GRETA P.

BORRA
JD 2 SY 2019-2020, 2nd Sem
Land Titles and Deeds Case Digests

GRETA P. BORRA

JD 2

LAND TITLE and DEEDS CASE DIGEST

#1 Malabanan vs Republic
G.R. No 179987 September 3, 2013
Heirs of Mario Malabanan, (Represented by Sally Malabanan), petitioners
vs
Republic of the Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:

On February 20, 1998 Mario Malabanan filed application for land registration of the
parcel of land which he had purchased from Eduardo Velasco, claiming that the property
formed part of alienable and disposable land of public domain, and that the predecessor-in-
interest had been in an open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more or less 30 years, thereby, entitling him to the judicial
confirmation of his title. Malabanan presented a certification issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) that the land is alienable and disposable.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the application of Malabanan. However,
Court of Appeal reversed the decision of the RTC, upon the appeal of the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) arguing that Malabanan failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in finding
that he had been in the possession of the property in the manner and for the length as
required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.

Initially the Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari because
Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the
property by him and his predecessor-in-interest since or before June 12, 1945. Petitioner
filed for Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, or both?

HELD:
The court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Under the Philippine Constitution, lands of public domain were classified into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral and national park. Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987

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Philippine Constitution provides that only agricultural lands of public domain may be
alienated; all other natural resources may not.

Further, Alienable and disposable lands of the State may fall into two categories, to
wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under
Article 425 of the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of public domain, or the public
lands as provided for by the Constitution, but with limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national park are not
susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive
act is necessary to enable such reclassification, which is, under the existing law is vested to
the Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public land will be classified as
neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a presidential
proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus,
until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify and reclassify lands, or
until the Congress of the Philippines declares that the State no longer intends to use the land
for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is
applicable.

All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided law. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly refers to the principles on
prescription under existing law. Accordingly, in the interpretation of Section 14(2) we have to
apply the civil law concept of prescription in the interpretation of this provision. The critical
qualifications under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is: property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The
identification of what consist of patrimonial property is provided by Article 420 and 421 as
quoted below:

Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

From the above provisions it is clear that property of public dominion, which generally
includes property belonging to the State cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed be
subject of the commerce of man. Lands of public domain whether declared alienable and
disposable or not, are property of public dominion and thus insusceptible by acquisition by
prescription. Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "property of public
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dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion
property may be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the
State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth". In other words, there must be am express
declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial property. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified
as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription.

It is clear that the evidence of the petitioner is insufficient to establish that Malabanan
had acquired the property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no
substantive evidence as well that Malabanan have been in possession of the property since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. The earlier that petitioner can date back their possession,
according to their own evidence-the Tax Declaration they presented-it to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree. Without satisfying the requisite character and possession – possession
and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run
against the State, such as the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law of the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended
for public service or for the development of the national wealth.

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#2 Malabanan vs Republic
G.R. No 201821 September 19, 2018
Pablo B. Malabanan, Petitioners
vs
Republic of the Philippines, Respondent

FACTS:
The Republic commenced a civil case action against Angelo B. Malabanan, Pablo B.
Malabanan (petitioner herein) and Greenthumb Realty and Development Corporation
(Greenthumb). The Republic alleged that upon verification with the Land Registration
Authority, the records on the judgment rendered in LRC, which was the basis of the Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) of the land in question could not be found. It further alleged that
the said land is within the unclassified public forest, remained part of the public domain that
pertained to the State, hence, could not be the subject of disposition or registration.
In response, the petitioner moved to dismiss Civil Case by arguing that the Regional
Trail Court (RTC) had no jurisdiction over the action because annulment of the judgment and
the decree issued in Land Registration Court (LRC) is under the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals (CA). The Republic opposed the motion to dismiss, insisting that its complaint did
not ask the RTC to annul the judgment because the judgment rendered by LRC did not exist
to begin with. The RTC granted the motion to dismiss the case stating that the action is for
nullification of the judgment of the LRC, therefore, based on Section 9(2) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 is under the jurisdiction of the CA. The Republic filed a notice of appeal,
which was denied by the RTC. The Republic then assailed the order in the CA by petition
for certiorari alleging thereby grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. CA set aside the order of the and remanded the case to RTC.
The CA on its ruling stated that where a parcel of land considered to be inalienable
land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the Government is allowed by
law to file an original action for reversion, an action where the ultimate relief is to revert the
land to the government pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, over which action, no doubt, the
RTC exercise exclusive jurisdiction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the remedy taken by the Republic is considered an annulment of the
judgment of the LRC, hence RTC has no jurisdiction thereof.

HELD:
The basic rule is that jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter is determined
from the allegations in the complaint, the law in force at the time complaint is filed, and the
character of the relief sought irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of
the claims averred.

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The Court found and declared that the complaint of the Republic is not seeking the
annulment of the judgment issued in LRC, but the reversion to the republic of the tract of
land on the ground that the land is within the unclassified public forest.
The material averments, as well as the character of the relied prayed for by
petitioners in the complaint before the RTC is that for the cancellation of title and reversion,
and not annulment of judgment of the RTC. The RTC may properly take cognizance of
reversion suits which do not call for an annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as an LRC.
Reversion is an action which involves the title to, or possession of real property, or any
interest therein, and where the assess value exceeds P20,000.00, falls under the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
The Court also emphasize that in reversion suit, it should be emphasized that attack
is not against the judgment ordering the issuance of title, but against the title which is sought
to be cancelled either because the judgment was not validly rendered, or the title issued did
not faithfully reflect the land referred to in the judgment, or because no judgment was
rendered at all.

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#3 REPUBLIC vs. NAGUIT

G.R. No 144057 January 17, 2005

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner
vs.
The Honorable Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit, respondent

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
seeking to review the decisions of the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the decision of
both the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MTCT), which
granted the application for the registration of parcel of land of Corazpn Naguit.
On January 5, 1993, Corazon Naguit filed with MTCT a petition for registration of title
of a parcel of land. The application seeks judicial confirmation of her imperfect title over the
aforesaid land.
The evidence on record revealed that the Ramon Urbano, the predecessor-in-interest
of the land in dispute, declared the land for taxation purposes from 1945 to 1991. In 1992
Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of heirs of Maming, and subsequently the
heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit, who,
thereupon started occupying the land, and through administrator, introduced improvements
thereto. Naguit and her predecessor-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the
concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until
she filed the application for registration.
The MCTC rendered decision in favor of Naguit and ordered that the subject land be
brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that
the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. The Republic, through the
Solicitor General, filed a motion for reconsideration, stressing that the land applied for was
declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980. The Republic appealed the
decision of the MCTC to the RTC. The RTC dismissed the appeal. Republic elevated the
case to the Court of Appeals, and the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not it is necessary that the land be classified as alienable and disposable
on or before June 12, 1945 before it can be registered under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Whether or not it is necessary under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration
Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the
applicant’s possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

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HELD by SC:
No, it is not required that the subject land be classified as alienable and disposable
on or before June 12, 1945 before it can be registered under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Under Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, there are three obvious
requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14 (1), to wit:
a. that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of public domain;
b. that the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessor-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation;
and
c. such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Petitioner claim that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have
already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier would render Section 14 (1) of the
said decree virtually inoperative for it would mean that all public domain lands which were
not declared as alienable and disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to
original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupants. In
effect, it precludes the government from enforcing the said provision as it decides to
reclassify lands as alienable and disposable. Instead, the reasonable interpretation of
Section 14 (1) is that it merely requires that the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed.
Hence, the decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed.

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#4 PALOMO vs CA
G.R. No 95608 January 21, 1997
Spouses Ignacio Palomo and Trinidad Pascual, and Carmen Palomo vda de
Buenaventura, petitioners
vs.
The Honorable Court of Appeals, The Republic of the Philippines, Faustino J.
Perfecto, Raffy Santillan, Boy Ariado, Lorenzo Brocales, Salvador Doe, and
other Does, Representatives

FACTS:
On June 13, 1913, the then Governor General of the Philippine Islands issued
Executive Order (EO) No. 40 which reserves 440,530 square meters of land situated in
Barrio Naga, Tiwi in the province of Albay City pursuant to the provisions of Act 648 of the
Philippine Commission.
Subsequently, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay ordered the registration
of 15 parcels of land covered by EO No. 40 in the name of Diego Palomo on December
1916 and January 1917. In 1937, Diego Palomo donated these parcels of land consisting of
74,872 square meters which were allegedly covered by various Original Certificates of Titles
(OCT) to his heirs, Ignacio and Carmen Palomo.
Claiming that the said OCTs were lost during the Japanese occupation, Ignacio
Palomo filed a petition for reconstitution with the CFI of Albay on May 30, 1950. The
Register of Deeds (ROD) of Albay issued Transfer of Certificates of Titles (TCT) in October
1953.
On July 1954, then President Ramon Magsaysay issued a Proclamation No. 47
converting the area embraced by EO No. 40 into the “Tiwi Hot Spring National Park,” under
the control, management protection and administration of Bureau of Forest Development
(BFD), The area was never released as alienable and disposable portion of public domain
and therefore is neither susceptible to disposition nor registrable. The Palomos, however,
continued in possession of the property, paid real taxes thereon, and introduced
improvements on the land.
On May 1974, the petitioners filed Civil Case No. T-143 for injunction with damages
against the employees of the of the BFD who entered the subject land and cut down
bamboos.
On October 1974, the Republic of the Philippines filed a Civil Case No, T-176 for the
annulment and cancellation of the Certificate of Titles involving the 15 parcels of lands.
A joint trial for Cases No. T-143 and T-176 was conducted. On Case No. T-146 the
trail court dismissed the injunction and damages case filed by the Palomos against the
employees of BFD. On Case No. T-176, the court decided in favor of the plaintiff, hence:
declaring the OCTs and TCTs null and void, forfeiting in favor of the plaintiff Government any
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and all improvements on the lands in question that are found therein. The trial court found no
sufficient proof that the Palomos established property rights over the parcels of land. The
court further stated that assuming that the decrees of the CFI were really issued, the
Palomos obtained such decrees when EO No, 40 was already in force.
The court also ordered the ROD to of Albay to cancel the alleged OCT and TCT of
the land in question.
The case was appealed to the Court of Appeal which affirmed in toto the findings of
the lower court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the alleged OCT issued pursuant to the order of the CFI in 1916-
1717 and the subsequent TCT issued thereto are valid;
2. Whether or not the parcels of land claimed by the Palomos are alienable land of
public domain which may be acquired by adverse possession; and
3. Whether or not the Government is estopped from questioning the validity of the
certificate of titles.

HELD by SC:
No. The parcels of land claimed by Palomos were not alienable land of public
domain, hence, the OCT and TCT issued to Palomos are null and void.
Petitioners were not able to prove that the petitioners’ predecessors in interest
derived title of the land from an Old Spanish grant.
The adverse possession of the land which may be the basis of grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases applies only to alienable lands of public domain. The law
governing natural resources provides that forest land cannot be owned by private person
and cannot be registered. Possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into
private property, unless such land is reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.
The lands in question are forming part of the forest zone, hence, cannot be owned by the
petitioners.
As to the forfeiture of the improvements introduced thereto by the petitioner, the fact
EO. no 40 was already in force at the time the land in question were surveyed for the
petitioners’ predecessor in interest, and that the petitioners apparently knew that the subject
land were covered under the reservation when they filed a petition for the reconstitution of
the lost OCT because the blueprint of Survey of Work Order No. contains a note ‘in conflict
with provincial reservation”. Hence, the petitioners’ plead of good faith for the introduction of
improvements to the land will not stand. The Court held that in as much as the Palomos
acquired the titles without government opposition, the principle of estoppel does not operate
against the government for the acts of its agents.

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#5 SUSI vs. RAZON

G.R. No L-24066 December 9, 1925
Valentin Susi, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, Defendants, The Director of
Lands, appellant

FACTS:
A complaint was filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of
Lands, praying for judgement:

a. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of subject land;
b. Annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the
ground that the land is a private property;
c. Ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to Angela Razon; and
d. Ordering the payment of the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of P500.00, as
damages.

The Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained in the complaint
and, as a special defense, alleged that the subject land was a property of the Government of
the United States under the administration and control of the Philippines before its sale to
Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pintac sold the subject
land and a fish pond to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza. After being in possession
thereof for about 8 years, Garcia and Mendoza sold the property to Valentin Susi.
Before the execution of the Deed of Sale, Valentin Susi paid its price and sown
“bacawan” on the land, availing himself to the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds
of sale oh which he had paid the price of the property.
The possession and occupation of the land by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Medoza,
and then by Valentin Susi had been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any
interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon
commenced the action in the Court of First Instance to recover the possession of the said
land. The Court of First Instance rendered judgment, in favor of Valentin Susi.
Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land through court, Angela
Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof. Valentin, upon learning the
application, apposed thereto, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years.
After conducting an administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the
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opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of the said grant,
the Register of Deeds issued the proper Certificate of Title to Angela Razon.

ISSUE:
Who is then the rightful owner of the land in question?
HELD:
The Supreme Court in their decision favored Valentin Susi. It clearly appears from
the evidence that Valentine Susi has been in the possession of the land in question openly,
continuously, adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors for forty-five
years. These being the facts, there is the presumption juris et de jure as established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act, No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with. So that when Angela
Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for a certificate of title is not
necessary to be issued in her name in order that the said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts. An application therefore is sufficient under section 47 of Act No, 2874. In effect,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land by a grant of the State, and it already ceased to be
public domain and had become a private property. Consequently, the selling of the land in
question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed a land over which he had no
longer title ot control, hence, the sale made was void and of no effect. Angela Razon did not
hereby acquire any right over the land.

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#6 Director of Lands vs ACME

G.R. No 73002 December 29, 1986
The Director of Lands, Petitioner
vs
Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., etc,
Respondent

FACTS:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance (CFI),
ordering the registration of parcels of land in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.
(ACME)
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc. is a corporation duly organized in accordance with
the Philippine Laws and registered with Securities and Exchange Commission. It is
represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario.
The subject land was ancestrally acquired by ACME from Mariano Infiel and Acer
Infiel, both are members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities on October
29, 1962. The applicable constitution at the time was the Republic Constitution of 1935. The
possession of the Irfiels over the subject land sold to ACME dates back before the
Philippines was even discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed
and occupied the land from generation to generation, until the same came into the
possession of Mariano and Acer Irfiel. The possession of ACME, tacking the possession of
the Infielss was continuous, adverse and public from time immemorial. Hence, the land is
being sought to be registered pursuant to Republic Act 3872 which grants absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their
ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable land or within the public domain.
The applicant ACME has introduced more than forty-five million (P45,000,000.00) worth of
improvements.
The Director of Lands takes no issues on the forgoing facts except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution, asserting that the registration proceeding was only
commenced on July 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect. The
latter being the applicable law at the time of the registration. Section 11 of Article XIV
prohibits the private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares. This provision is not found in the
1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question
from the Infiels. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the
time of the institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of
the public domain, it cannot be sold to a private corporations or associations. Otherwise, it

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the parcels of land were already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against
acquisition by private corporations or associations does not apply.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the land is already a private land
2. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of the subject
land by private corporation or associations applies.

HELD:
1. When the conditions as specified in Section 48 of Act 141 is complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by possession of law, a right to a government
grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land therefore
ceases to be of the public domain. The application for the confirmation is mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.

2. Therefore, since the subject land is already private land to which the Infiels had a
legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when ACME acquired it
from the said owners, it must be conceded that ACME had a perfect right to make
such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

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#7 International Hardwood vs IAC and UP

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD v UP G.R. No L-52518 August 13,
1991
International Hardwood and Veneer Company of the Philippines, petitioner-
appellee
vs.
University of the Philippines and Jose C. Campos Jr., respondent-appellants.
Tañada, Vivo & Tan for petitioner-appellee

FACTS:
International Hardwood is, among others, is engaged in the manufacturing,
processing and exporting of plywood and was, for said purpose, granted by the Government
an exclusive license for 25 years, expiring on February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove
timber from that portion of the subject timber land. Since the grant of the license, the
plaintiff has been in peaceful possession of the said timber concession and had been felling
cutting and removing timber therefrom, and had constructed improvements worth more than
P7,000,000.00.
In 1961, during the effectivity of the License agreement. Then President Carlos P.
Garcia issued Executive Proclamation No. 791. Under this proclamation, subject to the
private rights if there’s any, a certain parcel of land of the public domain in Quezon City and
Laguna were withdrawn from sale or settlement and were reserved for University of the
Philippines (UP) College of Agriculture, as experiment station for the proposed dairy
research institute and for agricultural research and production studies.
In June 1964, still during the effectivity of the license agreement, the Congress of the
Philippines enacted Republic Act (RA) 3990, establishing a central experiment station for the
use of UP college of agriculture, College of Veterinary Medicine and College of Arts and
Sciences. Under RA 3990, the land describes in Proclamation 791 was fully ceded and
transferred in full ownership to the UP, subject to any existing concessions, if any.
On the strength of RA 3990m UP demanded from Hardwood:
1. Payment of forest charges due and payable under the license agreement be paid
to UP instead of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and
2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by International Hardwood within the
boundaries of the Central Experiment Station as defined in RA 3990 be
performed by UP personnel.
However, despite the demand by UP, International Hardwood refused to comply.
International Hardwood filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with Injunction against UP. The CFI rendered judgment in favor of the

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International Hardwood, declaring that RA 3990 does not empower the UP, in lieu of the
BIR, to scale, measure and seal the timber cut by the petitioner, and to collect the
corresponding forest charges as prescribed by the National Internal Revenue Code.
The respondent appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the court of
appeals elevated the case to the Supreme Court as the case involves purely question of law,
or the interpretation and construction of RA 3990.

ISSUEs:
1. Whether or not UP, as the owner of the property, has the right to collect from
International Hardwood forest charges due and payable under the license
agreement which was used to be collected by the BIR.
2. Whether or not UP is entitled to supervise the logging, felling and removing of
timber within the Central Experiment Station area as described in RA 3990.

HELD by SC:
Under proclamation no. 791, the parcel of land of the public domain was withdrawn
from sale or settlement and was reserved for the College of Agriculture of the UP as the
experiment station, subject to private rights, if any. Under RA 3990, the reserved area was
now ceded and transferred in full ownership to the University of the Philippines subject to
any existing concession, if any.
When the government ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the
Philippines completely removed it from the public domain, and more specifically, in respect
to the areas covered by the timber license of the petitioner, removed and segregated it from
a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed
the same to UP; and made UP the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing
concession. That the law intended to transfer the absolute and full ownership, Full means
entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality.
However, the right of the timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it
must be respected.
An owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitation other
than those established by law. The right to enjoy includes the jus utendi or the right to
receive from the thing what it produces, and jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by
its use. As provided for in Article 441o of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural,
the industrial and the civil fruits. However, the exception to these rules, as where the
property is subject of usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. In the case at
hand, the exception is made for International Hardwood as licensee or grantee of the
concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the
area ceded and transferred to UP until February 1, 1985. However, it has the correlative
duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the
same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the
Republic of the Philippines through the BIR. Consequently, the BIR automatically lost its
authority and jurisdiction to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect
forestry charges and other fees dues.

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 GRETA P. BORRA
JD 2 SY 2019-2020, 2nd Sem
Land Titles and Deeds Case Digests

The judgment of the trial court therefore was reversed, and the Court declared thar
forest charges due from and payable by the petitioner for timber cut pursuant to its license
agreement should be paid to the UP; declaring the the UP is entitled to supervise, though its
duly appointed personnel, the logging, felling and removal of timber within the aforesaid area
covered by RA 3990.

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