The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War regarding the

provision of Russian officers for service in North Russia and Siberia (Paper GT-7165).

The Memorandum stated that, since the signing of the armistice, it had become increasingly evident
that an indefinite continuance of the occupation of parts of North Russia by Allied troops was
neither desirable nor feasible, and that an early opportunity for withdrawal must be sought. It was
therefore incumbent on the British Government to provide for those Russians who had remained
loyal to, and had fought for, the Allied cause in those regions. The formation of an efficient Russian
national force was urged as one of the first necessary steps to the attainment of this object, and it
was stated to be essential to secure Russian officers from some source and despatch them without
delay to Archangel. For this purpose the General Staff had calculated that it would be necessary to
provide a body of 675 officers for the Archangel area, besides 25 for the Murmansk theatre – making
a total for North Russia of 700. It was also considered necessary to despatch 500 Russian officers to
Vladivostock.

War Cabinet 563, 6 May 1919 (The National Archives, CAB-23/10)

The gobbet is an abstract that belongs to minute 3 from the War Cabinet Conclusion of a
meeting held on May 6, 1919. The gobbet therefore is an important governmental
document with a significant historical value The abstract makes reference to a
memorandum by the Secretary of State for War, Winton Churchill, the head of the War
Office, who requested provisions for White Officers. The historical context of the source
corresponds to the last stage of the British intervention in Russia that began in June 1918.
In September, only four months after the source was produced, British forces would depart
from Russia.
It is quite remarkable that Churchill admits the necessity of withdrawing British troops. As
illustrated by various historians such as Richard Ullman, Ilya Somin and Clifford Kinvig;
Winton Churchill was the main driving force for the continuation of the British intervention
in Russia, a fervent anti-Bolshevik who would push this policy against other members of the
Government like Lloyd-George and Balfour who opposed to the intervention. This reveals a
change of attitude from Churchill. The word choice of “neither desirable nor feasible”
suggests that the former might refer to the British public lack of support for the
intervention, e.g. the hands-off Russia campaign; and the latter might refer to the difficult
conditions experienced by the British forces that were affected by extreme weather
conditions, low morale, Bolshevik aggression and mutinous behaviours among White forces.
In the second part, Churchill recommends the formation of an effective Russian national
force as a preliminary step in the realisation of the objective of withdrawing British forces.
As illustrated by Damien Wright, the British authorities always contemplated the
recruitment of a strong White Russian Army as essential for the success of the campaign.
However, in this case, Churchill seems to appeal to this idea having as main concern the
evacuation of the troops. Churchill’s strategy, contrasts with the views of Henry Wilson and
Edmund Ironside, who as illustrated by Richard Ullman, did not have confidence in the
effectiveness of the White officers.
In the last part of the gobbet, it is indicated where the officers would be sent. It is no
surprise that it was planned to send the officers to these areas because of their strategical
value as points where the Allies held war stores. Furthermore, Churchill’s intention to send
officers to Vladivostock was in line with Admiral Kolchak's campaign. Indeed, perhaps there
is a connection between Churchill’s proposal and the Council of Four’s decisions taken on
May 27 to supply Kolchak’s forces.

The source is useful in providing historians with an understanding of how the last months of
the British intervention in Russia was being developed. Richard Ullman argues that at this
point Churchill became second in importance only to the Prime Minister in the
determination of the UK’s Russian policy. This makes the source quite significant. However,
there abstract has certain limitations. The source dates from the 6 th of May, the original
memorandum is from the 29th of April and it was two pages long. Therefore some important
parts of the document might be missing. For example, the source does not tell where the
Russian officers would be recruited from for Archangel. However, in the memorandum
Churchill states that they would come from Russian officers refugees in Allies countries and
among ex-prisoners of war in Germany. Moreover, in the last part, the abstract seems
unclear about whether the 700 officers would be British. Only in the memorandum it is
stated that they would be Russians who would be trained in Britain.