GP 44-70 - Overpressure Protection Systems

Document No.
GP 44-70
Applicability Group
Date 24 February 2010
GP 44-70
Overpressure Protection Systems
Group Practice
BP GROUP
ENGINEERING TECHNICAL PRACTICES
24 February 2010 GP 44-70
Foreword
This revision issue of Engineering Technical Practice (ETP) Group Practice (GP) GP 44-70 has been
revised to remove references to Strategic Performance Units (SPU). The changes are indicated by a
bar in the margin.
The previous revision (10 December 2009) consistsed of only one addition as 9.5.1.1.e. and is
indicated by a bar in the margin. Thisat revision recommendsed periodic revalidation of the relief
system design and was inadvertently omitted in the 26 October 2009 revision. Revisions to the
3 April 2006 version were more extensive and were not indicated by a bar in the margin but included
the following:
• Amendments to the scope of this GP.

• Update of normative references in accordance with BP Group and segment defined ETPs.
• Clarification on documentation requirements.
• Additional guidance on designing overpressure protection for a burst tube condition in a
shell and tube heat exchanger.
• Additional guidance on best practice for designing pressure letdown stations, including
assumptions on bypass valve positions and controls.
• Clarification on the use of series check valves to minimise reverse flow scenarios and
potential overpressure of equipment.
• Several amendments and clarifications from the original version within the document.
Copyright © 2010 BP International Ltd. All rights reserved.

This document and any data or information generated from its use are classified, as a
minimum, BP Internal. Distribution is intended for BP authorized recipients only. The
information contained in this document is subject to the terms and conditions of the
agreement or contract under which this document was supplied to the recipient's
organization. None of the information contained in this document shall be disclosed
outside the recipient's own organization, unless the terms of such agreement or contract
expressly allow, or unless disclosure is required by law.
In the event of a conflict between this document and a relevant law or regulation, the
relevant law or regulation shall be followed. If the document creates a higher obligation, it
shall be followed as long as this also achieves full compliance with the law or regulation.
Page 2 of 69
Table of Contents
Page
Foreword.......................................................................................................................................... 2
1. Scope...................................................................................................................................... 6
2. Normative references.............................................................................................................. 7
3. Terms and definitions.............................................................................................................. 8
4. Symbols and abbreviations...................................................................................................10
5. Philosophy............................................................................................................................. 12
5.1. Review of overpressure scenarios.............................................................................12
5.2. Safety instrumented systems (SIS)............................................................................12
5.3. Pressure settings.......................................................................................................13
5.4. Closed relief system...................................................................................................13
6. Design practice..................................................................................................................... 13
6.1. General...................................................................................................................... 13
6.2. Causes of overpressure.............................................................................................15
6.3. Relief limitation by design...........................................................................................18
6.4. Assessment of overpressure scenarios......................................................................19
6.5. Pressure limiting and safety instrumented systems (SIS)...........................................22
6.6. Reverse flow..............................................................................................................23
6.7. Vacuum relief............................................................................................................. 25
6.8. Cold service...............................................................................................................25
6.9. External fire condition.................................................................................................26
6.10. Multiphase vapour/liquid relief....................................................................................29
6.11. Thermal relief............................................................................................................. 29
7. Letdown stations................................................................................................................... 30
7.1. General...................................................................................................................... 31
7.2. Design for gas breakthrough (blowby)........................................................................31
7.3. Design for liquid overfill..............................................................................................32
7.4. Control valve size.......................................................................................................32
7.5. Credit for open outlets................................................................................................33
7.6. Credit for operator intervention...................................................................................33
7.7. Credit for instrumentation...........................................................................................33
7.8. Bypass valves and restriction orifices.........................................................................34
7.9. Temperature effects...................................................................................................36
7.10. Interconnecting pipework...........................................................................................36
8. Equipment, tankage, and piping............................................................................................36
8.1. Shell and tube heat exchangers.................................................................................36
8.2. Air cooled heat exchangers........................................................................................40
8.3. Double pipe heat exchangers.....................................................................................40
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8.4. Plate and frame/plate and shell heat exchangers.......................................................41

8.5. Printed circuit heat exchangers (PCHE).....................................................................41
8.6. Other types of heat exchangers.................................................................................41
8.7. Centrifugal pumps......................................................................................................42
8.8. Positive displacement pumps.....................................................................................43
8.9. Steam turbine drivers.................................................................................................43
8.10. Furnaces/waste heat recovery units...........................................................................45
8.11. Boilers........................................................................................................................ 45
8.12. Compressors..............................................................................................................46
8.13. Flowline and transmission pipelines and associated equipment.................................47
8.14. Process and utility piping............................................................................................49
8.15. Atmospheric/low pressure storage tanks....................................................................49
8.16. LPG/LNG storage.......................................................................................................51
9. Design documentation development by CVP phase..............................................................51
9.1. General...................................................................................................................... 51
9.2. Appraise and select stages - early design of relief and overpressure protection
systems...................................................................................................................... 52
9.3. Define stage - comprehensive relief and overpressure design basis..........................53
9.4. Execute stage - relief and overpressure system dossier............................................54
9.5. Operate stage - changes in design and operating conditions.....................................56
10. Pressure relief devices.......................................................................................................... 57
10.1. General...................................................................................................................... 57
10.2. Pressure relief valves.................................................................................................58
10.3. Rupture disks (bursting discs)....................................................................................64
10.4. Buckling pins/rupture pin relief valves........................................................................69
10.5. Sizing of pressure relief devices.................................................................................70
10.6. Configuration of pressure relief devices.....................................................................72
10.7. Preinstallation.............................................................................................................76
10.8. Installation of rupture disks.........................................................................................77
Annex A (Normative) Relief and overpressure protection dossier structure....................................78
A.1. General................................................................................................................................. 78
A.2. Design philosophy.................................................................................................................78
A.3. List of relieving devices, data sheets, and associated block valves.......................................79
A.4. Relief loads........................................................................................................................... 79
A.5. Relief limiting control valves and restriction orifices...............................................................80
A.6. Pump and/or compressor data..............................................................................................80
A.7. Other equipment data............................................................................................................81
A.8. Safety instrumented systems (SIS).......................................................................................81
A.9. Process control loop segregation..........................................................................................81
A.10. Fire areas, fire loads, and fireproofing...................................................................................82
A.11. Principal (or maximum) flare loads........................................................................................83
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A.12. Piping equivalent lengths and header pressure profiles - flare system simulation review
output (Flarenet or Visual Flare)............................................................................................83
A.13. HP/LP interfaces................................................................................................................... 84
A.14. Disposal system.................................................................................................................... 84
A.15. Test reports........................................................................................................................... 84
Annex B (Informative) Relief and overpressure dossier..................................................................85
Bibliography................................................................................................................................... 89
List of Tables
Table 1 - Overpressure design for letdown stations with bypasses................................................35
List of Figures
Figure 1 - Schematic of a typical letdown station............................................................................34

Figure 2 - Example of documentation requirements by CVP phase...............................................52
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1. Scope
a. This GP provides practice for selection, design, and installation of overpressure protection
systems and protection against overpressure of pressurised systems (up to the relief device
discharge flange), in new plants and facilities in the list provided below:
1. Hydrocarbon processing plants, including refineries, natural gas installations, and
chemical plants.
2. Steam and/or power generating plants and ancillary equipment.
3. Terminals, including jetty and loading facilities.
4. Offshore installations, including floating production systems.
5. Petroleum production facilities, including well pads and crude oil and gas gathering
centres.
6. Main transmission pipelines, flowlines, and associated equipment.
7. Storage installations.
8. Vacuum systems and systems relieving at pressure less than 1 barg (14,5 psig).
9. Utility systems.
10. Components of drilling systems on BP operated platforms in which the drilling rig is
an integral part of the facility or mobile drilling rigs that are owned or operated by
BP.
11. Ships, vessels such as a floating production storage offload (FPSO) and road/rail
tanks where the system is a special purpose-built facility that would normally be
considered a processing plant. This GP does not apply to other ships, vessels or
road/rail tanks.
b. This GP may also be used for assessment and modification of existing plants and facilities
in the list above.
c. This GP applies the general requirements, as outlined in GP 48-03, for the use of layer of
protection analysis (LOPA) to define applicable safety instrumented systems (SIS) for
overpressure protection or avoidance of overpressure. For the analysis of overpressure
systems, these requirements are based on:
1. Use of pressure relief devices, if practical, as the main method of overpressure
protection.
2. SIS, if used, which may be an additional method of overpressure protection in most
cases, and as the sole method in a limited number of cases.
d. This GP is to be used in conjunction with the following:
1. GP 44-80, which specifies the overall relief, vent, and depressurisation system design
of which the overpressure protection is a part.
2. ISO 4126, API Std 520, Part I, API RP 520, Part II, and API Std 521/ISO 23251,
interpreting and supplementing them as necessary to provide BP requirements.
e. This GP does not cover mobile drilling rigs or other equipment that is owned by others and
assembled as required on the facility.
f. This GP does not apply to pressure relief for systems in ships or road/rail tanks, unless the
system is for a special purpose built facility that would normally be considered a
processing plant (e.g., floating production storage offload [FPSO] facility).
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2. Normative references
The following referenced documents may, to the extent specified in subsequent clauses and normative
annexes, be required for full compliance with this GP:
• For dated references, only the edition cited applies.

• For undated references, the latest edition (including any amendments) applies.
BP
GN 44-001 Relief System Design Guide.
GN 44-005 Assessment of Acoustic Induced Vibrations.
GP 30-80 Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) - Specification and Implementation.
GP 30-81 Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) - Operations and Maintenance.
GP 32-47 In Service Inspection and Testing of Mechanical Protective Devices.
GP 42-10 Piping Systems (ASME B31.3).
GP 44-40 Isolation of Equipment for Maintenance and Emergency.
GP 44-80 Relief Disposal and Depressurisation Systems.
GP 48-02 Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study.
GP 48-03 Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA).
GP 48-04 Inherently Safer Design (ISD).
American Petroleum Institute (API)

API RP 14C Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Basic Surface Safety
Systems for Offshore Production Platforms.
API Std 520, Part I Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in
Refineries, Part I - Sizing and Selection.
API RP 520, Part II Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-Relieving Devices in
Refineries, Part II - Installation.
API Std 521 Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems.
API Std 526 Flanged Steel Pressure Relief Valves.
API Std 2000 Venting Atmospheric and Low-Pressure Storage Tanks: Nonrefrigerated
and Refrigerated.
API Std 2510 Design and Construction of LPG Installations.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (ASME Code).
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section I - Power Boilers.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII - Rules for
Construction of Pressure Vessels Division 1.
ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII - Rules for
Construction of Pressure Vessels Division 2 - Alternative Rules.
ANSI/ASME B16.5 Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings: NPS 1/2 through NPS 24.
ANSI/ASME B31.3 Process Piping.
ASME PTC 25 Pressure Relief Devices.
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British Standards Institute (BSI)

BS EN 1473 Installation and equipment for liquefied natural gas. Design of onshore
installations.
Energy Institute (EI)

IP 9 Model code of safe practice Part 9: Liquefied petroleum gas. Vol. 1.
Large bulk pressure storage and refrigerated LPG.
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-
related systems.
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

ISO 4126 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure.
ISO 4126-2 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure - Part 2: Bursting
disc safety devices.
ISO 4126-6 Safety devices for protection against excessive pressure - Part 6:
Application, selection and installation of bursting disc safety devices.
ISO 10418 Petroleum and natural gas industries - Offshore production installations -
Basic surface process safety systems.
ISO 23251 Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries - Pressure-relieving
and depressuring systems.
ISO 28300 Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries - Venting of
atmospheric and low-pressure storage tanks.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code.
NFPA 59A Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG).
3. Terms and definitions
The technical terms used in this GP have the meanings defined in API Std 521/ISO 23251. For the
purposes of this GP, the following terms and definitions also apply:
Corrected test pressure

Hydrostatic test pressure multiplied by the ratio of stress value at design temperature to stress value at
test temperature.
Disposal system
A system that conducts the relieved fluid to a location where it can be safely discharged. Disposal
systems may terminate in an atmospheric vent, a combustion device, such as a flare tip, or other
specialised treating equipment.
High pressure (HP)/low pressure (LP) interface

A piping component (valve, flange, orifice plate, etc.) in which the upstream operating pressure is
higher than the downstream maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP). Less obvious situations
could include reverse flow through pumps, hydraulic power recovery turbines or check valves, drains
to closed drain systems, or heat exchanger tube failures.
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Joule-Thomson effect
The temperature change of a gas or liquid that is forced through a valve or restriction while kept
insulated such that no heat is exchanged with the environment.
Letdown station
A flow restriction in which the upstream operating pressure is greater than the downstream design
pressure. Letdown stations normally consist of an arrangement of control valves, manual valves,
and/or orifice plates. Choke valves in Exploration and Production (E&P) operations are letdown
stations. Letdown stations can be permanent (e.g., fixed piping) or temporary (e.g., hoses).
HP/LP interfaces are letdown stations, including the following:
a. Reverse flow through pumps, check valves, or compressor recycle valves.

b. Drains from process systems to closed drain systems, across which an HP/LP interface
exists.
Pressure limiting instrumentation

Instrument systems that minimise the size or frequency of relief loads by automatically adjusting
process conditions if they tend toward a relief situation. One example of pressure limiting
instrumentation is an SIS (described in 6.5).
Pressure vessel
Vessel used for an integrated operation in petrochemical facilities, refineries, gas plants, oil and gas
production facilities, and other facilities.
Probability of failure on demand (PFD)

Probability that a system will fail to perform a specified function on demand.
Reliability analysis
Mathematical technique for assessing, in probabilistic terms, performance of a component, system, or
plant.
Relief device
Any device (mechanical or instrumentation) that acts automatically and reliably to relieve material
upon pressure rise. “Relief device” normally refers to pressure relief valves and bursting discs, but
explosion hatches, water seals, buckling pin devices, and pressure/vacuum breather valves are other
devices that meet this definition.
Safeguarding process flow diagram

Process flow diagram that illustrates major relief and flare system design features, including relative
relief devices, SIS devices, emergency shutdown valves (ESDVs), blowdown valves (BDVs), relief
headers, knockout drums, and flares.
Safety instrumented function (SIF)

Safety function with specified integrity level that is necessary to achieve functional safety by putting
process to a safe state or maintaining it in a safe state under predefined conditions. SIF is implemented
using SIS.
Safety instrumented system (SIS)

Instrumented system used to implement one or more SIF. SIS is composed of sensors, logic solvers,
and final control elements. An emergency shutdown (ESD) system is a specific example of an SIS.
Page 9 of 69
Safety integrity level (SIL)

Numerical representation of the integrity required and capability of SIF. SIL addresses hardware
reliability and capability to avoid systematic faults. SILs for SIFs operating in demand mode are
defined for hardware reliability in terms of PFD (see IEC 61511 and IEC 61508). See GP 48-03 for
details of SIL levels.
4. Symbols and abbreviations
For the purpose of this GP, the following symbols and abbreviations apply:
BDV Blowdown valve.
Cg Valve sizing coefficient for gas.
CHAZOP Computer HAZOP.
CSC/CSO Car sealed closed/car sealed open (normally applies to isolation valves).
Cv Valve sizing coefficient.
CV Control valve.
CVP Capital value process.
EA Engineering authority.
ESD Emergency shutdown.
ESDV Emergency shutdown valve.
FB Full bore.
FMEA Failure mode and effects analysis.
HAZID Hazard identification.
HAZOP Hazard and operability (study).
HEM Homogenous equilibrium model.
HIPS High integrity protection system.
HP High pressure.
I/O Input/output.
IFC Issued for construction (typically P&IDs).
IFD Issued for design (typically P&IDs).
IM Integrity management.
ISD Inherently safer design.
LNG Liquefied natural gas.
Page 10 of 69
LO/LC Locked open/locked closed valves.
LOPA Layer of protection analysis.
LP Low pressure.
LPG Liquefied petroleum gas.
LR Long radius.
MAWP Maximum allowable working pressure.
MBP Marked burst pressure.
MCC Motor control centre.
MOC Management of change.
MP Major projects.
NGL Natural gas liquids.
P&ID Process and instrument diagram.
PCHE Printed circuit heat exchanger.
PFD Probability of failure on demand.
PLC Programmable logic control.
PORV Pilot operated relief valve.
PSV Pressure safety valve.
QRA Quantitative review analysis.
RO Restriction orifice.
SBP Specified burst pressure.
SDV Shutdown valve.
SIF Safety instrumented function.
SIL Safety integrity level.
SIS Safety instrumented system(s).
SME Subject matter expert.
SPU Strategic performance unit.
SR Short radius.
TA Technical authority.
Page 11 of 69
5. Philosophy
5.1. Review of overpressure scenarios

a. A systematic review shall be conducted to review overpressure scenarios for equipment
and HP/LP interfaces.
b. During design of overpressure protection systems, the preferred order of techniques
employed should be as follows:
1. Elimination or reduction in magnitude and frequency of overpressure cases through
the application of ISD principles in accordance with GP 48-04.
2. Installation of mechanical relief devices to relieve excess pressure and protect
equipment from overpressure.
3. Application of SIS to limit relief loads.
4. Application of SIS to protect equipment from overpressure.
5.2. Safety instrumented systems (SIS)

a. Apart from SIS of sufficient integrity (designed for SIL in accordance with 6.5), no
automatic relief limiting systems (e.g., pressure sensor that triggers shutoff of heat source)
shall be used as alternatives to the provision of pressure relief devices as described in this
GP.
b. Installation of SIS as described in 6.5 in place of pressure relief valves shall comply with
SIS requirements across the entire lifecycle.
5.3. Pressure settings

a. Relief devices or overpressure protection shall be set at or lower than the design pressure
or MAWP of the weakest component in the system being protected, unless allowed
otherwise by code.
b. Occasionally, a relief device may be set lower than maximum design pressure to direct the
valve discharge to a preferred location. However, adequate spread between operating
pressure and set pressure of the relief device shall be maintained to prevent valve leakage
or premature opening.
5.4. Closed relief system

a. As the primary option, relief flow should be routed to a closed system (e.g., flare) or back
into the process. If atmospheric relief is selected, the hazards associated with atmospheric
relief should be assessed, and the overpressure reduction should be combined with a
reduction in venting volumes by the use of SIS in accordance with 6.5.
b. SIS devices may be used to minimise relief to a closed relief system provided the SIS
complies with 6.5.
c. Design of closed systems (e.g., flares) in which multiple pressure relief devices and/or
blowdown valves/vent valves are connected shall comply with GP 44-80.
d. For some installations, design, installation, and testing of overpressure protection systems
may comply with API RP 14C or ISO 10418. However, use of these standards does not
negate the need for LOPA.
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6. Design practice
6.1. General
a. A systematic examination of all modes of operation, including startup, shutdown, trip, and
maintenance, shall be made to identify failures capable of creating overpressure.
b. Apart from their normal operating mode, process units can have a range of other operating
conditions that are either necessary for maintenance or occur as a result of upsets.
Operating conditions (as applicable) to be considered shall include the following:
1. Normal and emergency shutdown.
2. Pressure and tightness testing.
3. Prestartup and startup.
4. Manual operation as a result of automatic control system failure or deactivation.
5. Alternate operating modes from original design (e.g., change in controller set point,
turndown, or turnup).
6. Catalyst conditioning.
7. Catalyst regeneration/passivation, etc.
8. Depressuring.
9. Removal of inventory from unit.
10. Gas freeing.
c. Establishment of relieving loads shall include consideration of common modes of failure,
such as electrical, instrument control system, mechanical, human, and procedural.
d. Relief rates, together with the relieving temperature and composition, should be calculated
by performing heat and mass balance calculations for relieving conditions. This should
include such factors as:
1. Reflux drum emptying or flooding.
2. Dryout of column sections, causing loss of circulating reflux.
3. Change of duty in air cooled exchangers due to different temperature differentials.
4. Change in latent heat and boiling temperature due to increased pressure and change in
composition.
5. Initial gas flow during startup of shut in oil wells.
e. Methods of calculation shall be defined at an early stage of the design.
f. A specialist in relief sizing for runaway reaction kinetics should be consulted to assist in
overpressure protection analysis of reaction systems. This analysis should include:
1. Too much reactant, wrong composition.
2. Too much catalyst and/or promoter.
3. Overfilling, insufficient ullage for expansion.
4. Loss of agitation.
5. Loss of cooling.
6. Failure to terminate the reaction.
7. Loss of control.
Page 13 of 69
g. Relief devices that only protect piping systems may be set above the design rating of the
piping in accordance with GP 42-10.
h. For internal explosion or runaway chemical reactions, if an ISD is not practical and if
pressure relieving devices cannot protect against the situation, special requirements for
emergency depressuring, halting reactions, or otherwise preventing/controlling these
situations shall be provided by SIS in accordance with GP 48-03, GP 30-80, and GP 30-81.
6.2. Causes of overpressure

a. Causes of overpressure to be considered in relief design shall include those listed in
API Std 521/ISO 23251 and GN 44-001.
b. The following list supplements the causes referenced in a, but the list shall not preclude a
detailed review of all other overpressure possibilities:
1. Power failure
a) Local power failure (local to equipment protected by a single PSV).
b) Complete power system failure within a unit or the entire facility.
c) Individual substation failure affecting all electrical equipment fed by a single
substation.
d) Individual MCC failure affecting all electrical equipment fed by a single MCC.
2. Cooling or reflux system failures - local unit, plant wide. Partial cooling water failure
shall not be assumed, i.e., complete cooling water failure shall be assumed if
applicable.
3. Boiler feedwater failure.
4. Multiple valve failure, open or closed.
5. Inadvertent valve operation, control valve failure, or valve opening from a higher
pressure source.
6. Failure of automatic controls. The instrumentation TA or appropriate SME should be
consulted for consideration of the following issues:
a) Potential failure of instrument systems, including SIS.
b) For modern instrument systems that may rely on distributed shared loop
systems, potential for simultaneous failure of more than one control loop.
c) Capability of a distributed control system to introduce means for otherwise
unrelated control systems to be driven simultaneously to a dangerous position.
d) Operation of controllers in manual mode or with alternative set points to the
original design basis.
7. Gas breakthrough (blowby). Gas breakthrough shall be specifically addressed as a
relief case (see 7.2).
8. Blocked or closed outlet(s).
9. Equipment failure (including pump, air cooled exchanger fan, or compressor trips and
shutdowns).
10. Reverse flow (e.g., check valve failure).
a) A reverse flow relief scenario is defined as when a feed pump or compressor to a
gas/liquid system stops and the high pressure gas/liquid can reverse flow into the
lower pressure system.
Page 14 of 69
b) If a single check valve is used on the discharge stream, full backflow shall be
considered, and the settle out pressure should be appropriately defined.
c) Typically, a dynamic analysis of the process system is required to be performed
to evaluate the “settle out” case.
11. Partial utility failure and/or interaction between utilities.
12. Changes in feedstock or other process condition changes.
13. Properties of process fluids under relief conditions that are different from normal
operation.
14. Effect of a very large capacity source (such as a wellhead or long pipeline)
a) The HP/LP interface shall be considered between a large high pressure inventory
that feeds a system of smaller capacity designed for lower pressure (e.g., a
subsea flowline or interfield pipeline feeding a topsides production manifold and
separator).
b) In these circumstances, it may not be feasible to provide a relief system of
sufficient capacity to accommodate the case in which the high pressure system is
suddenly deisolated (e.g., through failure open of the main ESDV).
c) In this case, it may be necessary to provide mechanisms for safely depressuring
the upstream source to a low enough pressure prior to startup with appropriate
SIS and procedural controls.
d) If SIS is used in lieu of mechanical devices, a detailed dynamic analysis should
be performed to ensure that the downstream system will be protected, given that
there is a delay between high pressure switch activation and closure of the
isolation valve.
6.3. Relief limitation by design
6.3.1. ISD measures

At an early design stage in the project, ISD measures as defined in GP 48-04, and further
defined for overpressure protection below, shall be considered. Some of the ISD design
measures that can be used are:
a. Design of vessels and equipment for pressure containment, rather than relying solely on
relief devices to limit pressure.
b. Reducing the source pressure in upstream supply.
c. Increasing the differential between operating pressure and the pressure at which the
pressure relief device operates or a control valve discharges to flare.
d. Independent subdivision of utilities, either imported and/or generated onsite (e.g., power,
steam, compressed air), to decrease (although it may not preclude) the likelihood of a total
utility failure.
e. Provision of two or more electrical feeders or generators to a site or part of a site.
Electrical feeders and generators shall be rated, connected, and protected such that failure
of any single element does not interrupt continuity of supply from other sources.
f. Consideration of layout for external fire conditions.
6.3.2. Basic design measures

At an early design stage in the project, the following methods to limit or reduce the likelihood
of pressure relief should be considered as good practice in reducing overpressure loads but shall
not be used as credit if sizing the pressure relief system:
Page 15 of 69
a. Design, selection, and protection of control equipment and other service systems to
minimise the potential for simultaneous failure of otherwise independent systems.
b. Use of auxiliary sources of power, such as diesel engines or steam turbines, to provide
cooling water, instrument air, electrical power, etc., under emergency conditions.
c. Provision of automatic reacceleration schemes for electric motor drivers, the loss of which
may give rise to overpressure conditions. These schemes may reaccelerate motors
simultaneously or sequentially, depending on the capability of the power supply.
d. Use of the same utility for cooling as for heat supply (e.g., steam or steam/hydraulic
drivers for air cooled exchangers and reflux pumps) in which steam driven feed pumps and
reboiler pumps or steam heated reboilers are used.
e. Consideration of the effect on relief systems in selecting process and auxiliary drivers.
f. Provision of cooling water standby tanks to ensure a period of water supply, normally
30 min.
6.4. Assessment of overpressure scenarios

a. Identification of all possible failure modes that could lead to an overpressure scenario, and
these probabilities and consequences shall be the responsibility of a design team. In
addition to HAZID and HAZOP, other formal procedures, such as LOPA, QRA, and
FMEA may be applied, as deemed necessary.
b. The potential for failure of major utilities and services with multiple drivers (e.g., cooling
water, refrigerant) should be determined, assuming that any one machine could be down
for maintenance.
c. API Std 521/ISO 23251, Section 4.2, provides requirements that shall be followed in
coincident failure situations.
d. Coincident failure shall be considered, if the result of a common mode failure or a process
dependency. For example:
1. There may be conditions in which fluids are particularly hazardous or the
consequences of failure are of such magnitude that the norm of not considering two
unrelated and coincident failures may not be appreciated.
2. In such cases, hazards should be quantified to determine the relief loads that need to
be considered.
e. Cascading events
1. Cascading events should be included in considering coincident failures.
2. If there are process connections from one part of a unit to another part of the same or
another unit, the need for overpressure protection due to an upset on one causing an
overpressure on the other should be addressed.
3. This shall particularly be examined for all cases in which gas generated in one
process is supplied to another.
f. Maximum discharge pressure of a fluid driver during an overpressure event should account
for effects of that event on suction pressure of the fluid driver.
g. If multiple interconnected vessels or equipment are protected by a common relief device,
the following criteria shall be used in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Section VIII Division 1 Appendix M and/or ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Section VIII Division 2 Part 9 as appropriate:
1. An open relief path shall be maintained between interconnected vessels and their
protective device (i.e., no intervening valves [automatic or manual] are permitted).
Page 16 of 69
2. If manual block valves are located in a normally flowing process line and if they are
only used for equipment isolation and maintenance, the flow path between the
equipment and its protective device shall be maintained open by:
a) Locking or sealing open the intervening block valve(s).
b) Identifying the valves in relief and overpressure system design documentation.
c) Closing the valves by permit or procedure only and including the isolation
procedure in plant operating instructions.
d) If manual block valves are installed around an exchanger for maintenance, the
exchanger shall be vented and drained immediately after it has been isolated. If
this is not practical, a relief device should be installed to protect the exchanger.
e) If the option of venting and draining is adopted, a warning notice should be
installed which states that the exchanger shall be vented and drained
immediately after being isolated.
3. If closure of the valve (due to mechanical failure or human error) can result in
pressures exceeding the corrected test pressure, either of the two following shall
occur:
a) The block valve(s) shall be eliminated.
b) A pressure relief device shall be installed that protects the equipment from
overpressure due to closure of the valve(s).
h. Credit shall not be taken for automatic controls acting to prevent an overpressure situation,
unless they meet the requirements required for SIS (see 6.5).
i. To address the issues of I/O card failure and inadvertent operation of control devices that
have multiple inputs, a process control loop failure assessment shall be performed as
follows:
1. For any system with more than one output, an analysis should be performed to
determine all reasonably foreseeable failure modes or common cause component
failures that may result in more than one output going to the nonfailsafe state and
potentially producing unacceptable process relief loads.
2. Relief loads that could arise from these failures should be determined. If relief loads
exceed design capability, it may be possible to reassign system outputs to reduce the
relief load.
j. Credit shall only be taken for an operator intervention in accordance with GP 48-03 to
determine if the operator, in conjunction with other layers of protection, can be relied upon
to address the overpressure scenario (e.g., liquid overfill).
k. Since piping and equipment design takes into account both temperature and pressure, the
possibility that departures from the normally expected operating temperature range may
occur during emergencies should be recognised.
l. Overpressure protection design shall be based on the maximum expected throughput for an
individual process component or process system. Consideration should be given to
variations in normal operating flow rates while avoiding significant oversizing of pressure
relief devices.
m. Relief devices protecting unfired process boilers (waste heat boilers) that are designed in
accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII (or another pressure
vessel design code) shall be consistent with that design code.
n. Dynamic simulation
1. Calculation of the quantity to be discharged under relief conditions normally assumes
a steady state condition.
Page 17 of 69
2. If it is estimated that this assumption is overly conservative, a dynamic simulation

should be performed to determine the required relief capacity.
3. Reference should be made to the requirements of API Std 521/ISO 23251 if using
dynamic simulation as a method for determining the relief rate and specifically, the
need for:
a) Sensitivity analysis.
b) Matching of the dynamic model with a steady state calculation.
c) Use of conservative assumptions.
6.5. Pressure limiting and safety instrumented systems (SIS)

a. SIS intended to avoid or limit pressure relief (also known as HIPS) may be a viable
approach to overpressure if compared to conventional protection methods using
mechanical devices, such as relief valves.
b. GP 48-03 shall be followed in the application of LOPA, and the SIS arrangement shall
comply with the appropriate SIL in accordance with GP 30-80 and GP 30-81.
c. SIS shall only be used as the sole means to provide final protection against overpressure if
all of the following conditions have been satisfied:
1. There are compelling engineering or commercial reasons that the equipment cannot
be protected by conventional pressure relief devices.
2. The appropriate EA has approved the use of SIS as follows:
a) For operating facilities, the appropriate EA (operations or site) shall be
responsible for ensuring LOPA planning, conduct, documentation, and
resolution of action items.
b) For projects, the project EA shall be responsible for ensuring LOPA planning,
conduct, documentation, and resolution of action items.
3. The closed system designed for receipt of relief valve discharges has been sized by
taking credit for the operation of automatic pressure limiting instrumentation to
reduce the relief load. Consideration for design of the relief system should be given to
SDV leakage rate and dynamic response of the shutdown system.
4. There is operations competence and capability to construct and maintain the SIS to
the required standard.
5. The system application and design complies with GP 48-03, GP 30-80, and GP 30-81.
d. Pressure limiting and temperature limiting SIS may, if appropriate, include automatic
actuation of the following:
1. Feed or pipeline transmission pump or compressor trips.
2. Fuel shutoff valves.
3. Reboiler heating medium bypasses and shutoff devices.
4. Fired reboiler shutdown and heating medium circulating pump trips.
5. Pressure and temperature limiting systems to protect reactors.
e. A philosophy of automatic turndown may be applied to allow time for effective operator
action to avoid both the operation of relief devices and widespread shutdown.
f. The set points of any pressure limiting SIS, preceded by alarms, as required, should be
below the lowest design pressure in the system under consideration to be effective.
Page 18 of 69
g. API Std 520, Part I, should be consulted for typical set point tolerances and the spread
required between operating and set pressure of relief devices.
h. Sufficient design margin, taking account of control system response and process dynamics,
shall be applied in selecting a set point. Design margin shall be defined to allow for:
1. Tolerance of set pressure of the relief device under actual working conditions.
2. Setting of any trip switch or amplifier and its switching differential.
3. Setting of the prealarm and its switching differential.
4. Maximum operating pressure under normal process conditions.
5. Time required for the SIS to fully complete its protective function in relation to
process dynamics.
6.6. Reverse flow

a. Overpressure resulting from reverse flow from a high pressure system shall be considered.
No credit shall be taken for the presence of a single check valve or steam trap in a line. The
following shall be considered:
1. Two check valves in series may be used as a means of overpressure protection,
provided that the application and subsequent reliability and maintenance complies
with GP 48-03. The installation of two check valves shall not be the sole means for
isolation of low and high pressure sources. A positive means of isolation of the line
shall be installed for maintenance.
2. Two dissimilar check valves in series used for overpressure protection shall only be
used in clean, nonvibrating, nonpulsating services and shall be periodically
maintained and tested to improve reliability by eliminating common mode valve
failures.
3. If two check valves are used as a means of overpressure protection, their use shall be
clearly documented in design, included in a register of safety critical equipment (e.g.,
the relief and overpressure dossier), and be subject to approval by the appropriate EA.
4. If the reliability of two check valves in series cannot be ensured, the reverse flow
leakage rate shall be based on calculated flow through a single orifice with a flow
area equal to 10% of the largest check valve flow area.
5. Orientation of check valves shall ensure that the check valves can function reliably in
accordance with manufacturer recommendations.
b. If there is only a single check valve, complete failure of the check valve shall be
considered for the applicable overpressure scenario definition. In this case, the reverse
flow rate shall be based on the full orifice diameter within the check valve, assuming
complete failure.
c. The requirement for additional isolation to prevent ongoing leakage raises the following
practical issues that shall be considered for the overall level of protection to be considered
satisfactory:
1. If some leakage is tolerable, a LOPA should be performed in accordance with
GP 48-03 to identify issues involved and sensitivities of key assumptions.
2. If a detailed analysis shows that manual isolation is not a practical option,
consideration should be given to automatic isolation or an alternative means of
protection as follows:
a) Circumstances that require additional manual isolation shall be clearly identified
and agreed with operating personnel. This additional manual isolation shall be
Page 19 of 69
readily identifiable in the field, and the requirement for isolation shall be clearly
identified in operating procedures.
b) System design shall ensure that it is safe for field personnel to make required
manual isolations. The rate of pressurisation of the low pressure system shall be
sufficiently slow such that a dangerous level of pressure is not reached within
the timescale for effective isolation.
c) Assessment of the timescale for isolation shall take into account the likely
circumstances of the initiating event (e.g., a total power failure) and the alarm
loading and work load on field personnel at the time. The human factor aspects
of the situation shall be considered, including the potential for the isolation step
to be omitted.
d) Any manual isolation valve that is required to supplement the check valves shall
be maintained in good working order. An actuated isolation valve should be
used, unless the manual valve is located in an area that is protected against
effects of fire or blast overpressure and potential escalation.
e) Any manual isolation valve shall be accessible in all foreseeable situations (e.g.,
if the cause of reverse flow was a fire that could lead to a pump being shut
down, the isolating valve would need to be accessible), unless the consequences
of any reverse flow were judged to be far less than the initiating event.
f) Consideration of the potential consequences of failure (either the failure of the
isolation valve to open or close) should be made. While catastrophic failure of a
vessel is always a very serious event, if the consequences are particularly severe,
a higher standard may be warranted.
g) Consideration should be given to the implications of assumed leakage rates on
the inspection regime of check valves and whether simple visual inspection is
sufficient or a higher standard of testing (e.g., periodic leak testing) is required.
6.7. Vacuum relief

a. The potential need for vacuum relief on vessels and systems shall be considered for all
modes of operation (e.g., purging, startup, shutdown, thermal contraction, condensing).
b. The ISD (preferred) method of vacuum protection is to design pressurised equipment for
full vacuum, if practical.
c. For low pressure equipment and other instances for which designing for full vacuum is not
practical, protection may be provided by vacuum relief systems or gas (noncondensable)
blanketing systems from a high reliability supply source using a protective system in
accordance with GP 48-03.
d. Under some circumstances, such as maintenance activities, procedural protection may be
adequate to prevent vacuum conditions. Basis of protection shall be included in
documentation required in 9.4.
e. The following causes of vacuum inside storage tanks could result in potential loss of
containment and/or a spill and should be considered:
1. Changes in ambient conditions causing contraction of a trapped vapour due to
lowering of the temperature of a closed vessel containing a volatile liquid below its
atmospheric boiling point.
2. Pumping out a vessel at a rate faster than the liquid can be replaced with gas or
vapour.
3. Gravity emptying.
4. Condensation of vapour.
Page 20 of 69
6.8. Cold service

a. Liquid condensation and/or solids formation
1. If autorefrigeration or Joule-Thomson cooling causes low temperatures (below
minimum rated temperature for the downstream piping and equipment), consideration
shall be given for liquid condensation and/or solids formation in released vapours
(e.g., letdown from high pressure gas service or low temperature storage of LNG or
LPG, fluorocarbons, or other low boiling materials).
2. In these cases, the pressure relief device and depressuring valve (if used) shall be
constructed of materials suitable for the minimum temperature encountered.
3. Refer to GP 44-80 for more detailed guidance.
4. Additionally, potential blockage and/or liquids accumulation should be considered in
the design for these services.
b. Any nonflammable, nontoxic liquefied gas (e.g., CO2) capable of forming solid particles
on discharge should be vented directly to atmosphere at a safe location with minimal
piping downstream of the pressure relief device. Refer to GP 44-80 for detailed guidance
on vent systems and dispersion modelling.
c. Pressure relief for CO2 is a specialised area, and further advice should be sought before
proceeding with the design. The pressure relief device should be constructed of materials
suitable for this service.
d. If autorefrigeration or Joule-Thomson cooling through a pressure relief valve is
anticipated, heating and insulating of the valve should be considered to minimise leakage
caused by the valve failing to reclose completely.
6.9. External fire condition

a. Pressure relief devices shall be provided for the fire relief condition on vessels and
equipment that could be subjected to a sustained external fire. Calculation methods shall
comply with API Std 521/ISO 23251.
b. For pressure equipment (i.e., design pressure greater than 1,0 barg [15 psig]), a heat input
rate of 66,2 kW/m2 (21 000 Btu/hr ft2) should be used if adequate drainage and firefighting
capability are provided in accordance with API Std 521/ISO 23251. If adequate drainage
and/or firefighting are not provided, a heat input rate of 108,8 kW/m2 (34 500 Btu/hr ft2)
shall be used.
c. For low pressure storage tanks (i.e., design pressure less than or equal to 1,0 barg
[15 psig]), requirements in API Std 2000 or ISO 28300 shall be used.
d. For all spherical storage vessels, regardless of drainage or firefighting capability, a heat
input rate 108,8 kW/m2 (34 500 Btu/hr ft2) shall be used.
e. For column bases, the level of the wetted surface should be based on the normal liquid
level, plus a level equivalent to the liquid on all the trays or internal packing, on the
assumption that the liquid will be dumped into the base of the column. If there are total
trapout trays, this should be modified.
f. Pressure vessels should not be assumed to be liquid full, unless that is the normal operating
condition (e.g., shell and tube heat exchangers that contain liquid streams). The liquid level
used in the wetted surface area determination for vessels may be based on either:
1. High level alarm set point.
2. Maximum operating level.
g. The relief rate shall be determined at the relieving conditions, taking account of changes in
latent heat, composition, etc., due to elevated pressure and temperature.
Page 21 of 69
h. Fire relief
1. Pressure relief devices that protect vessels during an external fire (including liquid
full vessels) should be sized assuming all vapour venting (i.e., adequate
disengagement of the liquid and vapour occurs).
2. However, fire relief design for vessels containing reactive or foamy fluids and/or
vessels in which the pressure relief device inlet is connected below liquid level shall
size the relief device based upon incomplete vapour/liquid disengagement (i.e., two
phase or flashing flow).
3. The relief rate should be determined on the basis that the equipment is isolated. It
may be acceptable to take credit for open outlets but only if it is possible to ensure
that the outlets will remain open and have adequate capacity during a fire (e.g., it is
normal practice for emergency responders to isolate lines and equipment).
i. Vessel failure
1. Vessels may fail due to sustained exposure to high temperature from the flame/fire
plume and/or thermal radiation for the following cases:
a) Gas or vapour filled vessels.
b) Vessels in which the fluid can reach or exceed thermodynamic critical
conditions (dense phase fluid).
2. In these cases, vessel will fail due to overtemperature rather than overpressure, so a
pressure relief device is generally ineffective.
3. Deluge, fireproofing, emergency depressurisation, or other system mitigation should
be provided to protect against vessel rupture due to overtemperature for large
equipment that is subject to external fire.
j. All bunded areas (curbed or diked) with storage tanks or equipment storing combustible
liquids shall be considered potential fire zones (refer to NFPA 30).
k. A closed system for the fire relief case shall be sized to handle simultaneous discharge
from all pressure relief devices that are judged to be affected. Refer to GN 44-001 for
additional guidance on fire zones as follows:
1. Fire zone shall be determined by reference to the plot plan, making allowance for
adjacent roads, bund (dike) walls, curbed areas, firewalls, and drainage conditions.
2. Areas considered shall be consistent with design of the surface water drainage system
such that it is not possible for fire to be spread further as a result of burning
hydrocarbons being carried on top of draining fire water.
3. If evaluating drainage credit, consideration should be given to the amount of firewater
that might be applied in the fire area (can be several hundred cubic metres per hour or
thousands of gallons per minute).
4. For offshore platforms, account shall be taken of plant above and below the plot area.
l. The pool fire case need not be considered for equipment if all the following conditions are
met:
1. Equipment itself does not contain flammable/combustible liquids.
2. Equipment is located greater than 15 m (50 ft) from any vessel, pipe, tank, or other
equipment containing flammable/combustible liquids.
3. Flammable/combustible liquid spills will not drain within 15 m (50 ft) of the
equipment.
Page 22 of 69
m. External pool fire need not be considered a credible cause of overpressure for equipment
that is below the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Section VIII Division 1 size
limitations (i.e., diameter of 150 mm [6 in] or less).
n. For each fire relief zone, the following shall be taken as the basis for calculation:
1. No process heat input or removal.
2. Fire heat input load on all equipment.
o. For any particular plot area for which fire conditions require relief capacity in excess of
that required for any other emergency conditions, fireproofing of selected equipment
should be applied to reduce the discharge rate and the size of any closed relief system as
follows:
1. If the pressure relief device is sized on this basis, fireproofing shall be specifically
designed and installed to resist the forces of fire hose streams and maintain its
insulation properties for an extended period (900°C [1 652°F] for 2 hr in accordance
with API Std 521/ISO 23251).
2. Details of fire resistant insulation shall be included in the relief and overpressure
design basis (see A.10.).
p. No credit for firewater or a fire protection system reducing fire heat input shall be taken
unless specifically allowed by the code (e.g., NFPA 30 for flammable/combustible storage
tanks) and approved by the project EA.
q. For above grade, nonearth covered vessels, the environment factor, F, in the API equation
(as referenced in API Std 521) should be assumed to equal 1,0, thereby allowing no credit
for insulation.
r. Requirements for shell and tube and air cooled heat exchangers during external fire
conditions are covered in 8.1.3 and 8.2, respectively.
6.10. Multiphase vapour/liquid relief

a. Some overpressure scenarios require a flashing liquid or a mixed phase fluid to be relieved.
Because these fluids generate additional vapour as the fluid is depressurised through the
relief device, the standard relief device sizing methods for liquid or vapour service shall
not be used.
b. Relief devices in multiphase service should be sized using the HEM method.
c. Relief device shall be selected, and the piping system shall be designed to accommodate
two phase flow, if this is identified as a potential relief scenario, even though it may not be
the governing relief case that determines the relief device capacity.
d. Consideration should be given to cases wherein the relieving fluid can change in phase as
the scenario progresses (e.g., displacement of a liquid plug ahead of the gas phase due to
gas breakthrough into a liquid filled system). In such cases, relief valve and downstream
piping system shall be designed for relief load requiring the maximum relief area.
e. Impact of liquid entrainment with vapour relief should be considered in sizing of pressure
relief devices and design of discharge systems. If atmospheric relief is used, environmental
and safety consequences shall be evaluated (see GP 44-80).
6.11. Thermal relief

a. Thermal relief on piping is not normally required in short, isolatable sections within
battery limits. However, liquid lines that can be blocked in during normal operation while
subject to heat input from external sources, such as ambient conditions, heat tracing, steam
jacketing, adjacent hot lines, or radiation from flares, shall have thermal relief valves if the
Page 23 of 69
increase in fluid pressure will increase pressures beyond those permitted by the relevant
piping design code (see 8.1.3 and GN 44-001). The following shall also be considered:
1. Expansion of trapped fluid shall be calculated and pressure relief device sized
accordingly.
2. For most systems, a DN 20 by DN 25 (NPS 3/4 by NPS 1) relief valve can be used,
even though it will commonly be oversized.
b. Equipment shall have thermal relief if fluid can be trapped between inlet and outlet valves
and if sufficient heat can be supplied to the fluid to increase pressure above equipment
design pressure. Such equipment shall include heat exchangers, vessels, and pumps as
follows:
1. This shall not apply if valves are locked open during operation and closed only under
permit or procedure (see 6.4.1.1.g).
2. If relief is to the process, thermal relief valves shall discharge to a location that is
always capable of absorbing relieved material. Location of other valves and their
possible positions at the time of discharge of the thermal relief valve shall be taken
into account.
c. To reduce the likelihood of demand on thermal relief valves, operating procedures should
be in place to ensure that blocked in piping and equipment is drained if equipment is to be
out of service for a prolonged period of time.
d. If the cold side can be blocked in between inlet and outlet valves with flow on the hot side,
heat exchanger shall have a pressure relief device for thermal expansion. However, note
the requirements outlined in 6.4.1.1.g.
e. Sizing of thermal relief shall assume that:
1. Fluid is initially at the most severe operating conditions.
2. Pumps and compressors on process fluid continue to operate, unless there is an
automatic shutdown initiated by blocking in, for example, on low flow.
3. Relief devices on pumps and compressors and kickback systems operate.
4. Heat input continues at design operating rate. If temperature sensors are located such
that blocking of the process flow gives a low temperature at the sensor, the maximum
possible heat input should be used in sizing thermal relief.
5. Potential for multiphase relief sizing should be considered if the fluid boils at relief
device opening pressure.
f. Sizing of thermal relief shall be based on maximum flow of fuel to fired heaters or of
heating medium to other equipment. Control valves on heater fuel or heating fluids shall be
assumed to be fully open.
g. If thermal relief valves discharge into a closed system, effects of backpressure shall be
considered for selection of relief valve type and its set pressure.
h. If thermal relief devices are present to protect piping, relief requirement should be
determined based on solar radiation flux at the site and half the area of piping (portion
exposed to sun).
7. Letdown stations
7.1. General
a. In considering process systems in which fluids pass from a high pressure system to a low
pressure system, the low pressure system shall be protected from overpressure.
Page 24 of 69
b. Relief devices shall be sized to take into account the fluid conditions and all undesirable
circumstances in operation of the letdown station.
7.2. Design for gas breakthrough (blowby)

a. Relief design shall consider the case in which all valves (operating in parallel) across an
HP/LP interface are fully open and gas breakthrough occurs in liquid systems.
b. To calculate the amount of gas breakthrough from a high pressure system to a low pressure
system with the letdown valve fully open, high pressure system should be assumed to be
operating at maximum possible pressure, taking into consideration any pressure limiting
instrumentation (e.g., high pressure trip setting) and normal operating temperature, and
with its normal molecular weight gas. Downstream system shall be assumed to be at its
maximum allowable accumulated pressure. Other considerations are:
1. These values should be modified if there is a known condition in which distinctly
different values prevail.
2. Full range of operating conditions shall be considered, from purging, through
prestartup and startup procedures, to shutdown, regeneration, and gas freeing. If there
is a range of operating conditions, the extreme shall be used in calculation.
c. Cg (valve sizing coefficient for gas) of actual letdown valve(s) and bypass valve(s) in their
fully open position shall be determined. Manufacturer equation for gas flow or a
recognised industry equivalent equation shall use this Cg data to calculate gas flow volume
between the upstream high pressure system and the downstream lower pressure in the
liquid system. Adequate downstream relief system capacity for the potential gas volumes
through the liquid valves shall be provided and verified.
d. Manual bypass
1. If manual bypass(es) installed around a control valve is capable of much higher flow
rates than the control valve itself, potential flow through the bypass may need to be
reduced by modifying the valve size, installing a restriction orifice, installing
mechanical limit stops, or applying administrative controls (e.g., locked or sealed
closed), dependent on capacity of the downstream relief system.
2. The appropriateness of all such protective measures should be considered in LOPA.
3. See 7.8 for more detail on accounting for flow through the bypass.
e. Calculated maximum flow rate of gas through the letdown station may exceed the flow
rate that could be reasonably sustained by the upstream system. In such cases, dynamic
simulation should be used to determine size of the downstream relief device, accounting
for the time it takes for downstream pressure to increase from its maximum operating
pressure to relieving pressure.
7.3. Design for liquid overfill

a. In addition to the gas breakthrough case, the effect of displacement of large quantities of
liquid from high pressure system and piping into low pressure system shall be considered.
If low pressure system gas space is not large enough to accommodate this liquid, relief
valves and relief lines shall be sized to accept this liquid at a volumetric rate equal to gas
flow across the letdown valve (gas expanded to relieving pressure of low pressure system)
as follows:
1. If this occurrence could cause overfilling of the low pressure vessel if starting from
normal operating levels, full liquid relief capacity shall be considered from the low
pressure vessel. Relieving liquid flow is the volumetric equivalent to gas flow through
the system (corrected for density), taking due account that liquid could be at or
exceeding its bubble point, in which case the relief device shall be designed for two
phase flow.
Page 25 of 69
2. Operating levels may be reduced to prevent overfilling, however either of the

following shall be provided:
a) Provision for full liquid relief capacity, together with suitable means of
disposing and handling a sufficient quantity of liquid (see GP 44-80).
b) SIS of suitable integrity, in accordance with GP 48-03, to stop further liquid
inflow a sufficient time before equipment space is filled.
b. If the downstream system is liquid full and gas breakthrough occurs, transient pressure
increase in the downstream system can be very rapid, and piping ahead of the relief device
could be exposed to pressures greater than design pressure due to increased pressure drop.
ISD principles should be applied in selecting design pressure and corresponding set
pressures for the downstream system and any relief devices.
7.4. Control valve size

a. In designing the relief system, installed valve size (assumed to be fully open) shall be
reflected in relief calculations, and the basis shall be clearly defined. No credit shall be
taken for mechanical stops, control systems, or administrative controls limiting opening of
the valve if upstream operating pressure can exceed downstream corrected test pressure.
b. Since control valve trim size and the size of any orifice plate in the bypass are central to
the relief case, this data:
1. Should be listed with relief valve data and included in a register of safety critical
equipment.
2. Shall not be changed without appropriate resizing calculations and using the
appropriate MOC procedure.
c. In new design, relief valve sizing and associated piping hydraulic calculations shall be
revalidated after control valve selection, even though control valve definition is often late
in the project cycle.
d. In erosive services, the potential for wear of the control valve internals or an orifice plate
shall be considered and measures put in place to ensure that downstream relief capacity is
not compromised by increases in valve Cg or orifice diameter in operation. Measures could
include providing a design margin in relief device capacity, subject to constraints, such as
valve chatter.
e. Modifications to control valve or bypass sizes shall be subject to MOC procedures
requiring reappraisal of the relief load and, hence, any changes required to the relief
capacity.
7.5. Credit for open outlets

a. HAZOP shall include consideration of operating scenarios under which relief conditions,
including gas breakthrough, could occur.
b. Credit for flow through normal vapour outlet(s) shall not be taken during gas
breakthrough, unless it can be shown that:
1. Downstream vessel has sufficient space for vapour-liquid disengagement.
2. Vapour outlet valve is normally open and will remain open during breakthrough
scenario.
3. Downstream vapour handling system can accommodate increased flow and/or
changing condition of breakthrough vapour.
c. If it is determined that credit can be taken for vapour outlet valve, it should be assumed
that this valve stays in its minimum operating position.
Page 26 of 69
d. No credit shall be taken for automatic controls operating to open gas outlet routes that are
normally closed (e.g., flare spilloff valves).
e. If credit is to be taken for an open outlet, it shall be demonstrated that the open outlet and
downstream equipment are able to accommodate fluid composition and possible phase
change under gas blowby conditions.
7.6. Credit for operator intervention

a. In design of relief systems on letdown stations in either vapour or liquid relieving
situations, no credit shall be taken for operator intervention. See GP 44-80 for decision
trees and additional guidance on operator intervention.
b. Operator response as part of the protection layer shall be considered as outlined in
7.7. Credit for instrumentation

a. Instrumentation (which is not high reliability and not designated as a SIS) that is used for
minimising the frequency and extent of relief valve operation shall not contribute to a
reduction in design capacity of the relief system.
b. Dynamics of the system shall be assessed to ensure that the response time of any SIS is
sufficiently fast to prevent downstream equipment from exceeding maximum allowable
accumulated pressure.
7.8. Bypass valves and restriction orifices

The following criteria shall be used to address bypasses around control valves during evaluation
of downstream equipment overpressure protection and relief system design (Figure 1 provides a
system sketch of a typical arrangement):
a. If upstream pressure when bypass valve is opened is less than maximum allowable
accumulated pressure (i.e., relieving pressure) in downstream equipment, procedures may
be used to protect against inadvertent opening of the bypass valve.
b. Definition of upstream pressure shall consider not only normal process conditions but also
nonroutine operations, such as startup and shutdown (see 7.2.1.1.b).
Figure 1 - Schematic of a typical letdown station
Pressure = P1
Pressure = P2
P2T = corrected test pressure

P2A = maximum allowable accumulated pressure
Page 27 of 69
Table 1 - Overpressure design for letdown stations with bypasses
Opening of
bypass
increases flow
Operating to downstream Relief device Bypass controls and/or
Case Bypass use pressure equipment? sizing basis hydraulic turbines
1 Normally open P2A < P1 < P2T No Consider transient None required
or maintenance conditions on initial
only opening of bypass
2 Normally open P2A < P1 < P2T Yes Flow through None required
control valve plus
flow through
bypass
3 Maintenance P2A < P1 < P2T Yes Flow through Bypass flow restricted to ≤
only control valve or maximum flow through control
flow through valve and bypass
bypass (whichever administrative controls to lock
is larger) in closed position
4 Maintenance P1 > P2T > P2A Yes Flow through Consider removal of bypass or
only control valve plus bypass flow restricted to ≤
flow through maximum flow through control
bypass valve and bypass
administrative controls to lock
in closed position
c. Cases summarised in Table 1 consider that upstream pressure exceeds maximum allowable
accumulated pressure (i.e., relieving pressure) in downstream equipment when bypass
valve is opened.
d. The following overpressure scenarios shall be considered for overpressure protection of
downstream equipment, with due reference to 7.5:
1. Normal flow through letdown station with a closed outlet on vessel.
2. Maximum flow through letdown station minus normal flow rate entering vessel.
3. Maximum flow through letdown station for cases in which a closed vessel outlet can
occur in conjunction with maximum flow through letdown station due to a credible
common failure mode.
e. Flow through the letdown station shall be calculated on the basis given in Table 1.
f. Pressure relief device shall be sized for the largest of credible scenarios.
g. In developing relief load, pressure drop through the lines at higher flow rates should be
considered to avoid overestimating relief load. Options to further reduce relief load
contribution from the bypass line include:
1. Removal of bypass line.
2. Installation of a smaller bypass valve.
3. Installation of a restriction orifice in bypass line.
7.9. Temperature effects

Since there can be appreciable temperature effects if hydrocarbon fluids are reduced in pressure,
the significance of these temperature changes shall be considered in both relief valve sizing and
the suitability of the materials of construction.
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7.10. Interconnecting pipework

a. In design, pipework lengths and valve sizes are normally such that flow is determined by
pressure drop through the valve rather than through piping. However, because this is not
necessarily so in all retrofit cases, checks should be made.
b. If credit is to be taken for influence of piping pressure drops, relevant data shall be
recorded in relief and overpressure design basis (see 9.3).
8. Equipment, tankage, and piping
8.1. Shell and tube heat exchangers
8.1.1. General
a. In exchanger systems consisting of more than one shell, both shell or tube sides
interconnected without intermediate isolating valves may be considered as single systems
for the purpose of overpressure protection design, unless severe fouling could occur or
transient overpressures as a result of tube rupture, validated by dynamic analysis, require
treatment as separate units.
b. Overpressure conditions to be considered shall include possibilities set forth in
API Std 521/ISO 23251 and as follows:
1. Blocked in and burst tube conditions shall be designed for, together with any
implications of more gradual tube leakage.
2. Overpressure conditions should be met by designing for pressure containment (see
GN 44-001).
8.1.2. Burst tube condition

a. A burst tube condition can occur either as a tube leak or as a tube rupture (sometimes
described as a guillotine fracture). Both cases shall be considered for possible overpressure
of the low pressure side of the exchanger, connected piping, cross contamination
consequences, and possible effects downstream of the exchanger in the entire low pressure
system where the tube failure occurred.
b. A complete single tube failure shall be taken for design purposes, with calculation in
accordance with API Std 521/ISO 23251.
c. If maximum operating pressure on high pressure side is greater than corrected test pressure
on low pressure side, the low pressure side of the exchanger shall have relief protection for
a burst tube.
d. If tube failure produces the controlling relief case, process design should be reconsidered
to check if it is economical to eliminate the relieving requirement (e.g., by increasing
design pressure of low pressure side of exchanger such that its test pressure equals design
pressure of high pressure side [see API Std 521/ISO 23251]). However, there may still be a
requirement to either increase design pressure or provide pressure relief on other items
connected to low pressure side.
e. If there is a significant differential pressure between high pressure and low pressure side of
exchanger and low pressure side is liquid full, process dynamics should be evaluated to
determine if low pressure side could be overpressured before relief device opens fully and
a full relief flow path is established as follows:
1. If high pressure side operates at pressures in excess of 69 barg (1 000 psig), dynamic
analysis should be performed to determine type, size(s), and location(s) for relief
device(s) and associated piping.
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2. Geometry of exchanger also influences extent of overpressure and should be

considered in determining whether dynamic analysis is required at lower differential
pressures.
f. If only a steady state analysis of the burst tube is warranted, calculation should assume a
worst case location for tube rupture and calculate pressure drop through the entire length of
flow path, from fracture site to relief device, to determine size(s) and location(s) of relief
device(s). Calculations should include the following:
1. If an instantaneous tube rupture is determined to be a credible scenario or the heat
exchanger is not part of a network, the relief device should be sized based on the
larger of the following calculations:
a) Mass flow of the high pressure fluid through ruptured tube ends.
b) Equivalent mass flow of displaced low pressure side fluid.
2. If tube rupture is likely to be caused by a more gradual failure mechanism, relief
device should be sized to accommodate flow of high pressure fluid from ruptured
tube ends and justification should be documented in the relief and overpressure
dossier (see 9.4).
3. Consideration should be given to potential increase in relieving rate due to heat
transfer by direct contact of high pressure and low pressure fluids.
g. Provision of several relief devices along the length of an exchanger or on multishell units
should be considered to ensure that flow path between any tube rupture location and a
relief device is minimised.
h. Credit for excess material escaping via the normal process system shall only be taken if it
can be demonstrated that the low pressure process system has capacity for the material,
administrative controls are in place, and there is little risk that operators would block in
low pressure side (i.e., block in relief path).
i. Overpressure protection of equipment shall be provided along the low pressure side flow
path to final destination (i.e., atmosphere or collection tank), since past incidents have
shown that it is possible to overpressure equipment some distance from the exchanger if
tube failure occurs.
j. In assessing behaviour of heating and cooling medium systems for burst tube and external
fire conditions, the following should be noted:
1. On steam systems, inlet check valves and downstream steam traps, if fitted, shall be
taken as equivalent to closed valves (i.e., steam side is completely blocked in).
Therefore, steam system piping and components, including check valves and steam
traps, shall be designed for the maximum overpressure case from either process or
utility systems.
2. On cooling medium systems, inlet check valves shall be taken as equivalent to closed
valves, and although a downstream pressure escape route may normally be open,
isolating valves in it shall be regarded as closed in emergency, unless administrative
controls are in place (particularly if light flammable fluid is found to be leaking into a
cooling medium system). In such cases, these systems should be regarded as blocked
in, and cooling medium system components between exchanger and cooling system
isolation valve(s) shall be designed for maximum overpressure from either process or
cooling medium system.
3. If a hot oil or other heating medium is on the low pressure side and a volatile fluid
(i.e., capable of vaporising at hot oil temperature) is on the high pressure side, the hot
oil receiver (expansion drum) shall have a pressure relief device. This device shall be
sized to accommodate flow from a single tube failure in heat exchanger that causes
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the largest relief load in the hot oil system, assuming that fluid is heated to normal hot
oil operating temperature.
k. Each case for possible design of pressure relief devices for this condition should be
considered individually. For example, if pressure differential and potential leakage are
significant, such as with high pressure gas coolers, or in any other case in which high
pressure can rapidly build up on low pressure side with a tube failure during normal
operation, a relief device should be installed. However, if a pressure leak can be
accommodated in normal flow, a relief device should not be automatically provided.
Accordingly, pressure relief for tube failure may be omitted if both of the following are
true (however, possible need for thermal relief should not be overlooked in any case):
1. Low pressure side can absorb tube rupture flow without causing other problems
upstream or downstream of tube break.
2. Volumetric flow from tube rupture (expanded to low pressure side relieving pressure)
is less than normal volumetric flow through low pressure side.
l. In offshore systems, a burst tube or spurious opening of the relief device(s) can result in
significant quantities of liquid and gas being relieved via the relief device(s) into the flare
system or to atmosphere (e.g., if direct seawater cooling is used and a caisson is provided
for disposal to sea). For this reason, emergency isolation valves should be installed on inlet
to and outlet from low pressure side of exchanger to limit quantities of liquid or gas
released. If emergency isolation valves are installed on cooling water stream, exchanger
should be considered to be blocked in for assessment of burst tube condition.
m. A burst tube condition shall be considered for a heating or cooling coil in a vessel, unless
process piping is used, in which case a small leak is frequently considered.
n. Provision of overpressure protection for heat exchanger and associated pipework does not
eliminate the need for process hazard analysis (i.e., HAZOP) to consider wider process
implications of any interstream leakage.
8.1.3. External fire condition

a. Heat exchangers that can be isolated without draining or are in an area where a fire could
be sustained shall have pressure relief capacity for the external fire condition on both sides.
This applies even if exchangers are designed for pressure containment.
b. Consideration should be given to the ability of operations/emergency responders to isolate
process and utilities flow during a major fire. It should be verified that failure of heat
exchanger would not affect response by emergency responders nor add appreciably to
extent and/or duration of the fire.
c. Sizing for the shell side shall be based on heat input to shell area exposed to fire. Sizing for
tube side shall be based on heat input to channel area exposed to fire.
d. For water cooled exchangers with hot fluid on the shell side, pressure relief devices need
not be provided for steam formation if maximum temperature of shell fluid is below
boiling point of water at tube side design pressure. However, relief capacity shall be made
available for any steam generated by heat input into the channel and/or bonnet, possibly
through pressure relief valves provided for thermal relief.
e. If chemical cleaning is required on a routine basis during normal operation, pressure relief
devices for fire condition shall be sized not only for normal process fluid but also for
chemical cleaning fluid.
f. For high boiling point liquids, vapourisation due to external fire may not need to be
considered. However, pressure relief devices for thermal expansion should be provided.
Page 31 of 69
8.2. Air cooled heat exchangers

a. Air cooled exchangers are generally protected by a pressure relief device installed on
upstream equipment.
b. An open flow path shall exist between protective device and air cooled exchanger.
c. For the fire scenario, API Std 521/ISO 23251 mitigation alternatives should be used in lieu
of a pressure relief device. Mitigation methods include:
1. Installing air cooled exchangers above pipe rack or at elevations greater than 7,5 m
(25 ft) from grade to mitigate fire exposure scenario. This is directly applicable to
pool fires that occur at grade. However, a more detailed analysis is required if jet fires
are possible.
2. Installing air cooled exchangers such that they are not located above equipment
containing large amounts of flammable liquids, including pumps, heat exchangers,
surge drums, reboilers, and accumulators, but not including pipe racks.
3. Considering plot layout (e.g., locating air cooled exchangers at the ends of the process
unit or as far as possible from other equipment containing liquids).
4. Providing capability to isolate the air cooled exchanger if a fire were to occur.
5. Designing overhead air cooled exchanger (condensers) to be free draining toward the
tower or reflux drum to minimise liquid content.
6. Sloping the ground underneath the air cooled exchanger to minimise formation of a
liquid pool beneath exchanger.
8.3. Double pipe heat exchangers

a. In general, double pipe heat exchangers are fabricated from schedule piping and complete
tube rupture is unlikely (see API Std 521/ISO 23251). Therefore, it is usually not necessary
to consider an internal failure in double pipe heat exchangers.
b. If specific experience has shown that an internal failure is credible, an internal failure
should be considered but, in most cases, would constitute a partial failure (e.g., hole),
rather than a full bore failure.
c. Regarding fire exposure, double pipe heat exchangers are similar to piping (high surface
area per volume) and, as such, should be treated comparably to air cooled heat exchangers.
8.4. Plate and frame/plate and shell heat exchangers

a. Relief protection of plate and frame exchangers shall comply with API Std 521/ISO 23251
requirements related to shell and tube heat exchangers. However, an effective hole size
should be used to determine flow through a cracked plate.
b. Fire should not be considered in the design of overpressure protection systems for plate
and frame exchangers with elastomeric gasketing that would burn away upon fire
exposure.
8.5. Printed circuit heat exchangers (PCHE)

a. There is no real equivalent of a burst tube case in a PCHE because it is constructed of a
solid block in which channels are etched. Hence, design pressure is equivalent on both
sides of exchanger. Pressure relief is therefore not required on a PCHE for burst tube.
b. PCHEs can, however, be subject to other failure mechanisms that can result in high
pressure gas leaking into low pressure fluid via cracks, with the potential to overpressure
downstream piping on the low pressure side, particularly if this can be blocked in under
normal operation. Leak rate shall be conservatively estimated to be equivalent to leakage
rate through an orifice equivalent to twice the diameter of a single flow channel.
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c. Thermal relief requirements shall be considered for PCHEs and appropriate protection
provided.
8.6. Other types of heat exchangers

a. Other types of heat exchangers include:
1. Brazed aluminium plate fin exchangers.
2. LNG main heat exchanger, spiral wound.
3. Twisted tube heat exchangers.
4. Helical baffle heat exchangers.
b. Overpressure protection for aluminium plate fin exchangers shall be treated similar to plate
and frame exchangers as described in 8.4.
c. Manufacturer of LNG main heat exchanger shall be consulted to determine overpressure
protection requirements.
d. Overpressure protection for twisted tube heat exchangers and helical baffle heat
exchangers shall be designed in accordance with 8.1.
8.7. Centrifugal pumps

a. If the suction side of a standby pump can be overpressured following inadvertent closure
of the suction block valve, suction line and fittings, from and including suction block valve
and pump suction flange, shall be rated at the same line specification as pump discharge. If
this cannot be achieved (due to an existing pump being reused or a vendor not making this
style pump available), adequate relief for potential backflow pressures and rates or
appropriate valve sequencing (such as holding the suction valve open) shall be designed
and verified during process hazard analysis (HAZOP) for this system.
b. For a constant speed centrifugal pump, maximum suction pressure should be determined
from the following set of considerations:
1. Maximum suction head in normal operation, based on largest size impeller that can be
accommodated in the casing design.
2. Shut-in differential head based on largest size impeller that can be accommodated in
the casing design.
3. Maximum specific gravity in normal operation.
c. In checking pressure ratings of suction line and fittings against pump design pressure,
depending on local codes, 33% may be added to the ratings for maximum allowable
nonshock working pressure given in ASME B16.5 for flanges (including pump casing
suction flange) and fittings, or 33% may be added to maximum allowable stress for other
components. The following should also be evaluated:
1. Pump casing and seals shall be checked to determine if there are pressure limitations
that prevent the use of 133% of piping design pressure.
2. The 33% allowance may be applied only if it lasts less than 10 hr at any one time or
less than 100 hr per yr in accordance with GP 42-10 and ASME B31.3 and shall not
be used for cast iron or similar nonductile material.
3. Other local codes and standards may govern the temporary overpressure allowance
for piping in other worldwide locations.
4. Pump seal shall also be checked for adequate design pressure.
d. As an alternative to rerating suction piping, pressure relief devices may be installed on the
suction lines between the block valve and pump, relieving pressure downstream of the inlet
Page 33 of 69
block valve to a safe location. However, this is normally a more expensive design and shall
not be used for highly viscous or coking liquids.
e. Pump pressure relief devices should discharge to a feed drum, tank, vessel, or pump
suction. If discharging into the pump suction, consideration shall be given to guard against
eventual overheating of fluid from mechanical heating (e.g., trip systems and
administrative controls are commonly used).
f. To mitigate a potential blocked discharge scenario, discharge piping and equipment shall
be designed for one of the following pressure ratings:
1. The sum of suction vessel design pressure plus static head pressure from the suction
vessel normal liquid level to the pump suction flange, plus pump shut-in pressure
with design impeller diameter.
2. The greater of:
a) The sum of suction vessel design pressure, plus static head pressure from the
suction vessel normal liquid level to pump suction flange, plus pump normal
differential pressure.
b) The sum of the suction vessel maximum operating pressure, plus static head
pressure from suction vessel normal operating pressure to pump suction flange,
plus pump shut-in pressure.
8.8. Positive displacement pumps

a. Positive displacement pumps other than as defined in c. shall have external pressure relief
valves.
b. Credit shall not be taken for internal relief devices for overpressure protection.
c. Some small pumps, such as small pneumatic driven metering pumps, if designed to stall
below the MAWP of the equipment, may not need a pressure relief device.
8.9. Steam turbine drivers

a. Backpressure turbines
1. For backpressure turbines in which the exhaust side can be overpressured following
inadvertent closure of exhaust side block valve, a pressure relief device shall be
installed between turbine and exhaust block valve.
2. This device shall be sized for full design turbine flow (final rated flow supplied by
turbine vendor for equipment actually installed) or capacity of the outlet at relieving
pressure (generally 110% of system design pressure) and shall be set at the casing
exhaust side pressure rating or the allowable exhaust piping pressure, whichever is
lower.
3. If backpressure turbines have intermediate takeoffs, the relief arrangements shall
ensure that no section of the turbine casing or interconnecting pipework is subject to
overpressure under conditions of wide open throttle valves, full design throttle
pressure, and closed intermediate takeoff valves.
b. Condensing turbines
1. Condensing turbines should be protected from overpressure by either atmospheric
relief valves or rupture disks.
2. The minimum area of relief should be such that, if the turbine throttle valves are wide
open with the turbine inlet pressure at its design value, no section of the turbine
casing, condenser, or interconnecting pipework should exceed its maximum
accumulated pressure.
Page 34 of 69
3. The provisions in 1 and 2. should also apply to condensing turbines with intermediate
takeoff connections.
c. In checking manufacturer rating for exhaust side of the casing and also maximum pressure
rating for the exhaust line, it is permissible, depending upon local codes, to add 33% to
ratings for maximum allowable nonshock working pressure given in ASME B16.5 for
flanges (including casing exhaust flange) and fittings or to add 33% to maximum allowable
stress for other components as follows:
1. The 33% allowance may be applied only if it lasts less than 10 hr at any one time or
less than 100 hr per yr in accordance with GP 42-10 and ASME B31.3 and shall not
be used for cast iron or similar nonductile materials.
2. Other local codes and standards may govern temporary overpressure allowance for
piping in other worldwide locations.
d. Condensing turbines shall have a pressure relief device to protect against overpressure
resulting from loss of cooling water or other operational failure.
e. Noncondensing turbines shall have a pressure relief device on the low pressure side
upstream of the first block valve. Sentinel valves shall not be considered pressure relief
devices.
8.10. Furnaces/waste heat recovery units

a. Pressure relief devices shall be located on furnace outlet, upstream of the first block valve.
These should be sized, taking into consideration the possibility of multiphase flow under
some relief scenarios.
b. Pressure relief devices shall only be installed at the furnace inlet if there is a possibility of
the following:
1. Internals of pressure relief devices is subject to coking, if located on the furnace outlet
and there is no steam or other purge available to keep pressure relief device inlet
clean.
2. Individual tubes can be blocked with coke.
c. A fuel shutdown system shall be provided to prevent overheating and rupture of a tube, if a
pressure relief device located at the furnace inlet opens and causes inadequate flow through
tubes.
d. Failure of the process tubes should still be considered, even if the fuel shutdown system
worked successfully, because it may be possible for the residual sensible heat of refractory
to cause overtemperature failure of the process tubes after firing is stopped.
8.11. Boilers
a. Safety valves for ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section I boilers should be set
such that the first valve to open is downstream of the superheater.
b. Pilot operated relief valves shall not be used on ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Section I boilers.
c. Safety valve(s) on steam drum should be set to open over as wide a range of pressure as
permissible, with the first safety valve to open being the smallest size used. Subsequent
safety valves should be progressively larger.
d. Safety valve protecting economiser/preheater (e.g., safety valve on the steam disengaging
drum) should be set to open after all drum valves have opened.
Page 35 of 69
8.12. Compressors
a. Reciprocating and centrifugal compressors in which pressure during surge or closed
discharge can exceed MAWP of piping, equipment, or casing shall have a pressure relief
device. An SIS shall not be used as a substitute for a pressure relief device to provide
overpressure protection in this instance.
b. Compressor pressure relief valves shall discharge to a safe location, such as a closed flare,
if compressing hydrocarbons or toxic materials. Consideration shall be given to Joule-
Thompson cooling across the pressure relief valve and downstream system.
c. If the pressure relief valve discharges back to suction of the compressor, an analysis should
be performed to verify that temperature and pressure of compressor suction and process
fluid do not exceed their maximum safe operating limits.
d. Operation of a pressure relief valve shall not cause or intensify compressor surge or create
a system malfunction.
e. If reciprocating compressor suction piping can be overpressured due to internal back
leakage through compressor discharge valves of discharge gas when the machine is shut
down, the suction piping shall have a pressure relief device or the compressor inlet flange
and suction piping back to the first block valve shall be rated for the higher pressure.
f. Reciprocating compressors shall have a pressure relief device on the discharge side that is
upstream of the first isolation valve.
g. Multistage reciprocating compressors shall have pressure relief devices for each stage.
Consideration should also be given to multistage centrifugal compressors, especially
multibody compressors to ensure that adequate overpressure protection is supplied for each
compressor stage.
h. Compressor suction systems, including suction drum and piping downstream of suction
side shutdown isolation valve, shall be designed to accommodate calculated settle out
pressure following a compressor shutdown, assuming that discharge is at the high pressure
trip setting. Design pressure of the suction system should be set at least 10% higher than
maximum settle out pressure.
D
i. Check valves should be provided between upstream low pressure systems and compressor
suction system to minimise reverse flow of high pressure gas from compressor discharge
during the time it takes for compressor to spin down and shutdown valves to isolate the
system following compressor shutdown.
8.13. Flowline and transmission pipelines and associated equipment
8.13.1. General
a. For the purposes of this GP, flowline and transmission pipelines and associated equipment
shall be defined as follows:
1. Oil or gas transmission pipelines both on land and offshore but excluding processing
plant.
2. Departure and arrival terminals immediately associated with transmission pipelines,
plus any intermediate stations, as required. This includes pig launchers/receivers and
slug catchers but not processing facilities associated with a terminal.
3. Flowlines transporting oil, gas, or water that connect wellheads to production
facilities. These can be used for production or injection/disposal purposes.
Page 36 of 69
b. In main transmission pipelines and associated equipment, provision of pressure relief

devices may not be acceptable or effective, apart from any provision for thermal
expansion.
c. All types of protective devices should be considered for overpressure protection, including
designing for pressure containment, overpressure controls, automatic shutdown equipment,
high integrity SIS, and pressure relief devices.
8.13.2. Surge
a. Maximum pressure in the system that can arise as the result of operating conditions plus
any surge pressure shall be evaluated and taken into consideration in design, after allowing
for the effect of all practical methods for surge protection (e.g., expansion vessels, slow
closing valves).
b. If operating pressure plus resultant surge pressure exceeds that permitted, then either
pressure relief devices or a suitably SIL rated SIS shall be installed.
c. Manufacturer should be consulted for data regarding specific valve types, and response
times of the valves shall be considered in hydraulic surge analyses.
d. Surge pressures that are likely to be significant shall be determined by dynamic simulation
and provided for in design, either by reducing level of permitted operating pressure or by
provision of protective devices to keep maximum pressure within that permissible.
8.13.3. Static head

If a pipeline that crosses undulating or mountainous terrain (whether or not it is designed for
slack line operation) can be shut down under pressure, means of overpressure protection shall be
provided to limit static head pressures due to differences in elevation to within maximum
permitted internal design pressure at any point of the system.
8.13.4. Fluid expansion

a. Effects of fluid expansion on internal pressure due to temperature changes in any static
section that can be isolated shall be considered, and pressure relief devices shall be
installed, if required.
b. If main line isolating valves have bypasses incorporating a pressure relief device,
cumulative pressure increase shall be considered.
8.13.5. Intermediate stations and terminals

a. Surge protection and relief facilities shall be provided, if necessary, to ensure that both
upstream and downstream line pressures do not exceed design pressure.
b. Relief storage of sufficient capacity to accommodate all relief discharges and drainage
shall be provided. Pumping facilities shall be provided wherever necessary to return
relieved fluids to the system.
c. Facilities for depressuring shall be provided at compressor stations.
d. Gas compressors shall have a pressure relieving system fully sized for blocked discharge
and installed in the discharge line from each compressor.
e. Pressure relieving systems, flares, and surge tanks shall be designed and located in
accordance with the applicable requirements in GP 44-80.
8.13.6. Natural gas liquid pipelines

The effect of high daytime temperatures and pressures and low night time temperatures and
impact on pressure (even vacuum) shall be determined, and protective systems shall be provided
as necessary.
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8.14. Process and utility piping

a. Pressure relief devices shall be set at the design pressure defined in GP 42-10 and
ASME B31.3 or national equivalent.
b. Pressure setting shall never exceed allowances for variations from normal operating
conditions permitted by GP 42-10 and ASME B31.3 or maximum design pressure of the
weakest component in the system.
c. Set pressure of liquid thermal expansion relief devices that only protect piping systems
shall be less than both the system corrected test pressure and 120% of design pressure in
accordance with GP 42-10 and ASME B31.3.
8.15. Atmospheric/low pressure storage tanks
8.15.1. General
Pressure relieving arrangements for storage tanks that operate at or near atmospheric pressure
shall comply with API Std 2000/ISO 28300.
8.15.2. Liquid storage tanks

a. Low pressure and atmospheric liquid storage tanks shall be protected by an emergency
vent.
b. All potential overpressure scenarios identified in API Std 2000 or ISO 28300 shall be
considered and the vent sized accordingly.
c. Low pressure and atmospheric tanks shall be protected by a vacuum relief device to
prevent pressure from being reduced below design if any of the following occurs:
1. Liquid content capable of being withdrawn faster than either the liquid inlet, vent, or
gas blanket can counteract, causing a decrease in internal tank pressure. During tank
vent evaluation, freezing conditions or plugging that could affect vent capacity shall
also be considered.
2. Compressor or blower capable of reducing pressure in the vapour space.
3. Materials capable of being introduced into the tank, causing thermal contraction of
product liquid volume or reduction of pressure in vapour space.
4. Changes in ambient temperature conditions or failure of heating device causing
thermal contraction of contents or reduction of vapour space pressure by
condensation.
5. Rapid condensation of vapour or steam leading to vacuum inside storage tanks and
silos, resulting in potential loss of containment. Calculated relief rate for this hazard
may be considerably larger than that required for normal tank pumpout or breathing.
d. Open vent to atmosphere
1. An open vent to atmosphere (i.e., gooseneck vent) may be used for both emergency
venting and normal tank breathing if all the following conditions are met:
a) Local environmental laws permit.
b) Contained liquid is a combustible liquid with a flashpoint above 93°C (200°F).
c) Operating temperature is at least 28°C (50°F) less than liquid flashpoint.
2. These may also be used if local environmental loss permits and any vapour emitted is
nontoxic or dispersion analysis indicates that personnel would not be adversely
affected.
Page 38 of 69
e. If air is not to be tolerated within the tank, consideration should be given to designing the
tank to withstand full vacuum or providing an inert gas blanketing system to prevent
vacuum during normal and emergency conditions.
f. Liquid storage tanks should be designed in accordance with ISO 28300.
8.15.3. Solid storage silos

a. Low pressure and atmospheric storage silos shall be protected by a venting device to
prevent pressure from rising above positive design pressure of the silo.
b. Low pressure and atmospheric storage silos shall be protected by a vacuum relief device to
prevent pressure from being reduced below vacuum design pressure if any of the following
may occur:
1. Contents from silo capable of being withdrawn faster than either inflow or vacuum
vent can counteract, causing a decrease in internal silo pressure. During evaluation of
a silo, freezing conditions or any other plugging that could affect vent/vacuum
capacity (e.g., bridging of solids) shall be considered.
2. Compressor or blower in silo overhead with capability to reduce pressure in vapour
space.
3. Either changes in ambient temperature conditions or a difference between ambient
and internal silo temperature, causing a reduction in pressure.
c. If air is not tolerated within the silo, consideration should be given to designing the silo to
withstand full vacuum or providing a backup inert gas system to be operational during
emergencies.
d. Typically, silos are inerted to prevent explosions. Other methods may be used (e.g.,
explosion panels). In such cases, an explosion specialist shall be consulted.
8.15.4. Other low pressure equipment

a. There may be other low pressure equipment types that do not fall under any specific code
or standard because their design pressure is low enough that they are not classified a
pressure vessel (in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII
Division 1, for example) nor are they classified as a storage tank (in accordance with
API Std 2000 or ISO 28300).
b. These shall be treated on a case by case basis regarding overpressure and vacuum
protection.
c. Consideration shall be given to the possible consequences of failure if a relief device or
vacuum protection device is not installed (i.e., potential personnel exposure, fire,
explosion, environmental release, business interruption loss).
d. If specifying a relief device, guidance in API Std 2000 or ISO 28300 may be useful,
although relieving pressure may need to be adjusted based on mechanical design specifics.
8.16. LPG/LNG storage

a. Overpressure protection of LPG storage systems shall comply with IP 9 or API Std 2510.
b. Overpressure protection of LNG storage systems shall comply with NFPA 59A or
BS EN 1473.
c. Refrigerated LPG and LNG tanks shall be protected against low pressure (partial vacuum)
conditions.
d. Nonrefrigerated LPG tanks shall be protected against low pressure partial vacuum
conditions caused by extremely low ambient temperature conditions.
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9. Design documentation development by CVP phase
9.1. General
a. This clause provides requirements for design documentation for new and modified facility
projects.
b. Documentation requirements are defined in accordance with the CVP as used on major
projects.
c. Requirements and recommendations should be followed by smaller projects. However,
they can be modified commensurate with the complexity and magnitude of the
overpressure hazards involved.
d. During project design, documentation for overpressure and relief systems shall be
generated in three phases. Each phase is further clarified as follows:
1. Early design concept (“appraise/select” project stages), with a conceptual design
philosophy.
2. Complete relief and overpressure design basis (“define” and “execute” project
stages), with supporting calculations and system details.
3. A comprehensive relief and overpressure dossier for incorporation into the plant
operating procedures (during the project “execute” stage for use in the “operate”
stage).
e. A typical example of how the documentation requirements in this GP can be met for a
major project is provided in Figure 2.
f. Preliminary design of an overpressure protection system shall be reviewed independently
in detail as specified by the MP EA (as applicable).
Figure 2 - Example of documentation requirements by CVP phase
Appraise Select Define Execute Operate
Relief and overpressure Relief and overpressure dossier

Design philosophy design basis Index of design philosophy and design
Overpressure protection Relief design philosophy basis documents
philosophy Overpressure and relief List of relief devices, relief limiting
Relief and blowdown summary equipment (pumps, control valves,
philosophy Detailed calculations and etc.), summary relief loads, fire areas,
Safeguarding process software models etc.
flow diagrams SIS reports LO/LC Valve Register
Process control loop Testing and maintenance data on relief
segregation devices (PSVs and SIL systems)
Principal flare loads HP/LP interface register
Flare header pressure
profiles
Fire areas loads
g. The subsequent design for overpressure protection shall then be developed, agreed, and
finalised as specified by the MP EA (as applicable).
h. Development of the overpressure protection systems through the remaining design stages
shall be fully documented to enable the design basis and any operating restrictions to be
understood and applied during the operate stage.
9.2. Appraise and select stages - early design of relief and overpressure protection
systems
a. At the appraise/select stage, overpressure scenarios shall be identified, and relief
requirements shall be studied in sufficient depth to establish the basic design philosophy.
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b. The opportunity to incorporate ISD measures to eliminate or mitigate overpressure

scenarios is greatest in the early stages of a project. Therefore, preliminary design of
overpressure protection systems should be completed as early as possible.
c. Design philosophy shall be developed, taking into consideration relevant statutory
requirements and process and layout constraints as follows:
1. For new or significantly modified plant and process, an outline design philosophy and
pertinent data on which the design has been based shall be provided.
2. Changes in a relief design philosophy or any other design changes that affect relief
and overpressure systems shall be provided by the responsible designer or project
team modifying the process system.
d. The preliminary design basis for any overpressure protection system shall include the
following minimum information:
1. Conceptual design philosophy (also known as a relief and blowdown philosophy) (see
Annex A, A.2.).
2. Codes, standards, and BP practices being used for design.
3. Philosophy on SIS as related to overpressure design and an outline of any proposed
SIS (see Annex A, A.8.).
4. Process flow diagrams or flowsheets (i.e., safeguarding process flow diagrams)
showing relief devices, discharge locations, and anticipated design and operating
pressures (see Annex A, A.3.).
5. Conceptual design of disposal system.
6. Preliminary material selection review and specification.
e. Conceptual design philosophy shall be subject to approval by the MP EA.
f. Backup information, such as calculations and other details, may also have to be supplied.
Final versions of the above information should be included in the relief and overpressure
protection design basis.
9.3. Define stage - comprehensive relief and overpressure design basis

a. After review and approval of the relief and overpressure conceptual design, a
comprehensive relief and overpressure design record shall be prepared that fully
documents but is not limited to the information detailed in Annex A.
b. This full description of the relief design philosophy shall be written as part of the project
technical documentation and should substantially be made available before HAZOP
reviews and before P&IDs are classified as “approved for design”.
c. The subsequent design basis shall be subject to approval by the MP EA.
d. All overpressure and vacuum cases that have been considered, including those which do
not govern relief device sizing, shall be listed in detail before proceeding with detailed
design of the relief system. Outline of operating procedures should be considered in
preparing the basis for this list of anticipated emergency conditions.
e. If an overpressure case is considered not applicable, a clear statement as to why it is not
applicable shall be included in the information under Annex A, A.2.
f. Documentation shall demonstrate that equipment (vessels, piping, pumps, compressors,
dryers, tanks, silos, etc.) has adequate overpressure protection or cannot be subjected to a
pressure beyond its maximum allowable accumulated pressure.
g. If overpressure protection is being provided by SIS, the relief and overpressure design
basis shall make reference to:
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1. HAZOP and/or LOPA.

2. SIL assessment.
3. Performance specification, including testing and inspection requirements.
h. Final material selection review and specification.
i. Relief and overpressure design basis shall be formatted in such a way that necessary
operating details can subsequently be incorporated and kept up to date in both the plant
operating manuals and in the relief and overpressure dossier.
j. Relief and overpressure design documentation should be in electronic format.
k. For any future plant modification, the local MOC procedure shall include either updating
or supplementing this documentation to maintain a comprehensive, up to date record of the
relief system design basis.
9.4. Execute stage - relief and overpressure system dossier

a. Relief and overpressure design basis shall be updated to make this comprehensive relief
design basis current with final project design details. The final design basis shall be subject
to approval by the MP EA or the SPU entity EA for major modification projects on
existing assets.
b. In addition to the detailed design basis, a concise document (e.g., spreadsheet, database, or
other electronic form) shall be developed that summarises critical relief system
components and details and indexes key documents within the design philosophy and
design basis. This relief and overpressure dossier has several distinct purposes:
1. To assist operations in the preparation of plant operating procedures.
2. To support establishment of a risk based maintenance and inspection program in
3. As a valuable summary by itself for critical process or plant parameters, equipment,
instrumentation, and other process elements that affect relief and overpressure
conditions in the plant.
c. The relief and overpressure dossier shall provide a summary of relevant plant and process
variables affecting overpressure and relief design distilled from the design basis, including
the following (further details of which are in Annex A and Annex B):
1. Design philosophy documentation references.
2. List of relieving devices.
3. List of removable spools.
4. Relief loads, calculations, and/or assumptions.
5. Relief limiting control valves and restriction orifices.
6. Pumps.
7. Compressors.
8. Other equipment data or reference.
9. Critical check valves.
10. Restricted Cv control valves.
11. SIS.
12. Process control loop segregation.
13. Fire areas, fire loads, and fire resistant insulation (fireproofing).
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14. Flare system details, including flare header, knockout drum and appurtenances, flare
stack, flare tip, ignitor system, etc.
15. Header pressure profiles.
16. Maximum tailpipe and header velocities.
17. LO/LC valve register.
18. HP/LP interface schedule.
19. Size and type of disposal system used.
20. Relief device inlet/outlet piping hydraulics.
21. Mechanical design basis of process piping and equipment.
9.5. Operate stage - changes in design and operating conditions

a. The relief and overpressure dossier shall be kept current by each facility as part of its MOC
process.
b. Changes in design or operating conditions of a process can affect design of the
overpressure protection system. The appropriate MOC procedures shall be followed to
ensure that any proposed changes are assessed and appropriate modifications made to the
overpressure protection.
c. If there is any change in design or operating conditions that could result in an additional
case of overpressure or a modification to an existing case, calculations for the revised
conditions shall be performed to ensure that the requirements for overpressure protection
are fully met as follows:
1. Relief and overpressure protection design basis shall be modified or updated
accordingly.
2. For modification to a closed relief system, refer to GP 44-80.
d. A change in a control system design or philosophy could necessitate a corresponding
change in design of an overpressure protection system and its supporting documentation.
For example:
1. Modification to a high integrity SIS (see GP 30-80).
2. Replacing a system of single control loop integrity by a distributed shared loop
system.
3. Multivariable control or computer optimisation linking control loops in a manner not
envisaged in the original design.
4. Changing pump impeller size, control valve trim size, or the removal or repositioning
of limit stops.
e. The relief system design basis should be revalidated on a periodic cycle to ensure that it
reflects current operating conditions and modifications to the plant and equipment.
10. Pressure relief devices
10.1. General
a. Equipment, vessels, or process systems protected with more than one relief device for the
same overpressure contingency should have staggered set pressures for these relief devices
as follows:
1. A smaller relief valve with a lower set pressure for smaller and more frequent upset
loads should be considered in addition to the larger valve for the less frequent, larger
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relief loads. Typically, a relief valve may be considered oversized if inlet flow is less
than approximately 25% of capacity.
2. One pressure relief device shall be set at or below design pressure or MAWP of
protected equipment.
3. Additional devices may be set at higher pressure (if allowed by local codes) but in no
case, except for fire, shall the setting be more than 105% of design pressure or
MAWP.
4. Only under fire conditions or other expected external heat input could a supplemental
device be set as high as 110% of design pressure or MAWP, if this is permitted under
equipment design code.
b. Attention shall be given to relief situations that result in a wide range of relieving flow
rates under different upset conditions as follows:
1. In this case, consideration shall be given to selection of two valves: a smaller pressure
relief valve set at the equipment design pressure to handle upset conditions resulting
in lower relieving rates and a larger valve set at 105% of equipment design pressure
for the largest relieving case or otherwise set as permitted by code.
2. Alternatively, modulating pilot operated relief valves may be used under certain
constraints (see 10.2.4).
c. Use of multiple pressure relief devices shall comply with the following:
1. Multiple pressure relief devices should be used if sufficient relief area cannot
practically be supplied by one relief device.
2. If a large valve is being considered (e.g., Q, R, or T size), consideration should be
given to using multiple smaller pressure relief devices.
3. A LOPA of the multiple relief device protective function shall be performed in
accordance with GP 48-03 and any further measures implemented to ensure that the
relief device complies with the reliability requirement.
d. Similar considerations shall apply if a single large rupture disk is required for the
controlling scenario as follows:
1. A parallel pressure relief valve set to open at lower pressure should be considered to
handle smaller upsets that do not require full rupture disk area but could occur more
frequently.
2. Depending on service, the pressure relief valve may require a rupture disk beneath it.
e. After hydraulic analysis of the disposal system has been performed, size and selection of
the relief device shall be revalidated based on calculated backpressure.
f. Total backpressure on a pressure relief device shall not reduce capacity of the pressure
relief device to less than that required for all overpressure contingencies.
g. Relief valve set pressure corrections for temperature may be necessary for high
temperature systems as follows:
1. Correction applied should be based on temperature at the valve when it is in the
closed position.
2. This temperature may not be the flowing process temperature, even if the valve is
mounted directly on protected equipment but uninsulated.
3. Distance from process and effects of any thermal tracing shall be taken into account
in applying a thermal correction factor.
4. After temperature is determined, manufacturer specific temperature correction factor
shall be applied.
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5. Correction factor should be multiplied by set pressure to determine cold set pressure.
h. Use of pressure relief devices other than pressure relief valves and rupture disks is not
excluded but shall be subject to approval by the appropriate EA (operations or site).
10.2. Pressure relief valves
10.2.1. General
a. Selection of pressure relief valve type is unique to each individual application. However,
general guidelines and experience can be given in b and c.
b. Relief valve material shall be suitable for inlet and outlet temperatures that result from
extremes of operating and emergency conditions. This includes effect of cooling as a result
of reducing pressure through the valve during relief. However, this temperature does not
include extreme conditions, such as external fire or explosion, in which relief valves would
subsequently be replaced.
c. Relief valves shall comply with API Std 520, Part I, or ISO 4126 guidelines and local or
national design standards, if applicable, such as PED and ASME.
10.2.2. Conventional type

a. Conventional pressure relief valves shall be nozzle entry type and shall comply with
ISO 4126, API Std 526, or other applicable national standards.
b. Pressure relief valves shall have enclosed springs, except for air, cooling water, or steam
services, in which open bonnet relief valves shall comply with ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Section VIII and ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section I.
c. Bodies shall be carbon or alloy steel with trims of 300 SS alloy or other corrosion resistant
alloy suitable for the service conditions.
d. For flammable service, toxic service, or hot condensate service that can cause burns,
conventional type pressure relief valves with closed bonnets should be used.
e. For conventional (or nonbalanced) relief valves, builtup backpressure should be limited to
10% of set pressure for nonfire cases and not exceed 21% of set pressure for any case
(including the fire case) as follows:
1. In all possible cases, backpressure should not exceed the maximum pressure rating on
outlet side of the conventional valve (refer to API Std 526 or manufacturer data).
2. If backpressure limits are exceeded, a special valve shall be made and a specific
manufacturer guarantee shall be required.
10.2.3. Balanced type

a. Balanced pressure relief valves may be used to eliminate or minimise the effect of either
constant or variable superimposed backpressure on relief valve set pressure and
performance.
b. If accidental discharge of liquid due to bellows failure is unacceptable (e.g., liquid is above
its autoignition temperature), an alternative safety relief device shall be used.
c. To provide for potential bellows failure or leak, bonnet shall be vented separately from
discharge. To avoid compromising functionality of the balanced valve, bonnet vent shall
not be routed to discharge piping.
d. Bonnet vent shall always be open, and bonnet vent gases shall be disposed of with
minimum restriction and to a safe location.
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e. Bellows type valves should not be used in fouling conditions, unless precautions are taken
to avoid or minimise bellows fouling or deposit buildup during relieving and normal
operation (e.g., due to leakage across valve seat).
f. Auxiliary balancing piston type relief device should be used for critical and fouling
service.
g. For those few cases in which a pressure relief valve discharge is routed to atmosphere and
yet is fitted with a bellows seal to protect the spring, guides, and top works from
atmospheric corrosion or fouling, failure of the bellows does not affect pressure at which
the valve commences to lift. However, consideration should be given to the potential for
corrosion or fouling affecting discharge capacity by restricting lift of the disc.
h. Backpressure
1. Maximum backpressure that a balanced type valve may be subjected to shall be based
on manufacturer recommendations (backpressure correction factor and pressure rating
of the bellows).
2. For total backpressure exceeding 50% of valve set pressure, performance data of the
specific valve at expected set pressure shall be obtained from manufacturer.
3. For preliminary sizing, backpressure should not exceed either of the following:
a) 50% (normally) or 60% (in consultation with valve manufacturer) of valve set
pressure.
b) Maximum pressure rating on the outlet side of the balanced valve (refer to
API Std 526).
i. Maximum pressure to which relief valve will be exposed shall be calculated based on
hydraulics of the disposal system for all relief scenarios, including those in which relief
valve is not operating.
10.2.4. Pilot operated type

a. PORVs should be considered if it is desirable to operate the process closer to set pressure
than is possible with conventional relief valves or rupture disks.
b. PORVs should only be used in clean vapour service in which plugging or freezing of the
pilot line is not anticipated.
c. PORVs have their major port or seat opening controlled by a self actuated auxiliary
pressure relief valve and should be used primarily in nonfouling service. If they are to be
used in fouling service, suitable precautions to avoid plugging shall be implemented (i.e.,
purging, flushing) following consultation with manufacturer.
d. The type of pressure relief device selected should be compatible with temperatures that can
reasonably be expected if relieved fluid pressure drops across the relief device down to
atmospheric or to system backpressure (autorefrigeration or Joule-Thomson effect).
e. Check valves shall not be installed in sensing lines for PORVs for condensable vapour
services (e.g., butane, propane, LPG).
f. Filters should not be used in pilot supply or sensing lines, unless experience has shown that
plugging of the sensing line filters will not occur. If filters are used, a continuous, reliable
purge or flush on the sensing line is recommended.
g. Discharge from the pilot valve shall be directed to a suitable low pressure location. For
PORVs in which high backpressure on pilot discharge could cause the main valve to
reclose, pilot discharge line shall be vented to atmosphere rather than into main valve
discharge piping, unless pilot operator is a balanced valve.
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h. If PORVs have the potential for downstream pressure being higher than upstream pressure,
these valves shall have a backflow preventer.
i. Blowdown shall be set such that the valve reseats if required (i.e., blowdown pressure does
not fall within normal operating pressure range).
j. Pilot valves should not be used in high temperature service (200°C to 260°C [400°F to
500°F]) due to elastomers used in pilot valve and/or main valve seat.
10.2.5. Pilot assisted type

a. A pilot assisted pressure relief valve, in which the valve is still capable of operating as a
normal conventional valve in the event of pilot or actuator failure, should be used in
preference to a pilot operated valve.
b. If accuracy of setting is important or rapid opening and closing are required, pilot assisted
valves should be considered.
10.2.6. Lifting lever

Lifting lever on pressure relief valves shall not be used, unless specified by statutory regulations
(e.g., ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section I steam valves).
10.3. Rupture disks (bursting discs)
10.3.1. General
a. Margins between normal operating and design pressures are generally larger for rupture
disks compared to relief valves and shall be accommodated in the design. Rupture disks
are susceptible to opening due to short duration pressure transients particularly common in
liquid filled systems.
b. Rupture disks may be considered for slurry, corrosive, and erosive services or to minimise
leakage of valuable, hazardous, or toxic fluids. Use of a pressure relief valve combined
with an inlet rupture disk should be evaluated on a case by case basis if corrosive fluids
dictate material of construction of the valve.
c. API Std 520, Part I, and the manufacturer shall be consulted for sizing of rupture disks.
Design shall consider such items as discharge velocities, maximum backpressure, and
Joule-Thomson effects downstream of the device.
10.3.2. Types of rupture disks

a. Depending on the application, various types of rupture disk may be used (i.e., forward
acting scored, reverse acting scored, prebulged, or composite).
b. If normal domed rupture disks may be subject to vacuum under any operating conditions
or if outlet pressure exceeds the inlet pressure temporarily, a vacuum support shall be used.
c. If used upstream of a relief valve, disks shall be nonfragmenting and shall have means of
retaining the disk after opening.
d. Standalone rupture disks that discharge into a closed system shall be nonfragmenting.
e. If the disk vents directly to atmosphere (no downstream relief valve) and there is minimal
outlet piping, fragmenting type rupture disks may be considered.
10.3.3. Use of rupture disks

a. Pressure relief should preferably be provided with pressure relief valves, due to their
reclosable nature. However, rupture disks may be an appropriate relief device for the
following:
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1. For relief of pressure that is rising too fast (less than 10 ms) for normal pressure relief
valves, typically in a reaction vessel, shell and tube exchangers, in which exchanger
shell requires rapid overpressure protection against tube rupture, or for potential
explosions in a powder silo.
2. For services in which operation of a pressure relief valve may be affected by
corrosion or corrosion products or by deposition of material that may prevent the
valve from lifting in service.
3. With fluids (e.g., highly toxic) for which leakage through a pressure relief valve
cannot be tolerated. In this case, either a standalone rupture disk or a combined
rupture disk and relief valve may be considered. Discharge location needs to consider
hazards of toxic releases and comply with GP 44-80.
4. For low positive set pressures in which pressure relief valves tend to leak.
5. For slurry flow, chemically reactive, and/or extremely viscous fluids. A rupture disk
may be used to either protect a pressure relief valve located downstream or in place of
a pressure relief valve if the valve would plug during normal operation or while
relieving.
6. If it is necessary for rapid depressuring to atmospheric pressure.
b. A rupture disk venting to atmosphere does not give the high velocity required for safe
discharge of flammable or toxic vapours for complete duration of the discharge. As the
pressure falls, so does the flow and, consequently, discharge velocity. In such
circumstances, there are two options:
1. Do not use a rupture disk.
2. Use a pressure relief valve in series with and downstream of a rupture disk.
c. Selected burst temperature shall consider day/night and seasonal temperature variations,
particularly if untraced and/or uninsulated.
d. Rupture tolerance range of rupture disk does not need to be considered if determining burst
pressure.
e. Rupture disks shall not be used for pulsating flows or at working pressure close to design
bursting pressure. The following shall also be considered:
1. Normal domed rupture disks (i.e., nonscored) may be operated at working pressures
only up to 70% of bursting pressure.
2. Forward acting scored rupture disks may be operated at 80% to 90% of bursting
pressure.
3. Reverse acting scored rupture disks may be operated up to 90% of bursting pressure
in many circumstances.
4. Rupture disks shall not be subjected to operating working pressure exceeding 90%.
5. API Std 520, Part I, or ISO 4126 should be used for general guidance on maximum
suitable operating pressures for various types of bursting disks. However, in all cases,
the manufacturer information on the specific disk should be used.
f. Rupture disks shall only be used to shield inlet or outlet of pressure relief valves if:
1. A “telltale” device and pressure gage is used between rupture disk and relief valve to
identify disk leakage or failure.
2. If the rupture disk and the pressure relief valve are installed in series, the space
between the two shall be vented to prevent slight leaks from the first device causing
the second to open. If leakage is not permitted to be routed to atmosphere, the vent
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should be routed to a closed system operating near atmospheric pressure, even under
upset conditions.
3. Any backpressure in the closed system should be considered in the rupture disk relief
burst pressure design. Maximum design backpressure in the closed system shall also
be considered if selecting the rupture disk assembly to ensure that maximum
backpressure can be tolerated.
4. A leaking rupture disk beneath a pressure relief valve should be replaced in a timely
manner.
5. If a rupture disk is used upstream of a pressure relief valve such that a lesser
metallurgy relief valve can be used (e.g., use of a titanium rupture disk with a
stainless steel pressure relief valve instead of a titanium pressure relief valve), and if
pressure relief valve vents into a common header, design should consider any
corrosive or fouling products from other locations that can degrade the pressure relief
valve from the outlet side.
g. Rupture disk layout and installation design shall be such that disks can be replaced
conveniently and safely.
h. Low pressure (less than 1,0 barg [15 psig]) rupture disk designs that do not allow affixing a
tag should only be used if tag is firmly secured to installed disk assembly and special
provisions are made to ensure correct installation.
i. For slurry or any other service in which material could build up, consideration should be
given to providing a small gas or clean liquid purge flow across process side of disk to
prevent possible obstruction in front of disk.
j. Rupture disks should preferably be prescored forward acting design and prescored reverse
acting design.
k. Reverse acting rupture disks that rely on a cutting assembly shall not be used.
l. If rupture disks are used to protect the low pressure liquid filled side of a shell and tube
exchanger, initial discharge through the disk could be a high velocity liquid slug. The
following shall be considered:
1. Downstream piping shall be designed to accommodate shock loads and two phase
flow from this event.
2. Surge analysis of the cooling medium system should be performed to ensure that
rupture disks will not routinely burst. Alternatively, mitigation measures can be
implemented to avoid spurious failures during nonroutine conditions (e.g.,
temporarily blocking inlet to the rupture disk if a cooling water pump is brought
online or if switching cooling water valves).
m. Inconel 600 rupture disks shall be heat treated by manufacturer to maximum operating
temperature that the disk is expected to see in service.
10.3.4. Rupture disk burst pressure considerations

a. To avoid a disk that bursts prematurely or a disk that is stamped above equipment MAWP,
design shall consider both operating to stamped burst pressure ratio and manufacture
range.
b. Rupture disk burst temperature shall be specified as the temperature at which the rupture
disk normally operates.
c. Rupture disk operating temperature may be significantly different from both relieving
temperature and process operating temperature.
d. To prevent mismatch of temperature, the following options shall be considered:
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1. Insulating rupture disk holder and associated piping.

2. Heat tracing or jacketing disk and holder to ensure that it is always at a specified
temperature. Design burst temperature should be specified at this temperature.
3. Keeping disk temperature near ambient through remote disk location and/or
insulation removal. An average ambient temperature should be specified for design
burst temperature. Extreme ambient temperatures should be evaluated to determine
the effect on burst pressure and whether specified average temperature is acceptable
to minimise spurious trips and overpressure scenarios.
4. Locating disk near enough to process such that it is kept at operating temperature.
Design burst temperature should be specified at or near average operating
temperature. Temperature of rupture disk shall be reconfirmed in the field.
5. Using other engineered solutions that minimise the difference between operating and
set temperature.
6. Specifying a disk material (e.g., Inconel 600 instead of 316 SS) that is less sensitive
to temperature and still meets all other requirements.
e. Rupture disks shall be specified to withstand maximum expected backpressure from
downstream relief system (particularly a closed flare) to ensure that the disks do not fail in
the reverse direction.
10.3.5. Rupture disk configuration

a. Relief valve with rupture disk installed on inlet side should have set pressure that is
minimum value of disk manufacturing range. Pressure relief valve set pressure shall not
exceed value that would be allowed if there were no upstream rupture disk.
b. A free vent shall be provided between rupture disk and pressure relief valve such that disk
bursts at desired pressure and not higher.
c. If two disks are installed in series or in pressure relief valve/rupture disk combinations,
sufficient clearance shall be provided between them such that their operation in either the
forward or reverse direction will not interfere with operation of the other disk.
d. Relief valve should normally be close coupled to rupture disk. However, additional space
between valve and the disk may be required, due to installation constraints and/or to
minimise plugging of the inlet piping.
e. Two rupture disks installed in series shall only be used if:
1. A telltale device is used between the two disks to identify disk leakage or failure.
2. Any backpressure in the closed system is considered in rupture disk relief burst
pressure design.
3. Any leaking rupture disk is replaced in a timely manner.
10.3.6. Rupture disk specification in accordance with ASME or ISO and performance criteria
a. Rupture disks (bursting discs) with a burst pressure greater than 1,0 barg (15,0 psig) shall
be manufactured, marked, and certified and shall comply with performance criteria (e.g.,
rated flow capacity, rupture tolerance) in accordance with the following, as a minimum:
1. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII Division 1 (with ASME PTC 25
testing protocol) or ISO 4126-2 and ISO 4126-6 (with ASME PTC 25 testing
protocol).
2. Any additional requirements mandated by local codes and regulations.
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b. Rupture disks (bursting discs) with a burst pressure of 1,0 barg (15,0 psig) or less shall be
manufactured, marked, certified, and comply with performance criteria (e.g., rated flow
capacity, rupture tolerance) in accordance with the following as a minimum:
1. ISO 4126-2 and ISO 4126-6 (with ASME PTC 25 testing protocol).
2. Any additional requirements mandated by local codes and regulations.
c. Each rupture disk shall be packaged separately.
10.4. Buckling pins/rupture pin relief valves

a. Use of rupture pin relief valves shall be subject to approval by SPU entity EA.
b. If evaluating a rupture pin valve application, an independent (i.e., not the manufacturer)
failure modes effects analysis or fault tree analysis shall be performed to verify that
reliability of the device is, at minimum, comparable to that of a standard pressure relief
valve or rupture disk.
c. If rupture pin valve requires a lubricated O-ring for rupture pin piston, lubricant shall be
insensitive to hydrocarbons (i.e., lubricant viscosity shall be unaffected by process fluids)
(viscosity changes can impact the relief pressure setting). Inline lubrication features should
be considered to minimise the need for isolating and opening the valve to relubricate it.
d. Pipe stresses or misalignment shall be carefully reviewed. Piping misalignment or undue
stress may result in the rupture pin valve setting inaccuracy.
10.5. Sizing of pressure relief devices

a. Preliminary sizing
1. ISO 4126 or API Std 520, Part I, should be used for preliminary sizing of pressure
relief device.
2. Once the type of valve has been selected and backpressures have been calculated,
preliminary size shall be validated.
3. Discharge coefficient, backpressure correction factor, viscosity correction factor,
orifice area, etc., shall use manufacturer data.
b. Calculated orifice area shall be provided by one or more relief devices.
c. Calculation of required free area for relief valves and rupture disks shall comply with the
appropriate national code.
d. For those relief fluids that are not specifically covered by API Std 520, Part I (e.g., dense
phase, supercritical fluids), the following guidance for the effective discharge coefficients
should be used:
Page 51 of 69
1. Compressible fluids that are not choked at the throat of the pressure relief valve may
use the effective discharge coefficient for nonflashing liquid flow.
2. Compressible fluids that are choked at the throat of the pressure relief valve may use
the effective discharge coefficient for vapour flow.
e. Capacity of an installation involving only rupture disks should be based on hydraulic
calculations of the piping system between pressurised equipment at relief conditions and
reservoir into which effluent is transferred as follows:
1. Hydraulic calculations of the piping system should be derated by a factor of 0,9 in
accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII Division 1.
2. If equivalent velocity head resistance factor (Kr) of rupture disk is not known or has
not been tested, a default value of 2,4 may be used.
f. For sizing relief devices, set pressure and accumulation pressure shall comply with
applicable pressure vessel design code.
g. Design of pressure relief devices discharging to a closed relief system shall take into
account maximum backpressure arising at discharge of the device for the particular
overpressure case under consideration. Additionally, mechanical design shall be suitable
for maximum backpressure to which a device can be exposed as a result of other devices
relieving.
10.6. Configuration of pressure relief devices
10.6.1. General
a. Pressure relief devices shall be configured in accordance with ISO 4126 or API RP 520,
Part II, as amplified and amended in this clause and 10.7, as well as other applicable codes
and standards, such as:
1. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section I.
2. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Section VIII.
3. BSI PD 5500.
4. PED.
b. Relief devices intended to relieve vapour should be connected to the highest point of
equipment to be protected, if possible. If this is not possible and there is the potential for
liquid above the relief device inlet line, relief device shall be sized for an equivalent
volumetric rate of liquid and also designed to minimise slugging.
c. If thermal cycling is an issue, to minimise thermal cycling, pressure relief valves should be
located such that fluid temperature at the valve during normal plant operation is near
ambient conditions, when the valve is inactive. If ambient conditions affect performance,
valve should be heat traced.
d. Pressure relief devices shall be isolated before hydrotest of piping or vessels but included
in system tightness testing.
10.6.2. Isolation of pressure relief devices

a. Isolation philosophy regarding installation of block valves or blinds (isolation devices) in
any location in which they could isolate a vessel or system from a pressure or vacuum
relief device or downstream flare system shall be subject to approval by the SPU entity EA
or the appropriate EA (operations, or site). GP 44-40 provides requirements for isolation of
equipment for maintenance.
b. Isolation block valves shall be locked or car sealed open during normal operation. Refer to
GP 44-80.
Page 52 of 69
c. Block valves and/or blinds are vital to the maintenance of items on operating units.
However, these should be kept to a minimum, identified, and a procedure shall be put in
place (generally a work permit or valve lock open procedure) for controlling their use.
d. Inlet or outlet block valves are generally not permitted for ASME Boiler and Pressure
Vessel Code Section I applications, unless special three way valves are approved by local
authorities and the appropriate EA. For ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
Section VIII applications, the PSV installation may provide in place online testing
capability to improve safety and reduce turnaround time and maintenance costs.
Restrictions to block valve use in overpressure relieving services shall be determined in
compliance with governing local codes and standards.
e. Block valves may be used to isolate pressure relief devices for inspection or maintenance,
provided that an additional relief device that supplies 100% design relieving capacity is
installed as follows:
1. Such block valves shall be installed on inlet piping to relief devices and on discharge
piping if this is to a closed system. Isolation valves shall also be acceptable
downstream of single relief valves to isolate them from a closed disposal system.
2. Such block valves shall be locked open or interlocked by a system approved by
operating management. Isolating valve should be secured by a physical means.
f. If block valves are installed on relief devices, upstream or inlet block valve shall be a full
port valve with valve inlet diameter the same as or larger than relief device inlet flange.
Downstream valve shall also be full port if required by pressure drop. With supporting
pressure drop calculations, a reduced port valve may be used (see 10.6.4.1.j).
g. A valved and blanked/plugged drain connection of minimum size DN 20 (NPS 3/4) shall
be provided between relief device and any upstream block valve. A similar vent
connection shall be provided between relief device and any downstream block valve.
h. A maintenance bypass valve or manual depressurisation valve shall only be located in
parallel to a PSV if the following conditions are met:
1. Capacity of bypass valve is limited to less than PSV capacity to avoid excessive flow
in the downstream system.
2. Bypass valve shall be locked or sealed closed and may only be opened under permit
for maintenance of the PSV or other situations if sustained flow through the bypass of
a cold fluid into a downstream system cannot occur.
3. Valve and downstream piping shall be designed for the minimum temperature
experienced under flowing conditions, taking into account autorefrigeration effects
(Joule-Thomson cooling) and the possible isentropic expansion of a closed volume of
the system that it is depressuring (see GP 44-80).
10.6.3. Location of pressure relief devices

a. Pressure relief devices shall be installed such that the relief device inlet drains back to the
equipment being protected, also subject to the need to drain the discharge side to a header.
If possible, pressure relief devices should be placed directly on the equipment or pipeline
that is being protected.
b. Pressure relief devices for fractionating columns should not be fitted to reflux drums or to
overheads piping such that reflux pump failure can cause flooding of the inlet to the
device. Pressure relief devices should normally be fitted between the fractionating column
and the overhead condenser.
c. Permanent access shall be provided to the following:
1. Rupture disk locations.
Page 53 of 69
2. Pressure relief valves that require inspection and/or maintenance between major plant
shutdowns.
d. Pressure relief devices discharging into a closed system shall be located such that there is
continuous elevation decline (slope) from the devices to the downstream knockout drum
such that the lines contain no liquid traps.
e. Relief valves shall be mounted in a vertical position.
10.6.4. Piping to and from pressure relief devices

a. If pressure relief devices are not placed directly on the equipment or pipeline they are
protecting, their inlet piping:
1. Should be as short as possible, with the inlet device connection located as near as
practical to the equipment being protected.
2. Shall have a bore area at least equal to that of the pressure relief device inlet.
3. Shall drain back to the equipment being protected.
b. For new installations, to prevent relief valve chatter and damage, total nonrecoverable
pressure loss between equipment or pipeline protected (including pipe entrance loss) and a
conventional pressure relief valve inlet shall not exceed 3% of set pressure of the valve for
flow corresponding to installed valve area (i.e., rated capacity of the valve).
c. For existing installations of conventional pressure relief valves, the nonrecoverable inlet
line pressure loss based on rated capacity of the valve should not exceed blowdown or 5%
of set pressure, whichever is lower unless justified by a further engineering analysis.
d. Inlet line losses for pilot operated pressure relief valves may be higher than those for
conventional pressure relief valves if both of the following are true:
1. Sensing line is connected to equipment away from effects of inlet pressure loss.
2. Relief area is calculated based on pressure at relief valve inlet flange (i.e., relieving
pressure in the vessel minus inlet line pressure loss).
e. The “nominal” flow area through all pipe and fittings between a pressure vessel and its
pressure relief device shall be equal to or greater than the device inlet “nominal” flow area.
Pressure loss of inlet piping shall be based on the actual pressure relief device capacity for
compressible flow.
f. If two or more pressure relief devices are placed on one connection, the cross sectional
“nominal” area of this connection shall be at least equal to the combined “nominal” inlet
areas of the valves, and the normal pressure loss requirement shall apply for the combined
rated flow of the valves.
g. Modulating action relief valves can use the required relief load rate instead of rated
capacity if determining inlet line pressure loss.
h. If fluids handled have pour or freezing points above the lowest ambient temperature or if
fluids handled become excessively viscous if cold, inlet piping shall be heat traced. High
viscosity shall be considered in pressure drop and relief device sizing.
i. Inlet piping shall not be susceptible to blockage in event of failure of other equipment,
such as level control float balls and pieces of mesh blanket/pad.
j. Isolating valves shall be selected to minimise pressure loss in the inlet line. For ball valves
in LPG service, the valves shall be full bore to help mitigate potential freezing problems.
k. If pressure relief devices discharge to atmosphere, each individual discharge line should
have at least the same bore as the outlet from the pressure relief device.
Page 54 of 69
l. If pressure relief device discharges to atmosphere, the potential for relief discharge ignition
coincident with the presence of an operator in the vicinity shall be considered and, if
necessary, specific means for operator protection or escape shall be provided.
m. Relief device discharge line to atmosphere shall have a 10 mm (3/8 in) drain at its lowest
point. If discharge is flammable or toxic, drain shall be piped to a safe location and may
contain a locked open isolation valve in an easily accessible location.
n. The ends of atmospheric discharge tailpipes should be cut off square, not chamfered (i.e.,
45 degree bevel). However, if atmospheric discharge tailpipes are chamfered, outlet piping
shall be designed, anchored, and guided to resist forward, lateral, and upward dynamic
forces.
o. Pressure relief devices and associated piping shall be designed, anchored, and guided to
resist forward, lateral, and upward dynamic forces.
p. Relief valve discharge lines connected to a closed system shall enter the top of the header
or discharge piping system, if practical.
q. Generally, the isothermal flow method should be used to calculate pressure drop in outlet
relief piping for gas service. See API Std 521/ISO 23251 for details. If the adiabatic
method is used in high pressure gas service, the “k” value shall be calculated for gas
conditions that exist in outlet relief piping.
r. Relief valve outlet piping shall be evaluated for potential acoustic and flow induced
vibration and appropriate supports shall be provided. See GN 44-005 for guidance on
acoustical and flow induced vibration. Pipe wall thickness of Schedule 10 or lower should
not be used without completing a detailed analysis per GN 44-005.
10.6.5. Relief valve sparing philosophy

a. Spare relief valves should not be installed unless required by regulations, codes, or for
relief valve testing or maintenance requirements.
b. Installed spares, if required, should not be installed on spare equipment or as spare thermal
relief valves on piping in cryogenic liquid service.
10.6.6. Rupture disks

a. Effects of recoil resulting from bursting of a disk shall be taken into consideration in
design of vessels and piping to which rupture disks are fitted. If practical, discharge lines
should be straight.
b. Discharge from rupture disks may, if appropriate, be to atmosphere, subject to GP 44-80
requirements. If it is desirable to reduce loss of contents of a vessel or system, a pressure
relief valve in series with a rupture disk may be used, normally downstream of the disk.
Alternatively, two bursting disks in parallel with a three way valve may be used to allow a
change to the second disk upon failure of the first.
c. If a burst rupture disk is likely to discharge solid material, such as polymer, arrangements
should be considered, if appropriate, to pass the discharge directly to a second vessel in
which the solid material may be retained, the gaseous element being discharged to
atmosphere, to treatment, or to flare, as appropriate.
10.7. Preinstallation
10.7.1. General
a. Before installation, pressure relief valves shall be stored in an upright position in a clean,
dry area, and rupture disks shall be stored in a clean, dry area in their original shipping
containers.
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b. Pressure relief device inlets and outlets shall remain covered until installation.
c. Before installation or bench testing, pressure setting engraved on pressure relief device
nameplates shall be verified as being the same as specified on data sheet and facility
pressure relief device records.
d. Inlet piping and associated equipment shall be free of foreign matter. This includes pipe
scale, welding beads, or other objects that could cause damage or prevent pressure relief
valves from reseating after operation.
10.7.2. Preinstallation of pressure relief valves

a. Before installation, protective covers shall be removed from pressure relief valves and
valves shall be inspected for foreign matter.
b. Pressure relief valves shall be made available for testing prior to commissioning.
c. For pressure relief valves with bellows, a pipe elbow shall be installed in vent connection
on bonnet with wire mesh over female end.
d. Conventional or unbalanced pressure relief valves that do not have bellows shall have their
bonnet vent connections plugged with a metal plug.
10.7.3. Preinstallation of rupture disks

a. Rupture disks should be packed separately to help keep them clean and dry. Unless rupture
disk is purchased preassembled in its holder, rupture disks shall be inspected to ensure
clean seating surfaces.
b. Disks shall be inspected for physical damage.
c. Disks that are dented, dirty, discoloured, or otherwise damaged shall not be used.
d. Rupture disk and holder assemblies of bolted construction shall be checked for torque as
recommended by manufacturer.
10.8. Installation of rupture disks

a. Installation shall comply with manufacturer instructions. Rupture disk and associated
retaining surfaces shall be kept clean during field installation.
b. Torque wrenches should be used if securing a rupture disk in the holder. Torque values
used shall comply with manufacturer recommendations.
c. Rupture disk installation shall be verified by a designated and qualified witness who shall
not be the installer.
Page 56 of 69
Annex A
(Normative)
Relief and overpressure protection dossier structure
A.1. General
a. Relief and overpressure documentation should consist of a readily accessible structure such
that pertinent information relating to design of overpressure protection systems can be
readily accessed.
b. Information listed in A.2. through A.15. may be included in the dossier. However, if the
information is maintained elsewhere in the documentation system, it should be made clear
in the dossier.
c. Details on information requirements to assist in compilation of the document are included
in A.2 through A.15. Example tables for recording data are in Annex A.
A.2. Design philosophy
The design philosophy section of the dossier contains a summary of the philosophy adopted in
process design that shall address in particular (but not be limited to) the following, as described
in 5 and 6:
a. Codes, standards, and BP practices used in the design.
b. Utility failures considered (total, unit, partial, etc.).
c. Whether multiple failure cases have been considered and, if so, where and why.
d. If SIS have been used to prevent overpressure or limit relief loads.
e. Design considerations of fire relief from vessels, shell and tube exchangers, and
condensers, especially if individual relief valves have not been provided.
f. Instances in which credit has been taken for operator intervention.
g. In developing the relief and overpressure philosophy, due consideration shall also be given
to potential vacuum conditions that can be created in process equipment.
h. Assumed position of bypass valves if control valves fail open.
i. Philosophy for sparing relief valves (see 10.6.5).
j. Maximum fire areas considered and how they relate to design of surface and firewater
drainage systems.
k. Basis for sizing discharge lines (i.e., maximum backpressure and velocity that have been
considered).
l. Values of pipe roughness used to size lines.
m. Unit capacities, feedstock, and maximum and normal design basis.
n. Flashback prevention design basis.
A.3. List of relieving devices, data sheets, and associated block valves
a. A complete set of relief valve specifications and rupture disk (i.e., bursting disk)
specifications shall be provided. In addition, the list shall include thermal relief valves,
rupture/buckling pins, conservation vents, vacuum relief valves, and other mechanical
devices used for both overpressure and underpressure protection.
Page 57 of 69
b. This section of the dossier shall contain an index of unit flowsheets or P&IDs that are
relevant to the stage of design or operation (i.e., IFD, IFC, or as built) and which shall be
marked up to designate and show all chain locked, CSO/CSC, or LO/LC manual block
valves that shall be locked or sealed open or closed during normal unit operation to
safeguard the integrity of the relief system as designed.
c. Reference shall be made to the valve register (LO, LC, CSO, or CSC isolation block valve
requirement), which shall consist of a tabulation, spreadsheet, and/or list of isolation block
valves in a relief or overpressure system path or process. This register is provided to ensure
that these administrative controls are implemented during construction and operation to
ensure an open relief path and/or to prevent occurrence of an overpressure situation within
the unit and assist in development of field operating procedures.
A.4. Relief loads
a. The relief loads section of the dossier shall contain a summary tabulation of the relief loads
generated for identified causes of overpressure, clearly indicating the case that governs
sizing of the relief device. For each device, the summary shall include:
1. Tag number.
2. Discharge location.
3. Relief loads for each credible overpressure case (included in relief device sizing
basis) as follows:
a) Each relief case shall note maximum vapour, liquid, or two phase relief rate and
may include additional data if deemed appropriate (e.g., a high temperature
relief case).
b) Fluid characteristics, such as molecular weight, specific gravity, fluid
temperatures at relieving conditions, and any other fluid properties relevant to
the relief case being reviewed. Relief device capacity shall also be included as
part of the data.
b. Conditions under which each relief load occurs shall be clearly defined. If recording power
failure, it should be stated whether this is facility wide, local (i.e., one unit or group of
units), partial (affecting part of the supply distribution within a unit or group of units [e.g.,
MCC]), or individual (single item of equipment).
c. If evaluating gas breakthrough conditions, the relief load summary should state:
1. Source of overpressure, including control valve tag number, if applicable.
2. Whether control valve bypass has been assumed open or closed, if applicable.
3. Assumed liquid level in low pressure vessel, if this has an impact on the relief case.
d. If a relief valve is provided to protect more than one item of equipment, the equipment
protected shall be clearly indicated.
e. Relief load detailed calculations shall be provided.
A.5. Relief limiting control valves and restriction orifices
a. This section of the dossier shall contain process data for control valves and restriction
orifices that limit relief loads as follows:
1. Sheet shall specify manufacturer, type, size, and rated conditions (including Cv) at
normal and fully open positions.
Page 58 of 69
2. A brief process sketch shall also be included or referenced, showing location of the
valve or orifice plate.
b. Control valve or restriction orifice replacement
1. If a control valve or restriction orifice is replaced, this section of relief and
overpressure design shall be reviewed to ensure that there has been no change that
can give rise to an increased relief load.
2. If an increased load can result, it is essential that capacity of the associated relief
valve and header system be checked to ensure that the system is adequately sized.
3. Relief and overpressure design basis shall either be updated or supplemented to
reflect this change.
4. Local MOC procedure shall be used to complete this change.
A.6. Pump and/or compressor data
The pump and/or compressor data section of the dossier shall contain a list of pumps with their
shut-in heads and the corresponding impeller sizes as used in the relief design. Much of the
information should be on the original data sheet. The minimum information required for
overpressure protection reasons shall be:
a. Manufacturer.
b. Type designation.
c. Equipment tag number.
d. Shut-in head for installed impeller (for pump or centrifugal compressor).
e. Shut-in head for maximum impeller size (for pump or centrifugal compressor).
f. Fluid density (including testing/commissioning fluids).
g. Installed impeller diameter (for pump or centrifugal compressor).
h. Maximum impeller diameter (for pump or centrifugal compressor).
i. Reference to manufacturer pump or centrifugal compressor curve.
j. Cylinder data for reciprocating compressors.
k. Unloader information for reciprocating compressors.
l. Motor or driver information.
A.7. Other equipment data
Design basis for overpressure protection of other equipment, such as compressors, heat
exchangers, and flare and vent systems, shall be specifically identified and quantified in the
detailed relief and overpressure design basis.
A.8. Safety instrumented systems (SIS)
a. The SIS section of the dossier shall contain details of SIS with a designated SIL that has
been provided to limit overpressure as an alternative to a relieving device or reduce the
overpressure load.
b. Information should be provided for each system, including a schematic and a list of each
instrument component showing the instrument type, manufacturer, testing frequency, type
of testing, and a reference to the analysis or report defining system reliability.
Page 59 of 69
A.9. Process control loop segregation
a. If a distributed control system, PLC, or similar electronic process control system is

installed, either a tabulated list or annotated diagrams should be provided, indicating the
way in which the distributed control system components are segregated to avoid common
cause instrument failures and reduce potential relief loads that could arise from failure of
the distributed control system as follows:
1. For any system with more than one output, an analysis shall be performed to
determine all reasonably foreseeable failure modes or common cause component
failures that may result in more than one output going to the nonfailsafe state and
potentially producing unacceptable process relief loads. See IEC 61508 for control
system electrical supply reliability.
2. Relief loads that could arise from these failures shall be determined. If relief loads
exceed design capability, it may be possible to reassign system outputs to reduce the
relief load.
3. In all cases, a table (see Annex A, A.4) shall be provided showing relief loads
associated with system outputs linked to the common cause failure being considered.
b. All items should be included in the process control loop segregation document, whether or
not their failure can result in overpressure.
A.10. Fire areas, fire loads, and fireproofing
a. This section of the dossier shall contain a list of fire areas that have been considered for
determining relief loads, indicating which relief valves are considered as relieving
simultaneously. If there is a fire relief case to be considered, a separate breakdown shall be
included, showing loads generated within each equipment item to be protected. Tabulation
shall include:
1. Fire area considered.
2. Equipment item.
3. Vessel liquid level.
4. Tag number of relief valve through which load is discharged (may not be located on
equipment).
5. Individual loads (flow, molecular weight, temperature).
6. Total load for area (total flow, mixture molecular weight, mixture temperature).
7. Environmental factors, thermal conductivity, thickness of insulation where
fireproofing credit is taken.
b. This section of the dossier shall reference a plot plan of the unit that is marked up to show
fire areas considered.
c. This section of the dossier shall contain a list of vessel and equipment that uses fire
resistant insulation to reduce fire relief load as follows:
1. Description should include insulation type, thickness, thermal conductivity, and
details of cladding and fixing methods.
2. If fireproofing is used to reduce relief loads, a table should be provided that clearly
identifies where fireproofing is used and gives basic information such that checks can
be made that it still has adequate integrity. Table should also allow verification if such
special arrangements are needed.
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A.11. Principal (or maximum) flare loads
a. The flare loads section of the dossier shall contain a breakdown of flare load for each
major utility failure case, emergency depressurisation (blowdown), and worst fire case.
This shall include relief loads from other units not under consideration that may be
relieving at the same time due to a common event.
b. If relief valve discharges from the unit or units can be directed to more than one flare in
accordance with flare sparing philosophy, loads for each flare shall be included.
A.12. Piping equivalent lengths and header pressure profiles - flare system
simulation review output (Flarenet or Visual Flare)
a. An electronic simulation of the relief and flare network system shall be developed that
includes:
1. Hydraulic profile of the flare system for major flare load cases (including blowdown),
with backpressures at each relief or blowdown device discharge and each subsequent
node in the network. Velocities in flare headers shall be reported for each case.
2. Model shall document pressure flow relationship for the flare tip.
3. This data shall be the final as built design and shall reference the number of the
piping isometric or general arrangement drawing for the line.
b. If credit is taken for pressure drop in interconnecting pipework to reduce flow in a gas
breakthrough situation or another pressure relief scenario, pipe lengths, diameters, and
fittings shall be fully described and documented in the relief and overpressure design basis.
These sections of pipe shall be flagged in the relief and overpressure dossier to ensure that
future piping modifications affecting this pipe are carefully reviewed.
c. This section of the dossier shall contain a series of layout drawings showing flare and
backpressure at junctions and key points in the relief system pipe network for each major
utility failure and fire case. Electronic files should be provided in either Flarenet or Visual
Flare format.
A.13. HP/LP interfaces
a. The HP/LP interfaces section of the dossier shall either consist of or reference a schedule
of all HP/LP design pressure specification breaks in the process, including pertinent data,
such as size, type, and fully open flow coefficient of limiting valves or orifices, locked
closed valves, in every route between high and low pressure systems.
b. Consideration should be given to all manual routes to flare and/or vent that could affect
flare system design.
A.14. Disposal system
a. The disposal section of the dossier shall either have or reference relevant information on
design of the disposal system, including type (e.g., elevated flares, ground flares,
atmospheric vent), capacity, radiation profiles, and noise profiles. See GP 44-80 for more
details on disposal system design guidelines.
b. Relief valves connected to disposal system shall be sized or validated using established
builtup backpressure and superimposed backpressure developed in the disposal system.
See GP 44-80 for guidance on relief system modelling.
Page 61 of 69
A.15. Test reports
Test dates and reports for pressure relief valves, rupture disks, and overpressure protection SIS
at SIL 1 and higher integrity levels shall be recorded and readily accessible for inspection.
Page 62 of 69
PSV tag number
Equipment
Equipment number
Fire
Blocked outlet
NOTE:
24 February 2010
Tube rupture
Gas blowby
Reverse flow
CV failure Relief cases

Thermal expansion
Sizing case
Inlet/outlet line size (in)
Discharge location (3)
Inlet (in)
been reduced in width to fit the current page size.
Orifice designation
Selected
PSV size
Outlet (in)
Type
Manufacturer
Relieving rate (kg/hr)

Required area (in2)
Actual rate (kg/hr)
Annex B
Selected area (in2)

(Informative)
Phase
Operating press (barg)

List of relief devices and relief loads
Operating temp (°C)

Relief and overpressure dossier
Accumulation (%)
Set pressure (barg)
Relieving temp (°C)
Relieving density (kg/m3)
Relieving viscosity (cP)
Vapour mol. weight
Specific heat ratio
Vapour compressibility
Constant backpress (barg)

The following tables are examples of how to document data for a relief and overpressure dossier. In many instances, table columns have
Builtup backpress (barg)

Page 63 of 69
GP 44-70
Multiple PSVs
Datasheet ref.
Pump data
Shut-in Impeller Discharge piping
Tag no. Service P&ID no. head (m) diameter pressure Final destination Protection Pump curve ref
Max Design
Installed Max Installed Max Design oper To press
(barg) (barg) (barg)
Critical check valves

Check valve tag
no. SP tag no. Location Remarks
Relief limiting control valves and restriction orifices

Control Location P&ID no. CV Capacity Orifice Bypass Remarks
valve/RO Full open Operating Full open Operating diameter controls
tag no. (barg) (barg) (kg/hr) (kg/hr) (mm)
Page 64 of 69
SIS
SIS tag no. Equipment protected SIL rating Set point Remarks
HP/LP interface schedule

Location Tag no. Upstream Pressure Downstream Pressure Protection
Design Operating Design Operating
(barg) (barg) (barg) (barg)
Fire areas, fire loads, and fire resistant insulation

Fire Vessel liquid Pool Jet Discharge Insulation Remarks
area Equipment Tag no. level PSV tag no. fire load fire load location details
(mm) (kg/hr) (kg/hr)
Page 65 of 69
Principal (or maximum) flare loads

Gas Liquid Relieving Relieving Inlet pressure (bara)
Major relief loads Relieving Tag flowrate flowrate pressure temperature MW Main Remarks
case no. (kg/hr) (kg/hr) (bara) (°C) Tailpipe header Drum Tip
Major relief cases
Simultaneous
blowdown
Coincident fire cases
HP/LP interface schedule

Location Tag no. Upstream Pressure Downstream Pressure Protection
Design Operating Design Operating
(barg) (barg) (barg) (barg)
Page 66 of 69
Tag no.
Equipment
Equipment number
Line
24 February 2010
Line size (in)
Actual PSV capacity (kg/hr)
Assumed rate (kg/hr)
Tees (run)
Tees (hard)
90° Elbows LR
90° Elbows SR
45° Elbows
Gate/FB ball valves
Globe valves
Plug valves
Tees (run)
Tees (run)
Swing check valves
Std contract (d/D=0,5)
Std contract (d/D=0,75)
Std enlarge (d/D=0,5)
Std enlarge (d/D=0,75)

Piping equivalent lengths and header pressure profiles
Vessel entry
Vessel exit
Straight length (m)
Total equivalent length (m)
Set pressure (barg)
3% of set pressure (bar)
Total pressure drop (bar)
Outlet velocity (m/s)
Backpressure assumed (bara)
Phase
Page 67 of 69
GP 44-70
Multiple PSVs
Bibliography
BP
[1] GIS 34-301, General Purpose Steam Turbines (API 611).
[2] GIS 34-302, Petroleum, Petrochemical and Natural Gas Industries - Steam Turbines - Special
Purpose Applications (ISO 10437).
[3] GN 30-401, CHAZOP.
[4] GP 06-25, Design for the Prevention of Corrosion under Insulation (CUI)) and Fireproofing (CUF).
[5] GP 24-10, Fire and Explosion Hazard Management of Onshore Facilitites.
[6] GP 24-20, Fire and Explosion Hazard Management of Offshore Facilities.
[7] GP 30-40, Process Automation Systems.
[8] GRP Std 01, Integrity Management Standard.
American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE)

[9] Guidelines for Pressure Relief and Effluent Handling Systems, Center for Chemical Process Safety
(CCPS).
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

[10] ASME B31.4, Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and Other Liquids.
[11] ASME B31.8, Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems.
British Standards Institute (BSI)

[12] BS 7910, Guide to methods for assessing the acceptability of flaws in metallic structures.
[13] BS CP 2010, Code of practice for pipelines. Design and construction of steel pipelines in land.
[14] BS EN 14161, Petroleum and natural gas industries. Pipeline transportation systems.
[15] PD 5500, Specification for unfired fusion welded pressure vessels.
Canadian Standards Association (CSA)

[16] CSA Z662, Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems.
Energy Institute (EI)

[17] Guidelines for the safe and optimum design of hydrocarbon pressure relief and blowdown systems.
[18] Model code of safe practice.
[19] Model Code of Safe Practice in the Petroleum Industry: Petroleum Pipelines Safety Code Pt. 6.
Gas Processors Suppliers Association (GPSA)

[20] Engineering Data Book.
Page 68 of 69
Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE)

[21] Relief system handbook, Parry, Cyril F.
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

[22] IEC 61511, Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry sector.
Other
[23] The European Pressure Equipment Directive (PED).
[24] Relief valve sizing and simulation tools.
Page 69 of 69

GP 44-70 - Overpressure Protection Systems

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GP 44-70 - Overpressure Protection Systems

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Document No.

Overpressure Protection Systems

• Amendments to the scope of this GP.

Copyright © 2010 BP International Ltd. All rights reserved.

8.4. Plate and frame/plate and shell heat exchangers.......................................................41

Table 1 - Overpressure design for letdown stations with bypasses................................................35

Figure 1 - Schematic of a typical letdown station............................................................................34

• For dated references, only the edition cited applies.

American Petroleum Institute (API)

American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)

British Standards Institute (BSI)

Energy Institute (EI)

International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)

International Organization for Standardization (ISO)

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

3. Terms and definitions

Corrected test pressure

High pressure (HP)/low pressure (LP) interface

HP/LP interfaces are letdown stations, including the following:

a. Reverse flow through pumps, check valves, or compressor recycle valves.

Pressure limiting instrumentation

Probability of failure on demand (PFD)

Safeguarding process flow diagram

Safety instrumented function (SIF)

Safety instrumented system (SIS)

Safety integrity level (SIL)

4. Symbols and abbreviations

BDV Blowdown valve.

Cg Valve sizing coefficient for gas.

CHAZOP Computer HAZOP.

Cv Valve sizing coefficient.

CVP Capital value process.

ESD Emergency shutdown.

ESDV Emergency shutdown valve.

FMEA Failure mode and effects analysis.

HAZID Hazard identification.

HAZOP Hazard and operability (study).

HEM Homogenous equilibrium model.

HIPS High integrity protection system.

IFC Issued for construction (typically P&IDs).

IFD Issued for design (typically P&IDs).

ISD Inherently safer design.

LNG Liquefied natural gas.

LO/LC Locked open/locked closed valves.

LOPA Layer of protection analysis.

LPG Liquefied petroleum gas.

MAWP Maximum allowable working pressure.

MBP Marked burst pressure.

MCC Motor control centre.

MOC Management of change.

NGL Natural gas liquids.

P&ID Process and instrument diagram.

PCHE Printed circuit heat exchanger.

PFD Probability of failure on demand.

PLC Programmable logic control.

PORV Pilot operated relief valve.

PSV Pressure safety valve.

QRA Quantitative review analysis.

SBP Specified burst pressure.

SDV Shutdown valve.

SIF Safety instrumented function.

SIL Safety integrity level.

SIS Safety instrumented system(s).

SME Subject matter expert.