0

The North Vietnamese Victory in the Second Indochina War

Subject: History
Word Count: 3976
 Table of Contents
What were the factors that lead to a decisive North Vietnamese victory in the
Second Indochina War, from 1955 to 1975?
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………....1

North Vietnamese Military Strategy…………………………………………………………....4

U.S. Political Instability ………………………………………………………………………....9

Soviet and Chinese Foreign Aid………………...…………………………………………......13

Conclusion.………………………………………………………………………………​.....​.....15

Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………….……....16
 1

Introduction

The Second Indochina War (SIW), also known as the Vietnam War, was fought by the

communist North Vietnam (NV) government and the Viet Cong1 against South Vietnam. The

scope of this essay focuses on the SIW from the beginning of US involvement, defined as the

establishment of the American Military Assistance Advisory Group on November 1, 1955

(denoting official US assistance of South Vietnam) to North Vietnam’s capture of Saigon2 on

April 30, 1975. Among scholars, the fall of Saigon is widely considered the end of the war and

the point of victory for North Vietnam.3 As part of the Cold War, the conflict was considered a

proxy war, where the United States provided financial and military support to South Vietnam in

order to counteract China and the USSR’s backing of North Vietnam. However, American

involvement extended past economic aid and into direct military intervention in the SIW, with

the most notorious example being the use of herbicide defoliants during Operation Ranch Hand.4

After the Viet Cong’s Tet Offensive of 1968, one of the largest campaigns in the entire conflict,

US public support sharply declined until its eventual military evacuation in early 1973. With the

total number of casualties reaching 2 million civilians, 1.1 million North Vietnamese soldiers,

250,000 South Vietnamese soldiers, and 58,200 US military personnel, the high cost of the war

has prompted much historical debate over the practical value of American participation on the

frontlines, and the wartime mechanisms that allowed North Vietnam to emerge victorious.5

1
More formally called the NLF, the Viet Cong was a guerilla, partisan force operating in South Vietnam territory
while ideologically committed to the North.
2
Capital of South Vietnam during the Vietnam War.
3
Peter Arnett, ​Saigon Has Fallen ​(AP Books, 2019).
4
William A. Buckingham Jr, ​The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia 1961-1971 ​(Office of Air Force
History, 1982).
5
Roger H. Spector,​ “​The Vietnam War,” 2019, ​Encyclopedia Britannica,
.https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War/The-fall-of-South-Vietnam.
 2

Considering the aforementioned scholarly discourse, three major schools of thought were

identified regarding the nature and outcome of the SIW. The most prominent lens is the orthodox

historiography, which argues that the improper management of the war by the US government

led to American public opposition, decreased military support over time, and ultimately an

inevitable defeat. Orthodox historians frequently criticize the actions of the US government,

including war crimes committed by soldiers, government-issued misinformation to promote an

illusion of US military superiority over North Vietnam, and the development of the infamous

“Domino Theory”6 as justification for initial US involvement.7 However, many of these

historians witnessed or participated in the liberal anti-war movements of the late 1960s and early

1970s; thus, their writing may have been influenced by personal political alignments and could

include logical fallacies such as confirmation bias or selective language in order to further

criticism of the government’s wartime actions. The second school of thought is the revisionist

lens. Pioneered by American-German political scientist Guenter Lewy years after the war, this

lens postulates that the victory was practically possible for the United States, but they were

overcome by the effectiveness of North Vietnamese military strategy and tactics throughout the

war.8 This less subjective viewpoint was constructed with the advantage of hindsight, along with

access to private and previously unseen archives. As a result, the revisionist perspective benefits

from a lack of historical bias but is dependent on the accuracy of analyzed data. Another

historiography is the pro-Communist lens, which argues that the communist nations of China and

the Sovet Union provided foreign aid throughout the Vietnam War, and were the main

6
A theory first described by former US President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1954, which claims that if Vietnam falls
under communist control, the rest of Asia would also adopt communist ideologies in a “domino effect”.
7
“Domino Theory, “ 2019, ​Encyclopedia Britannica​, https://www.britannica.com/topic/domino-theory.
8
Guenter Lewy. ​America in Vietnam​. (UK: Oxford University Press, 1980)
 3

contributors to the success of North Vietnam.9 Qiang Zhai and other historians under this school

of thought discuss how the initial US military dominance was subverted due to effective Soviet

and Chinese material and logistic support for the North Vietnam military. The pro-Communist

historiography may be overstating the role of foreign aid due to the scholars’ nationalism for

their respective countries, but this can be mitigated by analyzing third-party sources that are less

likely to be manipulated or propagandized.

Furthermore, the historical concepts of consequence and continuity are used in this essay

to produce a holistic analysis of the factors leading to the victory of North Vietnam and the Viet

Cong over South Vietnam. The final result of the war was a cumulative consequence of the short

term military operations, political movements, and other actions taken by both factions.

However, it was also determined by the ongoing political undertones and other aspects that

demonstrated continuity as long term factors to the NV victory. Therefore, this essay seeks to

answer the research question: What were the factors that lead to a decisive North Vietnamese

victory in the Vietnam War, from 1955 to 1975? Through OPCVL analysis of a variety of

primary and secondary resources, along with the consideration of different historiographical

lenses and historical concepts, this essay asserts that ​the long-term superiority of the North

Vietnamese military strategy was the primary factor in their success; the severe short-term

decline in American political stability after the Tet Offensive, coupled with long-term

Soviet and Chinese foreign aid used for transitioning North Vietnam into conventional

warfare were additional crucial factors that lead to the capture of Saigon and a North

Vietnamese victory, although to a lesser extent.

9
Tim Dilorio. “China Contributed Substantially to Vietnam War Victory, Claims Scholar”, 2001, ​Wilson Center,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/china-contributed-substantially-to-vietnam-war-victory-claims-scholar.
 4

North Vietnamese Military Strategy

Most importantly, the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Viet Cong successfully

employed a variety of tactics against South Vietnamese and American troops throughout the

SIW, as supported by the revisionist perspective. Their fundamental strategy was the extensive

use of guerilla warfare, primarily waged by the partisan Viet Cong as a means of counteracting

the United States’ superiority in pure resource and troop availability.10 This type of warfare was

also employed to allow for the gradual buildup of a sufficiently powerful conventional army in

North Vietnam.11 Through guerilla warfare, VC insurgents launched ambushes against US

patrols and bases under the concealment of the dense jungle, retreating before proper counter

attacks could be made. If a major US offensive pushed into NV territory, the Viet Cong forces

would scatter into smaller groups in order to avoid a conventional battle. The success of

initiating skirmishes instead of prolonged fights against the enemy was well documented, as

“more than 96% percent of all firefights involved U.S units numbering fewer than two hundred

troops” where the Viet Cong “almost always held the tactical advantage, choosing when and

where to initiate combat.”12 Additionally, the report on Operation Perishing noted that “even

under artillery fire, the enemy can reorganize and attempt an escape with his main force through

many avenues such as hedgerows, tunnels, stream beds, paddies, or sugar cane before the

encirclement can be completed.” These comments were observations made by US infantrymen

and officers, strengthening their accuracy in depicting the Viet Cong strategy as they were first

hand accounts of the battle. In January 1963, at the Battle of Ap Bac, approximately 400 VC

10
James A. Warren. “The Genius of North Vietnam’s War Strategy”, 2017, ​Daily Beast​,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-genius-of-north-vietnams-war-strategy.
11
Ibid.
12
Mark A. Lawrence. ​The Vietnam War: A Concise International History​. (UK: Oxford University Press, 2008).
105.
 5

soldiers “held off three times more South Vietnamese manpower” and destroyed five H21

Shawnee troop carrier helicopters.13 Seen in this example, North Vietnam was able to secure

decisive victories as a consequence of utilizing their guerilla warfare strategy, which allowed

them to defeat enemy forces of considerably greater troop strength and technological prowess.

The strength of this data, originating from an official US military field report, is seen in its

narrow scope; it brings a clear focus on the immediate and specific impacts of NV strategies on a

particular conflict.

A major advantage of the VC communist guerillas was their integration into the local

population. Due to the homogeneity of the Vietnamese people, Viet Cong soldiers were identical

to civilians and peasants on the battlefield. The difficulty of fighting such an unconventional

enemy was summarized by Vietnam Veteran Colonel Robert B. Rigg: “Sophisticated electronics

“bleep bleep” on consoles and the visual yellow-green-blue of radar constantly screens the sky.

But none of these modern devices can tell you the political coloring of a peasant who may have

just hidden a weapon.”14 The vivid first person experiences provided by Col. Rigg’s memoir

provide further insight into the challenging prospect of facing guerilla fighters that were

indistinguishable from the general populace. US counterinsurgency measures to curb this

challenge were initiated in the SIW, but to little success; the US Marine Corps (USMC) decided

to mount small-unit surveillance teams constantly surveying the environment in an attempt to

track VC fighters–”intense patrol activity became the hallmark of USMC counter-guerilla

operations.”15 However, due to the nature of guerilla doctrine, North Vietnamese combatants had

13
Ibid. 150.
14
Robert B. Rigg, ​How to Stay Alive in Vietnam: Combat Survival in the War of Many Fronts​ (Harrisburg, Pa.:
Stackpole Books, 1966), 48-49.
15
Michael A. Hennessy, ​Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps,​ 1965- 1972
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 24.
 6

superior mobility on the battlefield as a major consequence of reducing the movement and

geographic control of their enemies. In order to disrupt the advancements of USMC patrols, VC

insurgents employed extensive booby trap and snare systems across their territory.16 The most

notable trap was the punji stake, which consisted of sharp rods nailed to the bottom of a pit,

disguised with a grass-textured cover at the top.17 The rods were often covered with excrement,

urine, or poison to infect impaled soldiers. Ultimately, 60% of American casualties were caused

by mines or traps set by the Viet Cong, demonstrating the consequences of guerrilla tactics.18

Furthermore, the need to constantly scout for traps created an immense psychological toll on

soldiers–in one interview, veteran Colonel David Hackworth explained that “the impact on the

soldier was a psychological impact, that every time you put your foot down, you didn't know

whether you were going to have a leg, or a limb, or a life. And this played over for 365 days… .it

took the fight out of you.”19 As a first-hand account describing the long-term effects of booby

traps, this interview source provides clear insight into how the Viet Cong’s guerilla warfare

strategies created a continuity of its physically and mentally damaging impacts on enemy forces.

Guerilla warfare also permitted North Vietnam forces to cut off important SV/US supply

lines and impede successful economic mobilization. An example was realized in the US

military’s loss of Khe Sanh, a strategic firebase20 on the Vietnam-Laos border that served as a

patrol base for North Vietnamese troop movement and the major stronghold protecting the

16
Matthew Gaskill. “Booby Traps of the Vietnam War”, 2018, ​War History Online​,
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/vietnam-war/booby-traps-vietnam-war.html.
17
“Booby Traps, Vietnam War”, 2019, ​The Royal Australian Regiment Association Website​,
https://www.5rar.asn.au/weapons/boobytraps.htm.
18
David Hackworth. Interview by PBS. People’s Century | Guerilla Wars. ​Public Broadcasting Service​.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/episodes/guerrillawars/hackworthtranscript.html.
19
Ibid.
20
A temporary area in a warzone where artillery was consolidated before infantry offensives.
 7

western flank of South Vietnam.21 The US military had been stationed at Khe Sanh since 1962;

General William Westmoreland, commander of the US forces in Vietnam, believed the firebase

was vital to the American war effort.22 However, over 20,000 NVA and Viet Cong soldiers

surrounded Khe Sanh and 6,000 US marines in the 1968 encirclement campaign, cutting off

critical US supply routes.23 By ambushing from many fronts, NV forces were able to capture the

area as well as advanced ARVN/US equipment, which included weapons and ammunition.24 US

helicopters had to airdrop supplies in order to reach the trapped soldiers, but the poor visibility

meant that most packages were delivered to the enemy. Furthermore, the NV encirclement

allowed for the consolidation of manpower and supplies from the Northern regions into the

South, while simultaneously denying any US reconnaissance on the Vietnam-Laos border.25 US

commanders were unable to adapt to the VC guerilla tactics; General Westmoreland was

“delighted” that “the communists were finally going to wage his type of war” and exclaimed,

“basically I see no requirement to change our strategy.”26 From these first-hand accounts of a

distinguished military commander before and during the battle (showing a relatively broad

scope), there is a continuity of the US’ inability to defend nor adapt effectively against the

guerilla warfare strategies of North Vietnam–Westmoreland’s thoughts are very likely to be his

genuine opinions as they were said towards his troops, demonstrating how the US was

ill-prepared for guerilla tactics from an enemy they expected to only execute conventional

21
Peter Brush, ​The Withdrawal from Khe Sanh​ (Vietnam Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997).
22
Brush, ​The Withdrawal from Khe Sanh​.
23
Ibid.
24
Rigg, ​How to Stay Alive in Vietnam: Combat Survival in the War of Many Fronts​, 20.
25
Brush, ​The Withdrawal from Khe Sanh.
26
Ibid.
 8

warfare. The historical consequences were well observed, as the NVA was able to continue

building infrastructure and supply lines into the south in order to consolidate more forces.

The stealth and mobility of a guerrilla campaign was fully enabled by the efficient use of

the Ho Chi Minh Trail (HCMT), a logistical network of footpaths, roads, and tunnels that

extended from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and was primarily responsible for transporting

resources, soldiers, and reconnaissance throughout the war–demonstrating the historical

continuity of NV strategies.27 US intelligence estimated that during the war, the VC received an

average of 60 tons of aid from the HCMT per day. Inside these tunnels, the NVA and the VC

established infirmaries, equipment repair stations, and food storage/distribution facilities.28 In

order to facilitate transportation as secretly as possible, multiple deception techniques were used

by the 559th Transportation Group (the NVA unit responsible for the construction, maintenance,

and security of the HCMT) to dissuade enemy reconnaissance. Exposed segments of the trail

were obscured using artificial canopies, while plants were transported to resemble undisturbed

forest.29 Then US ambassador to Laos, William Sullivan, commented on the “impenetrable tree

canopy which high-speed, high-flying jets literally can not see through… Nowhere on this road,

except for two limited areas, was it open to the sky. Even flying over it slowly with a helicopter,

the road was not discernible from above. It seems clear to me… that significant quantities of

logistics can still be moving over routes which...our strike aircraft are unable to discern.”30 Any

US Air Force operations to destroy the trail were largely unsuccessful due to this inability to map

27
“Ho Chi Minh Trail​”​, 2017,​ Encyclopedia Britannica​, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ho-Chi-Minh-Trail.
28
M. G. Weiner, J. R. Brom, and R. E. Koon, ​Infiltration of Personnel from North Vietnam: 1959–1967​, USA: Rand
Corporation, 1968, 37.
29
Edgar C. Doleman et al., ​The Vietnam Experience: Tools of War​, USA: Boston Publishing Company, 1985, 151.
30
U.S. Department of State [DOS], telegram from Sullivan to DOS, 21 June 1965, Foreign Relations of the United
States [FRUS], 1964–1968, Volume 27, Laos, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxviii.
 9

its routes. Again, the military strategy of the NVA and the VC proved effective against the US

military, as seen in the nature of the technology used against the HCMT: aerial interdiction

missions usually involved extremely fast aircraft, such as the F-105 Thunderchief, which “had

only a few seconds to acquire their targets and unload their ordnance.”31 Therefore, the various

military strategies conducted by the North Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong throughout the

war were critical in establishing a continuity of tactical superiority over the South Vietnamese

and US forces; as a result, the NV victory in 1975 was a direct consequence of their long term

strategic prowess.

US Political Instability and Foreign Aid

Another prevalent factor in determining the outcome of the Second Indochina War in

North Vietnam’s favour was the declining political stability and public support for the war in the

United States, as well as diminishing foreign aid for South Vietnam, in the latter half of the war.

This viewpoint is mainly supported by the Orthodox school, which argues that short-term

instability of the American political environment was a major consequence of the mass media

and government’s misreporting of the Tet Offensive. Tet was one of the largest military

campaigns conducted by the NVA and the NLF, lasting from January to September 1968; around

85,000 NV troops simultaneously assaulted cities, military installations, and villages in a

massive surprise attack. Although the US managed to repel NV troops and inflicted heavy

casualties on the Viet Cong, the offensive shattered public confidence in its ability to win the

Michael E. Haas, ​Apollo’s Warriors: U.S. Air Force Special Operations During the Cold War​, USA: Air
31

University Press, 1997, 215.

 10

war-resulting in a political rather than military victory. Due to the LBJ32 administration’s efforts

to spread false optimism among the general public about the progress of the war, widespread

disillusionment was created in the American homefront during the early days of the Tet

Offensive. Examples of the curation of such a narrative was seen in General Westmoreland’s

1967 address about the state of the war, where he stated that “I see progress as I fly over

Vietnam” and “the enemy’s hopes are bankrupt.”33 This carried the logical fallacy of a hasty

generalization, as Westmoreland applied his very narrow insight of the war (from a few visits to

bases and fields) into a “deliberate and pervasive effort to create a specific narrative.”34

The negative misreporting of the events during Tet destroyed this positive narrative and

caused immense anti-war sentiments amongst the American public. Media claimed that “the

Vietcong have taken over the US Embassy,” a clear overstatement as in reality they only

managed to reach the immediate perimeter before retreating.35 American broadcast journalist

Walter Cronkite stated in a public address on February 27, 1968, that the situation in Tet

Offensive was “mired in stalemate.”36 However, NVA and VC forces were actually being rapidly

pushed back by US forces. The LBJ administration’s optimistic comments about the war, seen

from Westmoreland’s aforementioned addresses, caused the public to believe that a campaign on

the scale of Tet would be impossible due to the narrative of NV being severely weakened. Thus,

with the falsification of the offensive showing the opposite in North Vietnamese strength,

consequences arose with public distrust of the government and opposition to the war. Cronkite,

32
Lyndon B. Johnson, then President of the United States.
33
"General William C. Westmoreland Public Address, November 1967", 2019, ​University of Michigan​,
http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~ppennock/doc-Westmoreland.htm.
34
“The Tet Offensive 1968: A 50-Year Reflection on the Impact of Information, Influence, and Culture”, 2019,
Marine Corps University​, https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/LLI/MLD/Tet%20Offensive%20Case_FINAL.pdf.
35
“TET: Who Won?", 2004, ​Smithsonian​, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/tet-who-won-99179501/.
36
"Report From Vietnam (1968)", 2019, ​Youtube​, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nn4w-ud-TyE.
 11

then an extremely influential figure in the US (considered the “Most Trusted Man in America”

after his coverage of many significant events in the 1960s), even showed confusion when he

asked “What happened? I thought we were winning the war!” as a response to the North

Vietnamese aggression.37 Although Cronkite was originally supportive of the SIW, he started to

vehemently oppose US involvement in the aftermath of the politically fracturing Tet Offensive.

In a rare editorial report (an example showing just how jarring the truth of the NV attack was on

the American public, as Cronkite rarely discussed his own opinions on-air), Walter Cronkite

declared the war in Vietnam was unwinnable by the American side.38 Cronkite’s influence was

observed by the LBJ administration; after watching the editorial himself, President Lyndon B.

Johnson remarked that “If I’ve lost Cronkite, I’ve lost Middle America.”39 As this comment was

made in a private setting, LBJ’s thoughts were likely to be genuine, demonstrating how the Tet

Offensive had truly dealt a severe political blow to both the general populace and the

government’s stance on the war.

A rising anti-war sentiment among the American population, sparked by the Tet

Offensive, would ultimately lead to the historical consequence of the LBJ administration

withdrawing all US forces from South Vietnam in 1973. After Tet, President Johnson’s

popularity declined rapidly, with over half of the American public disapproving of his military

decisions in Vietnam.40 Political turmoil manifested in “the most intense anti-war protests to

date.”41 After reconvening with top strategists, the Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford believed

37
"Report From Vietnam (1968)", 2019, ​Youtube​.
38
Ibid.
39
“Walter Cronkite: The Most Trusted Man in America”, 2014, ​University of Oregon​,
https://blogs.uoregon.edu/frengsj387/vietnam-war/.
40
“Vietnam War Protests", 2019, ​HISTORY​, https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests.
41
Ibid.
 12

that they “must take steps to disengage,” citing the infeasibility of continuing the fight against

North Vietnam.42 These sentiments were echoed by President Richard Nixon, who succeeded

LBJ in 1968. Nixon wanted to gradually remove all American presence in the war and transfer

military responsibility to the South Vietnamese government through a process called

“Vietnamization.”43 This initiative involved training and equipping the ARVN in an attempt to

give them full defensive capabilities against the NVA and the Viet Cong, but also required secret

ground invasions of neutral Cambodia in 1970. When this expansion came into public view,

Nixon claimed it was “necessary to keep pressure on the enemy until the Vietnamization strategy

took root,” but the plan was still subject to intense criticism and fed more anti-war protests

across America.44 Thus, Nixon decided to retreat from Cambodia and reduce the number of

American troops in Vietnam at a faster rate—from 549,000 in 1969 to 69,000 in

1972—preventing Vietnamization from being fully established.45 The consequences of Nixon’s

poor management of the war were clearly observed in the March 1972 Easter Offensive, where

NVA forces managed to launch a complete surprise attack on the ARVN and captured the key

SV cities of Quảng Trị and Huế. South Vietnamese commanders observed the ineffectiveness of

the Vietnamization plan, admitting that their leadership was “rarely exemplary,” and “inept and

indecisive.”46 The SV Corps’ headquarters was described as a base that “never actually

functioned as a field headquarters in combat.” ARVN forces also showed unnecessary

cowardice, the most infamous example being Lieutenant Colonel Phan Van Dinh’s order for his

42
Jonathan Kirshner. “When The Wise Men Failed", 2017, ​New York Times​,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/opinion/lyndon-johnson-vietnam-war.html.
43
“Vietnamization”, 2010, ​HISTORY​, https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnamization.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid.
46
W.R. Baker, “The Easter Offensive of 1972: A Failure to Use Intelligence”, 1998, ​Small Wars Journal​,
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-easter-offensive-of-1972-a-failure-to-use-intelligence.
 13

56th ARVN Regiment to surrender after only a “short fight.”47 The final blow came two years

after all US troops were airlifted in 1973, where communist troops were met with little South

Vietnamese resistance as they stormed into Saigon and achieved victory. To conclude, the

mismanagement of the progression in the Second Indochina War by the US government paved

the way for rapidly deteriorating public support and increased political strife, which in turn

pressured a reduction in military involvement and lead to South Vietnam’s defeat; these

consequences reflect the Orthodox historiography’s claims of a US defeat being the result of

poor wartime administrative decisions.

Soviet and Chinese Foreign Aid

Pro-Communist scholars such as Qiang Zhai argue that the NVA and the VC received

continuous foreign support from the USSR and China over the course of the SIW, which served

as the backbone for their successful transition to conventional warfare against South Vietnam.

This claim was well-backed by data concerning their military relations and the impacts of such

aid on subsequent conflicts. The CIA published an extensive report on the role of foreign

powers, stating that “North Vietnam’s ability to maintain an effective military force, to furnish

continued logistic support to Communist forces in South Vietnam, and to withstand the effects of

the allied bombing is largely dependent on the continued receipt of material aid from other

Communist countries.”48 China-NV relations spurred the war effort since 1955, when Ho Chi

Minh met with Chairman Mao Zedong from June 25 to July 8 in Beijing. Mao agreed to provide

North Vietnam with the equivalent of 200 million USD (800 million Chinese yuan) in order to

47
Baker, “The Easter Offensive of 1972”, 1998, Small Wars Journal.
48
“The Role of Foreign Aid in North Vietnam’s Military and Economic Effort”, 1998, USA: CIA Historical Review
Program, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000496488.pdf.
 14

build the Haiphong cement plant, Hanoi power grid, and Nam Dinh cotton mill.49 The continuity

of Communist foreign aid was showcased in a CIA intelligence report, which stated that “the

USSR has been the leading supplier, accounting, since 1965, for more than 80 percent of the

military aid and over 55 percent of the economic aid.”50 The consequences of such a large

backing of the NV regime were seen in former USAF Officer Leonard M. Scruggs’ memoir,

where he observed “thousands of casualties resulting from Soviet-made AK47’s, grenades,

mines, artillery, and mortars.”51 The USSR also imported hundreds of conventional anti-aircraft

guns and Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) which had devastating impacts on American forces;

Operation Rolling Thunder, a US aerial bombing campaign, resulted in 101 US aircraft being

shot down by SAMs alone. At the end of 1968, over 250 SAM sites and 5,975 Soviet

anti-aircraft guns were deployed by North Vietnam, which resulted in 68% of all US aircraft

losses in Vietnam. Scruggs commented on the correlation, where “as the number of SAMs and

conventional antiaircraft weapons increased in North Vietnam and Laos, U.S. aircraft losses rose

accordingly.”52 The debilitating continuity of the inability of US forces to damage the North

Vietnamese conventional war effort contributed to the attitudes of the LBJ administration. As

seen when Admiral Grant Sharp Jr. called Operation Rolling Thunder “powder-puff air warfare

doctrine,” and eventually admitted that the Soviet and Chinese-backed conventional tactics and

technology of the NVA was a “fateful decision that contributed to our ultimate loss of South

Vietnam as much as any other single action we took during our involvement.”53 Therefore, the

49
Qiang Zhai, ​China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 ​(USA: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
50
“The Role of Foreign Aid in North Vietnam’s Military and Economic Effort”, 1998, CIA Historical Review
Program.
51
Leonard M. Scruggs. ​Lessons from the Vietnam War, ​(USA: Warren Publishing Inc, 2009)
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
 15

continuity in Communist foreign aid was a prominent factor in catalyzing North Vietnam’s

transition from guerilla to conventional fighting, additionally supported by the pro-Communist

historical lens.

Conclusion

Overall, the primary factor that lead to the capture of Saigon in 1975 by North Vietnam

and thus their victory over South Vietnam in the SIW was the long-term superior military

strategies employed by the NVA and the VC, guerilla tactics served to undermine initial

American arms power while allowing North Vietnamese forces to use environmental advantages

and win a battle of attrition. Supplemental factors included the immediate political disarray and

public opposition to the American war effort, caused by the LBJ government’s poor management

of morale during the Tet Offensive, as well as the long-term Soviet and Chinese military aid

given to North Vietnam that permitted their effective transition to conventional warfare. This

conclusion was reached with the historical concepts of consequence and continuity; decisions

conducted by individuals and governments were analyzed to determine consequences on the

progression of the war and their impact on the continuity of North Vietnamese political and

military advantage. In terms of historiography, the Revisionist lens provided the most significant

perspective into understanding the outcome of the SIW. The Orthodox and Pro-Communist

lenses were only partially correct interpretations, as the NV victory was solely due to American

mistakes or foreign influence but rather an amalgam of factors.

[Word Count: 3976]

 16

Bibliography
Arnett, Peter. ​Saigon Has Fallen. ​AP Books, 2019.

Baker, W.R. “The Easter Offensive of 1972: A Failure to Use Intelligence”. 1998. ​Small Wars Journal​. January 28,
2020. https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-easter-offensive-of-1972-a-failure-to-use-intelligence.

“Booby Traps, Vietnam War”. 2019. ​The Royal Australian Regiment Association Website.​
https://www.5rar.asn.au/weapons/boobytraps.htm.

Brush, P. ​The Withdrawal from Khe Sanh​. USA: Vietnam Vol. 10, No. 2, 1997.

​ SA: Office of Air Force

Buckingham Jr, William A. ​The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia 1961-1971. U
History, 1982.

Dilorio, Tim. “China Contributed Substantially to Vietnam War Victory, Claims Scholar”. 2001. Wilson Center.
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/china-contributed-substantially-to-vietnam-war-victory-claims-scholar.

Doleman, Edgar C. et al. ​The Vietnam Experience: Tools of War​. USA: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.

“Domino Theory”. 2019. ​Encyclopedia Britannica​. Accessed January 26, 2020.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/domino-theory.

Lawrence, Mark A. ​The Vietnam War: A Concise International History​. UK: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Lewy, Guenter. ​America in Vietnam​. UK: Oxford University Press, 1980.

"General William C. Westmoreland Public Address, November 1967". 2019. ​University of Michigan​. Accessed
January 15, 2020. http://www-personal.umd.umich.edu/~ppennock/doc-Westmoreland.htm.

Gaskill, Matthew. “Booby Traps of the Vietnam War”. 2018. ​War History Online. ​Accessed January 22, 2020.
https://www.warhistoryonline.com/vietnam-war/booby-traps-vietnam-war.html.

Haas, Michael E. ​Apollo’s Warriors: U.S. Air Force Special Operations During the Cold War​. USA: Air University
Press, 1997.

Hackworth, David. Interview by PBS. People’s Century | Guerilla Wars. ​Public Broadcasting Service​. Accessed
January 22, 2020. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/peoplescentury/episodes/guerrillawars/hackworthtranscript.html.

Hennessy, Michael A. ​Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965 - 1972​. USA:
Praeger, 1997.

“Ho Chi Minh Trail​”​. 2017. ​ Encyclopedia Britannica​. Accessed December 28, 2019.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Ho-Chi-Minh-Trail.

Kirshner, Jonathan. “When The Wise Men Failed". 2017. ​New York Times​. Accessed January 18, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/opinion/lyndon-johnson-vietnam-war.html.

"Report From Vietnam (1968)". 2019. ​Youtube​. Accessed January 15, 2020.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nn4w-ud-TyE.

Rigg, Robert B. ​How to Stay Alive in Vietnam: Combat Survival in the War of Many Fronts.​ USA: Stackpole Books,
1966.
 17

Scruggs, Leonard M. ​Lessons from the Vietnam War.​ USA: Warren Publishing Inc, 2009.

Spector, Roger H.​“​The Vietnam War”. 2019. ​Encyclopedia Britannica. ​Accessed January 27, 2020.
https://www.britannica.com/event/Vietnam-War/The-fall-of-South-Vietnam.

“TET: Who Won?". 2004. ​Smithsonian.​ https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/tet-who-won-99179501/.

“The Role of Foreign Aid in North Vietnam’s Military and Economic Effort”. 1998. USA: CIA Historical Review
Program. Accessed January 29, 2020. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000496488.pdf.

“The Tet Offensive 1968: A 50-Year Reflection on the Impact of Information, Influence, and Culture”. 2019.
Marine Corps University​. Accessed January 15, 2020.
https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/LLI/MLD/Tet%20Offensive%20Case_FINAL.pdf.

U.S. Department of State [DOS], telegram from Sullivan to DOS. 21 June 1965. Foreign Relations of the United
States [FRUS], 1964–1968, Volume 27. Laos. www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxviii.

“Vietnamization”. 2010. ​HISTORY​. Accessed January 29, 2020.

https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnamization.

“Vietnam War Protests". 2019. ​HISTORY​. Accessed January 16, 2020.

https://www.history.com/topics/vietnam-war/vietnam-war-protests.

“Walter Cronkite: The Most Trusted Man in America”. 2014. ​University of Oregon​. Accessed January 16, 2020.
https://blogs.uoregon.edu/frengsj387/vietnam-war/.

Warren, James A. “The Genius of North Vietnam’s War Strategy”, 2017. ​Daily Beast.​ Accessed December 26,
2019. https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-genius-of-north-vietnams-war-strategy.

Weiner, M.G, Brom, J.R, and Koon, R.E. ​Infiltration of Personnel from North Vietnam: 1959–1967​. USA: Rand
Corporation, 1985.

​ SA: University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Zhai, Qiang. ​China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975. U