FINC/015

IBS Center for Management Research

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Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions
This case was written by A. Mukund, IBS Center for Management Research. It was compiled from published sources, and is
intended to be used as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a
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management situation.
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2002, IBS Center for Management Research. All rights reserved.

To order copies, call +91-08417-236667/68 or write to IBS Center for Management Research (ICMR), IFHE Campus, Donthanapally,
Sankarapally Road, Hyderabad 501 504, Andhra Pradesh, India or email: info@icmrindia.org

www.icmrindia.org
 FINC/015

Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

“How can they not offer us the right of first refusal to the shares? Can anyone question our
commitment to the company?”
- B K Modi, commenting on the FIs selling their stake in Modi Rubber in the open
market, in August 1996.

THE POWER STRUGGLE

On June 30, 2001, a statement issued by Panduranga Rao (Rao), 1 Chairman of Modi Rubber

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Ltd. (MRL) came as a big surprise to Indian corporate watchers. The statement revealed that
the MRL board had, after a special meeting decided to strip Managing Director B K Modi of
his functionary powers. Rao said, “We have been compelled to transfer all areas hitherto
looked after by Dr B.K. Modi to the second MD (V K Modi – B K Modi‟s brother) for he is
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not giving enough attention to the affairs of the company.” The board also suspended three
other directors, B K Gupta, R L Ahuja and Atul Prakash - all reported to be close aides of B
K Modi.
What was more intriguing was the fact that B K Modi was absent from the meeting though a notice
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had been duly served to him. Rao commented, “The notice was served and the agenda was
circulated. He cannot make us wait.” Further, the move was reported to have the backing of V K
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Modi as well. Though the two brothers were not known to be the best of friends, this move was
rather unexpected.
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The very next day, B K Modi held a press conference where he announced his rejection of
the board‟s decision. He asserted that he was still the MD of the company and that the board
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was not empowered to remove him from the post. He claimed that the constitution of the
board itself was doubtful since the previous chairman Bodhishwar Rai (an independent
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director) was „unceremoniously‟ thrown out and replaced by a UTI nominee. This was
against the guidelines of the capital markets regulator Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI), according to which the chairman should be an independent director and not a
nominee director. He also said that there were no disputes between him and V K Modi.
Analysts however took this with a pinch of salt as V K Modi was absent from the press
conference.
On July 5, B K Modi sent a notice to V K Modi, charging him of breach of a shareholder‟s
agreement between them. (The agreement mentioned that while he would look after the production
side of MRL, V K Modi would look after sales and marketing. Moreover, it had been agreed that
any change in this arrangement would require the mutual consent of the two brothers.) MRL‟s
move against B K Modi eventually came to be seen as a major victory for financial institutions
(FIs) in the decade long MRL/FI battle for control of the company.

1
A nominee of the FI Unit Trust of India (UTI) on the MRL board, appointed as the Chairman on April
30, 2001.

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 Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

BACKGROUND NOTE

MRL, established in 1971, was a part of the Modi Group of companies.While B K and V K Modi
held 23.87% of MRL‟s equity, the FIs held 44.5% and the public held 31.63%2. A major part of
the FI stake in MRL was with Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) and UTI. The other FIs involved
were the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) and the Industrial Credit and Investment
Corporation of India (ICICI). The FIs had acquired their stake in MRL over the years, both
through conversion of unpaid loans into equity and market purchases.
The company‟s business comprised the manufacturing and marketing of automobile tyres/tubes/
flaps and retreading materials. A small portion of the revenue came from trading in tyres, tubes,
flaps, garments and other articles. The company had a technical collaboration with Continental AG
of Germany for manufacturing tyres. MRL‟s major customers included Telco, Ashok Leyland,
Maruti Udyog, Punjab Tractors and Escorts. The company was present in almost all segments of
the tyre industry - truck, bus, car, jeep, tractor (front, rear and trailer), scooter and motorcycle
tyres. The company had an overall market share of 14.8% in June 1999 and its sales were
concentrated in the truck and bus (T&B) tyres segment (around 45% in 1998-99). About 9.7% of
the total production catered to the passenger car segment. Almost 10% of the total industry

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production of tractor tyres came from MRL.
The company had two plants in Meerut district and one in Ghaziabad district in Uttar Pradesh. In
1998-99, on an installed capacity of 2.42 million tyres and tubes each, MRL produced 2.31 million
tyres and 2.144 million tubes. The company sold around 2.279 million tyres and 2.142 million
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tubes. Tyre sales contributed 90.9% to the gross sales turnover while sales of tubes formed 7%.
About 87% of its production was sold locally with the rest catering to the export market. MRL was
quite successful in building a strong base for itself in the export market.
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THE MODI RUBBER STORY

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Since the early days of MRL, B K Modi and V K Modi were reported to have „rarely seen eye to
eye.‟ Even after they signed a shareholder‟s agreement, their relationship never really improved.
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One of the main reasons for their differences was B K Modi‟s desire to get a higher share in MRL.
The Modis had been defaulting on FI loans since the 1980s. After a formal split in the family in
1989, the Modis refused to repay the money they owed the FIs on the grounds that the
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crossholdings of the various family factions in Modi companies were so complex that the liability
of each of the brothers could not be fixed till the division of property was effected. Since the Modi
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brothers could not arrive at an equitable division of assets, the Government appointed an arbitrator
from IFCI. The arbitrator came up with a solution, which was summarily rejected by the Modis.
Unhappy with the constant fights between the Modis and the way MRL was being run, Continental
suggested an operational restructuring for the company in 1993, making it a pre-requisite for a
joint venture to manufacture radial tyres, which was then under consideration. The FIs sanctioned
a Rs 900 million loan and the restructuring exercise was initiated.
At this point, Modistone - a Modi group company slated to be merged with MRL - floated a Rs
360 million rights issue. This issue was heavily under-subscribed and UTI purchased Rs 200
million worth of shares it had under-written. According to the terms of the merger, if the merger
was approved, the remaining Rs 160 million had to be accounted for by MRL. However, if the
merger was not approved, the Modis would have to bring in Rs 80 million each because of the
personal guarantees they had provided. MRL sources revealed that B K Modi saw this as an
opportunity to acquire a bigger stake in Modistone - and consequently in MRL. He came up with

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1997 figures.

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 Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

the plan of opposing the merger proposal - which meant that the brothers would have to pay up Rs
80 million each. B K Modi was working on the premise that V K Modi would not be able to
arrange this amount. In February 1995, B K Modi even stormed out of the meeting held for
approving the merger proposal, hoping that it would be adjourned. However, the meeting
continued and the merger was approved, dashing B K Modi‟s plans3.
Even as the company was negotiating the joint venture with Continental in July, 1996, the FIs
announced their decision to sell their MRL stake in the open market. In August, 1996, B K Modi‟s
request to the FIs to reconsider their stance was turned down. This move was reported to be a
result of a meeting, where B K Modi had misbehaved with P R Khanna, an independent director.
This infuriated the FIs who then began thinking of ousting the Modis from the board. Media
reports claimed that as a result of B K Modi‟s letter to the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, the
FIs decided not to oust the brothers and agreed on a stake sell-off instead.
In early 1997, the FIs initiated moves to change MRL‟s management. This resulted in the
resignation of five directors. In March, 1997, a committee headed by Unit Trust of India‟s (UTI)
Chief General Manager, Research and Planning, Basudev Sen, (set up in 1996 to draw up
guidelines on good corporate governance) submitted its report to the Government. In accordance
with the report‟s recommendations, in August 1997, the FIs decided to recall their loans to the

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Modi Group and offered their holding to the Modi family, provided the deal was struck at an
acceptable price. This announcement was a major climb down from their earlier stand that they
would sell their holdings in the market.
However, the recall of the loans to the Modi group clearly indicated that the intense lobbying by
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the Modis to pressure the FIs to abandon the use of the group approach policy4 (on fresh loans)
against them had failed. The FIs threatened that if the Modis failed to raise the requisite funds, the
open market sale option could be utilized. The FIs also refused to stand guarantee for loans raised
by the Modis from other sources. The Modis continued to argue that the FIs would be playing a
partisan role if they offered the shares to any other party without first offering it to them.
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For the year ending June 30, 1997, MRL posted a loss of Rs 150 million, against a profit of Rs 182
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million in the previous year. (Refer Exhibit I for a summary of MRL‟s financial performance). This
prompted MRL to appoint consultants McKinsey & Co, who designed a 42-point turnaround program for
the company with a focus on raising productivity levels. Around 29 of these action points were to be
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implemented at the plant level and were aimed at improving worker efficiency. The turnaround plan also
involved outsourcing tyres in those categories, where MRL did not make a good margin.
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In December 1997, the FIs and Modis agreed to negotiate the purchase price of shares within a
period of three months and acquire the stake in another three months. The FIs also agreed to
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withdraw a proposal of coming out with a rights issue and on clearing off loan defaults by MRL
without linking the acquisition of shareholding by the Modis. Though the FIs held a series of
meetings with the Modis, the issue remained deadlocked due to differences regarding the loan
repayments. The FIs did not want to have any exposure in the company after disinvestment of their
holding. On the other hand, the Modis argued that the sale of stake and the issue of loans should
not be clubbed together. The stalemate continued over the next few months with neither of the
parties willing to budge from their positions.

THE OPEN OFFER

In March, 1998, the Modis agreed to repay the entire outstanding FI loans if the FIs sold their stake
to MRL for a price higher than the ruling market price of Rs 26.90 a share. This development was
attributed to an agreement between the Modi brothers to put an end to their quarrels. The Modis

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Modistone later turned sick and was referred to the Board of Industrial and Financial Restructuring. (BIFR).
4
Under the group approach formula, the financial institutions stop advances to companies belonging to an
industrial group if other sister companies have defaulted on loans.

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 Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

offered to buy back UTI‟s holding in MRL at Rs 58 a share. However, UTI was asking for Rs 70
per share. The FIs had formed a committee to negotiate the price at which their holdings were to
be sold. However, the negotiations reached a deadlock since the FIs were not willing to bring
down the sale price from Rs 123 per share.
Meanwhile, MRL‟s sales declined to Rs 1.96 billion in the first quarter of 1998 from Rs 2.16
billion in the same period in the previous year. This was largely due to the shutting down of one of
the company‟s units. In November, 1999, the Modis appointed Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation (HSBC) to provide a blueprint for increasing their stake in the company to 51%. The
FIs responded by appointing SBI Capital Markets to divest their MRL stake through an open offer.
The issue dragged on into the new millennium when another controversy arose. In February, 2000,
some MRL shareholders filed charges against the FIs with the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices Commission (MRTPC). The shareholders alleged that the FIs were acting in connivance
with other tyre manufacturers.
In March, 2001, the Modis again made an open offer to buy a 35% stake in MRL at Rs 80 per share5.
By June, 2001, the price was revised to Rs 81.50. In a meeting of the heads of the FIs, it was decided
that the price revision was not in line with the indicative offer made by the Modis earlier. They decided
not to participate in the open offer and instead began planning their counter offer.

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By July 1, the open offer price had been increased to Rs 90 per share, and within the next week the
Modis picked up around 12% additional stake in the company. They also claimed to have reached
an agreement with the FIs for buying out their stake at Rs 90 per share. However, the FIs denied
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this and confirmed that they would not participate in the open offer as they were not willing to sell
their stake on a piecemeal basis6. Reacting to this, B K Modi said, “I fail to understand this new
development. We have agreed to all the demands by FIs, whether it be buying out their entire
stake, giving them a bank guarantee or whatever else it takes.”
By the end of July 2001, the Modis had received about 36% of MRL‟s shares through the open
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offer. Of this, around 10.8% had been sold by LIC. This came as a big surprise to all the parties
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concerned as it was directly against the stand taken by the insurance company as part of the FI
consortium earlier. The other FIs involved lashed out strongly against LIC‟s move. Things soon
took an interesting turn when LIC sent a letter to MRL stating that it wanted to withdraw the
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shares it had tendered in the open offer. But the Modis accepted LIC‟s shares after consulting legal
experts. These experts confirmed that a company could not go back on an open offer. The matter
was referred to the SEBI, which decided that LIC could not withdraw the shares as it had itself
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tendered them in an open offer. SEBI argued that if such about turns were allowed, the whole
process of open offers would be plunged into chaos and people would begin finding different
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reasons for withdrawing their shares from open offers.

LIC then moved the Mumbai High Court for an injunction against transfer of its holding in MRL
to the Modis. LIC sources revealed that the transfer of its 12% holding had happened
„inadvertently.‟ They said it happened without the approval of its investment committee, whose
clearance was mandatory. The transfer documents allowing the Stock Holding Corporation of

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At this point, MRL was involved in an insider-trading case as well, as in the three days prior to the open
offer, the company‟s scrip gained 23% in three trading sessions. The stock rose from Rs 49.55 on March
23 to Rs 61.05 on March 28 and to Rs 65.90 immediately after the open offer announcement.
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MRL had received a 13% stake from the public in response to the open offer. The Modis could have
bought only 22% from the FIs, but the FIs wanted to sell their entire 44% stake at one go. The FIs were
not willing to sell on a piecemeal basis because that they were not sure of the Modis buying the
remaining 22% stake later at the same price. Moreover, if the remaining 22% was purchased at this point
itself, it was not clear whether the Modis would have to make another open offer. (Under SEBI‟s
creeping acquisition guidelines, promoters holding 25-50% equity could acquire a maximum 5% stake in
a year through the creeping acquisition route.)

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 Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

India (SHCIL) to transfer LIC‟s shares to MRL were signed by two officers „by mistake‟ - both of
whom were later suspended by LIC. The Court granted a temporary injunction on LIC‟s
participation in the MRL open offer. In an interim order, the court said that LIC‟s shares could not
be considered for the open offer. In turn, LIC was asked to submit an undertaking that it would not
transfer its shares until the final hearing and disposal of the suit.

COMPANIES & FIs – THE ISSUE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

The Modis‟ predicament was not difficult to understand. The brothers claimed that on the one
hand, the FIs refused to sell their stake; on the other, they were not allowing MRL to borrow from
anyone else. The Modis also claimed that the interest rates being charged by the FIs (nearly 19%)
were very high. After repaying these loans, they wanted to look for cheaper loans elsewhere. B K
Modi said, “We want to return the entire loan taken from them, and look for cheaper loans from
other banks. Why should we service such a high cost debt? And if we return their loan, we would
also get them out of our board. For a long time, they sat on our board and did not allow us to
borrow from other banks. With them out of our board, we would be able to run the company in a
productive manner.”

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The MRL issue came to be seen as an example of the controversial role of FI lenders in Indian
companies. The FI announcement to sell their stake in the open market in 1996 sent shock waves
through India‟s family-run businesses (in which the FIs held large stakes7.) For decades, the
promoters had management control despite having low stakes because the FIs neither voted against
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the management, nor sold any shares. But now, businessmen across the country feared that if the
MRL stake sell-off succeeded, FIs would make it a norm to sell out if any company defaulted on
any loan. Besides, companies operating in industries suffering from cyclical downturns could be
unduly penalized this way. K P Singh, President, Associated Chambers of Commerce & Industry
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(ASSOCHAM ), said, “Certain cyclical industries may suffer a bad period, but this is no reason
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to punish an entrepreneur. This man has put in sweat for his company and now suddenly by selling
out, the institutions are punishing him.”
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MRL‟s predicament raised a heated debate in the chambers of commerce as well. Statements from
business houses, chambers of companies and FI officials regarding the MRL issue kept appearing
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frequently in the media. A FICCI9 source said that if the FIs decided to sell out, they should offer
the first right of refusal to the promoter at the market price. Both FICCI and ASSOCHAM
appealed to the Government to intervene and stop the FIs, while the Confederation of Indian
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Industry (CII)10 supported the FIs. Though there were rumors of some pressure from the
Government, eventually it decided to keep out of the tussle. In November, 1999, the Government
declined to take sides in the MRL/FI tussle. Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha said, “Would you
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like the government to intervene in the commercial decisions of the financial institutions? Here,
the question is of trust, and the FIs should not do anything to destroy this trust. They should work
on mutual understanding, and transparency cannot be made a victim. If the FIs feel that they are
getting a good deal by selling their stake, who am I to ask?”

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FIs owned high stakes in these companies because most of them had borrowed heavily from FIs. Later,
these loans were converted into equity.
8
The Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM) was a representative body
of Indian companies aiming to impact the policy and legislative environment for balanced economic,
social and industrial development.
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The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) was a representative body of
Indian companies that sought to look after the interests of corporates and to integrate the Indian economy
with the global mainstream.
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The Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) was a non-government, not-for-profit, industry led and
industry managed organization, partnering industry and government alike through advisory and
consultative services.

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 Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

More than the fear of getting a bad price for their stake, the companies feared that no one could
predict exactly when the FIs would decide to sell their stake. The FIs played a dual role in the
companies in which they held stakes – they were term lending bodies as well as investors. This
made it difficult to predict their moves. For instance, if an FI was facing a problem with non-
performing assets (NPAs),11 it could either start selling shares indiscriminately to raise money, or
it could selectively target companies or groups which were defaulting on their loans.
The fact that different categories of FIs had different motivations for lending to companies further
compounded the problem. Broadly, the FIs could be put in three categories - development finance
institutions (IDBI, ICICI, IFCI); insurance companies (LIC, GIC); and the UTI, an asset
management company. The development finance institutions were believed to be rather stable,
long-term shareholders, who claimed not to be interested in destabilizing existing managements. A
senior IDBI official commented, “By selling in Tata Steel or ITC alone, we can provision for most
of our NPAs. But I don‟t think this will ever happen. The whole country will be up in arms against
us.” A senior ICICI executive added, “Any sale of equity is bound to be controversial.”
However, it was a different story where the insurance companies and the UTI were concerned.
These institutions were under increasing pressure to maximize returns on their investments, and

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they had to consider shifting their investments from traditional manufacturing companies to the
then sunrise sectors like IT and Pharmaceuticals. Moreover, unlike development finance
institutions, their investments were marked to market - hence, they needed to constantly review
their investments. UTI General Manager, Basudeb Sen said, “Institutions like ours are asset
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managers now; we have a responsibility towards our shareholders. Now, decisions have to be
made looking at the market. Conditions of 10 years ago don‟t have any meaning today.” This was
why UTI sold 7% of its stake in MRL in 1997. Though UTI, LIC and GIC sources said that they
would never resort to selling shares of any company arbitrarily, they maintained that MRL was a
special case.
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The core issue involved in the MRL affair seemed to be the accountability of the management to
its shareholders. The fact that MRL had been performing badly over the years reflected badly on
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its commitment to enhance shareholder wealth. The company‟s defaults on loan repayments were
largely responsible for FIs acquiring almost 44% of its equity. A report claimed, “Sound corporate
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governance can be effected only through an efficient market for corporate control. Companies
should be allowed to be taken over by those who think that they can run them better. When a
company is run sub-optimally, it makes sense to buy up a controlling stake in it by making an
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outlay justified by future income streams from the company bought over, and to run that
company.”
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WHAT LIES AHEAD?

In mid-2001, MRL was reported to have begun work on a comprehensive turnaround strategy. It
infused Rs 500 million to modernize its operations and implemented stringent cost-cutting
measures. The Modis also began negotiations for selling the non-tyre assets of the company to
raise the money for augmenting the working capital base. This was deemed necessary to make the
company profitable once again.
The Modis had begun negotiations to get the FI loan freeze removed. The total capacity utilization
of MRL‟s facilities was under 60-65%, which was proposed to be raised after the restructuring.
Substantial salary cuts for senior executives of the company and the formation of a management
team with well-defined work targets and instructions to report to the Modis were also on the anvil.

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NPAs are loans on which interest payments have been due for more than one quarter and/or monthly
installments have been due for more than three installments.

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 Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

Even as legal battles over the dispute with LIC‟s open offer issue continued, MRL suspended the
manufacturing activities at its Modipuram plant in August, 2001. Though the exact reasons were
not revealed, sources cited certain administrative reasons, beyond the control of the management,
for the decision.
B K Modi meanwhile had unconditionally withdrawn the notice sent to V K Modi and the two
brothers were reported to be working frantically to get the plant operational again. There appeared
to be a lull in the battle between the FIs and the Modis - at least until one of them made a move.

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION:

1. Study the Modi Rubber/FI issue and prepare a brief note outlining the major events occurring
during the course of the dispute.
2. Were the FIs justified in adopting the group approach policy towards MRL? Do you think that
the company‟s poor performance over the years is partly because of the FIs? Give reasons to
support your answer.

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3. The FI threat to sell their MRL stake in the open market was part of a plan to ensure that
Indian companies adopt good corporate governance practices. Critically comment on the
above statement. CO
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Exhibit I
Modi Rubber – Financial Performance
(in Rs. million)

Period ended 1996 1997 1998 1999

Gross sales 10,562.4 11,259.4 8,293.6 9,329.4
Excise duty (2,236.4) (2,428.9) (1,637.1) (1,916.2)
Net sales 8,326.0 8,830.5 6,656.5 7,413.2
Other income 89.3 42.0 127.5 93.3
Total income 8,415.2 8,872.5 6,784.1 7,506.4
Raw materials 5,020.1 5,748.3 3,839.0 4,307.9
Stock adjustment (Inc)/ Dec (6.0) (64.1) 73.3 5.3

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Purchase of finished goods 223.1 113.3 105.8 58.7
Cost of material 5,237.2 5,797.6 4,018.0 4,371.9
Employee cost 510.8 631.2 537.3 653.6
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Power & fuel 374.5 499.7 471.2 518.7
Advertising/ promotion/ public 966.1 75.6 60.3 97.2
Freight & forwarding - 249.1 220.3 239.5
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Other expenses 623.4 1,112.2 933.8 1,027.9

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Cost of sales 7,712.0 8,365.5 6,241.0 6,908.8

PBIDT 703.2 507.0 543.1 597.7
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Interest & finance charges 458.0 648.4 477.0 404.1

PBDT 245.2 (141.4) 66.1 193.5
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Depreciation 94.5 122.1 94.1 98.2

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PBT 150.7 (263.5) (28.0) 95.3

Provision for taxation 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
Extraordinary items/ Prior year 6.7 15.1 - (6.5)
Adjusted PAT 156.7 (249.1) (28.6) 88.3
Source: www.indiainfoline.com

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Additional Readings & References:

1. Ghosh Indranil, Will the Modi Brothers lose MRL?, Business World, August 7, 1996.
2. Move to appoint executive chairman at Modi Rubber, Business Standard, August 26, 1996.
3. Iyengar Jayanthi, FI panel may first enforce code of ethics in Modi group, Business
Standard, March 22, 1997.
4. Thomas Cherian, Modi Rubber suffers Rs 15 cr. net loss, Business Standard, July 21, 1997.
5. Dabke K B, Getting the right men on board, Express India, August 12 1997.
6. Iyengar Jayanthi, FIs recall loans to Modi group, Business Standard, August 30, 1997.
7. FM urged to stall Modi Rubber stake selloff by FIs, Business Standard, September 3, 1997.
8. Roy Choudhury Saibal & Bakshi Veeshal, Financial institutions plan to fix deadline for
selling stake to Modis, Financial Express, January 23, 1998.

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9. Padmanabhan Anil & Thomas Cherian, Modis set to regain majority in MRL, Business
Standard, March 3, 1998. CO
10. Chaudhuri Debashis, Unit Trust may wash hands off Modi Rubber holding, Financial
Express, October 27, 1998.
11. Chambers lobbying for Modis, Express India, November 5, 1999.
12. Market for Corporate Control, www.epw.org.in, November 6, 1999.
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13. Mandal Kohinoor, Institutions free to decide on stake sale, says Sinha, Financial Express,
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November 6, 1999.
14. Prasad Swati & Das Gupta Surajeet, Modis to increase stake in Modi Rubber to 51%,
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Business Standard, November 10, 1999.

15. Bhandari Bhupesh & Das Gupta Surajeet, Modis to buy out 44.3% FI stake in Modi
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Rubber, Business Standard, November 18, 1999.

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16. Joseph Sandeep & Bhandari Bhupesh, Owners under fire, Business World, November 22, 1999.
17. Modi Rubber shareholders drag FIs to MRTPC over stake sale, www.indiainfoline.com,
February 22, 2000.
18. MRL Board suspends 3 directors of B K Modi faction, Deccan Herald, July 2, 2001.
19. Iyengar Jayanthi, BK Modi may have walked into trap, Economic Times, July 3, 2001.
20. Modis make open offer for Rs 80 a share for MRL, Business Standard, March 2001.
21. Modi Rubber jumps 23% in 3 days prior to open offer, Financial Express, March 30, 2001.
22. Institutions may make counter offer for Modi Rubber, www.indiainfoline.com, June 8, 2001.
23. MRL board to ‘strip' B.K. Modi of powers, Business Line, June 30, 2001.
24. BK Modi lashes out at financial institutions, Hindustan Times, July 1, 2001.

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 Modi Rubber vs. Financial Institutions

25. Modis claim 12% more stake under open offer, Deccan Herald, July 9, 2001.
26. FIs to stay away from Modi Rubber open offer, The Economic Times, July 14, 2001.
27. Speculation over offer by Modi Rubber, Business Line, July 20, 2001.
28. Srivats K R, Modi Rubber open offer gets 36% response, Business Line, July 24, 2001.
29. LIC files for injunction against transfer of Modi Rubber shares, Business Line, July 24, 2001.
30. Sharma Sanjeev, Sebi won’t let LIC reverse MRL sale, Economic Times, July 27, 2001.
31. Dubey Rajeev, Yes, the FIs have agreed to sell, Business World, July 30, 2001.
32. Modi Rubber suspends manufacturing activities at Modipuram plant, www.
capitalmarket.com, August 30, 2001.

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