48 INPUT AND EVIDENCE

“in the lexicon.” The exact properties of the lexicon are open to debate within
linguistic theory. What matters for syntactic discussion is simply that the lexicon
lies outside of derivational paths for particular sentences. So, parameter-setting
is outside of the derivation of a specific sentence. At the same time, generative
theory asserts that the lexicon is a memory store, in particular a storage place for
the idiosyncrasies and irregularities which could only result from learning — in
the conventional sense of the term. It follows that the mechanisms which are
responsible for setting lexical parameters cannot operate until (possibly) domain-
general mechanisms responsible for the induction of individual expressions from
the stimuli available have done their work. This proposal makes parameter-setting
and parameter-resetting dependent upon learning mechanisms in ways which
have as yet not been explored in SLA and which can hardly be called trivial.
Above we raised the issue of the functional architecture of the bilingual
linguistic system. We can raise it again in thinking about parameters which are
lexically expressed. One of the most vexed issues in treatments of bilingualism
is the question of whether bilinguals have one lexicon or two, and how the
lexical entries interact. The evidence that they do is compelling. See Pal (2000)
for discussion. What the implications of interacting lexicons are for the analysis
of functional categories and the re-setting of parameters connected to them has
yet to be discussed in the SLA literature.
All of the questions raised above are legitimate ones to be asked of a P&P
theory parading as a explanatory theory of acquisition. Unfortunately, the ques-
tions are being asked by the critics of the theory and not by its proponents. It is
the critics who have made plain that much current work in P&P theory has
confused Gregg’s two types of theories, treating a property theory as if it were
a transition theory. An acquisition theory must explain what causes grammatical
restructuring and must describe its course. This the P&P theory does not do. I
have concluded that parameter-(re)setting is an interesting metaphor, but ulti-
mately one which will not stand up to close scrutiny. I see no reason, therefore,
to contest claims by Bates and MacWhinney (1989: 71) that their Competition
Model is the only theory which can claim to be a theory of language acquisition.

1.3 Problems with the Competition Model

This said, I should add that being the only game in town does not mean that the
game is thereby a winning one. The Competition Model suffers very much from
its unwillingness to take seriously research into the nature of linguistic knowl-
edge. Indeed, one may question the extent to which the “Competitors” understand
contemporary theoretical linguistic research. On the one hand, one looks in vain
 PROPERTY AND TRANSITION THEORIES 49

in the Competitors’ publications for signs that structural constructs play a role in
processing and acquisition, although it is now abundantly clear that no account
can be given of linguistic knowledge without them. On the other hand, the
Competitors refuse to question the relevance of the form- and meaning-related
constructs they do adopt, as if it were somehow obvious that words and mor-
phemes have psychological reality while c-command and the No Crossing Lines
Constraint do not.22 It is as if the theoretical notions of American structuralism
(constructs like phoneme, morpheme, word, or sentence) have ceased to have
theory-dependent status simply because psychologists have heard of them (all
other more recent theoretical developments being, in contrast, suspect). This is
hardly a sensible approach to the characterisation of language. In addition, it is
apparent that the Competitors gloss over important linguistic details in experi-
mental work in an attempt to make induction and a structured environment the
major explanatory factors.23 It is therefore obvious to many of us that structural
representations have no explanatory role to play in this theory of language use.
Since the Competition Model also purports to be a theory of acquisition it
follows that the structural nature of grammatical representations can play no
causal role in explaining the transitions between knowledge states. This remains
true despite the rather frivolous response that Bates and MacWhinney (1989: 7)
give to their critics.24 The reason is obvious: the Competition Model claims that
the mappings between acoustic stimuli and semantic representations are direct.
This means that there are really no psycholinguistically relevant mediating
phonological or morphosyntactic representations. Any kind of grammatical or
semantic primitive must be characterised in terms of patterns of activation of
connected nets of nodes standing in for neurons. At best, therefore, grammar is
a metaphor for an emergent or distributed knowledge fully characterised in terms
of patterns of excitation of the auditory nerve, distributed patterns of node
activation in the neural nets doing the cognitive work, and the weighted connec-
tions among them. I reject this vision of linguistic knowledge.25 Finally, at least
some versions of the model (McDonald 1986; McDonald and Heilenman 1991)
explain language development by assuming that incorrect interpretations are a
triggering force. Incorrect interpretations are detected either when a given
interpretation contradicts the state of affairs perceptible through other means than
language, or when the learner is informed that his interpretation is incorrect. We
have no evidence yet that this particular type of negative evidence has any role
to play in the acquisition of the full range of types of grammatical knowledge.
50 INPUT AND EVIDENCE

1.4 A third approach: the Autonomous Induction Theory

I intend to take a route different from both of these approaches. On the one
hand, I shall go beyond my original claim that feedback and correction have a
role to play in adult SLA, to show how it might work. On the other hand, I shall
elaborate an independent model of SLA called the Autonomous Induction Theory.
It is based on a theory of cognition developed by Ray Jackendoff (1987, 1996a),
called Representational Modularity. The Representational Modularity model
posits that cognitive universals play a fundamental role in explaining what we
know about language and how we come to know it. These universals include
Universal Grammar, but UG is just one of several types of universals in the
arsenal of the human cognitive system. It also starts from the assumption that the
mappings between stimuli in the environment and meanings are crucially
mediated by representational “languages of the mind” which have significant
structural properties (Jackendoff 1992). These languages are quite distinct from
one another, and cannot be reduced to a single general type.
Representational Modularity is therefore incompatable with the view that
there is a general theory of learning in which the same processes and constraints
operate across all cognitive domains.
The Autonomous Induction Theory adopts representational modularity. This
assumption alone makes the Autonomous Induction Theory different from all
other current proposals, including the Competition Model, and proposals by Bley-
Vroman (1990), Clahsen and Muysken (1986, 1989), and Schachter (1992). It
follows from the assumption of Representational Modularity that not everything
that is representable in our conceptual systems can be encoded in our phonologi-
cal or morphosyntactic systems, and vice versa. This means that there will be
severe constraints on how conceptual information can interact with information
encoded in the specialised representational systems. Consequently, there are
important limitations on what feedback and correction can accomplish in
initiating grammatical restructuring. However, the theory elaborated is compatible
with the hypothesis that feedback and correction, mentally represented in
conceptual representations, can have an effect on grammatical restructuring. This
makes the Autonomous Induction Theory different from theories claiming that
there is no negative evidence in SLA (Schwartz 1986, 1987, 1993; Schwartz and
Gubala-Ryzak 1992) or no language acquisition based on metalinguistic informa-
tion (Truscott 1998b). I take the view that the investigation of exactly what the
effects of feedback and correction are can shed light on the nature of modularity
and information processing. Indeed, I will argue that the study of adult SLA and,
in particular, the study of the nature of the input and evidence to L2 grammatical