[G.R. No. 103328. October 19, 1992.

] x x x"

HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as
Governor of the Province of Camarines
Norte, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Jose J. Lapak for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Pursuant to Republic Act 7155, the Commission on
Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991,
Resolution No. 2312 which reads.
"WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on
September 6, 1991 creates the Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte
to be composed of Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui,
San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the
Municipality of Labo, same province.
WHEREAS, under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution 1 the creation of a municipality shall
be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local
Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 2
said plebiscite shall be conducted by the
Commission on Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155
provides that the expenses in holding the
plebiscite shall be taken out of the Contingent
Fund under the current fiscal year appropriations;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the
Commission hereby resolves to promulgated (sic) the
following guidelines to govern the conduct of said
plebiscite:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15,
1991, in the areas or units affected, namely the
barangays comprising the proposed Municipality of
Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte (Tan v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986).
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991
throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890
votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted
against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political
exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers
declared the rejection and disapproval of the
independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a
majority of voters. 3
Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari,
petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks
to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December
15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and
prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as
provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of
petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete
failure and that the results obtained were invalid
and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by
COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been
conducted only in the political unit or units
affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-
Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit,
Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-asa, Maot, and Calabasa.
Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not
have included the remaining area of the mother
unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.
In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the
approval and ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in
Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied upon by respondent
COMELEC is now passé, thus reinstating the case of
Paredes v. Executive Secretary 6 which held that
where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent
unit, only the voters of the unit to be segrated should
be included in the plebiscite. 7
Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312
and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite
conducted in the areas comprising the proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining
areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
NO!!!
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit
grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312
and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation
of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is
valid.
Petitioner’s contention that our ruling in Tan v. Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we
COMELEC has been superseded with the conclude that respondent COMELEC did not
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes v. Resolution No. 2312.
COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
Tan v. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article DISMISSED.
XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case
is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, especially since the
latter provision deleted the words "unit or."

We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit

or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the
1973 Constitution has not affected our ruling in
Tan v. COMELEC as explained by then CONCOM
Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague,
Associate Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the

deletion of "unit or," I would like to inform the
Committee that under the formulation in the present
Local Government Code, the words used are actually
"political unit or units." However, I do not know the
implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will
be no substantial difference, but I just want to inform
the Committee about this.

Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or

units" ? will there be no objection on the part of the
two Gentlemen from the floor?

Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the

deletion of the words "unit or" because in the
plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units
affected. If it is the creation of a barangay, the
municipality itself must participate in the plebiscite
because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a
territory. 9 (Emphasis supplied)

It stands to reason that when the law states that

the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political
units directly affected," it means that residents of
the political entity who would be economically
dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof
have a right to vote in said plebiscite.

Evidently, what is contemplated by the phrase

"political units directly affected," is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the
plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in
such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12
barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent

G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and
THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF
RIZAL, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question
the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite
proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of
boundary disputes between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay
Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the
proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims
these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while
the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed
barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of
Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its
mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of
Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a
distinct barangay to be known as Barangay
Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and
approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the
creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June
22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig
similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. 2 Plebiscite for
this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the
Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel
the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed
Petitions with the Commission on Elections
(hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19,
1996 (UND No. 96-016)3 and March 12, 1997 (UND
No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the
Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the
COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for
settlement of boundary dispute. 4 According to the
Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays
involve areas included in the boundary dispute
subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled
plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until
after the said case shall have been finally decided
by the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the
position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered
the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay
Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the
court has settled with finality the boundary
dispute involving the two municipalities.5 Hence,
the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND
No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being moot
in view of the holding of the plebiscite as
scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation
of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by
the majority of the votes cast therein.6 Hence, the
filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
ISSUE:
The issue before us is whether or not the
plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be
suspended or cancelled in view of the pending
boundary dispute between the two local
governments. YES!!!!
RULING:
To begin with, we agree with the position of the
COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the
boundary dispute between the Municipality of
Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial
question which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed
barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial
question since the same contemplates a civil and
criminal action and does not come into play where
both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this
may be the general rule, this Court has held
in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,7 that, in
the interest of good order, we can very well
suspend action on one case pending the final
outcome of another case closely interrelated or
linked to the first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously
claims that the areas covered by the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its
territory, it can not deny that portions of the same
area are included in the boundary dispute case
pending before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy
shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed
Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a
requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its
territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by
metes and bounds or by more or less permanent
natural boundaries.8 Precisely because territorial
jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil
case, until and unless such issue is resolved with
finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the
proposed barangays would only be an exercise in
futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way
for potentially ultra vires acts of such barangays.
Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,9 we
held that —
The importance of drawing, with
precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries
must be clear for they define the limits
of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately
exercise powers of government only
within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its
acts are ultra vires. Needless to state,
any uncertainty in the boundaries of
local government units will sow costly
conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the
holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to
hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending
final determination of whether or not the entire
area of the proposed barangays are truly within
the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a
plebiscite had already been held in the case of the
proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the
Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered
moot and academic. The issues raised by the
Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the
COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for
the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending
determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial
Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections,10 we struck down
the moot and academic argument as follows —
Considering that the legality of the
plebiscite itself is challenged for non-
compliance with constitutional
requisites, the fact that such plebiscite
had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed,
the case before Us cannot truly be
viewed as already moot and academic.
Continuation of the existence of this
newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have
been illegally born, deserves to be
inquired into by this Tribunal so that,
if indeed, illegality attaches to its
creation, the commission of that error
should not provide the very excuse for
perpetration of such wrong. For this
Court to yield to the respondents'
urging that, as there has been fait
accompli, then this Court should
passively accept and accede to the
prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant
petition, as respondents so propose is
a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents' submission will create a
dangerous precedent. Should this
Court decline now to perform its duty
of interpreting and indicating what the
law is and should be, this might tempt
again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and
with ulterior motives, create, merge,
divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly
or stealthily, confident that this Court
will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage
to bring about a fait accompli.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of
Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of
Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In
the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15,
1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico,
Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

1. The Petition of the City of

Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit;
while

2. The Petition of the

Municipality of Cainta in G.R.
No. 128663 is GRANTED. The
COMELEC Order in UND No.
97-002, dated March 21, 1997,
is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite
held on March 15, 1997 to
ratify the creation of Barangay
Napico in the City of Pasig is
declared null and void.
Plebiscite on the same is
ordered held in abeyance until
after the courts settle with
finality the boundary dispute
between the City of Pasig and
the Municipality of Cainta, in
Civil Case No. 94-3006.
G.R. No. 132603 September 18, 2000
ELPIDIO M. SALVA, vs.
HON. ROBERTO L. MAKALINTAL, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Balayan, Batangas;
BUENA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Order
dated February 25, 1998,1 of the Regional Trial
Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI,2 in Civil Case
No. 3442, denying the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction
to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from holding the plebiscite scheduled on February
28, 1998, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 23, 1998, petitioners, as officials and
residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca,
Batangas, filed a class suit against
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca,
Batangas, and the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), docketed as Civil Case No. 3442, before
the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch
XI, for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both enacted by
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of 199S, with
prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary
restraining order.
Ordinance No. 05 3 declared the abolition
of barangay San Rafael and its merger
with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca,
Batangas and accordingly instructed the COMELEC to
conduct the required plebiscite as provided under
Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991.4
On the other hand, Resolution No. 345 5 affirmed the
effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the
veto6 exercised by the governor of
Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the
7 Batangas to submit their own Comment on the
governor of Batangas for being ultra vires,
particularly, as it was not shown that the essential
requirements under Section 9, in relation to
Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the
attestations or certifications of the Department of
Finance (DOF), National Statistics Office (NSO) and
the Land Management Bureau of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
were obtained.
Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and resolution,
on February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2987, providing for the rules and
regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to
decide the issue of the abolition of barangay San
Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao,
Calaca, Batangas.8 Simultaneous with the filing of the
action before the trial court, petitioners also filed an ex
parte motion for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin respondents from
enforcing Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
In an Order dated February 25, 1998, the trial court
denied the ex parte motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to the
trial court, the temporary restraining
order/injunction sought by petitioners is directed
only to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The trial court
ruled that any petition or action questioning an act,
resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be
brought before the Supreme Court.9
On February 27, 1998, petitioners filed the instant
petition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order, without filing a motion for reconsideration of
the trial court's Order dated February 25, 1998,
claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin
the conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on February
28, 1998.10
In a Resolution dated March 10, 1998, the Court
directed the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition.11
On August 28, 1998, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment,
declaring that he concurs with petitioners' cause
and recommending that the instant petition be
given due course.12 Consequently, the Court further
resolved on September 29, 1998 to require the
COMELEC and the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
petition.
In a Resolution dated June 15, 1999, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and require
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.13
In their Memorandum filed on October 26, 1999,
petitioners submitted the following issue for the
resolution of this Court:
"WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT
COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN THE
COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS
RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998,
WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE
PLEBISCITE SCHEDULED ON FEBRUARY 28,
1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF
BARANGAY SAN RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER
WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO, CALACA,
BATANGAS, PENDING THE
DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442
FOR THE ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE NO.
05, RESOLUTION NO. 345 AND COMELEC
RESOLUTION NO. 2987."14
First, petitioners contend that the assailed Order
dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court
of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages
multiplicity of suit[s] and splitting a single cause of
action," contrary to Section 3, Rule 2, of the Rules of
Court.15 Petitioners maintain that since COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 was only issued pursuant to
Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, the
propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No.
2987 is dependent upon the validity of the Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345.16 And considering that
the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear and determine
the validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No.
345 is not disputed, the assailed Order dated February
25, 1998, directing petitioners to seek the preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order before
this Court, advances multiplicity of suits and splitting
a single cause of action.
RELATION TO OUR TOPIC
Second, petitioners assert that when the COMELEC
exercises its quasi judicial functions under Section
52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881), its acts are subject to the exclusive
review by this Court; but when the COMELEC
performs a purely ministerial but, such act is
subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial
Court,17 citing Filipinas Engineering and Machine
Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
"It cannot be gainsaid that the powers vested
by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be
classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or
those which are inherently administrative and
sometimes ministerial in character."'18
Corollary thereto, petitioners submit that "[t]he
conduct of [a] plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance
No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory
[or quasi judicial] in nature but simply ministerial
or administrative in nature [and only] in
obedience to the aforesaid Ordinance and
Resolution," citing Garces vs. Court of Appeals, 259
SCRA 99 (1996), thus:
". . . To rule otherwise would surely burden the
Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC
[Regional Trial Court], a court which the law
vests with the power to exercise original
jurisdiction over 'all cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi
judicial functions'."19
Lastly, petitioners allege that while the plebiscite
sought to be enjoined has already been conducted on
February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from
being moot and academic, claiming that the actual
holding of the said plebiscite could not validate an
otherwise invalid ordinance and resolution;20 that
there are still substantial matters to be
resolved;21 assuming arguendo that this petition has
become moot and academic, ". . . courts will decide a
question otherwise moot and academic if it is 'capable
of repetition, yet evading review"';22 and finally,
petitioners maintain that this Court has resolved to
require the parties to maintain the status quo
prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition, that
is, a day before the plebiscite was scheduled to be
conducted.23
Concurring with petitioners' arguments, the Solicitor
General, in his Memorandum filed on September 7,
1999, asserts that ". . . [I]t is already settled in this
jurisdiction that what is contemplated by the terms
'any decision, order or ruling' of the COMELEC
reviewable by certiorari to this Honorable Court, as
provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of the [1987]
Constitution, are those that relate to the COMELEC's
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers
involving elective regional, provincial and city
officials." (Citations omitted.)24 The Solicitor General
further argues that the issuance of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 is a ministerial duty of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its administrative
functions, hence, it is submitted that the aforecited
constitutional provision is inapplicable.
Public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), on the other hand, submits that the
power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No.
2987 solely belongs to this Court, citing the earlier
cases of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540-
541[1968]); Luison vs. Garcia (L-10916, May 20,
1957); Macud vs. COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 [1968]);
and Aratuc vs. COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272
[1979]);25 thus:
". . . For even without the express
constitutional prescription that only this Court
may review the decisions, orders and rulings
of the Commission on Elections, it is easy to
understand why no interference whatsoever
with the performance of the Commission on
Elections of its functions should be allowed
unless emanating from this Court. The
observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes
in Albano v. Arranz while not precisely in
point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: 'It
is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if
the Court of First Instance of each and every
province were to arrogate unto itself the
power to disregard, suspend, or contradict any
order of the Commission on Elections; that
constitutional body would be speedily
reduced to impotence."26
The COMELEC further argues that ". . . if a Regional
Trial Court does not have jurisdiction to issue
writs against statutory agencies of government
like the ones cited above [referring to the former
Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office,
Public Service Commission, Social Security
Commission, National Electrification Administration
and Presidential Commission on Good Government],
a fortiori it can not have any such jurisdiction over the
Commission on Elections, a constitutional
independent body expressly clothed by the 1987
Constitution with, among others, quasi-judicial
functions and tasked with one of the most paramount
aspects of a democratic government. . . ."27 Finally, the
COMELEC contends that the temporary restraining
order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot
and academic by the actual holding of the plebiscite
sought to be enjoined.28
The appeal is meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution
provides in part that:
"SECTION 7. . . . . Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within this days
from receipt of a copy thereof."
In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996])
and Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs.
Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to
interpret the foregoing provision in this wise:
". . . What is contemplated by the term 'final
orders, rulings and decisions' of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are
those rendered in actions or proceedings
before the COMELEC and taken cognizance
of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers."29
In Filipinas, we have likewise affirmed that powers
vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified
as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi-
judicial functions, or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial in
character.30
As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, in the
instant case, after the COMELEC ascertained the
issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the
abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held
in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions
of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160.
We agree with the Solicitor General that ". . . . [t]he
issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus
a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined
by law and is part and parcel of
its administrative functions. It involves no exercise
of discretionary authority on the part of
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and
resolve controversies defining the rights and duties
of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections
of public officers and the enforcement of the election
laws." (Citation omitted.)31 Briefly, COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules
and regulations governing the conduct of the
required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the
COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions but merely as
an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the
said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order" reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any
question pertaining to the validity of said
resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in

support of its contention — that the power to review
or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely
belongs to this Court are simply not in point. Zaldivar
vs. Estenzo32 speaks of the power of the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct
of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary. In the
present case, petitioners are not contesting the
exclusive authority of the COMELEC to enforce and
administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia33 refers to
this Court's power to review "administrative
decisions," particularly referring to a COMELEC
resolution declaring a certain certificate of candidacy
null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935
Constitution. In Macud vs. COMELEC,34 we reiterated
that when a board of canvassers rejects an election
return on the ground that it is spurious or has been
tampered with, the aggrieved party may elevate the
matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if
the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the
aggrieved party may appeal to this Court. In
both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC
resolutions fall within the purview of "final orders,
rulings and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable
by certiorari by this Court.

In view of the foregoing, public respondent's other

contentions deserve scant consideration.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

GRANTED, and the assailed Order dated February 25,
1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas,
Branch XI is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The
Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is
ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil
Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the
plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred
depending on the outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.
BUAC/BAUTISTA vs COMELEC (2004)
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed
by petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio
Bautista assailing the October 28, 2002 'en
banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) which held that it has no jurisdiction
over controversies involving the conduct of
plebiscite and the annulment of its result.
The facts show that in April, 1988, a plebiscite was
held in Taguig for the ratification of the Taguig
Cityhood Law (Republic Act No. 8487) proposing
the conversion of Taguig from a municipality into
a city. Without completing the canvass of sixty-
four (64) other election returns, the Plebiscite
Board of Canvassers declared that the "NO" votes
won and that the people rejected the conversion of
Taguig to a city.
The Board of Canvassers was, however, ordered by
the COMELEC en banc to reconvene and complete
the canvass. The Board did and in due time issued
an Order proclaiming that the negative votes
prevailed in the plebiscite conducted.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with the COMELEC
a petition to annul[1] the results of the plebiscite
with a prayer for revision and recount of the ballots
cast therein. They alleged that fraud and
irregularities attended the casting and counting of
votes. The case was docketed as an election
protest and raffled to the COMELEC Second
Division.[2]
Private respondent Cayetano intervened and
moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC. He claimed
that a plebiscite cannot be the subject of an
election protest. He averred that the jurisdiction
to hear a complaint involving the conduct of a
plebiscite is lodged with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC).[3]
The COMELEC Second Division initially gave due
course to the petition and ruled that it has
jurisdiction over the case. It treated the petition as
akin to an election protest considering that the
same allegations of fraud and irregularities in the
casting and counting of ballots and preparation of
returns are the same grounds for assailing the
results of an election. It then ordered the Taguig
ballot boxes to be brought to its Manila office and
created revision committees to revise and recount
the plebiscite ballots.[4]
In an unverified motion, intervenor Cayetano
moved for reconsideration of the COMELEC Order
insisting that it has no jurisdiction to hear and
decide a petition contesting the results of a
plebiscite.
In a complete turnaround, the COMELEC 2nd
Division issued an Order on November 29, 2001
granting the Motion for Reconsideration. It
dismissed the petition to annul the results of the
Taguig plebiscite and ruled that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction over said case as it involves an
exercise of quasi-judicial powers not
contemplated under Section 2 (2), Article IX (C) of
the 1987 Constitution.[5]
On appeal, the COMELEC en banc affirmed the
ruling of its 2nd Division. It held that the COMELEC
cannot use its power to enforce and administer all
laws relative to plebiscites as this power is purely
administrative or executive and not quasi-judicial
in nature. It concluded that the jurisdiction over the
petition to annul the Taguig plebiscite results is
lodged with the RTC under Section 19 (6) of Batas
Pambansa Big. 129 which provides that the RTC shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.[6]
Hence this petition.
Petitioners Ma. Salvacion Buac and Antonio Bautista
reiterate their submission that jurisdiction to decide
plebiscite protest cases is constitutionally vested with
the COMELEC. They likewise claim that the impugned
Order is discriminatory as during the pendency of the
Taguig case, the COMELEC assumed jurisdiction over
a similar case concerning the revision and recount of
the plebiscite ballots involving the conversion of
Malolos into a city. The COMELEC resolved said case
and already declared Malolos a city.
Respondents contend that there is no such action
as a plebiscite protest under the Constitution, the
laws and the COMELEC rules as they provided only
for election protests; the quasi-judicial jurisdiction
of the COMELEC over election contests extends only to
cases enumerated in Section 2(2), Article IX (C) of the
Constitution, which does not include controversies
over plebiscite results; and, even if the petition to
annul plebiscite results is akin to an election protest,
it is the RTC that has jurisdiction over election
protests involving municipal officials, and the
COMELEC has only appellate jurisdiction in said cases.
The petition is impressed with merit. amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, is ineluctably errant, viz:
First. The key to the case at bar is its nature. The case
at bar involves the determination of whether the Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial
electorate of Taguig voted in favor of, or against Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
the conversion of the municipality of Taguig into a
highly urbanized city in the plebiscite conducted 1.
for the purpose. 2. In all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary
Respondents submit that the regular courts of justice,
estimation;
more specifically, the Regional Trial Court, has the
jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy concerning
xxx xxx xxx
the conduct of said plebiscite. \
We hold that the invocation of judicial power to 6. In all cases not within the exclusive
settle disputes involving the conduct of a jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
plebiscite is misplaced. Section 1, Article VIII of the body exercising jurisdiction of any court,
Constitution defines judicial power as including tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
"the duty of the courts of justice to settle quasi-judicial functions.
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to There cannot be any bout with doubt that the
determine whether or not there has been a grave aforequoted provisions refer to civil cases or actions. A
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention
instrumentality of the Government." or redress of a wrong.[8] As stressed above, a plebiscite
involves the expression of the public will on a public
According to Mr. Justice Isagani Cruz, "the first part of
issue. The determination of the public will is a subject
the authority represents the traditional concept of
that does not fit the jurisdiction of civil courts, for civil
judicial power involving the settlement of conflicting
courts are established essentially to resolve
rights as conferred by law."[7]
controversies between private persons.[9]
The case at bar assailing the regularity of the
The case of Salva v. Macalintal [10] does not support the
conduct of the Taguig plebiscite does not fit the
overarching thesis that "any question on the validity
kind of a case calling for the exercise of judicial
of plebiscite, or any dispute on the result of the
power. It does not involve the violation of any
plebiscite falls within the general jurisdiction of
legally demandable right and its enforcement.
regular trial courts." Looking at it with clear eyes,
There is no plaintiff or defendant in the case at bar
Salva resolved the validity, not of a plebiscite or its
for it merely involves the ascertainment of the
result, but of a provision in the rules and regulations
vote of the electorate of Taguig whether they
issued by the COMELEC governing the conduct of a
approve or disapprove the conversion of their
plebiscite.
municipality to a highly urbanized city.
Third. To grant the RTC jurisdiction over petitions
There is no invocation of a private right conferred by
to annul plebiscite results can lead to jumbled
law that has been violated and which can be
justice. Consider for instance where the plebiscite is
vindicated alone in our courts of justice in an
national as it deals with the ratification of a proposed
adversarial proceeding. Rather, the issue in the case
amendment to our Constitution. Snap thinking will tell
at bar is the determination of the sovereign
us that it should be the COMELEC that should have
decision of the electorate of Taguig. The purpose
jurisdiction over a petition to annul its results. If
of this determination is more to protect the
jurisdiction is given to the regular courts, the result will
sovereignty of the people and less to vindicate the
not enhance the orderly administration of justice. Any
private interest of any individual. Such a
regional trial court from every nook and corner of the
determination does not contemplate the clash of
country will have jurisdiction over a petition
private rights of individuals and hence cannot
questioning the results of a nationwide plebiscite.
come under the traditional jurisdiction of courts.
Bearing in mind that the jurisdiction of these courts is
Second. If the determination of the result of a limited only within their respective judicial regions, the
plebiscite is not fit for the exercise ofjudicial power, difficulties that will attend their exercise of jurisdiction
the invocation of Section 19 of B.P. Big. 129, as would be many if not unmanageable.
Fourth. An eye contact with our Constitution and
related laws will reveal that only contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications
of elected officials are subject to the exercise of
judicial power of our courts or quasi-judicial power
of our administrative agencies, thus: (a) contests
involving elective municipal officials are tried and
decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction,
while those involving barangay officials are tried
and decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction;
in both cases, however, the COMELEC exercises
appellate jurisdiction; (b) contests involving all
elective regional, provincial and city officials fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
power; (c) contests involving members of the
House of Representatives fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in the exercise
of quasi-judicial power; (d) contests involving
members of the Senate fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal in the exercise of quasi-judicial power;
and, (e) contests involving the President and the
Vice President fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,
also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power.
What grabs the eyeball is the intent of our
Constitution and election laws to
subject only contests relating to the elections,
returns and qualifications of elected officials from
the barangay to the President of the Philippines to
the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of
courts or administrative tribunals.
Contests which do not involve the election,
returns and qualifications of elected officials are
not subjected to the exerci of the judicial or quasi-
judicial powers of courts or administra i agencies.
Clearly, controversies concerning the conduct
plebiscite appertain to this category.
In the case at bar. conduct of the Taguig plebiscite is
the core of the controversy. This is a matter that
involves the enforcement and administration of a
law relative to a plebiscite. It falls under the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Section 2(1),
Article IX (C) of the Constitution which gives it the
power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of a x x x
plebiscite x x x."
Fifth. The Court agrees with the following submissions
of the Solicitor General, viz.
xxx xxx xxx
There can hardly be any doubt that the test and intent
of the constitutional grant of powers to the COMELEC
is to give it all the necessary and incidental powers for
it to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest and
peaceful and credible elections [Maruhom v.
COMELEC, 331 SCRA 473 (2000)]. Hence, the all
encompassing power endowed the COMELEC to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election (or plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall) includes the power
to cancel proclamations [(Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275
SCRA 762 (1997)]. The COMELEC also has the power
to supervise and control the proceedings of the
board of canvassers, suspend and/or annul illegal
and void proclamations, declare a failure of
elections and promulgate rules and regulations
concerning the conduct of elections.
While the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is most
commonly invoked over popular elections that which
involves the choice or selection ' of candidates to
public office by popular vote, the same may likewise
be invoked in connection with the conduct of
plebiscite.
In the present case, petitioners filed a petition for
revision of ballots cast in a plebiscite. The COMELEC
dismissed the petition on the ground that it has no
jurisdiction over the petition considering that the
issue raised therein calls for the exercise by the
COMELEC of its judicial or quasi-judicial power.
According to the COMELEC, there is no law nor any
constitutional provision that confers it with
jurisdiction to hear and decide a case contesting the
officially proclaimed results of a plebiscite based on
frauds and irregularities.
COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION!!!
The COMELEC's position is highly
untenable. Article LX-C, Section 2(1) is very explicit
that the COMELEC has the power to "enforce
administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall." To enforce means to cause
to take effect or to cause the performance of such
act or acts necessary to bring into actual effect or
operation, a plan or measure. When we say the
COMELEC has the power to enforce all laws
relative to the conduct of a plebiscite, it
necessarily entails all the necessary and incidental
power for it to achieve the holding of an honest
and credible plebiscite. Obviously, the power of
the COMELEC is not limited to the mere
administrative function of conducting the
plebiscite. The law is clear. It is also mandated to
enforce the laws relative to the conduct of the
plebiscite. Hence, the COMELEC, whenever it is
called upon to correct or check what the Board of
Canvassers erroneously or fraudulently did
during the canvassing, can verify or ascertain the
true results of the plebiscite either through a pre-
proclamation case or through revision of ballots.
To remove from the COMELEC the power to ascertain
the true results of the plebiscite through revision of
ballots is to render nugatory its constitutionally
mandated power to "enforce" laws relative to the
conduct of plebiscite. It is not correct to argue that the
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC is limited to
contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and
city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided
by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective Barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. If the COMELEC has quasi-judicial
power to enforce laws relating to elective officials then
there is no reason why it cannot exercise the same
power to ascertain the true results of a plebiscite. All
that the Constitution provides is that the COMELEC
shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all contests
relating to elective officials. The provision is not a
limiting provision in the sense that it only limits the
quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to said cases. To
repeat, the power of the COMELEC to ascertain the
true results of the plebiscite is implicit in its power to
enforce all laws relative to the conduct of plebiscite.
COMELEC's claim that the petition for revision of
ballots is cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts
pursuant to Section 19 (6) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 whieh provides that
"Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction x x x in cases not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of any court tribunal, person or body
exercisingjudicial or quasi-judicial functions lacks
merit. To repeat, the power to ascertain the true
results of the plebiscite is necessarily included in the
power to enforce all laws relative to the conduct of
plebiscite.[11]
Sixth. From our earliest Constitution and election
laws, the conduct of plebiscite and determination of its
result have always been the business of the COMELEC
and not the regular courts. If the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction over this matter, our laws would have
been amended to that effect. There is another reason
why the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to resolve
disputes involving plebiscite results should be upheld.
Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which
is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent
constitutional body exclusively charged with the
power of enforcement and administration of all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the
COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of
election and related laws. Consequently, we should be
extra cautious in delimiting the parameters of the
COMELEC's broad powers. We should give the
COMELEC enough latitude in the exercise of its
expertise, for to straightjacket its discretion in the
enforcement and administration of laws relating to
the conduct of election, plebiscite or referendum may
render it impotent. This is the first time that the
COMELEC's jurisdiction over a petition to annul the
results of a plebiscite has been assailed and surprisingly,
this is the first time that the COMELEC has yielded its
historic jurisdiction. More inexplicable is the
inconsistent stance of the COMELEC on the issue. As
stressed by the petitioners, the COMELEC assumed
jurisdiction over the case assailing the result of the
Malolos plebiscite. In the case at bar, it refused to
exercise jurisdiction.
Seventh. Finally, it appears that the Motion for
Reconsideration of private respondent
Congressman Cayetano was filed out of time.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides that a motion for reconsideration should be
filed within five (5) days from receipt of the COMELEC
Order or Resolution. Congressman Cayetano himself
admitted[12] that he received a copy of the October 3,
2001 Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division on
October 9, 2001. The records show that it was only ten
(10) days after said receipt, or on October 19, 2001,
that private respondent Cayetano filed his undated
and unverified Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly,
the COMELEC 2nd Division had no jurisdiction to
entertain his Motion. .
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The
COMELEC is directed to reinstate the petition to annul
the results of the 1998 Taguig plebiscite and to decide
it without delay.
G.R. No. 176970 December 8, 2008
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus,1 with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction, filed by Rogelio Bagabuyo (petitioner) to
prevent the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
from implementing Resolution No. 7837 on the
ground that Republic Act No. 93712 - the law that
Resolution No. 7837 implements - is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then
Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and
sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing
for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative
District of the City of Cagayan De Oro."3 This law
eventually became Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371.4 It
increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district
from one to two. For the election of May 2007,
Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as
belonging to either the first or the second district,
depending on their place of residence. The
constituents of each district would elect their own
representative to Congress as well as eight members
of the Sangguniang Panglungsod.
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9371 apportioned the
City's barangays as follows:
Legislative Districts - The lone legislative
district of the City of Cagayan De Oro is hereby
apportioned to commence in the next national
elections after the effectivity of this Act.
Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas,
Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan,
Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan,
Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi,
Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon,
Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon,
Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the
first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macasandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman,
FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo, and
Balubal and all urban barangays from
Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the
second district.5
On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en
Banc promulgated Resolution No.
7837 implementing R.A. No. 9371.
6
Petitioner Rogelio Bagabuyo filed the present
petition against the COMELEC on March 27,
2007.7 On 10 April 2008, the petitioner amended the
petition to include the following as respondents:
Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita; the Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management; the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit; the Mayor and
the members of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Cagayan de Oro City; and its Board of Canvassers.8
In asking for the nullification of R.A. No. 9371 and
Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds, the
petitioner argued that the COMELEC cannot
implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the
rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct
of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the
division or conversion of a local government unit.
He prayed for the issuance of an order directing the
respondents to cease and desist from
implementing R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 7837, and to revert instead to
COMELEC Resolution No. 7801 which provided for a
single legislative district for Cagayan de Oro.
Since the Court did not grant the petitioner's
prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ
of preliminary injunction, the May 14 National and
Local Elections proceeded according to R.A. No. 9371
and Resolution No. 7837.
The respondent's Comment on the petition, filed
through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued
that:
1) the petitioner did not respect the hierarchy of
courts, as the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is vested with
concurrent jurisdiction over cases assailing the
constitutionality of a statute;
2) R.A. No. 9371 merely increased the
representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House
of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution; 3) the criteria established
under Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution only apply when there is a creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of a province, city,
municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration
of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and 4) R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any
change in Cagayan de Oro's territory, population and
income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.
The petitioner argued in his reply that: 1) pursuant
to the Court's ruling in Del Mar v. PAGCOR,9 the Court
may take cognizance of this petition if compelling
reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues
raised, warrant the immediate exercise of its
jurisdiction; 2) Cagayan de Oro City's
reapportionment under R.A. No. 9371 falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries of cities under
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; 3) the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units
involve a common denominator - the material change
in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected, as well as of the
people therein; 4) a voter's sovereign power to decide
on who should be elected as the entire city's
Congressman was arbitrarily reduced by at least one
half because the questioned law and resolution only
allowed him to vote and be voted for in the district
designated by the COMELEC; 5) a voter was also
arbitrarily denied his right to elect the Congressman
and the members of the city council for the other
legislative district, and 6) government funds were
illegally disbursed without prior approval by the
sovereign electorate of Cagayan De Oro City.10
THE ISSUES
The core issues, based on the petition and the parties'
memoranda, can be limited to the following
contentious points:
1) Did the petitioner violate the hierarchy of
courts rule; if so, should the instant petition be
dismissed on this ground?
2) Does R.A. No. 9371 merely provide for
the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan
de Oro City, or does it involve the division
and conversion of a local government unit?
3) Does R.A. No. 9371 violate the equality of
representation doctrine?
OUR RULING
Except for the issue of the hierarchy of courts rule,
we find the petition totally without merit.
The hierarchy of courts principle.
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.11 It was pursuant to this
original jurisdiction that the petitioner filed the
present petition.
While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of
Appeals12 and the RTCs,13 a direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction is allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
especially set out in the petition. Reasons of
practicality, dictated by an increasingly overcrowded
docket and the need to prioritize in favor of matters
within our exclusive jurisdiction, justify the existence
of this rule otherwise known as the "principle of
hierarchy of courts." More generally stated, the
principle requires that recourse must first be made to
the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent
jurisdiction with a higher court.14
Among the cases we have considered sufficiently
special and important to be exceptions to the rule, are
petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto against our nation's lawmakers when the
validity of their enactments is assailed.15 The present
petition is of this nature; its subject matter and the
nature of the issues raised - among them, whether
legislative reapportionment involves a division of
Cagayan de Oro City as a local government unit - are
reasons enough for considering it an exception to the
principle of hierarchy of courts. Additionally, the
petition assails as well a resolution of the COMELEC en
banc issued to implement the legislative
apportionment that R.A. No. 9371 decrees. As an
action against a COMELEC en banc resolution, the case
falls under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court that in turn
requires a review by this Court via a Rule 65 petition
for certiorari.16 For these reasons, we do not see the
principle of hierarchy of courts to be a stumbling block
in our consideration of the present case.
The Plebiscite Requirement.
The petitioner insists that R.A. No. 9371 converts
and divides the City of Cagayan de Oro as a local
government unit, and does not merely provide for
the City's legislative apportionment. This argument
essentially proceeds from a misunderstanding of the
constitutional concepts of apportionment of
legislative districts and division of local government
units.
Legislative apportionment is defined by Black's Law
Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other
subdivision may send to a legislative body.17It is the
allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to
the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as
to equalize population and voting power among the
districts.18 Reapportionment, on the other hand, is
the realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and mandated
by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.19
Article VI (entitled Legislative Department) of the
1987 Constitution lays down the rules on
legislative apportionment under its Section 5
which provides:
Sec. 5(1). (1) The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty members unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a
uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as
far as practicable, continuous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one
representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.
Separately from the legislative districts that legal
apportionment or reapportionment speaks of, are the
local government units (historically and generically
referred to as "municipal corporations") that the
Constitution itself classified into provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.20 In its strict and
proper sense, a municipality has been defined as "a
body politic and corporate constituted by the
incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for
the purpose of local government thereof."21 The
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of local government units, i.e., of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and barangays, are covered by
the Article on Local Government (Article X). Section 10
of this Article provides:
No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the political unit directly
affected.
Under both Article VI, Section 5, and Article X,
Section 10 of the Constitution, the authority to act
has been vested in the Legislature. The Legislature
undertakes the apportionment and reapportionment
of legislative districts,22 and likewise acts on local
government units by setting the standards for their
creation, division, merger, abolition and alteration of
boundaries and by actually creating, dividing,
merging, abolishing local government units and
altering their boundaries through legislation. Other
than this, not much commonality exists between the
two provisions since they are inherently different
although they interface and relate with one another.
The concern that leaps from the text of Article VI,
Section 5 is political representation and the means to
make a legislative district sufficiently represented so
that the people can be effectively heard. As above
stated, the aim of legislative apportionment is "to
equalize population and voting power among
districts."23
Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people
represented; the uniform and progressive ratio to
be observed among the representative districts;
and accessibility and commonality of interests in
terms of each district being, as far as practicable,
continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In
terms of the people represented, every city with at
least 250,000 people and every province
(irrespective of population) is entitled to one
representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on
the one hand, and provinces and cities, on the other,
relate and interface with each other. To ensure
continued adherence to the required standards of
apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically mandates
reapportionment as soon as the given standards
are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of
Article VI, Section 5, Article X, Section 10 expressly
speaks of how local government units may be
"created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered." Its concern is the
commencement, the termination, and the
modification of local government units' corporate
existence and territorial coverage; and it speaks of two
specific standards that must be observed in
implementing this concern, namely, the criteria
established in the local government code and the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Under the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160)
passed in 1991, the criteria of income, population
and land area are specified as verifiable indicators
of viability and capacity to provide services.24 The
division or merger of existing units must comply with
the same requirements (since a new local government
unit will come into being), provided that a division
shall not reduce the income, population, or land area
of the unit affected to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed in the Code.25
A pronounced distinction between Article VI, Section
5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a
plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government
Code expressly require a plebiscite to carry out any
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundary of a local government unit.26 In contrast, no
plebiscite requirement exists under the
apportionment or reapportionment provision.
In Tobias v. Abalos,27 a case that arose from the
division of the congressional district formerly
covering San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
districts, we confirmed this distinction and the fact
that no plebiscite is needed in a legislative
reapportionment. The plebiscite issue came up
because one was ordered and held for Mandaluyong in
the course of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city, while none was held for San Juan. In explaining
why this happened, the Court ruled that no plebiscite
was necessary for San Juan because the objective of
the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into
a highly urbanized city as required by Article X,
Section 10 the Local Government Code; the creation of
a new legislative district only followed as a
consequence. In other words, the apportionment
alone and by itself did not call for a plebiscite, so that
none was needed for San Juan where only a
reapportionment took place.
The need for a plebiscite under Article X, Section
10 and the lack of requirement for one under
Article VI, Section 5 can best be appreciated by a
consideration of the historical roots of these two
provisions, the nature of the concepts they
embody as heretofore discussed, and their areas
of application.
A Bit of History.
In Macias v. COMELEC,28 we first jurisprudentially
acknowledged the American roots of our
apportionment provision, noting its roots from the
Fourteenth Amendment29 of the U.S. Constitution and
from the constitutions of some American states. The
Philippine Organic Act of 1902 created the Philippine
Assembly,30 the body that acted as the lower house of
the bicameral legislature under the Americans, with
the Philippine Commission acting as the upper house.
While the members of the Philippine Commission
were appointed by the U.S. President with the
conformity of the U.S. Senate, the members of the
Philippine Assembly were elected by representative
districts previously delineated under the Philippine
Organic Act of 1902 pursuant to the mandate to
apportion the seats of the Philippine Assembly among
the provinces as nearly as practicable according to
population. Thus, legislative apportionment first
started in our country.
The Jones Law or the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916
maintained the apportionment provision, dividing the
country into 12 senate districts and 90 representative
districts electing one delegate each to the House of
Representatives. Section 16 of the Act specifically
vested the Philippine Legislature with the authority to
redistrict the Philippine Islands.
Under the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5
retained the concept of legislative apportionment
together with "district" as the basic unit of
apportionment; the concern was "equality of
representation . . . as an essential feature of republican
institutions" as expressed in the leading case of Macias
v. COMELEC.31 The case ruled that inequality of
representation is a justiciable, not a political issue,
which ruling was reiterated in Montejo v.
COMELEC.32 Notably, no issue regarding the holding of
a plebiscite ever came up in these cases and the others
that followed, as no plebiscite was required.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution
retained the concept of equal representation "in
accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio" with each district being, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. This formulation was essentially carried
over to the 1987 Constitution, distinguished only from
the previous one by the presence of party-list
representatives. In neither Constitution was a
plebiscite required.
The need for a plebiscite in the creation, division,
merger, or abolition of local government units was
not constitutionally enshrined until the 1973
Constitution. However, as early as 1959, R.A. No.
226433 required, in the creation of barrios by
Provincial Boards, that the creation and definition of
boundaries be "upon petition of a majority of the voters
in the areas affected." In 1961, the Charter of the City
of Caloocan (R.A. No. 3278) carried this further by
requiring that the "Act shall take effect after a majority
of voters of the Municipality of Caloocan vote in favor of
the conversion of their municipality into a city in a
plebiscite." This was followed up to 1972 by other
legislative enactments requiring a plebiscite as a
condition for the creation and conversion of local
government units as well as the transfer of sitios from
one legislative unit to another.34 In 1973, the
plebiscite requirement was accorded constitutional
status.
Under these separate historical tracks, it can be seen
that the holding of a plebiscite was never a
requirement in legislative apportionment or
reapportionment. After it became constitutionally
entrenched, a plebiscite was also always identified
with the creation, division, merger, abolition and
alteration of boundaries of local government units,
never with the concept of legislative apportionment.
Nature and Areas of Application.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5
speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit
because it is the basis for the election of a member of
the House of Representatives and members of the
local legislative body. It is not, however, a political
subdivision through which functions of government
are carried out. It can more appropriately be
described as a representative unit that may or may not
encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike
the latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a
corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf
of the people comprising the district; it merely
delineates the areas occupied by the people who will
choose a representative in their national affairs.
Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a
municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have
its own chief executive. The role of the congressman
that it elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of
the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the
affairs of the legislative district. Not being a corporate
unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that
must be created or dissolved and has no capacity to
act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the
creation, dissolution or any other similar action on a
legislative district.
The local government units, on the other hand, are
political and corporate units. They are the territorial
and political subdivisions of the state.35 They possess
legal personality on the authority of the Constitution
and by action of the Legislature. The Constitution
defines them as entities that Congress can, by law,
create, divide, abolish, merge; or whose boundaries
can be altered based on standards again established
by both the Constitution and the Legislature.36 A local
government unit's corporate existence begins upon
the election and qualification of its chief executive and
a majority of the members of its Sanggunian.37
As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an
"instrumentality of the state in carrying out the
functions of government."38 As a corporate entity with
a distinct and separate juridical personality from the
State, it exercises special functions for the sole benefit
of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the
community in the administration of local affairs"39 and
the mediums through which the people act in their
corporate capacity on local concerns.40 In light of
these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly
secure the consent of the people affected by the
creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of
boundaries of local government units through a
plebiscite.
These considerations clearly show the distinctions
between a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment and the division of a local
government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic
nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean,
and does not even imply, a division of a local
government unit where the apportionment takes
place. Thus, the plebiscite requirement that applies to
the division of a province, city, municipality
or barangay under the Local Government Code should
not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a
legislative apportionment or reapportionment.
R.A. No. 9371 and COMELEC Res. No. 7837
R.A. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a
reapportionment legislation passed in accordance
with the authority granted to Congress under Article
VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision
- Section 1 - provides:
SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. - The lone
legislative district of the City of Cagayan de
Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the
next national elections after the effectivity of
this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon,
Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua,
Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat,
Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan,
Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an,
Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon,
Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the
first district while barangays Macabalan,
Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth,
Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa,
Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto,
Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays
from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall
comprise the second district.
Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro
City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is
mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a
single unit and its administration is not divided along
territorial lines. Its territory remains completely
whole and intact; there is only the addition of another
legislative district and the delineation of the city into
two districts for purposes of representation in the
House of Representatives. Thus, Article X, Section 10
of the Constitution does not come into play and no
plebiscite is necessary to validly apportion Cagayan de
Oro City into two districts.
Admittedly, the legislative reapportionment carries
effects beyond the creation of another congressional
district in the city by providing, as reflected in
COMELEC Resolution No. 7837, for additional
Sangguniang Panglunsod seats to be voted for along
the lines of the congressional apportionment made.
The effect on the Sangguniang Panglunsod, however,
is not directly traceable to R.A. No. 9371 but to another
law - R.A. No. 663641 - whose Section 3 provides:
SECTION 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any
law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of
Cebu, City of Davao, and any other city with
more than one representative district shall
have eight (8) councilors for each district who
shall be residents thereof to be elected by the
qualified voters therein, provided that the
cities of Cagayan de Oro, Zamboanga, Bacolod,
Iloilo and other cities comprising a
representative district shall have twelve (12)
councilors each and all other cities shall have
ten (10) councilors each to be elected at large
by the qualified voters of the said cities:
Provided, That in no case shall the present
number of councilors according to their
charters be reduced.
However, neither does this law have the effect of
dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political
and corporate units and territories. Rather than divide
the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the
effect is merely to enhance voter representation by
giving each city voter more and greater say, both in
Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod.
To illustrate this effect, before the reapportionment,
Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12 city
council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000.42 By having two legislative
districts, each of them with one congressman, Cagayan
de Oro now effectively has two congressmen, each one
representing 250,000 of the city's population. In terms
of services for city residents, this easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now
services only 250,000 constituents as against the
500,000 he used to represent. The same goes true for
the Sangguniang Panglungsod with its ranks
increased from 12 to 16 since each legislative district
now has 8 councilors. In representation terms, the
fewer constituents represented translate to a greater
voice for each individual city resident in Congress and
in the Sanggunian; each congressman and each
councilor represents both a smaller area and fewer
constituents whose fewer numbers are now
concentrated in each representative. The City, for its
part, now has twice the number of congressmen
speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress.
Since the total number of congressmen in the country
has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers,
the presence of two congressman (instead of one)
from the same city cannot but be a quantitative and
proportional improvement in the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.
Equality of representation.
The petitioner argues that the distribution of the
legislative districts is unequal. District 1 has only
93,719 registered voters while District 2 has 127,071.
District 1 is composed mostly of rural barangays while
District 2 is composed mostly of constitutional standards for legislative apportionment
urban barangays.43 Thus, R.A. No. 9371 violates the or reapportionment. What the components of the two
principle of equality of representation. districts of Cagayan de Oro would be is a matter for the
lawmakers to determine as a matter of policy. In the
A clarification must be made. The law clearly provides absence of any grave abuse of discretion or violation
that the basis for districting shall be the number of the of the established legal parameters, this Court cannot
inhabitants of a city or a province, not the number of intrude into the wisdom of these policies.47
registered voters therein. We settled this very same
question in Herrera v. COMELEC44 when we WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for
interpreted a provision in R.A. No. 7166 and COMELEC lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
Resolution No. 2313 that applied to the Province of
Guimaras. We categorically ruled that the basis for
districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province
of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995
Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa,
Administrator of the National Statistics Office.

The petitioner, unfortunately, did not provide

information about the actual population of Cagayan de
Oro City. However, we take judicial notice of the
August 2007 census of the National Statistics Office
which shows that barangays comprising Cagayan de
Oro's first district have a total population of 254,644,
while the second district has 299,322 residents.
Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the
population sizes of the districts.45 The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude or
rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation.46 In fact, for cities, all it asks is that
"each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand shall have one representative," while
ensuring representation for every province regardless
of the size of its population. To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and
ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local
government units as they are found and does not
require their division, merger or transfer to satisfy the
numerical standard it imposes. Its requirements are
satisfied despite some numerical disparity if the units
are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far as
practicable.

The petitioner's contention that there is a resulting

inequality in the division of Cagayan de Oro City into
two districts because the barangays in the first district
are mostly rural barangays while the second district is
mostly urban, is largely unsubstantiated. But even if
backed up by proper proof, we cannot question the
division on the basis of the difference in
the barangays' levels of development or
developmental focus as these are not part of the

G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S.
FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA
ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of
the Decision dated 25 January 2010.1
The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular
reason, already considered and rejected in the
Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the
Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda),
Region III Director, National Statistics Office
(NSO), projecting Malolos City’s population in
2010, is non-justiciable. The COMELEC also calls
attention to the other sources of Malolos City’s
population indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of
Population – PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report2)
and as of 2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’
Water District, dated 31 July 2008,3 and Certification
of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 20084) which
Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act No.
9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its non-
justiciability argument to these materials.
We find no reason to grant the motion.
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the
reliability and authoritativeness of the population
indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are non-
justiciable. If laws creating legislative districts are
unquestionably within the ambit of this Court’s
judicial review power,5 then there is more reason to
hold justiciable subsidiary questions impacting on
their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a
specific constitutional limitation under Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only cities with
at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to
representation in Congress. To fulfill this obligation,
the Court, of necessity, must inquire into the
authoritativeness and reliability of the population
indicators Congress used to comply with the
constitutional limitation. Thus, nearly five decades
ago, we already rejected claims of non-justiciability of
an apportionment law alleged to violate the
constitutional requirement of proportional
representation:
It is argued in the motion to reconsider, that since
Republic Act 3040 improves existing conditions, this
Court could perhaps, in the exercise of judicial
statesmanship, consider the question involved as
purely political and therefore non-justiciable. The
overwhelming weight of authority is that district
apportionment laws are subject to review by the
courts[:]
The constitutionality of a legislative
apportionment act is a judicial question, and not
one which the court cannot consider on the
ground that it is a political question.
It is well settled that the passage of apportionment
acts is not so exclusively within the political power of
the legislature as to preclude a court from inquiring
into their constitutionality when the question is
properly brought before it.
It may be added in this connection, that the mere
impact of the suit upon the political situation does not
render it political instead of judicial.
The alleged circumstance that this statute improves
the present set-up constitutes no excuse for approving
a transgression of constitutional limitations, because
the end does not justify the means. Furthermore, there
is no reason to doubt that, aware of the existing
inequality of representation, and impelled by its sense
of duty, Congress will opportunely approve remedial
legislation in accord with the precepts of the
Constitution.6 (Emphasis supplied; internal citations
omitted)
To deny the Court the exercise of its judicial review
power over RA 9591 is to contend that this Court has
no power "to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government," a duty mandated
under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Indeed, if we subscribe to the COMELEC’s theory, this
Court would be reduced to rubberstamping laws
creating legislative districts no matter how unreliable
and non-authoritative the population indicators
Congress used to justify their creation. There can be
no surer way to render meaningless the limitation in
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. 7
Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135),
the population indicators Congress used to
measure Malolos City’s compliance with the
constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-
authoritative. On Miranda’s Certification, (that the
"projected population of the [City] of Malolos will
be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"),
this fell short of EO 135’s requirements that (a) for
intercensal years, the certification should be based on
a set of demographic projections and
estimates declared official by the National Statistical
and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications on
intercensal population estimates will be as of the
middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on
projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Further, using Miranda’s own growth rate assumption
of 3.78%, Malolos City’s population as of 1 August
2010 will only be 249,333, below the constitutional
threshold of 250,000 (using as base Malolos City’s
population as of 1 August 2007 which is 223,069).
That Miranda issued his Certification "by authority of
the NSO administrator" does not make the document
reliable as it neither makes Miranda the NSO
Administrator’s designated certifying officer nor cures
the Certification of its fatal defects for failing to use
demographic projections and estimates declared
official by the NSCB or make the projection as of the
middle of 2010.1avvphi1
Nor are the 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 –
Progress Enumeration Report, the Certification of the
City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July 2008 and
the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay, dated 22
August 2008, reliable because none of them qualifies
as authoritative population indicator under EO 135.
The 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 – Progress
Enumeration Report merely contains preliminary
data on the population census of Bulacan which were
subsequently adjusted to reflect actual population as
indicated in the 2007 Census results (showing Malolos
City’s population at 223,069). The COMELEC, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts
Malolos City’s claim that the 2007 census for Malolos
City was "sloped to make it appear that come Year
2010, the population count for Malolos would still fall
short of the constitutional requirement."8 This
unbecoming attack by the government’s chief counsel
on the integrity of the processes of the government’s
census authority has no place in our judicial system.
The OSG ought to know that absent convincing proof
of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys the
presumption of the regularity in the performance of
its functions.
The Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water District
fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its ambit
certifications from a public utility gathered
incidentally in the course of pursuing its business. To
elevate the water district’s so-called population
census to the level of credibility NSO certifications
enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO. This
will allow population data incidentally gathered by
electric, telephone, sewage, and other utilities to enter
into legislative processes even though these private
entities are not in the business of generating statistical
data and thus lack the scientific training, experience
and competence to handle, collate and process them.
Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay is
not authoritative because much like the Malolos City
Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not authorized
to conduct population census, much less during off-
census years. The non-NSO entities EO 135 authorizes
to conduct population census are local government
units (that is, province, city, municipality or barangay)
subject to the prior approval of the NSCB and under
the technical supervision of the NSO from planning to
data processing.9
By presenting these alternative population indicators
with their widely divergent population figures,10 the
COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the danger of
relying on non-NSO authorized certifications. EO 135’s
stringent standards ensuring reliability of population
census cannot be diluted as these data lie at the core
of crucial government decisions and, in this case, the
legislative function of enforcing the constitutional
mandate of creating congressional districts in cities
with at least 250,000 constituents.
There can be no doubt on the applicability of EO
135 to test the constitutionality of RA 9591. The
COMELEC invoked EO 135 to convince the Court of the
credibility and authoritativeness of Miranda’s
certificate.11 It is hardly alien for the Court to adopt
standards contained in a parallel statute to fill gaps in
the law in the absence of an express
prohibition.12 Indeed, one is hard-pressed to find any
distinction, statistically speaking, on the reliability of
an NSO certification of a city’s population for purposes
of creating its legislative district and for purposes of
converting it to a highly-urbanized or an independent
component city.13 Congress itself confirms the
wisdom and relevance of EO 135’s paradigm of
privileging NSO certifications by mandating that
compliance with the population requirement in
the creation and conversion of local government
units shall be proved exclusively by an NSO
certification.14 Unquestionably, representation in
Congress is no less important than the creation of local
government units in enhancing our democratic
institutions, thus both processes should be subject to
the same stringent standards.

Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in

Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections,
it breaches the 250,000 population mark
following the mandate in Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that
"any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member." COMELEC neither
alleged nor proved that Malolos City is in
compliance with Section 3 of the Ordinance.

Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3),

Article VI of the Constitution on the population
requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative
district for Malolos City, carving the city from the
former First Legislative District, leaves the town of
Bulacan isolated from the rest of the geographic mass
of that district.15 This contravenes the requirement
in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative
district shall "comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory." It is
no argument to say, as the OSG does, that it was
impracticable for Congress to create a district with
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory because
Malolos city lies at the center of the First Legislative
District. The geographic lay-out of the First Legislative
District is not an insuperable condition making
compliance with Section 5(3) impracticable. To
adhere to the constitutional mandate, and thus
maintain fidelity to its purpose of ensuring efficient
representation, the practicable alternative for
Congress was to include the municipality of Bulacan in
Malolos City’s legislative district. Although
unorthodox, the resulting contiguous and compact
district fulfills the constitutional requirements of
geographic unity and population floor, ensuring
efficient representation of the minimum mass of
constituents.

WHEREFORE, the Supplemental Motion for

Reconsideration of respondent Commission on
Elections dated 22 February 2010 is DENIED WITH
FINALITY. Let no further pleadings be allowed.