Faculty of Law

University of Antwerp

The contribution of the ‘Independence of the Supreme Court’ case

Interim Relief order to the development of EU law

ECJ 17 December 2018, C-619/18R, European Commission/Republic of Poland

(‘Independence of the Supreme Court’)

Ana Leonor Ruiz Castillo

Ana.RuizCastillo@student.uantwerpen.be
Law and Philosophy Erasmus Exchange Student

Prof. ​Johan Meeusen

Advanced Course on Constitutional Law of the European Union
3 March 2020
Abbreviations

Charter Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
Commission European Commission
TEU Treaty on European Union
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
Rules of Procedure Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice

Contents

1. Introduction 2
2. Background 2-3
3. The pre-requisites of Interim Relief 3-6
4. Effective Judicial Protection 6-9
5. Conclusion 9
Bibliography 10-11

1
 1. Introduction

The 17 December 2018 order of the C-619/18R case was a granted application for
interim relief aimed at preventing the downfall of an effective judicial protection system in
Poland and the rule of law in the European Union. It now serves as an example to follow in
terms of the Commission's strategy with Poland and any other non-compliant member state.
We will be exploring the significance of said order in terms of the doctrine it settles around
the concept of interim relief, the protection of judicial independence and protection as
warrantors of the rule of law.

2. Background

By virtue of a 2017 Judiciary Reform Act in Poland, the retirement of judges at the
Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) was lowered to 65 years for all those judges who had been
appointed before the Law’s entry into force, applying also to the First President (who would
otherwise have been in office until 2020). An extension of the period of judicial activity
beyond 65 years was possible, under the condition that the President of Poland authorized it,
a decision for which no criteria was offered. In view of the aforementioned, the Commission
launched and infringement procedure against Poland for failure to fulfil its obligations under
article 47 of the Charter, 19(1) TEU and for undermining the principle of judicial
independence and the irremovability of judges1.

The Commision also lodged an application for interim measures under article 279
TFEU,which will be our subject of study. The CJEU’s interim relief order of 17 December
2018 (hereinafter ‘17 December order’) fully granted the Commission's application for the
interim measures2 it deemed necessary including: the suspension of the application of
various provisions of the Polish Law on the Supreme Court of 8 December 2017, which
came into force on 3 April 2018, and the safeguarding of the rights of the judges of the
Supreme Court to continue to perform their duties and for Poland to refrain from adopting
any measures to appoint their replacements or a new First President of the Supreme Court3.

The 17 December order was, essentially, the upholding of the Court’s provisional order
of the 19 October of the same year4. The latter was issued by the Vice-President of the
Court even before Poland had submitted its observations for the interim proceedings. Both
had the purpose of ensuring the effectivity of the interim measures with retroactive effect5
from the moment the polish reform came into force6. Furthermore, the 17 December order

1
BOGDANOWICZ, Piotr. “The Court of Justice in defense of the independence of the Polish Supreme Court”,
Quaderni Costituzionali 2019, no. 4, 2019, p1. Available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3479649
2
Opinion of Advocate Tanchev in ​Commission v​ ​ Poland​, C‑619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:325, §21.
3
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018,​ Commission v Poland​, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021., §1.
4
WAHL.Thomas. “CJEU Confirms Interim Measures Against Polish Supreme Court Reform.”, EUCRIM,
2019. Available at
https://eucrim.eu/news/cjeu-confirms-interim-measures-against-polish-supreme-court-reform/
5
ECJ Press Release no 159/18. 19 October 2018.
6
SARMIENTO, Daniel. “Interim Revolutions”, Verfassungsblog, 2018. Available at
https://verfassungsblog.de/interim-revolutions/

2
 closed interim proceedings but did not make any final judgement on the substance of the
action7 as it was devised purely as a tool “until delivery of final judgement”8. Incidentally,
on November 15th the Court had granted the Commission's request to trigger an expedite
procedure9, marking the start of the main proceedings. The court reasoned that it was also in
the interest of Poland to end the case as soon as possible so as to be rid of the interim
measures put forth by the 17 December order10.

In 24 June 2019 a judgement was reached on the case C-619/18, based on an

infringement action under article 258 TFEU and accepting the arguments put forth by the
Advocate General11. Among other things, the Court concluded that the principle of
irremovability of judges is not absolute and takes notice of an exception warranted by a
legitimate objective in line with the principle of proportionality12. Instead, the new Polish
laws fostered discretional decisions on behalf of the government based on no criteria.

3. The pre-requisites of Interim Relief

Interim measures take place during the judicial phase before the CJEU. By virtue of
them, the member state is ordered to suspend the contested measures until the end of the
procedure13. Sarmiento defines interim measures as “exceptional means to ensure the
effectiveness of a procedure”, and which in practice are mostly used to suspend the effects
of EU acts14. Our case presents somewhat of an anomaly since this interim measure order is
directed against a national statutory act as opposed to an act of EU institutions15.

The legal basis of interim relief can be found in article 160(1,2,3) of the Rules of
Procedure of the CJEU which revert back to articles 278 and 279 TFEU. Article 278 gives
the Court the power to suspend an act if “the circumstances so require”16.In conjunction
with the grounds provided by the article 279 TFEU and 160 Rules of Procedure, it must be
noted that the interim relief provided in this order was “particularly urgent”17, which
allowed the Court to rule inaudita altera parte.​ This shows that the Court understood the
Commission’s request to rely on interim measures was an effective and immediate means to

7
WAHL, ​supra n​ ote 4.
8
Opinion of Advocate Tanchev in ​Commission v​ ​ Poland​, C‑619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:325, §21.
9
Id. §22.
10
ECJ. “Fact sheet: Urgent Preliminary Ruling Procedure and Expedited Procedure.”, April 2019, p27.
Available at
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2019-10/tra-doc-en-div-c-0000-2019-201906086-05_0
0.pdf
11
MASTRACCI, Matteo, “The Rule of Law and the Judicial Retirement Age in Poland: Is the ECJ Judgment
the End of the Story?”, 2019, P.2. Available at
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334576850_The_Rule_of_Law_and_the_Judicial_Retirement_Age_in
_Poland_Is_the_ECJ_Judgment_the_End_of_the_Story
12
BOGDANOWICZ, ​supra n​ ote 1 at 2
13
LASCHET, Ines, "La Pologne en chemin vers un Etat autoritaire : Comment faire respecter le principe de
l'Etat de droit ?", Université de Liège, 2019, p.12, Available at ​http://hdl.handle.net/2268.2/6849
14
SARMIENTO, Daniel. “Interim Revolutions”, Verfassungsblog, 2018. Available at
https://verfassungsblog.de/interim-revolutions/
15
BÁRD, Petra, and ŚLEDZIŃSKA-SIMON, Anna, “Rule of law infringement procedures A proposal to
extend the EU’s rule of law toolbox”, CEPS Publications, 2019, p.16, Available at
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/rule-of-law-infringement-procedures/
16
Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012) ​OJ C 326/47
17
SARMIENTO, ​supra ​note 14

3
 re-establish the rule of law and effective judicial protection in Poland by way of the
precautionary principle18.

It is indispensable for the measure to produce effects before a decision is reached

concerning the substance19, hence the importance of the interim procedure in shaping later
stages of the case at hand. As we discussed earlier, the Court approved the Commission's
request for an expedite procedure once it acknowledged the force that the interim measure
had had on the Polish government even before a judgement was reached. It is the direct
effect of the interim measure that makes it a useful tool in instances of prolonged
infringement by a member state.

There are several requisites that must be satisfied in order to grant interim relief.
Namely the triple set of conditions ​sine qua non ​that configure the concept of interim
measure are; ​fumus boni juris, i​ rreparable harm and urgency 20:

The ​fumus boni juris ​criteria when it comes to interim measures means that it has to be
“justified, prima facie, in fact and in law”21. That is, in complex cases an interim measure
must at least have the appearance of being founded. The Court bases the presence of ​fumus
boni juris i​n the 619/18 case on the C-64/16 case (Associação Sindical dos Juízes
Portugueses). This case revealed not only the importance of independent judges in
guaranteeing effective judicial protection but the doctrine that “the organisation of national
judiciaries is not a purely domestic matter”22 which we will discuss at length further on.

At any rate, it became apparent to the Court in the 17 December order that Poland had
not fulfilled its obligations towards article 19(1) TEU and article 47 Charter. A view that
was later on challenged by the Advocate General who would disagree that the Commission
had put forth enough evidence to support their claims around article 47 independently of
article 19 23. The same remark is put forth by Bonelli and Claes in light of the C-64/16
(Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses) case precedent. As stated in their paper,
invoking article 19 TFEU together with 47 of the Charter as it occurred in our case
C-619/18 R raises “new questions on the scope of application of the latter document”24.
Nonetheless, the authors concede to the idea that the rule of law versus fundamental rights
interpretation is not a debate that will affect the ‘substantive content’ of either of the two
provisions. Reading our case by way of one or the other will yield “similar, if not identical,
results”25.

From the point of view of our second ​conditio sine qua non Ciampi highlights that the
new Polish Law had by December of 2018 already caused serious and irreparable damage.

18
See BÁRD and ŚLEDZIŃSKA-SIMON, ​supra n​ ote 15 at 15
19
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018,​ Commission v Poland​, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021., §29
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
BONELLI, Matteo, and CLAES, Monica, “Judicial serendipity: How Portuguese judges came to the rescue of
the Polish judiciary: ECJ 27 February 2018, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses.”
European Constitutional Law Review,​ ​14​(3), 2018, p.628, Available at
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019618000330
23
LASCHET, ​supra n​ ote at 26, BOGDANOWICZ, ​supra ​note 1 at 1
24
BONELLI, ​supra n​ ote 21 at 637
25
Id.

4
 The 17 December rrder clarifies that “it is not necessary for the occurrence of the damage to
be demonstrated with absolute certainty” but that it is sufficient for the damage to be
“foreseeable with a sufficient degree of probability”26. To put it differently, interim
measures in the order at stake were not devised to “preserve the current situation” but to
“restore ​status quo” ​prior to it27 and allow the judges to “return to the exercise of their
judicial functions”28. That is to say, irreparable damage was being done in December 2018,
which provided sufficient grounds for an urgent procedure under article 160(7) of theRules
of Procedure29. Setting forth this interesting twist on the motivation behind an interim
measure certainly opens a new gateway for the Court in the future, especially in cases of
flagrant violation of article 2 TEU that need urgent action.

As Wahl puts it, the Court realized that the application of the new Polish law would
“cause serious damage to the EU legal order”. Since the independence of the Supreme Court
cannot be safeguarded until a final judgement is passed during the infringement
proceedings, interim measures were seen as a viable option to prevent serious and grave
consequences from spiraling out of control. The preliminary ruling mechanism cannot work
properly without an independent supreme court in view of the fact that “the independence of
national courts and tribunals is, in particular, essential to the proper working of the judicial
cooperation system embodied by the preliminary ruling mechanism under Article 267
TFEU”30.

The possibility that the Supreme Court would lose authority over lower national courts
is another worry closely linked to the principle of mutual trust. If member states lose faith
the Polish Judicial system this could lead to a “ refusal of recognition and enforcement of
judicial decisions made by Polish courts and, in the end, disturb the cooperation mechanism
in the EU​”31. The 17 December order carefully studies this possibility inasmuch as while the
final judgement is pending other member states are prone to lose trust in the Polish judiciary
system “and, as a result, in that Member State’s observance of the rule of law.”32. By
extensión, if the Court does not take effective interim measures against Poland, effective
judicial protection will not be safeguarded since mutual trust and judicial cooperation are its
key elements33.

Lastly, we should reflect upon the element of urgency. This requirement is dependent
upon the risk of serious and irreparable damage to the EU legal order and article 2 TEU as
we have previously discussed34. Above all, the urgency of the interim measure stems from

26
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021. §60
27
CIAMPI, Annalisa. “Can the EU Ensure Respect for the Rule of Law by its Member States? The Case of
Poland”, Osservatorio sulle fonti, n. 3/2018, p.7.Available at
https://www.osservatoriosullefonti.it/archivi/archivio-note-e-commenti/note-e-commenti-fasc-n-3-2018/1357-ca
n-the-eu-ensure-respect-for-the-rule-of-law-by-its-member-states-the-case-of-poland
28
SIKORA, Alicja, “Chapter 1: Infringement Actions Before The General Court: The Past, Present And Future
Of The Judicial Architecture Of The Union”,Yearbook on Procedural Law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union - First Edition, 2019,p.16 Available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3530773
29
BÁRD and ŚLEDZIŃSKA-SIMON, ​supra n​ ote 15 at 6
30
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021, §66
31
WAHL, ​supra n​ ote 4
32
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021, §64, §73
33
Id. §74, §75
34
Id. §68

5
 the fact that a non-independent Polish Supreme Court would be potentially not serving its
function as a watchful guardian of “lawful and consistent”35 case-law. Being the Supreme
Court a last instance court, all the decisions it takes until a final judgement is reached in
CJEU36 will have the authority of ​res judicata and as such an “irreversible”37 repercussion
on EU legal order. With respect to the interim relief order, Pech and Platon consider that it
was requested by the Commission “so as to prevent authorities from changing the facts on
the ground before the CJEU is able to issue final rulings”38.

Another factor that the Court took into account when granting the Commission's
request was the balancing of interests. According to the Court, this consists in assessing
whether the Commission's request is solid enough to outweigh Poland’s interest in an
immediate application of their new law39.From Wahl’s point of view, the Court’s conclusion
was categorical; the general interests of the EU in the functioning of the legal order in the
Union outweighs Poland’s stance on its Supreme Court. ​Inter alia, granted the interim
measures the system in force before the Polish reform would only be maintained
temporarily until the CJEU reaches a judgement.

In retrospect, Sarmiento describes this order of interim measures as the Court’s entry
into ​terra incognita ​in so far as it pushed a member state like never before to either suspend
the effects of the Judiciary Reform Act and stay in the track of european integration or to
“follow the path of authoritarian illiberalism”40. In relation to the 19 October provisional
order (that the 17 December order draws from) he calls it a “ground-breaking precedent”
because in the past the Court has been consistently reluctant to contemplate such measures
for anything other than infringement procedures on grounds of the 258 TFEU41. The
Commission was well aware that from the Court’s perspective that ​ordering ​states to refrain
from acting in provisional terms is a “gamble”, he writes42. Article 279 TFEU, as opposed to
article 258 TFEU (which was utilized by the Commission in the main proceedings) , is one
that allows for an “ample discretion” by the Court with regards to the determination of the
interim measure needed43 - it was not a safe bet but it proved to be the most successful
action to date in the polish rule of law crisis.

4. Effective Judicial Protection and Rule of Law

The infringement procedure of Case C-619/18 is substantiated upon Poland’s failure to

fulfill its obligations of articles 19 (1)TEU and article 47 of the Charter44 whereby member
states must “provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection” and ensure a
fair trial and legal aid respectively. Ultimately, the fundamental right to a fair trial rests

35
Id. §72
36
CIAMPI, ​supra n​ ote 26
37
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021, §71
38
PECH,Laurent, and PLATON,Sébastien, “The beginning of the end for Poland’s so-called “judicial reforms”?
Some thoughts on the ECJ ruling in Commission v Poland”, EU Law Analysis, 30 June 2019. Available at
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/06/the-beginning-of-end-for-polands-so.html
39
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021,.§91
40
SARMIENTO, ​supra n​ ote 14
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Order of the Court of 17 December 2018, Commission v Poland, C‑619/18 R, EU:C:2018:1021., §3

6
 upon the foundation of judicial independence and more broadly on the rule of law as
protected by article 2 TEU45.

In Kochenov’s eyes through the order of 17 December what we come to realize is that
article 19(1) TEU “is good enough” in the sense that it has proved to have a strong
“backfiring force” via interim measures46. In addition, the success of this tool suggests that
it could very well be deployed in other eras of EU law with a “significant impact”47.
Unequivocally, the treatment by the Court of the Commission's arguments around article 19
must not be taken for granted. This was the first instance in EU law history wherein a
member state was found to have unfulfilled its obligations with regards to it and to have
been subject to article 7(1) TFUE proceedings48, known as the ‘nuclear option’.

Broadly speaking, the significance of the the 17 December order is inextricably linked to the
scope of the C-619/18 case as a whole. As Hilpert observes, the order proved that applying
for interim measures through article 279 TFEU and an expedite procedure (article 133 Rules
of Procedure) is a better strategy than “hoping” for the reinstatement of judges after the
main proceedings49. In fact, in paragraph 33 of the Advocate General’s opinion the
successful suspension of the application of the new polish law and the elimination of its
effects is evident to the point that one of Poland’s argument in the main proceedings was
that the case was devoid of purpose since all the controversial provisions had been already
been repealed50.

In relation to the effective judicial protection in the context of the interim relief order,
Kochenov argues that the CJEU’s stone-by-stone approach as opposed to the long-jump
alternative is insufficient and that the only solution to reinstate the rule of law and effective
judicial protection in Poland (and Hungary) is a concerted effort of all the actors involved
(including the national governments)51.However, most attempts of concerted effort are
prone to failure until the rule of law crisis is stabilized and interim measures may be one of
our only tools to combat this crisis, along with pecuniary measures as observed in the
C-441/17 R Polish Forest Bialowieka case case52.

The C-441/17 R case is one where the Commission requested interim measures so as to
order Poland to cease active forest management operations, the removal of
century-old-or-more dead spruces and the felling of trees as part of increased logging on the
Puszcza Białowieska site. This interim measure was supplemented with a request to order a
periodic penalty payment of at least EUR 100 000 53 upon Poland’s possible
non-compliance under article 260 TFEU 54. Unfortunately the penalty measures did not
45
CIAMPI, ​supra n​ ote 26 at 3
46
KOCHENOV, ​supra ​note 46 at 3
47
Id.
48
BOGDANOWICZ, ​supra n​ ote 1
49
HILPERT, ​supra ​note 43 at 12
50
Opinion of Advocate Tanchev in ​Commission v​ ​ Poland,​ C‑619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:325, §33
51
KOCHENOV, ​supra ​note 46 at 6
52
KOCHENOV, ​supra ​note 46 at 3
53
FILIPEK, Powel. “Challenges to the Rule of Law in the European Union: the distressing case of Poland”,
Revista do Instituto Brasileiro de Direitos Humanos, 2018 , p.27. Available at
https://www.academia.edu/37589519/Challenges_to_the_Rule_of_Law_in_the_European_Union_the_distressin
g_case_of_Poland
54
CIAMPI, ​supra n​ ote 26 at 9

7
 yield the same results as in C-619/18. On the contrary, the Polish government responded
with intensified logging and a petition to remove the forest from the UNESCO World
Heritage list under the pretext of national sovereignty55.

In contrast, the C-192/18 case portrays the downside of not applying for interim relief.
It revolved around the independence of Polish ordinary courts and was born out of the
amendment of Law of Ordinary Courts in 12 July 2017, which was together with the Law
on the Supreme Court of 8 December 2017, a frontal non-compliance of Article 7 TEU and
the principle of effective judicial protection. Both of these new laws led the Commission to
start the infringement actions Case C-192/18 and Case C-619/1856. Although C-192/18 and
C-619/18 had a lot in common there were two key differences between the two. On the one
hand, C-192/18 did not apply for interim measures, the provisions were not repealed and so
a high number of judges were forced into retirement. On the other hand, because there was
no request formulated for an expedite procedure, a new president was appointed and judges
were replaced ‘irreversibly’ by the time the sentence was announced57. This outcome could
have been avoided if the Commission had applied for interim measures.58

An important point that is raised by Hilpert is that the judgement of the 24 June 2019 of
case C-619/18 proved the effective use of the interim relief as a tool to protect effective
judicial protection at the national level without treating it is as a domestic affair but as a
symptom of a rule of law crisis in the Union59. In paragraph 52 of the C-619/18 judgement
the Court affirms that while the organisation of justice is competence of the member states
its exercise is still subject to comply the EU law obligations60, this is what the Commission
failed to grasp when delineating its plan of action in C-192/18. In all, the significance of
case C-619/18 R and the 17 December order in particular, is the unprecedented use of a
combined approach of interim measures, expedite procedure and article 19 TEU is a
winning formula61.

Moreover, Hilpert values the holistic approach that the Court adopts in our case as it is
the only one that can “promise success where the judiciary is under threat”62 in the future.
Pech and Platon also commend the Commission's work and stressing on the innovation that
the C-619/18 case presents as a “new template to follow”. Kochenov agrees and advises the

55
KOCHENOV, ​supra ​note 46 at 13
56
BABUNSKA, Bojana. “Effective judicial protection and State liability in EU Law”, Utrecht University
Repository, 2019, p94. Available at ​https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/380629
57
HILPERT, ​supra ​note 43 at 12
58
HILPERT Franziska-Marie Laura, “A new dawn for the Infringement Procedure - New possibilities to
safeguard the rule of law under Article 258 TFEU” Lund University Libraries, 2019, p.32, Available at
https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8979634
59
HILPERT, ​supra ​note 43 at 18
60
Judgment of 24 June 2019​, Commission / Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême) ​(C-619/18)
ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, §​ 52
61
HILPERT, ​supra ​note 43 at 12
62
HILPERT, Franziska-Marie Laura, “An Old Procedure with New Solutions for the Rule of Law Crisis”,
Nordic Journal of European Law, Volume 2, Issue 2,2019, p13, Available at
https://journals.lub.lu.se/njel/article/view/20365/18313

8
 Commission to systematically consider interim measures as a valid mechanism given the
success of the 17 December order63.

At the time, some polish politicians were in favour of not complying with the order
because it invalidated the statutory law of a member state, which was against the treaties.
And yet their arguments were easily crumbled in light of the fact that the direct effect of
interim measures is a “consequence of the primacy of EU law”64. This drives authors like
Bárd to be skeptical and lament that the success of the interim order was partly on account
of upcoming elections in Poland, in which it was used as an electoral tactic. By April 2019
the government had begun “introducing new amendments to the Act on the Supreme Court
and to the disciplinary procedure for judges, by additionally curbing the rights of judges to a
fair trial”65. As Kochenov puts it, what the C-619/18 case teaches us is that respecting the
acquis is not synonymous with a continued adherence to article 2 TEU66.Be that as it may,
Bárd recognizes that the order had “domestic influence”67.

5. Conclusion

Perhaps the biggest contribution that this order offers the development of EU law is a
tool to protect fundamental rights of the EU citizens with direct and immediate effect in
urgent cases while pending judgement. It delineates the three core prerequisites for a
successful interim relief being ​fumus boni juris, u​ rgency and irreparable damage coupled
with the balancing of interests. On this occasion, the Court superimposes the general
interests of the EU to that of the Polish government. Via interim relief it not only guarantees
effective judicial protection (including judicial independence and the right to a fair trial) for
the Polish citizenship but also prevents the disintegration of the principle of mutual trust
between member states. For these reasons, the 17 December order brings to the table a fresh
start in the defence of EU legal order.

63
PECH,Laurent, and KOCHENOV, Dimitry, “Strengthening the Rule of Law Within the European Union:
Diagnoses, Recommendations, and What to Avoid”, 2019, p.5. Available at
https://reconnect-europe.eu/news/policy-brief-june-2019/
64
Id.
65
BÁRD and ŚLEDZIŃSKA-SIMON, ​supra n​ ote 15 at 17
66
KOCHENOV, Dimitry, “The Last Soldier Standing? Courts vs Politicians and the Rule of Law Crisis in the
New Member States of the EU”, European Yearbook of Constitutional Law, 2018, p.1. Available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3339631
67
BÁRD, ​supra ​note 15.

9
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