Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy

Author(s): Jonathan E. Adler

Source: Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1996), pp. 329-343
Published by: Penn State University Press
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Charity, Interpretation, Fallacy1

Jonathan E. Adler

l.Theallegedconflict
A principle of charity governs interprétation, thè interprétation of
arguments, in particular.The principle of charity implies that if one
attributes to a contribution manifestly false beliefs or illogical rea-
soning, then either one has not made sensé of that contribution or, at
least, the attribution must overcome a strong, prior implausibility.
To evaluate an argument as a fallacy is to attribute to it a serious
failure of reasoning. Consequently, this suggests that the principle of
charity is incompatible with fallacy attributions. The suggestion has
influenced theoretical judgment, as well as practice, without itself
being subject to criticai scrutiny. If I am correct, however, the lack of
criticai scrutiny is unfortunate, since there is no incompatibility. That
is the bürden of this paper.
There are various ways of f ormulating the principle of charity, but
let us focus on Davidson's, which is the most well-worked-out ver-
sion. (A possible ambiguity in his présentation is briefly discussed
later, in section 4). It also appears to be the strongest, in the extent of
its demand for interprétationto impute rationality to speakers, and so
thè target of most criticism.2 If I can show that Davidson's version is
compatible with fallacy attributions, a fortiori, they will be compat-
ible with the others. Of his method of radical translation, Davidson
tell us that it is
intendedto solve theproblemof theinterdependence of belief andmean-
ing by holding belief constant
as faras possiblewhile solvingfor mean-
ing.Thisis accomplishedby assigningtruthconditionsto aliensentences
thatmakenativespeakersrightwhenplausiblypossible, according,of
course,to ourown view of whatis right.Whatjustifiesthè procedureis
thè fact that disagreementand agreementalike are intelligible only
againsta backgroundof massiveagreement.Appliedto language,this
principlereads: the more sentences we conspire to accept or reject
(whetheror not througha mediumof interprétation), the betterwe un-
derstandthe rest, whetheror not we agréeaboutthem.

Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1996. Copyright © 1996 The Pennsylvania
State University, University Park, PA.

329
330 E. ADLER
JONATHAN

The methodological advice to Interpretin a way that optimizes agree-

ment should not be conceived as resting on a charitableassumption about
human intelligence that might turn out to be false. If we cannot find a
way to Interpret the utterances and other behavior of a creature as re-
vealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own stan-
dards, we have no reason to count that creature as rational, as having
beliefs, or as saying anything. (1984c, 137)
Here we have the ingrédients of what critice find disturbing: transla-
tion or interprétationis agreement with the translatoror interpreter's
own view; and, more strikingly, the act of translation or interpréta-
tion involves the attribution of massive agreement. Isn't this "cul-
tural imperialism" (imposing our views on aliens), which, even if
defensible, should be defended empirically, not a priori?
Against these claims and worries, there is Davidson's insistence
that the extending of charity involves no hopeful empirical discovery
concerning human intelligence; nor is it a contingent claim as to the
range of agreement. The impossibility of massive disagreement is a
condition of interprétation,not a fact we discover. Charity is a neces-
sity for understanding, not an approach to improving what is under-
stood.
Since Davidson's account of interprétationand meaning have been
the subject of extensive discussion, and since much of this discussion
is tangential to our focus on fallacies, I shall avoid presenting the
principle within a theory of understanding.Rather, my approach will
be to attemptto disarm the most prominent lines of reasoning against
fallacies (fallacy-ascriptions) thought to follow from the principle of
charity, especially from the demand for massive agreement and the
attributionof mostly true beliefs.
Regardless of our verdict on Davidson's own principle of charity,
some such principle permeates our understandingof arguments. Joe
says, "The offense is working on a sweep. So the guard should pulì."
It is hard to imagine any reasonable interprétation that treats these
two sentences as a complete argument.A principle of charity is auto-
matically invoked to view it as some enthymeme for, in this case, an
argument concerning a football play.
The implicit workings of some such principle is also evident in
reflecting upon how différent textbooks présent good and bad rea-
soning. Only those sections devoted to faulty reasoning offer elabo-
rate accounts of why people so reason. The good reasoning does not
so insistently demand explanation. Bad reasoning ili serves us, and
so, presuming we are rational (a facet of the principle of charity), we
 CHARITY, INTERPRETATION,FALLACY 331

must find some rationality-restoring story as to why it exists, per-

sists, and often thrives.
Unless Davidson's account was overwhelmingly wrong, any con-
clusion that the principle of charity is not compatible with the ascrip-
tion of fallacies, given what we know about the frailties of our
reasoning, should be construed as a reductio of thè premises that en-
tail it. Such a conclusion would imply that our concern for agreement
and ascriptions of rationality completely dominated our normal in-
terest in learning from others- in the informational value of commu-
nication. How could any such principle be at ail reconciled with our
belief that humans are fallible, especially where complex reasoning
is involved?
Indeed, sometimes the attribution of fallacious reasoning is itself
motivated by an appeal to charity. When a person cornes to a bizarre
conclusion, we excuse the resuit as due to the person committing a
very common, especially enticing, fallacy. Thus, for example, subtle
modal fallacies of scope are invoked to explain inferences from uni-
versal causality to the (hardly believable) conclusion that whatever
does occur must occur (see Thomas 1970). Quite often a strategy for
generating a nonfallacious interprétationis adopted whereby premises
are ascribed to the argument that are not explicit in it and not in-
cluded in the fallacy interprétation.The move by itself is suspect on
its own terms (of aiming at charity), for there is no good reason to
think that it is more charitable or rational to interpret an argument as
offering blatantly unsupported premises than to interpret it as a fal-
lacy when stripped of those premises. Otherwise there is a foolproof
recipe for avoiding fallacies: add to any argumenta conditional whose
antécédent is the conjunction of the premises and whose conséquent
is the conclusion.
In fact, when we look to Davidson's careful formulation, he does
not say maximizes agreement; instead, he says optimizes agreement.
The formulation suggests that increasing agreement is one, among
other, occasionally competing, desiderata. Presumably, one of those
desiderata is just fidelity to what is contributed.3
We then hâve to seek a resolution that, broadly speaking, suggests
how fidelity and massive agreement (or ascriptions of rationality) are
compatible (indeed, that the former requires the latter.) We need to
expose and reject the assumptions that lead us into the reductio that
there is any incompatibility with charity, properly understood, and
fallacy ascriptions. I believe that there are three main ones.
332 E. ADLER
JONATHAN

2. Transparencyof a fallacy

First, and most obviously, a distinction is to be drawn between offer-

ing a fallacious argument and recognizing the argumentone offers as
fallacious. One could assert an argumentthat one recognizes as falla-
cious only insincerely, perhaps with an intent to deceive, for to assert
an argument is to represent the premises as sufficient reason to be-
lieve or accept a conclusion. To recognize that one's argument is a
fallacy is to recognize that one is representing oneself falsely. Some-
times those who commit some fallacies are hardly capable of recog-
nizing them, since the tools of analysis that expose the fallacy are not
yet known (e.g., the fallacy of mixed quantifier reversai).
As obvious as this distinction is, it is easily overlooked. For once
a fallacy ascription is made, motivating us to search for a more "chari-
table"reading, we (the Interpreters)are cognizant ofthat fallacy. When
we find it difficult to believe that the arguer could hâve meant that
fallacious reading, it may be because the arguer did not so read it.
The claim that the arguermeant F, which is a fallacy, is clearly différ-
ent from the claim that he or she meant F as the fallacy we claim it to
be. The confusion in practice sometimes results, I hypothesize, be-
cause we as Interpretersimpose our récognition of the fallacy on the
subject of our interprétation.
Dennett, another defender of a (strong) principle of charity, may
lead his readers astray by not acknowledging the matter of récogni-
tion.4 He imagines a boy who gives a dime and penny change for the
quarterhe receives for the 12-cent lemonade. Dennett allows that the
boy has made a mistake, but he tries to convince us that it is very
difficult to say "exactly which mistake" (1987, 85). The most prom-
ising candidates seem to fail, since thèse are too obvious for the boy
not to believe: that 25 - 12 = 75; that 10 + 7 = 77; that 11 does not
equal 13.
But the problem is that we are using thèse "that"clauses not only
to pick out beliefs of the boy, but also to describe them (even when
the insertion of the "that" should warn us off). But in ascribing the
error to the boy, and attributing to him rationality, we are implicitly
denying that the error that he has made, which is picked out by at
least one of thèse clauses, does correspond to how he is thinking of
their content. The boy believes thè two objects he gives as change
(which are a dime and a penny) do equal the correct change. But he
does not thereby believe that a dime and a penny, so recognized, are
equal to 13 cents.5
 CHARITY, INTERPRETATION,FALLACY 333

So it is not only in our actual practice that the offering/recogniz-

ing (or transparency)distinction is obscured, but, sometimes, too, in
theoretical discussions. Consider, further,a remarkof Sorensen's that
is directly concerned with charity and fallacies:
Thereare methodologicalconsidérationsthat militateagainstattribu-
tions of logicai errors.Forvirtuallyeveryonerecognizesa principleof
charityis neededin orderto makesensé of what a personsays. By re-
quiringus to minimizeattributionsof irrationality,the principlecréâtes
a presumptionagainstfallacyattribution.(1988, 132)
Even so cautious a formulation as Sorensen's is liable to mislead.
Sorensen writes, "In order to make sensé ö/what a person says," but
it would be less misleading to say, "in order for it to make sensé that
the person said ." Sorensen's formulation focuses us on the con-
tent of what is said. So, then, the bizarreness of it, rather than of
someone's believing or contributing it (without necessarily recogniz-
ing it as bizarre), seems sufficient to rule it out via the principle of
charity. But, of course, there is a blunt distinction between, for ex-
ample, affirming a self-contradiction and (merely) contradicting one-
self. In the former case, the évidence thatjustifies ascribing the belief
to an agent- thè agent's sincere assertion- is also évidence that the
agent recognizes, and so accepts, his or her assertion as, for example,
self-contradictory.
In a salient precursor to Davidson's principle of charity, Quine
complains, "Assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely
to turn on hidden différences of language" (1960, 59).6 Quine's re-
mark follows upon a discussion of translations that attributeto a na-
tive speaker self-contradictions. The qualification startlingly clearly
implies a récognition by the speaker of the content of what he or she
asserts as contradictory.
It is doubtful that we can even accept as an assertion contributions
that are startlingly false or self-contradictory (and so meant), for to
assert that is to represent oneself as believing that is true. But if
is startlingly false or self-contradictory,then, presumably,the speaker
so recognizes it as (necessarily) false, and so the speaker cannot sin-
cerely represent it as what he or she believes to be true.7

3. An aside: A problem with fallacies ad

There is a difficulty, however, with thè scope of my lack of transpar-
ency explanation, as applied to fallacies ad. Unlike simple deductive
334 E. ADLER
JONATHAN

or language fallacies (e.g., equivocation), in fallacies ad, some réc-

ognition of one's argument as fallacious seems to play an explana-
tory role. The behavior of an arguerwho fallaciously attemptsto move
his audience to his conclusion through an appeal to pity is sometimes
partially explicable by his or her récognition of the persuasive, even
if dubious, force of the appeal. That would help to explain, also, why
typically appeals ad are only hinted at. In thèse cases, the arguer ap-
peals to pity or to the dubious character of the arguer in his or her
contribution, but does not clearly offer it as a premise in an argu-
ment.
The path I would seek to handle this difficulty, though not a path I
can take up now, is to draw a parallel with self-deception. What
self-deception shows us is that the récognition of the belief, which
one is motivated to deny and which must remain hidden for that at-
tempt to succeed, need not operate in a heavy-handed manner. It is
enough that thè desire leads the agent to be lax in applying his or her
normal criticai Standards,as is often true with fallacies ad, for the
ways such appeals are persuasive, illicit, and available are readily
acknowledged and yet easily lost sight of in the heat of argument. It
is easy to convince oneself that one's audience must see the muti-
lated fétus for them really to appreciate that abortion is murderof the
most innocent.

4. Agreement and the evident

Second, massive agreement (in belief) with a group of language us-

ers is compatible with ascribing to (members of) that group many
fallacies. Govier explains, "The content of the principle Davidson
défends is such that it will only rarely permit us to attributeto others
faulty belief s or reasoning" (1987, 135). Going along with this worry
is the corollary fear of cultural imperialism: "There is a fundamental
difficulty with a model which insists on a very wide agreement in
order to 'make sensé' of others' discourse. It is that the otherness of
other minds and cultures may be lost if charity goes too far" (139).
But Govier cites no fallacy that would be lost under a Davidsonian
approach.8This is not accidentai, but sensible from the Gricean point
of view that Govier adopts. It is a point of view I share. Yet what I
derive from it opposes the claim that if a strong principle of charity is
accepted, then fallacy ascriptions must be either rarities or, if not,
(culturally) diverse views will be homogenized.
 CHARITY, INTERPRETATION,FALLACY 335

Recali thè claim above about the nature of assertion- to assert

that is to represent oneself as believing that is true. Gricean con-
versational expectations (maxims) include, besides this truthfulness,
expectations of relevance and informativeness. These impose a se-
vere restriction on what beliefs of ours are candidates for assertion
(see Adler 1994b). "It's 3 o'clock" would normally be assertible, but
not "I hâve a hand" (specialized contexts aside, e.g., debating skepti-
cism.)
Davidson writes,
Consider why those who can understandone another's speech must share
a view of the world, whether or not that view is correct. The reason is
that we damage the intelligibility of our readings of the utterances of
others when our method of reading puts others into what we take to be
broad error.We can make sensé of différences ail right, but only against
a background of shared belief. What is shared does not in generai cali
for comment; it is too dull, trite, or familiär to stand notice. (1984b,
199-200)
Since the massive agreement is over those beliefs that are "too dull,
trite, or familiär to stand notice," I infer that thèse beliefs will not
largely be candidates for what is relevant and informative for most
discourse.9 Thus massive agreement in beliefs is compatible with ex-
tensive disagreement in what is said. The argument is of even greater
force for argumentativecontributions, as what we argue for are those
claims that are not mutually evident and, more usually, controversial.
What then are we to say of the cases in which we do attribute
stränge beliefs to others? In thèse cases, the évidence we appeal to
and the corresponding assertions that, to us, are manifestly false al-
ready presuppose (imply) massive agreement of beliefs.10Think about
what would be to us a blatant falsehood, as in an assertion such as
"Apollo moves the sun around the sky, while the earth stands still,"
which offered even today would be informative and also, let us con-
cede, intelligible. Yet, if we take that assertion at face value, even so
manifestly false a pronouncement appeals to widely shared agree-
ment: there is a sun, earth, and sky, and thèse terms refer to the same
objects as we take them to be; there is agreement as well in the ap-
pearances of the movement of the sun; there is agreement as to what
moving requires (a two-place relation between a mover and an object
moved); and no doubt we hint at much else (the sun is far away and
large, the earth is where we are located and not the sun, etc.) Given
ail thèse sharedbeliefs, disagreement over the natureof the real forces
336 E. ADLER
JONATHAN

that explain the motion, thè positing of a supernaturalbeing, and thè

relative motion of earth and sun are but narrow points of disagree-
ment. Further, all these latter différences are over theoretical
(nonobservational, spiritual) mattersthat do not affect day-to-day life
and survival and so the différences are explicable without threat to
attributions of rationality.11
The discussion so far, and as it will conclude in the next section, is
largely negative. It is intended to deny the incompatibility between
the principle of charity and fallacy ascriptions. However, behind this
negative critique is the view that embedded in Davidson's position is
a very valuable lesson for argumentation.
The lesson, which I indicate only briefly, is that disagreement is
sharper and clearer, and so argument more worthwhile, as it is nar-
rower. Consider the infamous account of justice offered by Thrasy-
machus in book 1 of the Republic (336b-341a4): Justice is in the
interests of the stronger. On such a view, many of the most central
intuitions and cases regardingjustice could not be appealed to as neu-
tral data (e.g., that slavery is unjust, that it is wrong to punish an
innocent person) and the very meaning of justice would come into
question (e.g., as involving fairness). Thus, the normal way debate
might continue as between competing views of justice (e.g., giving
each one his or her due, giving each what he or she needs, not inter-
fering with anyone's liberty, balancing or ordering between liberty
and equality in distribution) could not go on. We have sacrificed the
fund of intuitions and cases to test out the différent implications of
these positions. Argument loses focus. We would not know whether
we were trying to select between competitors of a single concept, or
debating Claims about différent though related concepts, or- in the
limit of fruitless debate- arguing at crosspurposes, or arguing merely
verbally.
However, adopting Davidson's principle of charity to this purpose
reveals a weaker and stronger version of it, even within Davidson's
own présentation. Is it a qualitative (or threshold notion) or a com-
parative one? The former is the weaker notion, and it goes along with
the idea of charity as a minimal condition for intelligibility. It is a
violation of charity in this way that rules out translations of utter-
ances as contradictions. But when various interprétations of a state-
ment reach the threshold for content-ascription or minimal
intelligibility, the principle of charity can do no further work.
 CHARITY, INTERPRETATION,FALLACY 337

The stronger comparative notion, however, encourages us to go

further. One interprétation is better than another if it is more chari-
table (roughly and ceteris paribus, more in accord with our own
views). However difficult it is to argue with Thrasymachus fruitfully
(without lapsing into verbal disagreements), his account of justice
taken fairly literally seems to pass the test of charity on the weaker
reader.Indeed, his view is often understood as a kind of egoism. Nev-
ertheless, a stronger view of charity directs us to look for other inter-
prétations of it.
We should stick with the weaker version and reserve the stronger
version for a regulative ideal applied for spécifie ends (such as fruit-
ful dialogue or argument). The principle of charity as a principle of
interprétation is, if anything, an attempt to get right what a person
means. So it is always constrained, as Davidson's choice of optimize
over maximize indicates, to be accurate and faithful to what is said.
As the Thrasymachus example illustrâtes, one who attempted to in-
terpret it so as to lessen the radical nature of its disagreement with
prevailing views would almost certainly distort it.

5. Bad inference rules and central beliefs

The third, and final, line of thought from the principle of charity to
the déniai of fallacies that I will consider begins from the observa-
tion that to ascribe to someone an argument is to ascribe to that per-
son the endorsing of a certain pattern of reasoning as good or valid.
So, to ascribe to someone a fallacious argument is to take that person
as endorsing a fallacious form of inference.
However, it is the nature of forms of inference to be both central
to our System of beliefs and indefinitely generative. They are central
in that forms of inference determine the implication relations among
our beliefs, and thereby what holds them together as a System. They
are generative in being forms of inference, and thus as licensing tran-
sitions from premises to conclusions of virtually any content. But if
the inference is not valid or good, those who endorse it will generate,
even from true premises, an unlimited numberof false beliefs. Among
thèse, in particular,will be ones starkly in conflict with our central or
basic beliefs, including those that are supposed to be self-evident and
those that constitute the fund of massive agreement.
It is probably due to reasoning along thèse lines that leads Massey
to conjecture: 'To accept affirmationof the conséquent would amount
338 E. ADLER
JONATHAN

not merely to a simple fallacy but to nearly certain suicide. Exposés

of fallacies are not needed to eliminate affirmers of the conséquent;
12
evolutionary pruning does thè job more decisively" (1981, 498).
In challenging this reasoning, I will assume a weak view as to
what it is to endorse a form of inference or to grasp a logicai connec-
tive, which can only be to thè benefit of this line of reasoning. The
assumption arises as an answer to the issue of the alleged inverse
relation between an agent's acceptance of certain (invalid) inferences,
that seem to involve a logicai connective and the attribution of that
connective to the agent (Quine 1979, chap.6). The assumption is that
the attributionof a form of inference or connective requires minimal
compétence: acceptance of only some very rudimentary inferences
with that connective (Cherniak 1986, chaps. 2 and 4). Since most
examples of fallacies are compatible with such minimal compétence,
there should not be a problem with such attributions (on this count).
Specifîcally, cases in which an agent is alleged to reverse the condi-
tional (or, for that matter, affirm the conséquent) are consistent with
that agent's accepting modus ponens, transitivity, and the falsity of
an if-then Statement,where antécédent is true and conséquent false.
This évidence of compétence, and more could be added, seems suffi-
cient for attributingthe conditional to an agent.
However, although in endorsing an argumentone endorses a form
of reasoning, it does not follow that one endorses the form of reason-
ing that the argument actually involves. It is plausible to believe that
many fallacies are committed because those who commit them mis-
takenly think of their reasoning as embodying a nearby valid or
nonfallacious form of inference (e.g., denying the antécédent and the
conversational reversai of the conditional); in the gambler's fallacy,
the law of large numbers is treated as governing individuai events as
well as an indefinite séries of trials (see Woods and Walton 1978). So
in endorsing their argument,they are not approvingof an invalid form
of inference. In fact, such endorsement would be anomalous, since
most fallacious forms of reasoning are recognized as fallacious when
stripped of content. (Certainly not all are recognized- the form of a
slippery slope fallacy as a sorities is persuasive, even in its bare for-
mal structure.) One reason for this récognition and rejection is that,
in thè case of deductive fallacies, there is good reason to believe that
the simple, valid rules of deductive logic are syntactically represented
in our minds. Stripped of meaningful content, we will distinguish
simple valid and invalid forms (see Rips 1983).13
 CHARITY, INTERPRETATION,FALLACY 339

But even if we suppose an agent does accept an invalid or falla-

cious form of inference, there is another obstacle to any conflict with
the principle of charity: the implication of massive agreement on
self-evident belief. Even suckers for some fallacy such as affirming
the conséquent are unlikely to accept an argument of that form when
the conclusion is "The earth is fiat." When an agent initially judges
the premises true, the reasonable conclusion the agent may reach upon
deriving the conclusion is that an error has been made about either
the premises or the validity of the inference.
The point is reinforced from the observation that our (unschooled)
judgments of the quality of an argument typically are judgments of
the worthiness for belief or acceptance of the conclusion, given our
assessment of the form of inference and the acceptability of the pre-
mises (see, e.g., Evans, Barston, and Pollard 1985). 14Judgments of
the quality of real arguments are, in Fodor's terms, Quinean- "sensi-
tive to properties of the entire belief System" (Fodor 1983, 107)-
since they are concerned with the real warrantfor accepting the con-
clusion on the reasons offered. That is why the endorsement of an
invalid argument does not imply a robust endorsement of its form
across a wide variety of altérations of content. Some, of course, will.
But overall our endorsements are rightly influenced by certain fac-
tors that, from the point of view of logicai form, are external,
content-effects. I use rightly, not because the distinction between the
logicai form and the content of an argument is not real or basic, or
because overlooking it will not damage the reliability of judgments
of an argument's cogency, but because the questions we are normally
answering in judging an argumentare more efficiently answered with-
out drawing on an explicit use of the distinction.
Consider the famous Wason sélection task (Wason and
Johnson-Laird 1972, chap. 13). Four cards are placed in front of each
subject:

4 7

The subjects know that on one side of each card is a letter and on the
other a number.The following rule is presented:
If a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on
the other side.
340 E. ADLER
JONATHAN

The task is to pick out just those cards that need to be turned over in
order to determine whether thè mie is true or false. The results are
that almost all subjects turn over the E, but many turn over the 4;
more crucially, few turn over the 7.
Despite this widespread failure, when thè task is set in certain natu-
rai settings, there is enormous improvement. If subjects are given a
rule relating an envelope's being unsealed to its requiring,on the other
side, a certain denomination stamp, improvement is dramatic. The
very conception of the problem appearsto alter.With a realistic model,
subjects solve their task by following out the model, readily recog-
nizing that the analogue of the 7 card must be turned over.
The role content-effects play in judging the quality of arguments,
and the resulting limit those effects hâve on the assumption of formal
compétence, is often missed for at least two reasons. First, the usu-
ally helpful practice of representing real arguments by abbreviative
letters obscures the problemof content-effects. The clarity of the (most
relevant) logicai form stands forth, so that we fail to notice how real
content influences ordinary judgments of the goodness of an argu-
ment. Second, the crucial évidence that indicates the depth of the
problem is not ordinarily, but only experimentally, available. We are
interested in understandingjudgments of a particular argument. So
we look to the judgment of an individuai in this particularcase. What
is not visible is the extent to which arguments of similar form, but
différent content, will be judged similarly by that same individuai.

6. Summary
Three assumptions and correspondingUnes of argumentfrom a (seem-
ingly) strong Davidsonian principle of charity to skepticism about
fallacies have been challenged. First, fallacious arguments are not
normally offered with the récognition that they are fallacious; rather,
they are offered as good arguments. Consequently, there is no diffi-
culty in supplying a rational account of why an agent would offer
such an argument.Second, the massive agreementimplied by the prin-
ciple of charity does not need to extend to most of what is contrib-
uted, and more so, for arguments.Relative to the totality of our beliefs,
what we say is thè tip of thè iceberg, and so there is no threat to
massive agreement in beliefs, even if our arguments are rife with fal-
lacies (or falsehoods).15Third, thè endorsement of a fallacious argu-
ment, although it involves the endorsement of a form of reasoning,
 CHARITY, INTERPRETATION,FALLACY 341

does not imply that one will reason in other areas according to a fal-
lacious rule, or that one will come to accept beliefs in conflict with
more central beliefs. If we do not recognize the fallacy as a fallacy,
we are not necessarily endorsing a fallacious form of inference. And,
we judge arguments for acceptability, not only in terms of form, but
also in terms of content, so those basic beliefs that we all have will
still provide an obstacle to accepting arguments with contrary con-
clusions.

7. Conclusion
Not knowing of any other Unes of argument from the principle of
charity to a generai undermining of fallacy ascriptions, and believing
that thèse are as good as it gets, I conclude that there is no incompat-
ibility.
This paper is a companion piece to my "Fallacies and Alternative
Interprétations"(1994).16 In that paper, I criticized arguments that
justify the practice whereby once an interprétation of an argument
that is plausibly attributedand nonfallacious is found, then that dis-
covery is taken as sufficient to disfavor, if not discrédit, any interpré-
tation of it as a fallacy.
Although I held that those arguments can be examined indepen-
dently of the principle of charity, and proceeded to do so, that prin-
ciple certainly strengthens them. With the conclusion of the présent
paper added, I am now more confident that the practices and theoreti-
cal discussions that treat a fallacy interprétation of an argument as
strongly and a priori disfavored are undefended, if not indefensible.
Department of Philosophy
Brooklyn College and thè Graduate Center, C.U.N.Y.

Notes
1. My thanks to Eugene Garver, Trudy Govier, Richard Mendelsohn, and Roy
Sorensen for helpful comments.
2. See Davidson (1984a), especially the essays in the section on radical interpré-
tation.
3. On a related point, see Bach and Harnish's "Presumption of Literalness"
(1979, 12).
4. See, among other writings of his on this thème, Dennett's "Making Sense of
Ourselves" (1987).
5. Since substitutivity of identicals fails in "believes that" clauses, the boy can
believe that he gave back in change a dime and penny without believing that 10 + 1 - 11.
6. Notice that charity, as expressed hère, amounts to an epistemic heuristic or strong
bias, not, as in Davidson, a constitutive principle of understanding.
342 JONATHAN E. ADLER

7. This is one difficulty with the argumentsin Thagard and Nisbett (1983). Govier,
in her Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation, endorses their objections to
principles of charity (1987, 138-40).
8. This is especially surprising in view of Govier's own Claims and solid objec-
tions to the arguments of others (1987, chap. 9, sec. 3). She does cite the example of
an allegedly believed self-contradiction (pp. 138-39) which I criticize above.
9. The triviality of much of the agreed beliefs is overlooked in Haack's récent
critique of Davidson's principle of charity (1993, 60-68). However, Haack's basic
objection to Davidson's move from massive agreement in belief to massive ascrip-
tions of truth is crédible.
10. Here is more that I find wanting in Thagard and Nisbett (1983).
11. The thèmes in this paragraphare discussed in a number of the articles collected
in Hollis and Lukes (1982).
12. Contrast Massey's conjecture with Peirce's: "Logicality in regard to practical
matters is the most useful quality an animal can possess, and might, therefore, result
from the action of naturai sélection; but outside of thèse it is probably of more advan-
tage to the animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions,
independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, naturai sélection
might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought" (1982, 64).
13. Nor does it appear that there are mentally basic représentations for deductively
invalid rules. For example, Wason and Johnson-Laird comment after one study in
which few committed a fallacy: "This confirmée that few if any individuale actually
possess rules of inference corresponding to the fallacies" (1972, 56).
14. In his récent textbook, introducing his own "mental modeis" approach, John-
son-Laird writes, "People understand the meanings of Statements, and so it is off to
suppose that when they reason they throw their understanding away and work with
formal rules that are purely syntactic" (1988, 226). However, I am inclined to believe
that the normalcy of content-effects in reasoning is compatible with the claim that we
have an innate représentation of certain simple logicai rules. For a judicious discus-
sion of content-effects, and the syntactic versus pragmatic view of logicai rules, see
Rips (1993).
15.1 set aside the problem that too many fallacies will lead to a loss of trust in one
another and so to a breakdown in communication and argument. The problem is an
artifact of the vagueness oïmany. The many fallacies that Davidsonian charity allows
are just those that textbooks cite as fallacies. Conceding ail of thèse as fallacies still
captures only a tiny portion of discourse, so there need be no breakdown in trust on
this count. Correspondingly, the many fallacies allowed dénies the claim of Govier
and others that Davidsonian charity implies that fallacies must be a rarity compared,
presumably, to the range of textbook cases.
16. I would now, however, renounce my opening example (see Burke 1994). Con-
trary to what Burke suggests, though, his account is very much localized to this spé-
cifie form of argument, providing little support for thè generai fallacy skepticism that
I address here and in that previous publication.

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