[AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

Religious Liberty in Indonesia and the Rights of “Deviant” Sects

Alfitri†

Abstract

Although Indonesia has acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights and freedom of religion is a mandate of the 1945 Constitution,
there is a significant difference between the promise and the practice of
religious liberty, especially regarding the rights of sects in Indonesia. This
article explores this theme in the context of the Congregation of Ahmadiyah
Indonesia, a minority Islamic sect which is not considered as an agama, or
official religion, as a case study. This designation has had various
discriminatory effects on its adherents, which waters down significantly the
guarantee of religious freedom in Indonesia.

Keywords: religious liberty, the 1945 Constitution, Agama, deviant sects,

Ahmadiyah

†
Lecturer, Samarinda State Institute for Islamic Studies (STAIN, Samarinda), Indonesia;
Research Assistant to Professor Tim Lindsey at the Asian Law Center, the University of
Melbourne. Australia; LLM (the University of Melbourne, 2006); MA and BA (Sunan
Kalijaga State Islamic University, Yogyakarta, 1999 and 2004).
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

I. INTRODUCTION

Religious liberty is one of the most fundamental of human rights. This has
been recognised and enshrined in a number of International legal documents. 1
For example, Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948
(UDHR) states:

[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and

religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship
and observance.2

The UDHR was then included in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by more than 144 countries. 3
According to international law, international treaties which have been ratified
must be implemented by state parties in good faith (pacta sunt servanda).4
Article 18 of the ICCPR, therefore, obliges state parties to guarantee the
religious liberty of their citizens to embrace and practise the religion or belief
of their choice.5
Indonesia acceded to the ICCPR on 23 February 2006.6 More
importantly, freedom of religion is a mandate of the 1945 Indonesian
Constitution (Undang-Undang Dasar 1945). Article 29(2) declares that “the
State guarantees the freedom of every citizen to embrace their religion and to
worship according to their religion and conviction”.7 Furthermore, Article 28E
was introduced by an amendment to the 1945 Constitution. Article 28E(1)
states that “[e]very person shall be free to embrace and to practise the religion
of his or her choice …”, and Article 28E(2) states that “[e]very person shall

1
Nikolas K Gvosdev, “Constitutional Doublethink, Managed Pluralism and Freedom of
Religion” (2001) 29 Religion, State and Society 81 [Gvosdev].
2
UDHR, Art 18, adopted and proclaimed by GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess, Supp
No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948).
3
See Abdullah Saeed & Hassan Saeed, Freedom of Religion, Apostasy and Islam (Burlington,
VT: Ashgate. 2004) at 10 [Saeed]; Gvosdev, supra note 1 at 82; Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Status of Ratifications of the Principal International
Human Rights Treaties as of 9 June 2004”, online: http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last
visited 19 December 2005).
4
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 22 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, art 26-27,
(entered into force on 27 January 1980),  online: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts
instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (last visited 14 November 2007).
5
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS
171, art 18(1)-(2) (entered into force 23 March 1976), online:
<http://www.unhchr.ch /html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm> (last visited 19 December 2005).
6
See Office of the United Nations High Commisioner for Human Rights, supra note 3.
7
1945 Constitution, chapter XI Art 29(2), available in Profil Menteri-Menteri Kabinet
Indonesia Bersatu, 1st ed (2004) at 46. Translated by the writer.
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

have the right to the freedom to hold beliefs, and to express his or her views
and thoughts, in accordance with his/her conscience”.8
In addition to the above, Article 22(1) of Law No 39/1999 Concerning
Human Rights (Undang-Undang No 39/1999 tentang Hak Azazi Manusia)
states that “[e]very person is free to profess their religion and to worship in
accordance with their religion and conviction”. In Article 22(2), the freedom
to profess one’s religion and to practise one’s convictions and beliefs are
guaranteed by the state.9 It is the state’s responsibility to safeguard, advance,
uphold and fulfil human rights in Indonesia. This responsibility is enshrined in
Article 8 of Law No 39/1999. 10 A violation of religious liberty therefore
contravenes Indonesian law and the 1945 Constitution.
However, the legal and constitutional guarantees of religious freedom
have, arguably, not been fully borne out in practice. Gvosdev, when observing
strategies employed by governments in restricting or prohibiting the right to
religious freedom, found that the Indonesian government had “redefin[ed]
‘religious freedom’ in a narrower or more restrictive fashion than the general
understanding of the term”.11
The situation of religious freedom in Indonesia, however, might be
more critical than Gvosdev observed if religious sects are taken into account.
This is because the government maintains a right to define what constitutes a
religion in Indonesia, and has ensured through its policies that its citizens
follow an acceptable religious faith.12 Only six religions – Islam, Catholicism,
Protestantism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism – are recognised by the
government as official religions in Indonesia. Other religions, therefore, do not
enjoy the same rights and protection from the government. The status of
religious sects in Indonesia is thus in question.
Among sects in Indonesia, the Congregation of Ahmadiyah Indonesia
(Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, or JAI) is perhaps the most controversial. JAI
is the Indonesian branch of Ahmadiyah, a religious group founded by Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad in India in 1889.13

8
Ibid, chapter XA Art 28E(1)(2) second amendment assented to on 18 August 2000.
Translated by Hikmahanto Juwana in “Assessing Indonesia’s Human Rights Practice in the
Post-Soeharto Era: 1998-2003” (2003) 7 Sing JICL 659 [Juwana].
9
Law No 39/1999, Art 22, online: <www.hukumonline.com> (last visited 13 December
2005). Translated by the writer.
10
Ibid, Art 8.
11
Gvosdev, supra note 1 at 83. As a matter of fact, Art 29(2) of the 1945 Constitution only
guarantees freedom of worship to its citizens, not the freedom to act on their beliefs.
12
See Kipp & Rodgers, “Introduction: Indonesian Religions in Society” in R S Kipp & S
Rodgers, eds, Indonesian Religions in Transition (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1987)
at 23 [Kipp]; Cf Paul Stange as quoted by Zifirdaus Adnan, “Islamic Religion: Yes, Islamic
(Political) Ideology: No; Islam and the State in Indonesia” in Arif Budiman, ed, State and
Civil Society in Indonesia (Clayton, Vic: Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash
University. 1990) at 449 [Adnan].
13
See “Mengkaji Ulang Ajaran Ahmadiyah”, online: <http://ahmadiyah.20m.com/artikel
/INDEX.HTM> (last visited 8 November 2005).
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

Unfortunately, JAI has experienced violence against its members and

vandalism of their property because it is perceived as apostate (riddah) by
practitioners of orthodox Islam. 14 This is due to the Ahmadiyan belief that
Mizra Ghulam Ahmad is the Prophet as well as the Messiah, which is
inconsistent with the orthodox Islamic view that Muhammad is the last
Prophet.
For example, from 10-13 September 2002 in Selong city (east
Lombok, West Nusatenggara province), hardline orthodox Muslims attacked
Ahmadiyah adherents, forcing hundreds of them to flee their residences. On 23
December 2002, two Ahmadiyah mosques in Manior Lor, Kuningan (West
Java province) were attacked by mobs. In this case, Ahmadiyah members
defended themselves successfully against the mobs.15
On 15 July 2005, the Islamic Society Movement (Gerakan Umat
Islam, or GUI) forced Jalsah Salanah (the annual JAI gathering), held at
Mubarak campus in Parung, Bogor (West Java Province), to disperse. JAI
members had to be evacuated by the police after GUI issued an ultimatum in
response to JAI’s refusal to disperse in accordance with an earlier request on 8
July 2005. Angry mobs had started vandalising JAI property and it was feared
that members would become targets of violence.16
More recently on 4 February 2006, local unease at JAI presence in the
Lingsar district of West Lombok erupted in violence. This forced about 187
JAI members to leave their homes for refuge in Denpasar, Bali. They
subsequently sought asylum at the Australian Diplomatic Mission, claiming
that the local government had neglected their need for a safe haven in which
they could live and practise their faith.17
Furthermore, orthodox Islam in Indonesia – like orthodox Islam all
around the world18 – has excommunicated the Ahmadiyah through a fatwa
(religious legal edict) from the Council of Indonesian Ulama. The fatwa also
asked the Government to ban Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. 19 Finding the
14
See about the criteria of apostasy in Islam and the analysis of their fluidity, in Saeed, supra
note 3 at 43-50.
15
See Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo, Data dan Analisa: Jalan Dialog untuk Aliran
Ahmadiyah, online: <http://www.pdat.co.id/hg/political_pdat/2005/07/29/pol,20050729-
01,id.html> (last visited 8 November 2005) [Pusat Data dan Analisa Tempo].
16
Ibid.
17
“Ahmadiyah Members Consider Seeking Asylum in Australia” The Jakarta Post (26 July
2006), online: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/detailheadlines.asp?fileid=20060725.@03&
irec=2> (last visited 26 July 2006).
18
On the fatawa (plural form of fatwa) excommunicating all Ahmadiyah adherents, see
“Fatwas of Muslim Scholars and Organisations Regarding the Qadiani (Ahmadiyyah Cult)”,
online: http://www.central-mosque.com/aqeedah/fatwas.htm (last visited 17 December
2005).
19
See “The Decision of the 2nd National Conference of the Council of Indonesian Ulama No
05/Kep/Munas II/MUI/1980”, online: http://ahmadiyah.20m.com/fatwa/MUI.HTM (last
visited 8 November 2005); and “The Decision of Fatwa of the Council of Indonesian Ulama
No 11/MUNAS VII/MUI/15/2005 Concerning Ahmadiyah Sect”, online:
http://www.majelisulama.com/mui_in/fatwa.php?id=131&PHPSESSID=49cb684872 (last
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

appropriate response to the demand is a pressing issue for the government of

the day.
This paper will study religious liberty in Indonesia and the rights of the
so-called “deviant” sects using JAI’s present circumstances as a case study.
This paper argues that Indonesia’s regime has shifted from an authoritarian to
a more democratic government which is marked, among other things, by the
commitment of the post-Soeharto regimes to enforce human rights.20 It also
argues, however, that religious liberty might remain elusive for alleged
“deviant” sects as long as the present regime retains the hegemonic and
intrusive regulations regarding religion inherited from the Soeharto (“New”)
Order.
This paper will first discuss the provisions of religious liberty in the
Constitution of 1945 and analyse the government’s interpretation of the
provisions through its regulations and policies. Next, the history and tenets of
JAI will be discussed. This will be followed by an analysis of the inter-
connected factors of government regulations and policies, and the
characteristics of Islam in Indonesia which have shaped the tension between
JAI and some orthodox Muslim groups in Indonesia.
It is hoped that insight into the practice of religious liberty in Indonesia
with regard to “deviant” sects will be gleaned from a discussion of JAI’s
present plight.

II. THE 1945 CONSTITUTION AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION

A. State and Religions from the Pancasila Point of View

The unique relationship between the state and religion in Indonesia pre-dates
its independence on 17 August 1945. There was controversy about the
ideological basis of the state between those who endeavoured to have some
form of formal link between Islamic ideology and the state and those who
opposed it.21 It was played out in the Investigation Committee for the
Preparation of Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI), which was formed by
Indonesians and the Japanese on 1 March 1945.22 This body was charged with
the task of outlining the political structure of an independent Indonesia. The
committee agreed on the basic economic and constitutional issues but was
deadlocked on the issue of Islam’s role in the state.
The debate within the committee was intense. On 1 June 1945,
Soekarno, who later became the first president of Indonesia, attempted to
resolve the crisis by suggesting the Pancasila (five principles). The First

visited 8 August 2005).

20
See Juwana, supra note 8 at 644.
21
Adnan, supra note 12 at 441.
22
Robert W Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslim and Democratization in Indonesia, 1st ed (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press. 2000) at 41. See also Fatimah Husein, Muslim-Christian
Relations in the New Order Indonesia: The Exclusivist and Inclusivist Muslims’ Perspectives
(Bandung, Indonesia: Mizan. 2005) at 73 [H
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

Principle was the “belief in God”, and this exemplified Soekarno’s effort to
find an acceptable compromise by making Indonesia neither an Islamic state
nor a secular state, but a state which would have a “religious state philosophy
so that the ideals of every religious denomination could be realised”.
In fact, Professor Drijarkara, a great Indonesian philosopher, has
described the Pancasila as the best possible conception of the relationship
between religion and the state in the context of Indonesia. Indonesian culture,
in general, is religious and sees life as a journey towards God. The Pancasila,
therefore, accords with Indonesian culture and beliefs by making the pursuit of
God the end objective of the state. The state, however, is not a theocracy and
will not enforce religious belief, nor should it. To Drijarkara, religious beliefs
should arise from individual conscience and should not be foisted upon the
individual by the state as this would detract from democracy and the dignity of
the human being.
Despite Soekarno’s proposal, Islam’s role in the state – in particular
the demand of some Muslim leaders for the enforcement of Shariah (Islamic
law) by the state for Muslims – remained unsolved. When Soekarno and Hatta
jointly proclaimed Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945, they did not
make any reference to Islam in the proclamation text. It seems, thus, that the
separation of religion from the state was envisaged at the inception of the
Indonesian Republic and that religion would be a private matter.
However, this was not to be the case. The state established the Ministry
of Religion (Departemen Agama) on 3 January 1946 which was to administer
the religious matters of the five official state-recognised religions; i.e. Islam,
Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism .
The establishment of the Ministry of Religion implements Article 29 of
the 1945 Constitution and the First Principle of the Pancasila: the state is now
directly involved in managing the religious institutions within it. This is not
necessarily a bad thing as this might facilitate and advance religious practices
through the establishment of places of worship or government support of
religious organisations and schools.
Unfortunately, this also opens the door to excessive governmental
control of religious matters through regulations concerning what constitutes
“acceptable” religion or “acceptable” theology within those religions. This is
what occurred under the authoritarian New Order regime and, this paper
argues, what is likely to remain as the state of affairs under the present regime
unless changes are made.

B. The 1945 Constitution, Freedom of Religion and “Illiberal Democracy”

in Indonesia

No discussion of freedom of religion in Indonesia would be complete without

close scrutiny of Soeharto’s New Order regime: it was this regime which
brought into being many of the regulations regarding religious practice in
Indonesia.
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

Human rights enforcement under the New Order regime was in a

dismal state. According to Tim Lindsey, this is because the state “relied on a
constant and official state of precariousness to justify acting in an essentially
extra-legal way”. This insecurity-based model rejected the notion of human
rights and the rule of law, and considered such notions as Western ideas which
are incompatible with Asian values. Furthermore, human rights were viewed
cynically as the West’s convenient justification for intervention in the
domestic affairs of Asian countries.
Interestingly, Lindsey found Soeharto’s position very similar to
Soekarno’s pseudo-Marxist policy during the Old Order. In 1957, Soekarno
declared that the country was in a state of war. He followed this by unilaterally
repealing the provisional parliamentary 1950 Constitution in favour of the
authoritarian 1945 Constitution. In a move typical of authoritarian and
repressive governments, Soekarno suspended the Legislature and then ruled
Indonesia by decree. At the same time he systematically degraded and
disempowered the Judiciary.
The oppressive and authoritarian nature of the government in Indonesia
finds its roots in the 1945 Constitution, which was originally intended as a
temporary Constitution. As a matter of fact, the 1945 Constitution was hastily
formulated within 20 working days. This was done to fulfil the need of the
emerging Indonesian state to prevent the return of Dutch colonialism to
Indonesia at the close of World War II.
One main feature of the 1945 Constitution, prior to the Fifth
Amendment 1999-2002, was that it maintained integralism. This led to a
Constitution vesting the government with absolute discretion and a citizenry
unable to check the state because the state “is all citizens and their interest[s]
are therefore identical”. Citizens are “an organic part of the state”and,
therefore, have to obey the state because of its ultimate legitimacy.
The total discretion of the state made human rights enforcement
dependent on the whims of the state. Unsurprisingly, many critics of the
government were imprisoned or abducted during the New Order regime.
Meanwhile, violence perpetrated by the state and its apparatus was rarely
processed in the courts or, if it was processed, the outcome would be
determined in its favour. Thus, though both Soekarno’s and Soeharto’s
regimes claimed the legitimacy of popular election and the implementation of
some form of the rule of law (negara hukum or rechtsstaat), it appears that the
conception of the rule of law was a very “thin” procedural or formal one.
The situation above has been dubbed “illiberal democracy” by Fareed
Zakaria. He has also pointed out that it is often the popularly elected
government that routinely overlooks constitutional limits on its power and
dispossesses its citizens of their basic rights. Furthermore, he has argued that
popular election is not sufficient, contrary to what many believe, to constitute
democracy and that the true touchstone of democracy is the existence of the
rule of law, separation of powers, and the protection of basic freedoms such as
the freedom of speech.
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

Freedom of religion in the 1945 Constitution needs to be looked at

with reference to the history of the drafting of the Constitution. This is because
it contains elements which possibly discriminate against Indonesians on the
basis of religion. As mentioned above, Soekarno’s proposal failed to resolve
the dispute among the BPUPKI members with regard to Islam’s role in the
state: especially in relation to the demand of some Muslim leaders for Shariah
(Islamic law) enforcement by the state for Muslims. In addition to this, the
Muslim leaders in the committee thought that the First Principle of the
Pancasila – “belief in God” – was insufficient. They, therefore, requested
more attention from the state to provide a Constitution which would better
accommodate Muslim needs.
Soekarno, then, delegated the matter to a sub-committee of the
BPUPKI which produced a draft preamble of the Indonesian Constitution
called the Jakarta Charter (Piagam Jakarta) on 22 June 1945. In the Charter,
seven words (tujuh kata) were added to the formulation of the First Principle
of the Pancasila. This addition made reference to the enforcement of Islamic
law in Indonesia for Muslims so that the preamble of the Indonesian
Constitution read:

[t]he Constitution of the Indonesian state which is to exist in the form

of the Republic of Indonesia, and to be based upon the sovereignty of
the people, is founded on the following principles: Belief in God, with
the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law, the
principle of righteous and moral humanitarianism; the unity of
Indonesia, and democracy led by the mutual deliberations of a
representative body which will lead to social justice for the entire
people. [Italics mine.]

On 16 July 1945, the BPUPKI accepted the adoption of the Shariah – as

enshrined in the Jakarta Charter – into the Constitution. Thus, chapter XI
about religion in Article 29 stipulated that “[t]he State is founded on Belief in
God, with the obligation for adherents of Islam to practise Islamic law”, and
chapter III about executive power in Article 6 read “[t]he President of the
Republic of Indonesia must be a born Indonesian who is a Muslim”.
Unsurprisingly, these three proposals caused much unhappiness within the
non-Muslim factions of the committee. There were objections from Christians,
Hindus, and secular nationalists about the implications of state enforcement of
Muslim law on non-Muslim communities
As a result, to safeguard the unity of the newly formed state, Soekarno
and Mohammad Hatta, the newly elected president and vice-president, had to
make another compromise on 17 August 1945, the day after Indonesia’s
declaration of independence. They dropped the Jakarta Charter from the
preamble of the Constitution and all references to Islam in the Constitution
were removed in spite of the insistence of some Muslim leaders that the state
should show support for the application of Islamic law in Indonesia. However,
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

to lessen the disappointment of some Muslim groups, Soekarno changed the

First Principle of the Pancasila to “belief in a singular God” which is closer to
the central tenet of Tauhid – “the affirmation of God’s indivisible oneness” –
in Islam.
It is also important to note the role of Mohammad Hatta, a devout
Muslim, in removing the three proposals from the Constitution and the fact
that not all Muslim leaders in the BPUPKI agreed with the addition of the
“seven words” because it could be interpreted as giving the state the authority
to force Muslims to carry out their religious obligations, such as worship. This
shows that views on the position of Islam were not monolithic even in the
early debate on the relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia. One
should constantly keep this fact in mind; especially with regard to an analysis
of the situation of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia.
Unfortunately, the compromise did not sufficiently alleviate the
growing disillusionment of certain factions with the newly established nation
under Soekarno’s rule. This manifested itself in the proclamation of the
secessionist Republic of South Maluku by the Christian Dr Soumokil – the
Minister of Justice in the East Indonesian Government – on 25 April 1950.
This was considered as treason perpetrated by Christians against the
Indonesian Republic. Some Muslim factions then followed suit by proclaiming
dar al-Islam (domain of Islam) in three provinces: West Java on 7 August
1949; South Sulawesi in 1952; and Aceh in September 1953.
This unstable political situation was exacerbated by the uncertainties
surrounding the Indonesian Constitution during the reign of Soekarno. As
mentioned above, the 1945 Constitution had been amended four times, i.e.
1945, 1949, 1950, 1956-1959, during the Old Order regime. In the last
amendment, Soekarno unilaterally repealed the provisional parliamentary
Constitution of 1950 in 1959, in favour of reverting to the authoritarian 1945
Constitution. He then suspended the Legislature and ruled Indonesia by
issuing decrees as well as systematically degrading and disempowering the
Judiciary. All of this, Lindsey says, makes Soekarno the founder of
authoritarian and repressive government in Indonesia, a legacy which was then
adopted by Soeharto when he overthrew Soekarno in 1966.
Soeharto sought to clamp down on religious freedom in Indonesia by
means of the SARA policy: the government banned citizens from public
discussion of ethnicity, religion or inter-group relations, lest discussion on
these topics should lead to conflict and endanger the unity of Indonesia.
Learning from the situation during the Soekarno era, Soeharto cited the ethnic
Chinese, fundamentalist Islam, communism and the West as four major
problems within Indonesian society that had to be overcome. Soeharto’s
regime employed harsh regulations which violated human rights to control
these four issues, justifying these measures as necessary for the continued
development of Indonesia as well as for national unity.
For example, between 1966 and 1981, Soeharto’s regime proscribed
any activity affiliated to Islamic politics, and it was declared that raising the
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

issue of Islam and the state, or challenging the Pancasila was subversive. It
often used its military might to quash such activity. The policy ultimately gave
rise to the promulgation of Law No 8/1985 which required all social and
political organisations, including religious organisations, in Indonesia to
recognise the Pancasila as their sole foundation (asas tunggal) if they did not
wish to be banned.
This regulation triggered strong objections from religious
organisations, especially from Islamic organisations in Indonesia. Muslims
resented having to accept the Pancasila as the sole foundation of their
organisations. They perceived the new law to be another strategy by which the
regime would control and eradicate right-wing organisations. Some activist
Muslim organisations even felt that this was a direct assault on Islam because
their position was that Islam should be the foundation of every Muslim
activity, and that no man-made ideology should be superior to Islam.
Soeharto also sought to “assimilate” the ethnic Chinese by enacting
laws which compelled Indonesian-born Chinese to completely give up their
ethnic identities, including their New Year (Imlek) celebration. Furthermore,
the New Order regime issued a regulation which banned Confucianism in
Indonesia. Previously, Confucianism had been recognised as a religion in
Indonesia through Law No 1/PNPS/1965.
The Baha’i faith was also outlawed under Soeharto’s regime.
Originally, the Baha’i community in Indonesia came from Iran. In 1962, the
regime only prohibited Baha’i organisations, but in 1972, the religion itself
has been banned. Those who practised it were arrested and imprisoned, a
notable example being the persecution of Baha’i followers in Southern
Sumatra. The Baha’i faith could not be reflected in identity cards.
The New Order Regime, as can be seen from the above, defined what
“religions” were in Indonesia through an official endorsement of agama
(religion). During this period, the Ministry of Religion had only four
Directors-General one for each of the officially sanctioned religion: Islam,
Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism and Buddhism. It is not clear, however,
why only these five religions were acknowledged by the state. These religions
are not the only ones practised by Indonesians – Judaism, Sikhism, Baha’i, as
well as indigenous religious beliefs are known to have adherents in Indonesia.
The New Order discriminated against them. Rita Smith Kipp and Susan
Rodger have pointed out that:

[a]lthough the people who do not “yet” have agama [official religions
endorsed by the state] do not face coercive pressure to convert, the
government’s messages about religion surely do encourage conversion
… the official endorsements of agama make those persons without
agama appear to be disloyal national citizens, uncommitted to the
values of the Pancasila, not to mention intellectually and morally
backward … [o]fficial identity cards usually specify religion.
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

The demise of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 brought about many

changes to the Constitution and democracy in Indonesia. Denny Indrayana
points out that in spite of the flawed process, amendments effected during the
1999-2002 Constitutional Reform have produced a more democratic
Constitution. This was achieved through the clearer separation of powers and
the introduction of human rights’ provisions. Freedom of religion is now not
only enshrined in Article 29(1)(2) of chapter XI regarding religion but also in
Article 28E(1)(2)(3) of chapter XA regarding human rights.
Likewise, Hikmahanto Juwana maintains that there has been a
fundamental shift from authoritarian to democratic government after Soeharto.
This is marked, inter alia, by the commitment of the governments-of-the-day
to human rights; demonstrated by their ratifying international human rights
instruments, promulgating laws which promote human rights and repealing
existing regulations which are inconsistent with these rights. However, this
does not automatically improve the practice of human rights. There is still a
need for consistent enforcement of those laws. There is also the important role
that the Indonesian community at large must play in establishing freedom of
religion. This is especially true with regard to the so-called “deviant” sects in
Indonesia.
Following the demise of Soeharto’s regime on 21 May 1998, Indonesia
faced socio-economic as well as political uncertainty as a result of the 1997
monetary crisis which caused the collapse of the Indonesian economy. This
triggered riots in a number of big cities, causing bloodshed and widespread
destruction in, for example, Jakarta, Medan and Solo.
With regard to religious life, the uncertain socio-economic and
political situation has also had an impact on the mood for religious tolerance in
Indonesia. Conflicts with an inter-religious flavour, involving arson against
places of worship, have arisen in places like Maluku and Poso in east
Indonesia. The focus of this discussion is, however, on internal conflict within
the various official religions, between the “orthodox” and “deviant” factions of
the same religion.

III. THE BAN ON THE AHMADIYAH CONGREGATION: A TEST CASE OF

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN INDONESIA

A. Beyond Orthodoxy and the Notion of “Official Religions” within the

Pancasila State

The term “agama” (religion) has had a narrower meaning in government

policy than in the everyday usage. The term agama in Indonesia encompasses
the theistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, and other missionary
faiths such as Hinduism and Buddhism. Disputes arise when a particular
religious practice, cult or belief not within these established faiths is in
question. In this regard, the Government has the right to decide whether it is
an agama in Indonesia.
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

As mentioned above, the state introduced the concept of official

religions in Indonesia and outlawed other beliefs. Baha’i is an example of a
belief which was once prohibited by the state. Another example is
Confucianism. The adherents to Confucianism in Indonesia, mainly ethnic
Chinese, faced difficulties practising their belief because it was excluded from
the agama.
Fortunately, this ended after the fourth President, Abdurrahman Wahid,
lifted the ban imposed on Confucianism. This restoration marks a new phase
of freedom of religion in Indonesia. The adherents of Confucianism can now
openly worship and celebrate their New Year festival (Imlek) without specific
permit from the government.
There are also situations where the Government has not recognised a
certain belief as a distinct religion. An example is Kaharingan, an indigenous
belief system of the Dayak people in Southern Borneo. Initially, the
government classified Kaharingan as a mystical movement; its practice was
thus supervised, as with other mystical movements, by the Ministry of
Education. However, the followers of Kaharingan objected to the
classification imposed by the government and requested that the government
acknowledge Kaharingan as an official religion.
The government could not very well ban Kaharingan because it has,
for countless generations, been deeply entrenched in Dayak lifestyle and
culture. The Government decided to officially acknowledge Kaharingan as a
branch of Hinduism (known as Hindu Kaharingan) although the two belief
systems have little in common with each other.
Mystical movements, such as aliran kepercayaan which consists of the
religious practices of the indigenous Javanese, have received inconsistent
treatment from the government due to political pressure exerted, mostly, by
the Muslim orthodoxy. The hostility of the Muslim orthodoxy is due to the
fact that aliran kepercayaan is practised by some Muslims but many of the
practices are not considered to be consistent with the Shariah.
The practice of aliran kepercayaan by some Muslims might be
explained by the tolerance of Islam toward existing ritual practices in the
community. Islam was first introduced to the archipelago through foreign
traders who came to the port-cities. In the port-cities, the foreign traders
encountered communities practising Buddhism, Hinduism and ancestral
worship. Islam was easily accepted by the community since it endorsed
equality among human beings, inasmuch as a caste system was alien to Islamic
values.
Islamic doctrines were taught gradually to these communities so that
the communities would not feel that their customs and traditions were being
threatened. The Shariah did not wholly supplant existing tradition or
customary law (adat), and both norms coexisted – to different extents in each
part of the archipelago – peacefully in the community. In fact, there are some
orthodox Islamic clerics in Java who not only tolerated the non-Islamic
elements but also practised them. In Lombok, in the West Nusatenggara
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

province, there is an Islamic community called Islam watu telu which only
prays (salat) three times a day. This is inconsistent with the obligation within
orthodox Islam that adherents pray five times daily. Nonetheless, Islam watu
telu continues to practise this custom which has existed prior to the arrival of
Islam.
Initially, there was an effort from the government in 1973 to give
aliran kepercayaan a status equal to that of other official religions. However,
some Muslims considered the practices of aliran kepercayaan inconsistent
with the Shariah and, believing it to be deviant, pressured the government to
deny it the status of a religion. As the demands from some orthodox Muslims
increased, the state, through TAP MPR No IV/MPR/1978 chapter IV Article
13 (1f), denied aliran kepercayaan the status of a religion.
As a result of this, like sports and cultural activities, aliran
kepercayaan is supervised under the auspices of the Department of Education.
This also means that its adherents cannot declare their belief on identity cards,
that marriages contracted in accordance with aliran kepercayaan are not
legally binding, and that they cannot conduct funeral services in accordance
with their belief.
It thus seems that religions outside the religious orthodoxy within the
Pancasila state are the subject of discrimination and persecution by the state.
According to data in ‘‘Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report”
compiled by Boyle and Sheen in 1997, the Indonesian government had
prohibited around 400 organisations. These include some religious groups
which have been banned on the ground that they have been led “off-track” and
misled, such as Islam Jamaah and Darul Arqam.
Recent developments in the context of religious liberty in Indonesia
show that pressures against the so-called “deviant” sects have intensified.
Unfortunately, these pressures also manifest themselves in the form of arson
attacks against places of worship carried out by supposed members of the
orthodoxy. The victims of these attacks include Pondok Nabi (the Prophet’s
Hut or the End of Days Sect), Lembaga Dakwah Islam Indonesia or LDII (the
Islamic Propagation Institution of Indonesia) and Jamaah Ahmadiyah
Indonesia (the Ahmadiyah Congregation of Indonesia).

B. The Ahmadiyah Congregation of Indonesia (JAI) and the Accusation

of Being a “Deviant Sect”

Ahmadiyah is a messianic sect of Islam. It is based on the teachings of Mirza

Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) who proclaimed himself the Messiah and Imam
Mahdi – someone whose calling is to purify, renew and revive Islam. They do
not believe in the second advent of Jesus, because Mirza Ghulam Ahmad had
supposedly verifiable evidence that Jesus did not ascend to heaven but,
instead, survived crucifixion and travelled to India to find the lost tribe of
Israel. His journey brought him to Kashmir where he settled and, then, died
naturally. His tomb is to be found in Srinager. Ahmadiyah thus offends both
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

the Islamic belief that Jesus ascended to heaven alive without being crucified,
and the Christian belief in the death, resurrection and second coming of Jesus
Christ.
However, it is the Ahmadiyan belief in the prophethood of Mirza
Ghulam Ahmad that more greatly offends orthodox Islam. In fact, this became
the subject of serious debate within Ahmadiyah itself. This led to a split in the
movement in 1914 into first, the Ahmadiyah of Lahore (now part of Pakistan)
which denied the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and only considered
him a mere reformer, and, second, the Ahmadiyah Qadiani in Rabwah (now
also part of Pakistan), which maintains that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a
prophet, but not a new-law bearing prophet.
Ahmadiyah Qadiani proselytes have met with success in some parts of
the world, for example in West Africa. It has been estimated that in the 1990s
Ahmadiyah had over 10 million adherents from Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
Central and West Africa and in the Americas. At present, this group claims
that it has a total membership of tens of millions worldwide.
Ahmadiyah came to Indonesia around 1925. There are two groups of
Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. First, Ahmadiyah Qadian, which is most active in
Parung, Bogor (West Java Province). Second, Ahmadiyah Lahore, which has
its central office in Yogyakarta. Ahmadiyah Lahore focusses its activities on
Islamic education and publication, while Ahmadiyah Qadian aggressively
propagates its doctrines and engages in missionary activities. The subject of
this paper is Ahmadiyah Qadian, which is known as the Congregation of
Ahmadiyah Indonesia (Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, or JAI), since it is this
group which faces greater challenges in Indonesia
The existence of Ahmadiyah Qadian within Indonesia is lawful
according to existing regulations. Ahmadiyah acquired legal status as a social
organisation in 1953. Prior to the promulgation of Law No 8/1985 concerning
Social Organisations, the acquisition of legal status as an organisation was
based on what the founders agreed to be its purpose. This purpose had to be
authenticated by a notary public, which then had to be registered in the District
Court. The registration was then announced in the State Gazette by the
Ministry of Justice. In 2003, Ahmadiyah Qadian acquired the status of a social
organisation from the Directorate for Relations with Political Institutions
(Direktorat Hubungan Kelembagaan Politik), of the Ministry of Home Affairs,
by an issuance of letter No 75//DI/VI/2003. This status further strengthens its
existence as a legal organisation in Indonesia.
Its legality, however, does nothing to reduce the hostility some
Muslims feel towards it because of its deviation from the orthodox Muslim
belief in the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood.
This conviction is enshrined in two primary sources of Islamic
doctrine. The Koran states that “Muhammad is not the father of any of your
men, but (he is) the Messenger of Allah, and the Seal of the Prophet; and Allah
has full knowledge of all things”. Thus, the Prophet Muhammad functioned as
the clarifier and exemplar of the Koran. The Prophet explained the Koran
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

through his actions as well as his words. These practices are known as the
Prophet’s traditions (Sunnah), and the articulation of his Sunnah is called
Hadith. In Islamic discourse, the Sunnah is considered the leading legal and
religious authority after the Koran.
With respect to the finality of Mohammad’s prophethood, in the
following Hadith Muhammad is recorded as saying:

My similitude in comparison with the other prophets is that of a man

who has built a house nicely and beautifully except for the place of one
brick in the corner. The People go about it and wonder at its beauty but
say: “Would that this brick be put in its place!” So I am that brick, and
I am the last of the prophets … The Israelites used to be ruled and
guided by prophets: whenever a prophet died, another would take his
place. There will no prophet after me but there will be Caliphs who
will increase in number.

As such, to the Muslim orthodoxy, anyone claiming to be Muslim but

disputing the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood cannot truly be a Muslim.
Matters are only made worse by Ahmadiyah Qadiani’s rejection of the idea of
military jihad. This rejection has led to accusations that the group is in league
with anti-Islamic forces or that it was, indeed, created by anti-Islamic forces
such as those of British imperialism or Zionism which is believed to desire the
ruin of Islam from within. Therefore, the World Muslim League, in its 1974
conference, recommended that all Muslim organisations and countries take
measures with regard to Ahmadiyah Qadiani and that:

All the Muslim organisations in the world must keep a vigilant eye on
all the activities of Qadianis [Ahmadiyah Qadian] in their respective
countries; to confine them all strictly to their schools, institutions and
orphanages only. Moreover he (sic the) Muslims of the world must be
shown the true picture of Qadianism and be briefed on their various
tactics so that the Muslims of the world can be safe from their designs.
All the Muslim countries must impose restrictions on the activities of
the claimant of Prophethood Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Qadiani’s
followers; must declare them a non-Muslim minority and must not
trust them with any post of responsibility in any Muslim country.

This fatwa has been followed by some Muslim countries as well as the
Councils of Ulama (Islamic religious scholars) around the world. The Council
of Indonesian Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia or MUI) issued a fatwa
concerning Ahmadiyah Qadian of Indonesia in 1980. The MUI maintains that
it has the authority to issue the fatwa and to advise the government, and the
Indonesian Islamic community, on matters of religion and social concern. The
fatwa excommunicated Ahmadiyah Qadian for the reasons stated above. The
fatwa reads:
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

In accordance with data and the fatwa found in 9 books about

Ahmadiyah [Qadian], the Council of Indonesian Ulama has decided
that Ahmadiyah [Qadian] is henceforth excommunicated from the
Islamic Congregation; it is deviant and misled. The Council of
Indonesian Ulama is expected to be in constant contact with the
government regarding the Ahmadiyah controversy.

The fatwa found support in a circular from the Ministry of Religion in 1984
requesting that the Ministry of Justice reconsider the legal status of JAI in
Indonesia. The reason given for this request was that JAI’s existence had
triggered unrest among the Islamic community and therefore “endangered the
order and safety of the state”.
In spite of this, JAI has not ceased its activities within Indonesia. As a
religious group which has been established for years and has legal status in
Indonesia, JAI has been steadfast in holding to its convictions in the face of
opposition from orthodox Islam in Indonesia. In fact, JAI has further
strengthened its existence by acquiring legal status as a social organisation
from the Directorate for Relations with Political Institutions as stated above.
The government’s response to this simmering tension between
“deviant” sects and religious orthodoxy has been inconsistent and confused.
While the central government has legalised JAI through the Ministry of Home
Affairs, several local governments, such as those in North and West Sumatra
as well as in Kuningan District of Java, have banned it. Furthermore, the
government has, without clear basis for distinction, banned other “deviant”
sects such as the Islam Jamaah and the Darul Arqam.
Unfortunately, the latent tension erupted in the violence against JAI
members in 2000 and has not been resolved satisfactorily to date.

C. The Ban of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia: State Regulations and Demands

from Orthodox Islam

Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International

Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantee the individual’s right to
embrace and practise the religion or belief of his or her choice. These
international treaties do not recognise the distinction between official and un-
official religions or traditional and non-traditional religions. They cover
theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs; even the right not to profess any
belief at all is protected.
Nonetheless, the right to practise one’s religion may be subjected to
limitations “as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedom of others”.
Thus, practices such as human sacrifice or self-immolation conducted as a part
of rituals or activities in the name of religion likely to endanger the peace and
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

security of a state or international communities may be rightfully prohibited in

accordance with the ICCPR and the UDHR.
The provisions regarding freedom of religion within the 1945
Constitution, however, do not set out any such limits. Nonetheless, the
government can prosecute the leaders of “deviant” sects under the criminal
law and, then, ban their organisations in Indonesia. In fact, Article 156a of the
Indonesian Criminal Code (Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Pidana, or KUHP)
states that anyone who behaves in a manner intended to incite hostility or
blaspheme against, or misuse, religions practised in Indonesia can be jailed for
up to five years. The same punishment applies to those who deter people from
embracing religions based on the First Principle of Pancasila.
Article 156 of the Indonesian Criminal Code finds its roots in Law No
1/PNPS/1965. Article 1 of Law No 1/PNPS/1965 prohibits the intentional
proselytising of beliefs which might resemble any one of the official religions
if the doctrines propounded and practised are inconsistent with the
fundamental doctrines of the respective religions. Article 4 of the same law
then incorporates this into the Indonesian Criminal Code. Thus, from this point
of view, “deviant” sects are possibly illegal in Indonesia.
As a matter of fact, the Public Prosecution Service of Indonesia is also
entrusted with the duty of keeping in check sects and mystical beliefs that
might endanger society and state. The two charges used by the Public
Prosecutor to carry out its duties are the offences of misuse of religion
(penyelewengan agama) and anti-religion (anti agama) pursuant to the letter
of the Attorney General’s Office No B-1177/D1/10/1982 dated 30 October
1982 Concerning Religious Offences in Law No 1/PNPS/1965. In general,
allegedly “deviant” sects are charged with the offence of misuse of religion.
To monitor the existence of “deviant” sects, the Attorney General of
Indonesia has ordered the formation of teams to monitor sects and mystical
beliefs (Tim Koordinasi Pengawasan Aliran Kepercayaan Masyarakat, or
PAKEM) in every province and municipality/district through its decision No
KEP-108/JA/5/1984. PAKEM members include the heads of local
government, district attorneys, chiefs of the constabulary and the military,
representatives of religious organisations such as the Council of Indonesian
Ulama or the Council of Indonesian churches, as well as officers of the
Ministry of Religion overseeing affairs at the provincial or district level.
The PAKEM of the province of West Sumatra has dissolved 25
“deviant” sects including JAI. The Council of District Officials (musyawarah
pimpinan daerah, or MUSPIDA) of the Kuningan district in the province of
West Java also issued a joint-decision on 3 November 2002 banning and
ordering the PAKEM of the district to enforce the decree. In the province of
North Sumatra, JAI was banned by order of the Chief of the High Public
Prosecution Office on 12 February 1994.
If the principle of decentralisation is taken into account, although the
power to dissolve or ban “deviant” sects should be exercised primarily by the
central government, that function can be delegated to the local government on
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

the ground that such delegation is necessary to maintain public order and
tranquillity. The language used by PAKEM or the Public Prosecution Office in
their decisions always alleges that the existence of JAI in their areas has
created unrest among Muslims. This, it is asserted, endangers the society and
the state. Thus, JAI has to be banned in order to preserve public order and
tranquillity.
Are these allegations true? Two possibilities come to mind. First, since
JAI actively engages in propagating its teachings and proselytising, such
activities are considered a threat to orthodox Islam in Indonesia. This is
because orthodox Islam, as we have seen, considers JAI apostates (riddah) as
well as blasphemers against the Prophet (sabb ar-rasul). Apostasy is one of
the major sins of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh); thus, by converting Muslims to
Ahmadiyah Qadian, JAI causes Muslims to commit a major sin and lose the
salvation of Islam, from the viewpoint of orthodox Islam.
On the other hand, JAI and its activities might be thought not to
endanger the society and the state sufficiently to justify proscription. JAI tends
to be a reclusive religious group; it builds its own places of worship and
performs its rituals and activities within its own milieu.
Nonetheless, hard-line orthodox Islamic groups have flourished rapidly
after the demise of Soeharto’s New Order regime in 1998. Having been
marginalised and oppressed during Soeharto’s reign, some Indonesian
Muslims have established groups to fight against the ethical degradation of
socio-religious and political life during the transitional period after Soeharto.
In their view, such a situation did not accord with Islamic values; their
solution for these societal ills is Shariah implementation in Indonesia.
To those who maintain a hard line ideology, Islam is the only way to
achieve salvation; thus, they will not tolerate any effort to convert Muslims to
other religions. With regard to their demand for the implementation of the
Shariah, they tend to apply Islamic religious texts (the Koran and the Hadith)
literally and are more oriented to classical Islamic jurisprudence. Islamic
religious texts instruct Muslims to “enjoin good and prevent evil”. It is their
belief that JAI engage in apostasy and blasphemy, evils which must be
prevented and fought against.
This stand finds support in the fatwa issued by the MUI
excommunicating JAI. The MUI is considered an authoritative religious body
in giving advice concerning religious and social matters to the government and
Islamic community in Indonesia. Furthermore, the term “religion” as presently
understood by the Ministry of Religious Affairs only refers to the six state-
endorsed religions. The Ministry has thus, directly or indirectly, adopted a
policy favouring orthodox Islam and discriminating against JAI as JAI is, it
appears, not considered by the Government to be legitimately part of Islam.
Recently, the Minister has suggested that JAI establishes a new religion in
order to prevent conflict with some orthodox Muslim groups.
In spite of this, the state has not clearly taken a position with regard to
whether JAI is a “deviant sect” or whether it should be banned in Indonesia.
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

The state, through the Attorney General, issued a circular in 1985

recommending that district attorneys ban JAI if “the existence of JAI in their
regions is expected to disturb the stability of public order and security”. This
action, however, did not satisfy the hardliner groups that emerged post-
Soeharto and this has resulted in the targeting of JAI properties mentioned
above.
This situation might suggest that the state has failed to protect the
religious liberty of all its citizens and exemplifies the “powerlessness” or
unwillingness of the state in protecting minorities from violence perpetrated
by some majority groups. Zakaria identifies the recent development of “the
democratisation of violence” which has become a frightening characteristic of
some countries in the world today. This is because the use of force against
human beings is not solely monopolised by the state anymore; small groups of
people attempt to further their ideologies by means of intimidations, threats or
violence and the state sometimes can or will do nothing to control them.
In the case of destruction of JAI’s properties, for example, the police
were often unable or unwilling to stop the vandals from their actions. The state
has also failed to prosecute any of the perpetrators although vandalism of
property is clearly a crime under Article 170 of the Indonesian Criminal Code.
It thus appears that the state has only halfheartedly carried out the
mandate of freedom of religion enshrined in the 1945 Constitution when it
comes to the rights of sects. The 1945 Indonesian Constitution, in fact, does
not exclude any religious denomination from the guarantee of religious liberty.
However, regulations concerning religion in Indonesia enable the state to
prosecute and ban “deviant” sects.
A recent example can be found in the case involving the Kingdom of
Eden, a religious sect created through mixing the doctrines of several official
religions within Indonesia. Its leader, Lia Aminuddin, was charged for
blasphemy under Article 156a of the Indonesian Criminal Code and was found
guilty by the court because she had blasphemed against Islam by allowing the
consumption of pork, performing prayers in two languages instead of only in
Arabic, and engaging in her own interpretation of the Koran.
There is thus a conflict between the mandate of the 1945 Constitution,
on the one hand, and the provisions of Law No 39/1999 regarding freedom of
religion as well as the provisions of the Indonesian Criminal Code regarding
blasphemy, on the other. With the establishment of Constitutional Courts by
the second amendment to the 1945 Constitution which was made within the
period 1999-2002, this conflict can be solved in this Court on judicial review
of Law No 1/PNPS/1965 as supplemented by Article 156a of the Indonesian
Criminal Code regarding blasphemy.
The application for judicial review should be made to restore the
constitutional rights of JAI and other “deviant” sects. If the Constitutional
Court upholds the application, the provisions mentioned in the previous
paragraph and all regulations relying on it (such as the Decision of Indonesian
Attorney General No KEP-108/JA/5/1984 concerning the formation of
 [AUTHOR EDIT VERSION] November 14, 2007

PAKEM) will be annulled. The rights of the so-called “deviant” sects now
depend on the independence and wisdom of the Constitutional Court. At this
stage, it is important to note the role of civil organisations which actively
advocate the rights of “deviant” sects to profess and practise their beliefs.
Their voices will serve as a check against those who would advocate religious
intolerance and provide valuable feedback and alternative advice to the
Indonesian government in the making of decisions affecting religious freedom
in Indonesia.

IV. CONCLUSION

An examination of JAI’s plight (as well as that of other “deviant” sects) shows
that the right of freedom of religion in Indonesia, as presently understood in
official circles, does not protect them. The State still employs regulations
which effectively discriminate against “deviant” sects. The Government’s
basis for banning a particular sect is the rather unsatisfactory one of the need
to preserve public order and tranquillity and the need to prevent civil unrest
endangering society. We have seen that this is usually interpreted from the
viewpoint of religious orthodoxy. Religious freedom for “deviant” sects
remains illusory.
The regulations which unduly restrict religious freedom on Indonesia
were inherited from prior authoritarian Indonesian regimes (the Old Order and
New Order regimes) which were generally hegemonic in nature. They are
incompatible with the official post-Soeharto concern with human rights’
protection in Indonesia. Thus, the future of the so-called “deviant” sects, does
not merely relate to the specific freedom of religion guaranteed by the
Constitution, but to the general shift from authoritarian to democratic
government.