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Explaining Individual Risk Perception: The Case of Nuclear Waste Author(s) : Lennart Sjöberg Source: Risk Management, 2004, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2004), Pp. 51-64 Published By: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
Explaining Individual Risk Perception: The Case of Nuclear Waste Author(s) : Lennart Sjöberg Source: Risk Management, 2004, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2004), Pp. 51-64 Published By: Palgrave Macmillan Journals
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to Risk Management
Lennart Sjiberg1
This paper deals with models of perceived risk, applied to the case of nuclear waste.
Data from a major survey recently conducted in municipalities where there were
intense discussions about the siting of nuclear waste are analyzed (N = 2523). It is
pointed out that previous work on the psychometric model has achieved some success
in accounting for perceived risk, but the claim that emotional factors are the main
engine in such accounting is shown to be misleading. New risk, the other major
psychometric factor, is found to be very weak. The major factors supported by the
present results were specific radiation risk, attitude to nuclear power (NP), severity
of consequences, and the tendency to amplify or attenuate all perceived risks. These
variables accounted for about 65 per cent of both personal and general perceived
risk of nuclear waste. A simplified model was somewhat more powerful, and also
supported, to some extent, 'interfering with nature'and 'trust 'as explanatory concepts.
It is pointed out that the counter-argument to some of these explanatory constructs-
that they overlap semantically with perceived nuclear waste risk-is misleading and
false. A special analysis showed that there were both extreme risk deniers and extreme
risk alarmists among the respondents, but twice as many deniers as alarmists. The
latter group was found most clearly among women with a low level of education.
Finally, the results are discussed with relation to the psychology of risk perception.
Introduction
Risk perception has been an important research topic since the 1970s. The reason is probably that
risk is believed to be a crucial factor in policy attitudes and decisions. There are several problematic
aspects to risk management, eg the often observed gap between experts and the public when it
comes to socially and economically important hazards, such as those associated with nuclear
technology. Another type of hazard of much current concern is food risk and genetically modified
organisms, a third is cellular telephones and the 'electrosmog' debate. Much of the important
work on risk perception was summarised in a volume edited by Slovic (2000).
Given that perceived risk is an important topic, one of the more urgent concerns for researchers
is that of explaining why people-be they experts, members of the public or politicians and
administrators-perceive risks the way they do. It has long since been realised that 'objective'
risk is not a sufficient explanation of perceived risk, not even for experts, and at times the two
differ widely.
The psychometric model (Fischhoff et al, 1978) attempts to explain risk perception, and it doe
so effectively in the case of mean risks, with very high multiple R's. The main explanatory
factors are 'novelty' and 'dread'. 'Dread' is said to be an emotional or affective factor, but only
one emotion word is included among the items measuring the factor. The dread words listed by
Slovic (1987) were: 'uncontrollable'; 'dread'; 'global catastrophic'; 'consequences fatal'; 'not
equitable'; 'catastrophic'; 'high risk to future generations'; 'not easily reduced'; 'risk increasing';
and 'involuntary'.
Hence, there is little explicit emotional content in the dread factor, despite its name (Sjoberg, in
press b). The effective component seems to be severity of consequences (Sjoberg, 2003d; in
press a). When it comes to new risk, the papers just cited show that this factor has not been very
powerful as an explanatory concept with regard to risk perception. The same is true of cultural
theory (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982), which is a very different approach to risk perception.
Wildavsky and Dake (1990) suggested scales for measuring its central variables, but these scales
have not been very useful in empirical research, typically accounting for a mere five per cent of
the variance of perceived risk, in European data (Brenot et al, 1998), and possibly somewhat
more in US applications.
Trust has been claimed to be an important factor in risk perception (Siegrist, 1999; 2000; Slovic
et al, 1991). The empirical data on trust provide only limited support for this notion, however.
Most of the work on trust has dealt with social trust, ie trust in experts or organisations. Trust in
science has been found to be a promising variation on the trust theme (Sjoiberg, 2001a). People
may well trust experts, while still believing that science does not have full and final answers to all
the questions arising in the risk assessment of such hazards as those associated with genetically
modified food or nuclear waste.
In previous work, it has been found that more powerful models of risk perception are possible if
new explanatory factors are brought in (Sjoberg, 2000a; 2000b; 2000c). These factors are:
* attitude to the risk-generating agent or agency; in the case of nuclear waste, this would be
nuclear power per se;
* the tendency to rate all risks as large or small, previously called 'risk sensitivity' but in the
present paper called 'risk amplification-attenuation'.
Other factors pertain to more general belief structures ('New Age' beliefs) (Sjoberg and af
Wahlberg, 2002) and personality. Factors of this type may have a moderate explanatory
power with regard to perceived risk but are not treated in the present paper.2 The purpose of
the study was to enhance understanding of perceived risk by investigating a full range of
explanatory variables and to do so on a large enough set of data concerning risk perception
by the public.3 The focus of the present paper is, in particular, on explaining the perceived
risk of nuclear waste.
The data analysed in the present study were collected in four Swedish communities in 2001:
Oskarshamn, Osthammar, Tierp and Alvkarleby. They were all involved in the nuclear waste
issue in the sense that pilot feasibility studies had indicated that they might be suitable as host
communities for the national Swedish HLNW repository. Before such a decision could be taken,
however, extensive site investigations had to take place. The decision faced by the communities
was whether they should allow such a site investigation.
Oskarshamn in the south-east and Osthammar in the middle of Sweden were already hosts to
nuclear industry, in both cases power plants and waste management facilities. Tierp bordered on
Osthammar and was assumed to have favourable geological conditions, while Alvkarleby would
be involved for transports of HLNW if Tierp were to become the host. They are small coastal
communities (see Table 1 for population data) on the Baltic Sea.
An extensive survey investigation was carried out in order to study public risk perception and
attitudes in the four communities. Some of the data will be used in the analyses reported here.
More extensive information is available elsewhere (Sjoberg, 2001b; 2003a; in press a).
Method
Procedure
The samples were obtained from SPAR-DAFA, a government data base of all residents in the
country. Strictly random samples of all residents aged 18-75 were delivered. The questionnaire
was then mailed to the respondents, in May 2001. Two reminders were sent to those who did not
respond, and incentives in the form of lottery tickets and certificates were promised to respondents
if they wanted them. It was stated in an accompanying letter that the study was sponsored by
SKB and the four municipalities, and that it gave the respondents a chance to influence decision-
making in their communities.
We also made an attempt to obtain a higher response rate by means of advertisements in local
newspapers and telephone prompts. Finally, a small sub-sample of non-respondents were
interviewed over the phone to check their similarity with the attitudes of the respondents on a
few of the questions.
Respondents
Total population, response rates and number of returned questionnaires in the four communities
are provided in Table 1. The total number of respondents was 2523, allowing for precise estimates
of model properties even with a fairly large number of explanatory variables.
Lennart Sjoberg 53
with a college education (some ten percentage points too many). However, level of education
was not a very important variable with regard to risk perception and policy attitudes, so the
bias was disregarded.
The telephone interviews showed that the non-respondents had similar views to the respondents,
except that they were less involved in the issues concerning nuclear waste. In addition, several
questions had been posed in a Gallup poll to these communities in the spring of 2000. Very
similar response distributions were obtained, in spite of a higher response rate in the Gallup
study. These results suggest that the present data give a fair picture of public opinion in the
four municipalities, in spite of the somewhat low response rate.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire comprised 30 pages, in A5 format, and contained about 260 questions or
rating variables (differing slightly in the four communities). The total time needed to complete
the questionnaire was, on the average (median), 45 minutes. The questionnaire contained
many questions about attitudes and perceived risk, with a focus on nuclear waste. The
questionnaires are available on a website.4
Results
Figures 1 and 2 show the distributions of ratings of personal and general risk of nuclear w
25 -
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Response cate
54 Explaining Indiv
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Il
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Response cate
As a preliminary analys
in the sense that they
prospect of a local nuc
to the following data:
* answer to a question
have been solved (a ca
* answer to a question
(a category variable w
* answer to a question
in the municipality (
* intention to vote in
repository (a category
Lennart Sjoberg 55
Regression models
The plan of analysis called for the use of the following
Table 3. Correlations between personal and general risk of nuclear waste, and
explaladtory variables (all correlations highly significant)
57
Lennart Sjoberg
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Risk Management: An International Journal 2004, 6 (1), 51-64
Hence, the final levels of fit were 0.658 and 0.644 for personal and general risk respectively. It
might be argued that nuclear power risks include, by definition, nuclear waste risks. As a check,
analyses were also run without the two nuclear power risk variables. Model fits then dropped to
0.631 and 0.624, so they were still at a very high level. Some true variance remains to be explained
because the residuals in the two regression analyses correlated 0.54.
The standardised regression coefficients of the full models (including risk attenuation-
amplification) for personal and general risk are given in Table 5.
* severity of consequences;
These six variables alone accounted for 64.9 per cent of personal risk of nuclear waste and for
62.1 per cent of general risk. The psychometric factors accounted for about 47 per cent of the
variance in perceived risk, somewhat better when the emotion item which gave the 'dread' factor
its name was excluded. It was 'severity of consequences' which was the important factor. The
single most important factor in perceived risk of nuclear waste was, however, the specific risk
associated with ionising radiation, in particular background radiation.
Simplified model
The initial model was complex. Some variables had no sizable effects, others could be grouped to
achieve a more comprehensive picture leading to a more straightforward interpretation. In addition,
separate analyses of personal and general risk resulted in only very small differences. It was therefore
decided to run an additional analysis, based on the most powerful trends found in the initial analysis.
The risk of capitalising on chance was judged to be small, since the sample size was so large.
In this final analysis, personal and general risk were combined to form one dependent variable. A
new, more comprehensive attitude dimension was produced by combining the attitude and benefit
ratings. The two risk ratings (personal and general risk) of background radiation were combined
into a variable measuring specific radiation risk. 'New risk', 'severity of consequences' and
'interfering with Nature' were unchanged. Amplification-attenuation of risk variables, personal
and general, were combined to form a common index of amplification-attenuation. Trust in experts,
authorities and industry was combined with trust in opposing experts and in science to form a
new trust index. The design thus included one dependent variable (perceived nuclear waste risk)
and seven independent variables.
The model accounted for 66.2 per cent of the variance of perceived nuclear waste risk;6 hence it
approaches a full explanation of perceived risk. The standardised beta values are given in Table 6.
Explanatory variable
* p < 0.0005
The simplified model gave results which supported those of the initial model. In particular, it was
found that:
'interfering with Nature' and 'trust' provided some additional explanatory power; and
* 'new risk' did not have any explanatory power beyond that of the other factors.
Lennart Sjoberg 59
These variables have been discussed in detail in previous work, with the exception of
'amplification-attenuation', a variable warranting a closer look.
There are several reasons why extreme risk perceptions are of interest. They may account for
most of the correlations found in regular samples of respondents, and also for the tendency of
some people to act on a risk and to demand that society take action. In a previous paper, it was
shown that stakeholders had more extreme views on risk than people in general (Sjoberg, 2003a).
The mean risk rating was computed for all risks, personal and general, and then the mean of
personal and general risk means, for each individual. The values were then grouped in three
groups: those with an extremely low mean risk value (<2), a middle group, and those with an
extremely high mean risk value (>7). These groups are tabulated against gender in Table 7.
Is amplification-attenua
ratings in response to a
amplification-attenuatio
60 Explaining
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Risk Management: An International Journal 2004, 6 (1), 51-64
as a measure of stakeholder activity level (Sjoberg, 2003a). They were, in the orderjust mentioned,
0.21, -0.23 and 0.03. Hence, there was no evidence of a pervasive response bias factor-the
tendency to rate risks as high or low was specific to risks.
Discussion
Social and behavioural researchers are often content with having reached statistical signi
and even very modest correlations or effect sizes are accepted as evidence for theories and m
The strategy behind the present work is that effect size does matter. However, risk researche
challenged this strategy and defended even very low correlations as important evidence f
conclusions as to the value of theories such as the cultural theory of risk perception (Pet
Slovic, 1996). These arguments are discussed elsewhere, where it is pointed out that a me
variance accounted for is appropriate when the purpose of a study is to test a model's goodn
fit (Sjoberg, 2003d). This argument does not preclude the possibility that other measures
more appropriate in cases with different purposes, such as assessing the practical valu
experimental manipulation.
The models of risk perception tested in the present paper were quite successful in account
a very large share of the variance, and replicated some of the findings reported earlier. Mor
60 per cent of the variance was accounted for by the models, and yet there was true varian
to be accounted for. This unaccounted variance could be due to components of perceiv
specific to nuclear waste, and independent of the factors measured in the present study
possible that some of this additional variance could be absorbed with the help of pers
factors, and also belief factors of some general applicability such as 'New Age' beliefs (S
and af Wahlberg, 2002). The inclusion of such dimensions was ruled out in the planning
present study on the grounds that they had no clear policy implications. Factors of the
theory type or world views are less likely as candidates for improving models of risk perce
Concerning the models, it was striking that a very powerful explanatory construct was
risk amplification-attenuation. Some people tend to regard all or most risks as large, others
opposite. Results showed that this factor was not simply a matter of response bias.
It was also interesting to see that attitude and risk of nuclear power was such an important v
The risk of nuclear power is not the same as the risk of nuclear waste, even if the two are conce
related. Attitude to nuclear power, or liking, is clearly a concept distinct from risk. The issue of
overlap is sometimes raised in connection with such findings; this critique is misdirected, h
because we have here concepts which are distinct, even if they are related. Liking or di
nuclear power is not a generic category under which we can subsume the risk of nuclear
Another important finding has to do with 'dread'. It is true that 'severity of consequences'
important explanatory factor, but that factor did not include the emotional aspect. Emo
itself added little, and even gave a paradoxically reversed beta-weight. The oft-quoted con
that people react emotionally to risk is not supported by studies, such as the present one
emotion proper has been singled out from the context of items measuring severity of conseq
Previous work has also shown that worry and perceived risk are only weakly related (S
1998b). The present results support the conclusion that risk perception is a matter of th
and beliefs, not emotions (Sjoberg, in press b).
Trust has been suggested as a very important factor in risk perception, but the prese
give only weak support to that thesis. The most important trust factor, trust in exp
authorities and industry, had a modest beta-weight. Other trust factors appeared to
some additional importance. Viklund (in press) has reported similar results. Henc
does not appear to be a major factor in risk perception.
Lennart Sjoberg 61
The asymmetry of high and low risk raters found here is interesting. Most research on risk perception
has been motivated by the fact that some people tend to be very alarmed about risks. Yet, the
number who on the contrary deny risks seems to be much larger, see Figures 1 and 2. The social and
political conflicts may still be won by the alarmists, as was recently demonstrated in the case of one
of the communities investigated in the present study. The more aggressive stance taken by those
opposed to, in this case, a repository, may well have the effect of creating an impression of a large
number of people opposed. Politicians have seldom been studied when it comes to risk perception
and attitudes, but in one extensive study in Sweden it was found that they had only scanty knowledge
of the public's risk perception (Sjoberg, 1996). The stakeholders in the opposition were also found
to be more aggressive than those supporting a repository project (Sjoberg, 2003a).
In conclusion, the study was successful in formulating powerful models to account for individual
differences in the perceived risk of nuclear waste. Previous work on this issue, based on the
psychometric model, has rarely achieved more than about 25 per cent explained variance, possibly
somewhat higher for nuclear risks. Most previous work has also been conducted on convenience
samples or on data obtained with very low response rates (see the discussion in Sjoberg and
Drottz-Sjoberg, 2001). In the present study, with large and representative samples of populations
where the issue was highly salient and important, well over 60 per cent was reached, confirming
our earlier work (Sjoberg, 2000a; 2000c).
Notes
1 Lennart Sjoberg is Head of the Center for Risk Research and Professor of Psychology at the
Stockholm School of Economics; email: lennart.sjoberg@hhs.se. The work reported here was
supported by a grant from the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB).
Their homepage is at http://www.skb.se. The author is grateful to Saida Engstrom and Roland
Johansson of SKB for discussions on the design of the study, as well as to a planning group
consisting of members of all the four communities. Johnny and Lena Drottz and Bjom Johansson
assisted in data collection, and Infoscandic AB of Umea, Sweden, scanned the data. Caroline
Nordlund assisted the work in various ways, as always in a very efficient and cheerful manner.
2 It is unacceptable and even provocative to some people to have their risk perception 'explained'
by their personality or religious beliefs. They see their risk assessment as pertaining to something
external to themselves, as a way of orienting themselves in the world, and not as a way of expressing
their personality.
3 Much previous work has been conducted on small convenience samples (Sjoberg and Drottz-
Sjoberg, 2001).
4 The questionnaire, in four slightly different versions, can be downloaded from http://
www. dynam_it. com/institute/.
5 Dread has previously been analysed by a combination of items measuring severity of consequences,
with one emotion word added.
6 It should be noted that nuclear waste risks, which could be seen as semantically overlapping with
waste risks, were not included in the model.
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