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CASE DOCTRINES ON CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE (Rules 110 to 127)

PEOPLE vs. HENRY T. GO

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

1) Once it is shown by probable cause after PI that a private person and a public officer have conspired to commit a crime (e.
g. violation of R. A, No. 3019) the private person may be properly charged, tried and convicted in the Sandiganbayan even if the public
officer is not charged with him by reason of his death or some other reason.

Although the public officer has died and could no longer be charged with the private person, it does not mean that the
allegation of conspiracy between them could no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing
extinguished by the death of the public officer is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the
basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private person.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such
person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer
be charged in court, as when the public officer dies before he could be charged, the private person may be indicted alone.

2) By posting bail and filing a motion for consolidation of the cases against him, an accused is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief from the court is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.

LACSON vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

1) For the SB to assume jurisdiction over the case, it is not enough that it be alleged in the Information that the accused
public officer “committed the crime in relation to his office”. The Information must contain specific allegation of facts showing that the
crime is “intimately connected” with the office of the accused such as (1) that he committed the crime while in the performance of his
official functions; (2) that he had no personal motives and would not have committed crime if not for his office; (3) that he used the
powers of his office to commit the crime or (4) that he could not have committed the crime if not for his office.

2) The use of the phrase in the Information “the accused committed the crime in relation to his public office”, which is a mere
conclusion of law, is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations
in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of
the offense charged. Thus, even if the phrase does not appear in the Information, the SB may exercise jurisdiction if there are specific
factual allegations showing close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the crime
charged.

SANCHEZ vs. DEMETRIOU

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

1) The SB is without jurisdiction over the case because there is no allegation in the information showing that that there is an
"intimate connection" between the offense of rape with homicide and the accused’s official functions as municipal mayor. It follows that
the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.

HANNAH SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

1) Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 provides that the SB has jurisdiction over “presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations”. Although she is not a public officer
with salary of at least 27, by express provision of P. D. No. 1606, accused Serana, a U. P. student regent, is included among those the
SB exercises jurisdiction.

2) The SB has jurisdiction over the crime of estafa if there are specific allegations of facts in the information showing that the
accused public officer committed the crime in relation to his office. The following allegations in the information is considered sufficient
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to vest jurisdiction on the SB over the crime, to wit: "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her
office and taking advantage of her position.”

3) A U. P. Student Regent was considered a public officer based on the following definition of a public office, to wit:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign
functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."

The fact that accused was not receiving salary as student regent is of no moment because salary is not an essential element of
public office.

4) Presented here is a brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan was created
by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest
norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.

P.D. No. 1486 was amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A.
No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997
by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

DE LIMA vs. HON. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017

1) Under Section 90 of R. A. No. 9165, the RTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act regardless of whether the accused is a public officer with a salary grade of at least 27 and he
committed the crime in relation to his office and regardless of the imposable penalty. Section 60 of R. A. No. 9165 provides, as follows:

Section 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial
Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of this Act. The number of courts
designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective
jurisdiction.
The DOJ shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of this Act.

No other trial court is mentioned in R. A. No. 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus,
even if the violation of R. A. No. 9165 is punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years, the crime is still exclusively
cognizable by the RTC. The only exception to this rule is that when the violation of R. A. No. 9165 is committed by a minor, or in
conspiracy with a minor, then the crime falls under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Family Court.

2) R. A. No. 9165 specifies the RTC as the only court with jurisdiction to exclusively try and hear cases involving any
violation thereto. This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD
1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to
be considered as an exception to the general.

3) The exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are (1) xxxxx, (2) when the case involves transcendental
importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the
essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was
considered as an inappropriate remedy.

4) As a rule, the denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order and is not appealable; an appeal from an interlocutory
order is not allowed under Section 1 (b), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Neither can it be a proper subject of a petition
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for certiorari which can be used only in the absence of an appeal or any other adequate, plain and speedy remedy. The plain and speedy
remedy upon denial of an interlocutory order is to proceed to trial.

5) Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the
judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, 'must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a
crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof'.

At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary
investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. The judge needs only to
determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused and, in doing so, he need not conduct a de novo hearing.

DUNCANO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G. R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015

1) Under Section 4(A)(1) of R. A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a Regional Director of the BIR
classified as Salary Grade 26. The relevant provision reads, as follow:

"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

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(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

Based on the afore-quoted, the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and higher".
Thus, for a Regional Director to fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, his position must be classified as Salary Grade 27 or
higher”. In the instant case, the accused’s position of Regional Director is classified as Salary Grade 26, placing him outside the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

2) The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the
powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI
thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D.
No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, 2015, R.A. No. 10660.

3) To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger
fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to
the clogging of the dockets of that court, to wit:

It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or lower,
devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose
salary grades were at Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in government
regardless of salary grade,

Enumerated below are some of the public officers whose positions may be lower than SG 27 but, by express provision of law,
are placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: (1) a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, (2) a department manager of the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth), (3) a student regent of the University of the Philippines, and (6) a Head of the
Legal Department and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).

INOCENTES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 205963-64 July 7, 2016
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1) Under subparagraphs (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan exercises jurisdiction over the
accused, a Branch Manager of the GSIS Tarlac City field office, although his position is classified as Salary Grade 26. The applicable
law provides that violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -
controlled corporations (such as GSIS), and state universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan exercises jurisdiction over public officers specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades. Simply put, public officers with Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated under subparagraphs (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

2) An accused who has posted bail is deemed to have voluntarily surrendered his person to the jurisdiction of the court and
may no longer question the court’s finding of probable cause which led to the issuance of the warrant for his arrest.

3) There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad
discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by
law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether
or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not
and may not be compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of
arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for
placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.

4) The case should be dismissed for inordinate delay if it took the Ombudsman seven (7) years to conduct the PI before filing
the information with the Sandiganbayan. There is inordinate delay if the delay in the PI unreasonable, oppressive, and vexatious. This
kind of delay violates the accused’s constitutional right to the speedy disposition of his case. A person’s right to a speedy disposition of
his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the Constitution:

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil
or administrative in nature, as well as in all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action of all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

CRISOSTOMO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 152398. April 14, 2005

1) Republic Act No. 7975, which limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to public officers with SG 27 or higher, took
effect on May 6, 1995. Before the effectivity of this law, the Sandiganbayan exercised jurisdiction over all public officers regardless of
his SG. Since the crime charged was allegedly committed by the accused police officer, a jail guard, in 1989, the SB assumed
jurisdiction over him without objection. The issue was whether there were specific allegations of facts in the information showing that
he committed the crime of killing an inmate in relation to his office as a jail guard.

The Information alleged that Crisostomo "a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his public position and thus committing the offense in
relation to his office" conspired, confederated and connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to kill
Renato, "a detention prisoner."

The SC ruled that the allegations in the foregoing information sufficed to vest on the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over the
case.
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2) Section 11(a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]n appeal taken by one or more [of] several accused shall
not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter." In
this case, only Crisostomo questioned the jurisdiction and decision of the Sandiganbayan. However, the evidence against Crisostomo
and his co-conspirator, Calingayan, are inextricably linked as their conviction hinged on the prosecution’s unproven theory of
conspiracy. Thus, Crisostomo’s acquittal, which is favorable and applicable to Calingayan, should benefit Calingayan.

3) An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. The reviewing tribunal can correct errors though unassigned
in the appeal, or even reverse the lower court’s decision on grounds other than those the parties raised as errors.

ESTEBAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 146646-49. March 11, 2005

1) The Sandiganbayan may exercise jurisdiction over the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against a court employee
by the presiding judge provided there are specific allegations of facts in the information showing that the judge committed the crime in
relation to his office. The SC found the following information sufficient:

"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer,
being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having
been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his
girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent
appointment as a bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and
malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab private complainant, kiss her all over
her face and touch her right breast against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.

2) In People v. Montejo, it was ruled that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.
This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. This is in
accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the information. Hence, where
the information is wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate relationship/connection between the offense charged and
the discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.

BONIFACIO vs. RTC OF MAKATI

G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010

1) Under Article 360 of the RPC as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, the criminal action for libel or written defamation
shall be instituted either in the proper court of the place where the libelous article was printed and first published or in the proper
court of the place where the private complainant resides.

If the place where the libelous article was printed and first published is made the basis for the venue, the Information must
allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. inclination to harass.

The foregoing, however, cannot be done if the defamatory material appeared on a website on the internet. If such is the case,
there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. In the instant case, since the libelous material
appeared on a website on the internet, the SC ruled that only the residence of the offended party may be made the basis of the venue of
the criminal action. Certainly, the place where the offended party would allege to have accessed the libelous material could not be used
in lieu of the place where the libelous material was printed and first published. This would give the offended party the undue
opportunity to harass the accused by filing the case in remote, out-of-town venues.

DISINI, JR. vs. SEC. OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 203335 February 11, 2014
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1) In the instant case, the Supreme Court ruled, as follows:

a. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel is declared valid and constitutional with respect to the
original author of the post but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post
and react to it; and

b. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes is
valid and constitutional only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System

In view of the foregoing, when the offender is charged with libel twice, the first under Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act
10175 and second under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, his right against double jeopardy would be violate. So would an
offender right against double jeopardy be violated if charged with child pornography twice, first under Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and, second, under Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009..

2) Online libel is different from libel defined under the RPC. There should be no question that if the published
material on print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section
4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself
claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4)
merely establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the offender under both laws would be a
blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPA’s scope so as to
include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPA’s definition of child pornography in fact already covers
the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both
Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.

JIMENEZ vs. SORONGON

G.R. No. 178607 December 5, 2012

1) Every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in interest is
one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit. By real
interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.

Procedural law mandates that "all criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court, the
People is the real party in interest represented by OSG.

A private complainant, therefore, has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case, either by appeal
or petition for certiorari, if the main issue raised pertains to the criminal aspect of the case such as the existence of probable
cause. If the private complainant is not appealing to protect his pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to
cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents, then he is without legal personality.

PEOPLE vs. VALDEZ

G.R. No. 175602 January 18, 2012

1) The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from
the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual
recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In the instant case, the SC did not consider the aggravating circumstance of
treachery in imposing the penalty on the accused because, although the word treachery was alleged, there was no allegation of
specific facts constituting the treachery. The rule is that, even if the aggravating circumstance was alleged and established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt, if the specific facts constituting the aggravating circumstance were not alleged in the
information, such aggravating circumstance cannot be considered by the court.
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The allegation in the information that “then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting [them]" on various parts of their
bodies "which [were] the direct and immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended each of the killings.

In People v. Dimaano, it was held that “what is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law, but the allegation
of specific facts describing how the crime was committed including the attending aggravating circumstances, if any.

2) To discharge its burden of informing the accused of the charge against him, the State must specify in the
information the details of the crime and any circumstance that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of
sufficient factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to enable
him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always
presumed to have no independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with.

MIGUEL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012

1) In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him, Section 6 of Rule 110 requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules requires that these
acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being.

The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of the offense charged. In particular, whether an
information validly charges an offense depends on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall
establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the requirement in the Rules is
to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.

In the instant case, the SC disputed petitioner’s argument that since the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality” immediately followed the phrase “conspiring and confederating with the private [individuals”, it means that
the phrase “acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality” pertained only to petitioner’s co-conspirators/private
individuals only and not to him.

The SC said the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was
merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain
and non-legalistic reading of the information would yield.

PEOPLE vs. SORIA

G.R. No. 179031 November 14, 2012

1) The SC found the Information sufficient and valid although it did not specify with certainty whether the accused
committed the rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, or rape by sexual assault as described in
paragraph 2 thereof. The Information stated that accused inserted his penis into the genital of "AAA," which constituted rape
by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A, at the same time, it also alleged that accusd used force and
intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or
manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of
the case.

Where an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged in the Information to
have been committed in two or more modes, the Information is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of
committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the various
ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby
rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness.
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In the instant case, the SC convicted the accused of rape by sexual assault because that was the accused’s mode of
committing rape that was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

UNION BANK vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192565 February 28, 2012

1) Venue is an essential element of jurisdiction in criminal cases. It determines not only the place where the criminal
action is to be instituted, but also the court that has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case. The reason for this rule is two-
fold. First, the jurisdiction of trial courts is limited to well-defined territories such that a trial court can only hear and try cases
involving crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Second, laying the venue in the locus criminis is grounded on the
necessity and justice of having an accused on trial in the municipality of province where witnesses and other facilities for his
defense are available.

Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or
territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.

The above provision should be read in light of Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which states:

Place of commission of the offense. – The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its
allegations that the offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of
the court, unless the particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is
necessary for its identification.

2) The crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed
at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of
perjury are executed. In this instance, the proper venue of the criminal action would be the proper court of the place where the
affidavit was subscribed and sworn to. For the information charging a crime under Article 183 to be sufficient, the place where
the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to must be alleged.

On the other hand, when the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual
testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be
at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission
are both essential ingredients of the crime of perjury. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in
the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

TEEHANKEE vs. MADAYAG

G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
REGALADO, J.:

1) Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show
that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the
supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the
crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There
is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally
applies to the amended information for murder. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended
information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case.

It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a
preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information
without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for
the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information.
Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry
 9

into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is
not necessary.

2) A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; 12 (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original
one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial
right of the accused, such as his right to invoke prescription.

SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the
criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. Since the civil liability that may be determine could arise
only from the crime charged, only the accused may be held liable for such civil liability. No person who has not been charged
with the accused may be held jointly and severally liable with the accused for the damages arising from the delict. This is
specially with regards to a juridical entity which could not be charged with the accused. A person or entity not charged with
the accused may, however be held to have subsidiary liability provided the requirements of Article 103 of the Civil Code are
satisfied. Article 103 reads, as follows:

“Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.”

Since a hospital is not engaged in any industry, it cannot be held to have subsidiary liability for its doctor’s civil
liability arising from reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries of his patient.

CASTILLO vs. SALVADOR

G.R. No. 191240 July 30, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

1) There are two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such
act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.

Thus, although the accused’s acquittal was based on reasonable doubt, if the prosecution failed to prove the civil
liability of the accused by preponderance of evidence, the accused could not be held civilly liable.

JOHN DY vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 158312 November 14, 2008
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.:

1) An accused may be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The rationale for this
is simple. The criminal and civil liabilities of an accused are separate and distinct from each other. One is meant to punish the
offender while the other is intended to repair the damage suffered by the aggrieved party. So, for the purpose of indemnifying
the latter, the offense need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt but only by preponderance of evidence.

Thus, even if the accused was acquitted of estafa and Violation of B. P. Blg. 22, if his civil liability has been established
by preponderance of evidence, the accused may be held civilly liable.

LILY LIM vs. KOU CO PING

G.R. No. 175256 August 23, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
 10

1) A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender - (1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of
the Revised Penal Code, and (2) independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on "an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony," as provided in Article 31 of the Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be
based on an act or omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal action by
specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code ("in cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries").

The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that constitute the criminal
offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is
impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the
criminal action declares that "the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist."

On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and may be pursued
independently, as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code, which state that:

ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied.)

Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds that the
offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on
forum shopping, litis pendentia, or res judicata. They present different causes of action, which under the law, are considered
"separate, distinct, and independent" from each other. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the
prohibition on double recovery under Article 2177 of the Civil Code.

CASUPANAN vs. LAROYA

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
CARPIO, J.:

1) In a case of collision between two motor vehicles, driver #1 may file against driver #2 a criminal case for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code. Deemed instituted with this criminal action is
the civil action to recover damages arising from the crime. Simultaneously or successively with the criminal action, driver #1
may also file against driver #2 an independent civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. On the other
hand, driver #2 may file against driver #1 a civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Although the two foregoing civil actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action.
The first civil action is based on the crime charged in the criminal action while the second civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the defendant."

Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1 of Rule 111 expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.

 11

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but
any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there
can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment. Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought.

2) Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without
reservation.

Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The only
limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases,
the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against his
employer or guardians.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal
case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to
litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way
that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing
a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

CATERPILLAR, INC. vs. SAMSON

November 9, 2016 G.R. No. 205972
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) A civil action for unfair competition, damages and cancellation of trademark and a criminal action for unfair
competition filed against the same person may co-exist. A common element in the two cases is fraud. Under Article 33 of
the Civil Code, a civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party in cases
of fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution. Being an independent civil action, it
cannot operate as a prejudicial question that that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in criminal action.

PIMENTEL vs. PIMENTEL

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
CARPIO, J.:

1) Does a civil action for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code filed by the wife against her
husband constitute a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the proceeding in the criminal action for
frustrated parricide filed against the husband? The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the
issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage in case the petition for
nullity of marriage is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between the spouses is annulled, the husband could still be held criminally liable since
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
 12

JM DOMINGUEZ. INC. vs. LICLICAN

G.R. No. 208587 July 29, 2015
VELASCO, JR., J.:

1) The pendency in the RTC of an intra-corporate dispute questioning the validity of the election of a set of corporate
officers and their subsequent acts of disbursing corporate money constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal action charging
said corporate officers with qualified theft for the said act of disbursing corporate money.

2) Grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the
law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The word
"capricious," usually used in tandem with the term "arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus,
when seeking the corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is
imperative.

FENEQUITO vs. VERGARA, JR.

G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) An order issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction setting aside the order of the MTC
dismissing the criminal case for lack of probable cause and directing the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the
prosecution to present its evidence is an interlocutory order and cannot be appealed to the Court of Appeals by petition for
review.

BURGUNDY REALTY CORP. vs. REYES

G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is a trial
to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.

2) To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of
the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.

The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion
and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

ABANADO vs. BA YONA

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804 July 30, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) An information that is filed in court shall, as far as practicable, be accompanied by a copy of the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor, the complainant’s affidavit, the sworn statements of the prosecution’s witnesses, the respondent’s
counter-affidavit and the sworn statements of his witnesses and such other evidence as may have been taken into account in
arriving at a determination of the existence of probable cause. If the resolution of the investigating prosecutor recommending
the dismissal of the complaint is reversed by the city or provincial prosecutor, the latter’s resolution finding probable cause
shall replace the resolution of the investigating prosecutor. The reversed resolution of the investigating prosecutor need not be
attached to the information and the judge cannot insist that the same be submitted to him.
 13

HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA vs. OBIAS

G.R. No. 175887 November 24, 2010

1) Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an
inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. Prosecutors
control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by
the Secretary of Justice. The duty of the Court in appropriate cases is merely to determine whether the executive determination
was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice are not
subject to review unless made with grave abuse.

2) In Crespo it was held that after the information has been filed in court, the court’s permission must be secured
should the fiscal find it proper that reinvestigation be made. Thereafter, the court shall consider and act upon the findings and
recommendations of the fiscal.

In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, it was clarified that the justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of
review over the investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court. However, the justice
secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose
jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court is duty-bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own independent judgment in
assessing the merits of the resulting motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution, to wit:

When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a
resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounded duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of
such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to
evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary’s ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial
court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such
recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction
over the criminal action.

UY vs. JUDGE JAVELLANA

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1666 September 5, 2012
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) Criminal cases falling within the scope of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure shall be commenced either by
complaint or by information, except that, in Metropolitan Manila and in chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only
by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses.

If commenced by complaint, on the basis of the complaint and the affidavits and other evidence accompanying the
same, the court may dismiss the case outright for being patently without basis or merit and order the release of the accused if in
custody.

If commenced by information, the court shall issue an order which, together with copies of the affidavits and other
evidence submitted by the prosecution, shall require the accused to submit his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his
witnesses as well as any evidence in his behalf, serving copies thereof on the complainant or prosecutor not later than ten (10)
days from receipt of said order. The prosecution may file reply affidavits within ten (10) days after receipt of the counter-
affidavits of the defense.

Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties,
find no cause or ground to hold the accused for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the
case for arraignment and trial. If the accused is in custody for the crime charged, he shall be immediately arraigned and if he
enters a plea of guilty, he shall forthwith be sentenced.
 14

2) Under Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, cases requiring referral to the Lupon for
conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such
requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such requirement shall have been complied
with. This provision shall not apply to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.

PEOPLE vs. VALENCIA

G.R. Nos. 94511-13 September 18, 1992

1) A person who is lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5 of Rule 113 shall be
subjected to an inquest in accordance with Rule 112, Section 6, after which Information may be filed against him without a
preliminary investigation.

PCGG vs. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ

G.R. No. 194159 October 21, 2015

1) The Supreme Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to
determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court
is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. The Court’s
pronouncement in Ciron v. Gutierrez is instructive on this matter, to wit:

x x x this Court’s consistent policy has been to maintain noninterference in the determination of the Ombudsman of
the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. This observed policy is
based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the
Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.

The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to hold a respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed.

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does
not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that
it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause,
the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has
no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.

2) Hearsay may be the bases for issuance of the warrant "so long as there … [is] a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay." x x x And, in Aguilar, we recognized that "an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the
direct personal observations of the affiant," so long as the magistrate is "informed of some of the underlying circumstances"
supporting the affiant’s conclusions and his belief that any informant involved "whose identity need not be disclosed…" was
"credible" or his information "reliable." x x x.

DE LIMA vs. REYES

G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016
LEONEN, J.:

1) The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act on any matter that may cause a
probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the
creation of a second panel of investigators to look into new evidence submitted by the complainant after the first panel has
submitted its resolution dismissing the complaint. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 questioning the
 15

regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of probable cause and
issues a warrant of arrest.

2) The public prosecutor’s power to conduct preliminary investigation appears to be quasi-judicial in nature only to
the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to
those of a court. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties,
and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a
preliminary investigation or when the Secretary of Justice reviews the former’s resolution.

3) Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed only to tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The issuance by the Secretary of Justice of a department order is a purely administrative or executive function. It is
not a quasi-judicial function. The DOJ is not a quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a
quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.

4) A petition for review under Rule 43 cannot be brought to assail the Secretary of Justice's resolution dismissing a
complaint for lack of probable cause because by issuing such resolution, the Secretary of Justice did not perform a quasi-judicial
but an essentially executive function.

5) A writ of prohibition is directed against the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. The Department of Justice is not a court of law and its
officers do not perform quasi-judicial functions. The Secretary of Justice's review of the resolutions of prosecutors is also not a
ministerial function.

6) If the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor upon the directive of the Secretary
of Justice, will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? The answer is simple. The role of the prosecutor is to see that justice
is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the
contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the
Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should
not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances.

LUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 197788 February 29, 2012
SERENO, J.:

1) A person who was flagged down for a traffic violation under a city ordinance and was brought to a nearby police
station to be issued a traffic citation ticket cannot be considered to have been arrested for the purpose of a warrantless search
incidental to a lawful arrest. A person caught committing a traffic violation should not be arrested but issued only traffic
citation ticket. The shabu recovered from the person by the police officers is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

2) The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs
search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances,
especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

3) The "stop and frisk" rule normally applies when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may
lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot. The rule is, however, a limited protective search of outer clothing for
weapons.

ANTIQUERA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180661 December 11, 2013
ABAD, J.:

1) Since the police officers had to push open the slightly ajar door of the house of the accused before they purportedly
saw him using shabu, there could be no valid arrest in flagrante delicto. Considering that the arrest of the accused was illegal, the
search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police
officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure.
 16

2) The alleged failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his
conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE vs. DONALD VASQUEZ

G.R. No. 200304 January 15, 2014
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) Any objection to a defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on
arraignment. If the accused fails to file a motion to quash before his arraignment, he will be estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest. Any irregularity is cured upon the accused’s voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction.

2) Since the accused was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-
bust operation, his warrantless arrest was valid Section 5(a) of Rule 113. If the warrantless arrest was valid, the warrantless
seizure of the illegal drugs from the accused is likewise valid.

ZUÑO vs. JUDGE CABEBE

A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ November 26, 2004
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1) Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. The
grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to
determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still
be held.

2) The failure of the prosecution to raise an objection to the accused’s application for bail does not dispense with the
requirement of a bail hearing. Even if the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection to the
motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which
it may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecutor refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as would
ascertain the strength of the State's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Irrespective of respondent judge's
opinion that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law and settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be
conducted before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if bail is at all justified.

GOVT. HK SPEC. ADM. REGION vs. OLALIA

G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

1) A potential extraditee who has been arrested and detained is entitled to bail. While the Philippines must honor its
extradition treaties with other countries, it does not necessarily mean that it should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to
life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by
international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. An extradite should not therefore be deprived of his right to
apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While
administrative in character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the
object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. The potential extraditee
must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court. “Clear and convincing evidence" is a quantum of evidence that is lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
but higher than preponderance of evidence.

LEVISTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

 17

G.R. No. 189122 March 17, 2010

PERALTA, J.:

1) The rules authorize the court to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to those convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense punishable by imprisonment of more than 6 years but not death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the
allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons,
considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. The “tough on bail pending” policy must be observed.

2) The 3rd paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on the appellant
applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years but not death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. If it is shown during
the bail hearing that at least one of the bail-negating circumstances enumerated in the 3rd paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
exist, the court has no option but to deny bail. If it is shown during the bail hearing that none of the bail-negating
circumstances exist, the court, in the exercise of its discretion, may grant or deny bail.

ENRILE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015
BERSAMIN, J.:

1) In granting bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the court may consider the principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. The court may also take guidance from the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment
is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights." In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available
to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the
right to be admitted to bail.

2) Bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee
the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high enough
to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before
or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

3) In deciding whether to grant bail or not to an accused charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the court should not consider the presence of mitigating circumstances that may reduce the
penalty that may be imposed on the accused to less than reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. The relevant clause in Section
13 of Article III is "charged with an offense punishable by." It is, therefore, the maximum penalty provided by the offense that
has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating circumstances being appreciated in the accused’s favor.

4) Enrile’s social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being
charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition
from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and
was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his
public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted
bail.

NAPOLES vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 224162 November 7, 2017
REYES, JR., J.:

1) The court may deny bail to an accused charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment by evidence less than that required for his conviction. At the bail hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits
or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against accused, nor will it
speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. It should not be
forgotten that the purpose of the bail hearing is to determine whether the accused is entitled to provisional liberty before
conviction. To require more from the prosecution, as well as from the trial court, effectively defeats the purpose of the
proceeding.
 18

2) Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the
presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused.

3) The purpose of the bail hearing is for the court to determine whether there is a strong presumption of the guilt of
the accused. It is merely a preliminary determination, and the court may deny admission to bail even when there is reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Thus, the prosecution can discharge its burden by proving that the evidence against the
accused shows evident proof of guilt or a great presumption of guilt. “Evident proof of guilt” or a “great presumption of guilt’
means “clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that the offense has been
committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is
administered." Presumption great" exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be
drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion.

ALTOBANO-RUIZ vs. PICHAY

A.M. No. MTJ-17-1893 February 19, 2018
PERALTA, J.:

1) Under Section 17 (a) of Rule 114, if the accused is arrested in the same province, city or municipality where his
case is pending, he may file bail in the court where his case is pending or, in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with another branch of the same court within the province or city. If the accused is arrested in a province, city or municipality
other than where his case is pending, he has two (2) options. First, he may file bail in the court where his case is pending or,
second, he may file bail with any regional trial court in the province, city or municipality where he was arrested. When no
regional trial court judge is available, he may file bail with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge or municipal
circuit trial judge therein.

DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 185128 January 30, 2012
PERALTA, J.:

1) When prohibited and regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by the
accused, the presumption arises that he is in possession of such drugs in violation of law. For the presumption to apply,
however, the prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence and presence of the drugs in the place
under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. If the prosecution fails to prove that the house was under the
control and dominion of the accused, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to
start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent
of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of
proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.

MIGUEL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 172035 July 4, 2012
BRION, J.:

1) Before an accused is suspended under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, a pre-suspension hearing is required. While a
pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
information or the regularity of the proceedings against him, jurisprudence has not established a hard and fast rule in
regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence of an actual hearing alone cannot be
determinative of the validity of a suspension order. In one case, the Court considered the opposition of the accused (to the
prosecution’s motion to suspend pendente lite) as sufficient to dispense with the need to actually set the prosecution’s motion
for hearing. In another case, the Court ruled that while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of
the Informations that had been filed against the accused, the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the
goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by
the court of the parties' pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

Since a pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public official is given an
adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an
accused would have no reason to complain that no actual hearing was conducted. It is well settled that "to be heard" does not
only mean oral arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exists.

2) Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which provides for the suspension of the accused pendente lite is not a penal provision
that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused and a strict construction against the State. The suspension
required under this provision is not a penalty, as it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if acquitted, the
 19

accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during his
suspension.

PEOPLE vs. LARA

G.R. No. 199877 August 13, 2012
REYES, J.:

1) The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made
to stand in a police line-up is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation.

The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only
by a person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of
the custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage. This
is because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory and it is usually the
witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who gives a statement in the course of the line-up.

PEOPLE vs. JUDGE AYSON

G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
NARVASA, J.:

1) A person who is being investigated by his employer for having misappropriated company funds is not in any sense
under custodial interrogation. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution are therefore not applicable. Neither may he invoke his right against self-incrimination during such
investigation.

VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
SERENO, CJ:

1) Since the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground that the accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated
amounts to an acquittal, any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of the accused’s right against double
jeopardy. The acquittal of the accused may, however be challenged by petition for certiorari under Rule 65 where there has
been a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prosecution mut convincingly establish that
the court’s decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law.

2) A felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with one committed by means of dolo. Culpable
felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. Regardless of how the
crime was committed, if is shown that it was committed by means of culpa, it cannot be given the penalty as it was committed
by means of dolo.

3) An accused who has been sentenced by the trial court to a non-probationable penalty but on appeal is sentenced to
a probationable penalty is allowed by law and jurisprudence to avail himself of probation.

PEOPLE vs. ESTOMACA

G.R. Nos. 117485-86 April 22, 1996
REGALADO, J.:

1) If the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offence, the trial court shall conduct a searching inquiry to
determine: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the
trial court must show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the accused and the questions must demonstrate accused full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilty. The court must inquire into the personality profile of the accused can
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and
 20

educational background of the accused must also be determined. The failure of the trial court to comply with the foregoing
requirements would render the arraignment of the accused null and void.

2) No valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. If the arraignment of the accused was void, the
judgment of conviction rendered against him would likewise be void. If such is the finding of the appellate court, it shall order
the case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 171020 March 14, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1) The fact that the accused was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision did not prejudice him. This
procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be
arraigned. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His counsel’s active participation in the hearings
is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would have objected and
informed the court of this blunder. Moreover, no protest was made when the accuse was subsequently arraigned. The parties
did not question the procedure undertaken by the trial court. It was only after being convicted and sentenced to two death
sentences, that accused complained that his constitutional right has been violated.

2) Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. The accused’s
arrest, not his arraignment, confers on the trial court jurisdiction over his person.

DAAN vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 163972-77 March 28, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

1)The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right
but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. The court should accept such plea of guilty
to a lesser offense only when it is shown that the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the
crime charged. Thus, if the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is made by the accused after the prosecution has already
rested its case, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully allow the accused to change his former plea of
not guilty to guilty to a lesser offense should be the evidence already in the record. The reason for this being that Section 2,
Rule 116 under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.

2) The court may correctly accept the accused’s offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense even if made after the
prosecution has rested its by reason of equity case provided the requirements for plea bargaining under Section 2 or Rule 116
are complied with and such offer would redound to the benefit of the state, as for instance the accused can help in the
prosecution of the other more guilty accused.

PEOPLE vs. JANJALANI

G.R. No. 188314 January 10, 2011
SERENO, J.:

1) Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt should be set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained,
because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.

G. R. No. 213847 August 18, 2015

ENRILE vs. PEOPLE
BERSAMIN, J.:
 21

1) During the preliminary investigation, a respondent is not entitled to copies of the affidavit of his co-respondents.
His motion for bill of particulars demanding to be furnished such affidavits should therefore be denied.

2) Under procedural law, a respondent under preliminary investigation has the right to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant, but he does not have a similar right over the evidence submitted by his or her co-respondents.
There is no law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the
investigating prosecutor furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3 (b), Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
supports Sen. Estrada's claim.

Although Section 4 (c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides that a respondent
"shall have access to the evidence on record," this provision should be construed in relation to Section 4 (a) and (b) of the
same Rule, as well as to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, Section 4 (a) states that "the investigating officer shall require
the complainant or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the complaint." The "supporting witnesses" are
the witnesses of the complainant, and do not refer to the co-respondents.

PEOPLE vs. DUMLAO

G.R. No. 168918 March 2, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1) If the ground raised in the accused’s motion to quash is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the
fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of the information is whether the facts alleged
therein, if hypothetically admitted as true, would establish the essentials elements of the crime as defined by law. Evidence
aliunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not to be considered.

2) Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for
dismissal of an action only after the prosecution rests its case.

SORIANO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an
information, there being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the aggrieved party. The proper
remedy for the accused is to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked
in his motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner
authorized by law. The case of Macapagal-Arroyo, however, provides for an exception to the rule established in this case.

CO vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS

G. R. No. 183994 June 30, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

1) In determining whether the criminal case was properly dismissed on the ground that the accused's right to speedy
trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the proceedings. The factors to balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused
by such delay. Surely, mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must
be regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard must be given to the
facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the accused's right to speedy trial should be recognized, the Sta could not
be deprived of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements which prolong the trial for an
unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.

IMPERIAL vs. JOSON

G.R. No. 160067 November 17, 2010
PEREZ, J.:

1) Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates commencement of the trial within 30 days from
receipt of the pre-trial order and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a (1), Rule 119
 22

provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded in computing the
time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required
to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to give
particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

PEOPLE vs. MA. CRISTINA SERGIO

G. R. No. 240053 October 9, 2019
Hernando, J.:

1) The fact that the prosecution witness is in prison in Indonesia awaiting her execution justifies a resort to Rule 23
so her deposition can be taken by written interrogatories to be used in the prosecution for human trafficking of the persons who
sent her to Indonesia with sever kilos of prohibited drug without her knowledge. Courts should always be guided by the
principle that rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding. Simply put, rules of procedure should facilitate an orderly administration of justice.
They should not be strictly applied causing injury to a substantive right of a party to case. The rules of procedure should be
viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.

JIMENEZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 209195 September 17, 2014
BRION, J.:

1) For the purpose of the discharge of an accused to be a state witness, absolute necessity exists for his testimony
when he or she alone has knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would
simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the prosecution’s evidence.The requirement of absolute necessity for the testimony
of a state witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the number of the participating conspirators.

2) That the prosecution could use the voluntary statements of the accused his discharge as a state witness is not an
important and relevant consideration. To the prosecution belongs the control of its case and the court cannot dictate on its
choice in the discharge of a state witness, save only when the legal requirements have not been complied with.

3) The testimony of the state witness may be substantially corroborated in its material points not only by the
testimonies of other prosecution witnesses but also by pieces of object evidence that were discovered through information
furnished by the state witness.

4) In resolving a motion to discharge an accused to be a state witness under Section 17 of Rule 119, the rules only
require that that the testimony of the accused be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all points. A trial
judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to inform himself with absolute certainty of everything that may
develop in the course of the trial with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were practicable or possible,
there would be little need for the formality of a trial.

5) By jurisprudence, "most guilty" refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the
commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be
given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account
his degree of participation in the commission of the offense. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty would
be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be penalized.

6) For purposes of discharging an accused to be a state witness, the principal by inducement is not automatically the
most guilty in a conspiracy. If one induces another to commit a crime, the influence is the determining cause of the crime.
Without the inducement, the crime would not have been committed; it is the inducer who sets into motion the execution of the
criminal act. Neither is the principal by direct participation more guilty than the principal by inducement as the Revised Penal
Code penalizes the principal by inducement only when the principal by direct participation has executed the crime.

7) In determining whether to discharge an accused to be a state witness, the trial court is not a mere "rubber stamp"
of the prosecution. It is still the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-
witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the
trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based on the
prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.
 23

PEOPLE vs. DOMINGUEZ

G.R. No. 229420 February 19, 2018

1) The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his testimony during the
discharge proceeding inadmissible. Section 17 of Rule 119 provides that evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall
automatically form part of the trial. It is only when the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness
that his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. Upon the grant of the motion for discharge, whatever transpired
during the hearing, including the sworn affidavit of the state witness, is already automatically deemed part of the records of the
criminal case. The subsequent death of the state witness before he could testify in the trial of the case will not render his
testimony during the hearing of the motion for discharge inadmissible.

While Section 17 of Rule 119 requires the accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state
witness, his noncompliance therewith would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an acquittal. It does not
speak of any penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the discharge proceeding
inadmissible. On the contrary, the testimonies and admissions of a state witness during the discharge proceedings may be
admitted as evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse to testify in accordance with his sworn
statement constituting the basis for the discharge, militating against the claim of inadmissibility.

That the testimony of the accused was offered for the limited purpose of qualifying him as a state witness does not
automatically render his statements as to the specifics on the commission of the offense inadmissible. One of the requirements
under Section 17, Rule 119 is to establish that the erstwhile respondent does not appear to be the most guilty among him and
his cohorts. Thus, it is quite understandable that, during the discharge proceeding, the accused would narrate in graphic detail
his entire knowledge of the crime and the extent of the participation of each of the accused.

CABADOR vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 186001 October 2, 2009
ABAD, J.:

1) A motion to dismiss filed by the accused before the prosecution has rested its case alleging that unreasonable,
vexatious, and oppressive delays due to the fault of the prosecution have attended the trial of his case should be treated as a
motion to dismiss on the ground of denial of his right to speedy trial and not a demurrer to evidence even if he also mentioned
in the motion that trial court "has no evidence to consider," "the charge has no leg to stand on," and that "the witnesses had no
knowledge of his connection with or any participation in the incident." The fact that the accused filed the motion before the
prosecution has rested his case and that he did not even mention the evidence adduced by the prosecution that proved to be
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt disqualifies it from being a demurrer to evidence. The denial of the
motion which was filed without leave of court should not, therefore, be a ground to deprive the accused of his right to adduce
evidence.

REPUBLIC VS. DE BORJA

1) In a demurrer to evidence, however, it is premature to speak of "preponderance of evidence" because it is

filed prior to the defendant's presentation of evidence; it is precisely the office of a demurrer to evidence to expeditiously
terminate the case without the need of the defendant's evidence. Hence, what is crucial is the determination as to whether the
plaintiffs evidence entitles it to the relief sought.

LLAMAS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 149588 September 29, 2009
NACHURA, J.:

1) The remedy of annulment of judgment under Rule 47 cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The remedy cannot be
resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was rendered in a criminal case. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases. Section 18, Rule 124 thereof, provides:

Sec. 18. Application of certain rules in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules 42,
44 to 46 and 48 to 56 relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original
and appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Rule.
 24

There is no basis in law or the rules, therefore, to extend the scope of Rule 47 to criminal cases. When there is no law
or rule providing for a remedy, recourse to it cannot be allowed.

HIPOS, SR. vs. JUDGE BAY

G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

1) A court cannot be compelled through a writ of mandamus to dismiss a criminal case by virtue of a motion to
withdraw information filed by the prosecutor’s office on the ground of lack of probable cause. As an extraordinary writ, the
remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not
issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment
in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.

In Crespo v. Mogul, it was held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the
case or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of
the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion to dismiss the case filed
by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or deny the same.

ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 2011
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.20 In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.21 When
the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award
the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the "extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that
the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."

While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it may also give rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and
moral duty of the accused to repair or make whole the damage caused to offended party by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. Simply stated, civil liability arises when one,
by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for the accused to be
civilly liable, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the offended party.

G.R. No. 173089 August 25, 2010

PEOPLE vs. Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS
Mendoza, J.:

1) A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal
whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a
judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. A petition for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases may be entertained if there a clear showing that
the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

An order of the trial court granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence may be assailed via a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such
dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or
set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is
not violated.

BASILONIA vs. HON. VLLLARUZ

G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015
PERALTA, J.:
 25

1) A motion for execution of a judgment of conviction filed more than 20 years from the time it became final and
executory may properly be granted by the court provided the penalty has not prescribed. The prescription of penalties found in
Article 93 of the RPC applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in
deprivation of liberty, and that the period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence
by escaping during the term of his sentence. Thus, if the accused was never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite
being sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment, the prescription of penalty of imprisonment would not have ran in his
favor.

2) Once a judgment of conviction becomes final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the court to immediately
execute the penalty of imprisonment and/or pecuniary penalty (fine). A motion to execute judgment of conviction is not
necessary. With respect to the penalty of imprisonment, the trial court should cancel the bail bond and issue a warrant of
arrest, if the accused is not yet under detention. If the convicted accused is already under detention by virtue of the warrant of
arrest issued, the trial court should immediately issue the corresponding mittimus or commitment order for the immediate
transfer of the accused to the National Penitentiary to serve his sentence, if the penalty imposed requires the service of sentence
in the National Penitentiary. The commitment order should state that an appeal had been filed, but the same had been
withdrawn, dismissed or decided with finality.

2) The motion for execution of the judgment of conviction with regards to the civil liability filed after 20 years from
its entry should be denied as it is in violation of Section 6 of Rule 39.

Xxxxxxxxxxxx

1) The dismissal of a criminal action on the ground that the lacks jurisdiction over the case is not an acquittal of the
accused. Basic is the rule that a dismissal of a case is different from an acquittal of the accused therein. Except in a dismissal
based on a Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused, or for violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial, the dismissal
of a criminal case on the ground of the court’s lack of jurisdiction will not result in the acquittal of the accused. Acquittal is
always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is
beyond a reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal
terminates the proceeding, either because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence does not show that
the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or
sufficient in form and substance, etc.

2) The only instance when the word dismissal amounts to an acquittal is where the court grants the accused’s
demurrer to evidence. In this case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits.

3) If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court and
the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the accused could not be again prosecuted
before the court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the defendant may again be prosecuted for the
same offense before the court of competent jurisdiction.

BRIONES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 156009 June 5, 2009
BRION, J.:

1) For new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following
conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted.

2) An accused charged in the information with robbery may be convicted of simple theft. The failure of the
information to specify the correct crime committed will not bar the accused’s conviction for the crime of theft. The character of
the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information, or by the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information. Robbery, which is the crime charged in the information necessarily includes the crime of simple theft,
which was the crime established beyond reasonable doubt.

SALUDAGA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010
MENDOZA, J.:
 26

1) The failure to conduct a new preliminary investigation does necessarily amount to a violation of the accused right
to due process. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused
before trial, the denial of the accused’s claim for a new investigation would not deprive him of his right to due process if the
new information does not contain substantial amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation.

PAYUMO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 151911 July 25, 2011
MENDOZA, J.:

1) The erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the trial court is not a ground for a new trial or reversal of the
decision if there are other independent evidence to sustain the decision, or if the rejected evidence, if it had been admitted would
not have changed the decision.

CORAZON MACAPAGAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 193217 February 26, 2014
PERALTA, J.:

1) An order of the trial court denying the accused’s notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which an
appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be taken from an order disallowing or
dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65.

ROSIE QUIDET vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 170289 April 8, 2010
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

1) Section 11 or Rule 122 provides that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who
did not appeal except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Since the judgment
of the appellate court reduced the penalty imposed the accused-appellant, such judgment shall apply to his co-accused who did
not appeal the judgment of the trial court.

BALABA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 169519 July 17, 2009
CARPIO, J.:

1) An error in designating the appellate court in the notice of appeal is not fatal to the appeal. However, the
correction in designating the proper appellate court (Sandiganbayan) should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once
made within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case have
been forwarded to the court without appellate jurisdiction (Court of Appeals). Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2 of
Rule 50 would apply, to wit: "An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate
court but shall be dismissed outright."

PEOPLE vs. OLIVO

G.R. No. 177768 July 27, 2009
QUISUMBING, J.:

1) The present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal,
except insofar as the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. If the judgment of the appellate
court, therefore, acquitted the accused-appellant for insufficiency of the prosecution evidence to convict him beyond reasonable
doubt, such judgment, being definitely favorable and applicable to the accused who did appeal, shall be applicable to him.
 27

PEOPLE vs. TARUC

G.R. No. 185202 February 18, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:

1) If accused fails without justifiable cause to appear at the promulgation of judgment despite notice, and the
judgment is one of conviction, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order
his arrest.
2) If the accused-appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal, the Court of appeals shall dismiss the appeal. Once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of
the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.

Although Section 8 of Rule 124 particularly applies to the Court of Appeals, it has been extended to the Supreme
Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:

SECTION 1. Uniform procedure. - Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the
procedure in the Supreme Court in original and in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of
Appeals.

There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of appeal is
not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may
waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision,
he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him.

G.R. No. 162370 April 21, 2009

TIU vs. COURT OF APPEALS
CARPIO, J.:

1) The private complainant has no legal personality to file with the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule that only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals.

COLINARES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
ABAD, J.:

1) An accused who appealed a judgment sentencing him to a non-probationable penalty may avail himself of
probation if the appellate court sentences him to a probationable penalty. The Probation Law never intended to deny an
accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. The Probation Law
must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to
do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not
because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
Sereno, SJ,:

1) The ruling in Colinares v. People, which modified the ruling in Francisco insofar as the eligibility for probation of
those who appeal their conviction is concerned, was applied in this case. In Francisco, the accused who appeals for whatever
reason a judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation even if the appellate court
sentences him to a probationable penalty. In Colinares, if the accused appeals a judgment of conviction imposing on him a non-
probationable penalty but the same is modified by the appellate court to a probationable penalty, he may avail himself of
probation. Of course, if the accused appeals a judgment of conviction imposing on him a probationable penalty, he is disqualified
from applying for probation even if the appellate court sentences him to a probationable penalty.
 28

G.R. No. 209464 July 1, 2015

DUNGO vs. PEOPLEO N
MENDOZA, J.:

1) Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03, dated
October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the penalty imposed is either reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. According to the said provision, "[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion
perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via Rule 45 under the
Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law. Moreover, such
review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons.

In other words, when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file a
notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire
case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of
discretion and raise only questions of law.

G.R. No. 158467 October 16, 2009

MARIMLA vs. PEOPLE
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

1) A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall
continue until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-
02-SC entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives
And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs
of Manila and Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties of Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision

Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. – The
Executive Judges and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on applications filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the
Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein
by the Supreme Court.

The applications shall be personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies and shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and
Vice-Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts.

PEOPLE vs. NUEVAS

G.R. No. 170233 February 22, 2007
TINGA, J.:

1) The Constitution states that a search and seizure must be carried through or with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. The constitutional proscription, however, is not absolute but admits of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and
prevailing jurisprudence);
 29

2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

2) For a search incidental to a lawful arrest to be valid, the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable
cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. It is also required that the person to be arrested must be committing or has
committed a crime in the presence of the police officers. Reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate
that he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."

3) For purposes of a valid search under the plain view doctrine, an object is in plain view if it is plainly exposed to
sight. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized
without a warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or
if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be seized. In other words, if the package
is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is
deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. If the dried marijuana leaves were inside a plastic bag, packed in newspaper
and wrapped therein. that the person to be arrested is carrying and were not readily apparent or transparent to the police
officers, the dried marijuana leaves could not be considered in plain view.

4) While the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived, it must be seen that the consent to the search was voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal detention and
search. For consent to be valid, it must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. The consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The
question whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent and the
environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3)
whether he objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the
person consenting. It is the State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent
was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given.

VERIDIANO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 200370 June 7, 2017
LEONEN, J.:

1) There is no valid arrest in flagrante delicto and search incident thereto under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court if the person arrested at a checkpoint was not committing a crime but was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any
unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. The police officers effecting the warrantless
arrest and search cannot rely solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless
arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being
committed, or is about to be committed.
 30

2) A warrantless arrest and search cannot likewise be justified under Section 5(b) of Rule 113 if the law enforcers
effecting the arrest had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an
offense. A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based
on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause
that would justify a warrantless search under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.

3) For warrantless search to be valid under the "stop and frisk" doctrine, the law enforcer must have a genuine reason
to believe, based on his experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance
on one suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.

A "stop and frisk" search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and
pat him for weapons or contraband." The allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search is limited to a "protective search of outer
clothing for weapons." Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards
crime prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Law
enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a
"stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch.

4) The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest
becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to
quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from
questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during trial
cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused."

Failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest, however, does not preclude an accused from questioning the
admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the court's
jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional
inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

MIGUEL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 227038 July 31, 2017
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) There was no valid arrest in flagrante delicto by Bantay Bayan operatives of a man caught urinating on a fence along
the road and allegedly showing his private parts who, after being searched, yielded two sticks of marijuana in a pack of
cigarette and was later charged not with displaying his private parts but possession of a dangerous drug. The marijuana
recovered was inadmissible for being the fruit of an unreasonable search. Clearly, the circumstances did not justify the conduct
of an in flagrante delicto arrest, considering that there was no overt act constituting a crime committed in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. Neither did the circumstances necessitate a "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest as the
arresting Bantay Bayan operatives did not have any personal knowledge of facts that petitioner had just committed an offense.
More importantly, there could be no valid warrantless arrest of the accused on account of the alleged public display of his
private parts because he was not charged for said crime but for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

2) With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that imposed on
state agents or authorized government authorities. If the search that yielded the evidence was conducted by a private person
and not on behalf of the State, the constitutional provision on unreasonable searches and seizure would not apply. In other
words, a private person could not conduct an unreasonable search that would render the evidence inadmissible. If the search is,
however, made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality.

3) Under existing jurisprudence, barangay tanods, Barangay Chairmen, and bantay bayan operatives are deemed as law
enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution. A bantav bayan operative has the color of a state-
related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights in relation to the authority to
conduct a custodial investigation under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution.
 31

4) A Port Authority (Manila, Cebu etc.) is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in this case, considering
that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents of government under Article III of the
Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

DIMAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 216922 APRIL 18, 2018
PERALTA, J.:

1) It is well settled that objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. For the "plain view doctrine" to apply,
however, it is required that the following requisites are present: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in
plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

What the 'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an
intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves
to supplement the prior justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to a lawful-arrest,
or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused-and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.

2) A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can ascertain and identify with
reasonable effort the place intended, and distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation that points out the
place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.

Technical precision of description is not required. "It is sufficient that there be reasonable particularity and certainty
as to the identity of the property to be searched for and seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission.
Indeed, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room
for doubt on the part of the searching authorities. If this were the rule, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to
obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things to look for.

3) A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized (1) when the description therein is as
specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or (2) when the description expresses a conclusion of fact - not of law by
which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search and seizure; (3) and when the things to be described are limited
to those which bear direct relation to the offenses for which the warrant is being issued. The purpose for this requirement is to
limit the articles to be seized only to those particularly described in the search warrant in order to leave the officers of the law
with no discretion regarding what items they shall seize, to the end that no unreasonable searches and seizures will be
committed.

LENIZA REYES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 229380 June 06, 2018
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

1) There was no lawful arrest of the accused because she was just passing by the police officers without acting
suspiciously or doing anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor. As no other overt act could be properly attributed to
the accused as to rouse suspicion in the mind of the police officers that she had just committed, was committing, or was about to
commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal basis. The act of walking while reeking of liquor per se cannot be considered a
criminal act. Since the arrest was unlawful, the search that followed it is also unlawful rendering the dangerous drug recovered
inadmissible in evidence.

2) One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a valid search may be effected is a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made –
the process cannot be reversed.
 32

HILARIO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 161070 April 14, 2008
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

1) In criminal cases, the accused may file a petition for relief from denial of appeal if, despite his express instruction,
his counsel failed to file a notice of appeal of the judgment of conviction. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the
right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law. An appeal is an essential part of the judicial system and trial courts are advised
to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities. While this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due
process, a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, if the accused’s loss of the right to appeal was due to his counsel’s
negligence and not at all attributed to him, his petition for relief from denial of appeal should be granted.