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Critical Studies on Terrorism

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Security, the War on Terror, and official

development assistance
a
Kwesi Aning
a
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre , Accra,
Ghana
Published online: 23 Apr 2010.

To cite this article: Kwesi Aning (2010) Security, the War on Terror, and official development
assistance, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 3:1, 7-26, DOI: 10.1080/17539151003594178

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 Critical Studies on Terrorism
Vol. 3, No. 1, April 2010, 7–26

ARTICLE
1753-9161
1753-9153
RTER
Critical Studies on Terrorism,
Terrorism Vol. 3, No. 1, Feb 2010: pp. 0–0

Security, the War on Terror, and official development assistance

Kwesi Aning*
Critical
K. AningStudies on Terrorism

Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Ghana

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States and the subsequent declaration of a
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War on Terror, several international issues have been affected, including the disburse-
ment of official development assistance. This paper examines the connections between
development aid, security, and the War on Terror and analyses the manner in which
these linkages are impacting on the orientation, understanding, performance, and effi-
cacy of existing official development assistance discourses, and assesses the emer-
gence or otherwise of a new securitisation and politicisation of aid. The paper draws
linkages between official development assistance, security, and terrorism, and applies
this analysis to a discussion that explores how in a practical and operational sense these
multiple dynamics have played out in the disbursement of aid by Japan, the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and China.
Keywords: War on Terror; securitisation; official development assistance; Africa;
11 September 2001; Taliban; al-Qaeda

Introduction

[9/11 has] reshaped the world politics of the twenty-first century . . . world politics has taken
on a much darker, more apocalyptic hue than at any time in recent history, and this has pro-
found implications as much for areas such as global economy and environmental sustainabil-
ity as for security. (Kennedy-Pipe and Renneger 2006, p. 539)
For years to come, if not decades, the ‘war on terror’ will be the defining paradigm in the
struggle for global order. (Booth and Dunne 2002, p. 9)
. . . September 11 2001, shift[ed] our psychological makeup – the DNA in our minds – with
consequences that will not become clear for years to come. (Gaddis 2004, pp. 4–5)

Historically, terrorists are known to have launched attacks in virtually all parts of the
world – Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas – for myriad reasons. The 11 September
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (what has become known as 9/11) has had a
phenomenal impact on the very concept of international security. The resultant declaration
of a War on Terror (WOT) by the United States and its allies has also had global ramifica-
tions. It can be argued that the WOT has become the new global war of the 21st century,
bringing with it transcending consequences in international politics and world order. This
situation has affected the order of global priorities in many spheres and relegated several
otherwise important global issues to second place. One major impact has been on the

*Email: Kwesi.aning@kaiptc.org

ISSN 1753-9153 print/ISSN 1753-9161 online

© 2010 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17539151003594178
http://www.informaworld.com
 8 K. Aning

discourse of international development. Considerations such as (1) the geographical allo-

cation of development assistance, (2) the use and conditionality of such assistance, and (3)
the actual quantities disbursed have all been affected.
While the disbursement of aid is a critical factor in the calculations of foreign policy
interests of donors, its immediate post-Second World War conception was primarily
geared toward reconstruction after the ruins of war. More recently, the concept has shifted
toward the elimination or reduction of poverty in recipient states, which in some cases
may help to prevent war as in Pakistan, Yemen, and Algeria. However, since 9/11, it has
become increasingly obvious that there is a growing conceptual and operational shift in
the official development assistance (ODA) discourse resulting in the routine subjection of
ODA disbursements to the imperatives of the WOT. This is further compounded by the
fact that the term ‘terrorism’ itself has been politicised, with state actors inappropriately
applying the term to serve particular ends.
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The connection between ODA and terrorism is usually overlooked in public dis-
course. It is, however, critical in contemporary international relations to understand how
the political use of terrorism can impact on the disbursements of ODA, and vice versa.
A critical analysis of the relationship between ODA and terrorism illustrates the new
security-first paradigm, which determines who gets what, why, how much, and increas-
ingly, what it should be used for. Based on this paradigm, it is the perceived or actual
role of a recipient state in the WOT that progressively determines the type and actual
size of aid disbursed. While the priority and share of a country’s ODA in the immediate
post-Second World War era was determined by the gravity of its reconstruction needs,
in the post-9/11 period that priority is accorded frontline states in the WOT. In other
words, the role played by a country in the WOT determines its share of ODA. This has
introduced a paradigm shift in which the significance of a recipient in the WOT has
become the determining variable.
The objective of this paper is to examine the multiple linkages and connections
between development aid, security, and the WOT. First, it examines the manner in
which these linkages are impacting on the orientation, understanding, performance,
and efficacy of the existing ODA architecture. By discussing the characteristics and
dynamics of the WOT after 9/11, the paper then compares the perceived shifting cri-
teria for ODA disbursements from 1970 to 2005, and assesses the emergence or oth-
erwise of a new securitisation and politicisation of aid. It also analyses the extent to
which there have been geographical shifts in the allocation of aid, and how what
qualifies as aid has been expanded, meaning that development aid allocations are
now being used for a wider variety of activities than in the pre-9/11 period. Subse-
quently, the analyses draws linkages and connections between ODA, security, and
terrorism, and applies this analysis to a discussion that explores how in a practical
and operational sense these multiple dynamics have been played out in several donor
states.

The War on Terror: characteristics and dynamics

After the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush declared his administration’s top prior-
ity to be a campaign to combat terrorism, a declaration of what became known as the War
on Terror. In an address to the joint Houses of Congress, President Bush officially
launched the war and defined it thus: ‘Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found,
stopped, and defeated’ (Address to Congress, 20 September 2001).
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 9

Even though terrorist groups besides al-Qaeda exist in many parts of the world – such
as in Colombia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda – the critical distinction is that al-Qaeda poses a
threat to international peace and security and to the interests of the United States in par-
ticular (Elworthy and Rogers 2002, p. 7). Against this backdrop, the US President stated
that the al-Qaeda network, and its sponsors and collaborators, would therefore be targeted.
This US resolve culminated in a United Nations Security Council-authorised and US-led
international military operation in Afghanistan, code-named Operation Enduring Freedom
on 7 October 2001. The operation was intended to overthrow the Taliban regime and to
eliminate al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan. Since its launch, the WOT has become a
lynchpin in US security calculations and an indispensable foreign policy determinant glo-
bally. In a subsequent speech on 29 January 2002, the tenets of US foreign policy over the
last half century were rewritten when President Bush stated that the US ‘would not wait on
events while dangers gather’; he declared, ‘states like these [Iran, Iraq and North Korea],
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and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the
world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing
danger’ (Elworthy and Rogers 2002). As a result of this speech, a new doctrine of US pri-
macy and pre-emption was initiated.
The WOT has been characterised by a mix of conventional and asymmetric warfare.
Conventional warfare entails direct engagement on land, sea, and/or air of two or more
military forces. However, the WOT presents a combination of military operations and
guerrilla and urban-style warfare, conducted by the proponents of the WOT against ter-
rorist groups and other non-state actors. Terrorists, who are the main targets in the war,
are scattered around the world without definitive geographical and territorial bounda-
ries, making it practically difficult for strategic or even tactical fixing, targeting, and
engagement.
During President Bill Clinton’s administration, the terminology of waging a ‘war’
against terrorism was discounted by one of his senior policy advisors who saw terrorism
as a challenge to be managed, not solved by war and subject to the metaphor of waging a
war against terrorism. This approach came from the view that ‘it is a war that cannot be
won’ and ‘unlike most wars, it has neither a fixed set of enemies nor the prospect of com-
ing to closure’ (Pillar 2001, pp. 217–218). The al-Qaeda network alone has a presence in
about 60 countries around the world where members and affiliates operate in varied forms
(Corbin 2002, p. 93, Atran 2003, pp. 7–8). Other related terrorist networks whose activi-
ties theoretically dovetail into each other are also scattered around the world. This geo-
graphical dispersion is a significant feature of the war. The bottom line is that enemies are
not easily identifiable at any point in time and in any specific geographical location. Apart
from the transnational presence and operations of terrorists, their impacts are also transna-
tional. For example, both the perpetrators and victims of the 9/11 attacks were from differ-
ent countries and geographical regions.
Yet another characteristic of the declaration of the WOT has been its contribution to
redefining inter-state relations by emphasising inter-state cooperation (Lebl 2006), in
order to defeat terrorist networks and infrastructures, deny terrorists haven and sponsor-
ship, eradicate sources of terrorist financing, ensure individual country domestic security,
reduce state vulnerability to terrorism, and enhance emergency preparedness and response
capabilities (White House 2003). Since 9/11, the United States and the European Union
have concluded agreements earlier considered unattainable and have worked together
much more closely than before in the effort to fight terrorism (European Council 2001).
There have been several anti-terrorism initiatives calling for solidarity and cooperation
with the United States, and the identification of common policies (European Council
 10 K. Aning

2001), which though recommended earlier, have recently been given renewed urgency for
implementation. This is based on an increasing realisation that success in the WOT is
largely dependent on the ability to cooperate on a wide range of issues, including tracking
and blocking the finances and communication networks of terrorist groups across the
globe. Efforts to achieve these ends culminated in the UN Security Council’s authorisation
of the US-led military operation in Afghanistan. However, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein
in Iraq was not sanctioned by the Security Council. In order to carry out these operations,
the United States obtained the support of several countries that collectively came to be
described as the Coalition of the Willing. The formation of the coalition was facilitated
through the use of political, diplomatic, military, and particularly economic levers by the
United States. Afghanistan and Iraq were identified as sponsors of terrorism and, among
other reasons, the operations in both countries were aimed at stemming this state sponsor-
ship of terrorists.
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9/11 and official development assistance

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there has been renewed interest in applying ODA as
an instrument for containing terrorism. This follows the realisation that state fragility and
poverty have implications for the establishment and operation of terrorist groups. For
example, in Afghanistan, state fragility, the Taliban regime, and poverty led to the crea-
tion of an environment that enabled al-Qaeda to establish itself and conduct its operations.
According to Michael J. Williams and Jessica von Borstel, this highlights the link between
the WOT and development, as well as military issues (Williams and von Borstel 2006,
p. 7). This is reflected in recent global trends in aid allocation. Between 2001 and 2004,
there was a significant increase of more than US$20 billion in new resources for develop-
ment assistance, primarily attributable to the WOT (Ewing et al. 2004, p. 8). However,
development assistance to regions less strategic to the WOT has been marginalised by
other seemingly more relevant geographical regions and priorities.
Opponents and supporters of the WOT have either been chastised or rewarded (Mason
2004) respectively through the use of ODA allocations, with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Iraq being the main recipients of the largesse of key actors in the WOT (Ewing et al. 2004,
p. 1). The following tables demonstrate how geo-strategic partners to the WOT have been
rewarded with increases in ODA allocations, while opponents have experienced negative
impacts. The WOT has also impacted on defence budgets: governments around the world
have increased their budgets to meet new demands for security (Ewing et al. 2004, p. 1).
The WOT has, therefore, highlighted security concerns, created renewed interest in ODA,
impacted on criteria for its disbursement, and led to its recognition as an indispensable
instrument in the War.

Geographic allocation of aid: any discernible changes?

Since the launch of the WOT, global development assistance patterns have been altered
in a number of ways. This includes shifts between countries or sectors, and changes in
activities within sectors. This section discusses the factors that determine or impact on
donor countries’ prioritisation of recipients in terms of which country receives what
share of ODA.
Until 9/11, disbursements by the major donors depended on foreign economic, polit-
ical, and security interests. Available data indicate that a colonial past, voting patterns in
the UN, and political institutions or the economic policies of recipient countries all played
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 11

critical roles in the allocation and disbursement of ODA (Woods 2005, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) 2003). At present, besides standard aid allocation variables, security-related con-
siderations seem greatly to influence aid allocation and disbursement. Security consider-
ations include the presence of foreign terrorist groups, sharing a border with a state
sponsor of terrorism, the contribution of troops in Iraq or membership of the Coalition of
the Willing (Moss, Roodman and Stanley 2005, p. 1). Other factors affected by security
issues besides ODA allocations are debt cancellation, support for refugees in donor coun-
tries, and sometimes financial support for military purposes.
Net OECD/DAC ODA increased to US$79.5 billion in 2004 (Padilla 2004, p. 219,
OECD, 2003). This increase raises the question of how increased aid has been used and
whether there have been changes in the geographical allocation of aid during the period of
the WOT. It is argued here that aid allocation has been skewed towards countries relevant
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to the WOT (Mason 2004). Table 1 shows recipients from selected major actors in the
WOT (the United States, the UK, Canada, and Australia), and points to how the percent-
age of allocations to some countries in the Middle East has generally risen above levels in
the 1990s (OECD 2006, pp. 218–219). In particular, there has been an increase in the per-
centage allocation of bilateral aid to Iraq and Afghanistan. As a result, both countries find
prominent placement among the top five recipients of bilateral aid from the major actors
in the WOT (OECD 2006, pp. 226–241).
About 61.4% of ODA to the Middle East went to Iraq in 2004 compared with 40.9% in
2003. Of aid to South and Central Asia, Afghanistan accounted for 24.1% and 19.3% in
2004 and 2003, respectively (OECD 2006, pp. 212–215). In comparison, East Asia has
seen a fall in total aid from 15.3% in 2000 to a low of 7.5% in 2004. Padilla (2004, p. 228)
argues that this pattern for East Asia is attributable, for the most part, to declining aid to
China and relative changes in flows to other countries in the region. In spite of increases to
Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the WOT, aid to South and Central Asia has remained
fairly constant due to offsets from declining aid to India and unchanged levels of aid to
other countries in the region.
Multilateral aid from UN agencies to the Middle East and North Africa increased from
20.8% of total gross disbursement in the late 1990s to 24.9% in 2004, while that of inter-
national financial institutions decreased from a low of 3.3% in 2003 to 1.5% in 2004,
despite the active presence of The World Bank in Iraq. While concerns about Iraq’s stabil-
ity and reconstruction may be drawing the involvement of UN agencies for humanitarian
purposes, continuing turbulence in the country may also constitute an unfavourable envir-
onment for international financial institutions (OECD 2006, pp. 218–219).

Post-9/11 US aid allocation policies

In absolute terms, the United States tops the list for aid disbursement post-9/11. This
amounted to about US$19.7 billion in 2004 (from a previous level of US$18.3 billion in
2003). The United States also heads the list in terms of significant increases in aid. In this
context, scrutiny of US aid allocation criteria is critical. Table 2 shows that since 9/11,
there have been major changes in US allocations, particularly affecting Iraq, Afghanistan,
Turkey, Pakistan, and Jordan.
The additional aid to these countries could be seen as having accrued from the overall
increase in US aid, and from declining allocations to Israel, Egypt, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina. According to Moss et al. (2005, p. 6), the US$4 billion cumulative net loss
by the bottom ten recipients of US aid – if added to the almost US$8 billion total increase
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12

Table 1. Major recipients of individual Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members’ aid as a percentage of official development assistance (ODA).
UK USA
1983–1984 1993–1994 2003–2004 1983–1984 1993–1994 2003–2004
K. Aning

India 11.8 India 3.9 India 5.7 Israel 14.1 Israel 10.9 Iraq 11.8
Kenya 2.8 Ex-Yugoslavia 3.1 Bangladesh 3.6 Egypt 13.0 Egypt 7.1 Congo, Democratic 4.1
unsp. Republic
Sudan 2.6 Bangladesh 2.2 Tanzania 3.6 El Salvador 2.5 El Salvador 4.1 Egypt 3.9
Bangladesh 2.6 Zambia 1.9 Iraq 3.1 Bangladesh 2.3 Somalia 3.6 Jordan 3.4
Sri Lanka 2.3 Uganda 1.7 Ghana 2.7 Turkey 2.2 Haiti 2.7 Afghanistan 3.3
Tanzania 2.2 Kenya 1.5 Zambia 2.4 Costa Rica 2.1 Philippines 1.8 Pakistan 3.0
Pakistan 1.5 Mozambique 1.4 Congo, Democratic 2.2 India 1.9 Colombia 1.4 Colombia 2.8
Republic
Zambia 1.3 China 1.4 Afghanistan 2.2 Northern Marianas 1.7 Jordan 1.3 Ethiopia 2.6
Zimbabwe 1.2 Tanzania 1.3 Malawi 1.6 Philippines 1.6 Jamaica 1.3 Sudan 1.4
Egypt 1.1 Malawi 1.3 South Africa 1.5 Sudan 1.6 Bolivia 1.2 Palestinian 1.2
Administrative areas
Australia Canada
Papua New 35.4 Papua New 22.3 Papua New 16.8 Bangladesh 5.6 China 2.8 Afghanistan 2.6
Guinea Guinea Guinea
Indonesia 6.2 Indonesia 8.7 Indonesia 7.2 India 3.8 India 2.1 Iraq 2.4
Bangladesh 2.7 China 6.0 Solomon Islands 6.4 Pakistan 3.7 Egypt 2.0 Ethiopia 2.0
Thailand 2.5 Philippines 3.0 Viet Nam 3.3 Sri Lanka 2.2 Jamaica 2.0 Congo, Democratic 1.9
Republic
Malaysia 2.4 Thailand 2.7 Iraq 2.7 Tanzania 1.9 Bangladesh 1.9 Bangladesh 1.7
Philippines 2.0 Viet Nam 2.6 China 2.6 Kenya 1.6 Indonesia 1.4 China 1.5
Fiji 1.3 Malaysia 2.2 Philippines 2.5 Senegal 1.5 Philippines 1.0 Mali 1.4
Egypt 1.2 Bangladesh 1.6 Timor-Leste 2.4 Ghana 1.4 Mozambique 0.9 Ghana 1.4
Tanzania 1.1 Fiji 1.5 Cambodia 1.7 Ethiopia 1.2 Ghana 0.9 Tanzania 1.3
China 1.1 Cambodia 1.2 Bangladesh 1.4 Indonesia 1.2 Guyana 0.9 India 1.3
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (2003), p. 241.
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 13

Table 2. Net changes in USAID since 1998–2005.

Total aid (US$, millions) Average aid per capita (US$)
Largest net changes in USAID
assistance (4-year period total; 1998– 2002– Percentage 1998– 2002– Percentage
constant 1995 US$) 2001 2005 change 2001 2005 change
1. Iraq 0 5710 571 000 0.00 51 5100
2. Afghanistan 45 1793 3884 0.47 15.88 3279
3. Turkey 11 1173 10 564 0.05 4.12 8140
4. Pakistan 18 1136 6217 0.03 1.87 6133
5. Jordan 589 1544 162 29.93 70.74 136
6. West Bank and Gaza 349 565 62 27.95 40.88 46
7. Sudan 198 365 84 1.53 2.59 69
8. Ethiopia 508 627 23 1.87 2.11 13
9. Congo, Democratic Republic 70 180 157 0.35 0.82 134
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10. Uzbekistan 74 179 141 0.76 1.73 128

Top ten subtotal 1863 13 272
145. Israel 3790 1868 −50.70 158.18 71.88 −55
144. Egypt 2651 2081 −21.50 10.00 7.26 −27
143. Bosnia and Herzegovina 619 165 −73.34 41.55 10.52 −75
142. Ukraine 661 371 −43.87 3.35 1.96 −41
141. Russia 633 382 −39.65 1.08 0.66 −39
140. Peru 418 233 −44.25 1.06 2.14 102
139. Haiti 324 196 −39.50 10.30 5.89 −43
138. Colombia 129 6 −95.34 0.77 0.03 −96
137. India 562 465 −17.26 0.14 0.11 −21
136. Bolivia 319 228 −28.53 9.67 6.42 −34
Bottom ten subtotal 10 106 5995
Total (all 145 countries) 19 769 27 494
Source: Moss et al. (2005), p. 6.

to all countries – will almost be equivalent to the cumulative net increases by the top ten
‘gainers’ of about US$11 billion. This indicates that about one-third of aid received by the
top ten gainers comes from a shift of resources from the bottom ten countries. These
changes appear to reflect emerging post-9/11 security realities, most notably the demands
of the WOT. Although many argue that aid curtailments to Israel and Egypt were planned
well before 2001, and that the cuts to Bosnia and Herzegovina were the result of major
post-conflict reconstruction coming to an end (OECD 2006, p. 11), it is nevertheless likely
that the WOT provided the enabling environment and served as a trigger for these changes
in aid disbursements.
Although 9/11 boosted aid in many regions, most of the increases went to augment
security sectors rather than purely for development. For example, in Africa, which saw aid
from the United States at its peak in 2003, the beneficiaries were either petroleum-export-
ing countries or countries whose support had been enlisted for the WOT, such as Nigeria,
Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Sudan (OECD 2006, p. 229). Among the members
of the Coalition of the Willing or important allies in the WOT, only Eritrea has seen fund-
ing decrease, as evidenced by the figures given in Table 3 (Williams and von Borstel
2006, pp. 15–19).
According to British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND), US military and
security-related aid to Africa has also increased, and countries that previously were of little
importance to the United States have acquired new funding through the WOT. Djibouti, for
example, obtained US$31 million for allowing the United States to establish a permanent
base. Furthermore, under the Pan-Sahelian Initiative (PSI), which was created in 2002, US
 14 K. Aning

Table 3. US development assistance to selected African countries, 1998–2005 (US$, thousands).

2004, 2005,
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 estimate estimate
Angola 13 000 14 019 9996 9963 11 174 12 365 11 300 11 674
Djibouti 0 0 0 0 0 2000 0 0
Eritrea 11 200 10 175 8827 10 119 10 908 10 160 6290 6386
Ethiopia 42 885 42 702 39 738 40 647 43 257 50 438 52 763 54 720
Kenya 19 500 20 470 31 373 33 199 41 110 51 398 44 110 44 133
Mali 37 500 35 372 35 248 33 679 36 176 40 402 38 596 34 767
Nigeria 7000 16 917 37 500 54 304 58 034 71 296 56 151 59 314
Rwanda 7500 14 755 16 120 14 164 18 502 22 296 18 160 18 527
Somalia 4000 1500 0 3000 2767 3372 999 986
South Africa 70 100 54 816 46 167 50 027 57 708 62 958 52 006 50 800
Sudan 0 0 0 4500 11 131 18 871 61 763 81 000
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Tanzania 19 700 21 951 23 822 21 103 24 808 37 809 28 200 26 988

Uganda 44 764 49 106 49 012 49 878 59 724 68 297 61 642 54 744
Source: Williams and von Borstel (2006), p. 9.

Special Operations Forces supply weapons, vehicles, and military training to anti-terrorism
teams in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania (BOND 2003, Volman 2006, p. 19).
From 2001 to 2003, US aid to Africa rose by approximately 10.3%, but it has
decreased since 2003. As Williams and von Borstel (2006, p. 7) suggest, this pattern
points to the initial link of the WOT to development, as well as military issues. However,
the increasing cost of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq meant there was less money to
spend on other parts of the world. In 2003, there were two US supplemental appropria-
tions in April (US$79 billion) and November (US$87 billion) to finance the war in Iraq.
These clearly put pressure on other programmes and resulted in a reduction in allocations
to Africa and other regions (Williams and von Borstel 2006, p. 6). In fact, overall aid to
North Africa has declined significantly since the 1990s: in 2004, this stood at 3.8% com-
pared with about 12.2% in 1990 (Sevastopulo, 2006, p. 5).
Thus, while there has been a rise in the total global aid volume, assistance to regions
less strategic to the WOT has been marginalised by other seemingly more strategic geo-
graphic regions and priorities. During fiscal year 2004, Afghanistan, Jordan, Pakistan, and
Turkey received a total of US$4.7 billion in aid from the United States – more than five
times the entire amount of its aid to Sub-Saharan Africa during the same year. Afghanistan,
Jordan, Pakistan, and Turkey received US$657 million, US$460 million, US$395 million,
and US$255 million, respectively, while total development assistance to Africa in the year
amounted to about US$966.3 million (Williams and von Borstel 2006, p. 16).
The effects of 9/11 have also affected other types of US assistance to African coun-
tries. One of the unintended consequences of US unilateral tendencies after 9/11 has been
the short-term application of the American Service Members Protection Act, which pro-
hibits certain types of military aid to countries that have signed on to the International
Criminal Court (ICC), but have not signed a separate Article 98 agreement with the United
States. The Protection Act provides funds for military training and for the purchase of mil-
itary hardware to armed forces of friendly countries, popularly known as the International
Military Education & Training (IMET) programme.1 The United States has pressed more
than 100 countries to sign Article 98, under which they would pledge not to surrender US
citizens to the ICC without US consent. Several Africa countries have refused to sign this
Article and have subsequently seen the slashing of IMET funds, including Kenya, Mali,
Namibia, Niger, and Tanzania (Mazetti 2006).
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 15

Allocation and use of aid: what qualifies as ‘development aid?’

The OECD/DAC has typically restrained attempts by donors to broaden the definition of offi-
cial development assistance. Nevertheless, important changes have occurred. According to
the OECD (1998, p. 114), these ‘changes in interpretation have tended to broaden the scope
of the concept’, and as a result have had an important influence on ODA performance indica-
tors, in particular in relation to ODA volume. In 1991, assistance provided to refugees from
recipient countries during the first year after arrival in the donor country was introduced as an
ODA-eligible item. This followed the addition of administrative costs (1979) and the cost of
students from the South (1984) (OECD 1998, p. 114). Over time, emergency and disaster
relief, debt forgiveness, changes regarding capital subscriptions, and other related themes
have been critical components of ODA calculations. Most recently, and clearly linked to the
current security paradigm, the DAC announced in April 2004 adjustments and clarifications
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on the definition of ODA relating to ‘preventing the recruitment of child soldiers, enhancing
civil society’s role in the security system, and promoting civilian oversight and democratic
control of the management of security expenditure’ (OECD 2004).
The widening interpretation of what qualifies as ODA allows donor countries to improve
their ODA performance figures. It does not, however, require them to demonstrate direct
linkage between increased ODA and improved impact on poverty reduction. Though donor
countries at the Millennium Summit in 2000 committed themselves to poverty-reduction
goals, very little of the subsequent increases in aid has been available for these goals (Padilla
2004, p. 225). It could be argued that the allocation of about 37% of new aid resources
between 2000 and 2004 to Afghanistan and Iraq partly explains this phenomenon (Padilla
2004, p. 225). Furthermore, debt relief, technical cooperation, and emergency assistance –
which together comprised 90% of the US$11.3 billion increase in bilateral aid between 2000
and 2004 – did not all translate into transfer of resources (United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) 2005). The considerable aid increases by Austria, Japan, Portugal, the UK,
and some other major donors are partly attributable to significant proportions of debt cancel-
lation (OECD 2005, p. 180). In fact, between 2000 and 2004, about 36% of the US$27 billion
in new aid resources was as a result of debt cancellation; thus, the real financial savings to the
recipient country came in the form of reduced debt servicing (Padilla 2004, p. 225). Further-
more, following the 2004 commitment by members of the Paris Club to reduce debt owed to
them by Iraq, the United States, for instance, cancelled all debts owed to it by Iraq amounting
to about US$4.1 billion. Similarly, the governing bodies of The World Bank and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), following the 2005 G8 Summit, agreed on a debt-cancellation
package for some 18 countries totalling about US$40 billion at a cost of more than US$10
billion to donors over the next ten years. The first phase of this debt write-off alone is
expected to raise the 2005 and 2006 ODA figures significantly for the major aid donors and
raise overall ODA substantially (Padilla 2004, p. 225). However, the rise will be artificial
and for recipient countries will not represent additional external resources available for pov-
erty-reduction goals, as available data will indicate.
Concurrently, support given to refugees in a donor country during their first year of
residence, and technical cooperation – which primarily employs experts from donor coun-
tries – are both labelled as ODA and distort resource flows into priority areas for intended
development (UNDP 2005). Since 2001, for instance, technical cooperation has increased
from US$13 602 million to US$18 764 million in 2004 (OECD 2005, p. 220). Padilla (2004,
p. 225), for example, suggests that this increase could be traced to the reconstruction of
roads, schools, water and power supply, health facilities, and government buildings that
have been destroyed in Afghanistan and Iraq.
 16 K. Aning

Old friends and new allies in the WOT, security and aid nexus:
Japan, Denmark, the UK, and China
Although the discussion so far has focused on the United States and broader multilateral
agencies such as the OECD/DAC and the changing application and discourse in ODA dis-
bursements post-9/11, it is important for the arguments presented herein concerning the
securitisation and politicisation of ODA to examine the extent, if any, to which other crit-
ical actors in the ODA discourse have shifted their stance since 9/11. To do this, Japan,
Denmark, the UK, and Canada, which represent traditional large donors, are examined.
However, to counterbalance the traditional ODA heavyweights, China’s emerging role on
the international scene is discussed to explore how, in these changed international circum-
stances, it is attempting to carve a niche for itself with respect to developing states.
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Japan
Japan is using supplementary appropriations to deliver contributions to the war in Afghanistan
and the reconstruction of Iraq as part of its response and contribution to the WOT. An under-
standing of Japan’s shift in emphasis should be informed by its selection of four target areas for
rapid ODA implementation: (1) waging the war against terrorism, (2) peace-building, (3) rein-
forcement of Japan’s influence in East Asia, and (4) dissemination of Asia’s development
experience to Africa. To fulfil the first aim of this new approach, in 2002 Japan pledged ¥6.5
billion in aid to Afghanistan over a 2.5-year period. In 2003, ¥1.5 billion were allocated in
grants to help Iraq and a further ¥3.5 billion in loans were pledged. As a result of these commit-
ments, Emergency Grant Aid funds were increased from ¥22.2 billion to ¥31.7 billion for
2004. Most remarkably, Japan amended its Development Assistance Charter in 2003 to
increase its orientation towards Japan’s foreign policy priorities so as to reflect, among other
things, the option of using its development assistance programmes to address global issues,
particularly terrorism. This is an important move towards recognising a wider range of security
goals as a legitimate and integral part of its development aid policy (Woods 2005).
The shift in Japan’s ODA toward a more security-oriented approach can be understood
in terms of its ‘consolidation of peace concept’ (Christian Aid 2004, p. 22), in which it
posits, ‘since [9/11] there has been a greater international awareness of the possibility of
poverty [zones] becoming hotbeds of terrorism, and the role of ODA is being re-considered’
(Economic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). But such linkages
between poverty zones becoming potential hotbeds of terrorism and thus deserving of
ODA reconsiderations are hardly related to poverty-reduction programmes. Instead, the
reconsideration process has targeted peace and security issues instead of core poverty-
reduction programmes. This interpretation suggests that a security first approach has been
taken in determining Japan’s ODA priorities (Kiyokazu 2006, p. 190).
Since 2002, some of the programmes that have been reconsidered are: (1) governance-
improvement programmes; (2) projects dealing with peace-building; and (3) counter-
terrorism issues. Furthermore, other programmes dealing with security have been initi-
ated, with funds towards Iraqi reconstruction taking a substantial percentage. For example,
in 2004, 70% of Japan’s total bilateral grant and 40% of its multilateral grant went toward
Iraqi reconstruction projects, with funds allocated for peace-building and conflict preven-
tion also increasing (Christian Aid 2004, p. 22). What is critical is that these shifts and
reconsiderations have taken place in the context of a general reduction in Japanese ODA
between 2003 and 2004. The inferences are clear, namely that security is more significant
and ODA targeted at the poor can take second place.
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 17

UK
Since 9/11, the UK has supported the United States as the most visible ally in the WOT
leading to an expansion in its security commitments. By 2003, the cost to the UK of the
war in Iraq included £842.2 million for military operations, £650 million for forces recu-
peration, £30 million for immediate humanitarian aid by the military, £10 million for
projects that would have a quick positive impact on protection of deployed UK forces, and
£1.2 billion for the cost of operations in 2003/04 (Ministry of Defence). The Department
for International Development’s (DFID) expenditure in Afghanistan has likewise risen
from about £35 million in 2002/03 to around £75 million in 2003/04. In fiscal year 2003/
04 alone, Iraq received £207 million (DFID 2004). Furthermore, there has been the redi-
rection and allocation of development resources to states particularly perceived to be allies
in the WOT. For example, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan have become key recipients of
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UK development assistance (Mason 2004). Pakistan, in particular, has seen a five-fold

increase in development assistance from the UK to about £64 million in 2003/04 from a
previous low of £12.6 million in 2001. Since 2003–2004, UK commitments in Iraq have
started negatively to impact on its commitments to low-income countries (DFID 2004). To
deal with this, the UK reduced aid to middle-income countries to about £100 million in
2004/05 and 2005/06.
However, with criticisms of a shift in UK ODA criteria and strategies, there seems to
be a grudging acceptance, at least at the level of political rhetoric, that the approach to the
WOT must change. A possible indication of this was former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s
speech in Los Angeles in July 2006 that seemed to point to a shift in developmental
emphasis and political realities. According to the then Prime Minister:

We are fighting a war, but not just against terrorism but also about how the world should govern
itself in the early 21st Century, about global values. We will not win the battle against this global
extremism unless we win it at the level of values as much as force, unless we show we are even-
handed, fair and just in our application of those values to the world. . . . Unless we re-appraise our
strategy, unless we revitalize the broader global agenda on poverty, climate change, [and] trade,
we will not win. And this is a battle we must win. (quoted in Reynolds 2006; emphasis added)

This shift in emphasis may be an initial response to consistent concern of non-governmen-

tal organizations (NGOs) in the UK about the extent to which UK involvement in Iraq and
Afghanistan could impact negatively on DFID priorities and possibly result in a diversion
of funds from poverty-reduction activities to the WOT. In spite of the former Prime Min-
ister’s assurances that earlier approved programmes would continue, the DFID itself
warned that ‘the burden of financing Iraq would have to be borne by the contingency
reserve and reductions in middle-income country budgets. These plans will mean that a
number of current programmes . . . will close’ (Christian Aid 2004, p. 18). Further assur-
ances were made that funding for Iraq would not ‘involve any reduction in DFID’s
planned development expenditure for low-income countries’ (Christian Aid 2004, p. 18),
but to commentators such as Ngaire Woods, such assurances ring hollow, because the
‘strain [on] DFID’s resources and mandate to reduce poverty posed by the war on terror
and the war in Iraq is already noticeable’ (Woods 2005).

Denmark
Denmark’s development policy has undergone substantial change since the declaration of
the WOT, and now serves as a policy instrument to overcome threats to security in general
 18 K. Aning

and to national security in particular. The early stages of this change began in 2004 when a
paradigm shift occurred in the underlying principles of Danish development assistance
and the government adopted its Principles Governing Danish Development Assistance for
the Fight against the New Terrorism. Combating and preventing terrorism became a new
priority for the disbursement of Danish development aid. As a result, the amount of aid
allocated to countries has now become dependant on their relevance in the WOT, and
security became the second most important criteria for deciding aid allocations for the
period 2004 to 2008.
Heldgaard and Anderskouv argue that these changes have resulted in a security and
anti-terrorism agenda taking priority in Danish development assistance, as opposed to the
traditional priorities of education, health, and water supply and sanitation. According to
the Danish International Development Agency’s (DANIDA) 2004 Annual Report (DAN-
IDA 2004), poverty reduction and the fight against terrorism go hand-in-hand to create a
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safer world. Furthermore, ‘[a] modern and effective foreign policy requires that the many
facets of foreign policy, such as development, security, defence and trade policies, are
integrated in a mutually reinforcing manner’ (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2003). The policy paper A Changing World argues that terrorism is a real and serious
threat to people all over the world and that the fight against new global threats demands
action across a broad number of areas, using a broad number of foreign policy instruments
(Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003).
In the context of the Danish debate, this is not purely a theoretical construct. Rather, in
operational terms, several aid initiatives have in recent years been subjected to the calcula-
tions of security imperatives, including the government’s adopted Principles Governing
Danish Development Assistance for the Fight against the New Terrorism, in 2004 which
made the fight a new priority for the consideration and eventual disbursement of Danish
aid. Under this plan, DKK145 million were allocated over the period 2004–2006 for mul-
tilateral efforts and for a series of special bilateral initiatives in countries such as Yemen,
Iran, Indonesia, Kenya, and Niger (Christian Aid 2004, p. 22).
In 2004, the Africa Program for Peace was initiated, with DKK248 million allocated
for the period 2004–2009 to support conflict-prevention work. The focus on security was
also reflected in the 2004 comprehensive strategy for Africa, Africa – Development and
Security (Moerup 2004, pp. 32–39, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005a, p. 3).
Because of this increasing securitisation and politicisation of aid, between 2001 and 2004
project spending on Africa decreased by almost 19% (Table 4) (Christian Aid 2004, p. 22).
Denmark’s increased international military engagement – in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
and Iraq – led to a 2004 initiative to coordinate civilian and military efforts in countries
afflicted by conflict. Civil–military cooperation was made official Danish policy and
DKK15 million per year were allocated from the aid budget for Danish soldiers’ involve-
ment in humanitarian and reconstruction activities in countries like Iraq.
Several other recent aid-financed initiatives also have a clearer focus on security rather
than on poverty. This applies to the Arab Initiative launched in 2003, the Region of Origin

Table 4. Danish International Development Agency’s

(DANIDA) spending on Africa since 2001.
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004
Kroner (millions) 2593 2312 2120 2106
Percentage change from 2001 – −11 −18 −19
Source: Budget proposals for FY 2004.
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 19

Initiative launched in 2004 to provide fast and efficient support to refugees in their regions
of origin (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005b), and the Neighbourhood Pro-
gram launched in 2003 to promote open, democratic societies in the countries neighbour-
ing the European Union and partly financed through the aid budget.
Yet another example of the critical importance given to the fight against terrorism and
its linkage to aid disbursement can be exemplified by the campaign to secure Denmark a
seat on the UN Security Council. When this campaign ended successfully in October
2004, with Denmark becoming a Council member for 2005 and 2006, the Foreign Minis-
ter immediately announced that the fight against terrorism would be a top Danish priority
in the UN. Furthermore, when Denmark was elected chair of the Counter-terrorism Com-
mittee (CTC) under the Security Council, it actively used its position to support poor
countries’ efforts to meet their obligations under UN Resolution 1373, which was passed
in reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and which also demands that states criminalise ter-
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rorism (Development Today 2005). Funding for Danish military and police contributions
to international peacekeeping operations and military training is partly funded under the
aid budget according to the DAC guidelines.
There may, however, be more continuity to Danish ODA allocations than the above
political statements and aggregate country figures suggest. One impression gained from
observing DANIDA is that the bureaucracy generally finds the terror criteria unhelpful,
but that they must be seen to be applying them. In the first review of Danish ODA, they
seem to have simply used a ‘rubber stamp’ approach to label projects and programmes
that they wanted to continue funding as ‘not related to terrorism’ or even as positive con-
tributions to counter-terrorism. The same may be the case for new projects, where officials
may come up with counter-terrorist arguments for projects they want to fund for com-
pletely different reasons. For instance, one can surely make a case that support for
women’s rights in Kenya will strengthen women’s groups and civil society, thereby pro-
viding a counter to terrorist constituencies (mainly men), and thus constituting a contribu-
tion to the WOT. But this may not be the real motive for supporting such projects. There is
probably no way to ascertain such ‘real motives’ and to determine the extent to which
security interests could be indirectly pursued.2

Canada
Yet another traditional generous ODA provider has also seen shifts in the criteria for its
disbursements. In the mid-2000s, the Government of Canada committed to double aid
from 2001 to 2010, equivalent to ODA increases of about 8% per annum. By 2005, Cana-
dian ODA had increased to C$3.76 billion compared with C$1.533 billion in 2001 (Table
5). However, a large proportion of the increases has been spent on Iraq and Afghanistan,
with the latter being the single largest recipient of Canadian foreign aid in 2003–2004
(Table 1) for reasons linked to global security and obviously the WOT (Lee 2006). This

Table 5. Net official development assistance (ODA) flows by Canada.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
ODA (US$, millions) 1533 2004 2031 2599 3756
ODA/GNI (%) 0.22 0.28 0.24 0.27 0.34
Note: GNI, gross national income.
Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) (2003), p. 130.
 20 K. Aning

has strained the government’s commitment to allocate new aid resources to its previous
focus countries, where poverty-reduction objectives are foremost. This has led to ques-
tioning of whether increases in aid that target security concerns should be counted as part
of the government’s previously announced commitment to increase development aid by
8% annually.

China: a new strategic player?

As well as changes to aid policy and allocations brought about by the WOT, China repre-
sents a significant new player that is affecting aid flows and geopolitical considerations.
As it celebrates the 50th anniversary of official Sino-African relations, China is increas-
ingly becoming a critical player in Africa as it redefines its relationship with the continent
as a whole, but more importantly with strategic partners in terms of its search for oil, tim-
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ber, and energy resources (Klare and Volman 2006, p. 297, Africa Confidential 2006,
p. 3). It has engaged in an unparalleled series of diplomatic offensives ‘promising more
trade, cheaper loans and no political interference’ (Africa Confidential 2006). China’s
aggressive posturing in Africa is not new. Rather, what has changed in recent years is its
emergence as a significant world player on the economic scene and its own need for oil
and other natural resources. China’s return to Africa in the 21st century is characterised
not only by a need for economic resources, but also, and more crucially, by its new finan-
cial and political muscle that enables it to play the game dramatically and competitively
(Lyman 2005).
China’s entry into Africa is characterised by a formula dependent on an aid-for-oil
strategy. As a result, China is receiving increasing supplies of oil from African countries;
at the same time, it is offering poor countries comprehensive and exploitative trade deals
combined with aid. According to Pan (2006), China’s importance to Africa in terms of the
aid discourse is exemplified by the fact that ‘China is now the continent’s third most
important trading partner, behind the United States and France, and ahead of Britain’
(Zweig and Bi 2005).
China’s Africa Policy and its subsequent White Paper shed further light on its ener-
getic diplomatic and business activities. Here, the Chinese government outlines its plans
to develop a partnership premised on consistent dialogue and diplomatic visits between
Chinese and African leaders, increased trade and economic investment through preferen-
tial loans and buyer credits, more agricultural and financial cooperation, and improved
efforts to encourage Chinese companies to build up Africa’s infrastructure (Borak 2006).
In terms of aid, however, Manning (2006) concludes that ‘the mix between concessional
and non-concessional funding, and the difficulty of relating announcements of commit-
ments to actual prospective disbursements make it difficult to reach a clear view of the
likely scale of aid . . . in the near term’.

The politicisation of aid and development: the US example

As this paper has shown, since 9/11 the crosscutting influence of security has had a major
influence on aid policy as a whole. The main direct effect has been the securitisation and
skewed disbursement of aid. However, besides these trends, the politicisation of aid has
also become rife. The United States provides the clearest example of this.
Although public proclamations by US authorities indicate otherwise, there is ample
evidence of its use of coercion, bullying, and acts tantamount to bribery and gunboat
diplomacy to garner support for its military actions in the WOT (Anderson et al. 2005, p. 1).
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 21

At present, US economic and development assistance remains very important to many

members of the UN. This renders such countries vulnerable to the manipulations of the US
aid lever. As a hegemon, it wields the most powerful military, economic, political, and
diplomatic leverage with which it is able to reward or chastise the positions of any individ-
ual country with respect to US interests. Following the declaration of the Coalition of the
Willing to garner support for the WOT, there has been a politicisation of aid synonymous
to that which surrounded the Gulf War.3
For instance, while the votes of several poor countries on the UN Security Council
were ‘purchased’ following 9/11 with new military aid and economic assistance, Yemen
was the only Arab country on the Security Council that voted against the resolution
authorising war in Iraq (Bennis 2003). In a punitive reaction to Yemen’s stance, three days
after the vote the US truncated its aid budget to Yemen, which amounted to US$70 million
(Kampfner 2004, p. 19). In order not to incur the wrath of the United States and to main-
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tain economic favours, many other countries wilfully lent their support to the Iraq course
and abstained from all semblance of opposition to it. For instance, after Costa Rica’s UN
Ambassador gave a statement opposing war in Iraq and favouring continued weapons
inspections, he was ordered by his country’s Foreign Minister to resign. The explanation
given was that the Ambassador had not received authorisation for the speech and that his
remarks conflicted with Costa Rica’s official position. After the Ambassador rendered an
apology and reversed his position, he was reinstated. The Costa Rican government was no
doubt nervous about straining relations with the United States while it was in the middle
of negotiating a free trade agreement between Central America and the United States.
Similarly, in order to ensure the United States did not block its accession to the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Bulgaria unanimously granted a US request for
military assistance against Iraq (Anderson et al. 2005, p. 1). In another instance, before the
assault on Iraq, the Turkish government rejected US officials’ determination to use Turkish
bases (Richburg 2003). The US government reportedly offered Turkey a package of US$6
billion in grants and US$10 billion in loans to soften the arrangement, despite some 95%
domestic opposition to the war (Anderson et al. 2005, p. 1). The Turkish parliament
rejected this offer and refused to endorse the government’s decision to deploy US troops
along its border (Kampfner 2004, p. 279).
The US’ trade relations with poor countries have also been politicised by security con-
siderations and the WOT, with resultant developmental impacts. Exporters from poor
countries can be eligible for preferential access to US markets through the 2000 Africa
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and through the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP) (Bennis 2003). However, accessing these benefits is dependent on support
for US security interests. For instance, in August 2002, Congress amended the GSP,
allowing the US government to strip a country of its GSP eligibility if it ‘has not taken
steps to support the efforts of the US to combat terrorism’. Original eligibility criteria that
allowed countries to qualify for preferential market access under AGOA included the
requirement that countries should ‘not engage in activities that undermine US national
security or foreign policy interests’. This criterion remained latent until the 2002 negotia-
tions in the UN Security Council over the last US-sponsored resolution on Iraq. When the
UN Ambassador from Mauritius, which held a temporary seat on the Council in 2001–2002,
appeared not to be enthused about an earlier version of the resolution, the Foreign Minister
recalled the Ambassador and ordered him to reconsider his stance and support the US
position. With hindsight, the Yemen case had apparently sent a clear message to weak, but
potentially recalcitrant, states, and the Mauritanian government was thus jittery about the
possible loss of AGOA preferences.
 22 K. Aning

ODA, security and terrorism: what linkages?

The rise in intra-state conflicts in the 1990s highlighted the far-reaching regional and inter-
national dimensions of insecurity. In many countries in conflict it is clear that the effects
have impacted negatively on development and in almost all cases reversed national develop-
ment strides. On the other hand, some of the conflicts were the result of failed developmental
efforts. Despite compelling evidence that underdevelopment (poverty, in particular) does not
necessarily cause conflict, there is equally gripping evidence that conditions of poverty feed
conflict-triggering factors, such as natural resource dependency, weak state structures, and
horizontal inequalities. The outbreak of violent conflicts as a result of these underlying
causes leads to an increase in human insecurity and undermines development efforts. On the
one hand, security from violence is fundamental for the achievement of poverty reduction,
sustainable economic, social and political development. On the other hand, sustainable
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development is indispensable for the attainment and maintenance of peace and security.
In the pursuit of peace and security, however, recent efforts have culminated in national
and international counter- and anti-terrorism efforts primarily aimed at preserving the territo-
rial integrity of the state from the subversive activities of terrorists. Generally referred to as
the WOT, the pursuit of peace and security through counter-terrorism measures has led to a
situation in which political opposition, media criticism, public demonstrations, and religious
fundamentalism have all been lumped under the single rubric of terrorist activities in some
countries. Together with the subjective definition of terrorism, this has led to a fluid defini-
tion of the WOT. Under the guise of counter-terrorism measures, therefore, repressive state
entities mete out various forms of human rights abuses to political and sometimes religious
opponents and implement domestic policies that were hitherto constrained.
Security-related terms such as ‘poverty reduction’, ‘conflict’, and ‘peace’ are increas-
ingly blended together with notions of ‘terrorism’ and ‘security’ in the discourse of many
donors (Ewing et al. 2004, p. 7). Despite the important role that development cooperation
could play in the WOT, the global fight against poverty has been lowered in the prioritisa-
tion of many donor countries ((Ewing et al. 2004). This has highlighted the complex rela-
tionship between development and security (Integrated Regional Information Network
(IRIN) 2004). According to BOND (2003):

This international focus on security and terrorism is having an impact on development not
only by drawing political and media attention away from development concerns, but by influ-
encing aid allocations and the nature of donor co-operation with development countries. The
War on Terror is also being used to justify practices that undermine the achievement of devel-
opment goals and run contrary to international commitments on human rights. Such trends are
a cause for concern for those who want to see development remain poverty-focused.

Traditionally, ODA is intended to assist development and the alleviation of poverty on

which security hinges. With the increasing securitisation of ODA after 9/11, allocations
and disbursements of ODA have been critically subjected to the direct influence and
imperatives of security realities, most important of which is terrorism. This has radically
altered the ODA architecture and the rationales that underpinned this framework.

Conclusion: the development–security nexus and the need for a new ODA architecture
Lessons from past official development assistance (ODA) disbursement indicate that the
share of humanitarian assistance has risen sharply, from 3% of ODA in the 1980s to close to
10% in recent years (OECD 2003a, p. 243). Even though first-year sustenance expenses for
 Critical Studies on Terrorism 23

persons arriving from countries experiencing civil war or those migrating due to humanitarian
or political reasons is partly attributable for the trend (OECD 2003, p. 243), it implies not only
the expansion of the issue areas to which ODA is now applied, but also reflects the particular
interests of donors, especially those engaged in the War on Terror (WOT) (OECD 2003, p.
243). The current ODA–security nexus has been further highlighted and given institutional
entrenchment by the OECD/DAC’s redefinition and clarification of ODA to embrace critical
security concerns. It is also being highlighted by the general trend of donor orientation
towards the use of ODA as a lever in waging the WOT and, thus, the securitisation of aid.
It is evident that aid programmes – not only from the United States, but also from other
major donors – have shifted emphasis in the post-9/11 era and have been greatly influ-
enced by the dynamics of the WOT. A major conclusion of this paper is that aid has
become highly securitised and politicised as a weapon for the realisation of the goals of
that war. The result is that aid for political and security purposes has tended to counter
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support to development priorities. The rise of terrorism as a critical security concern after
9/11 culminating in the WOT has warped the development–security dichotomy and initi-
ated a direct ODA–security nexus, as the Cold War before it did. As aid programmes
increasingly gain usage as a weapon in the WOT, ODA has further been drawn into close
proximity with security concerns rather than needs. This trend calls for a reconsideration
of the operating ODA architecture to embrace a security component.
Against the foregoing, the development–security nexus must inform the allocation of
aid resources. This implies the traditional notion that ODA is primarily for the needy and
should, therefore, be channelled to needy countries would not be relegated to the back-
ground, as is currently the case. Rather, ODA would serve as the basis to impel the
achievement of international and national security. This will draw on the consideration of
development as a necessary underlying factor in the achievement of sustainable security,
and security as an indispensable factor for sustainable development.
Thus, the development–security nexus is an inseparable and mutually reinforcing rela-
tionship that the global ODA architecture must wholly confront in order to sustain human
development. In effect, while donor countries seek to address security interests through
the allocation of aid for security-related purposes, the mutual interdependence of both
security and development must be duly recognised, highlighted, and pragmatically served
through the provision of adequate resources to confront development factors (particularly
poverty) that underlie some security realities. This implies, therefore, that security aid
should be given institutional buttressing and entrenchment alongside development or need
as the traditional purpose and criteria for allocation of aid.
Following this rationale, the indispensability and primacy of development priorities to
the ODA arrangement must be made sacrosanct and sustained. At present, this is in danger.
The danger is succinctly captured by Christian Aid. It foresees:

dark clouds . . . already gathering over the ideal that aid should be exclusively directed
towards those that need it most. . . . World leaders must ensure that aid is not hijacked
by the imperatives of the war on terror, as it was by the Cold War. (Christian Aid 2004)

This warning has also been repeated by the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, in
as many words:

international terrorism is not only a threat to peace and stability. . . . It also has caused our
attention to drift dangerously away from the [Millennium Development Goals]. . . . It is time
to re-balance the international agenda. (Christian Aid 2004, p. 24)
 24 K. Aning

Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to several colleagues for critical comments and useful suggestions, namely,
Andy Atta-Asamoah, Martin Ewi, Dr Nana Abena Owusu-Darkwa, Prosper Nii Nortey Addo, and
Dr Bjoern Moeller, and two anonymous referees for useful comments.

Notes
1. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) is a security scheme that provides
training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. Authority for the IMET pro-
gramme is found pursuant to Chapter 5, Part II, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 1961. Funding is
appropriated from the International Affairs budget of the Department of State. Participants are
exposed to US military procedures and the manner in which the military functions under civilian
control (see http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/international_military_education_training.htm).
2. I am grateful to Bjoern Moeller of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) for many
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helpful comments, of which this is one.

3. Before that war, the US government ‘bribed’ China with post-Tienanmen Square diplomatic
rehabilitation and the renewal of long-term development aid to prevent a veto of the UN resolu-
tion authorising the war.

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