Mind Association

Luckless Desert is Different Desert

Author(s): Jonathan E. Adler
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 96, No. 382 (Apr., 1987), pp. 247-249
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 Luckless
DesertisDifferent
Desert
JONATHAN E. ADLER

I
NorvinRichards'arguesthatallegedcasesofmoralluckdonotshowthatanagent's
desertcanbe partially determined bycircumstances overwhichhe hasno control.
Rather,thedifferences in desertattributed in 'lucky'(meantdescriptively) com-
paredto'non-lucky' situationsreflectstheepistemic differencesofattributors inthe
twosituations. Realdesert, forRichards, is attributed tofeatures ofcharacter. More
precisely,'behaviour whichenactsa particular traitcallsfor,or"deserves", protec-
tivemeasures inproportion totheriskoffuture harmsatwhichitputsotherpeople'.2
The fundamental difficultywithRichards'saccountis his failureto appreciate
thatdesertwouldbe radically differentunderhisconstrual. Thisfailure is duetohis
simply assuming, unjustifiablyI argue,thatdesertas heconstrues itwouldhavethe
sameshapeas desertas presently apportioned inepistemically 'clear'situations (the
'lucky'ones).Without suchjustification,Richardsmissesthecrucialissuegenerat-
ingtheproblemofmoralluck,namelythatthereis an imperfect alignment ofour
idealsforattributing desertandthepractices inwhichthoseattributions arerooted.
Attheend,I willbriefly mention somereasonsfordoubting thatdesertas Richards
construesit could remainbothrootedin our practices,whichhe accepts,and
identicalwithdesertas attributed in theclearcases.
Considerthecaseofthelorrydriverwhorunsovera child.The problem ofluck
arisesbecausea largepartofourapportioning ofdesertappearsto stemfromthe
child'sbeingkilled,rather thansolelytherecklessness ofthedriving. However,the
child'srunning outat thatmoment is notwithinthedriver'scontrol.
Since Richardsholds that it is solelyto the recklessness that the desert
attributed is attached, weare'entitled totreat.. . as hedeserves'3 anyotherequally
recklessdriver, accidentornot.What'he deserves'is notstatedexplicitly, butitis
impliedfrom whatRichardssayshereandinrelatedcasesthathemeansittobe the
desertwe attribute tothedriverinvolvedin theaccident.
Now, I grantthatepistemically we are usuallyin a betterpositionto ascribe
recklessness wherethereis an accidentthanwherethedrivercontinues without
incident.ButRichardshasno righttoassumethatrecklessness itselfdeservesjust
whatis normally attributed to thedriverin theeventofan accident.For beingin
an epistemically betterpositionto judge character(or character as enactedin
behaviour) is nottobe in thebestattainable positionso to judgecharacter.
A recordof speedingtickets,forexample,is muchbetterevidencethanan
accident.However, Richardsgivesus noreasontobelievethatthedesertattributed
withtheactualaccident, evenifepistemically a 'clear'case,willbe thesameas what
wouldbe attributed incaseswhereweattribute recklessnessonepistemically better
grounds (suchas onthebasisofthedriving record).And,infact,thereisprimafacie
1 N. Richards,
'Luck andDesert',Mind,I986, pp. I98-209.
2
Ibid.,p. 200.
3 Ibid.,p. 202.
 E. Adler
248 Jonathan
evidenceagainstsuchan identity. Legally,emotionally, andsocially, theblamewe
attributetothereckless driverwhorunsoverthechildis farworsethanthatwhich
weattribute tothedriverwhodoesn'thavean accidentbutwhoserecordindicates
equal,ifnotgreater, recklessness.
Norarethedifferences between ourresponses toactualeventsandourresponses
toprobableeventswithrespecttodesertbrought intolinethrough considering the
incremental increases inblameofthelattertoreachtheformer. Richardsconsiders
theNazi,who,hadhegonetoArgentina ona businesstripin 1930, mighthaveled
anuneventful life.Again,ifweimaginetheNazi-in-Argentina andcomparehimto
therealNazi,Richardsjustassumesthatwecanandshouldmoveourjudgements
oftheformer to thedepthsofblameofthelatter.We aretoblametheformer for
hisauthoritarian personality to thedegreethatwe blametheactualNazi. This is
preposterous.
If personalityis as stableas Richardsimagines it,itis reasonable to believethat
through a wholelifeothercircumstances willarisein whichtheauthoritarian per-
sonalitywillenactreprehensible behaviour.However, as weactually attributedesert
totheNazi,itrestsmainly ona singularseriesofhorrible actions.It is hardevento
imagineothercircumstances in whichsomepersonality couldbe similarly instru-
mentalin bringing aboutsuchdevastating consequences and thesecircumstances
beinglikelyto occurforthatpersonality. Evenforrecklessdriving, a muchmore
ordinary and muchless consequential evil,it is actually(i.e., statistically)
quite
unlikely thatmanysuchreckless willactuallyrunovera child(orhavean
drivers
equallyconsequential accident).For similarreasons,it is doubtfulthatthesum
totalofsmallevilsas enactments ofa personalitywhose'desiretopleaseauthorities
[is] "extremely strong" '4 overa longer periodoftimewillyieldthesamedesertas
the brief,but striking, consequencesof the actualNazi's actions.Again,this
remainstrueformanyreckless truckdrivers.

II
I havepointedout thatRichardssmugglesin an assumption of correspondence
between desertas presentlyapportioned toepistemically
(restricted clearcases)and
desertas he understands Probableharmsare,ofcourse,
it,thathe failsto justify.
relevantto, but cannotbe completely determinative of,legaldesert(theactual
consequences matter).Similarly,probableharmsareunlikely toengageour'reactive
to anyextentlikethefullcontext
attitudes'5 ofactionin whichthoseattitudes are
typicallyformed.I shouldliketo briefly mentionhow one lineof respected, if
controversial,researchcastsseriousdoubton Richards'sproposalin so faras our
reactive
attitudes areconstitutiveofthedetermination ofdesert.
The socio-psychological framework ofwhatis calledattribution theory6 strongly
opposestraditional personalitytheory.The lattercentrally claimswhatRichards
assumes,thatwe can makegoodsenseofrelatively stabletraitsofpersonality as
4 Ibid.,p. 204.
5The phraseas used hereis fromP. F. Strawson's'Freedomand Resentment', in his
reprinted
Freedom andResentmentandOtherEssays,London,Methuen,1974.
on attribution
6 The literature theoryis voluminous. is tobe foundin H. H.
The classicexplication
theory
Kelley,'Attribution in D. Levin,ed.,NebraskaSymposium
in socialpsychology' onMotivation
ofNebraska,I967.
Vol.I5, University
 LucklessDesertis Different
Desert 249

explaininghumanbehaviourin different circumstances.The newertheoryargues,

to the contrary,that it is situations,much more than personality,that are
predictivelyvaluable.7 Cross-situationalconsistencyin behaviouris the exception,
not the rule.
Finally, the broader objective stance that would be required for desert on
Richards'sproposalwillprobablyhave thatflattening effectthatwe recognizeas at
least a naturaltendencyin the phrase'to understandis to excuse'.8
Considerthecentrality, on Richards'sproposal,ofcomparingwhatX (the Nazi,
forexample) did witheitherwhatX mighthave done in othercircumstances(for
example,if he went to Argentina)or what otherswould have done in X's actual
circumstances.Such comparisonsare ways of generatinga patternto place the
behaviourso as to yield a rationalexplanation.I suggestthatthe properlevel of
abstractionforsucha patternis one in whichwe can see howX would easilydo what
othersdid inthosedifferent circumstances(forexample,inArgentina)orconversely,
how othersin X's actual circumstancesmighteasilyhave done whatX did ifin X's
circumstances.It is at thatlevelofabstractionthatwe see thebehaviouras rational.
In attributiontheory,one of the crucial determinantsin the attributionof
responsibilityis 'consensus': whatotherswould do or have done,in similarcircum-
stances.Now thecriticalobservation,and prediction,is thatas morepersonswould
have behaved similarly,attributionsof responsibilityto an agent are diminished.
The explanationis roughlythat as consensus increases,thereis more reason to
apportioncausal efficacy to the featuresof the situationratherthanfeaturesof the
agent.We tendtowardexplainingthe behaviouras due to the circumstancesmore
thantheagent,and hence we, as a matterof fact,lessentheblame attributedto the
agent. Since, forany agent,highconsensusof individualbehaviourin othersitua-
tions(or otheragentsin thesame situation)is readilyfound,and since theseare the
comparisonsthatRichards'sproposalenjoins,the outcomewould be a generaland
unacceptablemitigationof our presentapportionmentof desert.9

DepartmentofPhilosophy JONATHAN E. ADLER

BrooklynCollege,C. U.N. Y.
Brooklyn,N. Y. II2IO
U.S.A.
7 See W. Mischel,PersonalityandAssessment,NewYork,Wiley,I968.
8
Although Strawson doesnotdrawthisinferenceand,infact,opposesitas a thesisaboutdesertitself,
itdoesplausiblyfollowas a tendencyfromhischaracterization
oftheobjective stance.See Strawson,op.
cit.n. 5.
9 Worthrecalling hereis HannahArendt'sresponseto Eichmann's'banality ofevil'defencein her
controversialEichmann injerusalem,Penguin,I964, p. 279:
Let us assume... thatis wasnothing
morethanmisfortune thatmadeyoua willing instrument
inthe
organizationof massmurder;therestillremainsthefactthatyouhavecarriedout,and therefore
activelysupported,a policyofmassmurder...