CHAPTER 10: AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICATION AND REPEAL

CASE NO.1 | DAVID v. DANCEL

FACTS: The ranking of the Real Estate Division of the City Treasurer‟s Office in Manila are as
follows:
1. Marcelino Cueto - Chief of the Division
2. Manuel Lapid - Assistant Chief of the Division
3. Juan de Vera - Chief, Tax Registration Section
4. Justino L. David - Chief Tax-Sold Property Section (also Petitioner)
5. Angel Dancel - Senior Clerk (also Respondent)

Following the death of Marcelino Cueto in August 1961, Lapid was promoted as the Chief, while
de Vera was also promoted to take the place of Lapid, thereby leaving the position of Chief, Tax
Registration Section vacant. On August 5, 1961, the Office of the City Treasurer recommended
to then Mayor Arsenio Lacson the appointment of Angel Dancel, „the provisions of Paragraph 3,
Sec. 23 of RA 2260 have been observed in the consideration of this appointment‟. The
appointment was effected and then sent to the Civil Service Commission. Justino David
contents that he should have been the one promoted as he was next in rank. RTC ruled that the
disputed position could be filled only by a first grade civil service eligible, pursuant to Sec 9 of
the Civil Service Act (RA 2260). The Court further states that David must not only show that
respondent Dancel is not entitled to the position but that he must also establish that he has his
right to the position. David then contends that he is entitled to the position and he is a first grade
Civil Service eligible under RA 1080, as amended by purposes of a vacant position. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: Does the amendment of RA 1844 make Justino David a first grade civil service eligible?
No.

RULING: According to Sec 1 of RA 1080, as amended by RA 1844, petitioner, a member of the

Philippine Bar, is considered a first grade eligible only with respect to: "the duties of which
involve knowledge of the respective professions." As far as the other positions (which include
the vacant position) are concerned, he can only be considered a second grade civil service
eligible. The position of Chief, Tax Registration Section does not require professional knowledge
of the law, and thus he cannot be considered a first grade Civil Service eligible.

The Court upheld its appointment of Angel Dancel because has an efficiency rating of 90% as
compared to Justino David‟s efficiency rating 84%. Under E.O. 503, the minimum requirement
for promotion is 85%. It should be enough to say that the efficiency rating of an employee at the
time promotion is made and not his subsequent rating (which may be higher) is the one that
determines his competence. It should also be noted that David has not shown that he himself
has a right to the position. Thus, his petition is dismissed.

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CASE NO.2 | ESTRADA v. CASEDA

FACTS: On September 5, 1945, the plaintiff filed a suit for unlawful detainer against the
respondent. He wishes to order the respondent to vacate the property he owns which the latter
is leasing for P26 because his newly wedded daughter will be occupying it. The MTC granted
his petition hence, the respondent filed an appeal in the CFI. The CFI reversed the decision of
the MTC invoking Commonwealth Act No. 689 which provides three grounds for rejecting a
lessee from a building destined solely for dwelling namely (1) for willful and deliberate non-
payment of rents, (2) when the lessor has to occupy the building leased, and (3) when the
lessee shall have subleased the building or any part thereof as a dwelling or for dwelling
purpose without the written consent of the proprietor. CFI ruled that the reason stated by the
plaintiff does not fall on any of the aforementioned provisions hence, he may not force the
defendant to vacate the property. Hence, this petition by the plaintiff arguing that the governing
law has already lapsed its effectivity period thereby rendering it ineffective.

ISSUE: Should the amendatory law extending the duration of its provisions take effect on the
date of enactment of the original law? Yes.

RULING: An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been
repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead;
or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the adoption of the
amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its amended form. The amendment
becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been contained therein, unless such
amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations between the state and others.
Where an amendment leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are
continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they had before the amendment. So
where an amendatory act provides that are existing statute shall be amended to read as recited
in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or
substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment.

Applying it in this case, the 4 year amended duration should start from the promulgation of
the law. The CFI rendered the correct decision appreciating the effects of the law however,
since the 4 year duration has already expired in October 15, 1949, the plaintiff now has the
authority to eject the defendant from the house described in the complaint. (This decision was
rendered on October 25, 1949).

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CASE NO.3 | PEOPLE v. GARCIA

FACTS: Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by
reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or
care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being convicted and
sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that the
amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age,
"the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period." The appellant, being 17 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, was
entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The lower court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate
penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prisión correccional to 8 years of prisión mayor
for the crime of robbery of which he was found guilty.

ISSUE: Does the amendment by implication amend paragraph 2 of Article 68, which provides
that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years of age, "the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period”? No.

RULING: We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it now stands
and article 80 as amended. One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of
implied repeal or amendment is that penal law is to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly
against the state. Criminal and penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be
enlarged or extended by intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. Only those
persons, offenses, and penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be
considered within the statute's operation.

An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute has been repealed,
and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; or, as
frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the adoption of the
amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its amended form. The amendment
becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been contained therein, unless such
amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations between the state and others.
Where an amendment leaves certain portions of the original act unchanged, such portions are
continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they had before the amendment. So
where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be amended to read as recited
in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law as are retained, either literally or
substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new enactment.

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CASE NO.4 | PEOPLE v. OLARTE

FACTS: On the 24th day of February, 1954 and subsequently thereafter said defendant had
written certain letters which were libelous, contemptuous and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M.
Meris, with evident and malicious purpose of insulting, dishonoring, humiliating and bringing into
contempt the good name and reputation' of said complainant. On February 22, 1956, she filed
with the Justice of the Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, a complaint for libel against
Ascencion P. Olarte that the defendant waived her right to a preliminary investigation. The
Justice of the peace court forwarded the case to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the
defendant moved to quash the information upon the ground of prescription of the offense; and
that, after due hearing, the court of first instance granted said motion and dismissed the case,
with costs de oficio.

ISSUE: Will the decision in the subsequent case of People v. Coquia warrant the dismissal of
the information in the case at bar on the ground of prescription? No.

RULING: In the first appeal of People v. Olarte, constitutes the law of the case and even if it is
erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it became final. A subsequent
reinterpretation of the law may be applied to new cases but not to a case that has been finally
determined. As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is held to be the
law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party being to seek a
rehearing Subsequent changes in the doctrine of the Supreme Court cannot retroactively be
applied to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior decision was done
whether the case is civil or criminal in nature.

It is clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of this Court cannot retroactively be applied
to nullify a prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior adjudication was had,
whether the case should be civil or criminal in nature As such, the court holds that the filing of
the complaint in the Municipal Court or Justice of Peace Court should, and does interrupt the
period of prescription even though the complaint or information cannot be tried on its merits.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, stated that in declaring the period of prescription "shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the
complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on
the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Lastly, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.

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CASE NO.5 | GARCIA VALDEZ v. SOTENARANA TUASON

FACTS: A petition for divorce was filed by Vicente Garcia Valdez in 9 8 against his wife,
Maria Sotera a Tuason. Upon hearing the case, the trial judge found that the charge of adultery
was not sustained by the evidence; so he refused to grant relief. The judge invoked Act No.
2710 as basis for this decision. On March 11, 1917, Act No. 2710 became effective in the
Philippine Islands. This enactment introduced the radical innovation of dissolving the bonds of
matrimony. Another feature of the same Act (issue at hand) is a provision to the effect that a
petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery or concubinage and cannot be granted except
upon conviction of the guilty part in a criminal prosecution (secs. 1, and 8). The petition did not
allege that Maria had been convicted of the offense of adultery in a criminal prosecution as
required in section 8 of Act No. 2710.

ISSUE: Did Act No. 2710 repeal the previous law on divorce? Yes.

RULING: The Act has repealed the former divorce law by necessary implication. Although it is a
well-known rule of law that repeals by implication are not usually favored. Nevertheless, when
there is a plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy between two laws the later
expression of the Legislative will must be given effect. Comparing with the provisions of Act No.
2710, it is quite manifest that the previous law of divorce consists of judicial separation without
the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony, which was formerly granted for the adultery of either
of the spouses, has been abrogated by the Act and in its place has been substituted the
absolute divorce ex vinculis matrimonii, obtainable only under the conditions stated in said Act.

The most powerful implication of repeal noted by legal commentators is that which arise
when the later of two laws is expressed in the form of a universal negative. The repugnance of
two statutes is more readily seen when the later Act is in the form of a negative proposition than
when both laws are stated in the affirmative. Upon scanning the provisions of the Act, the Court
at once discover that every section defining the conditions under which a divorce may be
granted is expressed either in the form of a negative proposition or if in the form of an
affirmative, qualified by the word "only" which still has all the force of an exclusionary negation.
The trial court did not err because Maria was not charged of adultery in a criminal case. The
divorce sought in this proceeding cannot be granted because Act No. 2710 is applicable to the
case. Sec. 8 of the said Act requires such to assail divorce petitions. No court would in the
present state of the law to permit a decree of divorce to be entered contrary to the precepts of
section 8 of the Act cited.

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CASE NO.6 | MANILA ELECTRIC, ETC. CO. v. BD OF PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSIONERS

FACTS: The city of Manila, by virtue of its Ordinance No. 44, granted to Charles M. Swift a
franchise for the construction and maintenance of a street railway system for carrying
passengers for hire in the city of Manila. The franchise, says: "Members of the police and fire
departments of the city of Manila wearing official badges shall be entitled to ride free upon the
cars of the grantee, subject to such reasonable and proper restrictions as may be imposed." In
1905, the company promulgated a rule that, in order that members of the police and fire
departments of the city wearing official badges be permitted to enjoy free transportation on
petitioner's cars, they must be wearing their badges visibly.

For 9 years, this rule was the one in force. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners‟ order
resulted to policemen, whether uniformed or not, but wearing their badges exposed, were
transported without charge, while those who carried their badges in their pockets or concealed
them about their persons paid fares.. In 1914, the chief of the secret service bureau sought to
obtain a reversal of this long-established practice and accordingly made a petition to the Board
alleging that the street-car company, in requiring the badges to be worn visibly, was imposing
an unreasonable restriction on the transportation of the members of the police department.
Following a hearing on this petition, the Board made the order objected to, which is as follows:
"The petitioner is, therefore, ordered to furnish free transportation to the members of the police
department of the city of Manila, belonging to the secret service bureau thereof, wearing their
official badges, whether openly or concealed about their clothing in such a way that said
badges may be displayed to conductors or inspectors on the company's cars when required to
do so for purposes of identification.

ISSUE: Should the construction given by the company to the wording of the clause of the
franchise referred to be followed? Yes.

RULING: The history of the enactment of ordinance 44 and the amendments which were
offered and made to the original draft demonstrates that it was not the intention of the
Legislature to require the company to carry free of charge all of the police force of the city of
Manila under all circumstances. Ordinance 44 is a copy of Act No. 484 of the Philippine
Commission. When the bill came to its final reading, the clause in question stood as follows;
"Members of the police and fire department of the city of Manila shall be entitled to ride free
upon the cars of the grantee, subject to such reasonable and proper restrictions as may
imposed." An amendment was then made, adding the words "wearing officials badges." The
intention of the legislature as evidence by the amendment, together with the practical
construction adopted by the parties and acted on for a long period of time is sufficient to accept
the construction thus practically given and to overrule that adopted by the Board.

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CASE NO.7 | BUYCO v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK

FACTS: On April 24, 1956, petitioner Marcelino Buyco was indebted to respondent in the
amount of P5,102.90 plus interest.The said loan was secured by a mortgage of real property.
Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955,
under Rep. Act No. 897 in the amount of P22,227.69 payable in thirty (30) years. On April 24,
1956, petitioner offered to pay respondent bank the deficit of his crop loan for the
abovementioned crop year 1952-53 with his said backpay acknowledgment certificate, but on
July 18, 1956, respondent answered petitioner that since respondent's motion for
reconsideration in the case of Marcelino B. Florentino v. Philippine National Bank, was still
under consideration by this Court (S.C.) respondent "cannot yet grant" petitioner's request.The
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, on July 24, 1958, granted the petition and ordered the
respondent bank "to give due course on the vested right of the petitioner acquired previous to
the enactment of Republic Act No. 1576 .
ISSUE: Can the petitioner bank accept the offer made by the respondent? Yes.

RULING: The respondent Philippine National Bank therein was declared authorized to accept
backpay acknowledgment certificate as payment of the obligation of any holder thereof.
Although the Florentino case was promulgated on April 28, 1956, four (4) days after April 24,
1956, the date the appellee offered to pay with his backpay acknowledgment certificate, it is
nevertheless obvious that on or before said April 24, 1956, the right to have his certificate
applied for the payment of his obligation with the appellant already existed by virtue of Republic
Act No. 897, which was merely construed and clarified by this Court in the said Florentino case.

This notwithstanding, whether implied or expressed the admission by the appellant of

appellee's right, has already lost momentum or importance because the law on the matter on
April 25, 1956, when the offer to pay the obligation with the certificate was made, or the law
before the amendatory Act of June 16, 1956, was that the PNB was compelled to receive
petitioner's backpay certificate.Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). It is a rule in Statutory construction that all statutes are to be
construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied
from the language used; and that every case of doubt must be resolved against retrospective
effect. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such
may be implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment,
therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the
time the offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the
original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such
amendment.

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CASE NO.8 | MONTILLA v. AUGUSTINIAN CORPORATION

FACTS: Motions or objections have been made in these causes which raise the question of the
necessity of the use of the English language in the courts of the Islands.The brief and the
judgment objected to are in the Spanish language and were filed in actions begun prior to the
first day of January, 1913. The title of the Act is follows: "An Act further amending section twelve
of Act Numbered One hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' as amended, by providing for a
continuation of the Spanish language as the official language of the courts until the first day of
January, one thousand nine hundred and thirteen and for other purposes." Procedure is
amended so as to read, so far as material here, as follows: "The official language of all the
courts and their records shall be the Spanish language until the first day of January,
nineteen hundred and thirteen. After that date, English shall be the official language." The Act
contains, as is seen, no express word giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is there
anything found therein which indicates and intention to give it such an effect. Its effect is, rather,
by clear intendment, prospective.

ISSUE: Should Act No. 1946, amending section 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure, providing
that the official language is to be English after January 1, 1913, operate prospectively? Yes.

RULING: It is prospective only. It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be
construed ashaving only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the
Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly.

In the case, the Courts believe that the usual rule ought to be applied. Although there is a
difference recognized by the courts between acts which affect substantial rights and those
which affect only procedure or convenience, the courts being more liberal in their interpretation
relative to retrospective operation in the latter than in the former case, we do not believe that
such difference is sufficiently important in the cases before us to warrant us in relaxing the
rigidity of the rule. Serious inconvenience might be the result of giving the Act in question a
retrospective effect, and substantial rights might possibly be prejudiced thereby. The act itself
being by its terms applicable only after January 1, 1913, we think that there exists no reason
why the general rules of construction should not prevail, even if construction or interpretation is
in any sense necessary.

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CASE NO.9 | DIU v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: On several occasions from January 8, 1988 to April 18, 1989, Patricia Pagba
purchased on credit various articles of merchandise from Diu‟s store at Naval, Biliran all valued
at P7862.55. Despite repeated demands from the Dius, Pagba failed to pay. Patricia Pagba
admitted to the indebtedness but interposed two counterclaims:

● P6,227.00 as alleged expenses for maintenance and repair of the boat belonging to the Dius.
● P12,000.00 representing the cost of the two tires which the Dius allegedly misappropriated. Despite
the confrontations before the Brgy. Chairman, the Dius failed to pay their just and valid obligations.

Thus, the Dius brought the matter before the Brgy. Chairman of Naval and a date was set for
the hearing but Pagba still failed to appear. When another date was set, both parties appeared
but failed to reach an amicable settlement so the Brgy. Chairman issued a Certification to File
Action. Petitioners then filed for complaint for a sum of money before the Municipal Trial Court
of Naval. MTC dismissed the complaint by ruling against the evidence presented. Thus, the
petitioners appealed to the RTC pursuant to Sec 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. However,
they did not find it necessary to pass upon the issue of the alleged non-compliance with PD
1508. RTC rendered judgement in favor of the Dius and ordered Pagba to pay the Dius the
amount of P7,862.55 plus legal interest from July 1991, P1,000 as attorney fees and the costs
of suit.

ISSUE: Does the procedural provisions of the Local Government Code apply retroactively? Yes.

RULING: The case was filed when Presidential Decree No. 1508 was still in force, the
procedural provisions of the Local Government Code, which we have earlier noted as being
supportive of the validity of the conciliation proceedings, are also applicable to this case.
Statutes regulating procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense.The conciliation
procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-
compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired
over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein.

In this case, it is admitted that the parties did have confrontations before the Brgy.
Chairman although they were sent to the pangkat as the same was not constituted. Their
meetings were not fruitful as no amicable settlement was reached. While no pangkat was
constituted, it is not denied that the parties met at the office of the barangay chairman for
possible settlement. The efforts of the barangay chairman, however, proved futile as no
agreement was reached.

Although no pangkat was formed, the Court believes that there was substantial
compliance with the law. It is noteworthy that under Section 412 of the Local Government Code,
the confrontation before the lupon chairman OR the pangkat is sufficient compliance with the
precondition for filing the case in court. Sec 410(b) should be construed together with Sec 412,
as well as the circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the case.

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CASE NO.10 | RILLORAZA v. ARCIAGA

FACTS: Eulalia Banayat, respondent, is a head teacher who filed a criminal complaint of
assault upon an authority against the petitioner, Porfirio Rilloraza on June 18, 1963 in the MTC
of San Fernando, La Union. Petitioner moved to quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction.
This was denied. As the trial commenced, three prosecution witnesses testified and a
stenographic record of their testimony was taken. Then petitioner, went to the CFI of La Union
on certiorari and prohibition. Subsequently, CFI declared that the proceedings conducted by the
respondent municipal judge, Hon. Arciaga, null and void and directing him to desist from
continuing the hearing of the case. This was then transmitted to the MTC of Naguilian, La
Union, for the necessary preliminary investigation. Hence, this appeal.Petitioner moved to
quash the complaint filed from the MTC on lack of jurisdiction (denied). When the trial ensued,
Rilloraza appealed to the CFI of La Union for certiorari and prohibition. CFI declared that the
proceedings conducted by Judge Arciaga is null and void. Directing him to desist from
continuing the hearing of the case.The case was transmitted to the MTC of Naguilian, La Union.

While, Eulalia Banayat, a head teacher who filed a criminal complaint of assault upon an
authority against Porfirio Rilloraza in the MTC of San Fernando, La Union, Judge Arciaga.When
the trial ensued, three witnesses testified for the prosecution and a stenographic record of their
testimonies.

ISSUE: Does the Metropolitan Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union have jurisdiction over the
case at bar? Yes.

RULING: There are two contending statues which amended the jurisdiction of the MTC of San
Fernando, LU stipulated in Section 87 (c) of R.A. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948): RA 2613 (effective
on August 1, 1959) and RA 3828 (effective on June 22, 1963).

A rule long respected is that jurisdiction of a court of justice to try a criminal case is
determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted. Since prosecution started
on June 18, 1963 when RA 2613 was in force, this law should be utilized in ascertaining
whether the respondent judge or trial court has jurisdiction over the case. Hence, in the case at
bar, the criminal charge was direct assault upon a person in authority which encompass in
Art. 148 RPC. The penalty provided therein is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos. Thus, the Justice of the
Peace Court of San Fernando, Capital of La Union has jurisdiction to try this case

Also, noting that the passage of RA 3828 did not take away jurisdiction over the case from
the Municipal (Justice of the Peace) Court of San Fernando, La Union.

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CASE NO.11 | GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. AGONCILLO

FACTS: The Philippine National Bank is a corporation created by Acts of the Philippine
Legislature (Act No. 2616, as amended by Acts Nos. 2747 and 2938).

The original bank charter provided that the voting power of all the stock of the bank purchased
by the Philippine Government "shall be vested exclusively in the Governor-General." (Act No.
2612, sec. 5.) Thereafter it was provided that the voting of the Government stock in the
Philippine National Bank shall be "vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-
General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives." (Act
No. 2747, sec. 1.) Finally, the provisions relating to the voting power of the Government stock
were amended to read "The voting power of all the stock of the National Bank owned and
controlled by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a board.
the short title of which shall be ‟Board of Control,‟ composed of the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”

ISSUE: Are the amendments made to section 4 of Act No. 26 2 which provide that “the voting
power of all the stock of the National Bank owned and controlled by the Government of the
Philippine Islands shall be vested exclusively in a board. the short title of which shall be ‟Board
of Control,‟ composed of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives” valid? No.

RULING: The amendments to section 4 of Act No. 2612, made by section 1 of Act No. 2747
and section 1 of Act No. 2938 providing for a Board of Control for the Philippine National Bank
are invalid, and the defendants should be ousted from the offices of directors of the Philippine
National Bank, and the directors selected by the Governor-General placed in possession of
those offices. The application of the doctrine relating to partial invalidity was strengthened here
by the rule that where amendments to statute are unconstitutional, the original statute as it
existed before the attempted amendment remains in force. In this connection, it should be
recalled that the original statute vested the voting power of the stock owned by the Government
in the bank exclusively in the Governor-General, which was legal, while the amendments found
invalid, without express repeal, attempted to transfer this power to an illegally constituted Board
of Control.

Upon the facts of record and the law applicable thereto, it is held, that Gregorio Agoncillo,
Baldomero Roxas, and Catalino Lavadia are unlawfully and illegally holding and exercising the
position of members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, and should be
ousted and altogether excluded therefrom; that Manuel Yriarte, John Gordon, and A. Gideon
have been duly and legally elected as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
National Bank, and judgment is rendered that they be inducted into said position, to take charge
thereof and to perform the duties incumbent upon them as members of said board.

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CASE NO.12 | SANCHEZ v. RIGOS

FACTS: On April 3, 1961, Plaintiff Nicolas Sanchez and Defendant Severina Rigos executed
an instrument entitled “Option to Purchase” where Mrs. Rigos promised to sell to Sanchez for
P1,510 a parcel of land in the barrios of Abar and Sibot, municipality of San Jose, province of
Nueva Ecija and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-12528
of said province within 2 years from said date with the understanding that said option shall be
deemed terminated and elapsed if Sanchez fails to exercise his right to buy within stipulated
period. On March 12, 1963, several tenders of payment of the sum of P1,510 were made by
Sanchez within said period but were rejected by Mrs. Rigos. So Sanchez deposited said amount
with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and commenced against the latter the present
action for specific performance and damages.

After parties jointly moved for judgment on the pleadings, the lower court rendered judgment
for Sanchez, ordering Mrs. Rigos to accept the sum judicially consigned by him and to execute
in his favor the deed of conveyance (plus P200 as atty‟s fees and the costs). Mrs. Rigos filed
this appeal. This case admittedly hinges on the proper application of Article 1479 of our Civil
Code, which provides: “ART. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price
certain is reciprocally demandable. An accepted unilateral promise to buy or to sell a
determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promissor if the promise is supported by
a consideration distinct from the price.” By virtue of the option under consideration, defendant
agreed to sell and plaintiff agreed to buy the land in the option. Hence, the promise in the
contract is reciprocally demandable pursuant to Article 1479. The contract between the parties
is a unilateral promise to sell being unsupported by any valuable consideration is null and void
by the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Is the contract between the parties (in Option to Purchase) reciprocally demandable?
Yes.

RULING: Since there may be no valid contract without a cause or consideration, the promisor is
not bound by his promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it. Pending notice of its withdrawal,
his accepted promise partakes, however, of the nature of an offer to sell which, if accepted,
results in a perfected contract of sale. This view has the advantage of avoiding a conflict
between Articles 1824—on the general principles on contracts—and 1479—on sales—of the
Civil Code, in line with the cardinal rule of statutory construction that, in construing different
provisions of one and the same law or code, such interpretation should be favored as will
reconcile or harmonize said provisions and avoid a conflict between the same. Indeed, the
presumption is that, in the process of drafting the Code, its author has maintained a consistent
philosophy or position.

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CASE NO.13 | BAKING v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
FACTS: Before the Supreme Court is a two identical petitions for habeas corpus;
Petitioners Jose Lava et. al, had been under detention for more than 18 years under the charge
of respondent Director of Prisons for the crime of rebellion, when the Supreme Court in its
decision on People vs. Lava et. al, convicted petitioners for the crime of rebellion and sentenced
each of them to 10 years imprisonment.
Previously, petitioners Baking and Rodriguez filed a petition for habeas corpus. They claimed
that they had been denied the right to a speedy trial. After their conviction for the crime of
rebellion, they filed a motion for early decision of their petition for habeas corpus and for their
immediate release, based primarily upon an averment similar to the other petition for habeas
corpus before the Supreme Court.
The present thrust of the two petitions is that they should now be released because the ten year
sentences meted out to them have already been served. They argued that Article 97 of the
Revised Penal Code, which grants time allowance for good conduct, shall be applied through all
the time of their detention. The phrase “any prisoner” in this article embraces detention prisoner.

ISSUE: Is Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code applicable to detention petitioners? No.
RULING: No, Article 97 is only applicable to those who are serving their sentences. First,
inasmuch as the Revised Penal Code is written in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. Second, a
code enacted as a single comprehensive statute is to be construed as such, and not as a series
of disconnected articles or statutes.

The provision in question, Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, reads:

Article 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any prisoner in any penal institution shall
entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence xxx

In this case, the term “any prisoner” in the Spanish text is “el penado” which means a
convict or a person already sentenced by final judgement. Hence, the term “any prisoner” in
Article 97 should be limited to those convicted by final judgment.

Moreover, Article 94 of the same code provides that good conduct allowances are
rewarded only to those who are serving their sentence. Since, Article 97 is to be read in
conjunction with Article 94, it should likewise be deemed to give meaning to the term “any
prisoner” in Article 97. The Court elaborated that Article 94 and 97 were both found in the same
chapter of the subject code; that the rest of the provisions in the Chapter discuss to good
conduct time allowances; and that the phrase “any prisoner” in Article 98 is also limited to
convicted prisoners.

Therefore, by consideration of the terms in Article 97, and in conjunction with other
provisions of the same code, the phrase “any prisoner” in Article 97 thereof is to be regarded as
referring only to a prisoner serving sentence.

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CASE NO.14 | PEOPLE v. BINUYA

FACTS: Concepcion Capalungan was prosecuted for theft in the Justice of the Peace Court of
Laoag. She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one month and fifteen days of arresto mayor.
Her conviction was rendered on November 20, 1933 and on the same day was committed to the
provincial jail. On December 4, 1933, she interposed an appeal to the CFI of Ilocos Norte and
was released on bail. Wherein, she pleaded guilty and rendered a judgment which required her
to pay a fine of twenty pesos and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. She
then claimed that she was entitled to have credited against the subsidiary imprisonment
imposed because of the time she spent in the provincial jail (In other words, her “subsidiary
imprisonment” should be waived because she was able to serve her sentence or penalty). Thus,
she filed a motion for the purpose of having her claim recognized. This motion was denied.

Capalungan contends that Art. 29 RPC (Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from
term of imprisonment) is not applicable to this case because of the time she spent in the
provincial jail was not preventive imprisonment.

Regardless, Capalungan was prosecuted for theft in the Justice of the Peace Court of Laoag.
She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one month and fifteen days of arresto mayor. Her
conviction was rendered and on the same day was committed to the provincial jail. While the
respondent, interposed an appeal to the CFI of Ilocos Norte and was released on bail. When
she pleaded guilty and rendered a judgment which required her to pay a fine of twenty pesos
and to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Claiming that she was entitled to
have credited against the subsidiary imprisonment imposed because of the time she spent in
the provincial jail. In other words, her “subsidiary imprisonment” should be waived because she
was able to serve her sentence or penalty. Filed a motion for the purpose of having her claim
recognized (denied).

ISSUE: Can the appellant invoke a provision from the Old Penal Code in her favor? No.

RULING: The Court stated that because Capalungan was convicted of theft is not entitled to
the benefit granted under the mentioned article - Art. 29 RPC. Capalungan, further invokes
the last paragraph of Art. 30 RPC. And cited the following authority:The authority relied upon by
Capalungan, contemplates a case where an amendatory code was silent as to a point
expressly covered by the original code. In such situation, the applicable rule is that in the
construction of penal statutes and was repealed by implication is not favored. In the case at bar,
the penal code (RPC) in force is a complete revision of the old code (Old Penal Code) and
the rule is that where a statute is revised, or a series of legislative acts on the same subject are
revised and consolidated into one, all parts and provisions of the former act or acts, that
are omitted from the revised act, are repealed. While Art. 367 RPC expressly repeals the
old penal code, it follows that the omission in the RPC of the last paragraph in Art. 30 RPC
is fatal to appellant’s contention.

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CASE NO.15 | MECANO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS: Antonio A. Mecano, filed a petition for certiorari, which seeks to nullify the decision of
the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16,
1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.The petitioner Mecano is a
Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990 and on account
of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is
claiming from the COA.In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section
699 of the RAC.Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion
No. 73, S. 99 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699. COA Chairman however, denied
petitioner‟s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor
re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987.

ISSUE: Does Administrative Code of 1987 repeal or abrogate Section 699 of the RAC? No.

RULING: No. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing
provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof,
that are intended to be repealed.In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with
the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This
provision is found in Section 27, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:

Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof,inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code. Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the
provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In
fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature
being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.Lastly, it is
a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not
favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes.

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CASE NO.16 | GREENFIELD v. MEER

FACTS: In 1935, Greenfield began buying and selling his stocks and securities for his own
exclusive account and not for the account of orders. Greenfield filed an income tax return for the
calendar year of 1939 showing that he made a net profit of P52,449.29 on his embroidery
business, and P17,850 on dividends from various corporations, and P10,741.30 was his profit
for the purchase and sale of mining stocks and securities at the expense of P78,049.10.
Greenfield claims that he had lost P67,307.80 and he should be granted the income tax
return.For their income tax in 1939, Greenfield paid P9,008.14 to Meer under protest on the
grounds of Meer disallowing Greenfield to have a deduction of P67,307.80 as losses in his trade
or business. The first action filed by Greenfield is to recover the sum of P9,008.14 paid in 1939,
and the second action is to reclaim, should his first action be dismissed, the sum of P475
allegedly collected illegally by Meer for erroneous taxation on personal and additional
exemptions.

ISSUE: Will the personal and additional exemptions granted by Section 23 of Commonwealth
Act No. 466 be considered as credit against or be deducted from the net income of Greenfield. ?
No

RULING: Personal and additional exemptions claimed by appellant should be credited against
or deducted from the net income. "Exception is an immunity or privilege; it is freedom from a
charge or burden to which others are subjected." If the amounts of personal and additional
exemptions fixed in section 23 are exempt from taxation, they should not be included as part of
the net income, which is taxable. There is nothing in said section 23 to justify the contention that
the tax on personal exemptions should first be fixed, and then deducted from the tax on the net
income. In the revisions of statutes, neither an altercation in phraseology nor an omission or
addition of words in the latter statute shall be held to alter the construction of the former Act.

The mere fact that the phrase "in the nature of a deduction" found in section 7 of the old law
was omitted in section 23 of the new or National Internal Revenue Code did not effect any
change in the law. It is evident that said phrase was added or inserted in said section 7 only out
of extreme caution, because, even without it, the exemption would have to be deducted from the
gross income in order to determine the net income subject to tax. Had the provision in the old
law been drafted in exactly the same term as that of said section 23, the same construction
should have been adopted.

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CASE NO.17 | DUARTE v. DADE

FACTS: Facts: Petitioner, Pedro M. Duarte was a postmaster in Guam under the government of
the United States. He was removed from his office, and was tried in the first instance over his
objection by the court of appeals in the island of Guam. Duarte, under the orders of the
Governor-General of Guam, was sentenced to serve a 10 year sentence and was sent to Bilibid
Prison in Manila and was turned over to the Director of Prisons in the Philippines. Duarte filed
an application in the Supreme Court for the writ of habeas corpus.The whole purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to determine if the petitioner is legally held. The Supreme Court is
authorized to grant writs of habeas corpus. (Sec. 526, C.C.P.) It was suggested that the
Supreme Court of the Philippines does not have any authority to inquire whether the court of
appeals of Guam had the jurisdiction to try Duarte, since the governments of Guam and of the
Philippine Islands are two separate entities presiding over wholly separate and distinct territories
and neither has any control over the other, but both derive their powers from the central
Government of the United States.

ISSUE: May the Governor General change Duarte‟s sentence to 0 years and allow him to
serve the sentence in the Philippines? No

RULING: Duarte‟s conviction and sentence as ordered by the military governor of Guam was
legally done. Duarte is being punished for his crime against the United States, not against the
state of Guam for it is still the United States that run the territories of Guam and Philippines.The
Governor-General of Guam has the power to issue general orders that have the force of the
law, and is subject to repeal by his own subsequent general orders.In Statutory Construction,
"Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This
power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed;
and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law.

"In 1867 Congress enacted the Reconstruction Acts dividing the States which had
participated in the late rebellion into five military districts, each governed by a military governor.
These governors were authorized among other things to "allow local civil tribunals to take
jurisdiction of and to try offenders, or, when in his judgment it may be necessary for the trial of
offenders, and all interference under color of State authority with the exercise of military
authority under this act, shall be null and void.".The military general of Guam may transfer
Duarte to the Bilibid Prison in Philippine Islands, since it is still considered a state prison of the
United States. The Supreme Court ruled that “So long as the State permits him to remain in its
as the prisoner of the United States, and does not object to his detention by its officers, he is
rightfully detained in custody under a sentence lawfully passed”.

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CASE NO.18

CITY OF MANILA v. REYES

FACTS: This is an appeal by the defendant assailing the decision of the court of first instance,
ordering him to pay the city of manila the amount of P1,339.90. The amount includes with it the
license fees, and mayor permit fees due from the defendant on his retail sales of flour under the
provisions of Ordinance no. 3364. He assails that the promulgation of R.A no 325, 426, and 650
rendered the ordinance oppressive, unenforceable and that it impliedly repealed the Republic
acts because it imposed the necessary guidelines which every seller must follow unless they
want to be penalized. Furthermore, he argues that the ordinance was created when the sale of
flour was free, unrestricted, and can be made by anyone. However, the said implementation of
laws restricted and made it something which the government can control.

ISSUE: Does the promulgation of Acts no. 325, 426, and 650 repeal ordinance No. 3364? No.

RULING: There is nothing in the provisions of the aforementioned laws that states that they
repeal the ordinance hence, they can coexist. Furthermore, the laws merely enumerated the
products which importation should be regulated, created the import control office, and provided
penalties for its violation. the defendant is assailing the laws based on the presumption that
these laws would diminish his profits however, the court ruled that it is immaterial in the case.
Furthermore, the new laws didn‟t explicitly mention whether it should suspend or repeal the
ordinance hence, they should be implemented altogether. It is with the presumption that when
the legislature enacts laws, it considers all other laws which are similar in nature hence unless
stated, they are not repealed.

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CASE NO.19

THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN MANAGEMENT CO., INC. v. THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN

MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEES ASSOC.

FACTS: This petition for certiorari and prohibition originated from the dispute between
Philippine American Management Company Inc. and the Philippine American Management
Employees Association (PAMEA-FFW) regarding the legality of the strike staged by the
respondent union. Then Secretary of Labor Adrian E. Cristobal endorsed the dispute to the
Court of Industrial Relations stating that, "The President has taken cognizance to the existing
labor dispute involving minimum wage between the management of the Philippine American
Management Company, Inc. (PAMCI) and the Philippine American Management Employees
Association (PAMEA-FFW). Pursuant to Section 16 (c) of Republic Act No. 602, otherwise
known as Minimum Wage Law as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4180, 4707 and 5388, and in
accordance with the directive of the President of the Philippines.PAMCI filed an urgent motion to
dismiss stating that the certification had no basis given that since the dispute clearly involved no
demand for minimum wage. There was an opposition on the part of respondent Union PAMEA-
FFW asserting that the question of minimum wages was material.

ISSUE: Can the Court of Industrial Relations, may issue a return-to-work order while the
outcome of the dispute between Philippine American Management Company and Philippine
American Management Employees Association? No.

RULING: The Industrial Peace Act, granted the Court of Industrial Relations the limitation on
exercising to the full its powers as an arbitral tribunal, with the widest range of authority
recognized by law. At present, however, it lacks jurisdiction except where there has been a
Presidential certification to it of a labor dispute in industries indispensable to the national interest
or there is an indorsement to it by the Secretary of Labor of a minimum wage dispute. The
occasion for the exercise of such jurisdiction is thus limited, but, once invoked, the scope of
what may legitimately be done has not been curtailed.

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CASE NO.20 | PEOPLE v. CASTRO

FACTS: On June 25, 1921, Vicente Ramos, health officer, filed a complaint against Castro the
crime of injurias graves. CFI charged Castro and was proven to be guilty of the crime. The
prosecuting attorney of the Province of Occidental Negros presented a complaint which alleged
that Castro did willfully, unlawfully, and criminally insulted Ramos by uttering, among others, the
following words: 'You shameless fellow!' 'Now you put on that . . . health service uniform!' 'You
are stealing the people's money!' 'The people pay you without receiving services from you!'
'Shameful! Which words and phrases were written in a letter addressed to said Vicente Ramos
CFI entenced Castro to be banished from the municipality of Cadiz for a distance of 50
kilometers, for a period of 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day, and to pay a fine of P265, and in case
of insolvency to suffer subsidiary banishment in accordance with the provisions of the law, and
to pay the costs. The CFI court erred in holding that the facts alleged in the complaint constitute
"grave insults," and the appellant punishable therefore, instead of holding that said facts
constitute a libel and that the case should be decided under the Libel Law; and that the trial
court erred in not holding that in the instant case the Penal Code.

Issue: Are the Penal Code provisions (which define and punish calumny and insults when
expressed publicly in writing) already repealed by Libel Law? Yes. If so, how? BY NECESSARY
IMPLICATION

RULING:

CALUMNY :As defined by Title X of the Penal Code, is the false imputation of a crime against
the person upon which a prosecution might be instituted by the Government. In other words,
any false imputation against a person of a crime which is punishable under the Penal Code,
constitutes the crime of calumny. From the definitions of calumny and insult, it will be seen that
they both tend to bring the person against whom the imputation is made into disrepute,
discredit, or contempt, and tend to dishonor or to blacken the memory of said person.

LIBEL:Act No. 277 defines the crime of libel and provides for both a criminal and civil action.It
defines libel as a malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs or
pictured or the like, or public theatrical exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is
dead or to impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation or publish the alleged or actual defects of
one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. It will be noted
from said definition of libel that three things are necessary: It must be a malicious defamation; it
must be expressed in writing or in some form other than mere spoken words; and it must
blacken the memory of one who is dead, or impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation of one
who is alive and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule. A careful reading of
the provisions of the Penal Code will clearly show that all said imputations, statements, etc., are
included within the definition of libel as given in Act No. 277; and if both provisions of the Penal
Code and the Libel Law (Act No. 277) are in force, then we will have two laws punishing the
same offense. After a careful examination of the provisions of the Penal Code relating to
calumny and insults when expressed publicly in writing, in relation with the provisions of Act No.
277, the Court is convinced that the Legislature intended to repeal the former by the latter; and
in view of that conclusion, Penal Code provisions that refer to calumny and insults when
expressed publicly in writing have been repealed by Act No. 277.

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CASE NO.21 PEOPLE v. ALMUETE

FACTS:The herein defendants-appellees were charged with a violation of Section 39 of the

Agricultural Tenancy Law (Republic Act No. 1199). It was alleged in the information that in
December, 1963, in Muñoz, Nueva Ecija, the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in
her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their
respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage in the amount of P187.50 at
P12.50 a cavan. The defendants-appellee filed a motion to quash the information on the
grounds that (1) the information does not allege facts sufficient to constitute the crime charged;
(2) there is no law punishing the pre-threshing of the riceland without the consent of the owner;
(3) the court has no jurisdiction over the alleged crime. The Solicitor General argues that the
information alleges all the elements of the offense defined in section 39 of the Republic Act No.
1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263

ISSUE:
1. Is there is a law prohibiting pre-threshing? None.
2. Does the court have jurisdiction to punish persons charged with violation of Section 39 of the
RA 1199? None.

RULING: (1) None, section 39 of RA 1199 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land
Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389 and as implemented by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 2, 27 and 316. That Code was already in force when the act
complained of was committed.

It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that "an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends
to contain, operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contained in the old act and not
included in the amendatory act." The act of pre-threshing without notice to the landlord had
ceased to be an offense under the Code of Agrarian Reforms.

The prohibition on pre-threshing found in section 39 of R.A. 1199 is premised on the

existence of rice share tenancy system. The Agricultural Land Reform Code superseded the
Agricultural Tenancy Law (R.A. 1199). The Code instituted the leasehold system and abolished
share tenancy subject to certain conditions. Thus, the legal maxim cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases), applies to this case.
Section 39 is not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform Code whose section 172 repeals
“all laws or part of any law inconsistent with" its provisions.

(2)None, the repeal of penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged
with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal.

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CASE NO.22 | PARRAS v. LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION

Facts: Domingo T. Parras applied for registration of his land. In connection with this, the Land
Registration Commissioner required him to remit to his office the sum of P57.00 as estimated
cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of the hearing of the case for land
registration. Objecting to this requirement, Domingo filed a petition in the land registration
court claiming that this collection revenue-raising and is unconstitutional. He prayed that he be
exempted from making such charge.This petition was opposed by the Land Registration
Commissioner. The Commissioner adds that the exemption under Section 114 of Act 496
(Land Registration Act), as amended by Act 2866, where the applicant is exempted from
payment of the publication expenses if the value of the land to be registered is less than
P50,000.00, has already been eliminated. It was eliminated with the re-amendment of the
same Section 114 by Republic Act 117.
However, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of Parras, holding that RA 117
amended Section 114 of Act 496 only increased the rates payable by the applicant upon the
filing of the application and did not actually eliminate the exemption now being claimed by
Parras. Thus, the Land Registration Commissioner appealed directly to the Supreme Court on
purely legal ground, questioning the decision of the lower court.

Issue: Is Domingo Parras exempted from paying the cost of publication in the Official Gazette
for the registration of his land pursuant to RA 117 amending Sec 114 of Act 496? No.
Ruling: No, Domingo Parras is not exempted from paying the cost of publication in the Official
Gazette for the registration of his land. The enactment of RA 117 which completely amended
Sec. 114 of Act 496 did not anymore carry out the exemption part of the old law. This means
that the exemption is already deemed eliminated for when the amendatory act purports to set
out the original act or section as amended, all matters in the act or section that are omitted in
the amendment are considered repealed.
Section 114 of Act 496 provided that an applicant for registration is exempt from paying
the cost of publication when his land is valued at less than P50,000.00. However, RA 117,
amending the said provision, has eliminated this exempting part of the provision. This
suppression in the amendatory act cannot mean but a withdrawal by the legislature of such a
privilege allowed in the previous law. It cannot be said, as ruled by the lower court, that RA
117, in amending Section 114 of Act 496, merely changed the rates of fees fixed in the
original law. That Congress intended RA 117 to completely amend or replace Section 114 in
its entirety and not merely to increase the rates of filing fees, is evident from the specific
provision thereof that the section was "further amended to read as follows." With the phrase
“to read as follows,” the legislature thereby declares that the new statute is a substitute for the
original act or section. Only those provisions of the original act or section repeated in the
amendment are retained.

It is clear, therefore, that after the enactment of RA 117, the cost of publication of the notice
of initial hearing, required by the Land Registration Act shall be paid by the applicant Parras.

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CASE NO.23 | NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ARCA

Facts: The Philippine Power and Development Company and the Dagupan Electric Corporation
filed an injunction suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to restrain enforcement by the
National Power Corporation of a revised rate of charges for the electric power and energy sold
by National Power Corporation (NPC). They alleged that the increase of rates is unreasonable
and excessive, and that it is in gross violation of the provisions of the current contracts between
them. Finding sufficient reasons therefor, the lower court issued the writ of preliminary injunction
against NPC.

Thus, NPC filed a motion to dissolve the injunction challenging the jurisdiction of the lower
court. NPC argues, among others, that the court below cannot determine the reasonableness of
the disputed revised rates because the matter allegedly pertains to the Public Service
Commission pursuant to Republic Act 2677.

Issue: Can the Public Service Commission inquire into the rates of charges for services
rendered by the National Power Corporation pursuant to RA 2677? No.

Ruling: No, the authority to inquire into the rates of charges for services rendered by the
National Power Corporation does not devolve upon the Public Service Commission.
Commonwealth Act No. 120, creating the National Power Corporation, specifically provides:
"Sec. 2 - The powers, functions, rights and activities of the said corporation shall be the
following...(g) to sell electric power and to fix the rates and provide for the collection of the
charges for any service rendered. Provided, That the rates of charges shall not be subject to
revision by the Public Service Commission”.

It is true that under RA 2677, the Public Service Commission was vested with jurisdiction to
fix the rate of charges by public utilities owned or operated by any instrumentality of the National
Government or by any government-owned or controlled corporation. However, the enactment of
this later legislation, which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed or withdrawn
the exempting proviso of Section 2(g) of the earlier CA 120 above quoted. For it is now the
settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, providing for a particular case or class of
cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications,
unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad
enough to include the cases embraced in the special law”.

Thus, whether or not the Public Service Commission had authority to pass upon the NPC‟s
revised rates, it is undeniable that respondents companies had the right to resort to the Court of
First Instance in quest of injunctive relief against their enforcement which were claimed to be
unauthorized by law and violative of respondent companies' contracts; and it equally lay within
the lower court's jurisdiction to entertain their action since the authority to inquire into the rates
of charges for services rendered by the NPC does not devolve upon the Public Service
Commission.

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CASE NO.24 | AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY v. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: In the course of its ministry, the American Bible Society has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions thereof (except during the Japanese occupation)
throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several Philippine dialects. The acting
City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed the American Bible Society that it was conducting
the business of general merchandise without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit
and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos.
2529, 3028 and 3364, and required the American Bible Society to secure, within three days, the
corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the
4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953.

In a complaint, the American Bible Society prayed that judgment be rendered declaring the
said Municipal Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364
illegal and unconstitutional, and that the defendant be ordered to refund to the plaintiff the sum
they had paid under protest, together with legal interest thereon, and the costs, plaintiff further
praying for such other relief and remedy as the court may deem just equitable.

ISSUE: Should the American Bible Society pay sales tax for the distribution and sale of their
bibles? No.

RULING: Where the old statute is repealed in its entirety and by the same enactment re-enacts
all or certain portions of the pre-existing law, the majority view holds that the rights and liabilities
which have accrued under the original statute are preserved and may be enforced, since the re-
enactment neutralizes the repeal, therefore continuing the law in force without interruption.

Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied to the American
Bible Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to
the American Bible Society and the City of Manila is powerless to license or tax the business of
the Amercan Bible Society involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair The American
Bible Society‟s right to the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship,
as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, the Court finds that Ordinance No.
3000, as amended is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.

CHAPTER 10 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

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