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The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy
The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy
The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy
REFERENCES
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The Taylor Rule and Optimal Monetary Policy
By MICHAEL WOODFORD*
John B. Taylor (1993) has proposed that U.S. features of a desirable policy rule that are likely
monetary policy in recent years can be de- to hold under a variety of model specifications.
scribed by an interest-rate feedback rule of the
form I. The Taylor Principle and Determinacy
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VOL. 91 NO. 2 RECENT ADVANCES IN MONETARY-POLICY RULES 233
values for the inflation rate and the output gap, increase in expected inflation, for whatever rea-
respectively. Then using (4) to eliminate it in son, leads to a lower perceived real interest rate,
(2), the system in (2) and (3) can be written in which stimulates demand. This generates higher
the form inflation, increasing expected inflation still further
and driving inflation higher in a self-fulfilling
spiral. But once again, the classic analysis im-
(5) Etzt+I=Azt+et plicitly assumes an exogenous target path for
the nominal interest rate. The sort of feedback
where z = [iTt Yt], and et is a vector of from inflation and the output gap called for by
exogenous terms. System (5) has a unique sta- the Taylor rule is in fact of the sort needed to
tionary solution (assuming stationary distur- damp such an inflationary spiral.
bance processes) if and only if both eigenvalues James Bullard and Kaushik Mitra (2000)
of the matrix A lie outside the unit circle. If we consider the stability of rational-expectations
restrict attention to policy rules with 4, y > equilibrium under a form of adaptive learning
0, this condition holds if and only if dynamics in the model sketched above, again in
the case of a policy rule of form (4). They find
1 - ,B that condition (6) is also necessary and suffi-
(6) 0 K + K oy > 1. cient for "expectational stability" of the equi-
librium (i.e., for convergence of the learning
dynamics to rational expectations). Thus they
The determinacy condition (6) has a simple confirm the Wicksellian instability result in the
interpretation. A feedback rule satisfies the Tay- case of feedback from inflation or the output
lor principle if it implies that, in the event of a gap that is too weak; but this is not a problem in
sustained increase in the inflation rate by k the case of a rule that conforms to the Taylor
percent, the nominal interest rate will eventually principle. Taylor's emphasis upon raising inter-
be raised by more than k percent. (Taylor est rates sufficiently vigorously in response to
[1999] stresses this as a criterion for sound increases in inflation is again justified.
monetary policy.) In the context of the model
sketched above, each percentage point of per- II. Inflation and Output-Gap Stabilization Goals
manent increase in the inflation rate implies an
increase in the long-run average output gap of Even granting that the Taylor rule involves
(1 - /)IK percent; thus a rule of the form feedback of a kind that should tend to exclude
represented by (4) conforms to the Taylor prin- instability due purely to self-fulfilling expecta-
ciple if and only if the coefficients 4, and ytions, one must consider whether the equilib-
satisfy (6). In particular, the coefficient values rium determined by such a policy is a desirable
in (1) necessarily satisfy the criterion, regard- one. The dependence of the funds-rate target
less of the size of /3 and K. Thus the kind of upon the recent behavior of inflation and of the
feedback prescribed in the Taylor rule suffices output gap is prescribed in order to damp fluc-
to determine an equilibrium price level. Wood- tuations in those variables, and Woodford
ford (2000) shows that the Taylor principle con- (2000) shows that in the simple model described
tinues to be necessary and sufficient for above it has this effect. But are inflation and
determinacy when the family of rules is ex- output-gap stabilization in fact sensible proxi-
tended to allow for interest-rate inertia of the mate goals for monetary policy?
kind characteristic of estimated Federal Reserve Woodford (1999a) argues that both inflation
Board reaction functions. and output-gap stabilization are sensible goals
Another argument against interest-rate rules of monetary policy, as long as the "output gap"
with a venerable history asserts that targeting a is correctly understood. In fact, the paper shows
nominal interest rate allows for unstable infla- that in the context of the simple optimizing
tion dynamics when inflation expectations ex- model behind equations (2) and (3), it is possible
trapolate recent inflation experience. The basic to motivate a quadratic loss function as a second-
idea, which originates in Knut Wicksell's de- order Taylor-series approximation to the expected
scription of the "cumulative process," is that an utility of the economy's representative household,
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234 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2001
equal to the expected discounted sum of period The second qualification is that the "output
losses for certain coefficients A > 0 and x* > 0: gap" that one should seek to stabilize is the gap
between actual output and the natural rate of
(7) L, = -,T + A(ytY,-X*)n output defined above. This contrasts with the
assumption made in Taylor's (1993) compari-
Here yn is the same exogenously varying natural son between the proposed rule and actual U.S.
rate of output as in (3). This is defined as the policy, where the output gap is assumed to be
equilibrium level of output that would obtain in measured by output relative to a deterministic
the event of perfectly flexible prices; in general, trend. In theory, a wide variety of real shocks
this will not grow with a smooth trend, as a should affect the growth rate of potential output
result of real disturbances of many kinds. in the relevant sense; as shown in Woodford
There is a simple intuition for the two stabi- (2000), these include technology shocks,
lization objectives in (7). To the degree of ap- changes in attitudes toward labor supply, vari-
proximation discussed in Woodford (1999a), ations in government purchases, variation in
the efficient level of output y' (the same forhouseholds'
all impatience to consume, and varia-
goods, in the presence of purely aggregate tion in the productivity of currently available
shocks) varies in response to real disturbances investment opportunities, and there is no reason
in exactly the same proportion as does the to assume that all of these factors follow smooth
flexible-price equilibrium level y'; the two dif- trends. As a result, the output-gap measure that
fer at all times by the constant factor x* > 0. is relevant for welfare may be quite different
The average squared deviation of the log output from simple detrended output.
of each good from the efficient level can then be One source of evidence that this is so comes
decomposed into the squared deviation of the from a comparison of a detrended output series
average log output Yt from the efficient level with the behavior of real unit labor costs. In the
and the variance of the log output level across model that underlies both (3) and (7), the output
individual goods. This latter output dispersion gap Yt - yn appears because the average ratio of
term is in turn proportional to the dispersion ofmarginal supply cost to price is an increasing
prices across goods due to imperfect synchro- function of it; this cost/price ratio determines
nization of price changes, which in the case of a both the incentive to raise prices in (3) and the
particular model of staggered price-setting is deadweight losses in (7). A measure of real
proportional to the square of the inflation rate. marginal cost is thus an appropriate proxy for
This last result [and hence the exact form (7)] is the relevant output gap. But in quarterly U.S.
somewhat special. But the connection between data, variations in real unit labor cost are neg-
price dispersion and instability of the general atively correlated with detrended real GDP
level of prices holds more generally, so that a (Fig. 1). Moreover, Argia M. Sbordone (1998)
goal of inflation stabilization may be justified shows that equation (3) gives a very poor ac-
on more general grounds. count of U.S. inflation when detrended real
We thus find that the stabilization goals GDP is used as the gap measure but explains
implicit in the Taylor rule have a sound the- much of the medium-frequency variation when
oretical basis, subject to two important qual- real unit labor costs are used instead (see also
ifications. The first is that Taylor's classic Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler, 1999.)
formulation of the rule seeks to stabilize in- In each panel of Figure 2, a small, unre-
flation around a target rate of 2 percent per stricted vector autoregression (VAR) is used to
annum. Instead, the welfare-theoretic loss forecast the future evolution of the gap proxy,
function (7) implies that the target rate of infla- and then (3) is "solved forward" to obtain a
tion should be zero, as this is the rate that mini- predicted quarterly inflation series. The as-
mizes relative-price distortions associated with sumed value of /3 is 0.99; in panel (b), the
imperfect synchronization of price changes. Tak- elasticity K is chosen to minimize the mean-
ing account of additional frictions may modify square prediction error, while in panel (a) an
this conclusion, but in general this will also justifyarbitrary positive value is assumed (as predicted
the introduction of additional stabilization goals as inflation is negatively correlated with actual in-
well (Woodford, 1999a). flation in any event). The dramatic improve-
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VOL. 91 NO. 2 RECENT ADVANCES IN MONETARY-POLICY RULES 235
4
0 - .
-4~~~~~~~I
0
-2 " A
-6
-4
FIGURE 1. ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF THE OUrPUT GAP b) Using Real Unit Labor
IC0
Note: The dashed line shows detrended real GDP, while the
dotted line shows real unit labor costs (ULC). 8
6
-6
4
ment in fit in panel (b) suggests that real unit
2
labor cost is a much better measure of the true
0
output gap, at least for purposes of explaining
inflation variation. But Figure 1 indicates that -2
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236 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS MAY 2001
rate. Failure to adjust the intercept to track stabilize those variables, and stabilization of
variation in the natural rate of interest will result both variables is an appropriate goal, at least
in fluctuations in inflation and the output gap, when the output gap is properly defined. Fur-
just as in Wicksell's analysis (Woodford, 2000). thermore, the prescribed response to these
Of course, in a more realistic analysis, the variables counteracts dynamics that could oth-
optimal equilibrium is unlikely to involve com- erwise generate instability due to self-fulfilling
plete stabilization of inflation and output. For expectations.
example, while many real disturbances should At the same time, the original formulation of
affect yn and y' equally, others may not (Wood-
the rule may be improved upon. The measure of
ford, 1999a; Marc P. Giannoni, 2000), in which the output gap suggested in Taylor's (1993)
case it is no longer possible to fully stabilize empirical discussion may be quite different
both inflation and the welfare-relevant gap Yt - from the theoretically colTect measure, as the
yt. Alternatively, it may be desirable to acceptnatural rate of output should be affected by a
some variability of inflation and the output gap wide variety of real disturbances. The empirical
for the sake of less variable nominal interest discussion also assumes a constant intercept,
rates. In these cases, the optimal equilibrium but a desirable rule is likely to require that the
will involve some fluctuations in inflation and intercept be adjusted in response to fluctuations
the output gap in response to real disturbances; in the Wicksellian natural rate of interest, and
but contemporaneous feedback from the goal this too should vary in response to a variety of
variables is still generally insufficient to bring real disturbances. Finally, the classic formula-
about optimal interest-rate responses, for when tion assumes that interest rates should be set on
the private sector is forward-looking, optimal the basis of current measures of the target vari-
policy almost always involves a commitment to ables alone, but an optimal rule will generally
some later response to curTent shocks, which involve a commitment to history-dependent be-
then implies that policy must be history- havior; in particular, more gradual adjustment
dependent at that later date. of the level of interest rates has important ad-
In particular, in the model sketched above, it vantages. These considerations call for further
is optimal for the nominal interest rate to be research to improve measurement of the natural
adjusted only gradually in response to new in- rates of output and of interest, and to analyze
formation about the natural rate of interest the consequences of inertial rules in the context
(Woodford, 1999b; Giannoni, 2000). This is of more detailed models.
because (2) implies that aggregate demand is as
much affected by expected future short real REFERENCES
rates of interest as by current short rates. Thus a
predictable policy of gradual interest-rate ad- Bullard, James and Mitra, Kaushik. "Learning
justment allows substantial effects on aggregate about Monetary Policy Rules." Federal Re-
demand without requiring large swings in short- serve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No.
term interest rates. The advantages of interest- 200-OOIB, July 2000.
rate inertia in a generalized Taylor rule have Gall, Jordi and Gertler, Mark. "Inflation Dynam-
also been shown through numerical analysis in ics: A Structural Econometric Analysis."
the context of more complex econometric mod- Journal of Monetary Economics, June 1999,
els that nonetheless incorporate realistic degrees 44(3), pp. 195-222.
of forward-looking private-sector behavior Giannoni, Marc P. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules
(e.g., John C. Williams, 1999). in a Forward-Looking Model." Working pa-
per, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
IV. Conclusions September 2000.
Sbordone, Argia M. "Prices and Unit Labor
The Taylor rule incorporates several featuresCosts: A New Test of Price Stickiness." In-
of an optimal monetary policy, from the stand- stitute for International Economic Studies
point of at least one simple class of optimizing (Stockholm University, Sweden) Seminar Pa-
models. The response that it prescribes to fluc- per No. 653, October 1998.
tuations in inflation or the output gap tends to Taylor, John B. "Discretion versus Policy Rules
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VOL. 91 NO. 2 RECENT ADVANCES IN MONETARY-POLICY RULES 237
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