41

CASE DIGEST Labo v Comelec

176 SCRA 1 – Law on Public Officers – Election Laws – Citizenship of a Public Officer – Dual Citizenship – Labo Doctrine 
In 1988, Ramon Labo, Jr. was elected as mayor of Baguio City. His rival, Luis Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto
against Labo as Lardizabal asserts that Labo is an Australian citizen hence disqualified; that he was naturalized as an
Australian after he married an Australian.  Labo avers that his marriage with an Australian did not make him an Australian;
that at best he has dual citizenship, Australian and Filipino; that even if he indeed became an Australian when he married
an Australian citizen, such citizenship was lost when his marriage with the Australian was later declared void for being
bigamous. Labo further asserts that even if he’s considered as an Australian, his lack of citizenship is just a mere
technicality which should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio who voted for him by a vast majority.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Labo can retain his public office.
2. Whether or not Lardizabal, who obtained the second highest vote in the mayoralty race, can replace Labo in the event
Labo is disqualified.
HELD: 1. No. Labo did not question the authenticity of evidence presented against him. He was naturalized as an Australian
in 1976. It was not his marriage to an Australian that made him an Australian. It was his act of subsequently swearing by
taking an oath of allegiance to the government of Australia. He did not dispute that he needed an Australian passport to
return to the Philippines in 1980; and that he was listed as an immigrant here. It cannot be said also that he is a dual
citizen. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. He lost his Filipino
citizenship when he swore allegiance to Australia. He cannot also claim that when he lost his Australian citizenship, he
became solely a Filipino. To restore his Filipino citizenship, he must be naturalized or repatriated or be declared as a
Filipino through an act of Congress – none of this happened.
Labo, being a foreigner, cannot serve public office. His claim that his lack of citizenship should not overcome the will of the
electorate is not tenable. The people of Baguio could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of the Local
Government Code and the Constitution simply by electing a foreigner (curiously, would Baguio have voted for Labo had
they known he is Australian). The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen of
Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as
mayor of their city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.
2. Lardizabal on the other hand cannot assert, through the quo warranto proceeding, that he should be declared the
mayor by reason of Labo’s disqualification because Lardizabal obtained the second highest number of vote. It would be
extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that
public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office,
and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.
 

42
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:

In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently, he ran as a
candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed
office. After his term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his
opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been “removed
from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.

For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again contested. In 1995,
petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila,
placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office.
COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said resolution
was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the petition for
disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed
resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not
override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative
rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be
extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails
because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act
6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word
“may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.

44
Sinaca vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 135691 (1999)
Ponente: Davide

FACTS:

LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD had 2 opposing factions judging the May 11, 1998 elections -- the Barbers wing, which nominated
Grachil G. Canoy and was headed by Robert Barbers, and the Matugas wing, which nominated Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. and
was headed by Francisco Matugas.

Miguel Mula, a candidate for vice-mayor belonging to the Barbers wing filed a petition for disqualification against Teodoro,
a mayoral candidate in Malimono, Surigao del Norte, which COMELEC granted. Consequently, Teodoro filed a motion for
reconsideration. The same date that Teodoro filed a motion for reconsideration, Sinaca Sinaca, an independent candidate,
withdrew his certificate of candidacy, became a member of LAKAS, and ran as the substitute mayoral candidate under the
Matugas wing. As such, he filed another certificate of candidacy, now as mayoral candidate under LAKAS.

On May 11, 1998, Mula filed another petition for disqualification against Sinaca, contending that his nomination as a
substitute candidate is illegal because prior to being a substitute candidate, he was not part of any party; his nomination
bears only the approval of Provincial Chair Matugas, without consultation with the other party membes; and substitution
takes place only when the disqualification of a party results to losing representation, but in this case, LAKAS still had Canoy
as the party's candidate.

On May 28, 1998, COMELEC dismissed Mula's petition and upheld Sinaca's candidacy because Matugas was allowed to
nominate Sinaca as substitute candidate, and that the petition was rendered moot and academic because Sinaca was
already declared winner of the election, and has already taken his oath of office. Eventually, Mula filed a motion for
reconsideration. On October 6, 1998, COMELEC en ban issued a resolution disqualifying Sinaca solely on the basis of being
an independent candidate prior to his nomination as a substitute candidate. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that in the event that an official candidate dies, withdraws or is disqualified on the last day of the filing of
certificates of candidacy, only a person belonging to the same party may replace the candidate.

ISSUE: W/N COMELEC was correct in disqualifying Sinaca

HELD:

NO. Matugas had authority to nominate a candidate without Barbers' concurrence because he was designated as LAKAS
HQ's Deputy Secretary General and National Secretariat Executive Director. Sinaca was also rightfully a member of LAKAS.
The Supreme Court said that "a political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to
select a standard bearer who best represents the party's ideologies and preference. Political parties are generally free to
conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this common-law principle of judicial restraint, uprooted in the
constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public interest by allowing political processes to operate
without undue interference. Thus, the rule is that the determination of disputes as to party nominations rests with the
party, in the absence of statutes giving the court's jurisdiction."

45

46
PNOC-Energy Development Corp. v. NLRC
G.R. No. 100947, May 31, 1993

FACTS: Manuel S. Pineda was employed with the Philippine National Oil Co. - Energy Development Corp. (PNOC-EDC) from
September 17, 1981, when he was hired as clerk, to January 26, 1989, when his employment was terminated. In
November, 1987, while holding the position of Geothermal Construction Secretary, Engineering and Construction
Department at Tongonan Geothermal Project, Ormoc City. Pineda decided to run for councilor of the Municipality of
Kananga, Leyte, in the local elections scheduled in January, 1988, and filed the corresponding certificate of candidacy for
the position. Thereafter, Pineda won the election and was thus proclaimed. Despite so qualifying as councilor, and
assuming his duties as such, he continued working for PNOC-EDC. Legal Department of PNOC rendered an opinion to the
effect that Manuel S. Pineda should be considered ipso facto resigned upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy in
November, 1987, in accordance with Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. 

ISSUE: Whether or not an employee in a government-owned or controlled corporations without an original charter (and
therefore not covered by Civil Service Law) nevertheless falls within the scope of Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.

RULING: When the Congress of the Philippines reviewed the Omnibus Election Code of 1985, Congress made no effort to
distinguish between two classes of government-owned or controlled corporations or their employees in the Omnibus
Election Code or subsequent related statutes, particularly as regards the rule that an any employee "in government-owned
or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy." What all this imports is that Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code applies to officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, even those organized under the general laws on incorporation and
therefore not having an original or legislative charter, and even if they do not fall under the Civil Service Law but under the
Labor Code. In other words, Section 66 constitutes just cause for termination of employment in addition to those set forth
in the Labor Code, as amended.||

47
QUINTO vs COMELEC
The decision was first decided by a slim majority of 8-6, but was eventually reversed 10-5 upon a Motion for
Reconsideration after the retirement of one justice and the appointment of two new ones.

FACTS:
 This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the COMELEC questioning an earlier decision of the Supreme Court
declaring as unconstitutional the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369,
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, mainly on the ground
that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution and suffer from overbreadth.
 The assailed Decision thus paved the way for public appointive officials to continue discharging the powers,
prerogatives and functions of their office notwithstanding their entry into the political arena.
 Section 4 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 provides that, “Any person holding a public appointive office or
position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the
filing of his certificate of candidacy.”
 Petitioners of the above-entitled case are appointive officials who intend to be elected in the previously held 2010
elections and who felt aggrieved by the issuance of the questioned resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not 3rd Sec. 13 of RA 9369, Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and Section 4 (a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are unconstitutional.

HELD: NO.
 These provisions satisfy the requisites of the equal protection test, especially the second requirement that it must
be germane to the purposes of the law.
 It was emphasized that the purpose of the law is to defer to the sovereign will of the people by letting elective
officials serve until the end of the terms for which they were elected notwithstanding the filing of their certificates
of candidacy.
 On the contrary, the automatic resignation rule was imposed upon appointive officials because unlike elected
politicians, “appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging
in any partisan political activity or from taking part in any election, except to vote” (Sec. 55 of the Administrative
Code of 1987).
 It is settled that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The test used is reasonableness which requires that:
1. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
2. It is germane to the purposes of the law;
3. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. It applies equally to all members of the same class.
 Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.

48

GO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

GO vs. COMELEC
357 SCRA 739, 2001

Facts: Petitioner was the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte when she filed on February 27,
2001 with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of the
said municipality. 

On February 28, 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at
Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the
provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor. However, the provincial election
supervisor refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A,
she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for
mayor. 

Private respondents filed similar petitions to disqualify petitioner on the ground that petitioner filed certificates of
candidacy for two positions, namely, that for mayor, and that for governor, thus, making her ineligible for both. 

The COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the petitioner from running for both position. 

Issue: Whether or not an affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy should be filed with the election officer of the place where
the certificate of candidacy was filed.

Held: No. There is nothing in Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal
must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed
directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the
provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal
election officer of the said municipality. While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A requires
that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such
requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience.

49
De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union

De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers of La Union

48 Phil 211

Facts:

Tomas De Guzman filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court seeking to compel the Board of Canvassers of
La Union to annul the votes counted in favor of Juan Lucero and to declare him as the duly elected governor of La Union
based on the fact that certificate of candidacy filed by Juan Lucero was not made under oath in violation of Sec. 404 of the
Election Law. Lucero filed a motion to dismiss the petition on 3 grounds namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction on
the subject-matter of the complaint; (2) that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of the members of the board of
canvassers; and (3) the petition failed to state a cause of action. 

Issue:

WON the failure of Lucero in filing his certificate of candidacy under oath was fatal to his proclamation as the duly elected
governor of La Union 

Held:

No. The seeming irregularity in the filing of Lucero’s certificate of candidacy does not invalidate his election for the
fundamental reason that after it was proven by the count of the votes that Juan T. Lucero had obtained the majority of the
legal votes, the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality consisting in that his certificate of candidacy had
not been properly sworn to. In the case of Gardiner vs. Romulo, it was held that The provisions of the Election Law
declaring that a certain irregularity in an election procedure is fatal to the validity of the ballot or of the returns, or when
the purpose and spirit of the law would be plainly defeated by a substantial departure from the prescribed method, are
mandatory. When the Election Law does not provide that a departure from a prescribed form will be fatal and such
departure has been due to an honest mistake or misinterpretation of the Election Law on the part of him who was
obligated to observe it, and such departure has not been used as a means for fraudulent practices or for the intimidation
of voters, and it is clear that there has been a free and honest expression of the popular will, the law will be held directory
and such departure will be considered a harmless irregularity. And in Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, it was held that he rules and
regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after
the election, they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory,
innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various and numerous provisions of the
Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that
object. When the voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers
appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not done their duty. The law
provides a remedy, by criminal action, against them. They should be prosecuted criminally, and the will of the honest
voter, as expressed through his ballot, should be protected and upheld. 

Hence, even if the legal provision in question is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would have
been fatal to the recognition of the status of Juan T. Lucero as candidate but because the people have already expressed
their will honestly, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that Lucero who was certified by the provincial
secretary to be a legal candidate for the office of provincial governor has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.

50
MONROY V CA
G.R. No. L-232558 July 1, 1967 J. Bengzon DILAG
petitioners Roberto Monroy
respondents CA and Felipe del Rosario
summary Incumbent mayor filed COC as representative of the 1 st district of Rizal. Such COC was
subsequently withdrawn. Vice Mayor took oath of office as municipal mayor, alleging that the old
mayor automatically forfeited his position upon filing of the COC. The Court first ruled that Sec. 27
of the Rev. Election Code1 makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing
of the certificate of for another office. The Court then laid the general rule that the rightful
incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter
during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and
under color of title that applies in the present case.

facts of the case

Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal
September 15, 1961: Filed his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal
September 18: Petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy, which the Comelec approved.
September 21: Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that
petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.
Petitioner then filed a suit for injunction (CFI Rizal) against respondent, which held that:
(a) The former had ceased to be mayor of Navotas, Rizal, after his certificate of candidacy was filed;
(b) Respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor upon his having assumed office as such;
(c) Petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from
September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office; and
(d) Petitioner must pay respondent P1,000.00 as moral damages.
CA: Affirmed in toto except for the award of moral damages, which was eliminated.

1
Sec. 27. Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other then the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
issue
WON the TC and CA had jurisdiction to rule on decisions made by the COMELEC. Ha? Eh wala namang COMELEC ruling
dito!
WON the filing of the COC and its subsequent withdrawal amounted to a forfeiture of his current seat. YES.

ratio
WRT jurisdiction of the regular courts
There appears to be no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC on any administrative question or controversy. There
was no dispute before the Commission. Respondent never contested the filing of petitioner's COC neither has he disputed
the withdrawal thereof.
Assuming there was a controversy before the COMELEC, the same did not and could not possibly have anything to do
with the conduct of elections. What the parties are actually controverting is whether or not petitioner was still the
municipal mayor after September 15, 1961. This purely legal dispute has absolutely no bearing or effect on the conduct of
the elections for the seat of Congressman for the first district of Rizal.
The election can go on irrespective of whether petitioner is considered resigned from his position of municipal mayor
or not. So when petitioner withdrew the certificate announcing his candidacy for Congressman, he was no longer
interested in running for that seat. The issue on the forfeiture of his present position and the possible legal effect thereon
by the withdrawal of his certificate was completely out of the picture. Hence, that purely legal question properly fell within
the cognizance of the courts.

WRT the effect of filing and withdrawal of the COC

The withdrawal of a COC does not restore a candidate to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code 2 makes
the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of for another office. Only the moment
and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or
appointment can restore the ousted official.
Contention: My COC was filed without my knowledge and consent!
SC: It nowhere appears that the COMELEC’s resolution expressly invalidated the certificate. The withdrawal of a COC
does not necessarily render the certificate void ab initio. Once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain
even if the COC itself be subsequently withdrawn. Moreover, both the TC and CA expressly found that the COC was filed
with petitioner's knowledge and consent. Since the nature of the remedy would allow a discussion of purely legal
questions only, such fact is deemed conceded.

Contention: CA erred in affirming the judgment requiring petitioner to pay actual damages (salaries he was allegedly
entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the date of vacation of his office as mayor)
SC: Rodriguez v. Tan3 is not applicable here for absence of factual and legal similarities. Such case requires that the
candidate duly proclaimed must assume office notwithstanding a protest filed against him and can retain the
compensation paid during his incumbency. But the case at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective official who will be
ousted because of an election contest. The present case involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the
incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice-mayor because of the operation of Sec. 27 of the Rev.
Election Code.

Court then laid the general rule that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the
salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith
and under color of title that applies in the present case.
Rationale: For the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging
the duties of an office without being lawful officers.

As applied: Here, the issue is the possession of title, not of the office. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the
period of his wrongful retention of the public office.

51
Monsale v. Nico
G.R. No. L-2539, May 28, 1949

FACTS: Jose F. Monsale withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but, on November 7, attempted to
revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The Commission on Elections, however, ruled on November 8 that the protestant
could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed
that the protestee Paulino M. Nico received 2,291 votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao, 126, votes; and the
protestant Jose F. Monsale, none, evidently because the votes cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that
he was not a registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
2
Sec. 27. Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other then the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
3
A senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed office but was later on ousted in an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of
senator, and can retain the emoluments received even as against the successful protestant.
ISSUE: Whether or not a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate of candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his
letter of withdrawal or by filing a new certificate of candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filing of such
certificate.||| 

RULING: There is no question as to the right of a candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of candidacy, there
being no legal prohibition against such withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-one days before the election, the
protestant ceased to be a candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of fact the boards of election inspectors of
the municipality of Miagao were duly notified of his withdrawal. His letter to the Commission on Elections dated
November 6, 1947, which the subscribed and swore to before a notary public on November 7, whereby he withdrew his
withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having been
filed only four days before the election, could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such
certificate should be filed at least sixty days before the election.||| 

52
Recabo v Comelec

FACTS:

On March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Mainit, Surigao Del Norte
under the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP (LAKAS). His nomination is evidence by the certificate of nomination and acceptance
signed by Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of the said political
party.

On April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claiming to be the official candidate of LAKAS as vice-mayor of the same
municipality, also filed his certificate of candidacy. Recabo submitted to the Comelec a copy of the certificate of his
nomination and acceptance signed only by one representative of LAKAS, Francisco T. Matugas. The space of the other
representative (Robert Z. Barbers) is blank.

Reyes filed with the Comelec a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Recabo, alleging that Recabo is a
substitute candidate of his mother, Candelaria B. Recabo. Reyes submits that since the certificate of nomination and
acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not signed by Robert Barbers, there is no valid nomination by LAKAS in
favor of Candelaria. Therefore, Candelaria not having been validly nominated, should be deemed an independent
candidate only. And since Candelaria is an independent candidate, she cannot be validly substituted because under Sec.
11 of Comelec Res. No. 2977 promulgated on January 15, 1998, “no substitution shall be allowed for an independent
candidate.”

Comelec cancelled the certificate of candidacy of Recabo. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Hence, Recabo filed before the SC a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that: 1) His certificate of candidacy and
that of his mother whom he substituted substantially complied with the requirements of being official candidate of the
LAKAS; 2) The people of Mainit have spoken loud and clear in his favor by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes
or 12% of the votes cast for both of them; and, 3) By cancelling his certificate of candidacy, Comelec acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s certificate of nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP is valid?

NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5 thereof: “The certificate of nomination by registered political
parties of their official candidates shall be filed with the certificates of candidacy not later than the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy as specified in Section 4 hereof, duly signed and attested under oath by the party president,
chairman, secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so.”

Pursuant to said resolution, the political party of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP issued an `Authorization’ designating two (2) Party
officers to nominate, sign, attest under oath and issue the Official Certificates of Nomination, namely, Francisco T.
Matugas and Robert Ace S. Barbers. Consistent with the foregoing, the certificate of nomination and acceptance, as
pointed out by the Comelec, requires the joint signing of the two party officers.

The certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as his mother did not comply with the requirements of being
official candidates of LAKAS Party. The certificate of nomination was invalid because it was signed only by one authorized
party officer as compared to Reyes’ which was signed by the National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of
said political party.

Moreover, the chronology of events would still call for the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy to curb
the evil that the Comelec sought to abate pursuant to its mandate to hold free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections. As the respondent Commission stated, “to allow respondent to run under the circumstances adverted to
herein would put the election process in mockery and disrepute for we would in effect be allowing an anomalous
situation where a single political party may field-in multiple candidates for a single election position.”

It will be recalled that the mother of herein petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy on March 25, 1998 and later
withdrew the same on March 31, 1998. In the meantime, Reyes, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on March 27, 1998.
Thereafter, Recabo, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy on April 2, 1998, in substitution of his mother who had withdrawn
earlier.

Assuming all three candidates were fielded-in by the same political party, at the time petitioner Recabo, Jr. filed his
certificate of candidacy there was no more void to fill in as respondent Reyes, Jr. had already filed his
certificate of candidacy as official candidate of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. Verily, there was no more vacancy to be
substituted for. Disunity and discord amongst members of a political party should not be allowed to create a mockery
of our electoral process, which envisions one candidate from a political party for each position.

ISSUE: Whether or not a certificate of votes is sufficient to establish the results of the election.

To put matters in the proper perspective, we shall resolve the second issue first that the “electorate has spoken loud and
clear in favor of petitioner by giving him a resounding majority of 1,102 votes or 12% of the votes cast for both of them”.
Petitioner, in effect, argues that the “popular will as clearly expressed in votes cast and counted should prevail, such that
the election of a candidate cannot be annulled because of formal defects in his certificate.”

Recabo submitted a ‘Certified List of Candidates with their Votes Obtained’ and an undated `Certified List of Winning
Candidates’ both signed by the Acting Election Officer and Election Officer-OIC, respectively.

In Garay vs. Commission on Elections, we had occasion to rule that: “xxx. According to Section 17, a certificate of
votes can only be “evidence to prove tampering, alteration, falsification or any other anomaly committed in the
election returns concerned, when duly authenticated x x x.” A certificate of votes does not constitute sufficient
evidence of the true and genuine results of the election; only election returns are.”

In like manner, neither is the certified list of winning candidates sufficient evidence of the real results of the election.
Moreover, the certificate of votes submitted does not conform with Section 16 of R.A. 6646. It does not state the
number of votes obtained in words; it does not state the number of the precinct, the total number of voters who voted
in the precinct and the time issued. Most importantly, it was merely certified true and correct by a certain Lydia P.
Mahinay as acting election officer. As aforequoted, Section 16 of R.A. 6646 requires that the certificate of votes be
signed and thumbmarked by each member of the board of election inspectors.

Thus, the doctrine that a mere technicality cannot be used to frustrate the people’s will finds no application in the
case at bar considering that the results of the election have not been duly established.

ISSUE: Should Reyes be proclaimed winner and assume the position of vice-mayor being the second highest winning
candidate?

No. A certificate of votes is not sufficient to establish the true and genuine results of the election. A certificate of
canvass issued on the basis of the election returns is required to proclaim the elected candidate. It is settled that the
disqualification or non-qualification of the winner in a vice mayoralty race does not justify the proclamation of the
defeated candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes. To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer
is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under the
circumstances.

ISSUE: How then the vacancy should be filled up?

The vacancy due to the ineligibility of herein petitioner should be filled up in accordance with Section 44 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 which provides that the highest ranking sanggunian member shall become the vice-mayor.
(G.R. No. 134293, June 21, 1999)

53
Silverio Tagolino v HRET (G.R. No. 202202, March 19, 2013)

FACTS:
 Richard Gomez filed his Certificate of Candidacy seeking the Congressional office of the House of Representatives
for the 4th District of Leyte.
 In his CoC, he indicated that he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng Ormoc City.
 Bueneventura Juntilla, one of the opposing candidates, questioned the residence indicated in the CoC before the
COMELEC.
 Juntilla argued that, Richard is a resident of Colgate St, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila and not of
Can-adieng Ormoc City

COMELEC 1st division ruling:

 It granted Juntilla's petition without any qualification. And in its dispositive portion it stated, "Richard Gomez is
DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of Congresssman, Fourt District of Leyte, for lack of residency
requirement"

Lucy Torres-Gomez then filed her CoC together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party
endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate of her husband Richard wherein the COMELEC En Banc
approved such substitution.

COMELEC En Banc's ruling:

 It held that the disqualification does not automatically cancel one's CoC and the political party is still allowed to
substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified.

Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration from the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc. Pending the resolution of the
motion, the elections were held and the name of Richard Gomez remained in the ballots which garnered majority of the
votes. Due to the approved substitution by the COMELEC, votes for Richard were credited in favor of Lucy and she was
proclaimed the Representative of the 4th District of Leyte

Juntilla opposed and filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET arguing that, Lucy did not validly substitute
Richard because his CoC was void ab initio.

HRET ruling:
 It dismissed Juntilla's petition and declared the substitution as valid
 It also said that the COMELEC 1st Division's resolution spoke of disqualification and not the cancellation of the CoC

Juntilla filed for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
  Was there a valid substitution? And as a consequence of such substitution, was Lucy Torres-Gomez validly elected
as a representative of the 4th District of Leyte? NO

HELD:

A valid CoC as a condition sine que non for the substitution of candidate

 Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that, if an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same
political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified
 Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate substitution proceeds.
 As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an
elective public office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties.
 Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate.

Effect of Sec 68 and Sec 78 on candidate substitution under Sec 77

 Sec 684 speaks of a disqualification of the candidate based on the election offenses enumerated therein while Sec
78 speaks of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC based on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the
material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough there was lack of qualification
but there was also a false representation in the CoC.

 And under Sec 68, a person disqualified can be validly substituted pursuant to Sec 77 because he remains a
candidate but is ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction by the commission of the
election offenses enumerated in Sec 68.
 But a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Sec 78 cannot be substituted
because he is not considered a candidate. Hence, being a cancelled CoC it is considered void ab initio and thus
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and valid votes.

 In this case, there was confusion as to the word "disqualified" in the resolution of the COMELEC 1st division, which
was also adopted by the COMELEC En Banc and HRET.
 But it must be noted that Richard's "disqualification" was due to his failure to comply with the residency
requirement and misrepresenting his residence which is a ground for denial due course to and/or cancellation of
CoC under Sec 78.
 Hence, there was no valid substitution and Lucy Torres Gomez was not a bona fide candidate for the position
when she ran for office, which means she could not have been elected.

54

4
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
(b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or
made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc,
subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
 Cipriano v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 158830, August 10, 2004

FACTS: On June 7, 2002, petitioner filed with the COMELEC her certificate of candidacy as Chairman of the  Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) for the SK elections held on July 15, 2002. On the date of the elections, July 15, 2002, the COMELEC issued
a resolution denying due course to or cancel the certificates of candidacy of several candidates for the SK elections,
including petitioner, stating that those affected were not registered voters in the barangay where they intended to run. 
Petitioner, nonetheless, was allowed to vote in the July 15 SK elections and her name was not deleted from the official
list of candidates. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner was proclaimed by the Barangay Board of Canvassers the duly
elected SK Chairman of Barangay 38, Pasay City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on its own, in the exercise of its power to enforce and
administer election laws, look into the qualifications of a candidate and cancel his certificate of candidacy on the ground
that he lacks the qualifications prescribed by law.

RULING: The Commission may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy filed in due form. When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge its receipt. This is provided in Sec. 76 of the Omnibus Election Code. While the Commission
may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into matters not appearing on their face. The question of
eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.
55
G.R. Nos. 154796-97             October 23, 2003
RAYMUNDO A. BAUTISTA @ "OCA", petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JOSEFINA P. JAREÑO, HON.
MAYOR RAYMUND M. APACIBLE, FRANCISCA C. RODRIGUEZ, AGRIPINA B. ANTIG, MARIA G. CANOVAS, and DIVINA
ALCOREZA, respondents.

FACTS:
On 10 June 2002, Bautista filed his certificate of candidacy for Punong Barangay in Lumbangan for the 15 July
2002 barangay elections. Election Officer Josefina P. Jareño ("Election Officer Jareño") refused to accept Bautista's
certificate of candidacy because he was not a registered voter in Lumbangan. On 11 June 2002, Bautista filed an action
for mandamus against Election Officer Jareño with the Regional Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 14 ("trial court"). 3 On 1
July 2002, the trial court ordered Election Officer Jareño to accept Bautista's certificate of candidacy and to include his
name in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. The trial court ruled that Section 7 (g) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 4801 mandates Election Officer Jareño to include the name of Bautista in the certified list of candidates
until the COMELEC directs otherwise. In compliance with the trial court's order, Election Officer Jareño included Bautista
in the certified list of candidates for Punong Barangay. At the same time, Election Officer Jareño referred the matter of
Bautista's inclusion in the certified list of candidates with the COMELEC Law Department on 5 July 2002. On 11 July 2002,
the COMELEC Law Department recommended the cancellation of Bautista's certificate of candidacy since he was not
registered as a voter in Lumbangan. The COMELEC en banc failed to act on the COMELEC Law Department's
recommendation before the barangay elections on 15 July 2002.
During the 15 July 2002 barangay elections, Bautista and private respondent Divina Alcoreza ("Alcoreza") were
candidates for the position of Punong Barangay in Lumbangan. Bautista obtained the highest number of votes (719)
while Alcoreza came in second with 522 votes, or a margin of 197 votes. Thus, the Lumbangan Board of Canvassers
("Board of Canvassers")7 proclaimed Bautista as the elected Punong Barangay.

ISSUE:
Whether it was proper to proclaim Alcoreza as Punong Barangay in view of the alleged disqualification of the winning
candidate Bautista.

HELD:
Under the Revised Administrative Code,33 one of the qualifications of an elective municipal officer is that he must be a
"qualified voter" in his municipality. Section 2174 of the Revised Administrative Code reads:
Section 2174. Qualifications of elective municipal officer. - An elective municipal officer must, at the time of the election,
be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein for at least one year, and must not be less
than twenty-three years of age. He must also be able to read and write intelligently either English, Spanish, or the local
dialect. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under the Republic Act No. 2370, 34 otherwise known as the Barrio Charter, a candidate for the barrio
council35 must be a "qualified elector." Section 8 of the Barrio Charter reads:
Section 8. Qualifications for election to the barrio council. - Candidates for election to the barrio council:
(a) Must be a qualified elector and must have been a resident of the barrio for at least six months prior to the election;
and
(b) Must not have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or of a crime which carries a penalty of at least
one year imprisonment. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in the 1958 case of Rocha v. Cordis, the Court held that a candidate for an elective municipal office did not have to
be a registered voter in the municipality to qualify to run for an elective municipal office. Citing the earlier case of Yra v.
Abaño, the Court ruled that the words "qualified elector" meant a person who had all the qualifications provided by law
to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list. In the same vein, the term "qualified" when applied to a
voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter.
However, under the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, an elective local official,
including a Punong Barangay, must not only be a "qualified elector" or a "qualified voter," he must also be a registered
voter. It is thus clear that Bautista was remiss in his duty to ensure his right to vote and to be voted for public office. As
early as 2001, he was already aware that his name was no longer included in the roster of registered voters. Yet, Bautista
chose not to register anew that year despite his knowledge that he needed to register as a voter in the barangay to run
for the office of Punong Barangay.
Bautista alleges that his non-registration as a voter of Barangay Lumbangan was due to the refusal of Election Officer
Jareño to register him sometime in January 2002. 41 Aside from his bare allegation that he tried to register in January
2002, Bautista did not proffer any other proof like a duly accomplished application form for registration to substantiate
his claim that he indeed attempted to register anew. SC affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner
ineligible for the elective position as Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent
commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A
democratic government is necessarily a government of laws.
56
DELA CRUZ vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 192221, November 13, 2012

Issue:
With the adoption of automated election system in our country, one of the emerging concerns is the application of the
law on nuisance candidates under a new voting system wherein voters indicate their choice of candidates by shading the
oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate printed on the ballots, instead of writing the candidate's
name on the appropriate space provided in the ballots as in previous manual elections. If the name of a nuisance
candidate whose certificate of candidacy had been cancelled by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) was still
included or printed in the official ballots on election day, should the votes cast for such nuisance candidate be
considered stray or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?

Facts:
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution No. 8844 considering as stray the
votes cast in favor of certain candidates who were either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due
course but whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates for the May 10, 2010
elections.
During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010,
Casimira insisted that the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC refused, citing
Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-Mayor of Antique-Bugasong  showed the following
results of the voting:
TOTAL RANK
DELA CRUZ, AURELIO N. 532 3
DELA CRUZ, CASIMIRA S. 6389 2
PACETE, JOHN LLOYD M. 6428 1
Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by the MBOC of Bugasong.
Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that she would have
clearly won the elections for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast for Aurelio
to her votes.

Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
It bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases and not to petitions to cancel
or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material
representation shown to be false). Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates, or other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide
intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate" are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money
or material consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral functions, election
campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40  of Republic
Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification under Section 68 and a petition to
cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by
different rules and have distinct outcomes.
At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78" petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a
"Section 68" petition. They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities. x
xx
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC,
or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While
a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed
a CoC. Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68
can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a
person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he/she is
never considered a candidate. (Additional emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Said
votes cannot be counted in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at
all, as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose COC was cancelled or denied due
course be considered stray?
The foregoing rule regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final judgment
was applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the
same surname with the bona fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the COMELEC
rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998, it denied his motion for reconsideration only on
May 13, 1998 or three days after the election. We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on
orders of the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence are not really stray votes.
These separate tallies actually made the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a
potential nuisance candidate.
But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was not yet final on electionday,
this Court also considered those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray votes" refer
to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We
further noted that the voters had constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting Edwin
Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real intention of the voter. This is,
however, not the situation in the case at bar. Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper
releases and other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s decision to declare Edwin Bautista
a nuisance candidate.
In the more recent case of Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,  this Court likewise applied the rule
in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor
of the bona fide candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably
exposes the bona fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter’s will and frustrates
the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the
Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with
the electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other forms of notification on the day of
election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present in this case, if not worse,
considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or"C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than
sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after the recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010 elections. On the basis of
Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner.
COMELEC’s changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the invalidation of significant number
of votes and the loss of petitioner to private respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez:
Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter. The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing
field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him
invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a similar surname. Any delay on the part of
the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray
votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by
nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010
elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is
the apparent failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate
determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. x xx
COMELEC justified the issuance of Resolution No. 8844 to amend the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 by
enumerating those changes brought about by the new automated election system to the form of official ballots, manner
of voting and counting of votes. It said that the substantial distinctions between manual and automated elections validly
altered the rules on considering the votes cast for the disqualified or nuisance candidates. As to the rulings in Bautista
and Martinez III, COMELEC opines that these find no application in the case at bar because the rules on appreciation of
ballotsapply only to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots.
The Court is not persuaded.
In Martinez III, we took judicial notice of the reality that, especially in local elections, political rivals or operators
benefited from the usually belated decisions by COMELEC on petitions to cancel or deny due course to COCs of potential
nuisance candidates. In such instances, political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to
write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, but still, election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
As far as COMELEC is concerned, the confusion caused by similarity of surnames of candidates for the same
position and putting the electoral process in mockery or disrepute, had already been rectified by the new voting system
where the voter simply shades the oval corresponding to the name of their chosen candidate. However, as shown in this
case, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8844 on May 1, 2010, nine days before the elections, with sufficient time to delete
the names of disqualified candidates not just from the Certified List of Candidates but also from the Official Ballot.
Indeed, what use will it serve if COMELEC orders the names of disqualified candidates to be deleted from list of official
candidates if the official ballots still carry their names?
We hold that the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as
such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate has the same surname as that of the legitimate
candidate, notstray but counted in favor of the latter, remains a good law.
Moreover, private respondent admits that the voters were properly informed of the cancellation of COC of
Aurelio because COMELEC published the same before election day. As we pronounced in Bautista, the voters’
constructive knowledge of such cancelled candidacy made their will more determinable, as it is then more logical to
conclude that the votes cast for Aurelio could have been intended only for the legitimate candidate. The possibility of
confusion in names of candidates if the names of nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot
be discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially considering that voters who mistakenly
shaded the oval beside the name of the nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for
could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.
Finally, upholding the former rule in Resolution No. 4116 is more consistent with the rule well-ensconced in our
jurisprudence that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. Indeed, as our electoral experience had demonstrated, such infirmities and delays in the delisting of nuisance
candidates from both the Certified List of Candidates and Official Ballots only made possible the very evil sought to be
prevented by the exclusion of nuisance candidates during elections.

57
G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002
o If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification case, the proclamation of the candidate
cannot divest Comelec en banc of its jurisdiction to review its validity
o Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning candidate

FACTS:

Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition for
disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the
equipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codilla’s name remained in
the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his proclamation as
winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and
ordered disqualified.

Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative and subsequently
took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and also sought the
annulment of Locsin’s proclamation.

ISSUES:

o Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative

o Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative

RULING:

First. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed
by the petitioner.

xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his
proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of
the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis
for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.

xxx

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the
COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the
matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a
candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of
the House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the
very COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or
decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having
obtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident
that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the
petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the
respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus
“when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.” For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and
that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same
requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House
of Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the
public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the
proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its
Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been
challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by
the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision
be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

58
WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents (DIGEST)

G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:

In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently, he ran as a
candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed
office. After his term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his
opponents who wanted to dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been “removed
from office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.

For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again contested. In 1995,
petitioner Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered
the parties to submit their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of
Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office.

COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said resolution
was later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the petition for
disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed
resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not
override, but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law
prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of
Rep. Act 6646, the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed
the word “may,” it is, therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in
its rules.

Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit.

59
Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

FACTS:
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan
Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and
features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and
enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially section 5.4 which provides that surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published 7 days before the election.

SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels
and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to
publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint

RULING/RATIO:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press.

The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to
reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among
candidates.

Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the O’brient test for
content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials,
etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can e
protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.

Note: Justice Kapunan’s dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use
in order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and
balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of
the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other considerations (for example, prevention of last
minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.
60
Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147571 May 5, 2001

FACTS:
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys in various fields. Kamahalan
Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and
features items of information including election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the validity and
enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially section 5.4 which provides that surveys affecting national
candidates shall not be published 15 days before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be
published 7 days before the election.

SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections both at the national and local levels
and release to the media the results of such survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to
publish election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of
freedom of speech without any clear and present danger to justify such restraint

RULING/RATIO:
Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of speech, expression, and the
press.

The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal opportunity, time, space, and the right to
reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among
candidates.

Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this section pass the O’brient test for
content related regulation because (1) it suppresses one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials,
etc.; and (2) the restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the interest can e
protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.

Note: Justice Kapunan’s dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and present danger is inappropriate to use
in order to test the validity of this section. Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and
balancing the circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the free enjoyment of
the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the other considerations (for example, prevention of last
minute pressure on voters) should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.

61
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133486 Jan. 28, 2000 Panganiban,J. Bec
petitioners ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
respondents Commission on Elections
summary COMELEC prohibited the conduct of exit polls by ABS-CBN on the ground of clear and present
danger it poses to the integrity of elections. However the court said that it erred in such measure
because it violates freedom of speech and freedom of press by making an overbroad resolution as
it prohibits the long-tern use of such data on research.
facts of the case
COMELEC released a resolution which approved the issuance of a restraining order against ABS-CBN to conduct exit
survey. It acted upon reports that the network plans to conduct a TV-radio coverage of the elections and make an exit
survey of the votes cast for Pres and VP and broadcast the results immediately.
SC issued a TRO against the resolution of COMELEC and the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media.

Arguments:
ABS-CBN: Holding exit polls and nationwide reporting of results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the
press. COMELEC committed GAD when it issued such resolution

COMELEC: 1. The conduct of exit polls might confuse the voters and unduly influence them.
2. Exit surveys indirectly violate the sanctity of ballots as enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 2 Art. 5) because the voters
will be lured to reveal their votes.
3. Exit surveys pose a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process
because the media is not supervised by any gov’t agency which can easily be manipulated.

issue
WON COMELEC in the exercise of its powers can ban exit polls? NO. The measure is overbroad and unnecessarily restricts
fundamental rights of speech and of press.

ratio
The Constitution mandates that no law shall be passed abridging freedom of speech and press. These freedoms
basically consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.
(Gonzales v. COMELEC) It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust and wide open.
There are limitations however to this freedom in which the state, in the exercise of its police power, can curtail
whenever these tests are satisfied:
1. Clear and present danger rule – the evil consequence of comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence must be extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the substantive evil sought to be prevented.
2. Dangerous tendency rule -  If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. Note that the words need not be
definite so as to incite the listeners to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness.
The court adheres to the clear and present danger rule which is a question on the proximity and degree of the utterance
will result to the danger or evil sought to be avoided. This is a heavy burden because the court is always on the side of
freedom of expression. To justify restriction, the promotion of substantial govt interest must be clearly shown. And even
when its purpose are legitimate and substantial, the means employed should not be broad as to stifle personal liberties
when the end can be more narrowly achieved.
In this case, the freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed
is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. The interest being protected
is the fundamental right to vote and securing its sanctity through the ballots. However the means employed are necessarily
broad because it effectively prevents other uses of exit poll data – for long term research purposes.
COMELEC tried to justify the restraint in arguing that such conduct of exit polls present a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of electoral process. (na unreliable and surveys and might conflict with the count of
COMELEC and NAMFREL) However its arguments are purely speculative. Why?
1. Because in a survey, the participants are randomly selected so the results will be a representation or reflection of
the general sentiment of the community.
2. It is merely an opinion of the community or group polled. Its result is not meant to replace or be at par with the
official COMELEC count.

COMELEC ‘s restriction on exit polls is overly broad. Its application is without qualification whether the exit polls is
disruptive or not. And assuming arguendo that there is such qualification, there is no showing that exit polls will cause chaos
in voting centers. The absolute prohibition restricts the future use of valuable information for long-term research on the
impact of current events on the voting behavior of people.
ABS-CBN even explained its methodology which has enough precautions against the evils enumerated by COMELEC:
(1) communities are randomly selected in each province;
(2) residences to be polled in such communities are also chosen at random;
(3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown by the indelible ink on their fingers, are interviewed;
 (4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort;
(5) the poll results are released to the public only on the day after the elections

And lastly, on the issue of violation of ballot secrecy, the court said that such is not at issue here. The exit poll dies not
seek to access the ballots of the interviewees. The contents of their ballots are not exposed. Even the choice of revealing
who they voted for is not mandatory but voluntary.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are
prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from
putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by
particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the
association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance
with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and
confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for.

62
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days after, the petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed
upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures because he
was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner speculates that
"it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost".

Issue:
Whether or not a candidate is excused in filing his statement of contributions and expenditures after he has withdrawn his
certificate of candidacy.

Held:
The petition is dismissed. The court ruled that the filing or withdrawal of certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever
civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred. Petitioner’s withdrawal of his candidacy did
not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine. It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has
accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented
by the law is not all too remote. Courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing.

63

64 BANAT v. COMELEC same with 32

65 Garvida v. Sales same with 4
66 Dominador Jalosjos Jr v. COMELEC

FACTS:

Jalosjos and Cardino were candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte in the May 2010 elections.
Jalosjos was running for his third term. Cardino filed a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to deny due
course and to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Jalosjos. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy when he declared under oath that he was eligible for the Office of Mayor.

Cardino claimed that long before Jalosjos filed his certificate of candidacy, Jalosjos had already been convicted by
final judgment for robbery and sentenced to prisión mayor by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 (RTC) of Cebu City, in
Criminal Case No. CCC-XIV-140-CEBU. Cardino asserted that Jalosjos has not yet served his sentence. Jalosjos admitted his
conviction but stated that he had already been granted probation. Cardino countered that the RTC revoked Jalosjos’
probation in an Order dated 19 March 1987. Jalosjos refuted Cardino and stated that the RTC issued an Order dated 5
February 2004 declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation. Jalosjos further stated that during the
2004 elections the COMELEC denied a petition for disqualification filed against him on the same grounds.

Circuit Criminal Court of Cebu City found Jalosjos and his co-accused guilty of. Jalosjos appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed and after several years filed a Petition for Probation. It was granted but then,
on motion filed by his Probation Officer, Jalosjos’ probation was revoked and a warrant for his arrest was issued.
Surprisingly, the Parole and Probation Administrator Gregorio F. Bacolod issued a Certification attesting that respondent
Jalosjos, Jr., had already fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation. The said Certification was the one used by
respondent Jalosjos to secure the dismissal of the disqualification case filed against him by Adasa. The Commission on the
decision of the Sandiganbayan found Gregorio F. Bacolod, former Administrator of the Parole and Probation Administration,
guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for issuing a falsified Certification on December 19, 2003 attesting to the fact
that respondent Jalosjos had fully complied with the terms and conditions of his probation.

The COMELEC First Division granted Cardino’s petition and cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. The
COMELEC First Division concluded that "Jalosjos has indeed committed material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy when he declared, under oath, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to when in fact he is not by
reason of a final judgment in a criminal case, the sentence of which he has not yet served. the COMELEC En Banc denied
Jalosjos’ motion for reconsideration.

Jalosjos is disqualified to run for an elective position or to hold public office. His proclamation as the elected mayor
in the May 10, 2010 election does not deprive the Commission of its authority to resolve the present petition to its finality,
and to oust him from the office he now wrongfully holds.

Jalosjos filed his petition on August 21, 2010, docketed as G.R. No. 193237, while Cardino filed his petition on
September 17, 2010, docketed G.R. No. 193536. On February 22, 2011, the Court issued a resolution dismissing the former
resolution. ( G.R. No. 193237). Cardino filed a Manifestation on March 17, 2011 praying that the Court take judicial notice of
its resolution in G.R.No. 193237. Jalosjos filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 22, 2011.

On March 29, 2011, this Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 193536 with G.R. No. 193237, Jalosjos then filed a
Manifestation on June 1, 2012 which stated that “he resigned from the position of Mayor of the City of Dapitan effective
April 30, 2012, which resignation was accepted by the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, Atty. Roalando E.
Yebes.” Jalosjos’ resignation was made “in deference with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to his
candidacy as Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur in May 2013.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jalosjos make a false statement of a material fact in his certificate of candidacy when he stated under oath
that he was eligible to run for mayor?

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction
by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any
public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time, and all votes for
Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab initio, Cardino, as the only qualified
candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. A false statement in a certificate of
candidacy that a candidate is eligible to run for public office is a false material representation which is a ground for a
petition under Section 78 of the same Code. Conviction for robbery by final judgment with the penalty of prisión mayor, to
which perpetual special disqualification attaches by operation of law, is not a ground for a petition under Section 68
because robbery is not one of the offenses enumerated in Section 68. Insofar as crimes are concerned, Section 68 refers
only to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code and not to crimes under the Revised Penal Code.

This Court has already ruled that offenses punished in laws other than in the Omnibus Election Code cannot be a
ground for a petition under Section 68. In Codilla, Sr. v. de Venecia, the Court declared: The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to
disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses
are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.They are criminal and not administrative in nature.

What is indisputably clear is that the false material representation of Jalosjos is a ground for a petition under
Section 78. However, since the false material representation arises from a crime penalized by prisión mayor, a petition
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code can also be properly filed. The
petitioner has a choice whether to anchor his petition on Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code. The law expressly provides multiple remedies and the choice of which remedy to
adopt belongs to the petitioner.

The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of
ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes. 21 Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for
Mayor. . The law itself bars the convict from running for public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of the court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government
agencies tasked to implement the final judgment under the law.

Thus, the Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 193237 is DENIED, and the Petition in G.R. No. 193536 is
GRANTED.
67
Ampatuan, et al. vs. COMELEC
G. R. No. 149803.   January 31, 2002

The petitioners were proclaimed victorious in the May 14, 2001 Maguindanao Provincial election after the order suspending
such proclamation was lifted by the COMELEC, which issued the same.  Respondents petitioned, before the Supreme Court,
the suspension of  the effects of  the said proclamation and insisted that there had been a “failure of election”. The
COMELEC  ordered the consolidation of respondents’ petitions and  a random technical examination on several precincts.

Petitioners contended that by virtue of their proclamation, the proper remedy available to respondents was not a petition
for declaration of failure of elections but an election protest.

Issue:
Whether or not COMELEC had jurisdiction to act on respondents’ petitions even after proclamation of petitioners as
winners

Ruling: see: AMPATUAN VS. COMELEC RULING

AMPATUAN v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149803 (January 31, 2002) EN BANC A pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as
an action for annulment of election results, or failure of elections. Therefore, while the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-
proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or
behind them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of
elections. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of actions for annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections,
may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters’ signatures and thumbprints in
order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office does not deprive the COMELEC of its authority to annul any canvass and illegal
proclamation.
68
Pangandaman vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134340. November 25, 1999

FACTS:

Complaints were filed before the COMELEC to declare failure of election in the 12 municipalities of Lanao del Sur
due to numerous irregularities in the ballots, intimidations and violence between candidates and against election officers.
The complaints sought for the holding of special elections in the said municipalities some owing to widespread terrorism.

Hence, COMELEC issued an Omnibus Order ordering the conduct of special elections on July 18, 1998 in 5
municipalities and on July 15, 1998 in 3 municipalities.

Pangandaman asserted that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Ominibus Order:

1. Since the Special elections on July 18 and 25 is more than 30 days after the failure to elect in certain
municipalities in violation of Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code

2. By ordering only elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who are not
assigned to the affected areas, as members of the Board of Election Inspectors, in violation of Sections 166,
170, 175 and 176 of the Omnibus Election Code;
SEC. 6. Failure of elections. If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of
election would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any interested
party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a
failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.

Sec. 166. Qualification of members of the board of election inspectors. - No person shall be appointed chairman,
member or substitute member of the board of election inspectors unless he is of good moral character and irreproachable
reputation, a registered voter of the city or municipality, has never been convicted of any election offense or of any other
crime punishable by more than six months of imprisonment, or if he has pending against him an information for any election
offense. He must be able to speak and write English or the local dialect. 

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not COMELEC has the power to call for special election after the lapse of 30 days since the failure of
elections?
2. COMELEC may order elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who
are not assigned to the affected areas to act as members of the BEI.

RULING:

1. YES. In adopting a more liberal interpretation of the provision on failure of elections, the Court notes that the legal
compass from which COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is the principle that
“clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy
In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that:

a) it should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of
the election or the failure to elect; and,

b) it should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to
elect.

The first involves a question of fact. The second must be determined in the light of the peculiar circumstances of a case.

In this case, the dates set for the special elections were actually the nearest dates from the time total/partial failure
of elections was determined, which date fell on July 14, 1998, the date of promulgation of the challenged Omnibus Order.
Needless to state, July 18 and 25, the dates chosen by the COMELEC for the holding of special elections were only a few
days away from the time a total/partial failure of elections was declared and, thus, these were dates reasonably close
thereto, given the prevailing facts herein.

Thus, the holding of elections within the next few months from the cessation of the cause of the postponement,
suspension or failure to elect may still be considered reasonably close to the date of the election not held.

2. YES. COMELEC may order elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police who
are not assigned to the affected areas to act as members of the BEI.

In this case, the insistence of petitioner that the COMELEC violated Sections 166, 170, 175 and 176 of the
Omnibus Election Code when it ordered elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) who are not assigned to the affected areas as members of the Board of Election Inspectors
(BEIs) is likewise unconvincing vis-à-vis the underlying reason of the COMELEC to have an effective and impartial
military presence "to avoid the risk of another failure of election."

In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in
complex but little understood legalisms.

69
Sison v. COMELEC
JOSEPH SISON v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 134096, March 3, 1999
Romero, J. / En Banc

FACTS:

While the election returns were being canvassed by the Quezon City Board of Canvassers but before the winning
candidates were proclaimed, petitioner commenced suit before the COMELEC by filing a petition seeking to suspend the
canvassing of votes and/or proclamation in Quezon City and to declare a failure of elections, pursuant to Section 6 of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended) on the ground of "massive and orchestrated fraud and acts
analogous thereto which occurred after the voting and during the preparation of election returns and in the custody or
canvass thereof, which resulted in a failure to elect." 

However, the City Board of Canvassers proclaimed the winners of the elections in Quezon City, including the
winning candidate for the post of vice mayor while the petition was pending before the COMELEC. On June 22, 1998, the
COMELEC promulgated its challenged resolution dismissing the petition before it on the ground (1) that the allegations
therein were not supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) that the grounds recited were not among the pre-proclamation
issues set forth in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7166.

ISSUE: WON the COMELEC gravely erred in dismissing the petition.

RULING:

NO. At the outset, we notice that petitioner exhibits an ambivalent stand as to what exactly is the nature of the
remedy he availed of at the time he initiated proceedings before the COMELEC. At the start, he anchors his initiatory
petition under Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code regarding failure of elections, but he later builds his case as a pre-
proclamation controversy which is covered by Sections 241-248 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended by R.A. No.
7166.

In any case, petitioner nonetheless cannot succeed in either of the remedies he opted to pursue. Recently,
in Mantalam v. Commission on Elections, we have already declared that a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as
an action for annulment of results or declaration of failure of elections, founded as they are on different grounds.

Under the pertinent codal provision of Omnibus Election Code, there are only three (3) instances where a failure of
elections may be declared, namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held  on the date fixed on account
of  force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes; (b) the election in any polling place had been
suspended  before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of  force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud,
or other analogous causes; or (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in
the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect  on account of  force majeure, violence, terrorism,
fraud, or other analogous causes. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to support his claim. He never alleged at all that elections
were either not held or suspended. Furthermore, petitioner's claim of failure to elect stood as a bare conclusion bereft of
any substantive support to describe just exaclty how the failure to elect came about.

With respect to pre-proclamation controversy, it is well to note that the scope of pre-proclamation controversy is
only limited to the issues enumerated under Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, and the enumeration therein is
restrictive and exclusive:

Sec. 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy — The following shall be proper issues
that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
(a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers:
(b) The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered
with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as
mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code:
(c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are
obviously manufactured or not authentic; and
(d) when substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results
of which materially affected standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

The reason underlying the delimitation both of substantive ground and procedure is the policy of the election law
that pre-proclamation controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the law's desire that the canvass and
proclamation be delayed as little as possible. That is why such questions which require more deliberate and necessarily
longer consideration are left for examination in the corresponding protest. However, with the proclamation of the winning
candidate for the position contested, the question of whether the petition raised issues proper for a pre-proclamation
controversy is already of no consequence since the well-entrenched rule in such situation is that a pre-proclamation case
before the COMELEC is no longer viable, the more appropriate remedies being a regular election protest or a petition
for quo warranto. 

xxx xxx xxx

In paragraph 3 of the COMELEC's Omnibus Resolution No. 3049 (Omnibus Resolution on Pending Cases) dated June
29, 1998, it is clearly stated therein that "All other pre-proclamation cases . . . shall be  deemed terminated pursuant to
Section 16, R.A. 7166. Section 16 in the aforecited omnibus resolution refers to the termination of pre-proclamation cases
when the term of the office involved has already begun, which is precisely what obtains here. However, the petition filed
was terminated as it does not fall within the exceptions. The exception under Section 4 thereof operates only when what is
involved is not pre-proclamation controversy such as petitions for disqualification, failure of election or analogous cases. But
as we have earlier declared, his petition, though assuming to seek a declaration of failure of elections, is actually a case of
pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, not falling within the ambit of the exception. In any case, that omnibus resolution
would not have been applied in the first place because that was issued posterior to the date when the herein challenged
resolution was promulgated which is June 22, 1998. There was no provision that such omnibus resolution should have
retroactive effect.

As to petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his right to due process – that he was not allowed to present
evidence, shall likewise necessarily fail. Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code as basis for his right to present evidence
is misplaced. The phrase "after due notice" refers only to a situation where the COMELEC decides and, in fact, takes steps to
either partially or totally suspend or annul the proclamation of any candidate-elect. Also, presentation of evidence before
the COMELEC is not at all indispensable in order to satisfy the demands of due process. Under the amendment introduced
by R.A. No. 7166, particularly Section 18 thereof, all that is required now is that the COMELEC shall dispose of pre-
proclamation controversies "on the basis of the records and evidence elevated to it by the board of canvassers."
70
TAN V. COMELEC (1986)

Alampay, J:

FACTS:

-Petitioners, who are residents of Province of Negros Occidental, filed a petition for prohibition to stop the COMELEC from
holding a plebiscite for the ratification of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 which provides for the creation of Negros del Norte. The
plebiscite was scheduled for January 3, 1986. The petition was filed on December 3, 1985.

-Petitioners contend that BP 885 is unconstitutional because Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution provides that no local
government unit may be created, divided, merged or abolished or its boundary substantially altered unless it is in
accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code and subject to the approval by a majority of votes in
the unit or units thus affected.

Sec. 197 of the Local Government Code enumerates the conditions for the creation of a new local government unit and one
of them is that:

“its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section.”

-However, due to Christmas holiday, the Supreme Court was only able to act with the petition after the plebiscite was
already held.

-The petitioners thus filed a supplemental pleading assailing the plebiscite on the ground that only the inhabitants of
Negros del Norte were allowed to vote in the plebiscite. Voters from the rest of Negros Occidental were excluded from the
plebiscite.

-Respondents argued that the remaining cities and municipalities of Province of Negros Occidental not included in Negros
del Norte do not fall within the meaning and scope of terms “unit or units thus affected” referred to in Sec. 3, Art. XI. Of the
Constitution.

-Respondents also argued that the issue is already moot because the majority of residents of Negros del Norte already
ratified BP 885 in a plebiscite held on January 3, 1986.

ISSUES AND RULING:

ISSUE NO. 1: ON MOOTNESS

-The case is not moot because it involves an issue that is capable of repetition but can evade review. Non-resolution of this
case might tempt those who have selfish motives to create, divide, merge or abolish local government units knowing that
that Supreme Court will not entertain challenges to their acts if they manage to finalize those acts before the Court is able
to respond.

ON MERITS
ISSUE NO. 2: WON “unit or units affected” include the mother province

Yes. In the case at bar, the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially
altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the new province of Negros del Norte.
Hence, both the parent province of Negros Occidental and the new province of Negros del Norte are “political units
affected”.
-The respondents cited Gov. Paredes v. Hon. Executive Secretary to the President to defend its argument but that case only
involves a division of a barangay which is the smallest unit in the Local Government Code. In the case at bar, what is
involved is a division of a province, the largest political unit contemplated in Art. XI of the Constitution. Moreover, the
Supreme Court said that Gov. Paredes v. Executive Secretary is “one of those cases the discretion of the Court is allowed
considerable leeway”.

-The Supreme Court adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice Vicente Abad in Lopez, Jr. v. COMELEC which declared
unconstitutional a referendum which did not include all people of Bulacan and Rizal, when such referendum were intended
to ascertain if the people of said provinces were willing to give up some of their towns to Metropolitan Manila.

- It is a well-accepted rule that to ascertain the meaning of a particular provision, it can be gleaned from a provision in pari
materia. Parliamentary Bill No. 3644, which was the draft bill of BP 885, provides that “the plebiscite shall be conducted in
areas affected within a period of 120 days from the approval of the Act”. The proponents could have anticipated the strong
challenge against the legality of BP 885 that is why they deliberately added that phrase that states that the territory
covered by Negros del Norte constitutes the unit affected.

ISSUE NO. 3: WON BP 885 is Constitutional

No. Sec. 97 of the Local Government Code states that no province can be created unless if it has at least 3,500 km 2. Negros
del Norte only has at most 2,865 square kilometres considering the statistics relating to the land area of municipalities and
cities that constitute Negros del Norte.

-Respondents argue that the water must be included in the computation of the territory of Negros del Norte.

-Supreme Court said no. Sec. 197 states that “territory need not be contiguous if it comprises 2 or more islands”. This goes
to show that the word “territory” has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes water over which the political
unit exercises control.

ISSUE NO. 4: WON Supreme Court may mandate COMELEC to hold another plebiscite to include all the voters in the entire
province of Negros Occidental

-No. In the first place, BP 885 is unconstitutional so it cannot be ratified by the people.

71
Abayon vs Comelec G.R. n 189466 feb 11, 2010
ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the
House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

Respondents filed a petition with the HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee Abayon on the ground that Aangat
Tayo and Abayon did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Petitioner sought the dismissal of the case on the ground that the HRET had no jurisdiction over the matter. Petitioner
theorized that RA 7941 vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the
qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Since petitioner was not elected
into office but was chosen by her organization under its internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and
adjudicate her qualifications as nominee.

ISSUE:

Does the HRET have jurisdiction to resolve the qualifications of a party-list nominee?

RULING:

Yes. Party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are. Hence, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. NOMINEES ARE THE ONES
ELECTED TO OFFICE, NOT THE PARTY-LIST ORGANIZATION. Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the
elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution identifies that the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
"members x xx who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x xx shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution’s
point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution 9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are “elected members” of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications.

The Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16,2009.

72
TOPIC: Powers under Constitutional Bodies – Electoral Trbibunals
G.R. No. 178413 Mar. 13, 2008
TITLE: Aquilino Pimentel III petitioner-appellee, vs. The Commission on Elections respondent-appellant
NATURE OF ACTION: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court – Certiorari and Mandamus

FACTS:
 At the time of filing of the petition (May 14, 2007), 11 candidates were already officially proclaimed
 Only remaining contenders for the twelfth and final senatorial post were Aquilino Pimentel III and private
respondent Juan Miguel F. Zubiri
 Public respondent COMELEC acting as the National Board of Canvassers continued to conduct canvass proceedings
to determine the twelfth and last Senator-elect
 Side of the Petitioner/Appellee:
 Pimentel is assailing the proceedings before the NBC and its constituted Special Provincial Board of Canvassers for
Maguindanao in which the Provincial and Municapal Certificates of Canvass from the province of Maguindanao
 He is alleging that he was deprived of his constitutionally guaranteed right of due process when his counsel was
prohibited from asking questions to PES Bedol (former provincial election supervisor) and the Chairpersons of the
MBOCs-Maguindanao
 He is also alleging that the second Maguindanao PCOC from the national canvass was tampered with, falsified
and full of discrepancies because it was only copy 2 (copies intended to be posted on the wall)

Side of the Respondent/Appellant:

 Zubiri was then proclaimed as the winner and filed for the dismissal of Pimentel’s petition arguing that pursuant
to his assumption of office, controversies involving his election and qualification now fell under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
ISSUES:
WON COMELEC had jurisdiction over the case
HELD:
NO. According to Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a senator, COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the SET’s own jurisdiction
begins. The word "sole" in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the electoral
tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective members. It is therefore crystal clear that this Court
has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari and mandamus on matters, which may be threshed out in an election
contest. It is the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest
relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

DOCTRINE:
CONCURRING OR DISSENTING OPINIONS:

73
Garcia and O’Hara vs. De Jesus and Comelec

FACTS: (Consolidated cases)

(The Antipolo Case) Garcia and O’ Hara were the winners for the office of Mayor and Vice-Mayor in Antipolo, Rizal. Their
win was contested by De Jesus and David. (The Isabela Case) Neyra was proclaimed Mayor over petitioner Uy.

Principally, Petitioners in the two cases question the arrogation unto itself by the COMELEC of the power of issue Writs
of Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus. (Used: Pimentel vs COMELEC: where 1973 Consti doesn’t confer this power)

On the other hand, all Respondents contend that since the 1987 Constitution expressly gives COMELEC appellate
jurisdiction over election contests of elective municipal officials decided by trial courts. (Section 2[2], Article IX-C), and to
promulgate its own rules based in specific conditions.-> (Section 6, Article IX-A and Section 3, Article IX-C), the COMELEC
validly promulgated the rule which empowers it to issue the special Writs.

ISSUE: WON COMELEC has jurisdiction to Writs of Certiorari,  Prohibition and Mandamus in electoral contests involving
municipal and barangay officials

HELD:
In the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the Constitution or by legislative fiat, the COMELEC
is bereft of jurisdiction to issue said Writs. In the Philippine setting, the authority to issue Writs of Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction. Thus, such authority has always been expressly conferred,
either by the Constitution or by law.

Significantly, what the Constitution granted the COMELEC was appellate jurisdiction. The Constitution makes no mention of
any power given the COMELEC to exercise original jurisdiction over Petitioners for Certiorari,Prohibition
and  Mandamus  unlike in the case of the Supreme Court which was specifically conferred such authority (Art. VIII, Sec. 5[1]).
The immutable doctrine being that jurisdiction is fixed by law, the power to issue such Writs cannot be implied from the
mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.

DISMISSED.
74
Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador
Due Process – impartial and competent court
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos,  were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in
Antique. During election, Javier complained of  “massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and
falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed
men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the
Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend
the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board
to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission.
On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the
irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners
should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the
2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier
was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of
Javier’s death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently
demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.  The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that
when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they
will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments
of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already
committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall
have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no
writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments
are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.

75
TAULE v SANTOS
200 SCRA 512, 519 (1991)

FACTS:
 Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their
capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac,
Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers.
 When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the Provincial Treasurer and
the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. The election nevertheless proceeded
 Respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of
Local Government, * protesting the election of the officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several
flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted
 Petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the ABC denied the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent
Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same
time requesting for his appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected
President of the FABC in Catanduanes
 Respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the FABC in Catanduanes and ordering a
new one to be conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of
Local Government
 Petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary for being null and void.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest involving the election of the
officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;

RULING:
 Petition is GRANTED.
 The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers
of the FABC
 The jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of
the electorate.
 An election is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the
choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 
 "Election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes which do not characterize the election of
officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
 "Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or claim of title to an
elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled whether or not the contestant is claiming the
office in dispute and in the case of elections of barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of
the winners as no pre-proclamation controversies are allowed
 Jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay
composed of popularly elected  punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials
decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the
COMELEC over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of
the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organization. 
 There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the
Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protest involving officers of
the katipunan ng mga barangay.
 Respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of the officers of
the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants.
It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic
and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that the
ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be conducted be presided
by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays
which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision over local governments.
 Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances,
the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such
issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check."  This is compatible with the power of supervision of the
Secretary over local governments which as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit
concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government
Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how these
issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and not control over local
governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG Circular.  Any doubt therefore as to the
power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government

76
77
Case Digest: De Castro v. Ginete

Facts:
1. Petitioner Luis G. De Castro and respondent Julio G. Ginete were opposing candidates for the office of municipal
mayor of the municipality of Bulan, province of Sorsogon, in the general elections held on November 14, 1967. On
January 1, 1968 the board of canvassers, as constituted by the Commission on Elections, proclaimed petitioner as
the winning candidate with a margin of 12 votes over respondent.
2. De Castro filed a so-called "Manifestation and Motion" which is practically a motion to dismiss the protest upon the
ground of estoppel. It is alleged in the "Manifestation and Motion" that Ginete filed his protest after he had made a
written concession of the election of De Castro, and after he had publicly declared during the inauguration and
induction of De Castro as Mayor.
3. On April 22, 1968, before the hearing on the "Manifestation and Motion", on September 6, 1968, respondent Judge
Ubaldo Y. Arcangel of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon issued an order denying De Castro's amended
manifestation and motion. On October 4, 1968, De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
the amended manifestation and motion, upon the ground that the order was not in conformity with law.
Thereafter, petitioner filed before this court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.

Issues:
Whether or not Ginete is in estoppel to contest his election.

Held:
The court finds no merit in the contention of petitioner De Castro that respondent Ginete is estopped from contesting his
election. The Court resolves to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction

Rationale:
1. The court does not consider that the acts or conduct, or utterances, of respondent Ginete, had placed him in
estoppel to protest the election of petitioner De Castro. The conduct and utterances of the respondent were as
simply a laudable gesture of sportsmanship and a manifestation of his respect for the proclamation made by the
board of canvassers.
2. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of
canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate. What is sought in an election protest is the correction of the
canvass of the votes, which is the basis of the proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest involves a
public office in which the public has an interest. Certainly, the act of a losing candidate of recognized the one who is
proclaimed the winner should not bar the losing candidate from questioning the validity of the election of the
winner in the manner provided by law.
3. Estoppel rests on this rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation
arising out of such declaration, act, or omission, be permitted to falsify it. The elements of estoppel by conduct are:
(1) that there must have been a representation or concealment of material facts; (2) that the representation must
have been made with knowledge of the faculty (3) that the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of
the truth of the matter; and (4) that it must have been made with intentions that the other party would act upon it.
4. Following the principle in statutory construction, immaterial defects in pleadings in election contests should be
disregarded so that the will of the people in the choice of public officials will not be defeated by formal or technical
objections.
78
BESO vs ABALLE
326 SCRA 100

FACTS:

Petitioner Vito Beso (hereafter BESO) and private respondent Rita Aballe (hereafter ABALLE) were candidates for
the position of Barangay Captain of Barangay Carayman, Calbayog City, in the barangay elections of 12 May 1997.

In the canvass of the returns of the four precincts of Barangay Carayman, BESO was credited with four hundred
ninety-five (495) votes, while ABALLE obtained four hundred ninety-six (496) votes. The latter was thus proclaimed the
winning candidate.
BESO seasonably filed a protest with the Municipal Trial Court of Calbayog City (hereafter MTCC).
After due proceedings, the MTCC, per Judge Filemon A. Tandico, Jr., promulgated a decision in favor of BESO.
ABALLE filed a Notice of Appeal and purchased postal money orders in the amounts of  P500 and P20 in payment of
the appeal fees and filed them with the MTCC, which the latter transmitted to the Commission on Elections. However,
Records Officer IV Miguel T. Varquez, Jr. of the Electoral Contests Adjudication Department of the Commission on Elections
returned these money orders for having become stale and directed ABALLE to replace them within three days. BESO filed
with the MTCC a motion for execution pending appeal.
ABALLE sought to inhibit judge Filemon A. Tandinco, Jr. of MTCC, however, the motion was denied.
MTCC, handed down a Resolution granting the motion for execution pending appeal
ABALLE filed a motion to reconsider the Resolution, which the MTCC denied
ABALLE filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City (hereafter RTC) a special civil action for  certiorari and
prohibition, with an urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against
MTCC Judge Tandinco, Jr. to set aside and annul the latter’s order the motion for inhibition; the resolution granting the
motion for execution pending appeal; and the resolution denying the motion to reconsider the resolution of 5 March 1998.
BESO was impleaded as co-respondent. The case was assigned to Branch 31 of the RTC
Judge Navidad issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining respondent Judge Tandinco, Jr. and all persons
acting in his behalf "from enforcing the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal." The temporary restraining order was "effective
within 72 hours only from its issuance." 
BESO filed a comment to ABALLE’s petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging therein that pursuant to Section 1
of Rule 28 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and our decision in Relampagos v. Cumba, et al. (243 SCRA 690 [1995]), the
Commission on Elections, and not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has primary jurisdiction on the petition for certiorari.
HELD:
Since ABALLE has appealed to the COMELEC from the decision in Election Protest Case No. 30 of the MTCC, by filing
a Notice of Appeal, and submitting at the same time the postal money orders for the appeal fees, it follows that the
COMELEC has primary jurisdiction on the petition for certiorari to annul the execution pending appeal granted by the MTCC.

We ruled in Relampagos that the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and effect in such
cases where, under paragraph (2), Section 1 (should be Section 2) Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the election contest in question. In such cases the COMELEC has the authority to issue
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. The last paragraph of
Section 50 reads:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

Under the second paragraph of Section 2 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Commission on Elections has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over, inter alia, contests involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.

The contested position in this case is that of a barangay captain. The Municipal Trial Court of Calbayog City, a court
of limited jurisdiction, had the exclusive original jurisdiction over the election protest, and the COMELEC has the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over such protest. Sc
 It follows then that the RTC of Calbayog City is without jurisdiction on the petition for  certiorari and prohibition
which ABALLE filed to annul the execution pending appeal the MTCC had issued in the election protest case. ABALLE should
have gone to the COMELEC and her allegation that it was impossible for her to have invoked the power of the COMELEC to
issue the writ because the records of the Election Protest No. 130 were forwarded to the COMELEC only in August 1998
merits no sympathy as certified copies of the challenged resolutions or orders could easily be obtained and attached to the
petition.

79
Galido vs Comelec
Date: January 18, 1991
Petitioner: Perfecto Galido
Respondents: Comelec and Saturnino Galeon

Ponente: Padilla

Facts: Galido and private respondent Galeon were candidates during the January 1988 local elections for mayor of Garcia-
Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed the duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election protest before
the RTC. After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of petitioner. Private respondent appealed the RTC decision
to the COMELEC. Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After
the COMELEC en banc denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division. The
COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the initial “C” after the name “Galido” were
marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Undaunted by his previous failed actions the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari and injunction before
the Supreme Court and succeeded in getting a temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition, private
respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that “Final
decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective municipal offices are final and executory,
and not appealable.

Issue: Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial court’s decision involving marked ballots, be brought
to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party?

Held: Yes

Ratio: The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of
certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is stated, “Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof.” We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner.
The petition involves pure questions of fact as they relate to appreciation of evidence (ballots) which is beyond the
power of review of this Court. The COMELEC found that the writing of the letter "C" after the word "Galido" in the fifteen
(15) ballots of Precinct 14 is a clear and convincing proof of a pattern or design to identify the ballots and/or voters. This
finding should be conclusive on the Court.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests
involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987 Constitution).
In the present case, after a review of the trial court's decision, the respondent COMELEC found that fifteen (15)
ballots in the same precinct containing the letter "C" after the name Galido are clearly marked ballots. May this COMELEC
decision be brought to this court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party (the herein petitioner)?
Under Article IX (A) Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites in support of this petition, it is stated:
"(U)nless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional)
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a
copy thereof."
On the other hand, private respondent relies on Article IX, (C), Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the Constitution which
provides that decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections in contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
We resolve this issue in favor of the petitioner. The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on
Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not
preclude a recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. The proceedings in the Constitutional
Commission on this matter are enlightening.
We do not, however, believe that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior
court or tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 As correctly argued by the COMELEC, it has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence,
equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to
which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion
has been abused to the prejudice of either party. Finally, the records disclose that private respondent had already assumed
the position of Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue of the COMELEC
decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action and prevent the further performance of the act
complained of. In this light, the petition at bar has become moot and academic.

80
Petitioner: RAYMOND P. ESPIDOL
Respondents: COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, WILFREDO TABAG & THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF RAMON
ISABELA

Recit-Ready Facts:
1. Espidol and Tabag were candidates for the 2004 Mayoral elecions of Ramon, Isabela. During canvassing, the MBC
Chair reported to the C.I.C. of Regions II and III that Espidol had been coercing them and requested transfer of
venue. The C.I.C. however denied this request. Subsequently, Tabag orally sought exclusion of returns from several
precincts on the grounds of: lack of inner paper seals, lack of signature of the BEI Chairman, and absence of BEI
member thumbmarks.
2. The MBC did not heed Tabag’s opposition and proceeded to proclaim Espidol as Mayor. Tabag petitioned the
COMELEC to annul Espidol’s proclamation which the COMELEC did on the ground of MBC’s failure to resolve
Tabag’s objections. Espidol filed an MR with the COMELEC which was denied, thus he filed the present case with the
SC.
3. The court dismissed Espidol’s petition. The court agreed with COMELEC that the procedure for disposition of
contested election returns under RA 7166 was not followed due to MBC’s failure to act on Tabag’s opposition. In
this case the court had the opportunity to explain what constitutes a pre-proclamation controversy.

Doctrine:
1. A pre-proclamation controversy refers "to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of
canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233 (returns delayed, lost, or
destroyed), 234 (material defects in returns), 235 (returns appear to be tampered with or falsified) and 236
(discrepancies in returns) in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the
election returns."
2. Issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are as follows:
a. Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers;
b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or
falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in another authentic copies thereof as mentioned
in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code;
c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion or intimidation, or they are obviously
manufactured or not authentic; and
When substitute or fraudulent returns in controversy polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected
the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.