55.

ART 487
G.R. No. L-49731 September 29, 1988

ALFREDO SERING, petitioner,

vs.
RESTITUTO PLAZO and GERTRUDES SUAN, respondents.

FACTS:

The application of settled principles is all that is needed to resolve the instant appeal. Article 487 of the Civil
Code provides that anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment. A co-owner
may thus bring an ejectment action without joining the other co-owners, the suit being deemed instituted for
the benefit of all. 1 And the term, "action in ejectment," includes a suit of forcible entry (detentacion) or
unlawful detainer (desahucio). 2

The proceeding at bar had its inception in a forcible entry suit filed by petitioner Sering against respondent
Spouses Restituto Plazo and Gertrudes Suan with the then Municipal Court of del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. 3
The case resulted in a judgment against the Plazos who thereupon appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Surigao del Norte. In the latter court the Plazos learned that the property subject of the suit was not owned
solely by Sering but was owned in common by him and others. This prompted the Plazos to move for the
impleading of the other co-owners as parties plaintiff, on the theory that they were indispensable parties. 4
The Court agreed and ordered Sering to amend his complaint so as to include his co-owners as co-plaintiffs.
Sering demurred claiming that under the law anyone of the co-owners could bring suit for ejectment without
joining the others. 5 The Plazos contended, on the other hand, that the provision invoked by Sering had no
application to forcible entry actions, but only to suits of unlawful detainer. Because Sering failed to comply
with the Courts order for amendment of the complaint, the Trial Court dismissed his complaint. 6 It also
thereafter denied his motion for reconsidereration 7 Sering has come to this Court praying for the nullification
and reversal of said order of dismissal and that denying his plea for reconsideration.

ISSUE: whether an action of forcible entry and detainer should be brought in the name of all co-owners?

RULING:
We hold that under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring the action ... . In
forcible entry and detainer action(s) the matter to be determined is simply the question of prior physical
possession. It having been alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the properties,
certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in actual possession, could file the complaint.

The Court has been cited to no reason of substance for modifying or overruling this doctrine.
56. ARTICLE 493
G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987

JULITA GO ONG, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL GUARDIAN OF STEVEN GO ONG, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION and the CITY SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY,
respondents.

FACTS:

Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12 with an area of 1960.6 and Lot No. 1 with an
area of 3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188705 in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio
Hong married to Julita Go Ong "(Exh. D).

Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975 and Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her
husband's estate in Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was registered on TCT No. 188705 on
October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially
cancelled and TCT No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot No. 12 (Exh. D-4).

On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney-in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the
Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was
registered on TCT No. 188705 on the same date.

On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00 and Allied Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita
Go Ong, (Exh. E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the
bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was
plaintiff Julita Go Ong who promised to secure the court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong informed the
defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00 by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge
of the interest of the loan.

Concluding, the trial court ruled:

After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff acquired, by law, her
conjugal share, together with the hereditary rights thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal, L-14302, April 30, 1963).
Consequently, the mortgage constituted on said property, upon express authority of plaintiff, notwithstanding
the lack of judicial approval, is valid, with respect to her conjugal share thereon, together with her hereditary
rights.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONER'S
ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.

RULING:

In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of petitioner — the wife of the
deceased, is a community property and not the separate property of the latter; (2) that the mortgage was
constituted in the wife's personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage
affects the wife's share in the community property and her inheritance in the estate of her husband.

Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the
Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court ruled that the regulations provided in the said
section are mandatory.

Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, the Court of
Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was
constituted in her personal capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband.

Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483) and Fernandez, et al. vs.
Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the settlement proceedings of the estate of the deceased
spouse, the entire conjugal partnership property of the marriage is under administration. While such may
be in a sense true, that fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily
entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would result in an injustice. Under similar circumstances,
this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where the heirs as co-owners shall each
have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect the
substantive rights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership
ended with her husband's death, and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the
decedent (Art. 777, Civil Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the
other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where
judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under
administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of
the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove,
provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the government.

Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage.

G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993

HERODOTUS P. ACEBEDO and DEMOSTHENES P. ACEBEDO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, MIGUEL ACEBEDO, ALEXANDER ACEBEDO, NAPOLEON ACEBEDO, RIZALINO
ACEBEDO, REPUBLICA ACEBEDO, FILIPINAS ACEBEDO and YU HWA PING, respondents.

FACTS:

The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs and
ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining portions of said properties,
despite the absence of its prior approval as a probate court, is being challenged in the case at bar.
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in Quezon City and
Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 million. Said estate allegedly has unsettled
claims.

Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen years, respondents-heirs
filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. The said sale involved the properties covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City,
and form part of the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time,
they already had a buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that respondents-heirs have already received
their proportionate share of the six (6) million pesos paid by the buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that
the balance of P6,000,000.00 is more than enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they
prayed for the Court to direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-administrator
hereafter): to sell the properties mentioned in the motion; with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the
claims against the Estate; and to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the Estate.

On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45) days within which to
look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price higher than P12,000,000.00. they failed to
find a buyer and requested for another 30 days.

Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public document against Yu Hwa
Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, 1990. He initiated this complaint upon learning that it
was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-
administrator's signature was made to appear. He also learned that after he confronted the notary public of
the questioned document, the latter revoked his notarial act on the same.

On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by the Court of the
nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.

ISSUE: Is it within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving
the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and to order herein
Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said properties?

RULING:

Yes. Although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to
an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority
is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case
at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale.

An heir can sell whatever right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration.
This is a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court.

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under administration, is based
on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the
heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is
accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs.
The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this right. Although it is mandated that
each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. In other words, the law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common.

G.R. No. L-14429 June 30, 1962

RAMON MERCADO, BASILIA MERCADO joined by her husband,

FRANCISCO RONQUILLO, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
PIO D. LIWANAG, defendant-appellee.

FACTS:

1. That the complaint filed by the plaintiffs against the defendant seeks to annul a Deed of Sale on the ground
of fraud and on the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code.

2. That on July 14, 1956, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the plaintiff Ramon Mercado and the defendant Pio
D. Liwanag executed a Deed of Sale, covering a divided half and described in meter and bounds, or an area of
2,196 square meters at P7.00 per square meter or for a total amount of P15,372.00, of a parcel of land
situated at Kangkong, Quezon City, covered Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20805 of the Register of Deeds for
the province of Rizal, now Quezon City:

3. That the said T.C.T. No. 20805 containing an area of 4,392 square meters, is issued in the name of the
plaintiffs Ramon Mercado and Basilia Mercado as co-owners PRO-INDIVISO, and the sale was without the
knowledge and consent of plaintiff Basilia Mercado;

4. That out of the total area of 4,392 square meters, an area consisting of 391 square meters was expropriated
by the National Power Corporation sometime in December 1953 at a price of P10.00 per square meter, Civil
Case No. Q-829 (Eminent Domain) of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, entitled
"National Power Corporation, plaintiff, versus Brigido Almodoban, et als., defendants," but this fact of
expropriation came to the knowledge of the defendant Pio D. Liwanag upon the registration of the Deed of
Sale Annex "A". .

5. That pursuant to the Deed of Sale Annex "A" T.C.T. No. 32757 was issued in the name of Pio Liwanag and
Basilia photostat copy of which is hereto attached and marked as Annex "B".

6. That defendant submits the receipt signed by plaintiff Ramon Mercado dated July 14, 1956 photostat copy
of which is attached hereto and marked as Annex "C" and promissory note of the same date for P10,000.00,
photostat copy of which is attached hereto and marked is Annex "D" which are both self-explanatory, but
plaintiff Ramon Mercado disclaims payment and receipt of such check and promissory note, the check being
uncashed and is still in the possession of Atty. Eugenio de Garcia;

ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Sale Annex "A" court be annulled based in the foregoing facts in relation to
Article 493 of the Civil Code?
RULING:

Article 493 provides:

Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and
he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.

Appellants except to the application of this provision in this case for the reason that in the deed of sale sought
to be annulled the vendor disposed of a divided and determinate half of the land under co-ownership. The
argument, as far as it goes, seems to be tenable. What a co-owner may dispose of under Article 493 is only his
undivided aliquot share, which shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to divide the property into parts and then convey one part
by metes and bounds. Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Gonzales, et al. vs. Itchon, et al., 47 O.G. 6290; Manresa,
Vol. 3, 7th ed. p. 630.

Nevertheless, upon registration of the sale and cancellation of transfer certificate of title No. 20805 in the
names of the previous co-owners, the new transfer certificate that was issued (No. 32757) did not reproduce
the description in the instrument but carried the names of appellee Pio D. Liwanag and Basilia Mercado as "co-
owners pro-indiviso." There is no suggestion by any of the parties that this new certificate of title is invalid,
irregular or inaccurate. There is no prayer that it be canceled. As far as Basilia Mercado is concerned she
retains in all their integrity her rights as co-owner which she had before the sale, and consequently, she has no
cause to complain. Much less has Ramon Mercado, for it was he who was responsible for whatever indicia
there may be in the deed of sale that a determinate portion of the property was being sold, as shown by the
second paragraph thereof, quoted without contradiction in appellee's brief as follows:

That the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title was originally in my name, but was split into two equal parts by
virtue of my desire to donate to my sister-in-law Juana Gregorio an equal half thereof with the understanding
that I as donor would have the absolute power to choose from the property owned in common that part
which I would like to segregate for myself or my heir and assigns.

And of course appellee himself not only does not challenge the new certificate of title, wherein he appears as
co-owner of an undivided one-half share, but precisely relies upon it for his defense in this action.

The title is the final and conclusive repository of the rights of the new co-owners. The question of whether or
not the deed of sale should be annulled must be considered in conjunction with the title issued pursuant
thereto. Since, according to this title, what appellee acquired by virtue of the sale is only an undivided half-
share of the property, which under the law the vendor Ramon Mercado had the absolute right to dispose of,
the trial court committed no error in dismissing the action. The end-result of the transaction is in accordance
with Article 493 of the Civil Code.1äwphï1.ñët

The other point raised by appellants refers to the statement in the dispositive portion of the decision appealed
from that "the stipulation with regards to the deed of sale based on the ground of fraud is insufficient for all
purposes and besides, no proof showing the allegation of such fraud exists in the accord." It is contended that
the trial court erred in making such statement, the same being contrary to the stipulation in which the parties
expressly eliminated the issue of fraud. From the entire context of the decision, however, it can be gathered
that the case was not decided on the basis of the said issue. In any event, even if the court did err in
considering the question of fraud in spite of the stipulation, the error is not a prejudicial one. As far as the
dismissal of the actions concerned, it makes no difference whether fraud has not been proven or fraud has
been abandoned as an issue by express agreement.