SECOND DIVISION

February 14, 2018

G.R. No. 223477

CELSO M.F.L. MELGAR, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the

Decision2 dated August 28, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated February 10,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211, which
affirmed the Judgment4 dated September 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 6 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. CBU-87386 finding
petitioner Celso M.F.L. Melgar (Melgar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9262,5 otherwise known as
the "Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004."

An Information was filed before the RTC charging Melgar with violation
Section 5 of RA 9262, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the month of August, 2001 and subsequent thereto, in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, having the means and capacity to give financial
support, with deliberate intent, did then and there commit acts of economic
abuse against one [AAA,6 ] and her minor son, [BBB] (12 years old), by
depriving them of financial support, which caused mental or emotional
anguish, public ridicule or humiliation, to AAA and her son.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

After arraignment wherein Melgar pleaded not guilty to the charge against
him, he and AAA entered into a compromise agreement8 on the civil aspect
of the case. After the RTC's approval of the compromise agreement on June
24, 2010, the criminal aspect of the case was provisionally dismissed with
Melgar's conformity. However, one (1) year later, or on June 24, 2011, the
prosecution moved to set aside the compromise agreement and to revive
the criminal action, on the ground that Melgar sold the property, which
was supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his
son, BBB, from 2001 to 2010 pursuant to their compromise agreement.
Consequently, the RTC revived the criminal aspect of the case and allowed
the prosecution to present its evidence.9

The prosecution alleged that in 1995, AAA had a romantic relationship

with Melgar, which resulted in the birth of BBB, an illegitimate child.
Melgar freely acknowledged the paternity of BBB as evidenced by the
latter's Certificate of Live Birth, as well as numerous photographs showing
Melgar with BBB. However, AAA's relationship with Melgar turned sour
as the latter had an affair with a younger woman. When BBB was just about
one (1) year old, Melgar stopped giving support, prompting AAA to file a
case for support, which was eventually granted. This notwithstanding,
Melgar still refused to give support for her and BBB. As such, AAA was
constrained to file the instant criminal case against Melgar.10

To substantiate her claims, AAA averred that Melgar could afford to

provide support of ₱5,000.00 per month because he has a lavish lifestyle
with his family. He owns a Toyota Avanza and his children are enrolled in
██████. On the other hand, her son, BBB, is a scholar at
████████████████ and she spends the amount of ₱20,000.00 a
month for his needs, of which she asked Melgar for ₱8,000.00 as support.11

For his part, Melgar was deemed to have waived his right to adduce
evidence due to his repeated failure to appear during trial.12

The RTC Ruling

In a Judgment13 dated September 10, 2012, the RTC found Melgar guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 and,
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.14

The RTC found Melgar to have committed economic abuse against AAA
and their son, BBB, when he stopped supporting them. Worse, he sold the
property which was supposed to answer for his support-in-arrears from
2001 to 2010.15
Melgar moved for reconsideration,16 which was, however, denied in an
Order17 dated May 9, 2013 of the RTC. Aggrieved, Melgar appealed18 to the
CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision19 dated August 28, 2015, the CA affirmed Melgar's conviction.

It held that Melgar is legally obliged to support BBB.20 As such, when he
deliberately and with evident bad faith deprived BBB of support, he
committed economic abuse under Section 5 (e) of RA 9262. In this regard,
the CA observed that the reinstatement of the criminal case was prompted
by Melgar's evident refusal to comply with the judgment based on
compromise agreement, particularly, in providing support to his son; and
worse, in conveying to another person the parcel of land which was
supposed to, among others, answer for the support-in-arrears of his son
from 2001 to 2010.21 Lastly, the CA ruled that Melgar's acts "has clearly
caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
[AAA] and her child[, BBB]."22

Undaunted, Melgar moved for reconsideration,23 which was, however,

denied in a Resolution24 dated February 10, 2016; hence, this petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly
upheld Melgar's conviction for violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Enacted in 2004, RA 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and

criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC)
perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e., husband, former husband,
or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result
in or is likely to result in, inter alia, economic abuse.25 The said law defines
"economic abuse as follows:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - xx x.

xx xx
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging

in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right

to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in
common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victim's own money or properties or solely controlling the

conjugal money or properties.

xx xx

As may be gathered from the foregoing, "economic abuse" may include the
deprivation of support of a common child of the man-accused and the
woman-victim, whether such common child is legitimate or not.26 This
specific act is penalized by Section 5 (e) of RA 9262, pertinent portions of
which read:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:

xx xx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage

in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or to
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child.1âшphi1 This shall include, but not limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

xx xx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing
the woman's children insufficient financial support;

(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal

right;

Under this provision, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the

child is considered an act of violence against women and
children.27 Notably, case law instructs that the act of denying support to a
child is a continuing offense.28

In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of
violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are present, as it was established
that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's
birth; (b) Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar
had failed to provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old;
and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he
sold to a third party his property which was supposed to answer for,
among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus, the Court finds no
reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by
the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the
trial court was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of
the witnesses presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should
be accorded to the same.29

In an attempt to absolve himself from criminal liability, Melgar

argues, inter alia, that he was charged of violation of Section 5 (i) of RA 9262
as the Information alleged that the acts complained of "caused mental or
emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to [AAA] and her son[,
BBB]." As such, he contends that he cannot be convicted of violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262.30

Melgar's contention is untenable.

Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence,31 punishes the act

of "causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor children or denial of access to the woman's
child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of
violation of Section 5 (i) just like the mental or emotional anguish caused
on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or
the damage sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological
violence as an element of the crime, it is necessary to show proof of
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts.
And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the
testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this
party."32 Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's
denial thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse -
further caused mental or emotional anguish to the woman-victim and/or to
their common child.

In this case, while the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed
deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was presented to show
that such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional
anguish. Therefore, Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5 (i)
of RA 9262. This notwithstanding - and taking into consideration the
variance doctrine which allows the conviction of an accused for a crime
proved which is different from but necessarily included in the crime
charged33 - the courts a quo correctly convicted Melgar of violation of
Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 as the deprivation or denial of support, by itself
and even without the additional element of psychological violence, is
already specifically penalized therein.

As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Melgar, Section 6 of RA 9262

provides that violations of Section 5 (e) shall be punished by, inter alia,
prision correccional. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special
penal law, the penalty provided therein is taken from the technical
nomenclature in the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In Quimvel v. People,34 the
Court succinctly discussed the proper treatment of prescribed penalties
found in special penal laws vis-a-vis Act No. 4103,35 otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, viz.:

Meanwhile, Sec. 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate

Sentence Law (ISL), provides that if the offense is ostensibly punished
under a special law, the minimum and maximum prison term of the
indeterminate sentence shall not be beyond what the special law
prescribed. Be that as it may, the Court had clarified in the landmark ruling
of People v. Simon [(G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 239 SCRA 555)] that the
situation is different where although the offense is defined in a special law,
the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC.
Under such circumstance, the legal effects under the system of penalties
native to the Code would also necessarily apply to the special law.36

Otherwise stated, if the special penal law adopts the nomenclature of the
penalties under the RPC, the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence
will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable under the
RPC.37

Applying the foregoing to this case, the courts a quo correctly imposed on

Melgar the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, Melgar is also ordered to
pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00, to undergo a mandatory
psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment, and report compliance
to the court.38

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated

August 28, 2015 and the Resolution dated February 10, 2016 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 02211 finding petitioner Celso M.F .L.
Melgar GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5 (e) of
Republic Act No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004," are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing petitioner Celso
M.F.L. Melgar: (a) to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum; (b) to
pay a fine in the amount of ₱300,000.00; and (c) to undergo a mandatory
psychological counselling or psychiatric treatment and report compliance
to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 6.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S.

Associate Justice CAGUIOA*
 Associate Justice

ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decisionhad been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 FIRST DIVISION

January 11, 2018

G.R. No. 212448

AAA, Petitioner
vs.
BBB, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

May Philippine courts exercise jurisdiction over an offense constituting

psychological violence under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,1 otherwise
known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of
2004, committed through marital infidelity, when the alleged illicit
relationship occurred or is occurring outside the country?

The above question is addressed to this Court in the present Petition2 for

the issuance of a writ of certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to
nullify the Resolutions dated February 24, 20143 and May 2, 20144 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No.
146468. The assailed resolutions granted the motion to quash the
Information5 which charged respondent BBB under Section 5(i) of R.A. No.
9262, committed as follows:

On or about April 19, 2011, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, [BBB], being then legally married to [AAA], caused
herein [AAA] mental and emotional anguish by having an illicit
relationship with a certain Lisel Mok as confirmed by his photograph with
his purported paramour Lisel Mok and her children and the e-mailed letter
by his mother mentioning about the said relationship, to the damage and
prejudice of [AAA], in violation of the aforecited law.

Contrary to law.
We briefly recount the antecedents.

Petitioner AAA and BBB were married on August 1, 2006 in Quezon City.
Their union produced two children: CCC was born on March 4, 2007 and
DDD on October 1, 2009.6

In May of 2007, BBB started working in Singapore as a chef, where he

acquired permanent resident status in September of 2008. This petition
nonetheless indicates his address to be in Quezon City where his parents
reside and where AAA also resided from the time they were married until
March of 2010, when AAA and their children moved back to her parents'
house in Pasig City.7

AAA claimed, albeit not reflected in the Information, that BBB sent little to
no financial support, and only sporadically. This allegedly compelled her
to fly extra hours and take on additional jobs to augment her income as a
flight attendant. There were also allegations of virtual abandonment,
mistreatment of her and their son CCC, and physical and sexual violence.
To make matters worse, BBB supposedly started having an affair with a
Singaporean woman named Lisel Mok with whom he allegedly has been
living in Singapore. Things came to a head on April 19, 2011 when AAA
and BBB had a violent altercation at a hotel room in Singapore during her
visit with their kids.8 As can be gathered from the earlier cited Information,
despite the claims of varied forms of abuses, the investigating prosecutor
found sufficient basis to charge BBB with causing AAA mental and
emotional anguish through his alleged marital infidelity.9

The Information having been filed, a warrant of arrest was issued against
BBB. AAA was also able to secure a Hold-Departure Order against BBB
who continued to evade the warrant of arrest. Consequently, the case was
archived.10

On November 6, 2013, an Entry of Appearance as Counsel for the Accused

With Omnibus Motion to Revive Case, Quash Information, Lift Hold
Departure Order and Warrant of Arrest11 was filed on behalf of BBB.
Granting the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
thereby dismissing the case, the trial court reasoned:

Here, while the Court maintains its 28 October 2011 ruling that probable
cause exists in this case and that [BBB] is probably guilty of the crime
charged, considering, however, his subsequent clear showing that the acts
complained of him had occurred in Singapore, dismissal of this case is
proper since the Court enjoys no jurisdiction over the offense charged, it
having transpired outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court.

xxxx

The Court is not convinced by .the prosecution's argument that since

[AAA] has been suffering from mental and emotional anguish "wherever
she goes'', jurisdiction over the offense attaches to this Court
notwithstanding that the acts resulting in said suffering had happened
outside of the Philippines. To the mind of the Court, with it noting that
there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score considering that Republic
Act 9262 is relatively a new law, the act itself which had caused a woman to
suffer mental or emotional anguish must have occurred within the
territorial limits of the Court for it to enjoy jurisdiction over the offense.
This amply explains the use of the emphatic word "causing" in the
provisions of Section 5(i), above, which denotes the bringing about or into
existence of something. Hence, the mental or emotional anguish suffered
by a woman must have been brought about or into existence by a criminal
act which must logically have occurred within the territorial limits of the
Court for jurisdiction over the offense to attach to it. To rule otherwise
would violate or render nugatory one of the basic characteristics of our
criminal laws - territoriality.

In the listing provided in the law itself - "repeated verbal and emotional
abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of (sic)
access to the woman's child/children" - it becomes clear that there must be
an act which causes the "mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation", and it is such act which partakes of a criminal nature. Here,
such act was the alleged maintenance of "an illicit relationship with a
certain Liesel Mok" - which has been conceded to have been committed in
Singapore.

Granting, without conceding, that the law presents ambiguities as written,

quashal of the Information must still be ordered following the underlying
fundamental principle that all doubts must be resolved in favor of [BBB].
At best, the Court draws the attention of Congress to the arguments on
jurisdiction spawned by the law.12 (Emphasis in the original)

Aggrieved by the denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of

the dismissal of the case, AAA sought direct recourse to this Court via the
instant petition on a pure question of law. AAA posits that R.A. No. 9262 is
in danger of becoming transmogrified into a weak, wobbly, and worthless
law because with the court a quo's ruling, it is as if husbands of Filipino
women have been given license to enter into extra-marital affairs without
fear of any consequence, as long as they are carried out abroad. In the
main, AAA argues that mental and emotional anguish is an essential
element of the offense charged against BBB, which is experienced by her
wherever she goes, and not only in Singapore where the extra-marital affair
takes place; thus, the RTC of Pasig City where she resides can take
cognizance of the case.

In support of her theory, AAA draws attention to Section 7 of R.A. No.

9262, which provides:

Sec. 7. Venue - The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in
the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed
at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis ours)

As to the ambiguity in the law hypothetically referred to in the assailed

order, AAA directs us to:

Section 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the

protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their
children.

In his Comment13 filed on January 20, 2015, BBB contends that the grant of
the motion to quash is in effect an acquittal; that only the civil aspect of a
criminal case may be appealed by the private offended party; and. that this
petition should be dismissed outright for having been brought before this
Court by AAA instead of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as
counsel for the People in appellate proceedings. BBB furthermore avers
that the petition was belatedly filed.

We tackle first the threshold issue of whether or not this Court should
entertain the petition.

It must be stated beforehand that BBB is plainly mistaken in asserting that

the instant petition was belatedly filed. The date erroneously perceived by
BBB as the date of AAA's Motion for Extension14 was filed - June 2, 2014 -
refers to the date of receipt by the Division Clerk of Court and not the date
when the said motion was lodged before this Comi. The motion was in fact
filed on May 27, 2014, well within the period that AAA had under the
Rules of Court to file the intended petition. Thus, considering the
timeliness of the motion, this Comi in a Resolution15 dated June 9, 2014,
granted AAA an additional period of thirty (30) days or until June 26, 2014
to file a petition for review.

In AAA's motion for extension of time, it was mentioned that she was
awaiting the OSG's response to her Letter16 dated May 26, 2014 requesting
for representation. Since, the OSG was unresponsive to her plea for
assistance in filing the intended petition, AAA filed the present petition in
her own name before the lapse of the extension given her by this Court or
on June 25, 2014.

We find that under the circumstances, the ends of substantial justice will be
better served by entertaining the petition if only to resolve the question of
law lodged before this Court. In Morillo v. People of the Philippines, et
al., 17 where the Court entertained a Rule 45 petition which raised only a
question of law filed by the private offended party in the absence of the
OSG's participation, we recalled the instances when the Court permitted an
offended party to file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG. One
such instance is when the interest of substantial justice so requires.18

Morillo, 19 also differentiated between dismissal and acquittal, thus:

Acquittal is always based on the merits, that is, the defendant is acquitted
because the evidence does not show that defendant's guilt is beyond a
reasonable doubt; but dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or
that the defendant is not guilty. Dismissal terminates the proceeding, either
because the court is not a court of competent jurisdiction, or the evidence
does not show that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court, or the complaint or information is not valid or
sufficient in form and substance, etc. The only case in which the word
dismissal is commonly but not correctly used, instead of the proper term
acquittal, is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the
defendant moves for the dismissal and the court dismisses the case on the
ground that the evidence fails to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty; for in such case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal
because the case is decided on the merits. If the prosecution fails to prove
that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal, inasmuch
as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted before the
court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case, the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of
competent jurisdiction.20 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
The grant of BBB's motion to quash may not therefore be viewed as an
acquittal, which in limited instances may only be repudiated by a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 upon showing grave abuse of discretion lest the
accused would be twice placed in jeopardy.21

Indubitably, "the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule
45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or
involved."22 "There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the
truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
c01Tect application of law and jurisprudence on the matter."23

Further, the question of whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in view of
the peculiar provisions of R.A. No. 9262 is a question of law. Thus,
in Morillo,24 the Court reiterated that:

[T]he jurisdiction of the court is determined by the averments of the

complaint or Information, in relation to the law prevailing at the time of the
filing of the complaint or Information, and the penalty provided by law for
the crime charged at the time of its commission. Thus, when a case involves
a proper interpretation of the rules and jurisprudence with respect to the
jurisdiction of courts to entertain complaints filed therewith, it deals with a
question of law that can be properly brought to this Court under Rule
45.25 (Citations omitted)

We are not called upon in this case to determine the truth or falsity of the
charge against BBB, much less weigh the evidence, especially as the case
had not even proceeded to a full-blown trial on the merits. The issue for
resolution concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a
given set of circumstances, i.e., whether or not Philippine courts are
deprived of territorial jurisdiction over a criminal charge of psychological
abuse under R.A. No. 9262 when committed through marital infidelity and
the alleged illicit relationship took place outside the Philippines.

The novelty of the issue was even recognized by the RTC when it opined
that there is still as yet no jurisprudence on this score, prompting it to
quash the Information even as it maintained its earlier October 28, 2011
ruling that probable cause exists in the case.26 Calling the attention of
Congress to the arguments on jurisdiction spawned by the law,27 the RTC
furnished copies of the assailed order to the House of Representatives and
the Philippine Senate through the Committee on Youth, Women and Public
Relations, as well as the Committee on Justice and Human Rights.28
The issue acquires special significance when viewed against the present
economic reality that a great number of Filipino families have at least one
parent working overseas. In. April to September 2016, the number of
overseas Filipino workers who worked abroad was estimated at 2.2
million, 97.5 percent of which were comprised of overseas contract workers
or those with existing work contract while 2.5 percent worked overseas
without contract.29 It is thus necessary to clarify how R.A. No. 9262 should
be applied in a question of territorial jurisdiction over a case of
psychological abuse brought against the husband when such is allegedly
caused by marital infidelity carried on abroad.

Ruling of the Court

There is merit in the petition.

"Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological

abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common."30 In this regard, Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 made it a point to
encompass in a non-limiting manner the various forms of violence that
may be committed against women and their children:

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, (a) "Violence against women

and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely
to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic
abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the
following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed

against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

xxxx

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to

cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or
psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs,
or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets
or to unlawful or .unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or
visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman

financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

xxxx

As jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the

allegations in the complaint or information, threshing out the essential
elements of psychological abuse under R.A. No. 9262 is crucial.
In Dinamling v. People,31 this Court already had occasion to enumerate the
elements of psychological violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262, as
follows:

Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The crime of
violence against women and their children is committed through any of the
following acts:

xxxx

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to

the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the woman's child/children.

From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other sections of R[.]A[.]

No. 9262, the elements of the crime are derived as follows:

(1) The offended paiiy is a woma.J.1 and/or her child or children;

(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender,
or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman's child or children, they
may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or without
the family abode;

(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or

emotional anguish; and
 (4) The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, denial of
financial support or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar· such acts or omissions.

xxxx

It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms of psychological

violence that are inflicted on victims who are women and children. Other
forms of psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and economic
violence, are addressed and penalized in other subparts of Section 5.

xxxx

Psychological violence is an. element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the
mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence
is the means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional
anguish is the effect caused to or the damage sustained by the offended
party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in
Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional
anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party. x x x.32 (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours)

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes
is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing
mental or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the
violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to
outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts
by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending
on the circumstances of the spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit
relationship may or may not even be causing mental or emotional anguish
on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an
essential and distinct element in the commission of the offense.

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Trenas v. People,33 the

Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue
of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.1âwphi1 It is a
fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the
court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly
committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a
person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited
territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if
the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was
committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of
jurisdiction.34 (Emphasis in the original)

In Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262, venue undoubtedly pertains to jurisdiction.

As correctly pointed out by AAA, Section 7 provides that the case may be
filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the complainant. Which the psychological violence as the means employed
by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense,
equally essential also is the element of mental or emotional anguish which
is personal to the complainant. The resulting mental or emotional anguish
is analogous to the indispensable element of damage in a prosecution for
estafa, viz:

The circumstance that the deceitful manipulations or false pretenses

employed by the accused, as shown in the vouchers, might have been
perpetrated in Quezon City does not preclude the institution of the
criminal action in Mandaluyong where the damage was consummated.
Deceit and damage are the basic elements of estafa. The estafa involved in
this case appears to be a transitory or continuing offense. It could be filed
either in Quezon City or in Rizal. The theory is that a person charged with
a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is in
part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts
material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur
in one province and some in another, the court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the case will exclude the others x x x[.]35

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law
contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may
manifest as transitory or continuing crimes; meaning that some acts
material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in
one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such cases,
the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that
the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a
person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried
in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.36

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive

conduct or act of violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to
Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory,
that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in
view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In the
present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband
are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig
City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Certainly, the act causing psychological violence which under the

information relates to BBB's marital infidelity must be proven by probable
cause for the purpose of formally charging the husband, and to establish
the same beyond reasonable doubt for purposes of conviction. It likewise
remains imperative to acquire jurisdiction over the husband. What this case
concerns itself is simply whether or not a complaint for psychological
abuse under R.A. No. 9262 may even be filed within the Philippines if the
illicit relationship is conducted abroad. We say that even if the alleged
extra-marital affair causing the offended wife mental and emotional
anguish is committed abroad, the same does not place a prosecution under
R.A. No. 9262 absolutely beyond the reach of Philippine courts.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated February 24, 2014 and May 2, 2014 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, in Criminal Case No. 146468 are SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 146468 is
ordered REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice
Chairperson
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO- MARIANO C. DEL
DE CASTRO CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to the Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice