly livestock, and to
attend Mass. The encounter between recalcitrant Quechua Indians
and Diego Cristóbal and his entourage could have taken place in the
sixteenth-century Conquest. Some officials in Cuzco remained skep-
tical, however, as rumors circulated that trouble was brewing in the
high peaks and that the day before Diego Cristóbal had visited Com-
bapata, rabble-rousers had recruited more people and committed vio-
lent acts. 8

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Diego Cristóbal and the others persuaded Indians from his wife’s
hometown of Pitumarca to return to their town, which was abandoned
and overgrown with vegetation. Salcedo and Diego Cristóbal assured
the local population, which had massively supported the uprising, that
they were safe. They gave Indians from other key towns such as Laura-
marca, Ocongate, Calca, and Paucartambo similar assurances. The In-
dians in turn asked Salcedo to accompany them to their towns, to
make sure that corregidors and other authorities fulfi lled the promised
pardon and cease-fi re. In this highly polarized area, both sides believed
that the other was likely to seek bloody revenge. Valdés and Salcedo
understood that a small incident could spark new confrontations and
even a full-scale rebellion.9
Salcedo and Diego Cristóbal had to confront the delicate issue of
naming authorities. They understood the danger of a vacuum of power
but also knew that the question of whether to rename the same cor-
regidor or loyal kuraka or to fi nd replacements more acceptable to the
Indian majority could polarize the area, resurrecting the divisions that
marked the violence of the previous two years. In these early months,
they apparently decided on a case-by-case basis. The fi rst was perhaps
the greatest challenge: José Gabriel Tupac Amaru’s cacicazgo of Tunga-
suca, Pampamarca, and Surimana. Salcedo convinced Diego Cristóbal
not to assume the position in order to remain “independent of the gov-
ernment.” The rebel leader accepted, although unhappily according to
Salcedo, “as he’s used to being in charge.”10
The town of Checacupe presented a par tic ular challenge. Local In-
dians widely despised their kuraka, Aronis (no first name given in the
records), who had remained loyal to the Crown in the midst of the
fighting. Diego Cristóbal and Salcedo did not want to anger the major-
ity, but they wanted to recognize Aronis’s efforts. They came up with a
diplomatic solution, naming his son as the new kuraka.11 At this point,
in late March, Salcedo proposed that they continue to Calca, the Sacred
Valley, and then proceed to the Titicaca area to implement the pardon.
Inspector General del Valle, however, requested that they return to
Cuzco, which they did.12 Salcedo and Valdés presented their mission as
a success, an important step toward pacification. Hard-liners had a very
different interpretation.
Tensions flared in the upper provinces after their departure. In late
March, rival kurakas of the towns of Ocongate and Lauramarca, Andrés

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Quispe and Felipe Espinoza, came to blows, bringing hundreds of Indi-

ans as backup. Quispe and four hundred Indians killed Espinoza and
took refuge in the glacial peaks that soared above Ocongate. Quispe’s
faction would not lay down their arms for months, pledging to fight the
Spanish. One par tic ular incident gave pause to those who believed that
peace had returned. An Indian from the town of Pitura, a Quispe sup-
porter, assaulted and robbed a woman on her way to Cuzco. The anon-
ymous assailant sneered, “You and the rednecks (pukacuncas) believe
that just because we accepted the amnesty, that you will end up laugh-
ing.”13 Obviously, he did not believe that the insurgency had ended. Del
Valle sought the aid of Diego Cristóbal to disarm them. Quispe and his
followers, however, did not go away.
These initial months reassured Diego Cristóbal and the other leaders
that their worst fears had been ungrounded— they had not been de-
ceived, detained, or executed once they left behind their troops and
began handing over weapons. Authorities encouraged but did not
oblige them to go to Lima. For supporters of the cease-fi re, this initial
period had bolstered their optimism. Events outside of the Vilcanota
Valley, however, brought disturbing news that enraged and energized
the hard-liners who opposed the amnesty. The fighting continued.
Diego Cristobal’s commander, Pedro Vilca Apaza, had rejected the
cease-fire, insisting that it was a trap. He returned to Azángaro in early
1782 and fought in the area north of Lake Titicaca, Muñani and Putina.
Although many of his troops abandoned him to accept the pardon,
those who remained ransacked estates and towns and used hit-and-run
tactics to confront royalist troops. News about Vilca Apaza confirmed to
the already doubtful that the cease-fire was an illusion and that the reb-
els could not be trusted.14 However, the Arequipa troops led by Ramón
Arias arrived in the area in late March and separated Vilca Apaza from
the bulk of his fighters. An anonymous Spaniard from Lampa captured
him on March 29. Spaniards accused him of stealing silver and gold,
which he denied. On April 8, executioners attached his limbs to four
horses and when they could not dismember him, they doubled the
number. The excruciating dislocation of his legs and arms did not kill
him, so his tormenters strangled him with a rope and stabbed him. He
has become a folk hero in the Azángaro area, the “indomitable Puma.”
His death mortified Indian people yet did not satisfy hard-liners.
Intransigent royalists believed that Vilca Apaza proved that the rebel-

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modern borders
Orurillo
Muñani 0 50 miles
Asillo
Azángaro Putina 0 50 km
Santiago de Pupuja
Arapa
Vilque Chico Chuma
Taraco Moho
Lampa Mocomoco
Juliaca
Lake
Sorata B O L I V I A
Carabuco
Vilque Titicaca
Puno Ancoraimes
Chucuito
Achacuche
Acora Copacabana
Ilave Juli Huarina
San Pedro de Tiquina
P E R U Pomata Chulumani
Zepita Taraco La Paz
Desaguadero Tambillo
Collocollo
De s a
N
gu
ad
ero
Ri
v
er
Battle Areas near Lake Titicaca
lion was not over and that only repression could end it.15 One Spanish
commander, Raimundo Necochea, who became the Quispicanchi cor-
regidor, accused Diego Cristóbal of surreptitiously aiding Vilca Apaza
by attempting to impede the Arequipa Battalion from reaching the
Lake Titicaca area.16 Authorities captured another rebel commander
who did not accept the cease-fi re, Melchor Laura, in February. His tes-
timony heightened royalists’ concern about Tupac Amaru’s followers.
Laura declared that he had refused the pardon because of his “love for
Tupac Amaru” and that he only sought to control the province of Chu-
cuito for Tupac Amaru. They executed him.17
Royalists in La Paz moved to the north to extinguish any remnants
of the uprising. Their brutal, effective campaign eased the concerns of

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many of their followers, making many pause to wonder why del Valle
could not have used similar tactics and gained similar results in his ex-
pedition from Cuzco to Puno in 1781. Some colonial officials, however,
worried that commanders used too much force and that the ruthless-
ness would backfi re. Even the official narrative, usually a laconic list of
success after success, victory after victory, captured the brutality and
wanton violence. The Arequipa battalion, which had met with Diego
Cristóbal and then captured Vilca Apaza, converged with other battal-
ions in La Paz and moved toward the hills above Juli. Sebastián Segu-
rola operated from La Paz to Caracoto, and del Valle and Orellana mo-
bilized in Carabuco and Mocomoco. In his account, Segurola describes
meeting some resistance but overcoming it quickly, leaving behind one
hundred fi fty dead. Royalists were not taking prisoners; they assumed
that all Indians were dangerous rebels. On April 22, near Collana, they
killed “five or six hundred enemies, of both sexes” without taking any
losses, numbers that indicate mass detentions and fi ring squads rather
than a confrontation.18 The pockets of rebels who resisted with what-
ever weapons they still had infuriated the royalist troops. In the eyes of
Segurola, this explained atrocious acts or “excesses,” such as killing a
woman about to give birth (seizing the fetus from the womb so it could
be baptized before dying) or swinging another pregnant woman against
a boulder to kill her. The genocide included infanticide. To Segurola’s
surprise, the rebels did not surrender or flee. Royalists burned down
the town of Mecapata, sparing only the country homes and estates of
prominent La Paz residents.19
Troops entered the town of Coní, and executed “eight Indians and
some children before burning most of the town down.” There they
freed captives taken by the rebels in the sieges of Sorata and La Paz. Arias
and other commanders pardoned some relatives of rebel leaders, although
these seem to be exceptions— the campaign relied on brutality as it
spread from La Paz toward Lake Titicaca and to the northeast. Bishop
Moscoso wrote to Viceroy Jáuregui to express his concern about the
bloodshed, but the campaign continued. By May 1782, royalists had
defeated the rebels north of La Paz and brutally punished those sus-
pected of aiding the insurgents and Indians.20 They looked to the trian-
gle between La Paz, Lake Titicaca, and the Yungas to the northeast with
satisfaction; Tupac Amaru’s core area to the south of Cuzco, however,
worried them.

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Weddings, Funerals, Pensions, and Convents
The rebel leaders struggled to fi nd their place in post-rebellion Cuzco.

They had no precedent or model and their family’s patriarch, José Ga-
briel, had been executed. They received alarming news from Upper Peru
and were treated in confusing fashion in Cuzco, ranging from disdain to
veneration. While the scorn from some Indians and hatred from royal-
ists stung, the veneration could get them in trouble. Moreover, in mid-
1782, each of them became entangled in controversies that demonstrated
not only that they were human but very young. Each incident struck a
nerve as well with royalists, increasing their angst over the presence of
Diego Cristóbal, Andrés, and Mariano in the Cuzco region.
Tensions escalated because the rebel leaders expected the colonial
state and church to honor their family or at least recognize their royal
Inca bloodlines. Rituals such as weddings, baptisms, and funerals sanc-
tioned honor and prestige in colonial Peru. Their opponents understood
the Tupac Amaru clan to be common Indians or disgraced subversives
rather than distinguished kurakas and fi rmly believed that after the
cease-fi re the former rebel leaders did not deserve any type of public
recognition or deference. The rebels thought otherwise.
Resentment over Diego Cristóbal and Manuela Titu Condori’s wed-
ding and the treatment granted them by corregidor Francisco Salcedo
and del Valle smoldered. When they had a son, Salcedo delayed the bap-
tism until November 4, the day of San Carlos, in order to name him in
honor of King Charles III as well as Salcedo himself. In fact, they baptized
him Carlos Francisco Diego Manuel Mariano del Carmen in the new
Sicuani Royal fort, with Salcedo serving as the godfather.21 The infant
passed away on November 17. One historian asked whether “the little
prince” might have been poisoned.22 Hard-liners criticized Salcedo as
well as Bishop Moscoso for permitting a grandiose funeral in the Sicuani
church. An honor guard that included not only the parents and the god-
father but also dozens of soldiers and priests accompanied the small cas-
ket from the fort to the town of Sicuani. Critics led by the tireless Areche
saw this as yet another sign of undue respect to the rebels.23 Authorities
subsequently accused Salcedo of commissioning a portrait of the infant,
found in the possession of the Pampamarca priest and José Gabriel Tupac
Amaru intimate, Antonio López de Sosa. They charged Salcedo with
“criminal deference” and he lost his position as corregidor in 1783.24

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Diego Cristóbal and Andrés’s aspiration to honor their relatives also

irritated authorities. Diego Cristóbal sought to exhume the remains of
his cousin, José Gabriel, from the common grounds of the San Fran-
cisco church and bury him properly, in a more honorable place. Au-
thorities had incinerated his torso, dumping the ashes in the Huatanay
River, but displayed his head and limbs throughout Cuzco. These ap-
parently ended up in the San Francisco Church. On August 27, 1782,
with the support of Bishop Moscoso, Diego Cristóbal held a stately fu-
neral for his cousin. Areche condemned this ceremony, “as though it
were for a royal person,” censuring the bishop, the viceroy, and Diego
Cristóbal.25 Andrés sought to move the remains of his father, Pedro
Mendigure, from the section of the cathedral allotted to criminals and
lowlifes to a vault. (In the late eighteenth century, most people were
buried in churches— cemeteries emerged decades later.) Church officials
granted Andrés his request, which other authorities criticized, under-
standing the request as a disturbing sign of bad faith and dangerous
intentions. They did not want to grant any type of honor to the rebel
martyrs nor designate a place where they could be mourned.26
Mariano Tupac Amaru got himself in trouble by falling in love. He
sought to marry Maria Nieves Paita (or Payta), from Sicuani, who was
pregnant, presumably with his child. Authorities, specifically corregidor
Salcedo, deemed her a zamba, or part black, and a prostitute, pointing out
her two out-of-wedlock children and concubinage with other Cuzco men.
Diego Cristóbal also opposed the union, concerned about his family’s lin-
eage. Salcedo invoked the 1776 Real Pragmática or Royal Pragmatic that
compelled anyone under the age of twenty-five to have their parents’ ap-
proval to marry and restricted interracial marriages. Salcedo also implied
that he did not want the Tupac Amaru clan to reproduce.27 Authorities
arrested Paita and placed her in Cuzco’s Santa Catalina convent.
On September 19, 1782 Mariano and eight accomplices liberated
Paita from the convent, dumbfounding witnesses. They threatened the
nuns at the doors with their sabers, menacing anyone who tried to in-
tervene, and took her out a side door.28 Authorities rapidly detained
her, however, and transferred her to the Santa Clara convent. The stun-
ning news spread quickly. Mariano’s romantic escapades infuriated
Bishop Moscoso and proved to those opposed to the cease-fi re that the
rebel leaders could not be trusted. The paper trail on María Paita ends
here—we know nothing about her fate or her pregnancy.29

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As is so often the case, disputes about money accompanied those re-

garding sex, love, and marriage. The Spanish chided the rebels for hiding
vast amounts of silver and troves of livestock and other stolen property.
Royalists wrote among themselves about a hidden treasure secreted
away by the Tupac Amaru clan and demanded that Diego Cristóbal re-
turn the silver supposedly stolen in Sorata.30 They also complained
about the pensions granted to the rebel leaders. Viceroy Jáuregui agreed
to 1,000 pesos a year for Diego Cristóbal and 600 each for Andrés and
Mariano. The viceroy justified the payments in the following terms:
“having selected softness and sweetness to induce them toward obedi-
ence to His Majesty, this system [payments] seems justified in order to
achieve the provinces’ absolute pacification, showing them the hu-
manity with which they are treated and royal beneficence.”31 Areche
disagreed, contending that this was an affront to all royalists and a waste
of precious revenue. He included this point in his disparaging letters
and memos to Madrid and ultimately gained the attention of the king.
Bishop Moscoso, on the other hand, saw the payments as a small invest-
ment for peace.
And even collecting the money proved problematic. In March, Diego
Cristóbal refused to sign a receipt for his pension because it was made out
to Diego Cristóbal Condorcanqui—he demanded that it include Tupac
Amaru. Royalists wanted to eliminate that royal last name.32 Through-
out 1782 and early 1783, they accused rebel leaders of organizing the
masses, showing disrespect to the Crown, hiding stolen treasures, and
leading disreputable private lives.
News of these curious events as well as other incidents reached far
beyond Cuzco, even crossing the Atlantic. Supporters and opponents of
the cease-fi re lobbied authorities in Cuzco, Lima, and Madrid. Areche
incorporated his venomous complaints about the pardon into his inces-
sant letters and memos to Spain, which previously had focused on de-
riding del Valle and claiming the honor of capturing José Gabriel. In
October 1781, before Diego Cristóbal even had agreed to the cease-fi re,
Areche labeled the pardon “exorbitant.”33 His opposition hardened as
the months passed. In a May 29, 1782 letter to José Gálvez, his ally and
pen pal, he labeled Diego Cristóbal “insolent” and argued that the am-
nesty had reinforced the rebel leader’s belief that he was the “descendent
of the emperors or Incas.” Areche ridiculed the rebels’ weapons and
strategy and contended that they only responded to threats; conciliation

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would not work. He then returned to his previous obsession: that del
Valle received credit for the capture of José Gabriel whereas he had led
the charge.34
Jáuregui provided Madrid a much more positive summary of the
early 1782 events and the prospects for peace, complimenting the work
of Diego Cristóbal in the upper provinces. He explained the pension
granted to the rebel leaders as a reasonable expenditure to keep them
out of trouble. The Court returned the letter with a telling note in the
margin, dated February 10, 1783: “The king read this letter with con-
sternation due to the fact that pensions were granted to these infamous
and sacrilegious rebel chiefs without due process, necessity, or a motive
that could excuse excess that sets such a bad example. . . . His Majesty
deems that in very reserved form the viceroy and Visitador Escobedo be
instructed fi rmly, yet without alerting the public and thus discrediting
that weak and poorly advised government [Peru], to fi nd the way to
amend such a great error, and attempt to have Diego Cristóbal and his
two nephews safely in Lima, which should have been the fi rst priority
after they surrendered.”35
A note from Madrid dated February 27, 1783 underlines the king’s
dismay about the “distinctions” granted the rebel leaders. The king’s
anonymous scribe explained that if they, Indians in general, became
too proud, “they would become what we were for them in the time of
the Conquest.” In the name of the king, the writer complained about
the celebrations for the cease-fire, the publication of the decree, the fi re-
works, and solemn mass, maintaining that the rebels did not deserve
such honors and that these events broke protocol.36 Although soon to
be replaced in Peru, Visitador Areche had gained the ear of the court in
Madrid in the long paper war that stretched through 1781 and 1782.
His ire at this point focused on the deal struck with Diego Cristóbal and
company.
As Long as There Are Tupac Amarus in Peru . . .
In mid-1782, both supporters and opponents of the amnesty in the roy-

alist camp agreed that Diego Cristóbal, Mariano, and Andrés posed a
danger if they remained in Cuzco. The two sides, moderates and hard-
liners, disagreed fiercely about the solution, however. Moderates such as
Bishop Moscoso and Viceroy Jáuregui contended that the young rebels

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needed to go to Lima in order to separate them from the Indian masses,

whom they understood as still dangerously subversive at worst and, at a
minimum, impressionable. These authorities recognized that it would
be easier to monitor the rebel leaders’ activities in the capital. Hard-
liners, on the other hand, wanted to exterminate the Tupac Amaru
lineage. They believed that the rebel leaders were buying time to initiate
another bloody uprising and that as long as they were alive they posed a
great danger. Hard-liners led by Areche did not, however, seek to deport
them to Spain or send them to presidios—they wanted to kill them, to
rid the world of the Tupac Amaru bloodline. The paper war over the
amnesty escalated as both sides lobbied Lima and Madrid.
Why had moderates lost confidence in the prospects of the rebel
leaders staying in Cuzco? The death of an important ally, Commander
del Valle, on August 26, 1782 weakened them. He passed away in an
expedition to the towering hills above Calca. Whereas for his critics del
Valle embodied the failures of a supposedly feeble counterinsurgency
campaign and was a key culprit in the rebellion’s resurgence, for mod-
erates and rebels alike he had become a trusted commander who be-
lieved that negotiations rather than warfare would bring peace. Gabriel
Valdés replaced del Valle. But what swayed Moscoso was his belief that
a misunderstanding or an inopportune act by a rebel follower or the
rebel leaders themselves could escalate into a rupture of the cease-fi re
and renewed fighting. Although furious about the Santa Clara convent
escapade, he did not believe that the rebel leaders sought to rebuild
their movement and begin fighting again. Nor did the bishop think that
baptizing Diego Cristóbal’s son, paying the leaders a pension, or show-
ing respect for Andrés or Mariano constituted unacceptable deference
that could spark new tensions. What worried him was the possibility
that hard-liners could convert these or a different incident into a con-
frontation that would sabotage the amnesty.
A decade later, when he was battling charges that he had aided the
rebels, Moscoso wrote that he understood that the departure of Diego
Cristóbal and his two cousins would “leave those provinces without
caudillos or patrons, whose mere presence could inflame the always
ardent spirit of those Indians [Naturales].”37 In this defense, Moscoso
stressed that Viceroy Jáuregui was the author of the pardon and that
he, Moscoso, oversaw its implementation out of “prudence” rather than
“compassion.”38 Although Moscoso downplayed his role in supporting

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the pardon at this point, in 1788, it is indisputable that in 1782 the

bishop wanted to remove Diego Cristóbal and company from Cuzco in
order to prevent an incident that could shatter the cease-fi re. In July
1782 Moscoso wrote Viceroy Jáuregui that getting the rebel leaders out
of the area “is the business of the day.” Nonetheless, he applauded the
success of the amnesty (indulto).39 Corregidor Salcedo labeled getting
the rebel leaders to Lima “a priority.” 40
Hard-liners, in contrast, had no hesitations about the use of violence
to separate the rebel leaders from Cuzco. Commanders such as Orel-
lana, Flores, Segurola, and Necochea saw threats of new outbreaks ev-
erywhere and grumbled that rebel leaders still had a mass following
and that the indigenous people had showed no contrition. Their num-
bers were bolstered when Jorge Escobedo y Alarcón replaced Areche as
Visitador General in June 1782.41 At every opportunity this group ex-
pressed their opposition to the amnesty.
In May 1782, Commander Avilés wrote to the viceroy to alert him
about disturbing events in the Azángaro area and closer to Cuzco. He
claimed that it was absolutely necessary to “get the Tupa Maros out of
these provinces due to the incredible affection and passion that Indians
hold for them.” 42 Matías Baulen, the corregidor of Cuzco and lieutenant
colonel of the militias, explained that Tungasuca was a particularly
dangerous home for Diego Cristóbal since it was isolated and difficult to
monitor. He asserted that Indians continued to hail the rebel leader and
offer him “tributes and adoration,” to the point that a “terrible storm”
could be unleashed and Europeans exterminated. Baulen called for the
insurgent leaders to be “yanked out of their beloved nest, but without
too much noise.” 43 Around the same time, Baulen wrote another letter
to the viceroy providing numerous reasons why he believed that the
Tupac Amaru family would not “remain quiet” in Tungasuca: the town
brought back memories of their perfidious past; its isolation allowed
them to ponder; it was several leagues away from Sicuani and thus the
corregidor could not follow their actions; it was an unpopulated area;
and the people there had abandoned their loyalty to the king.44
The bishop of La Paz, Gregorio Francisco de Campos, wrote in June
to express his extreme pessimism: “As long as there are Tupac Amarus
in Peru there will be no tranquility (sosiego).” He argued that the entire
family should be sent to Spain. The bishop contended that Diego Cris-
tóbal had acted with “iniquity, treachery and bad faith” and called

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Andrés “a cruel monster” for his role in the death of Spaniards in So-
rata. Campos maintained that although women and children begged
for mercy with tear-fi lled eyes, Andrés slaughtered them anyway due
to “this Attila’s implacable hatred, his desire to exterminate everyone,
to take over this kingdom, and to allow the Dev il to return to control
these dominions.” 45
These writers based their views on their experience in the brutal
battles of late 1781, their ensuing hatred for the Tupac Amaru clan, and
their belief that rebel fury would soon rekindle in Tungasuca and the
Sicuani area. They did not trust the rebels. Other hard-liners highlighted
disturbing events in 1782, after the cease-fi re was signed, to support
their argument that the Tupac Amaru clan had to be exterminated.
They believed that a dangerous conspiracy was brewing in the upper
provinces, particularly around Marcapata and Ocongate, which could
spark a new phase of insurgency. They also identified other signs of
disobedience and potential indigenous subversion. These events, real or
invented, changed the course of Peruvian history.
Fire and Barbarous Straw
The evidence on the unrest comes primarily from royalists and needs
to be read critically. Hard-liners eagerly sought a pretext to sabotage the
cease-fi re. Areche and others read reports of Indians gathering and fur-
tive messengers going back and forth from Pampamarca and Tungas-
uca with a certain glee— the uncovering of a conspiracy could undo the
cease-fi re and force the viceroy and Bishop Moscoso to the side. More-
over, after two years of vicious fighting, anxiety ran high, and many
Spaniards saw any sign of indigenous resistance (a hint of defiance or
even the refusal to show deference) as a portent of an impending revolt.
They saw Indian belligerence everywhere.
Yet the accounts do not sound like fabrications or ridiculous exag-
gerations. The uprising had ended abruptly, far too soon for the droves of
indigenous people who believed that victory was imminent, that the
Spanish were on the ropes, that radical change was at hand. Many fol-
lowers reproached Diego Cristóbal for having signed the amnesty. Fur-
thermore, many indigenous peasants, even if they did not seek the con-
tinuation of the uprising, refused to accept a return to the old ways of
Spanish domination, such as Indian submission or abuse by outsiders.

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They believed that the uprising, no matter how it concluded, had earned
them increased rights. People understood the peace treaty in different
ways, and after its signing local struggles erupted or reignited— about
the naming of local authorities, land, taxes, the role of the Church, and
the other grievances that had sparked the Tupac Amaru and other up-
risings. In an area torn by a brutal guerrilla war for over a year, which
had ended on terms not accepted by all sides, multiple tensions and mis-
understandings remained. These could spiral into confrontations; the
cease-fire and amnesty disliked by many remained fragile.
One other feature suggests that these conspiracies were not just roy-
alist fabrications or delusions. They had an odd, quixotic nature that
reproduced one of the characteristics of late eighteenth-century indig-
enous uprisings in the Andes: the creative search for a model or a plat-
form. The instigators claimed to fight in the name of Diego Cristóbal
and saw him as their leader. His critics claimed that Diego Cristóbal was
the mastermind; defenders said that he had not participated and in fact
did not know about the conspiracies. The instigators expressed broad
veneration for “the Inca” and incorporated material elements from the
uprising such as flags, banners, and velvet sashes. The conspiracy de-
scribed by local officials in the upper provinces and relayed by anxious
yet pleased authorities to Lima and Madrid was just unique enough
and contained enough verisimilitude that it was probably true.
Throughout 1782 and early 1783, authorities reported numerous
signs that the rebel leaders and followers had not accepted the cease-
fi re and were planning to resume the fight. They pointed to Indians’
veneration for Diego Cristóbal, proof not only that Indians remained
hopeful about renewed fighting but also that the Tupac Amaru leaders,
by accepting and even fostering this respect, had acted in bad faith and
ultimately planned to strike again. In September 1782 a local judge in
Pomacanchi, the textile town just to the north of Pampamarca that
José Gabriel Tupac Amaru had ransacked in the fi rst days of the upris-
ing, complained that “birds, lambs, and eggs” could not be found in the
market because people were stockpiling them to give to Diego Cristóbal
and his mother: “We can just about say they idolize them.” This author-
ity warned that “the idolatry will not stop until the idol, Diego Cris-
tóbal, is separated from these brutes; the fi re will remain lit and even
spread because of the barbarous straw [pajas bárbaras] that surrounds
him.” 46

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In the coming months and years, royalists would develop this meta-
phor of smoldering ashes in a perilously combustible situation, explain-
ing the danger as due to Indians’ rusticity and veneration for the Inca
past as well as the rebel leaders’ treachery and haughtiness. In September
1782, Commander Avilés glumly noted that in the upper provinces, de-
spite the leaders’ seeming submission, “the Indians still venerate them.” 47
In the same month, a royalist commander observed with disapproval
that when a poor Indian saw Andrés Tupac Amaru [Mendigure], he
kneeled down in honor.48 The loquacious corregidor Baulen denounced
Indians who “see Diego Cristóbal as a superior man and offer him hom-
ages suitable only for a deity.” Baulen argued that this respect had fi lled
the young rebel leader with vanity, haughtiness, and pride and height-
ened his hypocrisy.49 For royalists, these signs of reverence confi rmed
that the danger of the rebellion had not faded.
They also found evidence that Indians of the upper provinces col-
laborated with Diego Cristóbal in a plan to renew fighting. In June 1782
corregidor Necochea accused Andrés Mendigure of building a house
with a chapel, a refuge, in a “secret place” called Coñamuro above
Ocongate. Necochea believed that Andrés and his followers were biding
time before striking again.50 An Indian, Alejo Quispe, had told one of
Necochea’s trusted friends that Andrés had instructed Indians of the
Pampamarca and Labramarca area to disobey Necochea’s commands
and requested that they build him a house. Someone else told Neco-
chea that a defiant Indian woman named Buenaventura Antequera
had shouted that the pukakunkas who came from the town of Urcos to
sell their goods needed to be told that the land was not theirs but the
Indians’, as they had “defeated them in war.” She instructed Indians
not to give up their weapons to any authority, because they had strug-
gled so hard to gain them.51 Necochea explained that these rumors
worried him because the Tupac Amaru family frequented the area and
because dangerous former rebels remained active.
Alejo Quispe testified through a translator that when in Ocongate
and Lauramarca to buy sheep, he had heard an Indian council mem-
ber, a regidor, tell the Coñamuro mayor that Andrés Mendigure and
Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, “our little father [nuestro Padre chiquito],”
had ordered local Indians not to recognize Necochea as the corregidor
of Quispicanchi and to disobey his representatives. The rebel leaders
explained that they, “Inca Diego Tupa Amaro” and Andrés Mendigure,

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were lying low until the Spanish dropped their guard. The rebel leaders
needed the house built for them in a secure place such as Coñamuro to
“commit their treachery.” Quispe continued that the Indians of the
area had faith in their “Inca” or “king.” Diego Cristóbal would aid them
and, in return, had instructed them not to obey priests and corregidors.
The local Indians declared that with “our king” [Diego Cristóbal],
the pukakunkas would never defeat them. Quispe, an illiterate forty-
six-year-old man, claimed that he reported this as soon as he arrived in
Ocongate.
The Indian mayor of Ocongate, Manuel Caguana, testified on July
23 that Andrés Mendigure had been in his town ten days earlier to ob-
tain wood for the building. The mayor confi rmed that the regidor, Este-
ban Mamani, had told him about “Inga Chiquito [the little Inca] An-
drés Mendiguri Tupa Amaro” and that Andrés had ordered them not to
obey Necochea. Mamani then stated that Andrés had gathered two hun-
dred Indians in the kuraka’s house in Lauramarca and given a speech in
which he ordered them not to obey Necochea. The rebel leader re-
quested their patience until Inspector del Valle returned to Lima “and
then all the pukakunkas and mestizos will pay with their lives, we will
possess everything, all of the wealth that is found everywhere.” Ma-
mani claimed that Andrés did this in the name of Diego Cristóbal, who
had determined that Coñamuro was the best place for the house and
chapel. Andrés told the gathered Indians that Diego Cristóbal would
send written instructions, including orders that priests not overcharge
for burials. The Indians “threw their hats [monteras] in the air, yelled
‘Long Live our Inca, Long Live our King,’ ” and pledged to defend him
with their lives. Mamani closed by claiming that the rebel followers
had hidden their fusils, daggers, sabers, and other weapons in nearby
valleys “with the intention of rising up again once Inspector del Valle
leaves for Lima.”52 Necochea led a group to Coñamuro in early Septem-
ber and razed the building that Indian workers had begun.53
The accusations need to be read carefully. One feature makes Quispe’s
testimony dubious—he repeats almost line by line the summary that
Necochea gave of the conspiracy. It seems that the illiterate Quispe was
told to confirm what Necochea had reported and did not present his own
version. In trials, testimonies almost invariably differ in details and fo-
cus; in this case, they were virtual duplicates. Necochea presumably
could have asked Quispe to recite what the corregidor had already writ-

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ten the day before. Not surprisingly, the humble indigenous man fol-
lowed orders. However, the accusations could be true. The Indians of
Ocongate and Lauramarca had actively supported the rebels and would
have rejoiced at the presence of Andrés Mendigure. The rebel leader, in
turn, would have probably appreciated the veneration and have stoked
the insurgent dreams of those around him with his mere presence. On
the other hand, he might simply have been building a second home and
have been falsely accused due to specious rumors or the fabrications of
the corregidor, who aimed to strengthen his grasp on the rebellious
Quispicanchi province. Hard-liners in Cuzco and Lima eagerly sought
such news in order to bolster their argument that Diego Cristóbal and the
other leaders needed to be detained in order to prevent a new uprising.
Officials subsequently accused Diego Cristóbal of instigating the
problems in the upper provinces during his pacification visit in March
1782. Fernando Iguilus, an illiterate Spaniard from Ocongate, claimed
that the Indians “from Ocongate to Marcapata have not accepted the
pardon with good faith.” He contended that during this March visit
Diego Cristóbal had surreptitiously told a large group of Indians to
gather their weapons and wait for him in Lauramarca, ready for battle.
Diego Cristóbal promised them that they would become “owners of the
haciendas and Spaniards’ land,” redistributed to the ayllus, the tradi-
tional units of Andean political and social life. He also vowed the aboli-
tion of the corregidor office, to be replaced by a local judge in every
town, one of José Gabriel’s promises. Diego Cristóbal requested that
they remain vigilant and defend him if he were in trouble.54 Iguilus
added that in the conversations he overheard, Indians expressed great
hatred toward Spaniards and love toward Tupac Amaru.
Other Spaniards testified in late 1782 that in March Diego Cristóbal
had instructed Indians to have their weapons ready to defend him. He
reminded them what he had done for them and promised to abolish cor-
regidors and redistribute land. Felipe Mendoza, a Spaniard from Ocon-
gate, stated that Diego Cristóbal told a group of Indians not to work on
haciendas as the Spanish owners could get “blacks or other castas” to do
the work.55 Esteban Grados, also a Spaniard from Ocongate, declared
that Diego Cristóbal demanded that the Indians not do free ser vice la-
bor, pongo, for anyone, including priests.56
In September, Inspector General Avilés wrote the viceroy that the
Tupac Amaru clan had active supporters in the upper provinces and

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that even though the Tupac Amaru leaders had accepted the pardon,
the Indians there “still venerate them.” He answered the question of
how Diego Cristóbal had proselytized and rabble-roused in his March
pacification campaign when in the company of Salcedo and, for a time,
del Valle. Avilés clamed that the sneaky rebel leader took advantage of
Francisco Salcedo’s monolingualism, exhorting his Indian followers in
Quechua in front of the uncomprehending corregidor.57 Avilés insisted
that they needed to get Mariano, Andrés, and Diego Cristóbal out of
Cuzco but that they had limited options. The three rebel leaders re-
jected Bishop Moscoso and Salcedo’s pressure to go to Lima and in-
sisted on remaining in the Vilcanota Valley, where they had family and
an income. If removed by force, however, Indians would rise up in a
mutiny. Furthermore, Avilés worried that the young rebel leaders could
simply disappear, escape from surveillance, and perhaps resurrect the
uprising in the south or elsewhere.58
It is unclear whether Diego Cristóbal told his supporters in the upper
provinces to prepare for a new uprising. Perhaps he simply acknowl-
edged their support and his frustration with the cease-fi re. Indians
might have understood this as a suggestion that the rebellion was not
over. Or the Spaniards who testified might have interpreted indigenous
restlessness and renewed tension as a sign that Diego Cristóbal had en-
couraged the Indians. This would have reflected the widespread belief
among Spaniards that Indians could not act, let alone organize, on
their own, but would follow loyally. The testimonies are second- or third-
hand and the people who testified about Diego Cristobal’s supposed
invocations or the Spaniards who overhead Indians talk about it could
have misunderstood, exaggerated, and even fabricated. What is true
without a doubt is that the Indians of the upper provinces around Ocon-
gate and Lauramarca remained mobilized throughout 1782. The rebel-
lion had not ended for them, or at least was not going to end on terms
that returned Indian-Spanish relations to the status quo.
One of the Spaniards who testified about Diego Cristobal’s supposed
rabble-rousing explained that in mid-1782 “the Indians of that area [the
upper provinces] are as arrogant and dangerous as they were in the
time of the rebellion, and they don’t let any Spaniard go by. The only
difference with the pardon is that they aren’t killing people any more,
although they are willing to continue their excesses.” He also noted
that they were still armed.59 Authorities did not invent these rebels in

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the upper provinces— they were there, waiting for their Inca. One
account described Andrés Quispe leading Indians from Ocongate, Ca-
ñamuro, and Andamayo, insisting that they not be fooled by the pu-
kakunkas and that they keep their weapons.60 In the hills above Catca,
Quispe’s followers detained an Indian councilman from the Muñacpata
ayllu. They told him that only Tupac Amaru, who they held for their
“true Inca,” could give orders and name authorities. They mentioned
that Mariano Tupac Amaru was in Marcapata and that they awaited
orders from Diego Cristóbal. These rebels concerned authorities even
though controlling the upper provinces, an indigenous area that was not
central to the regional economy, was not their top priority. What the
colonial officials sought, however, was proof of ties to the Tupac Amaru
leadership.61
Rebels in the City of the Kings
Colonial authorities agreed by the latter part of 1782 that it would be

easier to monitor the rebels and prevent ties with Indian rebels if they
could be induced to relocate in Lima.62 Viceroy Jáuregui sent passports
(a medieval term referring to permission to pass through city gates or
portes) in June and spent the fi nal months of 1782 attempting to con-
vince them to come down to Lima. He believed that compelling them
could spark a new uprising; his uncompromising opponents believed
that it was just one more case of weakness on his part. Finding them-
selves adrift in Cuzco, young Mariano and Andrés fi nally decided to go
in December. Diego Cristóbal delayed his decision.
Inspector General Avilés wrote that Mariano and Andrés requested
500 pesos each for expenses in the trip as well as 500 to pay for mules.
He complained that they both liked to spend money and, on a more
ominous note, described the arrival of “an incredible gathering of peo-
ple” to see them off. Avilés explained that this proved the “control their
family still had in this city [Cuzco], which is presumably even greater
in the provinces.” Avilés was convinced that “these individuals can’t
remain in Peru.”63
Indians conveyed their adoration for the two young rebels through-
out the long journey to Lima, observed closely by authorities. The night
before their departure, a crowd gathered in Cuzco to wish them well;
in the village of Caicai, Indians showed their respect by taking off their

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hats and kneeling, despite the presence of Avilés; admirers pressed to

meet them in every town and city. For ner vous authorities, these were
signs that the rebels continued to conspire and that Indians remained
seditious. These encounters also indicated that the danger had spread
far beyond Cuzco, from the Inca capital to the viceregal capital.64
Mariano and Andrés met Viceroy Jáuregui in Lima on January 4,
1783. While demanding that they be supervised carefully, the Viceroy
believed that their arrival confirmed that peace would continue. In con-
trast, hard-liners such as Avilés and Mata Linares worried instead that
the viceroy and others treated the young rebel leaders too well. They
thought that this treatment not only raised their confidence but increased
their status in the eyes of others, and that conspiracies would soon
spread. These officials also fretted that in Lima they would meet with
other malcontents.
Testimonies about Mariano and Andrés’s time in Lima provide a
portrait of young men enjoying themselves, meeting a variety of people,
and trying to fi nd a place in this city of fi fty thousand. This would be a
typical experience for provincial youth in any new city, yet each en-
counter took on great significance, or multiple meanings, because of
the context: authorities watched the former rebel leaders’ every move.
Viceroy Jáuregui himself noted the dangers: “This city is loaded with
Indians within its walls as well as in the surrounding provinces,” and
worried that they could hatch a new conspiracy.65 The young rebels
stayed at the School for Kurakas, (el Colegio del Príncipe), located in the
Indian quarter in the eastern part of the city. One witness described
going to the roof of the school to play around and drink a traditional
nonalcoholic beverage—horchata—and other refreshments in the midst
of the Lima summer. But authorities reported more suspicious meet-
ings such as that with a mirror maker, Felipe Tupa Inga, who told the
young men that they had made a mistake coming to Lima and that
new uprisings were on the horizon. Another visitor told Andrés and
Mariano that they had been “foolish [zonzos] for not proving capable of
defending José Gabriel.” The son of a prestigious Indian family from
nearby Yauyos, don Vicente Ninavilca, was in their room to pick up a
guitar when he declared that he would defend Indians with his life if
new abuses emerged. Authorities accused the young men of receiving
and sending documents and letters, describing a cloak-and-dagger at-
mosphere. Ninavilca himself denied writing “important things” and

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claimed that he was just jotting down some verbs when witnesses saw
him.66
The courts scrutinized their activities in Lima. Their lives in the City
of the Kings seem to reflect the same pattern as in Cuzco: some people
venerated them and others chided them for having given up the struggle.
While struggling to find a place in the postrebellion society, they also
enjoyed themselves a bit. At one point Andrés asked Vicente Ninavilca to
write a letter to his mother, as the post was leaving soon for Cuzco. He
instructed Ninavilca to write her: “Don’t be upset, the viceroy has
treated us well, offering to help us establish ourselves. It’s best that Di-
ego Cristóbal come soon to fi nish all of these matters.” Andrés would
soon learn that his optimism was misplaced.67
In February 1783, while Andrés and Mariano were still learning
their way around Lima, Corregidor Necochea uncovered another revolt
or conspiracy around Marcapata in highland Cuzco. He had arrested
Santos Guaygua, a rebel and kuraka who had never recognized the
cease-fire, and learned that rebels from Azángaro were approaching the
upper provinces. Necochea beheaded Guaygua and exhibited his head
throughout the area.68 According to numerous, confusing accounts,
rebels from Azángaro led by Andrés Condorpuse and Guaygua, reached
Marcapata in late January 1783. Condorpuse and his son, who took the
names Simón and Lorenzo Condori, wore a black felt sash with silver
embroidery and a cross in the middle that they claimed had been given
to them by Inga Tupac Amaru, presumably Diego Cristóbal. Although
they maintained that their forces came from Azángaro to the south, in
the trial Simón Condori identified himself as a tailor from Chilca, Pitu-
marca, in Tupac Amaru’s home base. In Marcapata, the Condoris de-
clared to the assembled Indians that more troops were waiting at the
Ausangate glacier, a sacred place or huaca for Andean people, and that
Mariano would arrive from Lima. The town’s priest tried to intervene
but the crowd overlooked his entreaties to reject the rebels. Officials
reported that “Indians” had threatened market women and stolen live-
stock.69 Condori reportedly told people in Marcapata that even more
troops were waiting in the towns above Paucartambo and that Diego
Cristóbal would join them in the time of Carnival. They were arrested
days after their fiery speech in Marcapata.
The Spanish found letters and documents from Diego Cristóbal and
Mariano recognizing Simón Condori as their representative and granting

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him power. For the Spanish, this was proof of an alarming conspiracy.
The rebel leaders, however, denied having produced the documents
and implied that the Spanish had planted them.70 In his trial, Simón
Condori declared that he had received the sash from Mariano Tupac
Amaru’s servant, Diego Quero, who in turn claimed that he received
the papers and other materials he handed over to Condori from some-
one named Juan Laya. These accounts frustrated the investigators’ ef-
forts to uncover a direct link with the Tupac Amaru leaders. Lorenzo
Condori, however, maintained that his father had met Mariano Tupac
Amaru, who had told the elder Condori “I’m off to Lima with little An-
drés. Pray day and night that we return safely; if I die, Andrés will re-
turn, if he dies, I will return.” Lorenzo Condori contended that Mariano
instructed Simón Condori to be the commander of the new uprising.71
Mariano denied knowing Lorenzo but remembered Simón Condori for
his role in the earlier phase of the uprising in Azángaro.72
The flare-up in Marcapata seems believable. Lake Titicaca and the
upper provinces were the last hotbeds of rebel support. Insurgents from
the south would have found comrades in the peaks about the Vilcanota
Valley. Whether the Condoris had the support of Diego Cristóbal, An-
drés, and Mariano is unclear. The evidence seems tenuous. Nonethe-
less, it did not matter. In the eyes of the hard-liners, they had sufficient
evidence to show that trouble was brewing throughout Peru: the con-
spiring cousins in Lima, the defiant Diego Cristóbal still in Cuzco, armed
rebels in the upper provinces, and Indian followers throughout the vice-
royalty. Authorities acted swiftly.

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12
Ordered by the Catholic King
B Y EA R LY 1783, authorities wrote each other with growing frequency

and urgency about the rebels. They had succeeded in luring two of
the three leaders to Lima and now carefully monitored their activities
as well as any sign of violence or subversion in southern Peru. Viceroy
Jáuregui demanded more information from Visitador Escobedo, who
came down from Cuzco to Lima on February 15 with documentation
about the rebels’ bad faith and the imminent danger of more insubordi-
nation. The hard-liners had taken charge.
Escobedo’s documents typified the two-faced language characteris-
tic of trumped-up charges or a dubious official story: certainty tinged
with doubts in a clear attempt to preempt accusations of wrongdoing.
Escobedo reiterated the necessity of imprisoning the rebels, listing a
number of charges and outlining the benefits that their incarceration
would bring. Yet he also pointed out the need to have a trial, in order to
justify the arrests and to thwart accusations that the royalists had bro-
ken a signed agreement.1 Escobedo called for the arrest of the three
leaders and many others; the focus was on the leadership.
On February 25, 1783, Viceroy Jáuregui instructed Inspector Gen-
eral Gabriel de Avilés to bring Diego Cristóbal to Cuzco for questioning
and, unless something went wrong, to arrest him. Writing from Lima,
Viceroy Jáuregui explained: “To dispel right away suspicions that could
arise about our breaking the terms of the pardon, it would be most con-
venient to conduct a trial against the prisoners.”2 Hard-liners and even
the vacillating Viceroy Jáuregui wanted to arrest and execute the leaders,
but they understood that a trial, no matter how dubious, was necessary
in order to lessen condemnation in Peru and Spain. Yet the following

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day a letter from Corregidor Necochea arrived, providing details about

the Marcapata uprising. The corregidor relayed the information about
the simmering upheaval in the upper provinces provided—under du-
ress or even torture— by Santos Guaygua before he was quartered and
by Andrés Condorpuse (Simón Condori), who Necochea had captured
but not executed. This news was the icing on the cake, or to use Mata
Linares’s phrase, “came from Divine Providence,” and the viceroy lost
no time in ordering the arrest of Andrés and Mariano in Lima and Di-
ego Cristóbal in Cuzco.3
Authorities detained Andrés and Mariano in Lima on the night of
February 26. Hours later, a messenger left Lima for Cuzco with instruc-
tions to make the 725-mile trip, which crossed peaks of over thirteen
thousand feet above sea level, in six days. Even with horses and multi-
ple messengers (using what had been the Inca chasqui system), it was an
arduous journey.4 In Cuzco, worried that Diego Cristóbal would resist
or flee, authorities devised a ruse. They presented the military contin-
gent that moved from Cuzco toward Sicuani as an honor guard that
would accompany the newly named bishop of Arequipa, Friar Miguel de
Pamplona, who was arriving from Tucumán in Rio de la Plata. Necochea
arrested Diego Cristóbal, his wife Manuela Tito Condori, and mother in
Tungasuca on March 14, apparently without incident. Hours later, au-
thorities detained Cecilia Tupac Amaru, Diego’s sister and Andrés’s
mother, in Sicuani. On March 16, 1783 heavily armed troops brought
the chained prisoners into Cuzco, in a somber ritual that must have
reminded the city’s population of the arrival of José Gabriel and others
in April 1781. Some of the population celebrated; others silently mourned
and wondered what had happened, how events could have taken such
a turn for the worse.5
Corregidor Salcedo, perhaps trying to overcome his image as a de-
fender of the rebels, arrested seventy-five suspected accomplices. The
list reads like a convoluted kinship chart: sons, daughters, grandchil-
dren, sisters, brothers, aunts, uncle, cousin, daughters-in-law, and so
on. Salcedo also captured Diego Ortigoza, accused of being Diego Cris-
tóbal’s confidante, as well as other nonrelatives believed to have held
military positions in the uprising.6 Corregidors continued to arrest
people in the following weeks, including any member of the extended
Tupac Amaru clan they could fi nd. Inmates overcrowded the jails of
Cuzco and authorities decided to hold the trial there rather than in

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Ordered by the Catholic King 245
Lima, concerned about the transfer of hundreds of prisoners to the

coast. Escobedo deemed the leaders’ arrest “our most important victory
to date. Thanks to it, the king ensures his realm, which otherwise, as
many loyal and wise men have told the viceroy, would be forever vul-
nerable.”7 Royalists believed that they had defeated the rebellion— they
were correct. They also thought that they could implement far-reaching
policies that would prevent any further subversion, convert Indians via
coercion into Spanish-speaking, loyal citizens, and shatter their ties to the
Inca past and the insurgent present. This proved much more difficult.
Mata Linares and the Trial
Viceroy Jáuregui placed Mata Linares in charge of the trial. Unlike the
1781 prosecution of José Gabriel and his inner circle, this time they ar-
raigned hundreds of defendants. Mata Linares himself recognized that
in the month he was granted to conclude the trials, he could not “in
terms of the principal case against Diego and his family, get a fi rm grip
[ fijar pie] on anything substantial.”8 The accusation repeated the litany
of dubious claims made by royalists throughout 1782: the three rebel
leaders had received suspicious visitors and had been treated as Incas;
they had sought to build a refuge in Marcapata and reignite the upris-
ing; they had honored their convicted and executed family members
and led sordid private lives; they had not returned stolen goods and had
gold, silver, and weapons hidden somewhere; and they had supported
Condorpuse and other rebels in the upper provinces.9 The trial reiter-
ated these charges ad nauseam, stressing that Diego Cristóbal had not
respected the pardon and had acted in bad faith. The prosecution called
in witnesses and had the accused testify against one another. They did
not allow extended testimonies or rebuttals. With the trial, the prose-
cutors sought to confi rm and disseminate the reports or rumors about
the rebel leaders’ misdeeds and the subversive spirit still brewing in the
area. and to dampen potential accusations that they, the colonial au-
thorities, had broken the terms of the pardon. Although Mata Linares
and others followed basic protocol, the sentences were foregone conclu-
sions and the rushed trials a farce.10
On May 31, 1783, prosecutors sentenced Diego Cristóbal, his mother
Marcela Castro, his wife Manuela Tito Condori, and Lorenzo and
Simón Condori to death, although ultimately they did not execute Tito

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Condori. Bishop Moscoso and Corregidor Salcedo lobbied to lighten the

sentence but to no avail.11 Mata Linares and the rest of the prosecution
team managed to make Diego Cristóbal’s death even more gruesome
than that of his cousin, José Gabriel. Around 10:00 a.m. on July 19,
1783, he, his mother, and the Condoris were dragged behind pack ani-
mals, their arms and legs bound, from the jail to the Regocijo Plaza
while a town crier called out their crimes. Crowds jeered them and the
cobblestone streets tore at their skin. Soldiers lined the plaza to prevent
any disturbance and to witness the death of the rebel leader. All of the
military force headquartered in Cuzco was present: the city’s infantry,
cavalry, and light cavalry regiments made up primarily of militia mem-
bers, as well as the Callao regiment. Their commanders and local authori-
ties also observed.12 Executioners Felipe Quinco and Pascual Orcoguar-
anca fi rst hanged Lucas Jacinto and Ramón Jacinto, tried separately for
their participation in the Marcapata events.13 They then dropped the
Condoris from the gallows. Quinco and Orcoguaranca cut Marcela Cas-
tro’s tongue off before hanging her. Diego Cristóbal was forced to watch
the bloody spectacle of his mother’s death. Just before he was dragged to
the gallows the town crier, one Lorenzo Quispe, bellowed “This is the
justice ordered by the Catholic King, our Lord (may God protect Him)”
and then repeated the charges. The executioners had built a fire next to
the gallows and used burning hot pincers to rip the flesh off Diego Cris-
tóbal’s chest. The atenaceado or scorching pincers had been one of the
mainstays of the Inquisition. The executioners then dragged Diego
Cristóbal— bleeding profusely and in utter agony—to the gallows and
hanged him. The town crier dared anyone to remove the dangling reb-
els from the gallows—no one took the challenge.
Around 4:00 p.m. the executioners quartered the bodies. Diego Cris-
tóbal’s sentence ordered that his “body will be quartered and his head
taken to the town of Tungasuca, one arm to Lauramarca, the other to
the town of Carabaya, one leg to Paucartambo, the other to Calca, and
the rest of his body shall be put on a pillory on the road to this city’s
water tank. All his property shall be confiscated . . . and his houses de-
stroyed and his fields salted.”14 Authorities displayed the Condori heads
and limbs in Marcapata, distant Azángaro, the Ausangate glacier, and
other towns. Ausangate had been a refuge for rebels; it also constituted
a revered, symbolic place for Andean people, a site for pilgrimage.15
Marcela Castro’s head was exhibited on a pike in San Sebastián, just

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outside of Cuzco toward the Vilcanota Valley, and her other body parts
were displayed in Sicuani, Urcos Bridge, Pampamarca, Ocongate. Exe-
cutioners incinerated her torso in a fire in the main plaza and “threw her
ashes into the air.”16 Avilés and Mata Linares explained: “Monuments
to their excesses will remain in the areas where Diego Cristóbal and his
accomplices displayed their bloodthirsty nature, as fragments of their
cadavers will be distributed there.”17 A week after the execution, with
the news perhaps having reached Lima but certainly not Madrid, the
King signed a royal order decreeing that Diego Cristóbal and his cous-
ins be sent to Spain alive. To the satisfaction of Avilés and Mata Lin-
ares, it was too late.18
Authorities decided to try Mariano and Andrés in Lima, perhaps
fearing a return trip to Cuzco. In their March 1783 testimonies, Mari-
ano and Andrés recognized Felipe Velasco Tupa Inca Yupanqui’s (often
shortened to Felipe Tupa Inca) visits to their room in Lima and his dis-
appointment that they had disarmed. He had chastised them for ac-
cepting the royalists’ offer, assuring them that “now is the time to rise
up because the province of Huarochirí, those around Lima, and that of
Cajamarca [to the north] will be ours soon.”19 Prosecutors ordered
Tupa Inca’s arrest but he snuck out of Lima and made it to the Andean
area of Huarochirí, just to the east. Tupa Inca called for locals to rise up
against the Spanish. He claimed to be following “his cousin” José Ga-
briel Tupac Amaru, whom he believed either alive, presumably in the
jungle, or alive in spirit in Diego Cristóbal. A Spanish commander,
with three other Spaniards and a black slave, reached Huarochirí and
imprisoned Tupa Inca on June 2. On their return, they stumbled upon
fi fteen hundred rebels, and barely escaped. They continued to Lima
and a larger group left the viceregal capital to confront the nearby reb-
els. They arrested Tupa Inca’s commander, Ciriaco Flores, and eight
accomplices.
The rapid investigation confi rmed that Tupa Inca, a Lima mirror
maker with no real blood ties to the Tupac Amaru family, had met with
Mariano and Andrés and boasted of grandiose plans to resurrect the
uprising in Lima’s Andean backyard. Tupa Inca personified widespread
discontent over the breakdown of the pardon and anger at both the
royalists for their treachery and the second wave of rebel leaders for be-
ing duped. In their testimonies, Tupa Inca and Flores also noted their
belief that José Gabriel Tupac Amaru was alive— his execution was a

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Places where body parts

were exhibited:
Acobamba
1781
Urubamba
1783
Vi l c a b a m b a
Calca Paucartambo over 6,000m
outskirts of Cuzco (water tank) 4,000–6,000m
N 500–4,000m
San Sebastián 0–500m
Ocongate Carabaya
Cuzco Urcos Lauramarca lake
Ausangate 0 25 miles
Chilques y Marques Quiquijana
(Paruro) 0 25 km
Pitumarca Carabaya
Pampamarca
Tungasuca Tinta
Sicuani
Ap
Chumbivilcas
urim a c R
iver
Azángaro
Lampa Lake
Titicaca
Condesuyos
Puno
Chuquibamba
Arequipa
Pacific
Ocean
The Distribution of Rebel Body Parts

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royalist fabrication. Scores of supporters trusted that José Gabriel and

perhaps Diego Cristóbal continued the struggle in the “Gran Paititi,” a
mythical place in the Amazon jungle.20 On July 7 executioners hanged
Tupa Inca and Flores in Lima’s Plaza Mayor (today’s Plaza de Armas),
displaying their heads and limbs in this walled city’s gates. Their subor-
dinates were forced to watch the execution, many of them receiving
lashes, and sent to presidios in Africa, Valdivia, Chile, and Callao. Tupa
Inca’s “concubine” and another woman involved were sentenced to ten
years in a convent and banned from Lima.21
The Huarochirí events confi rmed to hard-liners the dangers of fur-
ther Tupac Amaru–inspired violence and the need to take drastic ac-
tion. Even in Andean towns hundreds of miles from Cuzco, local indig-
enous people knew that authorities had broken the ceasefi re agreement,
an action they saw as royalist treachery. In March 1783 Mata Linares
and Avilés wrote to Jáuregui and Gálvez to explain how the events in
Huarochirí had justified a harsh, swift sentence against Diego Cristóbal:
“In Huarochirí, they made the Indians believe that the late José Gabriel
had been crowned in the Gran Paititi. [With our sentencing], they have
irrefutable proof that this perverse subject [Diego Cristóbal] is dead and
they will fi nally abandon the crazy hope that they had for this family,
seeing them as their liberators.”22 Mata Linares and Avilés insisted that
Diego Cristóbal’s death be publicized throughout Peru and beyond.
To Lima and Beyond

Unlike 1781 Cuzco authorities tried dozens of supporters and family
members in 1783— they moved far beyond those executed on July 19.
In the midst of the trials, Mata Linares put aside his normally intransi-
gent rhetoric about the dangerous laxity of Peru and his tireless efforts
to eradicate subversion, and admitted that he could not keep track of
the prisoners arriving in Cuzco. He acknowledged that many were in-
nocent, or simply guilty of having blood ties to Tupac Amaru, and that
he did not have enough proof to try them. On May 12 Mata Linares
wrote to Necochea and Salcedo to demand a better accounting system
to “avoid confusion, which prevents us from imposing the proper pun-
ishment and might lead to mistaking the prisoners with the inno-
cent.”23 He mentioned a total of 133 prisoners and divided them into
two groups, 57 “Indians, Spaniards, and mestizos” for whom he had

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little documentation regarding their role in the uprising and he be-

lieved mostly innocent, and 73 members of the extended Tupac Amaru
family. (The discrepancy in the numbers, 133 and 130, might have
been caused by deaths, escapes, or counting the Condori father and son
separately, as guilty but not family.) Mata Linares called for leniency
with those he believed innocent (or at least he could not prove guilty)
in order to demonstrate “the king’s pity,” and recommended that the
members of the Tupac Amaru family other than those executed in July
be taken to Lima, to rid the region of their dangerous presence. He sug-
gested that they could be escorted to Lima without too much cost,
bringing peace to Cuzco and resurrecting its economy, and from there
shipped to Europe when the war with England ended and the seas
were safe.24 At this point, in mid-1783, Spanish authorities correctly
believed that the confl ict with England, part of the American Revolu-
tionary War, would soon end.
Mata Linares freed dozens of prisoners who he considered innocent,
including a couple of Spaniards who shouted “Long Live the King”
when released.25 In September, Escobedo provided a list of the sen-
tences: seven people executed, twelve immediately banished or exiled
from Peru (including Diego’s wife, who gained a last-minute reprieve
from her death sentence), and sixty-one family members sent to Lima.26
On October 6 seventy-eight prisoners, including sixteen nonfamily
members, left for Lima, guarded by 100 soldiers. The contingent in-
cluded seventeen children (four months to nine years old); thirty-five
women, most elderly; and twenty-six adult men, including one man in
his eighties and, according to Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru, his 125-year-old
uncle. The journey to Lima was always grueling, but for people of all
ages weakened by months of incarceration and mistreatment, forced to
travel in chains and without sufficient food, water, and shelter, it was a
death march.27 Juan Bautista, José Gabriel’s half brother, provided a
detailed account of the trip’s horrors. The Urcos corregidor had tricked
him over a meal at some point in March and taken him prisoner to
Cuzco, his second stint in jail. Surprised that he was not included in the
July 19, 1783 executions, Juan Bautista spent seven months impris-
oned, hungry, and fi lthy. Before departing, guards chained the prison-
ers’ hands and feet and paraded them around the main plaza to jeers of
“rascals, traitors, you should pay for it.”28 Among a crowd Juan Bautista
calculated at six thousand, one individual displayed remarkable kindness.

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The anonymous man somehow gave Juan Bautista a horse, which pro-
vided for a better journey. The other prisoners were on beaten-down
mules. Each time they fell, their chains chafed their skin and the guards’
bayonets forced them back up.
Juan Bautista described relentless hunger, thirst, and cruelty. His
mother, Ventura Monjarras, died of dehydration, the guards spurning
her pleas for water. They arrived in Lima after forty days, but their fate
did not improve. Guards jammed them into a dungeon in the Callao
fort, “the most melancholy place imaginable,” and kept them tied to a
chain that ran through it. The guards continued to torment them in nu-
merous ways. Their via crucis, particularly that of Juan Bautista, was not
over.29
The official documentation also portrays a miserable trip, due not to
Spanish cruelty but rather to the challenging terrain between Cuzco
and Lima and the lack of cooperation by both local authorities and the
prisoners. The convoy took the Cuzco-Abancay-Huamanga-Ica route,
and misfortune and desperation struck in the latter half, once they
passed Huamanga. On November 5 Commander Jacinto Iriarte sent a
desperate note to his commanding officer, “I am on the Royal Highway
with troops and the prisoners, and I don’t know exactly where we are,
our cargo has been lost, and the prisoners are sick. We don’t have wa-
ter, food, or mules.”30 The group had been stuck for four days near Cas-
trovirreyna, in the breathtaking mountain passes that tower between
the desert coast and Huamanga. Several mules had died (an indication
of the route’s severity) and indigenous muleteers had fled with many
others. The group ran out of water and had to break through the rocky
soil to unearth a small, putrid puddle.
A priest of the nearby town of Tambillo arranged for a tobacco trader,
Pedro Villanueva, to rescue the lost and hungry contingent from the
high peaks called San Martín. Villanueva tracked the lost group with
his 100 mules. The priest underlined their desperation, noting that the
coastal troops simply could not withstand the arid, two-mile-high
mountain passes.31 He brought them horses and meat and arranged for
the group to recover in Tambillo. Two prisoners died in the frigid weather
and one, Bernardo Castro, escaped, causing further delays and harsh
punishment for several guards. Commander Iriarte noted that Castro
was married and had children in Tinta and missed them greatly. Iriarte
blamed the fiasco on the fact that the corregidor of Castrovirreyna was

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London
BRAZIL Paris
Callao PERU
Lima Huamanga PORTUGAL Madrid SPAIN
(Ayacucho) Peniche Getafe
Washington DC Cuzco Seville
Pisco Castrovirreyna Lisbon Cádiz
Abancay
Ceuta Algiers Tunis
BOLIVIA
journey Cuzco-Lima
by Juan Bautista La Paz
and other prisoners
Havana modern borders
CHILE
San Juan
SENEGAL
Dakar
Cartagena
Lagos
Quito
PERU
Callao BRAZIL
Lima Salvador
Cuzco
La Paz
A T L A N T I C
BOLIVIA
Rio de Janeiro O C E A N
São Paulo
CHILE
ARGENTINA
Santiago
Montevideo
Buenos
Aires
Talcahuano/
Concepción
El Peruano
San Pedro Alcántara

Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru’s return
to Buenos Aires, 1822
The Prisoners’ Journey: Cuzco-Lima and Callao-Europe

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ill and his substitute had not arranged for fresh mules and supplies
along the route. Even after their rescue and arrival at Ica, the group had
to confront the summer sun as they moved north up the desert coast.
After delays and the death of six prisoners, they reached Lima around
November 22.32
Viceroy Jáuregui confi rmed the July 26, 1783 royal order to send
the surviving rebel leaders to Spain. He wanted neither leniency nor
more executions, and after the Huarochirí scare he agreed with the
hard-liners about the need to remove the entire family. In March 1784
the Lima Audiencia or High Court sentenced Mariano, Andrés, Juan
Bautista, and Fernando to ten years of hard labor in a Spanish presidio
to be selected by the king. The viceroy insisted that they not be sent to
Africa or any other presidio outside of Spain, because they might es-
cape and spread their subversive message.33 The war with England had
limited the number of ships leaving Callao for Europe, however, caus-
ing a huge backup of cargo, above all precious metals. In desperate
need of revenue, authorities in Spain demanded that their counterparts
in Peru send as much gold and silver as quickly as possible once it was
feasible. After numerous delays, two warships, El Peruano and the San
Pedro de Alcántara, left Callao on April 13, 1784. Dockworkers over-
loaded both ships. The San Pedro de Alcántara carried almost double its
normal load, including 600 tons of copper, 153 tons of silver, and 4 tons
of gold.34 Tito Condori, Diego Cristóbal’s widow, could not board be-
cause of an illness, perhaps tuberculosis, and died in Peru in March
1785.35 Juan Bautista, Mariano, and twenty-seven other prisoners as
well as the renowned French botanist Joseph Dombey traveled on the
Peruano.36
Juan Bautista provided a graphic description of the dreadful jour-
ney. The prisoners were chained together on deck, with nothing but
“an old poncho” and a sheep hide to protect them from the sun, rain,
and cold. They were so hungry that they scrambled to grab the bones
that their shipmates threw at their feet. Illnesses spread, particularly
scurvy, due to malnutrition and the lack of vitamin C, and one evening
the two men tied to Juan Bautista died. The sadistic crew took hours to
remove them. When prisoners complained to the commander, he threat-
ened to tie them to the cannons. They gained a temporary reprieve
when two French prisoners, who were enlisted to fi x the broken rud-
der, demanded that the chains be removed from all of the prisoners;

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the mates clamped them back on as soon as the repair was fi nished.
Juan Bautista noted that when “one of my little nephews” died in ag-
ony of colic, the Spanish only laughed or remained indifferent.37 Juan
Bautista was not exaggerating. By the time the ship had reached Rio de
Janeiro, Mariano Tupac Amaru had died, along with fifteen others, in-
cluding four minors. Crewmen presumably dumped Mariano, José
Gabriel and Micaela’s son and one of the leaders of the rebellion’s sec-
ond stage, into the Atlantic Ocean. Two others passed away in Brazil,
before the ship left for Spain.38
In four months in Rio the crew tied the prisoners to the mainmast
(palo mayor) during the day and left them chained to the foremast at
night. They continued to do this on the voyage across the Atlantic. Their
commander worried that a British ship might board and free the pris-
oners, which made the crew even more abusive. A guard offered the
hungry Juan Bautista some crackers and when he returned with his
treasure hidden in his ragged hat, he fell from his old spot that the
guard had booby-trapped, breaking two ribs. His chest ached the rest of
his life. Juan Bautista also pointed out the Spanish hypocrisy about
religion. The crew prohibited the prisoners from praying, which Juan
Bautista interpreted as a way to reinforce the notion that they were
inferior, not true Catholics. They reached Cádiz on March 1, 1785. Of the
twenty-nine prisoners that left Lima in 1784 on the Peruano, only four
were alive in 1788.39 Juan Bautista was so weak that soldiers had to
carry him to his cell in the San Sebastián castle. His troubles were far
from over.40
Shockingly, the San Pedro de Alcántara expedition was worse. Chil-
ean naval officials would not let the man-of-war anchor in the port of
Talcahuano because they worried that Fernando Tupac Amaru (José
Gabriel and Micaela’s youngest son) would subvert Indians and mesti-
zos. Commander Manuel Fernando de Montoya decided to return to
Callao. While still on the Pacific side of South America, sixteen of the
forty-one prisoners had died due to vile conditions. Departing for the
second time on December 21, 1784, the overloaded ship made it across
the Atlantic, after stops in Concepción, Chile and Rio de Janeiro. The
ship had numerous leaks and the crew had to use the pumps around
the clock. Disaster struck on February 2, 1786. The man-of-war ship-
wrecked near Peniche, Portugal, north of Lisbon. Andrés Tupac Amaru
and seventeen other prisoners died while up to six prisoners survived,

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including Fernando. The Spanish claimed to have lost over 7.5 million
pesos in gold and silver. Forty divers paid by the Spanish government
worked around the clock for four years after the shipwreck to recover
the gold, silver, and copper, the largest diving enterprise up to that point
in European history.41 Documents about the prisoners on both ships
tumbled overboard in the wreck and authorities in Cádiz scrambled to
identify the prisoners already held there and those arriving from Portu-
gal.42 In recent decades archeologists discovered the graves of the dead
who either washed up on shore or were retrieved from the ship. Euro-
peans had individual graves; the political prisoners were dumped in a
pile, their chains still on many of them.43
Authorities sent the surviving prisoners to jails and presidios in
Spain. Fernando, who at the age of ten had witnessed the brutal execu-
tion of his parents Micaela and José Gabriel, reached shore after the
shipwreck and wandered around for three days before turning himself
in. He spent three years in a miserable, humid cell in Cádiz. In 1787, at
the age of sixteen, he petitioned the king for his release. He or his law-
yer noted that his only crime was being the son of his father, and that
as a child, “he had no broader knowledge of the world other than what
he learned from chasing butterfl ies, imbibed in this and other child-
hood activities.” 44 The following year he was interned at a school
in Getafe and made clear that he did not want to become a priest. Not
surprisingly in light of his years of imprisonment, the terrible journey
to Spain, and the traumas he endured, he suffered various ailments
and died in Madrid on August 19, 1798. Even the innocuous documents
about his education and possible employment reminded the reader, “This
subject is the son of the principal author of the past revolutions of Peru,
Josef Gabriel Tupacamaro. He was sent to Spain to remove from Peru
the memory of those events as well as the only inheritor of his father’s
rights.” 45
Juan Bautista’s woes continued, although he ultimately had the sat-
isfaction of frustrating the royalists’ vow to rid the Americas of all Tupac
Amaru family members. His memoirs, written in the 1820s in Argen-
tina just after independence, cast the Spaniards as relentlessly brutal.
During his thirty-nine months in the San Sebastián castle, “I have no
memory of a single Spaniard showing any human sign.” 46 He was then
sent to Ceuta, Spain’s northern African outpost. He lived in this presi-
dio just across the Strait of Gibraltar from Spain with an exploitative

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silversmith and survived on a small pension. His memoirs only provide

bits of information about these years, particularly his efforts to educate
himself and the abuse he received, from Spaniards and even an indig-
enous person. In one passage, he notes his difficulties with the Spanish
language.47 In 1813 he met his guardian angel, Marcos Durán Martel,
an Augustinian priest imprisoned for his participation in an uprising in
Huánuco, Peru in 1812.
In 1820, after the Liberal Revolution, the Spanish courts freed many
prisoners from las américas. After a fall that left him with more broken
ribs and prompted numerous delays, the eighty-year-old Juan Bautista
embarked for Argentina on July 3, 1822, aided by Durán Martel and
the Maltese-Argentine naval hero Juan Bautista Azopardo.48 The Argen-
tine government, independent since 1816, granted him a pension and
supported his efforts to write his memoirs. One of Argentina’s found-
ing fathers, Manuel Belgrano, considered him as a possible Inca king
under his 1816 Inca Plan to install an Inca monarchy. For some, the In-
cas and the Tupac Amaru rebels constituted alluring historical symbols
that countered colonial or Hispanocentric visions of the past. In 1821, a
five-act play, Tupac Amarú [sic], had opened in Buenos Aires, portraying
Juan Bautista’s half brother as a heroic victim of Spanish brutality.
However, opponents ridiculed efforts to link the nascent Argentina with
the ancient Inca past and the Tupac Amaru uprising. Journalists dis-
missed Belgrano’s plan as “a monarchy in Indian sandals” and “a mon-
arch with dirty shoes.” 49 Juan Bautista died in Argentina on September
2, 1827, at the age of eighty-five. He never made it back to Peru.50
Machines
By the time the prisoners had been forced onto the warships in April
1784, Cuzco found itself with new authorities. Mata Linares remained
as Cuzco’s fi rst intendant in a new administrative system inaugurated
in 1784 and Escobedo y Alarcón had replaced Areche as visitador. Eight
intendancies were created, with that of Puno transferred to Rio de la
Plata. The idea was to count on authorities closer to local society than
the viceroy and his court in Lima yet less abusive and corrupt than the
corregidors, who were replaced by subdelegates. In order to discourage
shady pacts between officials and locals, the intendancy program pledged
adequate salaries for the intendants and subdelegates.51

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In a region devastated by two years of vicious guerrilla warfare and

counterinsurgency, in which hard-liners had fi nally defeated moder-
ates within the royalist campaign as well as the rebels, mass trials and
executions might seem the logical modus operandi in the mid-1780s.
The Spanish had proven themselves capable of using extraordinary
means— legal and not so legal— against subversives, while authorities
such as Bishop Moscoso who preferred more conciliatory methods had
lost power. The savagery of the war and the vitriolic language of the
victors would suggest mass repression, a bloodbath of thousands of In-
dians. Nonetheless, authorities did not stage mass trials against Indian
suspects, nor did they condone extrajudicial executions. Violence reig-
nited now and again in the Vilcanota Valley and indigenous fighters
returned to their communities defeated, facing the jeers of royalists and
the disfavor of the courts, but they were not jailed or killed en masse.
Numerous explanations can be found. Spanish authorities were re-
lieved and even ecstatic but also apprehensive— they knew they had
just barely won and that tensions simmered. While officials in Cuzco
and Lima could bluster about the victory and a supposed return of in-
digenous subordination, they understood that local power relations re-
mained fragile. Pushing too hard could prompt a dangerous reaction by
the defeated but bitter and defiant Indian masses. Authorities used any
association with Tupac Amaru to weaken Indians’ lawsuits but indige-
nous people also employed carefully presented threats of renewed vio-
lence to bolster their demands. Colonial officials did not hold all the
power.52 After the initial thrill of convincing the rebel leaders to accept
the ceasefi re and then capturing them after sabotaging it, authorities
understood that mass trials were not feasible or desirable.
But another explanation has to be considered for the absence of
mass trials or even executions— Spanish disdain for Indians. Mata Lin-
ares, whose writing rarely had any ambiguity or subtlety, believed that
with the leadership dead or exiled, the rebel followers, real or potential,
would not act. He wrote on May 31, 1783, “Since the imprisonment of
Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru and his family, Indians are more submis-
sive, which is natural since Indians do not have heads and are incapable
of independent thoughts and can be said without exaggeration to be
machines.”53 Despite a massive uprising that had led to tens of thousands
of dead, Mata Linares was not deeply concerned about another indige-
nous uprising. In his view, without leaders, the indigenous people were

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not a threat. Mata Linares presumably thought that Indians deserved

brutal punishment for their insubordination, but that it was not an in-
dispensable preventive measure.54 Mata Linares believed, however,
that Spanish administration or control of Peru had deteriorated greatly,
and he found many culprits; above all, lax authorities, wayward priests,
and conniving creoles. In his mind, they had mismanaged Peru to such
an extreme that Spanish rule was in danger. Moreover, tax revenues
continued to plummet, greatly concerning Madrid in this time of almost
incessant European warfare. For Mata Linares and his allies, this mis-
management had fostered Indians’ autonomy and minimal assimila-
tion, which lay at the heart of their disobedience. Mata Linares had
plans to punish creoles and to force Indians to assimilate. These would
greatly alter Peru and even the Americas, but not in the ways he
expected.
The Spanish implemented a fierce campaign against Andean cul-
ture, the memory of the Incas, and the uprising itself. In his May 15,
1781 sentence against José Gabriel, Micaela Bastidas, and other mem-
bers of the inner circle, Areche not only designed the brutal execution
in Cuzco’s main plaza but also, in the words of Clements Markham,
ordered that Tupac Amaru’s “houses were to be demolished, all his
goods to be confiscated, his relations to be declared infamous, all docu-
ments relating to his descent to be burned by the common hangman,
all dresses used by the Incas to be prohibited, all pictures of them to be
seized and burned, the representation of Quichua dramas was forbid-
den, all musical instruments of the Indians to be destroyed, all Indians
to give up their national costumes and to dress henceforth in the Span-
ish fashion, the use of the Quichua language was prohibited, and the
reading of the history of the Incas by Garcilaso de la Vega was forbid-
den.”55 The sentiments expressed in these harsh measures, the hatred
and the desire to exterminate the Tupac Amaru clan, only deepened in
the coming months, as the Spanish counterinsurgency campaigns to
the south stalled or even failed. A royal decree (real cédula) dated April
27, 1782 confi rmed the measures against Inca music and culture and
also stipulated that the position of kuraka would no longer be heredi-
tary.56 Areche began a campaign to eradicate Andean culture and the
pact between indigenous people and the colonial state that dated from
the late sixteenth century. Mata Linares attempted to implement the
campaign.

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These policies sought to dislodge any trace of the Incas in the Cuzco
region and to assimilate the Quechua people into Spanish customs and
language by force. Simply put, this was cultural genocide, and they
failed. The Spanish did not have the resources to force Indians to
switch languages, to abandon Quechua. Areche and others could blame
priests for allowing Quechua to slip into Mass and other rituals and
could devise plans to punish non-Indians who did not impose Spanish
on indigenous people, but they could not compel the majority of Cuz-
co’s population to give up their mother tongue and shift to Spanish
monolingualism.57 In fact, Areche and others presented no plan to in-
doctrinate or assimilate other than the abolition of Quechua, Inca cus-
toms, Garcilaso de la Vega, and so on. The fact that Areche was called
back to Spain in 1782 (departing Peru in 1783) and eventually prose-
cuted for his heavy-handed policies, which some in Madrid believed
sparked the uprising, certainly weakened the anti-Indian crusade.58
Nonetheless, Mata Linares remained in Cuzco until 1787 and shared
Areche’s passion for extirpating all things Inca from the Andes.
Mata Linares could not implement Areche’s draconian vision. The
explanation can be found not in administrative shifts (the replacement
of a particular authority), but instead in the lack of resources committed
by the Spanish to such a radical transformation, and to Indians’ resis-
tance. The extirpation of all things Inca, including the Quechua language,
would have required massive resources and a fundamental restructur-
ing of Andean society. It was probably doomed from the beginning—
eliminating a major linguistic group, an entire culture with deep roots
that preceded the majestic Incan Empire (1250–1550), would daunt
even the most ambitious imperialist— but especially if the metropolis
showed little interest. Despite the alarmist reports about how Indians’
autonomy had nearly cost Spain its South American holdings, Madrid
expressed lukewarm support for the project.
Two decades later, in 1805, a Cuzco authority sought to understand
a recent uprising in Cuzco, that of Aguilar and Ubalde. He cited Mata
Linares, who had been in Spain since 1803, and reiterated what Mata
Linares considered the four principal causes for Andean subordination:
“the superstitious obedience and blind love” that all Indians hold for
anyone who claims to descend from the Incas; tensions between cre-
oles and Spaniards; “the excessive hold that the Church had on those
dupes [incautos]”; and abuses by priests as well as corregidors. The writer

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called for a number of reforms that echoed those of Areche and Mata
Linares.59 The letter showed that the radical cultural reforms proposed
by Areche and Mata Linares in the early 1780s had floundered and were
not in place in 1805.
The late 1782 and early 1783 repression of the Kataristas in Upper
Peru, who remained armed and defiant, had been brutal, with thou-
sands dead. Yet in Cuzco commanders had not embarked on any kind
of mass slaughter, in part because the fighting there had largely
stopped. To torpedo the amnesty, they had uncovered looming con-
spiracies rather than true uprisings. In the trials Cuzco authorities tar-
geted the entire Tupac Amaru family, executing or expatriating them.
They had also unleashed an unremitting campaign against the Que-
chua language and the memory of the Incas. On this front, they failed.
But one other group remained, besides the rebel leadership and the
mass supporters: the middling creoles, mestizos, and even Spaniards
who had reportedly aided the rebellion. Authorities prosecuted them
with passion and patience. Some of the trials lingered for more than a
decade.
Supporters
The question of how Tupac Amaru did it, how a small-town kuraka and
his wife masterminded an uprising that spread throughout Peru, bedev-
iled the Spanish. The prospect of traitors in their midst particularly wor-
ried them. After the initial wave of rushed prosecutions in 1783 that led
to the grisly executions in Cuzco and mass deportations to Spain, Mata
Linares scrutinized alleged creole supporters of the rebellions. On the
one hand, this reflected the royalists’ belief that Indians were incapable
of organizing such a mass movement. Authorities such as Mata Linares
could not conceive of indigenous people, including kurakas such as Tu-
pac Amaru and his wife, planning, recruiting, and unifying—they as-
sumed there had to be other masterminds. On the other hand, the trials
against creoles evolved from the tensions in 1782 when hard-liners and
moderates fought over who was at fault for the rebel expansion. Now
firmly in power, the revenge-seeking hard-liners persecuted those who
had lobbied for more conciliatory tactics, which they interpreted as an
indication of rebel sympathies.

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Mata Linares was an obstinate reformer who believed that the

Americas needed urgent reorganization. The rebellion’s aftermath of-
fered an ideal opportunity. In 1781, after the capture of José Gabriel, he
wrote that many factors contributed to the disloyalty of Spanish subjects
in the Americas, but chief among them were “corregidors and priests’
extortions, the division between creoles and Europeans, the lack of edu-
cation among the youth, and the fact that this America is so ecclesiasti-
cal.”60 He was a regalist who believed that the Church should be firmly
under the control of the Crown. In this informative letter to José de
Gálvez, Mata Linares described how corregidors and priests teamed up to
exploit Indians, with little supervision from other authorities. Although
critical of corregidors— an office in the midst of being abolished—he was
harsher toward priests: “The corregidor might initiate the destruction of
the Indian but the priest finishes him off.”61 After describing how cor-
regidors and others exploited Indians, Mata Linares blamed priests for
the uprising, contending that if all priests had been good subjects, the
rebellion would have never happened. Moreover, he argued that priests
were to blame for Indians’ adhesion to pre-Hispanic or Andean religion
and their weak grasp of Catholicism. For Mata Linares and other hard-
line reformists, this lack of acculturation, a task handed over to priests in
the sixteenth century, explained Indians’ ignorance and thus mistrust of
Spanish ways. While he and other Bourbon Reformers sought to remedy
these broad structural problems through a series of administrative
changes, in the trials that he oversaw from 1781 until 1787 he focused on
unmasking and punishing prominent people who he believed had sup-
ported Tupac Amaru. They were, by and large, creoles and priests.
With the support of Commander Avilés, the new visitador general
Jorge Escobedo, and, from the side of the Church, the archdeacon
Simón Ximénez Villalva, Mata Linares investigated and tried the no-
tary José de Palacios, the lawyer Julián Capetillo, Bishop Moscoso,
and the three brothers Antonio, Gabriel and Gaspar Ugarte. As seen
earlier, he also oversaw the prosecution of Fathers Puente, López de
Sosa, and Maruri. No one could accuse Mata Linares of being lax in
his prosecution efforts. For example, he had the penmanship of the
letters to and from Tupac Amaru during the siege of Cuzco evaluated
to see if it matched with any well-known Cuzco notaries, whether
Palacios or others.62 Prosecutors accused Capetillo and Palacios, who

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was a cousin of Micaela Bastidas, of corresponding with the rebel in

the midst of the uprising. The trial reflected royalists’ concern about
enemies within the upper ranks of the city of Cuzco and their belief
that Indians led by a kuraka family could not have undertaken such a
bold and successful enterprise. While confi rming that Palacios and
Tupac Amaru had long been friends, the prosecution did not prove
that Palacios and Capetillo had supported the rebellion and absolved
both.63
The trial against the Ugarte clan lasted for years, both displaying
and accentuating the divide between the uncompromising reformers
and prominent Cuzco creoles. Wealthy landowners and holders of the
prestigious alfarez real, the position of chief ensign, the Ugarte clan had
intermarried with other important families and also had blood ties with
Inca royalty dating from the sixteenth century. They sat at the top of
Cuzco society. The accusations initially centered on a letter that Tupac
Amaru had sent Antonio Ugarte at the beginning of the uprising, dated
November 22, 1780. He referred to the Ugarte brothers as “cousins” and
city leaders (principales) in a tone that was both welcoming and threat-
ening. The Ugartes’ blood ties with Inca nobility no doubt fortified José
Gabriel’s view of them as family. Gabriel Ugarte’s older daughter was
known as the “Coya” or “Inca Queen” and a pasquinade posted just
before the uprising declared, “Prepare yourself, Ugarte, because we want
to crown you.”64 The Tupac Amaru letter never reached the Ugartes;
nonetheless, it caused them nearly a decade of legal problems.65 In tes-
timony under duress, Tupac Amaru claimed not to remember the letter
and hinted that perhaps his scribes had written it without telling him.
The text perturbed authorities during the rebellion and for years after-
wards. It suggested that insurgents could be found not only in the
hills— in Indian ayllus and communities— but also in the better resi-
dences of the city of Cuzco.
Rivalries also played a role. Cuzco’s corregidor, Matías Baulen, au-
thor of the most alarmist memos regarding Diego Cristóbal and the sup-
posed rupture of the indulto, sought the alfarez real position for his brother
Antonio. Gaspar Ugarte had held it since 1780.66 Moreover, Ugarte’s
sister-in-law, María de la Concepción Rivadeneyra, the prioress of the
Santa Catalina convent, was accused of having an affair with the prior
of Santo Domingo. Bishop Moscoso intervened, only to be accused of
also having romantic ties to the nun.67 The trial in Lima’s Audiencia

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dragged on from 1783 to 1786, with the Ugarte brothers the recipients
of venomous anticreole insults. The evidence was minimal, other than
the letter that they never received, and the prosecution appeared to
persecute them simply for being prestigious creoles who had ties to the
rebels (they admitted meeting Tupac Amaru before the rebellion), great
prestige among a broad section of Cuzco society, and a distaste for some
of the reforms imposed by Areche, Escobedo, and company. Although
they were not found guilty, the court banished them to Spain. The
trial’s cost and the departure of the three brothers broke the family
econom ical ly.68
Bishop Moscoso already had enemies when he arrived in Cuzco in
1779 to become bishop. Prominent Spaniards had disliked the decision
to name a creole rather than a European to the prestigious position. His
confl ict with corregidor Arriaga in early 1780, just months before Ar-
riaga’s hanging would launch the rebellion, earned him more adversar-
ies. Arriaga’s nephew, Eusebio Balza y Verganza, presented a book-
length accusation against the Bishop in 1782, La verdad desnuda or The
Naked Truth, alleging that the bishop supported the Tupac Amaru rebels
and led a dissolute private life, specifically alleging a taste for young
women and nuns. As this book has shown, Moscoso was an implacable
and effective opponent of the rebels. They could not overcome his
strategy of maintaining priests in rebel-controlled areas and excommu-
nicating the leadership, which neutralized the insurgents’ claims of
working within the system and their expectation of support from
Madrid and even God. Nonetheless, his support for the pardon and
his proximity to Diego Cristóbal earned him the wrath of Areche
and, even more so, Mata Linares.69 In 1783, echoing the accusations of
La verdad desnuda, Mata Linares initiated a trial in Lima’s high court,
to evaluate whether the bishop “had any influence in the recent
commotion.”70
Bishop Moscoso fought the charges for almost a decade. In 1784, he
left Cuzco to plead his case in Lima and two years later he departed for
Spain to lobby in Madrid. This Arequipeño would never return to Peru.
His case was aided by the death of Charles III on December 14, 1788,
and his replacement by King Charles IV, who sought to terminate the
countless lingering trials that bloated Spain’s legal and political sys-
tems. The retirement of José de Gálvez from the Council of the Indies also
apparently helped him.71 In March 1789 Moscoso presented a 248-page

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defense, focused on the twenty-two accusations against him, specifi-

cally his participation in conspiracies before the outbreak of the Tupac
Amaru rebellion and his purported hand in the death of corregidor Ar-
riaga (nine accusations), his role in the Tupac Amaru uprising (eleven),
and his treatment of and possible “illegitimate friendships” with mem-
bers of the Santa Catalina convent (two). The paper trail is astonishing.
A 1980 document collection that published part of the proceedings
against him found primarily in Seville’s Archivo de Indias ran to 736
pages.72
In his defense, Moscoso counters each accusation and insists that all
of them were based on insinuations and gossip rather than hard proof.
He underlines his role in the repression of the first stage, adding the
testimony of prominent people who seconded him, and justifies his
support for the pardon. He stresses Peru’s terrible situation in late 1781,
the danger that the rebels would exterminate all Europeans and cap-
ture churches, and cites an axiom—“Pardon the multitude to save the
nation.” Months after handing in his long defense, Moscoso received
the prestigious position of Archbishop of Granada and was granted the
Gran Cruz de Charles III (Great Cross of Charles III) for his work de-
fending the Crown in the Tupac Amaru rebellion. He remained in
Granada until his death in 1811, embroiling himself in controversies
about women’s decency, supporting the French over the English in
Spain’s persistent wars, and building an estate in the town of Víznar
adorned with art alluding to Cervantes and the Andes.73
The trials of the Ugarte brothers and Bishop Moscoso damaged their
reputations, nearly bankrupted them, and forced them to leave Peru for
Spain. Even if they outlasted their accusers, they paid an enormous
cost. There are multiple ironies in these long, bitter disputes. In these
trials as well as those against Diego Cristóbal and company, Mata Lin-
ares, having already taken care of the rebel leadership, pounced upon
the two social groups he believed responsible for Peru’s maladies: in-
subordinate creoles and priests. He believed these individuals sup-
ported the rebellion and that the social groups they represented al-
lowed it to spread. Yet this book has shown the opposite: that creoles by
and large did not accept José Gabriel and Micaela Bastidas’s invitation
to join in a proto–national uprising and that Cuzco’s gentry—fearful of
the radical consequences of a rebel victory and conscious that royalist

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repression would be brutal—fought against the rebels in the siege in

early 1781. Moreover, the Church led the opposition against the rebels,
and Moscoso’s tactics—relying on priests as in for mants and as a fi fth
column, and weakening the rebels’ claim of legitimacy through
excommunications—worked brilliantly. In his self-defense, Bishop
Moscoso stressed that people had called him “the reconquistador of
Peru”; he was not exaggerating.74 While the Ugartes did not have as
strong credentials, their trial cast them as symbols or proxies of Cuzco’s
creole elites. Despite Areche and Mata Linares’s rhetoric, these groups
had remained loyal to the Crown with minor exceptions.
The ironies do not end there. The defendants went to great lengths
to defend their reputations, to challenge the notion emerging from the
lengthy trials and spreading among gossipy local society in Cuzco and
Lima that they had supported the insurgents and hindered their re-
pression. They ultimately won (or at least were not found guilty), al-
though at a great cost. Yet the accusations that they found so distaste-
ful and so damaging in the 1780s were transformed, decades and even
centuries later, into an accomplishment or a badge of honor. While in
the 1780s members of the Ugarte family rued Mata Linares’s obstinacy
and despised the trials, their descendants in independent Peru might
have seen their ancestors as early heroes of Peruvian independence.
Readers of the voluminous trial transcripts— the fundamental
source for scholars of the rebellion—rapidly get the impression that
important creoles and members of the church hierarchy aided the reb-
els, or would have if they had been able. Mata Linares and Areche’s
paranoid interpretation of the rebellion, based on their profound mis-
givings about creoles and priests, oozes from the archival record. José
Gabriel’s invocations for a multiethnic coalition also support this view:
he very much sought respectable allies. Therefore Moscoso and to a
lesser extent the Ugartes could become heroes in postcolonial Peru.
Because a few priests did support Tupac Amaru and because La verdad
desnuda and the long trial harangued Moscoso for his rebel inclinations,
many interpretations deemed the role of the church in the rebellion
ambiguous or unclear and highlighted patriotic heroes such as father
López de Sosa. The trials that extend beyond a thousand pages, the as-
tonishing paper trail, seem to confi rm that the role of creoles and the
Church in the uprising are open questions, subject to debate, which in

Authenticated
fact are resurrected periodically in scholarly discussions and remain at

the core of the Tupac Amaru historiography. By ruining the reputa-
tions of Moscoso, the Ugarte family, and others in the gloomy years
after the uprising, Mata Linares provided the prime material for their
conversion into patriotic heroes after the independence of Peru in the
1820s.

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Conclusion
The Legacy of Tupac Amaru
C uprisings, the Tupac Amaru rebellion

OU PL ED W I T H T H E K ATA R ISTA
stretched from Cuzco to Potosí, with copycat revolts occurring else-
where in South America. Like all revolutions, it swept people into its
vortex: as rebels or royalist fighters, as victims or targets of repression,
as refugees. After the initial months, it became nearly impossible to
remain neutral. People in southern Peru had to choose a side or flee
and tens of thousands, including those who did not sympathize with
either the rebels or the royalists, lost their lives.
Tupac Amaru demanded that his followers limit their attacks to ex-
ploitative Spaniards, corregidors, and their defenders. Royalists, in turn,
pursued those deemed rebels, indigenous fighters. Both sides, however,
abandoned these restrictions in the course of the rebellion, widening
the defi nition of the enemy, and thus who should be killed. Rebels at-
tacked anyone considered part of the Spanish colonial world— including
those who only spoke Spanish or wore European clothing—while roy-
alists targeted all indigenous people. Not only did violence intensify but
the brutality became increasingly horrific: beheadings, ritual killings,
rapes, and public executions.
The Tupac Amaru rebellion changed Peru indelibly and had impor-
tant repercussions in South America and across the Atlantic. In the af-
termath of the uprising, authorities imposed stern measures that aimed
to punish and assimilate the indigenous population and to erase ties
with the Inca past. They also sought to silence discussion about the re-
bellion, to cover up what had happened, and to impede collective

Authenticated
memory. Both the administrative/cultural reforms and the silencing of

the 1780–1783 events initially succeeded. Reformers shattered the colo-
nial system in place since the 1570s, in their eyes restoring Spanish
control in the Andes. They also prevented public discussions and com-
memoration of the uprising. This success, however, proved fleeting. The
radical administrative changes buckled under their own weight and
the core issue these reforms targeted— the role of indigenous people in
Peru—remains contentious today. They did not solve this “problem” in
the short- or the long term. Nor did they succeed in silencing discus-
sions or impeding the memory of the uprising. People began to remember
the uprising in different ways, and José Gabriel and Micaela Bastidas
resurfaced in curious places and moments, in Peru and far beyond, as
martyrs, heroes, and paradigms. The struggles over forgetting and re-
membering the uprising— the ultimate phase of any war, the battles
over memory— continue today.
The Embers Remain
The royalists in charge of Cuzco after the rebellion did not prosecute
the thousands of Indians suspected of rebel sympathies, but instead initi-
ated a wide-ranging campaign against Andean culture and the collec-
tive memory of the Incas. They understood that mass trials would
prove complicated, costly, and very likely counterproductive. They also
believed that Indians were “machines” in the words of Mata Linares,
mere followers with no initiative of their own. So instead of prosecu-
tion, officials sought to extirpate the memory of the Incas and to force
Indians to abandon the Quechua language, a cornerstone of their in-
digenous culture.
The campaign built on brisk reformist winds from Spain, particu-
larly efforts to control the Catholic Church and to homogenize religious
practices. It also reflected the impression that authorities’ vitriolic ti-
rades about the sorry state of the Andes had made in Madrid. In search-
ing for a cause for the uprising, Areche, Mata Linares and even Bishop
Moscoso blamed Indians for being insufficiently European (or too In-
dian), ultimately blaming wayward authorities, especially creoles and
priests, for allowing Peru’s indigenous people to remain autonomous.
Although the visitador and the judge on the one side and the bishop
on the other clashed during the uprising, and Moscoso faced a decade-

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Conclusion 269
long legal struggle over his alleged support for the rebels, they agreed
that Indians were too attached to the Incas and too detached from the
Spanish. They rued the persistence of Inca dress, songs, and dramas as
well as the predominance of Quechua, taking priests to task for their
failure to convert and assimilate. In their correspondence as well as
reports to Lima and Madrid, these authorities underlined the sorry
state of Spanish rule in the Andes. Moscoso called Cuzco “a Babylon.”1
Mata Linares ranted incessantly about Cuzco and its inhabitants. He
considered the Andes “rough and disagreeable” and claimed that peo-
ple in Cuzco were either “traitors or cowards.”2 These complaints about
Indians’ stubborn hold on the past and refusal to learn Spanish devel-
oped, improbably, into a broad-reaching policy. The paper war between
hard-liners and moderates not only shaped royalist tactics during the
war but also molded programs and policies after the massive rebellion.
The postrebellion assimilationist campaign or cultural genocide
failed. Reforms could not eradicate Quechua or Andean culture, nor
could they assimilate the Andean masses into the Spanish-Catholic world.
Nonetheless, Areche’s measures changed relations between Spain and
the Andes. The draconian measures terminated the two-republics sys-
tem imposed by Viceroy Toledo in the 1570s. This system granted Indi-
ans a degree of cultural, political, and economic autonomy in return
for their designation as separate and inferior subjects and the obligation
of heavy head and labor taxes. Under the Toledan system Indians were
allowed to speak Quechua, remember the Incas, maintain ethnic
kurakas, control communal land, and enjoy other rights as long as they
paid the head tax, worked in the mines under the dreadful mita, and
pledged obedience to the king and the Church. Dating from the middle
of the eighteenth century, the Bourbon Reforms had chipped away at
this “colonial pact,” replacing indigenous authorities with Europeans
and raising taxes and labor demands. These changes prompted the ire
of Indians as well as mestizos, Europeans, and the multiracial castas,
fostering the riots, revolts, and smaller uprisings that preceded Tupac
Amaru. Nonetheless, the administrative reforms prior to 1780 had only
destabilized the deep structures of Indian-colonial state relations. The
rebellion and its aftermath smashed them.
Even as the former system, the two republics, disintegrated under the
pressure of the post–Tupac Amaru repression and policy changes, no
clear replacement or alternative emerged. In other words, the reforms

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were more destructive than constructive; they obliterated the system

implemented by Toledo in the late sixteenth century but did not create
a coherent successor. Venomous postrebellion fury and extreme anti-
Indian notions rather than careful planning guided the changes, doom-
ing them. Eliminating a language spoken by millions and assimilating
the indigenous population almost overnight were unattainable fanta-
sies, particularly if Madrid did not intend to invest in Peru and if the
Catholic Church lacked bilingual priests. This failure meant that many
questions regarding the place of Indians in the colonial Andes re-
mained unclear; uncertainty and disagreement reigned. From 1780 until
independence in the 1820s and beyond, Andean people— authorities,
the indigenous, and those in between— debated and struggled about
the legitimacy of noble Indians, the role and succession of kurakas, the
continuation of the mita, and the weight of taxes on indigenous people.
The unfeasible or inapplicable post–Tupac Amaru policies, along with
the winds of change arriving from distant France, Iberia, and— by
1800— other parts of Spanish America, converted these local disputes
into raging struggles about Spanish rule.3
The failure of the post–Tupac Amaru cultural project, which, if suc-
cessful, would have been a virtual cultural revolution, should not be ex-
aggerated. Anti-Quechua diatribes and plans continued to emerge. For
example, in 1798 Father José Fernando Baeza lobbied to “extinguish” the
Quechua language and to prevent Indians from gaining Spanish literacy.
He explained, “Anyone who has carefully and attentively observed Indi-
ans’ character and temperament knows that education [la ilustración]
makes them haughty. Just them knowing how to read and write is
enough to disturb the peace. José Gabriel Condorcanqui, alias Tupac
Amaro, would still live with tranquility in his hut and he would not have
caused irreparable damage, if it weren’t for the School for Indians in this
city [Cuzco], where the Indians who deem themselves noble are edu-
cated, and thus would not have drunk from the poison that is Garcilaso
de la Vega.”4 Father Baeza proposed forcing mestizos who spoke Quechua
to pay the Indian head tax and contended that Spanish women fostered
Quechua by not imposing Spanish on their maids and other domestic
servants. Spiteful anti-Indian sentiments persisted. The harsh Areche
reforms might have collapsed rapidly, but anti-Indian attitudes did not.
Mata Linares and others largely succeeded in ridding the area of
representations of the Incas and of Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas

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Conclusion 271
themselves, as well as limiting other forms of remembering and cele-

brating the Incan Empire. The battles over paintings are particularly
revealing. In April 1781 Bishop Moscoso oversaw the removal of The
Incas of Peru from the San Francisco school for the children of noble
Indians, where Tupac Amaru had studied, and in the church of Cura-
huasi in Abancay. He deemed it a “prudent precaution” because “these
gentiles [the Incas] have made such an impression on the Indians, al-
ways prone to such a memory.”5 Authorities destroyed the portraits of
Tupac Amaru and many other paintings, although a few survived,
above all those in houses or estates that escaped the vigilant eye of the
state.6 Moreover, officials often did not destroy the paintings but simply
allowed artists to paint over them. Modern specialists have uncovered,
literally, several colonial paintings with allusions to noble Indians, the
Incas, or even Tupac Amaru himself, which in the decades after the
uprising had been covered by religious themes. Authorities failed to rid
the area of all pictorial references to the Incas and their descendants,
but destroyed the vast majority.7
The measures succeeded in making references to Tupac Amaru, Mi-
caela Bastidas, and the uprising taboo in Cuzco in the following de-
cades. The public executions, the decade-long trials against Bishop Mos-
coso and others, and the antisubversive hubris of Mata Linares meant
that for years afterward, Indians, mestizos, and creoles worried about
accusations of harboring rebel sympathies. In the legal system, these
insinuations— no proof was necessary— could damage a case; people
hid their support for the uprising.8
It was not only fear, of course, that discouraged people from dis-
cussing the uprising. No group looked back at it with pride and satisfac-
tion. For the Spanish, it had been a terrible shock, a costly one in terms
of human lives, expenditures, cohesion, and legitimacy. They knew
that they had barely held on and did not gloat. For Indians, the brutal
executions symbolized a painful defeat. In the heady days of late 1780,
when Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas led tens of thousands of
troops in the siege of Cuzco, or in late 1781, when Diego Cristóbal, An-
drés, and Mariano seemed unstoppable in the high plateau around Lake
Titicaca, Indians felt that the rebels had been on the verge of victory.
(Some realized this with dread or disappointment— it should not be
forgotten that not all Indians supported the uprising.) Both episodes
ended with their leaders’ severed body parts displayed on pikes or hung

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from trees as macabre warnings; estate and textile mill owners as well
as unpopular officials soon returned. At best, Indian supporters saw
the rebellion as a tragic near miss. Mestizos and others caught in the
middle recalled the threat of violence from both the rebels and the roy-
alists and the high toll the uprising took on the regional economy and
daily life.
Officials often grumbled that the prospect of more violence or even
the return of some member of the Tupac Amaru family had not disap-
peared. For example, in July 1783 Cuzco’s corregidor, Matías Baulen,
wrote, “The embers remain from the recent fi re and it’s not impossible
that they heat up again, even among those people who seem to have
the best temperament. This riffraff [chusma] works on fi rst impres-
sions.”9 For some people, such as Baulen, the lingering impression that
another uprising was possible, perhaps just around the corner, indi-
cated that repression had not gone far enough; for others, the Spanish
hard-liners had been excessive, imperiling Spanish control of the An-
des. Yet these were rumors or private musings. Repression managed to
silence public discussion and expressions of nostalgia or veneration for
Tupac Amaru for decades. This would change. Despite the effort to
construct “official silence,” the voices of Tupac Amaru’s supporters rose
to praise him, to construct an alternative path from his memory.10
What did Tupac Amaru mean for broader political alignments in
Peru? In a landmark publication in 1972 that burst the bubble of the
flag-waving 150th anniversary celebrations of Peruvian independence
(independence was declared in 1821 but the Spanish were not defeated
until 1824), Heraclio Bonilla and Karen Spalding underlined that Tu-
pac Amaru had intimidated creoles and other non-Indians and dis-
couraged them from supporting Andean-based uprisings. These histo-
rians suggested that the events of the 1780s widened the coast-Andes
breach and gave Lima-based creoles, already much more conservative
than their brethren in “peripheral areas” such as Buenos Aires or Cara-
cas, more reason to vacillate over the struggle against the Spanish that
erupted in the early 1800s.11 The irony stands out— Bonilla and Spald-
ing argued that a mass uprising that was at that time, the 1970s, being
portrayed as the precursor of Peruvian independence had actually
weakened or delayed the rupture with Spain. Decades of subsequent
research on the lower classes and politics in the independence period
have amended or fi ne-tuned this uncompromising interpretation,

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Conclusion 273
highlighting the role that the lower classes played in regional move-
ments and stressing different types of popular politics. Nonetheless, the
gap between coastal independence movements and Andean people
was im mense, fortified by the coastal elite’s terror of marauding Indian
guerrillas.12
The rebellion demonstrated the high cost of an uprising to creoles
and mestizos: insubordination and violence by the lower orders, on the
one hand, and brutal repression by authorities, on the other. It alarmed
the nonindigenous population and increased the already considerable
rift between the coast and the highlands. The uprising culminated in
the annihilation of the Tupac Amaru clan, other kurakas, and tens of
thousands of Indians. The repression thus exterminated or at least in-
timidated future rebel leaders and followers, dampening the prospect of
future Cuzco-based insurgencies.13 However, the violence also ruptured
the historic pact between Indians and the colonial state and proved to
thousands of survivors that the Spanish should not be tolerated. In-
canism did not perish, and during the wars of independence and be-
yond intellectuals and others expressed an appreciation for the Inca
Empire and timidly proposed it as a possible national symbol.14 The Tu-
pac Amaru rebellion both delayed and hastened independence from
Spain: it widened the Andean-coastal gap and underscored to the upper
classes and others the high cost of insurgency, but also ruptured the
Toledan system that had been the bedrock of colonial rule for 200 years.
Tupac Amaru and his movement did not become heroes, models,
icons, or points of reference for the leaders of the wars of independence
in Peru from 1808 to 1824. Tupac’s name surfaced from time to time,
as both a hero and a villain, but not, until many years later, as a con-
stant refrain. In 1814, the creole intellectual José Baquíjano y Carrillo
wrote, “Indians are tenacious in preserving resentment . . . they la-
ment the atrocious execution of Diego Tupac Amaru in 1780 [sic], after
he had handed over his weapons, accepted the pardon, sworn to it in-
side a Church.”15 Yet the rebels in Peru in 1814, based in Cuzco and led
by, among others, Tupac Amaru’s nemesis Pumacahua, did not fight in
José Gabriel or Micaela’s name.16 Tupac Amaru became a national
symbol— but only decades or even centuries later. We can assume Tu-
pac Amaru and Micaela remained larger-than-life heroes to vast num-
bers of indigenous people in Cuzco and beyond. But we will probably
never know for certain. If indigenous voices are normally rare in the

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written record, in the bleak post–Tupac Amaru decades, Indian peoples

retreated into stony silence in the extant archives.17
In 1783 a junta of three distinguished authorities in Madrid re-
viewed the 1781 cases against José Gabriel and others to evaluate whether
the procedures, sentences, and punishments were acceptable. They
chided the judges (without naming Mata Linares or Areche) for cutting
José Gabriel’s tongue while he was alive: this was not permitted ac-
cording to the laws of Castile or of the Indies. They also questioned the
burning of the bodies and the spreading of their ashes as well as some
of the actions taken against minors. The three judges called for “pru-
dence” in the banning of kurakas and Inca clothing and theater, noting
that it was preferable to get rid of “everything that makes the Indians
remember their antiquity and gentile past, but with political caution
and in such a way that the intentions and ends of these policies are not
easily seen.”18 They understood that the war was now being fought in
the realm of memory, in how Tupac Amaru was remembered and how
effectively they could silence indigenous supporters. In a marginal note
in a copy of the junta’s fi ndings, which questioned some of the tactics
and procedures but generally supported the sentences and cultural re-
pression, a Madrid court scribe scribbled, “In light of the enormity of
these crimes and the other circumstances that intervened in this case,
the king approves what was done with the cadavers, for public terror
and as a lesson.” [para terror y escarmiento público].19
In arguably the first historical account of the uprising, in 1816 the
Argentine priest, Gregorio Funes, wrote in his multivolume Essay on the
Civil History of Buenos Aires, Tucumán, and Paraguay, “Through the force
of terror, the Ancien Régime treated the writing and even the discus-
sion [discurso] about the rebellion as a conspiracy against the state. They
wanted these events to be erased from memory, even that of the op-
pressed, or at least that they only remain in the oppressors’ con-
science.”20 It would be decades until Spanish writers overcame official
silencing and began to criticize Spanish brutality and cast Tupac Amaru
in a new light.21 Depicting the uprising as an isolated conspiracy, the
Spanish had done a remarkable job in silencing discussion about it.
But Tupac Amaru resurfaced in curious, unexpected places. In
1802, in the waning moments of the Haitian Revolution, Jean-Jacques
Dessalines, the commanding general of the Haitian Revolutionary Army
and at this point the governor-general, deemed his forces “the Army of

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Conclusion 275
the Incas” and “Sons of the Sun.” The invocation of Tupac Amaru and
Peru made sense. Just two decades earlier, the overwhelmingly indig-
enous rebel army had nearly dislodged Spain from its South American
hub, inventing a new revolutionary framework. Events in the Carib-
bean were equally shocking and momentous. Haitian slaves were in
the midst of toppling French colonialism and Atlantic slavery, on an
island at the center of the sugar economy.22 Around 1810, gaucho rebels
fighting the Spanish in the area north of Buenos Aires, in present-day
Uruguay, assumed the name Tupamaros.23 And the prospect of a Tupac
Amaru leading another uprising outside of Peru concerned authorities
for decades. In 1790, a Madrid court official requested that the gover-
nors of Guyana and Venezuela investigate whether two nephews of
Tupac Amaru had sneaked into the Dutch territory of Surinam. The
official asked them to fi nd out if the two men were hiding among the
fugitive population “and whether they had contact with Indians, and
whether these natives look at the nephews with consideration.” They
were not found.24 For decades, perhaps even centuries, authorities in
Cuzco, Lima, and beyond worried about the resurgence of Tupac Amaru
or his followers.
Memory and Legacy
In 1965, Peruvian poet Antonio Cisneros wrote in “Tupac Amaru

Relegated”:
There are liberators

with long sideburns
who saw the dead and wounded brought back
after the battles. Soon their names
became history, and the sideburns
growing into their old uniforms
proclaimed them founders of the nation.
Others with less luck have taken up

two pages of text
with four horses and their death.25
Written almost fi fty years ago, the poem contrasts the well-known mili-
tary heroes of the wars of independence, all of European descent, lauded
and pictured in museums and textbooks, with the overlooked (or “less
lucky”) martyr of Pampamarca.

Authenticated
Tupac Amaru, however, is no longer the forgotten figure he once was.

Young Peruvians can identify him as well (or as poorly) as they can the
major figures of the Wars of Independence (1808–1824) or the martyrs
of the War of the Pacific (1879–1882), Cisneros’s liberators with side-
burns. Historians have turned their attention to the events of 1780–1783,
and Tupac Amaru has become an international symbol of resistance
and even a dark-skinned, pony-tailed icon.
Two guerrilla groups named their movements after him: the Tupama-
ros in Uruguay (1960–1974) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Move-
ment in Peru (1980–1997).26 My students gasp when they learn that the
rapper Tupac Amaru Shakur was named after the Cuzco rebel. In 1972,
Afeni Shakur (formerly Alice Faye Williams), a member of the Black Pan-
ther Party in the United States, was acquitted on conspiracy charges (as
part of what is known as the Panther 21). She changed her infant’s name
from Lesane Parish Crooks to Tupac Amaru Shakur. He was less than a
year old, born on June 16, 1971. The last name honored her husband
and Tupac’s stepfather, Mutulu Shakur, himself a prominent black
nationalist. “Tupac Amaru” referred to the Peruvian revolutionary. 27
Tupac wore the name proudly, emblazing it as “2-Pac” on his chest, in
one of his many tattoos. Handsome, gifted, and shot down in his prime,
Tupac Shakur became an international symbol of resistance, “a global
barometer of youth malaise.”28 Both Tupacs, José Gabriel and Shakur,
died martyrs, with their popularity or fan base growing postmortem.
The increased prominence of Tupac Amaru, his transformation from
just another rebel to an international symbol, can be traced to one curi-
ous and momentous period in modern Peruvian history, the left-leaning
military regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975). The Velasco
government converted the Andean insurgent into its major symbol, em-
blazoning his image on banners, posters, coins, bills, and publications.
Tupac Amaru became the face of the extensive agrarian reform that the
Velasco regime enacted. A supposed Tupac Amaru quote, “campesino, el
patrón ya no comerá tu pobreza” (“Peasant, the master will no longer feed
from your hunger”) became the government’s leading slogan for land
reform; Velasco’s speechwriter invented it.29
Tupac Amaru meshed well with how the Velasco government
sought to present itself: as a defender of Andean indigenous peasants
(the beneficiaries of the agrarian reform) and as nationalists confront-
ing foreign imperialists (gringo oil companies rather than Spaniards).

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Conclusion 277
The Velasco government published multivolume document collections

on the Tupac Amaru uprising and sponsored works of poetry and mu-
sic and art competitions. Building on nationalist scholarship, Velasco
ideologues cast Tupac Amaru as the precursor to the Peruvian War of
Independence.30 As Cisneros’s poem underlines, until this acclamation
of Tupac Amaru, Peru’s national heroes had either been foreign libera-
tors (the Argentine San Martín and the Venezuelan Bolívar) or coastal
men of European descent.
The iconography and diverse political uses of Tupac Amaru have a
long history. Such an account would have to move from newly founded
Argentina—which seriously debated the crowning of an Inca King in
1816, staged a five-act play, Tupac Amarú, in 1821, and received Juan
Bautista Tupac Amaru in 1822— through different political and ideo-
logical movements and schools of thought in Peru in the last two cen-
turies. Various political groups—not just guerrillas— have claimed him,
and the city of Cuzco celebrates Tupac Amaru as a heroic native son. In
1950, Cuzco’s City Council, the San Antonio Abad University, and the
Rotary Club installed a plaque in Tupac Amaru’s honor in the Plaza de
Armas, near where he and his intimates were kept captive and exe-
cuted. Several other plaques and small monuments in the plaza com-
memorate Tupac Amaru and the uprising while, after decades of de-
bate, in 1980 workers installed a massive statue of José Gabriel on
horseback in a large, somewhat barren plaza less than a mile from the
city center.31 In Cuzco and beyond, Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas
have inspired artists, sculptors, playwrights, poets, and novelists, with
varying results.32
Despite the appropriation of his image and the outpouring of stud-
ies, Tupac Amaru, Micaela Bastidas, and their movement have not
entered the pantheon of North Atlantic revolutions. Scholars and the
textbooks they write have long focused on the creation of the United
States and the French Revolution, more recently incorporating the Hai-
tian Revolution (1791–1804) into a grand narrative of the Era of Revo-
lutions. There are reasons to consider the Andean insurgency alongside
these better-known revolutions. The territorial expansion of the Tupac
Amaru and Katarista rebellions surpassed that of the American Revo-
lution, while the death toll—100,000—approximated Haiti’s 150,000.
The rebels rethought and tried to reinvent the colonial, Andean world,
putting Spanish control of the Andes on the brink. They patched together

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a variety of ideologies, particularly Incan revivalism, Christian egali-

tarianism, and Spanish “buen gobierno,” though largely excluding ele-
ments of the Enlightenment. One obvious reason that historians do not
consider the Tupac Amaru Rebellion in the same breath as these more
famous revolutions is that it lost—Tupac Amaru and his comrades in
arms did not topple the Spanish. Moreover, while the Haitian revolution-
aries confronted slavery and the transatlantic sugar economy, thus mo-
bilizing a multinational reactionary coalition that fought the revolution
and independent Haiti for decades, the Andean rebels attracted far less
international attention.33 Nonetheless, the Tupac Amaru rebels fashioned
a fascinating and complex movement with novel guerrilla tactics that,
although ultimately defeated, changed the Andean and Atlantic world
indelibly.
The allure of the memory of Tupac Amaru is not limited to scholars
and well-read leftists. In 1980, an eleven-year-old Quechua-speaking boy,
whose family had been forced to flee Ayacucho because of the Shining
Path violence, told an anthropologist, “Tupac Amaru fought for us because
they worked the Indians too hard. He fought, struggled, killed many
Spaniards. This is how Indians fight today. They have told me that he
hasn’t died. He’s alive and will never get old. They say he rides around on
horseback. He lives in the high peaks, but we never see him. He rides hid-
den, like the wind. That’s what they say.”34 For this boy and many, many
others, Tupac Amaru continues present.

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Chronology of the Rebellion
1738 José Gabriel Condorcanqui, Tupac Amaru II, born in

Surimana
1744 Micaela Bastidas Puyucahua born in Pampamarca
1759–1788 Reign of Charles III, King of Spain, oversees Bourbon
Reforms
1760 Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas marry
1760s & 1770s Period of increasing number of revolts in Andean
communities
1772 The alcabala (sales tax) increases from 2 percent to 4 percent
1774 Customs Houses (aduana) are established in Cochabamba;
revolts ensue
1775–1783 American Revolutionary War
1776 José Antonio de Areche is named inspector (Visitador General)
by the Spanish Crown, arrives in 1777
1776 The alcabala is again increased, from 4 percent to 6 percent
1776 Upper Peru becomes part of the new Viceroyalty of Rio de La
Plata
1777 The fi rst revolt against the La Paz Customs House, in late
October
1777 Tupac Amaru litigates in Lima
1778 Tomás Katari goes to Buenos Aires seeking justice for his
people
1778 Crown orders corregidors to collect the 6 percent alcabala
1779 Tomás Katari is arrested, leading to widespread protests
1779 Coca, previously exempt, becomes subject to the 6 percent
alcabala

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282 Chronology of the Rebellion
1780 January 1, riots in Arequipa over Customs House

1780 Lampoons appear in Cuzco shortly after Arequipa riot
warning against Customs House
1780 In March, riot attacking the La Paz Customs House
1780 Katari rebellion begins in late August
1780 In November, José Gabriel Tupac Amaru’s rebellion erupts
with the capture (November 4) and execution (November 10)
of Corregidor Antonio de Arriaga
1780–1781 Late December/early January, Tupac Amaru forces surround
Cuzco but never enter it
1781 Tomás Katari killed; his brothers Nicolás and Dámaso
continue the struggle until they too are killed
1781 April 7, Tupac Amaru captured in Langui; Micaela Bastidas,
their two sons Hipólito and Fernando, and Tomasa Tito
Condemayta captured en route to Livitaca
1781 May 18, Tupac Amaru, his wife, and others are executed in
the main plaza of Cuzco; Diego Tupac Amaru has assumed
leadership of the rebellion
1781 Tupac Katari (Julián Apaza) puts La Paz under extensive
siege
1781 In November, Tupac Katari is captured and executed
1782 Bartolina Sisa and Gregoria Apaza, the wife and sister of
Tupac Katari, are executed
1783 July 19, Diego Tupac Amaru is brutally executed along with
his mother and others
1784 Fernando, son of Tupac Amaru and Micaela Bastidas, is sent
into exile in Spain
1789–1799 French Revolution
1791–1804 Haitian Revolution
1811–1824 War of Independence in Peru (independence proclaimed in
1821, Spanish defeated in 1824)
1820–1822 Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru freed from Spanish jail (Ceuta),
settles in Argentina until his death in 1827

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Notes
Abbreviations
ADC Archivo Departamental del Cuzco

AGI Archivo General de Indias
CBC Centro Bartolomé de Las Casas
CDBRETA Colección Documental del Bicentenario de la Revolución
Emancipadora de Túpac Amaru
CDIP Colección Documental de la Independencia del Perú
CEMHAL Centro de Estudios la Mujer en la Historia de América Latina
CNDBRETA Comisión Nacional del Bicentenario de la Rebelión de Túpac
Amaru
CNDSIP Comisión Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia
del Perú
HAHR Hispanic American Historical Review
IEP Instituto de Estudios Peruanos
Leg. Legajo
PUC Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
RAH Real Academia de la Historia (Madrid)
UNMSM Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos
Introduction
Epigraphs: Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucumán y

Paraguay, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1856), 229–230; Modesto Ba-
sadre, Riquezas peruanas (Lima: Imprenta de la Tribuna, 1884), 96.
1. Because this story involves many members of the Tupac Amaru family, I
will rely on fi rst names. I follow the colonial form and do not put an accent
on Tupac (Túpac).
2. His uncle Julián de Arriaga was a member of the Council of Indies and his
brother owned ships. See Antonio de Arriaga, “Relación de méritos,” 1771,
AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041.

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284 Notes to Pages 2–6
3. The two main accounts vary in their details. Melchor de Paz publishes an
account that says that Arriaga grabbed a gun, while López de Sosa states
that he tried to escape in a ravine. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista: Rebe-
liones de Indios en Sur América, la sublevación de Tupac Amaru: Crónica de
Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis Antonio Eguiguren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p., 1952),
1:231–236; López de Sosa’s testimony appears in AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80.
4. Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del Perú (Pam-
plona, Spain: Diputación Foral de Navarra, Institución Príncipe de Viana,
1979), 51.
5. Ward Stavig and Ella Schmidt, eds., The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebel-
lions: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 2008),
62– 63.
6. For López de Sosa’s explanation of why he gave him confession, see CD-
BRETA, I, 108–109 (Lima: CNDBRETA, 1980).
7. See AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 31; another copy of this source is found in AGI, Cuzco,
Leg. 80.
8. Lillian E. Fisher summarizes the few descriptions of his attire. L. E. Fisher,
The Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1966), 30–31.
9. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, testimony by doña Ignacia Sotomayor.
10. CDBRETA, I, 508, document from don Miguel Martínez, priest and vicar
of Nuñoa and Santa Rosa.
11. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, testimony by doña Ignacia Sotomayor.
12. Zudaire, Don Agustín, 53.
13. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, testimony by Antonio López de Sosa. The translation
of this rare Quechua phrase in the archival documentation was an inter-
national enterprise. In Seville, Luis Miguel Glave double-checked my
transcription, and Janett Vengoa, Rosalia Puma Escalante, and Zoila Men-
doza offered their Quechua skills.
14. “Informe de un clérigo sobre Tupac Amaru,” 1781, Lilly Library, Indiana
University. An almost identical quote can be found in Melchor de Paz,
Guerra separatista, 1:259–260.
15. Divisions in the church included those between regulars (the mendicant
orders such as the Dominicans and Franciscans) and seculars as well as
those between the episcopal bureaucracy and the parish priests.
16. Lillian Fisher wrote the competent The Last Inca Revolt in 1966; I prefer the
English geographer Clements Markham’s vivid overviews from the 1850s
and 1860s. The Polish-Argentine Boleslao Lewin published several deeply
researched works in Spanish in the 1950s that have stood the test of time
well. A Jewish refugee from Hitler’s Europe, Lewin makes implicit parallels
between antifascist resistance in Europe and the mass indigenous uprising
in the late eighteenth century. Yet his La rebelión de Tupac Amaru is now fi fty
years old, more than six hundred pages long, and out of print. When people

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Notes to Page 7 285
ask for a recommendation, I would mention these as well as the works of

Peruvian authors but usually stress the need to consult a number of books
and articles. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt; Clements R. Markham, Travels in
Peru and India (London: John Murray, 1862), 134–180; Boleslao Lewin, La
rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: SELA, 1967), 276–285.
17. Two examples that helped greatly in this book: Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy,
Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia 1700–1783 (Cuzco: CBC,
1988) (also available in English: Rebellions and Revolts in Eighteenth Century
Peru and Upper Peru [Cologne: Bohlau Verlag Köln Wien, 1985]); Neus
Escandell-Tur, Producción y comercio de tejidos coloniales: Los obrajes y chorrillos
del Cuzco 1570–1820 (Cuzco: CBC, 1997).
18. The Colección Documental de la Independencia Peruana (CDIP) originally was to
have 106 volumes but ended up with 86 (confusingly divided into tomos and
each of these subdivided into volúmenes). CDIP (Lima: Comisión Nacional
del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia del Perú, 1971–1976); see tomo II,
La Rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 4 vols. (1971–1972). The Colección Documental del
Bicentenario de la Revolución Emancipadora de Túpac Amaru (CDBRETA) pub-
lished five document collections (I, II, III-I, IV-II, V-III), one “anthology,”
and one collection of articles from a conference (Lima: CNDBRETA, 1981–
1982). On Velasco, see Leopoldo Lituma Agüero, El verdadero rostro de Túpac
Amaru (Perú, 1969–1975) (Lima: UNMSM, 2011); on the rising interest in
social movements in the Vietnam era, see two influential edited volumes:
Steve Stern, ed., Resistance, Rebellion, Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World,
18th to 20th Centuries (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), par-
ticularly Stern’s introductory essay, “New Approaches to the Study of Peas-
ant Rebellion and Consciousness: Implications of the Andean Experiment,”
3–28; Friedrich Katz, ed., Riot, Rebellion, and Revolution: Rural Social Conflict in
Mexico (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988).
The Colección Documental and the Colección del Bicenenterio are not
the only document collections. For example, Pedro de Angelis published an
important set in 1836 in Buenos Aires. Pedro de Angelis, Documentos para la
historia de la sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac Amaru, cacique de la provincia
de Tinta, en el Perú (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836), most of which
was reproduced by Manuel de Odriozola without citing Angelis. Odriozola,
Documentos históricos del Perú en las epocas del coloniaje despues de la Conquista y
de la independencia hasta la presente, vol. 1 (Lima: Tipografía de Aurelio
Alfaro, 1863). Others have followed. No guide exists that indicates what is
published where and so I often spent days on a document in Seville that I
later learned was already reproduced. I’ve followed a simple rule: I cite
what I read, whether from an archive or from a document collection.
19. Juan José Vega and Daniel Valcárcel wrote multiple books on the uprising.
See Juan José Vega, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru (Lima: n.p., 1969); among the
dozens of books by Valcárcel, many of them repetitive, see Carlos Daniel

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Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru, el revolucionario (Lima: Moncloa- Campodónico,

1970).
20. The Spanish preoccupation and indeed obsession with José Gabriel Tupac
Amaru and Micaela Bastidas left a rich trove of information that permits
detailed studies such as this one to be written. Authorities in Madrid, Lima,
and Cuzco closely examined their activities prior to the uprising to compre-
hend how and why they rebelled, who supported them, and for how long
they had planned an uprising. These obsessed authorities were correct, of
course, in that the lives of José Gabriel and Micaela Bastidas up until 1780
enable us to begin to understand the course of the rebellion, its ideology,
followers, strengths, and weaknesses. The biographies not only illuminate
the nature of urban and rural Cuzco, but also that of Peru and the politics of
Spain itself.
21. I have benefited greatly from the document collection Túpac Amaru y la
Iglesia: Antología (Cuzco: Comité Arquidiocesano del Bicentenario Túpac
Amaru, 1983).
22. While a list of good narrative histories could go on for pages, I’ve been in-
spired by UC Davis colleagues who believe that good history and good
writing are the same thing: Arnie Bauer, Ari Kelman, Andrés Reséndez,
and Alan Taylor in par tic u lar.
23. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 10.
24. The term is usually applied to a more modern era, ranging from the U.S.
Civil War to the two world wars, when the nation-state could use the prod-
ucts of industrialization to mobilize and slaughter. Nonetheless, some have
used the concept for the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), and I have found it
germane. I only use the more common term in Latin America, “caste war,”
to refer to royalist or civilian panic that the rebellion was turning into an
Indian-based war of extermination. The literature is massive. I found par-
ticularly useful David Silvey, “Total War,” in Encyclopedia of Warfare, ed. Gor-
don Martel (London: Blackwell Publishing, 2011); David A. Bell, The First
Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Modern Warfare as We Know It (Bos-
ton: Houghton Miffl in Harcourt, 2008). On caste war, see Terry Rugeley,
Rebellion Now and Forever: Mayas, Hispanics, and Caste War Violence in Yucatán,
1800–1880 (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); Michael T.
Ducey, A Nation of Villages: Riots and Rebellions in the Mexican Huasteca, 1750–
1850 (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2004), chapter 6.
25. Wayne Lee, Barbarians & Brothers: Anglo-American Warfare, 1500–1865 (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors:
How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).
On violence and daily life in Latin America, see William Taylor, Drinking,
Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 1979); Sonya Lipsett-Rivera, Gender and the Negotiation of
Daily Life in Mexico, 1750–1850 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2012).

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Notes to Pages 11–18 287
26. O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo.

27. On violence in Cuzco, see Ward Stavig, The World of Tupac Amaru: Conflict,
Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1999); Charles F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of
Republican Peru, 1780–1835 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999).
28. For comparing and contextualizing the violence of the uprising, I have ben-
efitted from Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Exter-
mination from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press,
2007); Christian Gerlach, Extremely Violent Societies: Mass Violence in the
Twentieth- Century World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010);
Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined
(New York: Penguin Books, 2012). Specifically on the Andean uprisings,
see Nicholas Robins, “Genocide and the Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 in
Peru and Upper Peru,” Journal of Genocide Research 7, 3 (2005): 251–375.
29. On empathy, see Pinker, The Better Angels, 59–128.
30. The debate about whether modernity or the “civilizing project” hinders or
fosters violence continues. To take two prominent examples, Pinker ar-
gues that it hinders violence, while Jared Diamond contends that it fosters
it. Pinker, The Better Angels; Jared Diamond, The World Until Yesterday: What
Can We Learn from Traditional Societies (New York: Viking, 2012).
31. Mark Fiege, The Republic of Nature: An Environmental History of the United
States (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2012), 10–11, is excellent
on the formative role of ideas of nature.
32. Markham, even with his Victorian-era blinders, presents stirring summa-
ries of Andean geography. Markham, Travels, as well as Clements R.
Markham, A History of Peru (Chicago: Charles H. Sergel 1892); on economy
and era in the Titicaca region, see Nils Jacobsen, Mirages of Transition: The
Peruvian Altiplano, 1780–1930 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
33. A nice analysis can be found in Thomas Cummins, “A Tale of Two Cities:
Cuzco, Lima and the Construction of Colonial Representation,” in Converg-
ing Cultures: Art and Identity in Spanish America, ed. Diane Fane (New York:
Brooklyn Museum, Harry N. Abrams, 1996), 157–170. On late colonial
Cuzco, see Magnus Mörner, Perfil de la sociedad rural del Cuzco a fines de la
colonia (Lima: Universidad del Pacífico, 1978); Walker, Smoldering Ashes.
34. John Murra developed the term “vertical archipelagos.” John Murra, For-
maciones económicas y políticas del mundo andino (Lima: IEP, 1975).
35. For calculations on genocide, see Kiernan, Blood and Soil.
1. The Andes in the Atlantic World
1. See José Antonio del Busto Duthurburu, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru antes de su
rebelión (Lima: PUC, 1981), 34; John Rowe, “El movimiento nacional inca del
siglo XVIII,” in Tupac Amaru II-1780, ed. Alberto Flores Galindo (Lima: Re-
tablo de Papel, 1976), 13– 66, esp. 27–30 (pointing out that it was Garcilaso

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de la Vega who transformed “Thupa” or “Tupa” to “Tupac”); Carlos Daniel

Valcárcel, La familia del cacique Túpac Amaru (Documentos existentes en la iglesa
de Pampamarca), 2nd ed. (Lima: UNMSM, 1979). I thank Zoila Mendoza for
help with Quechua.
2. Héctor Oliva, Pasajes a América: La vida desmesurada de cinco catalanes (Barce-
lona: RBA Libros, 2007), 246–248.
3. Del Busto Duthurburu, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru, is excellent on his
childhood.
4. Juan José Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros, 2 vols. (Cuzco: Municipali-
dad del Qosqo, 1995), is very good on his fi nances; see also John H. Rowe,
“La fecha del nacimiento de José Gabriel Thupa Amaro,” Historia y Cultura
5 (1971): 187–191.
5. Enrique Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, “Prices and Agricultural Produc-
tion: Potosí and Charcas in the Eighteenth Century,” in Essays on the Price
History of Eighteenth- Century Latin America, ed. Lyman Johnson and Enrique
Tandeter (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1989), 201–275,
esp. 241; Luis Miguel Glave and María Isabel Remy, Estructura agraria y
vida rural en una región andina: Ollantaytambo entre los siglos XVI y XIX (Cuzco:
CBC, 1983). The climate study on Upper Peru by Prieto and Herrera indi-
cates that the years around 1780 were cold and dry. María del Rosario
Prieto and Roberto G. Herrera, “Clima y economía en el área andino: El
Alto Perú y el espacio económico regional a fi nes del siglo XVIII,” in Estu-
dios sobre historia y ambiente en América, ed. Bernardo García Moreno and
María del Rosario Prieto, vol. 2 (Mexico City: El Colegio de México/Insti-
tuto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, 2002), 55– 80.
6. On muleteers and trans-Andean traders, the key work is Luis Miguel
Glave, Trajinantes: Caminos indígenas en la sociedad colonial, siglos XVI/XVII
(Lima: Instituto de Apoyo Agrario, 1989). On Tupac Amaru’s debts, see
David Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution in Bourbon Peru: The Dio-
cese of Cuzco, 1780–1814” (PhD diss. University of Liverpool, 1984), 213.
7. Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy has long worked on this subject. See her Kurakas
sin sucesiones: Del cacique al alcalde de indios, Perú y Bolivia 1750–1835 (Cuzco:
CBC, 1997); see also David T. Garrett, Shadows of Empire: The Indian Nobility of
Cusco, 1750–1825 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 183–210.
8. Del Busto Duthurburu, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru, 54–56; Jorge Cornejo
Bouroncle, Sangre andina: Diez mujeres Cuzqueñas (Cuzco: H.G. Rozas
Sucesores, 1949), 29–108; Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Tupac Amaru, la revolu-
ción precursora de la emancipación continental (Cuzco: Universidad Nacional
del Cuzco, 1949), 599– 601. Esquivel y Navia refers to this priest, noting his
death on June 5, 1746, an argument that Del Busto discounts. Diego de
Esquivel y Navia, Noticias cronológicas de la Gran Ciudad del Cuzco, 2 vols.
(Lima: Biblioteca Peruana de Cultura, 1980), 2:348. See also Vega, Túpac
Amaru y sus compañeros, 2:284.

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9. The documentation on Micaela Bastidas is scarce, particularly when com-

pared to her husband. This might be partially explained by the Spanish
burning her belongings after her trial but is also due to the fact that an il-
legitimate daughter received less official attention than a litigious kuraka.
Renata Fernández Dominguez, “Micaela Bastidas en la Historia, Literatura,
y Cultura Peruana: Análisis de sus Reconfiguraciones Discursivas” (PhD
diss., University of Kentucky, 2005); Mariselle Meléndez, Deviant and Useful
Citizens: The Cultural Production of the Female Body in Eighteenth- Century Peru
(Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2011), 11– 40; Sara Beatriz
Guardia, “Reconociendo las huellas: Micaela Bastidas y las heroinas de la
Independencia del Perú,” in Las mujeres en la independencia de América Latina,
ed. Sara Beatriz Guardia (Lima: CEMHAL, 2010), 31– 47; Vega, Túpac
Amaru y sus compañeros; Víctor Angles Vargas, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru
(Cuzco: n.p., 2004), 115–133. For the marriage certificate, CDIP, II, 2, 19.
10. Clements R. Markham, Travels in Peru and India (London: John Murray,
1862), 135–136.
11. Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros, 2:288.
12. The literature on gender in colonial Peru has improved greatly in the last
decade. Standout works in English include Jane Mangan, Trading Roles:
Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2005); Karen Graubart, With Our Labor and Sweat:
Indigenous Women and the Formation of Colonial Society in Peru, 1550–1700
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2007); Kimberly Gauderman,
Women’s Lives in Colonial Quito: Gender, Law, and Economy in Spanish America
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009); Ward Stavig, The World of Tupac
Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in Colonial Peru (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1999). I have also drawn from my own observations and
the reading of criminal trials.
13. Markham, Travels in Peru and India, 136. Don Pablo Astete, Tupac Amaru’s
contemporary, gave this description to General William Miller in the 1830s,
who passed it along to Markham. The quotation has been frequently used in
Spanish-language works, although many fail to cite Markham. In his 1890
diccionario biográfico, Manuel de Mendiburu does not cite the English geog-
rapher (but mentions Astete) and reproduces this quote with some signifi-
cant omissions and additions. Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario histórico-
biográfico del Perú, bk. 8 (Lima: Imp. De Torres Aguirre, 1890), 109–110.
14. “Relación de los acontecimientos de Tinta y Lampa, en el reino del Perú,
con motivo de las sublevaciones de los indios en el año de 1780,” Boletín de
Historia y Antigüedades, órgano de la Academia Nacional de Historia, Bogotá, 11
(1917), 657– 673. I worked from a transcription by John Rowe, kindly pro-
vided by Pat Lyon.
15. J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492–
1830 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), 294.

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16. Elliott, Empires, 303–305; surprisingly, we do not have a modern biography

of Gálvez. See H. I. Priestley, José de Gálvez, Visitor- General of New Spain,
1765–1771 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1916).
17. Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: SELA,
1967). One Peruvian Jesuit requested that the English aid the rebels, to no
avail. Juan Pablo Viscardo y Guzmán, “Propuesta al cónsul inglés en
Livorno para que ayude a Túpac Amaru,” in Raúl Ferrero, El liberalismo
peruano (Lima, Tipografía Peruana, 1958), 74–75.
18. On the role of the Bourbon Reforms in the uprising, see Scarlett O’Phelan
Godoy, Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia 1700–1783 (Cuzco:
CBC, 1988); John Fisher, “La rebelión de Tupac Amaru y el programa im-
perial de Carlos III,” in Túpac Amaru II, ed. Alberto Flores Galindo (Lima:
Retablo de Papel Ediciones, 1976), 107–128; Alberto Flores Galindo, In
Search of an Inca: Identity and Utopia in the Andes (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2010), chap. 5.
19. For an overview, see John R. Fisher, Bourbon Peru, 1750–1824 (Liverpool:
Liverpool University Press, 2003).
20. John Rowe, “Genealogía y rebelión en el siglo XVIII,” Histórica 6, no. 1
(1982): 74–75. On the reparto, see the documents in Ward Stavig and Ella
Schmidt, eds., The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions: An Anthology of
Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 2008), 30–32.
21. See O’Phelan Godoy, Kurakas sin sucesiones; Brooke Larson, “Caciques,
Class Structure and the Colonial State in Bolivia,” Nova Americana 2 (1979):
197–235; and Núria Sala i Vila, Y se armó el tole tole: Tributo indígena y mov-
imientos sociales en el virreinato del Perú, 1780–1814 (Lima: IER José María
Arguedas, 1996), among many others.
22. Francisco A. Loayza, Genealogia de Tupac Amaru (Lima: Librería e Imprenta
D. Miranda, 1946). For an important recasting of these trials, see Cahill,
who overcomes generations of hagiographic and nationalist views that al-
ways sided with Tupac Amaru. David Cahill, “Looking for an Inca: The
Marquesado de Oropesa Litigation (1741–1780) and the Roots of Rebel-
lion,” Jahrbuch fur Geschichte Lateinamerikas 41 (2004): 137–166.
23. The anonymous “Relación histórica” argues the opposite— that the case
gave him an inflated idea of his social standing. “Relación histórica del
principio, progresos y estado de la sublevación de José Gabriel Tupac-
Amaru. En cuatro décadas,” in Documentos para la historia antigua de Bolivia
sacados de la biblioteca de J. R. Gutiérrez: sitios de la Paz y el Cuzco 1780–1781, ed.
J. R. Gutiérrez (La Paz: Imprenta de la Unión Americana, 1879), 117–151,
esp. 119. Gutiérrez believes the author might have been Tadeo Medina, a
Cuzco official.
24. Charles F. Walker, Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in
Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press,
2008).

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25. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1049. This contains the trial against Montiel and rich in-
formation on Tupac Amaru’s ties in Lima.
26. The literature is vast. See Harold Livermore’s introduction to Garcilaso de
la Vega, Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1966), xv–xxxi; José Durand, “El influjo de Gar-
cilaso Inca en Tupac Amaru,” COPE 2, no. 5 (1971): 2–7, an argument he
developed in many other publications.
27. John Rowe, “El movimiento nacional Inca en el siglo XVIII,” in Tupac
Amaru II, 11– 66.
28. Cited in Kenneth Mills, William B. Taylor, and Sandra Lauderdale Gra-
ham, Colonial Latin America: A Documentary History (Wilmington, Del.: SR
Books, 2002), 394, which examines an eighteenth-century portrait of the
Inca martyr. The authors provide an excellent summary of the memory of
Tupac Amaru I, 390–394. On prophecies about the return of the Incas
propagated by Sir Walter Raleigh and cited in certain editions of the Royal
Commentaries, see Rowe, “El movimiento nacional,” 25–32. See also David
Brading, “Inca Humanist,” The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole
Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492–1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 255–272.
29. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 77. A Cuzco authority called the Royal Commentaries the
backbone of “the rebel Josef Tupac Amaru’s entire education and reading.”
AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 29, Moscoso to Areche, 13 April 1781.
30. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1042.
31. Quoted in Del Busto Duthurburu, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru, 95. See also AGI,
Lima, Leg. 1044, about people suspected of having been hosts of Tupac
Amaru in the City of Kings. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32, also has information.
32. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, testimony by López y Sosa.
33. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32; this is repeated by Mariano de la Banda, CDBRETA,
V, 157.
34. Del Busto Duthurburu, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru, 109–115. His December
petition to Viceroy Guerior is found in Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac
Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 20–24. The testimonies found in AGI, Cuzco,
Leg. 32, have many references to Huarochirí.
35. Fisher, Bourbon Peru 1750–1824, 162.
36. Ibid., 162–163; see also O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo, chap. 4.
37. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1044. On 1777 see Flores Galindo, In Search of an Inca,
102–103.
39. On Santa Rosa, the prophecies, and much more see Ramón Mujica Pini-
lla, Rosa limensis: Mística, política e iconografía en torno a la patrona de América
(Lima: IFEA, Fondo de Culture Económica, Banco Central de la Reserva,
2001).

Authenticated
41. Ibid.
42. ADC, Colección Vega Centeno, bolsa 3, “Expediente relativo a las repre-
sentaciones hechas en el año de 1779 a Don Ildefonso Mendieta Justicia
Mayor de Tinta quejándose del Rebelde José Gabriel Tupac Amaro.”
43. Ibid. Here Mata Linares noted the need to “suffocate [dissidence] in the
root.” He put into place severe repressive measures aimed at preventing
any further uprisings. See also David Cahill, “Genocide from Below: The
Great Rebellion of 1780– 82 in the Southern Andes,” in Empire, Colony,
Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A.
Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 403– 423, esp. 411–12.
44. Charles F. Walker, Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru,
1780–1835 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), 29–30.
45. Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 158.
46. David Cahill, “Taxonomy of a Colonial Riot: The Arequipa Disturbances of
1780,” in Reform and Insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru, ed. John
R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane (Baton Rouge: Louisi-
ana State University Press, 1991), 255–291.
47. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1039, letter from April 20, 1780.
48. O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo, 214.
49. Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution,” 223; his summary of the Farfán
de los Godos Conspiracy (also called the Plateros) is found at 216–224. See
also Walker, Smoldering Ashes, 30–33.
50. Charles Walker, “Prólogo,” in Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia jus-
tificada contra los artificios de la calumnia (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional, in press).
51. On Moscoso, see Gustavo Bacacorzo, Don Juan Manuel de Moscoso y Peralta,
ubicación en el proceso de la independencia Americana (Lima: UNMSM, 1982);
Leon J. Campbell, “Rebel or Royalist? Bishop Juan Manuel Moscoso y Per-
alta and the Tupac Amaru Revolt in Peru, 1780–1784,” Revista de Historia de
América 86 (1978): 139; Luis Durand Florez, “El caso Moscoso,” Actas del
Coloquio Internacional ‘Túpac Amaru y su tiempo’ (Lima: CNDBRETA, 1982),
491– 493; Walker, “Prólogo.”
52. Cited by Durand Florez, “El Caso Moscoso,” 495. For the accusations
against Moscoso, see Francisco Loayza, ed., La verdad desnuda o las dos faces
de un obispo: Escrita en 1780 por un imparcial religioso (Lima: Los pequeños
grandes libros de Historia Americana, 1943). Moscoso published his own
defense in Inocencia justifacada.
53. Loayza, La verdad desnuda, 240–246.
54. The best summary of the confrontation is Luis Miguel Glave, “Canas 1780: El
año de la rebelión,” in Desde afuera y desde adentro: ensayos de etnografía e historia
del Cuzco y Apurímac, ed. Luis Millones, Hiroyasu Tomoeda, and Tatsuhiko Fu-
jii (Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2000), 61–93; the quote is from 79.
55. AGI, Leg. 80. For Arriaga’s accusation, see ADC, Colección Vega Centeno,
bolsa 3 (Coporaque October 1780, inventory of Father Puente’s goods). See
also Luis Miguel Glave, Vida, símbolos y batallas: Creación y recreación de la co-

Authenticated
munidad indígena, Cuzco, siglo xvi–xx (Lima: Fondo de Cultura Económica,

2002), 117–152; Stavig, The World of Tupac Amaru, 250–254; Túpac Amaru y
la Iglesia: antología (Cuzco: Comité Arquidiocesano del Bicentenario Túpac
Amaru, 1983), 165–200.
56. CDBRETA, V, III, 132, testimony of José Esteban Escarcena.
57. Flores Galindo, In Search of an Inca, develops this extensively.
58. John Leddy Phelan, The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Co-
lombia, 1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Walker, Smol-
dering Ashes, 21–23.
2. From Pampamarca to Sangarará
1. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, testimony of Father Ildefonso Bejarano, January 1781.
2. Cited in Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 3d ed. (Buenos Aires:
SELA, 1967), 545.
3. The lack of evidence does not mean that the women camp aides (called
soldaderas in other instances) did not exist. It probably reflects blindness to
women’s role and all domestic ser vice, even in the midst of a bloody
rebellion.
4. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, testimony of Father Ildefonso Bejarano, January
1781. On weapons, see Juan José Vega, Historia general del ejército, El ejército
durante la dominación española del Perú, tomo III, vol. 1 (Lima: Comisión
Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, 1981), 499–507.
5. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596, refers to the cross as obligatory; for the cross and
embroidery, see CDBRETA, V, III, 89– 90, testimony of José Coyo and Pas-
cual Sirena.
6. CDBRETA, IV, II, 15, testimony of Micaela Bastidas, December 13, 1780.
See also CDBRETA, IV, II, 39, December 15, 1780, where she again refers
to the cross.
7. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596, testimony of don Thadeo Fisona. They also fre-
quently carried red flags. See Vega, Historia general, 481– 483.
8. Juan José Vega, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru (Lima: Editorial Universal, 1969),
48–55; see also Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Tupac Amaru, la revolución precur-
sora de la emancipación continental (Cuzco: Universidad Nacional del Cuzco,
1949), 156; J. R. Gutiérrez, ed., Documentos para la historia antigua de Bolivia
sacados de la biblioteca de J. R. Gutiérrez: sitios de Paz y el Cuzco 1780–1781 (La
Paz: Imprenta de la Unión Americana, 1879), 122.
9. Bishop Moscoso mentions this salary. He calculated that Tupac Amaru
counted on ten thousand Indian combatants and six hundred mestizos.
CDIP, II, 2, 277, Moscoso, November 17, 1780.
10. CDBRETA, III, I, 84– 85, testimony by Montecinos.
11. Víctor Angles Vargas, José Gabriel Túpac Amaru (Cuzco: n.p., 2004), 83– 84;
Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista: Rebeliones de Indios en Sur América, la sub-
levación de Tupac Amaru: Crónica de Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis Antonio Eguiguren,

Authenticated
2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 1: 247–248, “Carta del Coronel de las Milicia de
Azángaro,” mentions Cabrera’s narrow escape. On the region’s obrajes, the
key work is Neus Escandell-Tur, Producción y comercio de tejidos coloniales: Los
obrajes y chorrillos del Cuzco 1570–1820 (Cuzco: CBC, 1997).
12. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from don Joseph Albares y Nava, n.d.
13. This is reminiscent of the 1536–1537 siege of Cuzco, when the Incas mis-
understood the importance of writing and allowed Spanish messages to
reach Lima. See John Hemming, The Conquest of the Incas (New York: Har-
court Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 215–216.
14. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from don Joseph Albares y Nava, n.d.
15. CDBRETA, V, III, 126, testimony of José Esteban Escarcena. For another
example in which Tupac Amaru called for the abolition of all taxes and
exactions other than the head tax, see his January 17, 1781, decree in CD-
BRETA, III, 1, 110, from Tinta.
16. CDBRETA, V, III, 126, testimony of Escarcena.
17. From Escarcena’s testimony, CDBRETA, V, III, 126–127; also in Lewin, La
rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 445.
18. CDIP, II, 2, 258–259, letter from Tupac Amaru, November 12, 1780.
19. CDBRETA, V, III, 140–141, testimony of Escarcena.
20. This might have been an echo of Garcilaso de la Vega, who stressed the
Inca’s fi rm treatment of offenders. Garcilaso de la Vega, Royal Commentaries
of the Incas and General History of Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1966), 96– 99.
22. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 537, letter from Miguel Martínez, Santa Rosa, Novem-
ber 14, 1780. See also CDBRETA, V, III, 123–124, testimony of Escarcena,
who before reaching Tungasuca had heard that Tupac Amaru had received
a “royal decree” from Madrid allowing him to kill abusive corregidors and
carry out radical reforms.
23. CDIP, II, 3, 149–154, letter from Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru to Bishop
Moscoso, November 5, 1781, quote from 151.
24. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1042, testimony of Friar Juan de Rios Pacheco, Mercedar-
ian. He claimed that Tupac Amaru wrote on pieces of canvas to sneak mes-
sages into Cuzco.
25. CDIP, II, 2, 270–271, letter of November 15, 1780.
26. CDIP, II, 2, 272–273, document from Diego Chuguihuanca [sic], November
16, 1780.
27. Ward Stavig and Ella Schmidt, eds., The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebel-
lions: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 2008),
69–70; original document in CDIP, II, 2, 274.
28. CDIP, II, 2, 271, letter from Tupac Amaru, and 274, “Edicto,” November
15, 1780.
29. Gutiérrez, “Relación histórica del principio, progresos y estado de la suble-
vación de José Gabriel Tupac-Amaru. En cuatro décadas,” in Documentos

Authenticated
para la historia antigua de Bolivia sacados de la biblioteca de J. R. Gutiérrez: sitios

de la Paz y el Cuzco 1780–1781, ed. J. R. Gutiérrez (La Paz: Imprenta de la
Unión Americana, 1879), 122.
30. Carlos Aguirre provides an excellent overview of slavery in Peru in Breve
historia de la esclavitud en el Perú: Una herida que no deja de sangrar (Lima: Edi-
torial del Congreso del Perú, 2005), 22. The percentages come from Al-
berto Flores Galindo, Aristocracia y plebe: Lima 1760–1830 (Lima: Mosca
Azul, 1984), 100.
31. See Jean-Pierre Tardieu, El negro en el Cuzco: los caminos de la alienación en la
segunda mitad del siglo XVII (Lima: PUC, 1998); Frederick Bowser, The Afri-
can Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524–1650 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1974).
32. I use “it does not appear” because perhaps such a link can be uncovered— I
did not fi nd it. The literature is vast. For an incisive overview, see David
Brion Davis, Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).
33. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:93.
34. Flores Galindo, Aristocracia y plebe; Charles F. Walker, Shaky Colonialism: The
1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru and Its Long Aftermath (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008).
35. Aguirre, Breve historia de la esclavitud; Christine Hünefeldt, “Los negros de
Lima 1800–1830,” Histórica 3 (1979): 17–51. The liberation of slaves be-
came standard practice in the Wars of Independence.
36. Peter Guardino makes this point for nineteenth-century Mexico. “La iden-
tidad nacional y los afromexicanos en el siglo XIX,” in Prácticas Populares,
Cultura Política y Poder en México, Siglo XIX, ed. Brian Connaughton (Mexico
City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapalapa/Juan Pablos,
2008), 259–301.
37. CDBRETA, III, 1, the record of an emergency city council meeting on No-
vember 12, 1780, 69–72, quote from 69.
38. CDBRETA, I, 96– 97, junta to Moscoso, November 14, 1780.
39. See the scathing letter by Bishop Moscoso about the junta’s internal disputes,
July 20, 1782, in CDIP, II, 3, 329–346, esp. 337. He made similar charges in a
November 29, 1780, letter, CDBRETA, 1, 173–177.
40. David Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution in Bourbon Peru: The Diocese
of Cuzco, 1780–1814” (PhD diss., University of Liverpool, 1984), 258–259.
41. CDIP, II, 3, 337, letter from Moscoso, July 20, 1782.
42. Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution,” 256; for documentation, see CD-
BRETA, 1, 95– 96.
43. CDBRETA, 1, 81– 87, document from November 13, 1780, quotes from 83.
44. CDBRETA, 1, 81– 87, document from November 13, 1780. Moscoso wrote
López de Sosa that same day, requesting that he persuade Tupac Amaru to
“halt his efforts, which are desolating all the towns where he passes.” AGI,
Cuzco, Leg. 80, letter dated November 13, 1780.

Authenticated
45. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1: 246.

46. Ibid.; also Gutiérrez, Relación histórica, 120.
47. Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 447–553; Túpac Amaru y la Iglesia: an-
tología (Cuzco: Comité Arquidiocesano del Bicentenario Túpac Amaru,
1983), 212–215; Alejandro Seraylán Leiva, Historia general del Ejército Peru-
ano, III, 2, “Campañas militares durante la dominación española” (Lima:
Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, 1981), 609– 612;
Walker, Smoldering Ashes, 36–39.
48. CDBRETA, 1, 421– 424, testimony of Bartolomé Castañeda, November 20,
1780.
49. CDBRETA, I, 424, testimony of Bartolomé Castañeda; on the key and com-
munion, see Gutiérrez, Relación histórica, 119–121.
50. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:246–247.
51. CDBRETA, I, testimony of Juan de Mollinedo, 429– 434, quote from
432.
52. CDBRETA, I, testimony of Juan de Mollinedo, 433.
53. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1586. These documents come from Mollinedo almost a
decade later to gain recognition for his aid to the royalists.
54. CDBRETA, I, 433– 434.
55. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1042, testimony of Friar Juan de Rios Pacheco,
Mercedarian.
56. Ibid.
57. These actions are taken from the sentence against her. CDBRETA, IV, II,
73–75, May 15, 1781, from Visitador General Areche.
58. Of course, many scholars have examined their inner circle. See Scarlett
O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia 1700–
1783 (Cuzco: CBC, 1985); David Cahill, “Genocide from Below: The Great
Rebellion of 1780– 82 in the Southern Andes,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide:
Conquest, Occupation, and Subaltern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk
Moses (New York: Berghahn Books, 2008), 403– 423; Magnus Mörner
and Efraín Trelles, “A Test of Causal Interpretations of the Túpac Amaru
Rebellion,” in Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant
World, 18th to 20th Centuries, ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1987), 94–109. CDBRETA III, 1, 3– 6, a decree by
Areche dated March 8, 1781, has a list of rebel supporters excluded from a
pardon.
59. The fi rst quote is in AGI, Lima, Leg. 1042, from November 20, 1780, pub-
lished in CDBRETA, III, I, 4; the Micaela quote is in AGI, Lima, Leg.
1042, letter from Micaela Bastidas to Señores gobernadores don Agustin y
don Lucas Nuñez de la Torre y don Mathías Canal, Tungasuca, December
7, 1780.
60. For a good example, see the letters from Villalba to Areche blaming both
creoles and priests, claiming that the Church “was the only culprit of all
the damage.” AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041.

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61. CDBRETA, III, 1, 259–261; several other testimonies confi rm this. For ex-
ample, CDBRETA, III, 1, 261–262, court testimony by Isidro Toera and
Domingo Pérez León.
62. On Inca revivalism, messianism, and millenarianism, see, among many,
Flores Galindo, In Search of an Inca; Jorge Hidalgo Lehuede, “Amarus y ca-
taris: Aspectos mesiánicos de la rebelión indígena de 1781 en Cuzco, Chay-
anta, La Paz y Arica,” Chungará 10 (1983): 117–138; Jan Szeminski, La
utopía tupamarista (Lima: PUC, 1983).
63. CDBRETA, III, I, 4–5.
64. In Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 84– 89,
dated January 9, 1781; also in CDIP, II, 2, 395– 401. Tupac Amaru owed de
la Madrid money from his 1777 trip to Lima. See testimony of Juan Anto-
nio Figueroa, April 27, 1781 (who also mentions Micaela Bastidas’s reli-
ance on Quechua). CDBRETA, IV, II, 53–54; also Eulogio Zudaire, Don
Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del Perú (Pamplona, Spain: Diputación
Foral de Navarra, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1979), 77–78.
65. In Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 85.
66. Ibid., 88. I have altered the translation slightly.
67. CDBRETA, III, I, 284, letter from Tupac Amaru to Micaela Bastidas, No-
vember 26, 1780.
69. For example see the testimony by Bernardo de la Madrid, who mentions
translators when discussing with her as she spoke the “Indian language.”
CDBRETA, IV, 2, 51, April 27, 1781.
70. Juan José Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros (Cuzco: Municipalidad del
Qosqo, 1995), 1:78; see also O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo, 229.
71. CDBRETA, V, III, 147, testimony of Escarcena, January 19, 1781.
72. AGI, Lima, Leg. 80, trial of Father Ildefonso Bejarano.
73. CDBRETA, IV, II, 324.
74. See CDBRETA, V, III, 151, Banda’s testimony; also mentioned by Francisco
Molina, CDBRETA, III, 1, 10. Banda mentions that Palacios encouraged
Micaela to go fi rst to Lampa, to confront the Arequipa forces, and to then
return to Cuzco, where taking the city would be “easy,” 153. This is an early
use of the term gamonal, which in the nineteenth century became a syn-
onym of omnipotent landowners who exploited the Andean peasantry.
75. CDBRETA, V, III, 315–320. I have not seen more on these attempts.
76. CDBRETA, V, III, 374, testimony by Galleguillos, n.d.
77. O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo, 243–257.
78. In their classic works on eighteenth-century social movements, both Flores
Galindo and O’Phelan Godoy provide numerous examples. Flores Galindo,
In Search of an Inca; O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo.
79. David Garrett, Shadows of Empire: The Indian Nobility of Cuzco, 1750–1825
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
80. Cited by Luis Durand Florez, Introduction, CDBRETA, IV, II, XII.

Authenticated
81. Cahill, “Genocide from Below,” 413.

82. Like other creoles, they defected after the failed siege of Cuzco and the
catastrophic battle outside of the city, in Saylla, where royalists demol-
ished the troops lead by Antonio Castelo. Despite his insistence that he and
his family had turned on the rebel, Antonio Castelo was executed along-
side José Gabriel. Cahill, “Genocide from Below,” 414– 416; Vega, Túpac
Amaru y sus compañeros, 37–72. For Andrés Castelo’s trial, see CDBRETA,
III, 1, 519–550. For that of Vicente Castelo, who was absolved, see CD-
BRETA, V, III, 501–545.
3. A World without the Catholic Church?
1. Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) Virrey Interino del Perú (Pam-
1979), 126. Parts of this chapter were included in Charles Walker, “ ‘When
Fear Rather than Reason Dominates’: Priests Behind the Lines in the Tu-
pac Amaru Rebellion (1780–1783),” in Facing Fear: The History of an Emotion
in Global Perspective, ed. Michael Laffan and Max Weiss (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2012), 54–73.
2. David Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution in Bourbon Peru: The Di-
ocese of Cuzco, 1780–1814” (PhD diss., University of Liverpool, 1984),
42– 46.
3. For a recent overview, see Gauvin Alexander Bailey, The Andean Hybrid
Baroque: Convergent Cultures in the Churches of Colonial Peru (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2010). For a wonderful set of essays,
see Ramón Mujica Pinilla, ed., El Barroco Peruano, 2 vols. (Lima: Banco de
Crédito, 2002–2003).
4. For a sample of the fees, see Ward Stavig and Ella Schmidt, eds., The Tupac
Amaru and Catarista Rebellions: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.:
Hackett Publishing, 2008), 15–16. On the church and economy, see Kath-
ryn Burns, Colonial Habits: Convents and the Spiritual Economy of Cuzco Peru
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999).
5. Nicolas A. Robins, Priests-Indian Conflicts in Upper Peru: The Generation of
Rebellion, 1750–1780 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2007);
Ward Stavig, The World of Tupac Amaru: Conflict, Community, and Identity in
Colonial Peru (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999). The archives
are loaded with relevant documents; see Tupac Amaru y la Iglesia for some
rich examples.
6. Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, “‘Ascender el estado ecclesiástico’: la ordenación
de indios en Lima a mediados del siglo XVIII,” in Incas e indios cristianos:
Elites indígenas e identidades cristanas en los andes coloniales, ed. Jean-Jacques
Decoster (Cuzco: CBC-IFEA, 2002), 311–329; Charles F. Walker, Shaky Co-
lonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru and Its Long Aftermath
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2008), 156–185.

Authenticated
7. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 74–75; origi-
nal in CDIP, II, 2, 275. My translation incorporates a few words excluded
by Stavig and Schmidt.
8. Summarized in Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru, el revolucionario (Lima:
Moncloa-Campodónico, 1970), 157, where the quote is found; Cahill deems
the junta “fissiparous” and convincingly shows that the bishop took over.
Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution,” 254–256.
9. Boleslao Lewin argued vehemently in the 1950s and 1960s about the essen-
tial role of the Church, particularly Bishop Moscoso, in the defeat of the re-
bellion. See Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 3rd ed. (Buenos Ai-
res: SELA, 1967), 248, for a summary of his views. Peruvian authors such as
Carlos Daniel Valcárcel and Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle were more circum-
spect about Moscoso. Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution,” chapter 5,
smartly discounts the interpretation of Moscoso as a rebel supporter.
10. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from the town of Yauri, December 2, 1780.
11. Testificación del R. P. M. Fr. Pedro de la Sota, Provincial en el Real Con-
vento de la Merced del Cuzco, in Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia
justificada contra los artificios de la calumnia (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional, in
press), 98–105, esp. 99. See also Rolena Adorno, “Images of Indian Ladi-
nos,” in Transatlantic Encounters: Europeans and Andeans in the Sixteenth Cen-
tury, ed. Kenneth Andrien and Rolena Adorno (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1992), 232–270.
12. CDIP, II, 2, 716, testimony of Micaela Bastidas, April 22, 1781.
13. Quoted in Cahill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution,” 203, who provides
much evidence about his religiosity and even traditionalist views. For ex-
amples of how the rebels were not opposed to the Church, see AGI, Lima,
Leg. 1041; CDBRETA, III, 16–17.
14. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista: Rebeliones de Indios en Sur América, la sub-
levación de Tupac Amaru: Crónica de Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis Antonio Eguig-
uren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 1:292. Letter from January 10, 1781.
15. CDIP, II, 3, 352–353, edicto of December 13, 1780, Tungasuca. Also in CD-
BRETA, IV, II, 14–15.
16. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1030. See also AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, about Acomayo,
Rondocan, and Pirque.
17. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, testimony of don Domingo de Escalante. It was to his
advantage to claim that he did not know about the excommunication, and
prosecutors seemed to believe him.
18. CDBRETA, III, I, 17–18, summarizes key points of Juan Esteben Escarce-
na’s testimony.
19. CDBRETA, III, 1, 111.
21. Cited in Emilio Garzón Heredia, “1780: Clero, elite local y rebelión,” in Entre
la retórica y la insurgencia: Las ideas y los movimientos sociales en los Andes, siglo
XVIII, ed. Charles Walker (Cuzco: CBC, 1996), 245–271, quote from 249.

Authenticated
22. Garzón Heredia, “1780,” 250. Cited in AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 66.
23. “Informe Relacionado del Cabildo del Cuzco,” (1784), in CDIP, II, 1, 97–
148, quote from 114–115. I fi rst consulted this in the Mata Linares Collec-
tion, Academia de Historia, Madrid.
24. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, anonymous letter to Don Joseph Domingo de Frías,
secretario Señor Don Francisco Xavier Delgado, December 10, 1780.
25. Several of the testimonies collected in the wake of the rebellion support-
ing Moscoso stressed how his decree had prompted desertions among the
enemy. For example, see the testimony of Manuel de Mendieta, Dean of
the Cathedral, in Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada, 89– 90.
26. Key here are Robins, Priests-Indian Conflicts in Upper Peru, and Stavig, The
World of Tupac Amaru.
27. CDBRETA, III, I, 38–39, anonymous letter to Tupac Amaru, Calca, De-
cember 16, 1780.
28. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:280. Pumacahua was chastised for
these actions but not punished. This account highlights the impact of the
excommunication.
29. Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada, 99, testimony by Friar Pedro de la
Sota.
30. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from Bishop Moscoso to Viceroy Jáuregui,
December 21, 1780.
31. Ibid. On November 14, 1780, the junta in Cuzco wrote to the bishop to re-
quest that he maintain priests in Tinta and Quispicanchi, to provide infor-
mation about the rebels. They also asked that he censure the rebel in order
to discourage his followers. CDBRETA, I, 96.
32. “Informe Relacionado del Cabildo del Cuzco,” (1784), in CDIP, II, 1, 97–
148, quote from 114. See also testimonies in Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia
justificada.
33. Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada, 90.
34. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from Moscoso to Antonio Areta, December
9, 1780.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, “Causas contra varios curas por las rebeliones del
Perú, 1785–1795,” is the key source for this section, including the trial
against Juan de Luna and the February 10, 1781, letter from Juan de Luna
to Micaela Bastidas.
38. Ibid.
39. Yet as will be seen, this would change and rebels targeted priests, quite
violently, particularly in the south.
40. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, testimony of Domingo Escalante.
41. Grave fear constituted a valid excuse from censure “if the law is ecclesiasti-
cal and if it’s nonobservance will not militate against the public good, the
Faith, or the authority of the Church.” See Canons 125, 2, 1324, 1325, and

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1620, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06020b.htm, accessed July 9.

2012. For an overview, see James A. Coriden, An Introduction to Canon Law,
rev. ed. (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 3–32; John P. Beal, James A.
Coriden, and Thomas J. Green, eds., New Commentary on the Code of Canon
Law (New York: Paulist Press, 2000), 179–180, 1542–1544, 1727–1730.
Revised in 1917 and 1983, the Code emerged from the late medieval period
and was the guiding framework of the 1780 trials.
42. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, trial of don Antonio Chaves. The letter to Tupac Amaru
is from Sicuani, January 20, 1781.
43. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, letter from Yanaoca, December 26, 1780.
44. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80. Escalante was absolved in June 1782.
45. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, no date specified in sentence, 1782.
46. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80. For a letter from Gallegos to Bastidas, see CDIP, II, 2,
324, December 9, 1780.
47. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, letter from Bishop Moscoso, November 25, 1780.
48. Ibid.
49. Their activities are nicely summarized by David Cahill, “Crown, Clergy,
and Revolution,” 241–245, quote from 241.
50. CDIP, II, 2, 304, letter from November 26, 1780.
51. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80, letter from Bejarano to Tupac Amaru, December 1,
1780.
52. These trials are found in AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80.
53. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 80.
54. Sources mention that Tupac Amaru usually had a priest alongside in his
military campaigns, but these priests are not named. López de Sosa and
Bejarano did not venture far from Pampamarca in late 1780 and 1781.
55. Volume 2 of the Colección documental del bicentenario de la revolución emanci-
padora de Tupac Amaru (CDBRETA) focuses on the Moscoso trials. Most of
this is from AGI, Lima, Leg. 74–79, a stunningly large paper trail.
56. Francisco Loayza, ed., La verdad desnuda o las dos faces de un Obispo: Escrita en
1780 por un imparcial religioso (Lima: Los pequeños grandes libros de Historia
Americana, 1943). Miguel de Arriaga and Don Eusebio Balza de Berganza
claimed that Arriaga was owed 170,000 pesos upon his death, a debt they
hoped to recover. They suggested that in compensation they be allowed to
import slaves to Peru through Buenos Aires. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041.
57. Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada (Madrid: L.M. Vendero de Valero,
1790?); thanks to the generosity of Patricia Lyon, who gave me access to
the late John Rowe’s excellent library. Also Raphael José Sahuaraura Titu
Atauchi, Estado del Perú. Códice escrito en 1780 y que contiene datos importantes
sobre la Revolución de José Gabriel Túpac Amaru por Raphael José Sahuaraura
Titu Atauchi, ed. Francisco Loayza (Lima: Los pequeños grandes libros de
Historia Americana, 1944); Estado del Perú in CDIP, II, 1, 331– 415. On the
Sahuaraura family, see Javier Flores Espinoza, “Estudio,” and Teresa Gis-
bert, “Texto Explicativo,” in Don Justo Apu Sahuaraura Inca, Recuerdos de

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la Monarquía Peruana o Bosquejo de la Historia de los Incas (Lima: Fundación

Telefónica del Perú, 2001).
58. On the Church in late colonial Spanish America, see David Brading,
Church and State in Bourbon Mexico: The Diocese of Michoacán 1749–1810 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Pamela Voekel, Alone Before
God: The Religious Origins of Modernity (Durham, N.C.: Duke University
Press, 2002); Gabriel Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in
Spain and Its Empire 1759–1808 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). I
discuss the impact of regalism in Walker, Shaky Colonialism.
59. The report by the Spanish military officers, Jorge Juan and Antonio de
Ulloa, prompted much debate about the “decadent” nature of the Church.
Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, Discourse and Political Reflections on the
Kingdom of Peru, ed. John TePaske (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1978), 280–316. First published in Spanish with the tantalizing title “Noti-
cias secretas . . .”
60. AGI, Lima, Leg. 187, letter from Areche to José Gálvez, June 23, 1781.
61. This is David Cahill’s line of argument in his important dissertation. Ca-
hill, “Crown, Clergy, and Revolution.”
4. The Rebellion Goes South
1. Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del Perú (Pam-
1979), 144–146. See also AGI, Cuzco, Legs. 75 and 76, for documents.
Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada contra los artificios de la
calumnia (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional, in press), testimony by Soto, 99–100.
For the city’s preparations, see Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru el revo-
lucionario (Lima: Moncloa– Campodónica, 1970), 172–175.
2. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 145.
3. J. R. Gutiérrez, ed., Documentos para la historia antigua de Bolivia sacados de la
biblioteca de J. R. Gutiérrez, sitios de la Paz y el Cuzco 1780–1781 (La Paz: Im-
prenta de la Unión Americana, 1879), 123.
4. Agustín de Jáuregui, Relación de gobierno, Perú (1780–1784), ed. Remedios
Contreras (Madrid: CSIC, 1982), 170; Leon Campbell, The Military and Soci-
ety in Colonial Peru, 1750–1810 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Soci-
ety, 1978), 113–115.
5. I have helped hundreds of students with soroche upon arrival in Cuzco—I
tell them to rest. The soldiers did not have this luxury. I learned from John
West, High Life: A History of High-Altitude Physiology and Medicine (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1998); on Peru, see an excellent recent study, Jorge Los-
sio, El peruano y su entorno: aclimatándose a las alturas andinas (Lima: IEP, 2012).
6. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 147–149, 158–161; Boleslao Lewin, La re-
belión de Túpac Amaru, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: SELA, 1967), 454– 455; Jáu-

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regui, Relación de gobierno, 170–174. At one point they considered a more

southerly route through Arequipa.
7. Areche to corregidor de Abancay, December 11, 1780, Peru-1780, Lilly Li-
brary, Indiana University.
8. John R. Fisher, Bourbon Peru, 1750–1824 (Liverpool: Liverpool University
Press, 2003), 168–169; Víctor Peralta Ruiz, “From Indiano Bureaucrats to
Afrancesado Politicians in the Spanish Bonapartist State: The Cases of
Azanza and Mata Linares,” in Napoleon’s Atlantic: The Impact of Napoleonic
Empire in the Atlantic World, ed. Christophe Belaubre, Jordana Dym, and
John Savage (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 177–197. Mata Linares’s extensive pa-
pers are found in the Real Academia de la Historia, “Colección Mata Lin-
ares,” which proved very illuminating for this study. For a cata logue, see
Remedios Contreras, Catálogo de la Colección Mata Linares (Madrid: Real Aca-
demia de la Historia, 1970).
9. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 147–151; Campbell, Military and Society,
113–117; these letters are featured prominently in the ensuing chapters.
Although Areche and Mata Linares would subsequently be implacable
hard-liners in the repression of the revolt (and, in general, the Andean
people), Areche did not initially believe that it amounted to much. He
claimed, “Indians don’t have the spirit or resolve [constancia].” Cited in
Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 151.
10. CDIP, II, 2, November 25, 1780, “Edicto a los moradores de Lampa.” It is
datelined “Tungasuca,” but this was often done with documents written
on the trail.
11. For the “five or six days quote,” see CDIP, II, 2, 305, November 26, 1780.
On his concerns about the five corregidors, see CDIP, II, 2, 322, December
1, 1780; see CDBRETA, V, III, 290, about kurakas. For a summary, see
12. Garcilaso de la Vega, Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of
Peru (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), 109–114, quote from 111.
Other chapters describe the Inca’s glorious subjugation of the Collao as
well. Augusto Ramos Zambrano, Puno en la rebelión de Túpac Amaru (Puno:
Universidad Nacional Técnica del Altiplano, 1982), 78– 87.
13. For example, see book 3, chapter 6, which describes how the Collas (peo-
ple of the Collao) fought with “great pertinacity and blindness” against the
fourth Inca Maita Capac, whose reign began around 1290. Royal Commen-
taries, 145–147, quote from 147.
14. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 537, from Provincia de la Plata, Audiencia de Charcas,
“Méritos y servicos del Corregidor que fue de Carabaya Don Miguel de
Urbiola.”
15. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 537.
16. “Relación del cacique de Puno, de sus expediciones, sitios, defensa y varios . . .
(Joaquín de Orellana),” in Pedro de Angelis, Documentos para la historia de la

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sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac-Amaru, cacique de la provincia de Tinta, en el

Perú (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836), 60–103, esp. 60– 65.
17. “Relación histórica del principio, progresos y estado de la sublevación de José
Gabriel Tupac-Amaru. En cuatro décadas,” in Gutiérrez, Documentos, 117–
151, see 126. This account contends that the “precipitated” flight of the cor-
regidors who faced “only Tupac Amaru and his 3,000 troops” had been “criti-
cized in this city [Cuzco].” Clearly, Orellana and the other corregidors had a
very different view of Tupac Amaru’s strength and troop numbers.
18. Ramos Zambrano, Puno en la rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 77–78.
19. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 537.
20. Alejandro Seraylán Leiva, Historia general del Ejército Peruano, III, 2, “Cam-
pañas militares durante la dominación española” (Lima: Comisión Perma-
nente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, 1981), 614.
21. Ramos Zambrano, Puno en la rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 65– 67.
22. Ibid., 81– 99, quote from 82; see also Gutiérrez, Documentos, 124–126.
23. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596, testimony about observer by don Pedro de la Val-
lina, coronel del regimiento.
24. Gutiérrez, Documentos, 126, describes children dying of hunger in their
mothers’ arms.
25. Gutiérrez, Documentos, 124–126.
26. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 172–173; document from AGI, Cuzco,
Leg. 33.
27. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 537, “Méritos y servicios de Don Diego Choquehuanca,
coronel del Regimiento de Infanteria de los Naturales de esta provincia de
Azángaro y cazique del pueblo de este nombre.”
28. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 537, “Méritos y servicios de Don Diego Choquehuanca.”
See also Gutiérrez, Documentos, 126–128. On the Choquehuanca family,
see David T. Garrett, Shadows of Empire: The Indian Nobility of Cusco, 1750–
1825 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
29. Garrett, Shadows of Empire, 191. Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, Kurakas sin
sucesiones: Del cacique al alcalde de indios, Perú y Bolivia 1750–1835 (Cuzco:
CBC, 1997).
30. Clements R. Markham, A History of Peru (Chicago: Charles H. Sergel and Co.,
1892), 200–201. Markham mistakenly says Azángaro, where Tupac Amaru
did not reach. See Augusto Ramos Zambrano, Tupamarus, Vilcapazas, Cataris,
Ingariconas (Arequipa: Instituto de Estudios Pukara, 2009), 48–50.
31. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, December 11, 1780.
34. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596. The letter is unsigned but apparently from Father
Joseph Eustaquio de Canavedo, of Vilque.
36. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Capellan Santiago de Ortega (?), Lampa, December
13, 1780.

Authenticated
37. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596, Gutiérrez Sonco’s undated testimony.

38. Ibid., Manuel Chuquipata’s undated testimony.
39. On his itinerary, see Ramos Zambrano, Tupamarus, 117.
40. CDIP, II, 2, 329–330, December 6, 1780.
41. “Informe de un clérigo sobre Tupac Amaru,” 1781, Lilly Library, Indiana
University. Renata Fernández Dominguez cites a different version of this
quote in her dissertation, “Micaela Bastidas en la histora, literatura y cul-
tura peruana” (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 2005), 89. Fernández
Dominguez also analyzes the discourse about Micaela.
42. CDIP, II, 2, 343, December 10, 1780. More of Micaela’s letters can be found
in CDBRETA, IV, 2, 78– 88
43. CDIP, II, 2, 302, November 23, 1780.
44. CDIP, II, 2, December 8, 1780, 337–338.
45. CDIP, II, 2, 361–364, December 20, 1780; also in AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 76. The
information about Micaela comes from a series of letters found in CDIP, II,
2. For a selection of letters to her, see Francisco Loayza, Mártires y heroinas
(documentos inéditos del año de 1780 a 1782) (Lima: Imprenta D. Miranda,
1945), 18– 42.
46. CDBRETA, IV, II, 11, testimony of Manuel Galleguillos.
47. Ibid.
48. CDIP, II, 2, 355–356, December 16, 1780. He claimed that the people of
Acomayo were uncontrollable, acting “like wild beasts.”
49. CDIP, II, 2, 355, December 16, 1780.
50. CDIP, II, 2, 357, December 16, 1780.
51. CDIP, II, 2, 357, Micaela Bastidas to Señores Gobernadores, December 15,
1780.
52. CDIP, II, 2, 329–331, December 6, 1780, Micaela Bastidas to Tupac Amaru.
53. Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Sangre andina: Diez mujeres Cuzqueñas (Cuzco:
H.G. Rozas Sucesores, 1949), 109–136; Juan José Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus
compañeros, 2 vols. (Cuzco: Municipalidad del Qosqo, 1995), 2:409– 412.
54. CDBRETA, III, 1, 493– 494, Tomasa Tita Condemayta to Tupac Amaru,
November 12, 1780.
55. CDIP, II, 2, Tomasa Tito Condemayta to Tupac Amaru, November 30,
1780, 321; ibid., 340–341 (letter from Tomasa Tito Condemayta to Micaela
Bastidas, December 9, 1780), also in CDBRETA, III, 1, 491.
56. CDIP, II, 2, Tomasa Tito Condemayta to Micaela Bastidas, n.d., 341.
57. CDIP II, 2, December 20, 1780, Moscoso to Areche, 361–364; December 21,
1780, Moscoso to Viceroy Jáuregui, 365–368. The “throat of the viceroyalty”
quote is from 363.
58. CDIP, II, 2, 327.
59. The copies of this letter found in Seville, the AGI, and published in the
CDIP do not include the confession. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32; CDIP, II, 2, 332–333;
ADC, Vega Centeno, No. 11, 1780. A guide to the Vega Centeno collection
has been published. Imelda Vega Centeno, Costumbres indígenas, administración

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de bienes y normas eclesiásticas (s. XVI–XIX) (Cuzco: CBC, 2004), see 283 for
this document.
60. ADC, Vega Centeno, No. 11, 1780.
62. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, number provided by the Guayllabamba priest. See
also CDBRETA, I, 184–186, Moscoso to Jáuregui, December 22, 1780.
63. “Relación histórica,” Documentos, 128–129.
64. Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia,
1700–1783 (Cuzco: CBC, 1988), 235–237; Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, La gran
rebelión en los andes: De Túpac Amaru a Túpac Catari (Cuzco: CBC, 1995),
47– 68.
65. CDIP, III, 8, 408– 416, “Relación de los Méritos y Servicios del Coronel Don
Mateo Pumachahua, cacique y gobernador del pueblo de Chinchero,”
quote from 411.
66. CDIP II, 1, 117, “Informe Relacionado del Cabildo del Cuzco, 1784.”
67. “Relación histórica,” Documentos, 127; “Informe Relacionado,” 117–119; see
also Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista: Rebeliones de Indios en Sur América, la
sublevación de Tupac Amaru: Crónica de Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis Antonio
Eguiguren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 1:277; CDBRETA, I, 237–240, letter
from Moscoso to Areche, December 22, 1780.
68. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041; also “Informe Relacionado,” 120.
69. I thank Donato Amado for his geograph ical help. The quote is from Mos-
coso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada, 102.
70. On the importance of the Apurimac bridge, see various documents in AGI,
Lima, Leg. 1041; also ADC, Vega Centeno, No. 11, 1780, “copia de una carta
de la mujer del rebelde Tupamaro,” December 1780; CDIP, II, 2, 328; see also
CDIP, II, 2, 350. Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy stressed the importance of royalist
kurakas from the Sacred Valley. De Túpac Amaru a Túpac Catari, 47– 68.
71. Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, is particularly important on this. Peter Silver,
Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York:
W. W. Norton, 2009).
72. Although Szeminski erred, in my mind, in framing this in terms of a
somewhat ahistoric Andean mentality, he shows how the rebels both ex-
panded the defi nition of the enemy and justified violence against them.
Jan Szeminski, La utopía tupamarista (Lima: PUC, 1983); see also Szemin-
ski, “Why Kill Spaniards? New Perspectives on Andean Insurrectionary
Ideology in the 18th Century,” in Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in
the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries, ed. Steve J. Stern (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 166–192.
73. “Relación histórica,” 128–129. Vega stresses how this rebel violence hurt
their prestige and recruiting elements. Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros,
1:129–132.
74. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Cuartel Gral. del Cuzco, December 22, 1780 (re-
ceived in Lima January 14, 1781).

Authenticated
75. CDIP, II, 2, 316 and 317.

76. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from Tupac Amaru, Tungasuca, December
23, 1780.
5. The Siege of Cuzco
1. In fact, the main path to Sacsayhuaman is called Cuesta Amargura, or Bitter

Slope, because so many Indians were hurt when rolling the massive stones
down to build the cathedral.
1780–1835 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), 10–13; Paul Goo-
tenberg, “Population and Ethnicity in Early Republican Peru: Some Revi-
sions,” Latin American Research Review 26, no. 3 (1991): 109–157; Víctor
Peralta Ruiz, En pos del tributo: Burocracia estatal, elite regional y comunidades
indígenas en el Cuzco rural (1826–1854) (Cuzco: CBC, 1991). On “thousands”
of Indians supplying the city, see Concolorcorvo, El Lazarillo. A Guide for
Inexperienced Travelers between Buenos Aires and Lima, tr. Walter D. Kline
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965), 204.
4. Clerics again proved to be key in for mants. For example, AGI, Lima, Leg.
1041, begins, “Acaba de informarnos . . .”
5. CDIP, II, 1, 120–123, “Informe Relacionado del Cabildo del Cuzco, 1784.”
6. CDBRETA, 1, 301, Moscoso to Reverendo Padre, Santo Domingo, Decem-
ber 31, 1780. He pointed out that “precautions are always favorable.”
7. Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada contra los artificios de la
calumnia (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional, in press), 99–101 (testimony of Mer-
cedarian Pedro de la Sota).
8. Leon G. Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 1750–1810 (Phila-
delphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978), 112. Moscoso continued to
demand money from convents in January; see his command on January 7,
1781, CDBRETA, I, 316–317; see also Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada.
9. Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 111–112; Eulogio Zu-
daire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del Perú (Pamplona, Spain:
Diputación Foral de Navarra, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1979), 150–
151. The city council also boasted that their measures in mid- to late No-
vember had forced Tupac Amaru to “extend himself” and proceed south
before attacking the city. Nothing else indicates, however, that this fac-
tored into his decision. “Informe relacionado,” 104–113.
1967), 455; L. E. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783 (Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 120.
11. J. R. Gutiérrez, ed., Documentos para la historia antigua de Bolivia sacados de la
biblioteca de J. R. Gutiérrez: Sitios de la Paz y el Cuzco 1780–1781 (La Paz: Imprenta
de la Unión Americana, 1879), 126–127.

Authenticated
12. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from Ignacio de Santiesteban Ruiz Cano to
Junta de Guerra, December 19, 1780.
13. A carga or load is usually estimated at 120 liters. The challenging Andean
terrain might have reduced each load, or at least what each mule carried. I
thank Ramiro Flores Guzmán for help on this question.
14. On the majeños, see Zoila Mendoza, “Performing Decency: Ethnicity and
Race in Andean ‘Mestizo’ Ritual Dance,” in Music and the Racial Imagina-
tion, ed. Ronald Radano and Philip Bohlman (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 2000), 231–270.
15. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, testimony of Agustín Herrera.
16. Perhaps the intended date was Saturday, December 30. On the devotion to
the Virgin Mary on Saturdays, see “Saturdays and the Immaculate Heart
of Mary,” www.mariancatechist.com/formation/mary/saturdays/index.
html (accessed 2/18/11).
17. AGI, Lima, 1041, testimony of Agustín Herrera.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. AGI, Lima, 1041, testimony of Jorge Masías.
21. The historian Juan José Vega argues that Micaela Bastidas lost patience with
Tupac Amaru and began the march on Cuzco days before his return to Tun-
gasuca. However, she quickly lost control of the Quechua masses that had
urged her to depart and did not get far before they stopped and waited to re-
join the troops led by Tupac Amaru. His argument, based on scant documen-
tation and relying heavily on assumptions about her “impulsive” nature,
possible depression, and misunderstanding of the rebellion’s “continental
extension,” is not persuasive, but it highlights differences between the two
leaders and within the camp. Juan José Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros, 2
vols. (Cuzco: Municipalidad del Qosqo, 1995), 1:127–139; 2:306–320.
22. Gutiérrez, Documentos, 130. Padre de Sota also uses this number. Moscoso
y Peralta, Inocencia justificada, 101.
23. The sources do not discuss these “rabonas,” the women who accompanied
the rebels. In general, all of the troops were simply deemed “Indians” and
thus not discussed.
24. CDIP, II, 1, 113–115, “Informe Relacionado.”
25. CDIP, II, 2, 376, 377 (two documents). He had written a similar note on
December 21, 1780, about “Indians and Spaniards, who had stayed behind
in Sicuani.” CDBRETA, III, 1, 293, December 1, 1780, Tupac Amaru to
Don Basilio Morales and Eugenio Figueroa. On Maruri, see Vega, Túpac
Amaru y sus compañeros, 2:375–377.
26. CDBRETA, III, I, 296, December 30, 1780.
27. CDIP, II, 2, 380.
28. CDIP, II, 2, 383.
29. Ibid.

Authenticated
30. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596, “quaderno 3, Testimonio formado sobre el alza-
miento de la provincia de Tinta.”
31. Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros, 1:147; for more on Castelo see David
Cahill, “Genocide from Below: The Great Rebellion of 1780– 82 in the
Southern Andes,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Sub-
altern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2008), 403– 423.
32. Alejandro Seraylán Leiva, Historia general del ejército Peruano, tomo III, vol.
2, “Campañas militares durante la dominación española” (Lima: Comisión
Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, 1981), 615– 617.
33. For de la Madrid’s version, see CDIP, II, 2, 395– 401, which sheds light also
on how the letters were received by Moscoso. For the letters, see Pedro de
Angelis, Documentos para la historia de la sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac
Amaru, cacique de la provincia de Tinta, en el Perú (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del
Estado, 1836), 18–24.
34. This is found in CDBRETA, 1, 327–328. The publishing history of these let-
ters is complicated. Those to Bishop Moscoso and the city council have been
reprinted numerous times, with errors. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui,
163–166, especially footnote 6, clarifies this. The letters can be found in
CDIP, II, 2, 377–378 and 378–380; a subsequent letter to the city council is
found on 394–395. This same volume mistakenly prints another copy of
the letter to the bishop with the date of December 12, 1780, a mistake fi rst
made by Angelis, Documentos para la historia, 18–24. Zudaire also refers to
the letter to Tupac Amaru’s “beloved compatriots” but apparently read this
in AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 77. I found it in CDBRETA, 1, 330–331. Zudaire, Don
Agustín de Jáuregui, 345–346.
35. John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810 (London: University
of London Press, 1958), 4.
36. CDIP, II, 2, January 3, 1781, 377–378. “Thebes” refers to the decision by
the Theban commander Epaminondas not to take the weakened city of
Sparta but rather return to Thebes in 371 BC .
37. CDIP, II, 2, 378, January 3, 1781.
38. Ibid. He also called for the establishment of a Real Audiencia in Cuzco, a
high court, a demand met in 1784.
39. CDBRETA, 1, 330–331.
40. Zudaire notes his efforts to calm criollos. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui,
164–166.
41. Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 455. From the perspective of the city
council, this was absurd: he was not a legitimate authority and he was not
about to take the city. See “Informe relacionado,” 123, in which they
called the letters “soberbia arrogancia.”
42. “Informe Relacionado,” 123–124. Tupac Amaru hoped to control the Caja
de Agua, the entryway to Anta Pampa and Lima.

Authenticated
43. CDIP, II, 2, 440. The account in Melchor de Paz repeats the bishop’s line
that this charge was “imprudent.”
44. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from José Casorla Tristán to Visitador Areche,
January 14, 1781.
45. Letter from Jáuregui to King, February 15, 1781, cited in Eulogio Zudaire,
“Análisis de la rebelión de Tupac Amaru en su Bicentenario (1780–1980),”
Revista de Indias 40 (1980), 13–70, quote from 48. The viceroy had more
than a year of hindsight at this point.
46. “Informe relacionado,” 120, uses the figure 60,000 rebels.
47. The sources never mention them. As it had done since it was coined in the
sixteenth century, the term “Indian,” used to describe Tupac Amaru’s
mass followers, lumped together and homogenized different social groups,
in this case fighters and followers. The mention about the more important
rebels attacked in Saylla who slept in tents is a rare reference to differences
among the rebel followers.
levación de Tupac Amaru. Crónica de Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis Antonio Eguig-
uren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 1:283.
49. “Informe Relacionado,” 125.
50. CDBRETA, 1, 187, Moscoso, January 4, 1781.
51. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1586, “Secularización de los curatos y doctrinas,” testi-
mony by Father Juan Hurtado, 1790.
52. CDIP, II, 1, 331– 415, 356, Rafael José Sahuaraura Titu Atauchi, Estado del
Perú; Moscoso y Peralta Inocencia justificada, 102–104, account of Padre de
Sota.
53. CDIP, II, 1, 149–330, 217, Ignacio de Castro, Relación del Cuzco.
54. CDIP, II, 2, 459– 460, Micaela Bastidas to Tupac Amaru, January 24, 1781.
55. Ibid.
56. Vega makes this point in Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros, 1:156.
57. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32, trial of Figueroa. In CDBRETA, V, III, esp. 440– 442.
58. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32.
59. Mateo Urbicaín, “Sintético ‘diario’ de la Revolución,” in Preliminares del
incendio: Documentos del año de 1776 a 1780, en su mayoría inéditos, anteri-
ores y sobre la Revolución Libertadora que engendró y dió vida José Gabriel
Túpak Amaru, en 1780, ed. Francisco Loayza (Lima: Imprenta D. Miranda,
1947), 147.
60. CDBRETA, III, 1, 293–294, Tupac Amaru to Eugenio Canatupa Sinanyuca,
December 29, 1780.
61. CDIP, II, 2, 441, Moscoso to Areche, January 14, 1781. See also the account
in Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 457– 449, which mentions Friar Ramón
Salazar.
62. CDIP, II, 2, 394–395, January 9, 1781.

Authenticated
64. Gutiérrez, Documentos, 133; see also AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, José Casorla
Tristán to Areche, January 11, 1781.
65. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, José Casorla Tristán to Areche, January 11, 1781.
66. CDIP, II, 2, 442.
67. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596, letter from Gregorio Mariano Sánchez to Señor
Gobernador Diego Choquiguanca, January 17, 1781.
69. “Historieta instructiva aunque concisa de la rebelión de José Gabriel Tupac
Amaru que fue executado . . .” 1781. I read this rare document in the Mata
Linares Collection, Real Academia de Historia, Madrid.
70. I play with this conjecture in a book on counterfactual Peruvian history.
Charles F. Walker, “Un Inca en Sacsayhuamán: Si Túpac Amaru hubiese
tomado el Cuzco (1780–1781),” in Contra-historia del Perú. Ensayos de Historia
Política Peruana, ed. Eduardo Dargent and José Ragas (Lima: MITIN, 2012),
33– 47.
72. The idea comes from a single citation, but sources are so thin with regard
to many facets of the uprising, particularly the background and conditions
of rebel fighters, that ideas emerging from single citations have been re-
peated by generations of historians.
73. The best work on disease, medicine, and society in colonial Peru has fo-
cused on Lima. For an important recent study, see Adam Warren, Medicine
and Politics in Colonial Peru: Population Growth and the Bourbon Reforms (Pitts-
burgh, Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010).
75. CDIP, II, 2, 441, Moscoso to Jáuregui. On the threat of food shortages, see
Gutiérrez, Documentos, 135–136; Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:284,
which mentions “hunger” spreading in January.
76. Gutiérrez, Documentos, 134–135.
78. CDIP, II, 1, 359–360, Sahuaraura, Estado del Perú.
79. CDIP, II, 1, 127, “Informe relacionado.”
6. In Pursuit of Tupac Amaru

uren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 1:333–335, March 20, 1781.
2. CDIP, II, 2, 590–592, “Auto que se publicó en esta ciudad del Cuzco,”
March 20, 1781.

Authenticated
3. CDIP, II, 2, 518–520, has the list of troops. Juan José Vega, “Túpac Amaru
y su tiempo,” in Historia general del ejército Peruano tomo II, vol. 1, ed. Juan
José Vega (Lima: Comisión Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú,
1981), 421, notes the racial composition. Leon Campbell, The Military and
Society in Colonial Peru, 1750–1810 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical
Society, 1978), 129–131.
4. Vega, “Túpac Amaru y su tiempo,” 418; Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Túpac
Amaru (Lima: Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 1977), 116–121.
5. The tally of troops itself in CDIP, II, 2, 518–520; for an English summary,
see Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 130–131.
6. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, March 1, 1781; his abilities to resurrect were also cov-
ered in his trial: see CDBRETA, III, I, 261, testimony of Diego Ortigoza,
May 14, 1781,
7. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, March 1, 1781.
8. Ibid.
9. Areche used the term cañada. CDIP, II, 2, 620, April 8, 1781.
10. CDIP, II, 2, 457– 458, Moscoso to Areche, January 21, 1781. He warned
that the control of the Apurimac Bridge was fundamental to success.
11. CDBRETA, III, 1, 296–297, Comisiones to Felipe Cano and Tomás Quispe
and to Lucas Champi Tito Quecaño, January 14, 1781. Tupac Amaru over-
saw the building of a defensive wall outside of Combapata and trenches in
Tinta. He apparently moved headquarters to Tinta, where he had property.
Later in the month, he visited Langui and perhaps made a quick visit to
the south. Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del
Perú (Pamplona, Spain: Diputación Foral de Navarra, Institución Príncipe
de Viana, 1979), 175. See also AGI, Cuzco, Legs. 75 and 76, for extensive
documentation; Juan Manuel Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada contra
los artificios de la calumnia (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional, in press), testimony of
Soto, 99–100; Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru el revolucionario (Lima:
Moncloa– Campodónica, 1970), 172–175, for the city’s preparations.
12. Micaela Bastidas’s trial provides extensive documentation on this. See CD-
BRETA, IV, II.
13. For example, see the January 10, 1781, ultimatum by Juan de Dios Valen-
cia. CDBRETA, III, 1, 95– 96, “pena de vida.” Other hints of disciplinary
problems among the rebels can be seen in CDBRETA, III, 1, 95– 96, Santo
Tomás, January 10, 1781; also CDBRETA, III, 1, 109–110, Chumbivilcas,
March 1781. Antonio Bastidas describes the difficulties in controlling rebel
troops in CDIP, II, 2, 501–502. Bastidas also worried that with the proxim-
ity of Carnival, rebel troops would focus more on drinking than fighting.
14. Both letters found in Francisco Loayza, Mártires y heroinas (documentos inédi-
tos del año de 1780 a 1782) (Lima: Imprenta D. Miranda, 1945), 40, 41. Other
letters here from early 1781 mention the prospect of Indians abandoning
the struggle to tend to their fields and families.

Authenticated
15. On this point, see Magnus Mörner and Efraín Trelles, “A Test of Causal
Interpretations of the Túpac Amaru Rebellion,” in Resistance, Rebellion, and
Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries, ed. Steve J.
Stern (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 94–109.
16. David Cahill, “Genocide from Below: The Great Rebellion of 1780– 82 in the
Southern Andes,” in Empire, Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation, and Subal-
tern Resistance in World History, ed. A. Dirk Moses (New York: Berghahn Books,
2008), 403– 423. Cahill overstates his argument— Castelo was important but
he and others never challenged José Gabriel and Micaela for the leadership.
17. CDBRETA, III, 1, 519–550.
18. CDBRETA, III, I, 611– 612.
19. Ibid.
20. CDBRETA, III, I, 612– 613, from Tupac Amaru to Francisco Torres, Janu-
ary 17, 1781.
21. See Alejandro Seraylán Leiva, Historia general del ejército Peruano, III, 2,
“Campañas militares durante la dominación española” (Lima: Comisión
Permanente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, 1981), 624– 625, for a map of
these maneuvers.
22. See CDIP, II, 2, 512–517, for a detailed description of the attack.
23. J. R. Gutiérrez, ed., Documentos para la Historia Antigua de Bolivia sacados de la
Biblioteca de J. R. Gutiérrez. Sitios de la Paz y el Cuzco 1780–1781 (La Paz: Im-
prenta de la Unión Americana, 1879), 138; Melchor de Paz, Guerra separat-
ista, 1:328–329; Jan Szeminski, “Why Kill the Spaniard? New Perspectives
on Andean Insurrectionary Ideology in the 18th Century,” in Resistance,
Rebellion, and Consciousness, 166–192.
dad del Qosqo, 1995), 2:395; CDIP, II, 1, “Informe relacionado,” 129–131.
At this point, the rebels failed to connect forces; Ramón Ponce and Parvina
then attacked to the northeast, in Paruro, Cotabambas, and the provincias
altas. Paruro had provided troops to the royalists in the siege of Cuzco.
They attempted to cut the Pachachaca and Apurímac bridges to slow del
Valle’s forces, but to no avail.
25. Jorge Hidalgo Lehuede, “Amarus y cataris: Aspectos mesiánicos de la re-
belión indígena de 1781 en Cuzco, Chayanta, La Paz y Arica,” Chungará 10
(1983): 117–138.
26. As noted elsewhere, she also demonstrates the influence of Garcilaso de la
Vega. O’Phelan Godoy, “El ‘castigo ejemplar del traidor’: La radicalización
de la violencia en el Bajo y el Alto Perú,” in La gran rebelión en los andes: De
Túpac Amaru a Túpac Catari (Cuzco: CBC, 1995), 105–137.
27. Szeminski, “Why Kill the Spaniard?”
28. A critique well made by O’Phelan Godoy. “El castigo ejemplar,” 109.
29. Cited in Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 176. From Mata Linares regard-
ing Paruro.
30. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 176–177.

Authenticated
31. For masterful applications of longer timeframes to understand Katarista

violence in Upper Peru, see Sergio Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial Authority:
Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth- Century Southern Andes (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2003), and Sinclair Thomson, We Alone Will
Rule: Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 2002). Steve Stern stresses the need for multiple time-
frames in his “New Approaches to the Study of Peasant Rebellion and
Consciousness: Implications of the Andean Experience,” in Resistance, Re-
bellion, and Consciousness, 3–29, esp. 11–15.
32. CDIP, II, 2, 619– 623, “Relación de los sucesos”; also in Melchor de Paz,
Guerra separatista, 1:356–359.
33. Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, 126–153.
34. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, Manuel Villalta to Señor Comandante General
Avilés, Campo de Sullumayo, March 26, 1781.
35. Vega, “Túpac Amaru y su tiempo,” 422.
36. CDBRETA, 1, documentos varios, 535–543, del Valle to Viceroy Jáuregui,
April 20, 1781. I also consulted this in AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040.
37. CDBRETA, 1, 538–359.
38. “Sobre la supresión de la rebelión,” April 8, 1781, Lilly Library, Indiana
University.
39. CDBRETA, 1, 541.
40. CDIP, II, 1, 582, Eusebio Balza de Berganza, “La Verdad desnuda.”
41. CDBRETA, 1, 542.
42. CDIP, II, 2, 620, letter from April 8, 1781.
43. Ibid. Antonio Bastidas explains the rebel retreat in CDBRETA, III, 1, 448–
449, April 2, 1781.
44. Vega, “Túpac Amaru y su tiempo,” 422– 427.
45. CDBRETA, III, I, 109–110, “Bando de Túpac Amaru sobre la conducta de
los pobladores de Chumbivilcas,” March 13, 1781.
46. CDIP, II, 2, 587–588. On the heads, see Luis Durand Florez, Introducción,
CDBRETA, IV, II, 13.
47. CDBRETA, III, I, Areche to Mata Linares, April 7, 1781, 314–315.
48. CDIP, II, 2, 587, del Valle diary, March 19, 1781.
49. CDBRETA, III, 1, 324, testimony by Francisco Cisneros. This is the only
mention of rebels cutting off and keeping heads as trophies, so it must be
read skeptically.
50. Numerous documents refer to this. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 596, “quad. 3 Testi-
monio formado sobre el alzamiento de la prov. de Tinta.”
51. CDIP, II, 2, 501–502, letter from Antonio Bastidas to Micaela Bastidas,
February 15, 1781.
52. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040. This is an account to Areche, by Domingo Marnara
and José Acuña. Santo Tomás (Chumbivilcas), March 23, 1781.
53. CDIP, II, 2, 462.
54. Ibid.

Authenticated
55. Javier Flores Espinoza, “Justo Sahuaraura Inca y sus Recuerdos de la monar-
quía peruana,” in Don Justo Apu Sahuaraura Inca, Recuerdos de la Monarquía
Peruana o bosquejo de la historia de los Incas (Lima: Fundación Telefónica,
2001), 23–25. The letter is in CDIP, II, 2, 521–531.
57. CDIP, II, 2, 521–531.
58. CDIP, II, 2, 528–529. He sent similar letters to Bishop Moscoso. Zudaire,
Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 186.
59. CDIP, II, 2, 521–531; CDBRETA, III, 1, 204–222. For an overview about
Quechua in the eighteenth century, see Kenneth J. Andrien, “The Bour-
bon Reforms, Independence, and the Spread of Quechua and Aymara,” in
History and Language in the Andes, ed. Paul Heggarty and Adrian J. Pearce
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 113–133. Andrien discusses the
relationship of the Church and Quechua at 116–123.
60. CDIP, II, 2, 534–535.
61. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 77, Fernando Ramos Titu Atauchi to Moscoso.
62. CDIP, II, 2, 556–564, quote from 556. Also found in AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040.
63. CDIP, II, 2, 550, 556–564.
64. Ibid.
66. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, Areche to Gálvez, March 1, 1781.
67. Ibid.
68. Vega, “Túpac Amaru y su tiempo,” 425. I did not fi nd more information
about the movement of troops, but if Tupac Amaru did make this decision,
he erred.
University.
70. On the deserter, see Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru
(México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1947), 116–117; see also L. E.
Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1966), 217–220; Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 3rd ed.
(Buenos Aires: SELA, 1967), 468– 472.
71. Vega, “Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros,” 206.
72. CDIP, II, 2, 588.
73. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, letter from del Valle, April 8, 1781; CDIP, II, 2, 610–
623; also key is Avilés, April 12, 1781, in Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista,
1:353–56 and 356–59. Del Valle describes Tupac Amaru’s letter— I have
never seen a copy and thus have doubts about its existence.
74. Markham provides a strong narrative of the Spanish offensive. Clements
R. Markham, A History of Peru (Chicago: Charles H. Sergel 1892), 202–205;
75. CDBRETA, IV, 2, 43– 45, Micaela Bastidas’s testimony from April 22, 1781.
On the accusations, see “Relación histórica del principio, progresos y es-
tado de la sublevación de José Gabriel Tupac-Amaru. En cuatro décadas,”

Authenticated
in Gutiérrez, Documentos, 147. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:356–359

refers to a mule with their “stolen goods” slowing them down.
76. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:356–359. Landaeta’s testimony about
the bribe offer is at CDBRETA, III, 1, 180, April 26, 1781.
77. CDIP, II, 2, 637– 640, lists a few of the rebels executed but admits that it
omits many. Del Valle cites sixty-seven executed. Melchor de Paz, Guerra
separatista, 1:356–359.
78. According to Bishop Moscoso, Tupac Amaru himself spread this rumor in his
testimony. CDIP, II, 2, letter from Bishop Moscoso, April 13, 1781, 642– 646.
79. CDBRETA, III, 1, del Valle to Areche, April 6, 1781, 7– 9, quote from 8. The
remark about losing sleep is at CDIP, II, 2, 588.
80. For one example, see AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, José Gabriel Tupac Amaru to
his son, Mariano April 7, 1781; CDBRETA, 303–304, to Diego Cristóbal,
April 8, 1781. Others are found in AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 33. The day before his
capture, Tupac Amaru commissioned Andrés, his nephew, to lead rebel
forces in the south, in Lampa, Azángaro, and Carabaya, instructing him to
punish any disobedient follower and to impose “the death sentence” for
anyone who deserted. Andrés and others who had received these orders or
heard of them certainly would not have believed the letter. The commis-
sion for Andrés is in CDBRETA, III, 1, 113, Tupac Amaru, April 4, 1781.
University. The quote and the account of bellringing are from this docu-
ment, which also includes a list of prisoners. See Zudaire, Don Agustín de
Jáuregui, 204–205, for a good summary of this.
82. CDBRETA, III, 1, 8, del Valle to Areche, April 6, 1781.
7. Torment
1. J. R. Gutiérrez, ed., Documentos para la Historia Antigua de Bolivia sacados de la

Biblioteca de J. R. Gutiérrez. Sitios de Paz y el Cuzco 1780–1781 (La Paz: Imprenta
de la Unión Americana, 1879), 149; CDIP, II, 1, 134–135, “Informe Rela-
cionado del Cabildo del Cuzco, 1784.”
2. CDBRETA, IV, II, 47, testimony of Francisco Tupac Amaru on Micaela
Bastidas’s tears; CDBRETA, IV, II, 11, testimony of Manuel Galleguillos on
her understanding of the dangers, in which he discusses her contingency
plans if they were captured.
3. The best summary of the trials is Bohumir Roedl, “Causa Tupa Amaro: El
proceso a los tupamaros en Cuzco, abril– julio de 1781,” Revista Andina 34
(2002): 99–119. See also Mariselle Meléndez, Deviant and Useful Citizens:
The Cultural Production of the Female Body in Eighteenth- Century Peru (Nash-
ville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2011), 11– 40; Scarlett O’Phelan
Godoy, Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia 1700–1783 (Cuzco:
CBC, 1988), a pioneer in using the data from the trials. The trials, Legajos
32 and 33, are republished in CDBRETA.

Authenticated
4. CDBRETA, III, 1, 140–141.

5. Ibid.
6. CDBRETA, III, 1; the trial is on 138–155.
7. CDBRETA, III, 1, 155–171, quote from 155.
8. CDBRETA, III, 1; see the “careos” from 190–196.
9. CDBRETA, III, 1, 184–186; Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II)
virrey interino del Perú (Pamplona, Spain: Diputación Foral de Navarra,
Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1979), 218. The sheet is in AGI, Lima,
Leg. 1050.
10. CDBRETA, III, 1, 184–186.
11. “Strappado,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strappado (accessed 7/7/12).
12. Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años de cautiverio (memorias del inka
Juan Bautista Túpac Amaru), ed. Francisco A. Loayza (Lima: D. Miranda,
1945), 28–32.
14. CDBRETA, III, I, 196, “Auto de Tormento.”
15. “Strappado,” en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strappado (accessed 7/7/12).
16. George Ryley Scott, History of Torture through the Ages (London: Luxor Press,
1939), 168.
17. CDBRETA, III, I, 197–199. This is the diligenica del tormento.
uren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 1:405. In his memoirs, Tupac Amaru’s
half-brother, Juan Bautista, claims that the defendant declared, “Here,
there are only two accomplices: you as the oppressor and I as the libera-
tor.” Túpac Amaru, Cuarenta años de cautiverio, 20–21.
19. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:405. Even if these quotes are fabri-
cated, they show how people understood Tupac Amaru as a courageous
victim of Spanish brutality, a compelling interpretation.
20. This does not mean that they weren’t badly treated. One prisoner, Isidro
Mamani, tried to hang himself, almost succeeding. He gave as his reasons
the mistreatment he received when taken to Cuzco, his utter lack of money
(“no tener medio real”), and threats of other prisoners. CDBRETA, III, 1,
682– 683. He was executed.
21. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32, f. 66.
22. CDBRETA, IV, II, 71–72. Testimony from May 9, 1781. This was taken un-
der duress and Micaela and José Gabriel had not seen each other since their
capture. It’s curious, however, that scholars have not discussed this physi-
cal abuse, perhaps deeming it “normal” for the period. It deserves more
attention.
23. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32, found in CDBRETA, IV, 11.
24. Meléndez, Deviant and Useful Citizens, 15–23, develops this.
25. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 32, f. 66.
26. Quoted in Roedl, “Causa Tupa Amaro,” 104.

Authenticated
27. CDIP, II, 2, 578–579, and for the English translation stored in the Public
Record Office, 579–581; for a different English translation, see Ward Stavig
and Ella Schmidt, eds., The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions: An Anthol-
ogy of Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 2008), 121–122. I
have consulted both but made some changes.
28. CDIP, II, 2, 581; I have maintained the rustic English translation.
30. Quoted in Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 222.
31. CDBRETA, III, I, 222–226, May 5, 1781.
32. CDBRETA, III, I, 234. José de Saldívar y Saavedra, May 5, 1781.
33. Roedl makes this point. Roedl, “Causa Tupa Amaro,” 109–111.
34. CDBRETA, III, I, 245–247. I reviewed the London Gazette Extraordinary and
did not fi nd any mention of Tupac Amaru. The Chester Chronicle and General
Advertiser published an article on October 6, 1780, that refers to an English
privateer who overtook a Spanish ship and came across letters from Are-
quipa, Cuzco, La Paz, and Potosí. On October 10, the same periodical pro-
vides further details, based on the letters written by a Jesuit priest.
35. I thank Griselda Jarquin for her diligent work on British newspapers.
36. CDBRETA, III, 1, 250–259.
37. CDBRETA, III, 1, 259–261; several other witnesses confi rm this. Ibid.,
261–262, testimony of Isidro Toera and Domingo Pérez León.
38. CDBRETA, III, 1, 267–268; for his property, see 224–226.
39. CDBRETA, III, I, 268–277. I have also used the English translation in
Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 130–135.
40. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 132. I have added
a passage that they omitted from their translation, CDBRETA, III, I, 271.
41. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 133.
42. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 135; I have
made a minor change in the translation.
43. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 133. For the
Spanish original, see CDBRETA, III, I, 268–277.
44. CDBRETA, III, I, 278–279, Areche, May 16, 1781.
45. CDBRETA, III, I, 280–281, Areche, May 17, 1781.
46. CDBRETA, III, I, 279–288.
47. Daniel Valcárcel, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru (Mexico City: Fondo de Cul-
tura Económica, 1965), 121–122.
48. CDBRETA, V, III, has these trials, including the sentences.
49. CDIP, II, 2, 776.
50. Zudaire, Don Augstín de Jáuregui, 173.
51. Pedro de Angelis, “Castigos ejecutados en la ciudad del Cuzco con Tupac-
Amaru, su muger, hijos y confidentes,” in Documentos para la historia de la
sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac-Amaru cacique de la provincia de Tinta, en el
Perú (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836), 52–54, quote from 53.
Also in CDIP, II, 2, 774–776.

Authenticated
52. CDIP, II, 2, 775. Zudaire vehemently disagrees with this, arguing that the
garrote worked on any size neck. It is a bizarre passage, since he passionately
ridicules those who accept this view but passively describes this ritualized
torture. A meticulous historian, he is nevertheless the rare apologist for the
Spanish. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 228. On Micaela Bastidis’s tongue,
see Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:40; Durand Florez, Introducción, CD-
BRETA, IV, 2, summarizes these arguments well; see pp. x–xii.
53. CDIP, II, 2, 775.
54. Clements R. Markham, A History of Peru (Chicago: Charles H. Sergel and
Company 1892), 207.
55. CDIP, II, 2, 776.
56. CDIP, II, 2, 790–793.
57. Analysts, myself included, have too easily accepted the royalist intent of
using the ritual as a symbolic termination of the uprising.
8. The Other Side of the Lake
1. Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia

1700–1783 (Cuzco: CBC, 1988); see also María Eugenia del Valle de Siles,
Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 1781–1782 (La Paz: Don Bosco, 1990).
For a recent comparative work, see Sergio Serulnikov, Revolution in the An-
des: The Age of Túpac Amaru (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2013).
2. For this summary, I draw heavily from del Valle de Siles, Historia de la re-
belión de Tupac Catari; Sergio Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial Authority: Chal-
lenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth- Century Southern Andes (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 2003); and Sinclair Thomson, We Alone Will Rule:
Native Andean Politics in the Age of Insurgency (Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press, 2002). I also build on ideas presented in Charles Walker,
“Prologue,” Serulnikov, Revolution in the Andes, xi–xvi.
3. Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial Authority, 171–185; see the documents in Ward
Stavig and Ella Schmidt, eds., The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions: An
Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 2008), 182–214.
4. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 208; Serul-
nikov, Subverting Colonial Authority, 187.
5. Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 172.
6. Cited in Oscar Cornblit, Power and Violence in the Colonial City: Oruro from the
Mining Renaissance to the Rebellion of Tupac Amaru 1740–1782 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 139.
7. Serulnikov, Subverting Colonial Authority, 103–133; Cornblit, Power and Vio-
lence in the Colonial City, 167–172.
8. Del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 3. This book pro-
vides an excellent overview of Julián Apaza, 1–30 and throughout.
9. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 216, from
Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 184.

Authenticated
10. Del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 8–10. For a smart analy-
sis of how historians have not fully overcome contemporaries’ snide assess-
ment of Katari as a barbarian, see Thomson, We Alone Will Rule, 180–186.
11. Serulnikov develops the comparison in Revolution in the Andes; O’Phelan
Godoy has long linked the analysis of the two social movements; see
O’Phelan Godoy, Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales. On more contemporary
tensions between Inca and Aymara identities, see E. Gabrielle Kuenzli,
Acting Inca: National Belonging in Twentieth- Century Bolivia (Pittsburgh,
Penn.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013).
12. Del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, esp. 241–258.
13. Ibid., 45– 60.
14. Ibid., 1–30.
15. CDIP, II, 2, “Relación del éxito,” 407.
16. CDBRETA, III, I, Ponce to Tupac Amaru, February 1781, 589.
17. CDBRETA, III, I, Ponce to Tupac Amaru, March 5, 1781, 590–591.
dad del Qosqo, 1995), 2:401. Ponce was referring to Isidro Mamani and
Andrés Guara.
19. Del Valle de Siles is excellent on this. Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari,
31–52.
20. “Relaciones de las operaciones militares del General Dn. Joaquín de Orel-
lana,” in Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista: Rebeliones de Indios en Sur
América, la sublevación de Tupac Amaru: Crónica de Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis
Antonio Eguiguren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p., 1952), 1:389– 403, quote from 395.
22. Ibid., 376.
23. Ibid.
24. Augusto Ramos Zambrano, Puno en la rebelión de Túpac Amaru (Puno: Uni-
versidad Nacional Técnica del Altiplano, 1982), 236–237; Mamani’s trial is
in CDBRETA, III, I, 665– 687. See also Orellana in Melchor de Paz, Guerra
separatista, 1:375–377.
25. On his capture and the quote, CDBRETA, III, I, 672, Orellana, July 10,
1781.
26. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:382, 386, report from Don Celedonio
Bermejo, April 21, 1781.
27. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:373, “Capitulo de carta que refiere la
derrota de los Yndios rebeldes por el Comandante Don Ygnacio Flores en
las inmediaciones de Chuquisaca.”
28. Ibid., 376, 378–379.
29. Alberto Flores Galindo, In Search of an Inca: Identity and Utopia in the Andes
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 106–120; Carlos Sempat
Assadourian, Sistema de la economía colonial: mercado interno, regiones y espacio
económico (Lima: IEP, 1982); Enrique Tandeter, Coacción y mercado: La min-
ería de la plata en el Potosí colonial, 1692–1826 (Cuzco: CBC, 1992).

Authenticated
30. For an incisive account on contemporary Bolivia, including the legacy of the
eighteenth-century rebellions, see Sinclair Thomson and Forrest Hylton, Rev-
olutionary Horizons: Past and Present in Bolivian Politics (New York: Verso, 2007).
31. Primary accounts include “Diario de los Sucesos del Cerco de la Ciudad de
La Paz en 1781, por el Brigadier Don Sebastián de Segurola,” in Archivo
Boliviano: Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de Bolivia, ed. Vicente
de Ballivián y Rojas, 2nd ed. (La Paz: Casa Municipal de la Cultura Franz
Tamayo, 1977), 1–183; Francisco Tadeo Diez de Medina, Diario del alza-
miento de indios conjurados contra la ciudad de Nuestra Señora de La Paz 1781, ed.
Maria Eugenia del Valle de Siles (La Paz: Don Bosco, 1981). For analysis,
see Mark Thurner, “Guerra andina y política campesina en el sitio de La
Paz, 1781,” in Poder y violencia en los andes, ed. Henrique Urbano (Cuzco:
CBC, 1991), 93–121. See also letters in Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac
Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 227–239.
32. Del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 179.
1967), 515–517.
34. Del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 175–180.
9. Southern Campaigns
1. For example, on October 17, 1781, Diego Cristóbal deemed himself the “le-
gitimate brother” of “Governador Don Joseph Gavriel Tupa Amaru.” See
Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del Perú (Pamplona,
Spain: Diputación Foral de Navarra, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1979),
332.
uren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 2:159.
3. Diego Cristóbal made more spelling mistakes and did not have the flourish
of José Gabriel. For example, see his August 19, 1781, letter to Fray Miguel
Morán. Lilly Library, Indiana University.
4. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, del Valle to Francisco Cuellar, June 22, 1781. Cuel-
lar was governor of Castrovirreina, part of Huancavelica. Zudaire, Don
Agustín de Jáuregui, 192.
6. Sergio Serulnikov, Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Túpac Amaru (Durham,
N.C.: Duke University Press, 2013), 56–59. On the Choquehuanca clan, see
Nils Jacobsen, Mirages of Transition: The Peruvian Altiplano, 1780–1930
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 82– 84.
7. Jacobsen, Mirages of Transition, describes and examines the altiplano well.
8. Lillian Fisher summarizes who was where. L. E. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt,
1780–1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), 252.
9. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, letter from del Valle, to Josef de Gálvez, June 26, 1781.

Authenticated
10. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, which has considerable information about this pe-
riod and violence; also AGI, Lima, Leg. 600; for del Valle’s account, AGI,
Cuzco, Leg. 63, June 26, 1781; Pedro de Angelis, Colección de obras y docu-
mentos relativos a la historia antigua y moderna de las provincias del Río de la
Plata (Buenos Aires: J. Lajouane and CIA, 1910), tomo IV (5 vols.), 316. On
this journey and other events examined here, see Boleslao Lewin, La re-
belión de Túpac Amaru (Buenos Aires: SELA, 1967), 484–527; Zudaire, Don
Agustín de Jáuregui, 255–268; L. E. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, 242–280.
11. AGI, Lima, Leg. 660, Martínez to Areche, June 22, 1781. See also AGI,
Lima, Leg. 1040, for Areche’s critique.
12. Almost all accounts of del Valle’s campaign rely on the “Relación histórica
de los sucesos de la rebelión de José Gabriel Tupac-Amaru, en las provincias
del Perú, el año de 1780,” found in the second edition of Angelis’s document
collection. Angelis, Colección de obras, IV, 316; see also Zudaire, Don Agustín de
Jáuregui, 257, and Gauvin Alexander Bailey, The Andean Hybrid: Baroque Con-
vergent Cultures in the Churches of Colonial Peru (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 2010), 282–284, who calls Maruri a “Robin Hood priest.”
Maruri was deported to Spain but freed in 1787. CDIP, II, 4, 372–373.
13. Augusto Ramos Zambrano, Tupamarus, Vilcapazas, Cataris, Ingariconas
(Arequipa: Instituto de Estudios Pukara, 2009), 27–50.
14. “Relación histórica de los sucesos,” 317.
15. Ibid.; Ramos Zambrano, Tupamarus, Vilcapazas, 53–55.
16. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, del Valle to Gálvez, June 26, 1781.
17. Ibid.
18. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1039, January 2, 1781, from don Vicente Oré, corregidor
de Lampa.
19. ADC, Vega Centeno Collection, bolsa 3, number 35, 1783, “Criminal Pedro
Quispe Indio de Paucartambo.”
20. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, del Valle to Gálvez, June 26, 1781. See AGI, Cuzco,
Leg. 63, from June 6, 1781, Cuellar to del Valle. Also in August 8, 1781,
letter in Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:92.
21. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:91; see also AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63, letter
from del Valle to Gálvez, July 18, 1781.
22. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63. This letter is dated September 28, 1781, when del
Valle is attempting to justify his failure, but the details ring true.
23. Ibid.
24. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Manuel de Castilla to Areche, April 28, 1781.
25. Alicia Poderti, Palabra e historia en los Andes: La rebelión del Inca Túpac Amaru
y el noroeste argentino (Buenos Aires: Corregidor, 1997), 41– 67; Boleslao
Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 3rd ed. (Buenos Aires: SELA, 1967),
573– 611 on Argentina and 538– 687 for the rebellion’s repercussions in
other areas in Spanish America.
26. John Phelan, The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia,
1781 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Horacio Rodríguez

Authenticated
Plata, “Tupac Amaru y los comuneros de Socorro,” Correo de los andes 2, 5

(Bogotá, 1980): 25–32; on the spread to what became Venezuela, see Jorge
Guillermo Llosa, “Bicentenario de la rebelión de Túpac Amaru,” Academia
Nacional de la Historia 64 (1981): 303–308.
27. William B. Taylor, Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Vil-
lages (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1979), 120.
28. Jacobsen, Mirage, 107–148, on the multiple challenges to the wool econ-
omy in the altiplano.
29. Orellana, “Relación del cacique de Puno,” in Documentos para la historia de
la sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac-Amaru, Cacique de la provincia de Tinta
en el Perú, ed. Pedro de Angelis (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836),
80– 81; Augusto Ramos Zambrano, Puno en la rebelión de Túpac Amaru
(Puno: Universidad Nacional Técnica del Altiplano, 1982), 213–214.
30. Orellana, “Relación del cacique,” 80– 85; Ramos Zambrano, Puno, 152–162;
María Eugenia del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Túpac Catari, 1781–
1782 (La Paz: Don Bosco, 1990), 46–51.
31. Orellana, “Relación del cacique,” 86– 87.
32. Ibid., 87.
33. Ibid., 92; parts of this account, by Orellana, are also found in Melchor de
Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:423– 426.
34. Orellana, “Relación del cacique,” 91– 98.
35. Letter from Jáuregui to King Charles III, May 20, 1781, quoted in Zudaire,
Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 259.
36. Ibid.
37. Orellana, “Relación del cacique,” 99–100.
38. Ibid., 100.
39. Del Valle, May 25, 1781, in Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:458– 460.
40. I build from the detailed account in AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, José Lagos to
Areche, Santa Rosa, May 25, 1781.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Orellana, “Relación del cacique,” 100. Lagos himself continued to criticize
the junta’s decision. In a June letter to Areche, he claimed that the king-
dom was in worse shape than before the capture of Tupac Amaru. AGI,
Lima, Leg. 1040, Lagos to Areche, June 18, 1781.
44. Orellana, “Relación del cacique,” 101.
45. Ibid., 102.
46. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Jáuregui to Gálvez, August 4, 1781, citing del Valle’s
July 4 letter.
47. Alejandro Seraylán Leiva, Historia general del ejército Peruano, III, 2, “Campa-
ñas militares durante la dominación española” (Lima: Comisión Perman-
ente de Historia del Ejército del Perú, 1981), 736; the quote is from a Sep-
tember 28, 1781, letter from del Valle to José de Gálvez, also in AGI, Cuzco,
Leg. 63.

Authenticated
48. Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru el revolucionario (Lima: Moncloa–

Campodónico, 1970), 138–139.
49. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Jáuregui to Gálvez, August 4, 1781, citing del Valle’s
July 4 letter.
50. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, del Valle to Jáuregui, dated July 12, 1781; for an-
other version of the same quote, see AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Jáuregui to
Gálvez, August 4, 1781, citing del Valle’s July 4 letter.
51. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, Areche to Jáuregui, June 29, 1781.
52. Ibid.
53. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, letter from del Valle to Jáuregui, July 12, 1781. On
the term, see Walter Laqueur, “The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine,” Journal
of Contemporary History 10 (July 1975): 341–382.
54. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, del Valle to Viceroy Jáuregui, July 12, 1781.
55. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from May 29, 1782. On del Valle’s death, Zu-
daire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 467. I assume that Gaceta refers to the Gaceta
de Madrid; I am not sure about the Cádiz periodical.
56. These letters are found in several legajos in Seville. For a summary, see
Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 262–267, who lists the Areche correspon-
dence, brimming with conspiratorial excess.
57. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 1:386–388, anonymous quote from 386.
58. Diego Cristóbal to Fray Miguel Morán, Azángaro, August 19, 1781. Lilly
Library, Indiana University.
59. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1044, “Relación de los sucesos,” June 25, 1781. Also found
in AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 63.
60. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1044, “Relación de los sucesos.”
61. Letter from the priest José Eustaquio Caravedo, quoted in Lewin, La re-
belión de Túpac Amaru, 290.
62. Ibid.
63. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 329–330, highlights the more critical ver-
sions; Lewin the less critical; see La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 491– 492.
10. The Pardon and the Cease-Fire
1. For one version, see Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Compara-
tive Study of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1979).
levación de Tupac Amaru. Crónica de Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis Antonio Egu-
guren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 2:164, letter from don Juan Bautista de
Zavala, November 3, 1781. English translation in Ward Stavig and Ella
Schmidt, eds., The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions: An Anthology of
Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing, 2008), 231–234.

Authenticated
4. María Eugenia del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 1781–
1782 (La Paz: Don Bosco, 1990), 5–7.
5. Del Valle de Siles documents these tensions well. See del Valle de Siles,
Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 24–31. See also Sergio Serulnikov,
Revolution in the Andes: The Age of Túpac Amaru (Durham, N.C.: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2013), 154–158. On Andrés Tupac Amaru and Gregoria
Apaza, including some love letters, see Teodosio Imaña Castro, “De lo pa-
sional en la vida de los caudillos indígenas de 1780,” Historia y Cultura 1
(1973, La Paz): 125–142.
6. Serulnikov, Revolution in the Andes, 156; the quotes are from an anonymous
account translated in Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista
Rebellions, 235–237 (with slight modification).
7. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 235–237. See
also del Valle de Siles, Historia de la rebelión de Tupac Catari, 267–280. Other
accounts include Sebastián Segurola’s diary, “Diario de los sucesos del
cerco de la ciudad de La Paz en 1781,” in Colección de documentos relativos a la
historia de Bolivia, 2nd ed., ed. Vicente Ballivián y Rojas (La Paz: Munici-
palidad de la Paz, 1977).
8. Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru (Buenos Aires: SELA, 1967), 521.
9. Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 515–526; del Valle de Siles, Historia de la
rebelión de Túpac Catari, 305–333; Serulnikov, Revolution in the Andes,
157–159.
10. Serulnikov, Revolution in the Andes, 158, uses the term “collapse.”
11. Serulnikov, Revolution in the Andes, 157–159; del Valle de Siles, Historia de la
rebelión de Tupac Catari, 317–329.
12. Death sentence against Tupac Katari in Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac
Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 241–242. Sisa had been captured months
before her husband, in July 1781.
13. “Tratado Celebrado con Miguel Tupac-Amaru,” November 3, 1781, in Doc-
umentos para la historia de la sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac-Amaru, Caci-
que de la provincia de Tinta en el Perú, ed. Pedro de Angelis (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta del Estado, 1836), 130–132; Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáu-
regui (II) virrey interino del Perú (Pamplona, Spain: Diputación Foral de Na-
varra, Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1979), 344–349; Juan José Vega, Tú-
pac Amaru y sus compañeros, 2 vols. (Cuzco: Municipalidad del Qosqo, 1995),
2:447– 449. The fact that Miguel was tried in Buenos Aires rather than
Lima probably saved him from the death penalty. Doubts remain about
whether he was Micaela’s half- or full brother.
14. Jáuregui to Gálvez, December 16, 1782. Cited to AGI, Lima, Leg. 1044, by
Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 339; I found this document in Leg. 1041.
15. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1085; Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, offers a timeline,
309–311.

Authenticated
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 237, 379–380.
19. See Areche’s sharp letter against del Valle. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Areche to
Gálvez, October 16, 1781. Other important documents are found here as
well.
20. See his detailed letter, Areche to Gálvez, October 3, 1781, in which he
called the pardon “exorbitant.” AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040. On this correspon-
dence, see Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 317.
21. CDIP, II, 3, 104–120, “Manifiesto que hace, José del Valle,” September 30,
1781, quote from 119–120.
22. José del Valle to Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru, Cuzco, October 10, 1781.
Transcription found in John Rowe Archive, Spanish American Mss. Box 5,
Yale University Library (Bingham Collection, from F. Pérez de Velasco).
23. Azángaro to del Valle, October 18, 1781, in Melchor de Paz, Guerra separat-
ista, 2:153–154.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 75, letter from Moscoso to Diego Cristóbal, November 3,
1781.
27. Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru to Bishop Moscoso, November 5, 1781, in
Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:167–171, quote on 168.
28. Ibid.; for kuraka letter, see Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 341–342.
29. Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru to Bishop Moscoso, November 5, 1781, in
Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:167–171.
30. Diego Cristóbal Tupac Amaru to Moscoso, Azángaro, January 3, 1782, in
31. Valdez declared that the bishop was the rebel leader’s “life, shadow, asy-
lum, compass, guide, anchor, and pastor.” Letter from don Antonio Valdez
to Bishop Moscoso, Azángaro, January 3, 1781, in Melchor de Paz, Guerra
separatista, 2:172–174, quote from 173.
32. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from Diego Cristóbal to del Valle, December 5,
1781. He complained about the abuses of the Choquehuanca clan.
33. RAH, Colección Mata Linares, Mata Linares to Gálvez, December 1, 1782,
Lima, 75V.
34. See letter from Moscoso to Diego Cristobal, November 17, 1781, Cuzco, in
36. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:155–160, account by Ramón de Arias,
December 11, 1781.
37. Ibid., 157.
38. Ibid. See also Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 355.
40. Zudaire summarizes a variety of documents, Don Agustín de Jáuregui,
350–355.

Authenticated
41. Letter from don Juan Bautista Zavala, La Paz, January 15, 1782, in Melchor
de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:186. He states that Arias was “fooling himself”
in believing that clemency would pacify Indians.
43. Ibid.
44. For the offer of support if he returned to arms, see Zudaire, Don Agustín de
Jáuregui, 362.
45. “Relación de lo acaecido en el rendimiento de Diego Cristóbal Tupac Am-
aro, el que se efectuó a diez del dia 26 de enero de 1782” (Sicuani, January
29, 1782). This document was published in Monumentos literarios del Perú,
colectados por Don Guillermo del Rio, ed. Guillermo del Rio (Lima: Imprenta
de los Huérfanos, 1812). I am using the much-improved transcription by
John Rowe, kindly granted to me by his widow, Pat Lyon.
46. “Relación de lo acaecido.”
47. Jorge Cornejo Bouroncle, Sangre andina: Diez mujeres Cuzqueñas (Cuzco:
H. G. Rozas, 1949), 174–192; Vega, Túpac Amaru y sus compañeros, 2: 413–
416 provides brief biographical sketches.
48. See Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 366. We know little about Condori.
49. “De un vecino del Cuzco a un Ministro de Madrid,” September 1, 1782, in La
verdad desnuda o las dos faces de un obispo, ed. Francisco Loayza (Lima: D. Mi-
randa, 1943), 152–186, quote from 184. See also Leon Campbell, “Rebel or
Royalist? Bishop Juan Manuel de Moscoso y Peralta and the Tupac Amaru
Revolt in Peru, 1780–1784,” Revista de Historia de América 86 (1978): 135–167,
for the context—these were part of a campaign against Bishop Moscoso. Ca-
chuas or Kashwas is the name of a common group dance in Carnival.
51. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:206–207, Bando (edict), February 20,
1782.
11. The Rebellion in Limbo
1. CDIP, II, 3, 240–242, “Bando Publicado en Lima a 20 de febrero.”

2. L. E. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, 1780–1783 (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1966), 370; Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista: Rebeliones de Indios en Sur
América, la sublevación de Tupac Amaru: Crónica de Melchor de Paz, ed. Luis Anto-
nio Eguiguren, 2 vols. (Lima: n.p, 1952), 2:187–190, “Carta que refiere.”
3. Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años de cautiverio (memorias del inka
Juan Bautista Túpac Amaru), ed. Francisco A. Loayza (Lima: D. Miranda,
1945), 29.
4. Ibid., 29–30.
5. Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años.
6. Quoted in Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del
Perú (Pamplona, Spain: Diputación Foral de Navarra, Institución Príncipe
de Viana, 1979), 403, 405.

Authenticated
7. These activities, however, did not indicate that rebels were abandoning the
fight, one that they undertook in the name of the king and Church. AGI,
Lima, Leg. 1041, letters from Salcedo to Moscoso, March 20, 1782, and
February 26, 1782.
8. Ibid.
9. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Salcedo to Moscoso, February 26, 1782.
10. Ibid. It is not clear who took the position.
11. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Valdés to Moscoso, February 26, 1782, Checacupe.
Markham includes Aronis in a list of kurakas loyal to the Crown in the
uprising. Clements R. Markham, Travels in India and Peru (London: John
Murray, 1862), 147.
12. The “Informe Relacionado del Cabildo” incorrectly contends that Diego Cris-
tóbal accompanied del Valle in his campaign to La Paz. CDIP, II, I, 141–142.
13. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from del Valle, March 6, 1782, Sicuani.
14. For example, see AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter by Francisco de Cuellar,
June 22, 1782, Sicuani.
15. Augusto Ramos Zambrano, Tupamaros, Vilcapazas, Catarias, Ingariconas
(Arequipa: Instituto de Estudios Pukara, 2009), 79– 88; Lizandro Luna, El
Puma Indomable: la sublevación indígena de 1780 en Azángaro (Puno: Editorial
Samuel Frisancho Pineda, 1982).
16. Zudaire, Don Agustín Jáuregui, 406.
17. Cited in Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru (Buenos Aires: SELA,
1967), 701–702. More information in AGI, Lima, Leg. 661, esp. letter from
Jáuregui to King Charles III, February 23, 1782.
18. Sebastián Segurola, “Diario de operaciones,” in Melchor de Paz, Guerra
separatista, 2:241–255, quote from 243.
19. Ibid., 244.
20. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 374–376, summarizes this well. For the
Moscoso letter, see 375, from AGI, Lima, Leg. 661. Resistance continued
in the Yungas to the north until August 1782. See Lewin, La rebelión de
Túpac Amaru, 702.
21. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, letter from Diego Cristóbal to Salcedo, November 5,
1782.
dad del Qosqo, 1995), 2:414. He provides no proof.
23. Fisher, The Last Inca Revolt, 373–374; documentation can be found in AGI,
Lima, Leg. 1045.
25. Carlos Daniel Valcárcel, Túpac Amaru, precursor de la independencia (Lima:
UNMSM, 1977), 143–144.
26. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, del Valle to Jáuregui, August 8, 1782; Fisher, The
Last Inca Revolt, 373–374.
27. See Kathryn Burns’s wonderful article on this, “Amor y rebelión en 1782:
El caso de Mariano Tupac Amaru y Mariana Mejia,” Histórica 16 (1992):

Authenticated
131–176. The 1776 law had been modified in the late 1770s. On Salcedo’s
views, see AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, letter from Moscoso to Jáuregui, Septem-
ber 30, 1782; also AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, letter from Avilés to “Exc. Señor,”
October 1, 1782.
28. Burns, “Amor y rebelión,” 152–176, esp. 168–170.
29. Ibid., 144–145. More documentation can be found in AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045,
particularly a letter from Bishop Moscoso to Viceroy Jáuregui, September
30, 1782.
30. Examples includes AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, Avilés to “Ex. Señor,” October 1,
1782. The letters refer to zurrón de plata or leather satchels.
31. Letter from Jáuregui to Areche, March 2, 1781, Lilly Library, Indiana
University.
32. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1091, “Duplicado de los autos,” has extensive documenta-
tion. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 408– 409. In a May 8, 1782, letter to
Bishop Moscoso, Diego Cristóbal refers to the accusations about his hidden
wealth and excessive income. Melchor de Paz, Guerra separatista, 2:237–240.
33. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1040, Areche to Gálvez, October 3, 1781.
34. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Areche to Gálvez, May 29, 1782.
35. Ibid., marginal note dated February 10, 1783. On documents such as these
and how people have read (and scribbled on) them, see Kathryn Burns,
Into the Archive: Writing and Power in Colonial Peru (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 2010).
36. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041. These are marginal comments to a letter from Jáu-
regui to Gálvez, March 23, 1782, the comments dated February 27, 1783.
calumnia (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional, in press), 67.
38. Ibid., 60– 67.
39. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, Moscoso to Jáuregui, July 16, 1782, Urubamba. Here
Moscoso mentions the complaints by Andrés about Franciscan friars who
were overcharging Indians. The Franciscans discounted the complaints,
contending that their work was more necessary than ever. Del Valle chimed
in that he thought “separation by force” would be counterproductive be-
cause it might lead people, that is, Indians, to believe that the amnesty and
thus the cease-fi re was over. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, letter from Moscoso to
Jáuregui, July 16, 1782; del Valle to Jáuregui, August 20, 1782.
40. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, Salcedo to Jáuregui, July 28, 1782.
41. Although Areche learned of the change in a February 1782 letter and
handed over the position to Escobedo in June 1782, he remained in Peru
until March 1783. For short biographies of Areche and Escobedo, see John
R. Fisher, Bourbon Peru 1750–1824 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press,
2003), 162–166.
42. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, letter from Avilés to Jáuregui, May 23, 1782. Tupac
was often spelled Tupa and Amaru alternated with Amaro.
43. Ibid., letter from Baulen to Jáuregui, October 20, 1782.

Authenticated
44. Ibid., letter from Baulen to Jáuregui, October 1, 1782.

45. Ibid., letter from Bishop de Campos to Jáuregui, June 11, 1782, La Paz.
46. Ibid., letter from Luis Orós to General don Raimundo Necochea, Septem-
ber 27, 1782.
47. Ibid., letter from Gabriel Avilés to Viceroy Jáuregui, September 8, 1782.
48. Ibid., letter from Avilés to Jáuregui, December 28, 1782. The incident oc-
curred earlier.
49. Cited in Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 406– 407, from August 31,
1782.
50. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, testimony by Necochea, July 22, 1782, Catca.
51. Ibid. This report came from Necochea’s assistant Dr. Don Feliciano
Masías.
52. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, Necochea, July 22, 1782, Catca. For more, see Mata
Linares, “Informe de Mata Linares a Gálvez sobre los delitos de Diego y
Mariano Tupac Amaru, Andrés Mendigure y algunos de sus secuaces,”
May 31, 1783, Cuzco. RAH, Colección Mata Linares, #1585.
53. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, document from September 6, 1782, apparently from
Necochea.
54. Ibid., testimony of Fernando Iguilus, Urcos, 1782, n.d.
55. Ibid., testimony of Felipe Mendoza. Mendoza could not sign his name, a
sign that he was certainly among the lower ranks of Spaniards.
56. Ibid., testimony of Esteban Grados.
57. Ibid., letter from Avilés to Viceroy Jáuregui, Cuzco, September 8, 1782.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., testimony of Esteban Torres.
60. Ibid., testimony of Miguel de Zegarra, who had been Quispe’s secretary.
61. Ibid., testimony of Francisco Laime, indio regidor of Muñacpata, June 15,
1782.
62. For example, the new Visitador and Superintendent of the Royal Treasury,
Jorge Escobedo y Alarcón, questioned Diego Cristóbal’s sincerity in early
September 1782. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 408.
63. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, Avilés to Jáuregui, December 20, 1782.
64. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, testimony of Don Andrés Navarro.
65. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, Jáuregui to Gálvez, December 16, 1783.
66. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, “Expediente sobre las asignaciones.”
67. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, testimony of Vicente Ninavilca.
68. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, testimony of Lorenzo Condori, who saw Guaygua’s
head exhibited on a pike in Ocongate.
69. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, testimony of Necochea, January 30, 1783; Matías
Arce, a Spaniard from Marcapata; and Felipe Monsón, a Spaniard, who
mentions the sash.
70. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045. In the trial they reviewed the papers found in
Simón Condori’s pockets. One document was dated May 3, 1781; this
seemed legitimate. The others were from 1782, after the cease-fi re.

Authenticated
71. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, testimony of Lorenzo Condori, Ocongate, February
15, 1783.
72. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, testimony of Mariano Tupac Amaru.
12. Ordered by the Catholic King
1. These documents are reviewed in Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui

(II), virrey interino del Perú (Pamplona, Spain: Diputación Foral de Navarra,
Institución Príncipe de Viana, 1979), 413– 416.
2. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 416. For a summary of the viceroy’s ac-
tions, see his May 5, 1783, letter to Gálvez, in Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru,
Cuarenta años de cautiverio (memorias del inka Juan Bautista Túpac Amaru), ed.
Francisco A. Loayza (Lima: Imp. D. Miranda, 1945), 112–115.
3. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1045, Mata Linares to José de Gálvez, May 31, 1783. He
summarizes the different charges and the benefits of ridding Peru of the
Tupac Amaru.
5. See CDIP, II, 1, “Informe Relacionado del Cabildo,” esp. 144–147.
6. For the list, see Ward Stavig and Ella Schmidt, eds., The Tupac Amaru and
Catarista Rebellions: An Anthology of Sources (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub-
lishing, 2008), 136–138; Pedro de Angelis, ed., Documentos para la historia
de la sublevación de José Gabriel de Tupac-Amaru Cacique de la Provincia de
Tinta, en el Perú (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1836), 176–178.
7. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1096, letter from Escobedo to Gálvez, April 16, 1783.
8. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 424. See also Boleslao Lewin, La rebelión
de Túpac Amaru (Buenos Aires: SELA, 1967), 708, who condemns the trial
as a charade.
9. CDIP, II, 1, 142–144, “Informe Relacionado del Cabildo,” is one summary.
10. Eulogio Zudaire provides the most detailed account of this period and he
passionately defends Mata Linares and others. Most historians censure
them.
11. Sentence in Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions,
161–164. Trial in AGI, Lima, Leg. 1046. The appeal by Diego Cristóbal’s
lawyer is found in CDIP, II, IV, 222–224. Sebastián Medina y Arenas, Pro-
tector de Naturales, argued that the punishment was too cruel and that
Diego Cristóbal was not of sound mind. He also requested that Marcela
Castro have her tongue cut after her death, not before. His appeal was re-
jected and he was fi ned 100 pesos. On Moscoso and Salcedo, see Zudaire,
Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 436– 437.
12. De Angelis, Documentos, 188.
13. Their trial can be found in ADC, Colección Vega Centeno, bolsa 4, July 17,
1783. See also de Angelis, Documentos, 184–187 and 188–191.
14. I have used the sentence as well as the summary of the execution by
Agustín Chacón y Becerra. De Angelis, Documentos, 184–187, 188–191. The

Authenticated
sentence in English can be found in Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru
and Catarista Rebellions, 161–164.
15. Stavig and Schmidt, The Tupac Amaru and Catarista Rebellions, 162–164.
16. De Angelis, Documentos, 184–187, 188–191.
17. AGI, Charcas, Leg. 598, letter from Avilés and Mata Linares to Jáuregui,
August 1, 1783.
18. Zudaire summarizes these events and the flurry of orders and reports that
crossed the Andes and the Atlantic Ocean in Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 439–
441. The real orden can be found in AGI, Lima, Leg. 666.
19. Cited in Núria Sala i Vila, “La rebelión de Huarochirí de 1783,” Entre la
retórica y la insurgencia, ed. Charles Walker (Cuzco: CBC, 1995), 273–308,
quote from 281.
20. Sala i Vila, “La rebelión,” 295. On the Paititi, see Alberto Flores Galindo, In
Search of an Inca: Utopia and Identity in the Andes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 32–36, 49–52.
21. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 430– 434. Sentence in CDIP, II, 3, 402.
22. RAH, Mata Linares Collection, documents collected March 4, 1784, letter
from March 1783.
23. CDIP, II, 3, 385, Mata Linares to Necochea, May 14, 1783. Necochea an-
swered two days later from Urcos, showing the speed of communications.
24. CDIP, II, 3, 386–389, Mata Linares to Jáuregui, May 31, 1783.
25. Zudaire presents this as a sign of his humanity. Zudaire, Don Agustín de
Jáuregui, 428. Mata Linares and other authorities knew that imprisoning
hundreds of indigenous people and others accused of being accomplices
would be impractical and unproductive. I do not believe that this makes it
a humane decision.
26. Six people had been executed on July 19; the seventh person sentenced,
Isidro Aguirre, had died in jail. Philippe Seiler, “Response to Rebellion in
Bourbon Spain: Colonial Revolt and Imperial Reactions, 1763–1783” (PhD
diss., Tulane University, 1995), 246–248. Seiler builds on data provided by
Scarlett O’Phelan Godoy in Un siglo de rebeliones anticoloniales: Perú y Bolivia
1700–1783 (Cuzco: CBC, 1988), 308–320. See CDIP, II, 3, 393, for a list of
those sent to Lima.
27. Loayza provides the breakdown of the ages; Zudaire differs and also argues
that only six were chained. See Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 128–130;
Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 444– 445.
28. Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 36.
29. Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 32–37. Loayza uses the expression “via cru-
cis” in his summary of the trip, 111–140.
30. CDIP, II, 3, 396, Commander Jacinto Iriarte, November 5, 1783, Camino
Real.
31. Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 131–132, letter from Capellán Pablo Lopes to
Viceroy Jáuregui, November 4, 1783.

Authenticated
32. CDIP, II, 3, 398– 401, letters from Jacinto Iriarte to Viceroy Jáuregui, No-
vember 12, 1783, Ica, and November 28, 1783, Lima.
33. CDIP, II, 3, 425– 427, letter from Viceroy Jáuregui to Gálvez, April 1,
1784, Lima. For the sentence see AGI, Lima, Leg. 1046, Testimonio del
Cuaderno, 9.
34. “San Pedro de Alcantara,” www.abc.se/~pa/mar/spa.htm (accessed
5/10/11).
35. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 466. For a list of passengers, see CDIP, II,
3, 427– 428.
36. For two lists, see CDIP, II, 3, 464– 467.
37. Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 40– 43.
38. CDIP, II, 3, 464– 466, “Relación de los Pasageros,” February 25, 1785; Tu-
pac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 148–149.
39. Lewin, La rebelión de Túpac Amaru, 712. His figures are from Juan Bautista
Tupac Amaru.
40. Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 43– 49.
41. “El hundimiento de San Pedro Alcántara,” www.todoababor.es/datos_do-
cum/hundimiento-sanpedro.htm (accessed 1/6/12).
42. CDIP, II, 3, 460– 466, has a variety of documents about the chaotic arrival
in Spain and the confusion after the shipwreck.
43. “San Pedro de Alcantara,” www.abc.se/~pa/mar/spa.htm.
44. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1049, September 7, 1787, petition from Castillo de Santa
Catalina. Reprinted in Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 78–79.
45. CDIP, II, 3, 495, document from July 29, 1792, Madrid. See also docu-
ments in AGI, Charcas, Leg. 597, request from Miguel Tupac Amaru,
Cádiz. Unfairly and even viciously, Zudaire claims that he died of hypo-
chondria. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 449.
46. Tupac Amaru, Cuarenta años, 50.
47. Ibid., 50–56.
48. Ibid., 56– 60.
49. Bartolomé Mitre, Historia de Belgrano y de la Independencia Argentina, 3 vols.
(Buenos Aires: F. Lajouane, 1887), 2:420– 424.
50. More needs to be known about Juan Bautista’s long life. See Eduardo
Astesano, Juan Bautista de América: El Rey Inca de Manuel Belgrano (Buenos
Aires: Ediciones Castañeda, 1979); Alfredo Varela, Memorias del hermano
de Túpac Amaru escritas en Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Editorial Boeda,
1976).
1780–1835 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), 59– 61.
52. Ibid.
53. RAH, Colección Mata Linares, #1593, May 31, 1783.
54. On late colonial ideologues and their views on Indians, see Pablo Macera,
Trabajos de historia, 4 vols. (Lima: Instituto Nacional de Historia, 1977). Also

Authenticated
important are David T. Garrett, Shadows of Empire: The Indian Nobility of Cuzco,
1750–1825 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Alcira Dueñas,
Indians and Mestizo in the “Lettered City:” Reshaping Justice, Social Hierarchy, and
Political Culture in Colonial Peru (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2010).
55. Clements R. Markham, A History of Peru (Chicago: Charles H. Sergel and
Company, 1892), 205. Quechua can be spelled different ways.
56. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1041, letter from Jáuregui to Gálvez, June 20, 1781; more
is found in AGI Lima, Leg. 1046. For a good overview, see David Cahill,
“El visitador general Areche y su campaña iconoclasta contra la cultura
andina,” in Visión y símbolos: Del Virreinato criollo a la república peruana, ed.
Ramón Mujica Pinilla (Lima: Banco de Crédito, 2006), 85–111.
57. For the history of Quechua debates in eighteenth century, see Bruce
Mannheim, The Language of the Inka since the European Invasion (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1991); Kenneth Andrien, “The Bourbon Re-
forms,” and Adrian J. Pearce, “Reindigenization and Native Languages,” in
History and Language in the Andes, ed. Paul Heggarty and Adrian J. Pearce
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 113–133, 135–162, as well as other
essays in this important collection.
58. Eunice Joiner Gates, “Don José Antonio de Areche: His Own Defense,”
HAHR 8, 1 (1928): 14– 42; for a biographical synopsis see John R. Fisher,
Bourbon Peru, 1750–1824 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2003),
162–163.
59. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 29, Antonio Samper to Sr. Marqués Caballero, 1807.
60. RAH, Mata Linares, #1606, informe de Mata Linares, June 30, 1781.
61. Ibid.
62. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 29, Mata Linares to Jáuregui, June 30, 1783.
63. AGI, Lima, Legs. 1055 and 1056; Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 453– 455.
There is one mention of the friendship with Palacios in CDBRETA, I, 526,
testimony from don Esteban Zuñiga.
64. David Cahill, “A Liminal Nobility: The Incas in the Middle Ground of Late
Colonial Peru,” in New World, First Nations, ed. David Cahill and Blanca
Tovías (Brighton, United Kingdom: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 169–
195, quote from 181.
65. I am relying on the excellent article by Cora Bunster and Ana María Lo-
randi, “El fantasma del criollismo después de la rebelión de Túpac Amaru,”
Histórica 30, 1 (2006): 99–135. The key information can be found in AGI,
Cuzco, Leg. 29. See also Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 450– 457; David
Cahill, “Repartos ilícitos, y familias principales en el sur andino: 1780–
1824,” Revista de Indias 182– 83 (1988): 453– 455, and Cahill, “A Liminal
Nobility,” 179–182, for information on the family itself.
66. Lorandi and Bunster, “El fantasma del criollismo,” 113.
67. Summarized nicely in Ana María Lorandi, “Sospechas de sospechas, de
sospechas: memorial de un militar ilustrado a fi nales del siglo XVIII,”
Fronteras de la historia 14, 1 (2009): 128–148, which analyzes the document

Authenticated
produced by Juan Manuel Fernández Campero, a Ugarte brother-in-law,

about their case.
68. Lorandi and Bunster, “El fantasma del criollismo.” See also Lorandi, “Sos-
pechas de sospechas”; Cahill, “A Liminal Nobility.”
calumnia (Lima: Biblioteca Nacional, in press).
70. CDBRETA, 1, 545–569, quote from 545. This includes key sections from
AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 74. The verdad desnuda was not published until 1943 but
could be found in Spanish archives. CDIP, II, 1, 459– 650; Francisco
Loayza, La verdad desnuda o dos faces de un obispo (Lima: D. Miranda, 1943).
Here the author appears as “Un imparcial religioso,” but it was clearly by
Eusebio Balsa de Berganza.
71. Gustavo Bacacorzo, Don Juan Manuel de Moscoso y Peralta (Lima: UNMSM,
1982), 72–77; Zudaire has a different view on Moscoso and the Madrid
court. Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui, 489– 490; Charles Walker,
“Prólogo,” in Mosoco y Peralta, Inocencia justificada.
72. CDBRETA, II, “Descargos del Obispo del Cuzco Juan Manuel Moscoso y
Peralta,” which is from AGI, Cuzco, Legs. 77 and 78.
73. For more on Moscoso, see Walker, “Prólogo.” Spanish fascists executed the
poet Federico García Lorca in Viznar in 1936.
74. Moscoso y Peralta, Inocencia justificada, 89. This is testimony from Dr. D.
Manuel de Mendieta, Déan de la Santa Iglesia del Cuzco.
Conclusion
1. AGI, Lima, Leg. 1088, letter from Moscoso to Jáuregui, June 8, 1782.
2. RAH, Mata Linares Collection, #1571, Carta de Mata Linares a Gálvez,
sobre la expedición al Cuzco para someter a Tupac Amaru, January 18,
1781, Huamanga.
3. The literature on change in the late eighteenth century is vast. For a sharp
overview, see Gabriel Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform in
Spain and its Empire, 1759–1808 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
4. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 65, letter to Sr. Intendente Conde Ruiz de Castilla, June
28, 1798.
5. AGI, Cuzco, Leg. 29, Moscoso to Areche, April 13, 1781.
6. See the detailed explanation by Juan Carlos Estenssoro, “La plástica colonial
y sus relaciones con la gran rebelión,” Revista Andina, 9, 2 (1991): 415– 439.
7. I thank Professor Tom Cummins for alerting me to this and sharing images.
1780–1835 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999), 72–77.
9. Cited in Eulogio Zudaire, Don Agustín de Jáuregui (II) virrey interino del Perú
(Pamplona, Spain: Diputación Foral de Navarra, Institución Príncipe de
Viana, 1979), 441.

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10. This is based on Walker, Smoldering Ashes.

11. Heraclio Bonilla and Karen Spalding, “La independencia en el Perú: las
palabras y los hechos,” in La independencia en el Perú (Lima: IEP, 1981)
(originally published 1972), 70–114.
12. This has been a leading issue in Andean studies in recent years. Among
numerous monographs in English, see Florencia Mallon, Peasant and Na-
tion: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1995); Cecilia Méndez Gastelumendi, The Plebeian Republic:
The Huanta Rebellion and the Making of the Peruvian State, 1820–1850 (Dur-
ham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2005); Mark Thurner, From Two Repub-
lics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial Nation-making in Andean Peru
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1996).
Creoles did not turn their back completely on the Andean past. In an
important survey of the image of the Inca, 1780–1900, Natalia Majluf un-
derlines creoles’ appropriation of Incanism. She shows the fascination
with Inca music and history in the fi nal colonial decades in Lima and be-
yond, thus demonstrating the short shelf life of Areche and Mata Linares’s
anti-Andean measures. At least in symbolic or historic terms, the gap be-
tween the Andes and the coast was not insurmountable. Natalia Majluf,
“De la rebelión al museo: Genealogías y retratos de los incas, 1781–1900,”
in Los incas, reyes del Perú, ed. Natalia Majluf (Lima: Banco de Crédito,
2005), 252–319. See also Núria Sala i Vila, “De Inca a indígena: Cambio en
la simbología del sol a principios del siglo XIX,” Allpanchis 35–36, no. 2
(1991); Rebecca Earle, The Return of the Native: Indians and Myth-Making in
Spanish America, 1810–1930 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2007).
13. A point made and probably exaggerated by Bonilla and Spalding, “La inde-
pendencia en el Perú,” 97.
14. Curiously, Incanism was much stronger in Rio de la Plata-Argentina, where
some independence leaders sought to name an Inca as monarch and, as
seen, received Juan Bautista Tupac Amaru. This is curious because the Inca
Empire barely spilled into what became northwestern Argentina. Late co-
lonial Incanism in Peru was comparatively muted, even subterranean. Ma-
jluf, “De la rebelión al museo”; Jesús Díaz Caballero, “Incaismo as the First
Guiding Fiction in the Emergence of the Creole Nation in the United Prov-
inces of Río de la Plata,” Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, 17, 1
(2008): 1–22.
15. José Baquíjano y Carrillo, “Plan del estado de las provincias de América,”
La causa de la emancipación del Perú (Lima: Instituto Riva-Agüero, 1960),
174–206.
16. On the all-important 1814 rebellion, see Luis Miguel Glave, “A Historical
and Cultural Perspective on the 1814 Revolution in Cuzco,” in New Worlds,
New Nations: Native Peoples of Mesoamerica and the Andes Under Colonial Rule,
ed. David Cahill and Blanca Tovías (Brighton, United Kingdom: Sussex
Academic Press, 2006), 196–217.

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17. By this I mean they tempered their criticism and demands, but certainly
did not recede into an apolitical cave. As recent waves of historiography
have shown, indigenous voices ripple through the archives— but as errant
taxpayers, troublemakers, or victims and rarely as three-dimensional
subjects.
18. CDBRETA, V, III, “Informe,” November 3, 1783, Madrid, 613– 614.
19. CDBRETA, V, III, “Conclusiones a las que llegó en Madrid la Junta de
Ministros sobre sentencias por la rebelión y otras,” 635.
20. Gregorio Funes, Ensayo de la historia civil de Buenos Aires, Tucumán y Para-
guay, 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires, Calle del Perú 171, 1856), 2:229–230.
21. Antonio Ferrer del Rio, Historia del reinado de Carlos III en España (Madrid:
Imprenta Matute, 1856), vol. 3, chap. 5; Miguel Lobo, Historia general de las
antiguas colonias hispano-americanas desde su descubrimiento hasta el año mil
ochocientos ocho (Madrid: M. Guijarro, 1875), vol. 3. See also Jean P. Clem-
ent, “La opinión de la corona española sobre la rebelión de Túpac Amaru,”
Acta Litteraria Academiae Scientarum Hungaricae 23 (1981): 325–335.
22. Scholars disagree about whether the leader of this massive slave revolution
was referring to the Incan Empire (some thought that the indigenous
people of Hispaniola, the Taino, descended from the Incas) or the Cuzco
rebels. Jean Fouchard, “Pourquoi Haiti? Ou quand et par qui fut choisi de
redonner a notre patrie le nom Indien d’Haiti?” Revue de la Societe Haitienne
D’Histoire et de Geographie 42, 145 (1984): 13–17 (the link to Peru is dis-
cussed at 14); Laurent Dubois, “Avenging America: The Politics of Violence
in the Haitian Revolution,” in The World of the Haitian Revolution, ed. David
Geggus and Norman Fiering (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press,
2009), 122. David Geggus is skeptical; see his Haitian Revolutionary Studies
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 214.
23. Luis Camnitzer, On Art, Artists, Latin America, and Other Utopias, ed. Rachel
Weiss (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2009), 73.
24. AGI, Estado, Leg. 65, no. 1, letter of June 4, 1790, to Governador de Guyana.
25. Antonio Cisneros, Postales para Lima (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Colihue,
2001), 35 (my translation).
26. The Tupamaros had three sources for the name: Tupac Amaru II; Uru-
guayan gauchos who fought the Spanish in the early nineteenth century
and assumed the name Tupamaros; and a popu lar song by a 1960s Uru-
guayan folk group, the Olimareños. Camnitzer, On Art, 73.
27. Tayannah Lee McQillar and Fred Johnson III, Tupac Shakur: The Life and
Times of an American Icon (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 2010), 33–34;
Jasmine Guy, Afeni Skakur: Evolution of a Revolutionary (New York: Atria
Books, 2005).
28. Jeremy Prestholdt, “The Afterlives of 2Pac: Imagery and alienation in Si-
erra Leone and Beyond,” Journal of African Cultural Studies 21, 2 (2007):
197–218; the quote is from 197, fi rst paragraph. I also learned from Lindon
Barrett, “Dead Men Printed: Tupac Shakur, Biggie Small, and Hip-Hop

Authenticated
Eulogy,” Callaloo 22, 2 (Spring, 1999): 306–332. The literature on Tupac

Shakur is massive; I found these two particularly insightful on his legacy.
29. For a strong overview of Velasco’s use of Tupac Amaru, see Leopoldo Li-
tuma Agüero, El verdadero rostro de Túpac Amaru (Perú, 1969–1975) (Lima:
UNMSM, 2011); see 54–55 for the invented slogan.
30. Lituma Agüero, El verdadero rostro, and Anna Cant, “ ‘Land for Those Who
Work It’: A Visual Analysis of Agrarian Reform Posters in Velasco’s Peru,”
Journal of Latin American Studies 44, 1 (2012): 1–37. Reflecting the interest
in the 1960s and 1970s in peasant insurgencies and anticolonialism, histo-
rians used these newly available sources and began to publish widely on
the uprising. They debated whether Tupac Amaru was truly a precursor of
independence or had a vastly different project, and also inserted him into
the leftist debates of the era, asking whether he was a “reformist” or
“revolutionary.”
31. This book has highlighted this irony: while the city’s energetic defense
against his siege preceded his downfall, Tupac Amaru has become a favor-
ite son of the city of Cuzco, one of its preferred symbols. For a fascinating
history of the monuments and the incessant debate, see Helaine Silver-
man, “The Space of Heroism in the Historic Center of Cuzco,” in On Loca-
tion: Heritage Cities and Sites, ed. D. Fairchild Ruggles (New York: Springer,
2012), 89–112. See also José Tamayo Herrera, “La historia del monumento
a Túpac Amaru” (Lima: CNBRETA, 1980).
32. The poetry is far superior to the prose. See poems by José María Arguedas,
Pablo Neruda, Alejandro Romualdo, and Antonio Cisneros, to name a few;
I have not fi nished any of the several novels about the uprising. The 1984
Cuban-Peruvian fi lm Tupac Amaru is entertaining.
33. Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004);
Geggus and Fiering, The World of the Haitian Revolution; Ada Ferrer, “Haiti,
Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic,” American Histori-
cal Review 117, 1 (2012): 40– 66.
34. Cited in Alberto Gálvez Olaechea, Desde el país de las sombras: Escrito en la
prisión (SUR, Casa de Estudios del Socialismo, 2009), 62– 63. Originally
from Juan Granda, Los pequeños zorros: relatos de niños ayacuchanos (Lima:
Radda Barnen, 1990).

Authenticated
Acknowledgments
Arnie Bauer and Andrés Reséndez read this book chapter by chapter, improving
my arguments and writing. Carlos Aguirre, Kathryn Burns, Mark Carey, Peter
Guardino, Ari Kelman, and Kathy Olmsted provided thoughtful feedback.
Antonio Acosta, María José Fitz, and Luis Miguel Glave brightened research in
Seville, while Marta Irurozqui and Víctor Peralta guided me in Madrid. In Peru,
I always count on Iván Hinojosa, and I also want to mention the support of
Donato Amado, Ruth Borja, Marco Curatola, Javier Flores Espinoza, Pedro
Guibovich, Margareth Najarro, Lucho Nieto, Ramón Mujica, Scarlett O’Phelan
Godoy, Aldo Panfichi, and Claudia Rosas. I want to extend a special note of
gratitude to Patricia Lyon. Just after I embarked on the project, she called to
invite me to review the late John Rowe’s library. I found treasures there and
also learned a great deal in my conversations with Pat.
I have presented sections of this book in numerous places. Special thanks for
their suggestions to John Coatsworth, Jeremy Adelman, Michael Laffan, Marga-
ret Chowning, Víctor Maqque, Karen Graubart, Shane Greene, Tom Cummins,
Gary Urton, Christian Fernández Palacios, Michael Gonzales, Kristin Huffi ne,
Dain Borges, Emilio Kouri, Fernando Purcell, Pablo Whipple, Cristian Castro,
Paulo Drinot, Anne More, Ivonne del Valle, and Barbara Fuchs. Bruce Castle-
man, Carolyn Dean, Ramiro Flores, Stella Nair, Margaret Sankey, David Sil-
bey, Stefano Varese, Janett Vengoa, and Adam Warren answered random ques-
tions on topics ranging from Ceuta to total war. I’ve had wonderful students in
Davis, including my summer class in Cuzco. I particularly want to thank Mark
Dries, Griselda Jarquin, Jeremy Mikecz, Elizabeth Montañez Sanabria, and
José Ragas for their research assistance. In Davis, my pelotón keeps me sane—
thanks Ari, Pablo, Simon, and Tim for the rides and much more.
Zoila Mendoza is my in-house Cuzco consultant and daily inspiration. She
and my children, María and Sammy, joined me in Sevilla for six months in
2007 and have followed this book with patience and even love. They are my
world. My mother passed away while I was writing the book. I think she would
have liked it. John, Mary, and Maggie are always supportive and helped in

Authenticated
340 Acknowledgments
numerous ways. While in Lima I count on the Mendoza clan. Abrazos to doña
Zoila, Miguel, Chachi, Martha, Pocha, Chicho, Uba, Kelly, and my wonderful
nieces and nephews. I also want to mention the late Lucrecia Moeremans, mi
mamá tucumana, who meant so much to me.
Kathleen McDermott and Andrew Kinney gracefully guided me through
the editing process at Harvard University Press while Pamela Nelson oversaw
production and James Cappio did a masterful job at copyediting. I want to
thank the two anonymous reviewers for their thorough reports. It was a plea-
sure working with Isabelle Lewis on the maps; Christina Acosta did another
fi ne job on the index. In my search for images, numerous people came to my
aid, including Carlos Aguirre, Nino Bariola, Tom Cummins, Luis Miguel Glave,
Natalia Majluf, José Ragas, Pilar Ríos and TJ Rushing. Antonio Cisneros’s poem
“Tupac Amaru Relegated” is from Postales para Lima (Buenos Aires: Ediciones
Colihue, 2001), p. 35. The translation is my own.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the four late historians to whom I am dedi-
cating this book, all wonderful people and inspiring scholars: Alberto Flores
Galindo, Friedrich Katz, Enrique Tandeter, and my beloved suegro, don Edu-
ardo Mendoza Meléndez (1911–2013).

Authenticated
Index
Abancay, 20, 87, 103, 105, 132, 271 replacement of, 232, 256; sentencing of
Acomayo, 71, 100, 128, 137 Tupac Amaru, 162, 166, 207
Acora, 102, 172, 176, 191 Areta, Antonio, 74
Acos, 70, 78, 100, 101 Arias, Ramón, 210, 212–214, 224, 226
Acuña, José, 155, 193, 194 Arriaga, Antonio de, 1–5, 16, 34–37, 48,
Afro-Peruvian slaves, 49–51 57– 64, 69, 82– 85, 125, 160, 165;
alcabala, 4, 25, 48, 87, 125 capture of, 60, 81; excommunication
Alvarez y Nava, don Joseph, 44– 45 of, 37; execution of, 1–17, 27, 34–37,
Amaru-Katarista alliance, 169, 209 40, 41, 49, 51, 60, 63, 64, 66, 81– 83, 88,
American Revolutionary War, 16, 250, 145–147, 160, 162, 263–264
277 Asillo, 127, 186, 211
Andes, 3– 6, 9, 14, 16–17, 18–39, 65, Ausangate, 110, 241, 246
88– 89, 109, 130, 132, 138, 148, 163, Avilés, Gabriel de, 88– 89, 192–194, 221,
180, 183–184, 208, 259, 264; Catholic 232, 235, 237–240, 243, 247, 249;
church in, 68; colonial, 1, 68, 211, 270; arrival of, 116; forces of, 88 117, 119,
southern, 5, 6, 23, 41, 56, 215; under 121, 126, 186; support for, 261
Spanish rule, 2, 46, 181, 196, 203, Ayaviri, 93, 95, 97, 102
268–269, 272, 277; uprising in, 10, 209, Aymara, 169, 171–173, 185, 204; language
234 of, 15
Anta, 105, 121, 131, 142, 186 Azángaro, 34, 48, 92, 93, 101, 111, 135,
Apaza, Gregoria, 172, 201, 204, 206 184, 187, 190, 199, 200, 205, 207, 208,
Apaza, Julián. See Tupac Katari, Andrés 210, 216–217, 224, 232, 241, 246;
Inca kurakas from, 94, 96, 115, 211, 213;
Apurímac Bridge, 105, 313n24 rebels from, 191; uprising in, 242
Areche, José Antonio de, 3, 24–26,
30–32, 34, 57, 83– 84, 88– 91, 102, 111, Banda, Mariano, 58– 62, 159, 164
162–167, 184, 190, 202, 207–208, 214, Bastidas, Antonio, 35, 45, 136, 144, 165,
217–218, 221, 227–233, 265, 268–269, 166
274; and abolition of Quechua, Bastidas, Micaela, 2, 3, 14, 20–23, 30, 34,
258–260; correspondence with del 54– 61, 63– 64, 77, 78– 81, 94, 98–103,
Valle, 196–199; correspondence with 106–108, 110, 112–113, 122–124, 128,
Tupac Amaru, 144–148; decree of, 131; 131, 135–136, 144, 147, 149, 152–154,
efforts with Mata Linares, 91, 151–153, 158–161, 165–166, 168, 172, 177, 187,
155–156, 158, 167, 212; and Madrid 189, 196, 198, 206–208, 217, 254, 262,
court, 229–231, 259; petition to, 30; 264, 268, 273; background of, 20–21;
reforms of, 34, 208, 260, 263, 270; capture of, 150, 182–183, 196, 198, 207;

Authenticated
342 Index
Bastidas, Micaela (continued) Charles IV, 263

correspondence of, 40, 70, 73, 75, 77, Chaves, Antonio, 77, 79
79, 87, 98, 99–102, 122; excommunica- Chayanta, 107, 169, 171, 205
tion of, 68–74; letters to, 75, 77, 79, 99, Choquehuanca, Diego, 48– 49, 94, 96, 97,
144, 149; portrait of, 8; as rebel leader, 127, 184, 186, 213
21, 38, 43, 45, 51, 55–57, 60, 65, 66, 85, Chucuito, 94, 101, 111, 172, 175–177, 214,
86– 87, 92, 100, 107–108, 110, 135–136, 225; siege of, 181, 190–191, 193–194
144; representations of, 270–271, 277; Chumbivilcas, 55, 65, 70, 76, 98, 99, 124,
role in uprising, 4–5, 9, 12, 20, 22, 143–144, 148; corregidor of, 92;
40– 41, 64, 135, 181–182; trial and province of, 71, 192
execution of, 68, 70, 152–154, 158–159, Cisneros, Antonio, 275
165–166, 180, 207, 255, 258; twentieth- Cisneros, Francisco, 58, 59, 61– 62, 120,
century depiction of, 23 146, 154, 161, 164
Bastidas, Miguel, 182, 183, 204, 205–206 Cochabamba, 34, 205
Battle of Sangarará, 51–54, 85 Collao, the, 15, 16, 92– 95, 107, 110–111,
Baulen, Matías, 193, 194, 232, 235, 236, 115, 124, 133, 144, 172–173, 182,
272 184–185, 188, 193, 195–196; Indians
Bejarano, Ildefonso, 9, 61, 81– 83, 85, 117 in, 98; rebels in, 168
Bermúdez, Felipe Miguel, 2, 57, 63, 70, Combapata, 135, 143, 149–150, 222
143, 146, 149, 155 Condorcanqui, Diego Felipe, 229
Betancur, don Diego Felipe de, 26–27, 30 Condori, Manuela Tito, 217, 222, 227, 244
Bourbon Reforms, 5, 23, 26, 32, 38, 39, Condori, Simón, 241–242, 244
118, 208, 261, 269 Condorpuse, Andrés, 241, 244–245
Coporaque, 35, 36, 91
Cabrera, Fernando, 44, 51, 53, 59 corregidor, 1– 6, 11, 13, 16, 22, 24–26, 29,
Cailloma, 93, 143, 148 32, 35–38, 45– 49, 51, 53, 56–59, 62, 64,
Calca, 73, 104–105, 118, 137, 223, 231, 66, 69–73, 78–79, 82, 85, 86, 89, 91,
246; bridge of, 105; highlands, 132; 92– 96, 98, 103, 111, 117–119, 121, 125,
massacre, 107 133, 148, 154, 160, 169, 171, 173, 175,
Calca y Lares, 192, 216 178, 184, 190, 192–194, 200, 203–207,
Callao, 27, 198, 247, 249, 251, 253, 254 210–214, 216–218, 223, 225, 227, 228,
Campos, Gregorio Francisco de, 232–233 232, 235–238, 241, 244, 246, 250, 251,
Capetillo, Julián, 261–262 256, 259, 261–264, 267, 272; intrusion
Carabaya, 19, 92, 93– 94, 101, 135, of, 40; mistreatment of Indians,
174–175, 187, 190, 191–192, 200, 246; 145–147, 157–158, 211, 261; office of,
corregidors of, 92– 94, 96 237; property of, 44; system of, 215;
Carabuco, 226; mayor of, 97 “thieving,” 45, 78, 209
Castelo, Antonio, 115, 116, 124, 128, Cotabambas, 131, 134, 149
136–137, 165, 166 Council of the Indies, 1, 133, 163
Castro Puiucahua, Marcela, 222, 245–246 Creole, 2, 4, 11–12, 20, 31, 35–36, 38, 40,
Catholic Church, 6, 9, 13, 21, 26, 35–38, 46, 53, 56–57, 60– 64, 66, 84, 91, 94,
49, 65– 85, 109, 117, 147, 162–166, 196, 95, 100, 101, 119, 123, 132, 136, 159,
220, 234, 259, 261, 265, 268–270 170, 171–173, 177, 189, 191, 203, 215,
Chamaca, 75, 112 258–265, 271–273; as “class traitor,”
chapetones, 49, 97, 148, 171, 209 171; as clergy, 84; of Cuzco, 20, 262,
Charcas, 6, 86, 168, 169, 172, 175, 176, 265; followers of Tupac Amaru, 20, 56,
179, 185, 194, 206, 209, 212; insurgents 63– 64, 153–154, 159, 172, 213, 215,
in, 171 261; of Lima, 272; pardoned by rebels,
Charles III (King of Spain), 23, 32, 35, 39, 201; power of, 26, 31, 262; and priests,
48, 49, 118, 155, 184, 209, 227, 230, 99, 261, 264–265, 268; sentencing of,
247, 250, 253, 255, 269, 274; death of, 164; as society, 62– 63; supporters of
263; Great Cross of, 264; saint day of, 2 rebels, 63, 123, 260–261

Authenticated
Index 343
Cuzco, 1, 3, 6, 10–22, 25–28, 31–38, 40, Gálvez, José de, 23–24, 31, 32, 90, 133,
44, 47–58, 60– 61, 65–76, 81– 83, 148, 198, 208, 218, 229, 249, 261, 263
86– 94, 96, 98–105, 130–151, 152–157, Garcilaso de la Vega y Vargas, Sebastián
161, 164, 165, 168–169, 172–179, (“El Inca”), 28–29, 92, 209, 258–259,
180–182, 184–186, 189, 190, 192–200, 270; Royal Commentaries of the Incas
202–204, 206–207, 209–212, 238–244, (Comentarios Reales), 28, 29, 92
246–247, 249–251, 256, 259–265, Guaygua, Santos, 241, 244
267–273, 275–277; authorities in, 26, Guirior, Manuel de, 30, 32, 37, 39
53, 69, 70–71, 82, 93, 100, 150, 196, Gutiérrez, Ramón, 102–103
229, 249, 256, 260, 275; as “a Babylon,” Gutiérrez Sonco, Pascual, 97, 98
269; bishop of, 9, 36, 48; cathedral of,
19, 66, 68, 109, 111; Catholic Church Haitian Revolution, 16, 274, 277, 278
in, 66; city council of, 81, 87– 88, 104, Huamanga, 142, 156, 161, 164, 251
111, 117, 125, 129, 188, 277; conspira- Huarochirí, 30, 31, 160, 247, 249, 253
cies in, 34–35; corregidor of, 51, 232; Huatanay River, 110, 152, 166, 228
countryside of, 68, 85; execution in,
181; hard-liners in, 237, 243; as Inca Inca(s), 1, 6, 15–16, 21–22, 29, 109–110,
center, 110; indigenous people of, 5, 11, 129, 184, 188, 245, 256, 269, 271, 275;
26, 182; officials in, 257; plaza of, 100, blood of, 49; conquest of, 68, 134;
109, 137, 143, 153, 164–165, 258; descendants of, 14, 64, 67, 154, 162,
population of, 16, 184, 244, 259; 185, 229, 259, 271; empire of, 67, 118,
royalists in, 87, 129, 133, 268; siege of, 172, 259, 271, 273; genius of, 16; heir
109–129, 135, 136–137, 141, 164, 173, of, 147; heritage of, 19, 119, 137,
216, 261, 271; terror in, 107–108, 117; 258–259; idolatry of, 92; image of, 31,
Tupac Amaru base in, 7, 11; uprising 172, 270–271, 336n12; king of, 33, 35,
in, 259; war council of, 51, 111 185, 204, 236, 256, 277; language of,
15, 110; last of, 27–31, 33–34; memory
de la Puente, Vicente, 36–37 of, 148, 163, 258, 260, 268–269, 271;
del Valle, José, 88, 90– 91, 102, 131, 133, name of, 204; period of, 55; return of,
135, 136, 139–144, 147, 148–151, 179, 6, 33, 38–39, 57, 172, 209; romantic
183–190, 192–200, 202, 206–211, depiction of, 29; royalty, 1, 18, 25, 33,
213–217, 220–221, 223–224, 226, 227, 49, 118, 262; ruler, 6, 18, 92, 109, 277;
229–231, 236, 238; commanders of, stories of, 28, 92
193; correspondence of, 190; death of, Incanism, 273, 336n12, 336n14
198; failed campaign of, 202; role in
Tupac Amaru’s execution, 209; troops Jáuregui, Agustín de, 32, 39, 74, 88, 91,
of, 141–143, 187–189 111, 113, 148, 195, 196–199, 202, 214,
Dominicans, 27, 67 217, 226, 229–232, 239–240, 243, 245,
249; signing of amnesty, 207–208
Escarcena, José Esteban, 47, 58, 59, 61, 164 Jesuits, 18, 20, 27, 67, 160; church in Juli,
Escobedo y Alarcón, Jorge, 230, 232, 243, 176; college of, 111, 128; holdings of,
245, 250, 256, 261, 263 153; monastery of, 51
Jujuy, 16, 189
Figueroa, Juan Antonio “el Gallego,” 3, Juli, 172, 175, 176, 177, 191, 200, 226
58, 59, 82, 123, 125, 164
Flores, Ciriaco, 247, 249 Katari, Dámaso, 170
Flores, Ignacio, 179, 203, 204, 232 Katari, Nicolás, 170
Franciscans, 27, 67 Katari, Tomás, 169–170
Katari Rebellion, 180, 277
Gallegos, don Justo, 80, 113, 220 Katarista(s), 6, 107, 169–176, 178–179,
Galleguillos, Manuel, 57– 60, 62, 100, 203, 260, 270; leadership of, 175–176;
159, 164 movement of, 172; rebellion of, 180,

Authenticated
344 Index
Katarista(s) (continued) 230–231, 234, 247, 258, 274; inner

277; revolutionaries of, 169; uprising circle of, 84; memos to, 181, 202, 229
of, 172, 267 Madrid, Bernardo de la, 3, 59, 117, 123,
kuraka, 1–3, 5, 11, 13, 16, 18–21, 24, 164
26–27, 31, 34, 35, 37, 40, 44, 48– 49, Mamani, Isidro, 175–176, 181–182, 191
52–54, 55–57, 60, 62, 67, 72, 73, 87, 91, Maras, 34, 102, 103, 121
92, 95, 99–105, 115, 121, 127, 129, 132, Marcapata, 152–157, 160, 233, 237, 239,
136, 137, 146, 169, 176, 177, 179, 183, 241–242, 244–246
184, 186, 210, 211, 213, 223, 227, 236, Maruri, José de, 115, 127, 186, 261
241, 258, 260, 262, 273; abolition of, Mata Linares, Benito, 34, 83– 84, 91, 161,
163; as abusive, 186; of Acos, 101; of 164, 167, 212, 240, 244, 263–266,
Anta, 131; as antirebel, 100; of 268–271, 274; as prosecutor, 245–247,
Azángaro, 94, 96, 213; banning of, 274; 249–250, 256–258; as reformer,
of Chinchero, 104, 107, 131; as ethnic, 259–261
38, 63, 269; of Lampa, 49; office of, 25, Mendigure, Andrés (Tupac Amaru), 151,
104; of Pampamarca, 18, 27, 154; of 166, 182, 217, 220, 228, 235–237
Pisac, 35; of Pitumarca, 141; role of, Mendigure, Pedro, 182, 228
270; school for, 13, 240; southern, 96; mita, 2, 4– 6, 26, 30, 45– 46, 48–50, 56,
support of, 207; of Surimana, 18, 27; of 82, 86, 148, 269–270; abolition of, 95,
Tungasuca, 18, 27; of Yanaoca, 81 145
kurakazgo, 24, 26, 101 Molina, Francisco, 58, 61, 159, 164
Mollinedo, Juan de, 53–54
Lagos, José de, 193–195 Morán, Juan Bautista, 95, 199
Laisequilla, Francisco, 105, 116, 143–144, Moscoso y Peralta, Manuel, 9, 36–37, 51,
192 73, 74, 77, 81– 85, 87– 89, 100, 102–105,
Lampa, 92, 93– 97, 98, 101, 103, 111, 135, 107, 111, 116–118, 120, 122–123,
188, 191, 200, 212, 214, 224; kuraka of, 125–126, 128–129, 135, 139, 145, 198,
49; population of, 91 200, 208, 210, 211–217, 222, 226,
Landa, don Tiburcio, 52–54 227–233, 238, 246, 257, 261, 263–266,
Langui, 99, 150–151, 183, 185 268–269; excommunication of Tupac
La Paz, 34, 55, 92– 94, 110, 150, 161, Amaru, 68–71; as prosecutor; 75, 79;
171–173, 177, 183, 184–190, 201, 202, supporters of, 123; trials against, 271
212, 220; bishop of, 96, 232; as
bishopric, 200; royalists in, 225–226; Necochea, Raimundo, 225, 232, 235–236,
sieges of, 177–179, 180–181, 193–194, 241, 244, 249
198–199, 202–210, 226 neo-Inca, 29, 57
Lauramarca, 137, 223, 235, 236, 237, 238, Ninavilca, Vicente, 240–241
246 Noguera, Andrés, 78, 94, 96
Layo, 80, 99, 113, 183 Noguera, María Rosa, 18
Lima, 239–242, 243–245, 247, 250–251, Noguera, Simón, 59
253, 254, 256, 262–263, 265, 269;
authorities in, 275; creoles in, 272; high Oblitas, Antonio, 4, 165
court of, 263; Plaza Mayor of, 249 obrajes, 4, 43, 44, 103, 148
Livitaca, 65, 73, 75, 100, 150 Ocongate, 103, 137, 200, 223–224, 233,
López de Sosa, Antonio, 1, 2, 3, 9, 18, 34, 235–239, 247
52, 80– 83, 85, 227, 261, 265 Ocoruro, 115, 119, 120, 128
Luna, Juan de, 75–76, 79 Orcoguaranca, Juan de Dios Tupa, 32, 33
Orellana, Joaquín de, 93, 173–176,
Machu Picchu, 15, 120, 124 190–195, 200, 232, 246
Madrid, 1, 48, 82, 90– 91, 148, 151, 160, Oropesa, 26, 27, 52, 54, 115
220, 230, 259, 263, 268–270, 274; Ortigoza, Diego, 57, 58, 59, 62, 164, 244
authorities in, 3; court in, 23–24, 218, Oruro, 43; uprising in, 171–172, 205

Authenticated
Index 345
Palacios, José de, 61, 161, 261–262 of, 190–199; refugees of, 196; residents
Pampamarca, 1, 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, 27, 34, of, 192, 194, 196, 200
40– 64, 67, 82, 115, 154, 161, 166, 180, Puquín, 120, 122, 124, 125, 187
210, 220, 221, 223, 233–235, 247;
martyr of, 275; parish of, 3, 80; priest Qosqo. See Cuzco
of, 80, 227 Quechua, 4– 6, 15, 18, 20–21, 25, 28, 33,
Paruro, 71, 100–101, 102, 121, 125, 134, 38, 46, 55, 60, 72, 91, 97, 110, 120, 122,
137, 149, 187 138, 141, 144, 146, 148, 166, 238,
Parvina, Tomás, 137–138, 143–144, 149 259–260, 268–270; abolition of, 259; as
Paucartambo, 76, 83, 96, 100, 101–103, area, 65; as culture, 269; Indians in, 20,
133–134, 137, 192, 200, 212, 246; 110, 173, 222; Masses in, 69, 269;
lowlands of, 65; river of, 14 movement, 203; people of, 138, 172,
Peru, 5– 6, 10–11, 16–17, 23, 27, 29, 31, 259; as region, 222; speakers of, 1, 20,
40, 48–51, 68, 71–72, 83, 88, 91, 110, 41, 110, 122, 146, 204
152, 156, 161, 165, 168, 179, 181, 194, Quiquijana, 41, 44, 46, 74, 100, 101
199, 208, 215, 230–233, 243, 249, 250, 142–143
253; Andes of, 6, 16; border with Quispe, Alejo, 235–236
Bolivia, 14, 191; colonial, 20, 58, 227; Quispe, Andrés, 223–224, 239
demography of, 132; fate of, 203; Quispe Tupa Inga, Joseph Gran, 33
history of, 233; Inca-dominated, 27; Quispicanchi, 41, 51, 53, 55, 78, 101, 192,
independent, 265–266; Lower, 206; 225, 235, 237
multilingual, 148; population of, 203;
postcolonial, 265; revolution in, 24, Rio de la Plata, 25, 94, 101, 179, 189, 190,
255; southern, 101, 207, 243; Spanish 199, 244, 256
rule in, 151, 220, 258; Upper, 6, 15, 19, Rodríguez, Carlos, 1, 18, 77–78, 81
25, 26, 39, 43, 47, 55, 86, 98, 138, 144, Rosas, Nicolás, 121, 131
168–169, 173–175, 177, 186, 190, 194,
199, 205, 227, 260; uprising in, Sahuaraura Titu Atauchi, José Raphael,
168–169, 264; Viceroyalty of, 10, 23, 83, 129, 145, 147; Estado del Perú, 83
38, 162, 193; wealth in, 84 Sahuaraura Titu Atauchi, Pedro Ramos,
Peruano, 253–254 52, 145–146
Pisac, 35, 88, 103, 116, 137; bridge of, 104 Salcedo, Francisco, 207, 216–217,
Pitumarca, 141, 217, 223, 241 221–223, 227–228, 232, 238, 244, 246,
Plaza Mayor, 27, 143, 153, 164, 249 249
Pomacanchi, 43– 44, 54, 59, 234; Indians San Francisco de Borja School, 18, 153
of, 78 Sangarará, 40, 51–54, 58, 60, 64, 68, 73,
Ponce, Ramón, 70, 143, 174–175 74, 78, 85, 86– 88, 96, 125, 145–146,
Potosí, 15, 25, 30, 59, 92, 110, 161, 169, 150, 162; church of, 69, 107; rebels in,
179, 190, 196, 203, 205, 209, 267; mita 54; victory in, 65– 66, 86
to, 2, 4–5, 45; silver mines of, 1, 19, 23, San Pedro de Alcántara, 253–254
26, 38, 86, 168, 177 Santa Rosa (town), 94, 95, 174, 185, 198,
provincias altas, 15, 65, 222 216
Pucacasa, 140, 141–143, 148 Santo Tomás, 72, 138, 143
puka kunka, 33, 55, 61, 106, 176, 199, 235, Saylla, 116, 136
236, 239 Segurola, Sebastián, 226, 232
Pumacahua, Mateo, 73, 96, 104, 107, 116, Sicasica, 171, 172, 199
121, 131, 132, 137–138; forces of, 141, Sicuani, 34, 63, 74, 77, 136, 185, 188,
185, 186; troops of, 106, 149 215, 216–217, 228, 232–233, 244, 247;
Puno, 6, 15, 16, 45, 55, 85, 92– 93, 94, 98, church in, 227; events in, 219; fort of,
108, 143, 144, 174–176, 181, 184, 186, 227; signings in, 220, 222
187, 202, 207–208, 210–211, 226, 256; Sinayuca, 37, 91, 92
attack on, 172; population of, 193; siege Sisa, Bartolina, 172, 206

Authenticated
346 Index
Sorata, 184, 202, 204–205, 229, 233; siege 65– 85, 86– 88, 91–108, 110–129,
of, 200, 226 130–151, 169–170, 168–179, 180–192,
soroche, 88, 89, 140, 185 198–200, 209, 212, 221, 229, 231–244,
Spain, 19, 23–29, 31, 35, 38, 56, 67, 246–247, 249, 260–266, 267–278;
82– 84, 198, 206, 209, 215, 221, 229, biography of, 5; capture of, 154, 183,
231, 232, 243, 247, 253–255, 259, 198, 202–203, 207, 230, 261; clan of,
263–264, 268–269, 272–273, 275; 227–229, 233, 237, 244, 258, 273; death
deportations to, 260; empire of, 1; of, 166, 170, 172, 180; duties as kuraka,
golden era of literature, 28; northern 1, 18, 183; excommunication of, 9,
African outpost of, 255; Peruvian 68–74; 75– 85, 86– 88, 102, 107, 118,
independence from, 7; role of the 137, 162, 164, 177, 180–192; followers
Church in Spain, 84; trade with, 25; of, 150, 168, 175, 180, 205, 225; inner
wars in Italy, 104; war with England, circle of, 50, 56–57, 131, 146, 152, 163,
194 166, 183, 198, 245, 258; legacy of, 182,
Spanish rule, 2, 5, 13, 33, 38, 47, 109, 267–278; movement of, 35, 41, 50,
148, 151, 161, 164–167, 168, 181, 220, 56–58, 62– 64, 66, 72, 91, 122, 147, 169,
258, 270 181, 203; rebel base of, 27, 35, 45,
Surimana, 13, 18, 21, 27, 81, 101, 115, 54– 61, 73, 86, 102, 107, 110, 112, 116,
154, 161, 166 215–216, 222–223, 227, 234, 241,
247–248; rebels of, 173, 256, 263, 278;
Tapia, don Buenaventura, 79 trial and execution of, 152–167, 181,
Tinta, 2, 26, 34, 35, 47, 52, 55, 57, 58, 63, 192, 196, 203, 207, 209, 247; troops of,
101, 111, 123, 125, 132, 135, 139, 142, 53, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 113, 115,
143, 144, 149–151, 153, 155, 161, 166, 116–117, 121, 124, 126, 128, 131,
180, 195, 200, 212, 251; corregidor of, 135–136, 143–144, 149, 177; uprising
216, 221; district of, 18; people of, 185; of, 4–17, 20–23, 29, 31–35, 39, 40– 49,
rebels of, 131, 171 52, 55–58, 61– 64, 66, 68–70, 72–75,
Titicaca, Lake, 6, 7, 8, 10–12, 14–15, 19, 83, 85, 88– 90, 93, 97, 98, 101, 106–107,
48, 49, 76, 86, 91– 92, 95, 97, 140, 111, 113, 118, 123, 128, 130, 132,
168–169, 171–181, 183–191, 196, 198, 136–138, 143, 146, 151–152, 155,
200, 202–203, 205, 206, 208, 218, 220, 157–162, 166, 168–170, 172–174, 179,
224–226, 242, 271; area, 11, 13, 65, 181, 184–185, 189, 256, 264, 277
93– 94, 96, 130, 135, 144, 168, 172–174, Tupac Amaru, Andrés, 182–184,
176, 177, 179–181, 190–191, 196, 202, 200–205, 213, 217, 220, 223, 227–231,
206, 210, 212, 214, 219, 223, 225; 233, 235–242, 244, 247, 253–254, 271
corregidors of, 212, 218; inhabitants of, Tupac Amaru, Cecilia, 182, 211, 215, 244
184; largest city of, 93 Tupac Amaru, Diego Cristóbal, 7, 48,
Tito Condori, Manuela, 217, 222, 244, 115–117, 126, 143, 147, 151, 220–230,
245, 253 257, 262–264, 271; correspondence of,
Toledan Reforms, 163 172–173, 210–211; death of, 199–200,
Toledo, Viceroy, 18, 269–270 207–209, 246–247, 249; defeat of, 105;
Tucumán, 189, 244, 274 forces of, 104, 137–138, 166, 191–192,
Tungasuca, 1–3, 13, 15, 18, 27, 38, 41, 45, 199; as leader of rebellion, 7, 63, 65,
48, 51, 63, 70, 74, 76, 81, 82, 87, 91, 94, 103, 105, 153, 179, 181–185, 187, 189,
98, 99, 100, 102–103, 107, 110, 112, 195, 198; offer of amnesty to, 208–217,
123, 135, 154, 166, 180, 221, 223, 219, 230–234; sentencing of, 245, 249;
232–233, 244, 246; base in, 40, 54– 61, widow of, 253
64, 65, 86, 87; priest of, 52, 61; rebels Tupac Amaru, Fernando, 254
in, 103, 104, 113 Tupac Amaru, Francisco, 165
Tupac Amaru I, 6 Tupac Amaru, Hipólito, 166
Tupac Amaru II, José Gabriel, 1–17, Tupac Amaru, Juan Bautista, 43, 156,
18–19, 21–22, 25–27, 29, 30–39, 40– 64, 157, 221, 250–251, 253–256

Authenticated
Index 347
Tupac Amaru, Marcos, 182 Valcárcel, Joaquín de, 116, 193–194, 217
Tupac Amaru, Mariano, 21, 99, 151, 153, Velasco Alvarado, Juan, 7, 276
166, 182–184, 201, 210, 220, 227–229, Velille, 74, 75, 112
230–231, 238–242; arrest of, 244; Verdad desnuda o las dos fases de un Obispo,
death of, 254; sentencing of, 253; trial La, 83, 263, 265
of, 247 Verdejo, Diego, 143, 165
Tupac Amaru, Miguel Condorcanqui Verganza, Eusebio Balza de, 37, 83, 263
Usquionsa, 18 Vilca Apaza, Pedro, 143, 181, 186, 200,
Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement 224–226
(MRTA), 62, 276 Vilcabamba, 26, 134
Tupac Katari, Andrés Inca, 171–173, Vilcanota River, 103, 104, 141, 142, 149,
175–176, 178, 199, 204–206, 211; 150
background of, 171, 173; camps of, 174; Vilcanota Valley, 15, 49, 65, 68, 73, 86,
commanders of, 191, 204; execution of, 102, 107, 110, 111, 115, 116, 130, 151,
211–215; followers of, 205; forces of, 175, 184, 216, 220, 224, 238, 242, 247,
191, 202–204; movement of, 183, 189, 257; control of, 128; military engage-
204; name of, 171; uprising of, 200 ment in, 142
Tupa Inca (Felipe Velasco Tupa Inca Villalta, Manuel, 87, 140, 149
Yupanqui), 247, 249 Villalva, Simón Ximénez, 108, 261
Tupamaros, 17, 275, 276 Vivas, Antonio, 193, 194
Tupa Orcoguaranca, Juan de Dios, 32–33
War of Independence, Peru, 7, 51, 277
Ugarte, Gaspar de, 193–194, 261–266
Urbiola, don Miguel de, 93– 94 Yanaoca, 1–2, 21, 77; church of, 78;
Urcos, 101, 116, 144, 149, 151, 153, 235 kuraka of, 81
Urcos Bridge, 103, 142, 247 Yauri, 35, 36, 91
Urubamba, 101, 102, 143, 148, 192; bridge
of, 117; river of, 105; valley of, 137 Zuñiga, Esteban, 34

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The Tupac Amaru Rebellion

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

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There is a general belief that the declaration of Peru’s indepen-

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Introduction: The Execution of Antonio de Arriaga 1

1. The Andes in the Atlantic World 18

Conclusion: The Legacy of Tupac Amaru 267

Chronology of the Rebellion 281

Illustrations follow page 108

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Western South America 8

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O N NOV EM BER 4, 1780, José Gabriel Condorcanqui Noguera, who

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López de Sosa, had been Tupac Amaru’s ﬁrst teachers. Impressed by

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take seventy-ﬁve fusils or light ﬂ intlock muskets, a small number of

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The Experience of Rebellion

The Tupac Amaru rebellion is not an untold story. Generations of histo-

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Western South America

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José Gabriel in his frequent absences. As is common today in the Andes,

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Gore and Gorges

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down local revolts. In riots or upheavals prior to 1780, militias took

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continue to debate whether modernity and the “civilizing process” re-

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or to purchase haciendas. This Spanish presence weakened as one moved

In geographical terms, the Tupac Amaru Rebellion encompassed a larger

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the Americas, casting a large shadow on the wars of independence that

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The Andes in the Atlantic World

J OSÉ GA BR I EL CON DORCA NQU I , born on March 10, 1738 in Surimana,

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hill from Cuzco’s imposing cathedral, he learned Latin and deepened

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An anonymous Spaniard stressed his seriousness and deemed Tupac

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enabled him to oversee the slaughter of innocent Europeans, while

The Atlantic World Reaches the Andes

Tupac Amaru moved throughout the Peruvian viceroyalty, from the