Epaminondas and Thebes

Author(s): G. L. Cawkwell
Source: The Classical Quarterly , Nov., 1972, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Nov., 1972), pp. 254-278
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES

EPAMINONDASi the soldier has been much admired. H

rank as masterpieces of the military art. Epaminondas him
them as his greatest achievements, to judge by his last w
Diodorus (15. 87). He had been carried from the batt
with a spear stuck in his chest. The doctors declared tha
removed he would die. After hearing that his own shield
Boeotians had won, he ordered that the spear be removed
said to him 'But you die without a son.' He answered 'I do
two daughters, my victory of Leuctra and my victory o
he died. Nor were his 'daughters' unadmired. By rem
future Philip II of Macedon was hostage at Thebes a
Epaminondas' pre-eminence and did not fail to learn,
show.2
Epaminondas the statesman has received less attenti
scribed beneath his statue at Thebess gave the Theba
achievements. 'By my counsels Sparta was shorn of
Messene at long last takes back her sons: by Theban a
been crowned, and all Hellas rules itself in freedom.'
at least disputable, the rest true enough, but what we ne
of those 'counsels'. This task is not made easy by our sou
is in large measure omitted. So a new discussion may not

Epaminondas by no means lacked admirers in antiqu

spiration of Timoleon, the liberator of Syracuse, as of Phi
of Sparta.4 Plutarch matched his life with that of Scipio
he was 'princeps, meo iudicio, Graeciae'.6 The emperor
memorial beside the ancient Boeotian one at the place wh
self composed the epigram inscribed on it.7 Nor was it o
admired. Timoleon's opportunity to emulate him cam
his death, but his views must have been formed in Corin
Epaminondas was passing and repassing into the Peloponn
contemporary who was deeply impressed was Ephorus
obituary notice, he declared that Epaminondas surpas
greatness of soul as well as in the intelligence and skill o
his great contemporaries but also the great Greeks of pr

I In addition to the general histories

Cloche, Thibes de ofBdotie, Namur 1952; M.
Fortina, Epaminonda,
Meyer and of Beloch, the following are the Torino 1958.
most important for the history2 of Cf. Epaminon-
A. Aymard, R.E.A. Ivi (I954), 15 if.
das: L. Pomtow, Das Leben des 3Epaminondas,
Paus. 9. I5. 6.
4 Plut. Tim.
sein Charakter und seine Politik, Berlin 36, Philop.
1870; E. 3.
s Cf. L. Peper, De
von Stern, Geschichte der spartanischen Plutarchi 'Epaminonda'
und
(Jena I912), I29
thebanischen Hegemonie vom Ki'nigsfrieden bisff.,
zur and K. Ziegler, R.E.
Schlacht bei Mantineia, Dorpat I884; H. xxi col. 896.
Swoboda, R.E. v (I905) col. 2674 f. s.v. 6 Tusc. I. 2. 4, and cf. De oratore 3. 34. 139.
Epameinondas; G. M. Bersanetti, 'Pelo- 7 Paus. 8. 11. 8.

pida', Athenaeum xxvii (I949), 43ff.; P.

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 255

Themistocles, Miltiades, Cimon, Myronides, and P

was moved tardily to tempered commendation.2
By contrast the evidence on which judgement of h
is lamentably slight. Ephorus must have been fairly
sumably did not neglect to treat of the internal h
epitome of Diodorus contains very little on the s
Epaminondas is lost and, although what is commonly
of it is to be found in Pausanias (9. 13. 15),3 much
lost and Pausanias is particularly brief on the last ye
of Pelopidas and the Life of Agesilaus help in so far as
brought him inextricably into contact with these
method is to avoid duplicating narrative and so these
for what we have lost in the Life of Epaminondas. F
one of the least brief and contains valuable mate
places reflections of the fourth-century tradition
indeed, since it is one of the notable things abou
the chances of literary survival have forced us so m
astoundingly deficient in information about Epamin
Epaminondas does not appear in the pages of Xenop

vasion of the Peloponnese, in 366, when his treat

Achaea contrasted favourably, in Xenophon's view, w
Thebes (Hell. 7. I. 41-3). After this, Xenophon doe
Epaminondas' part in the campaign of Mantinea a
to it (Hell. 7. 4. 40 and 5. I ff.). Even he was not equa
of the Theban commander in that campaign. But for
a formidable silence. Not only did he omit to name E
with his masterpiece, the campaign of Leuctra, but a
full account of the Peace Congress before Leuctra
famous scenes which set first Callistratus of Ath
conflict with Epaminondas.4 Perhaps Xenophon did n
tan defeat at Leuctra. He believed that the gods w
6. 4. 3, 8, 23). He accepted the Spartan version; Cl
(Hell. 6. 4. 13; cf. Isoc. Archid. 9). He may have felt n
But the Peace Congress was a different matter. X
hood present at the festival of the Gymnopaedia wh
Congress and during which the news of the battle of
His intimacy with Agesilaus could not have denie
infamy of Epaminondas, and even if Xenophon was n
after the battle, it is inconceivable that the alte
Epaminondas did not echo through the Peloponnes
Scillus. His silence must have been deliberate-a cha
In general, of course, Xenophon had no taste for re
ments. In the whole ofhis history, which covered the t
named only thirteen Thebans, seven of them in conne

Diod. 15. 88, in contrast with

3 Cf.Theopom-
L. Peper, op. cit. I6 ff.
pus, for whom Agesilaus was 4 5.the
I. greatest
man of the age (F.G.H. I 15 F
s 32 1, 6.
Hell. though
4. I6. Xenophon write
of the 390os and so perhapshad witnessed
without com- the scene; note p
parison with Epaminondas). dEE, which in Xenophon are sign
2 Hell. 7- 5. 8 f., I8 f.

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 256 G. L. CAWKWELL

Pelopidas received mention only in conn

with Artaxerxes in 367 (7. I. 33 f.). H
the Liberation, his triumph at Tegyra u
the successes of Epaminondas.I Gorgid
by Ephorus as one of the architects of
Some of these silences may be explained
interests. He called his work Hellenic
rate after 2. 3. Io, have been entitled
intention to talk, or in studied manner
plans or his diplomatic interventions
vision as indeed was the main preoccupa
viz. the recovery of Amphipolis and
intervention in Thessaly concerned h
allusion in a debate on strategy in Corin
his life, he preferred the Peloponnes
within the Peloponnese which he did
must have been deliberate. Above all,
by which 'holy Messene at long last tak
nondas within a single winter's campaig
into a local wrangler.3 There is nothi
to be a mere geographical expression
politans appeared, in a single mentio
(7- 5. 5). Of the foundation of the city
not remarkable that he withheld the name of the man who marched into
Laconia, so long inviolate.
Plainly Xenophon hated the Thebans. Unprovoked by Sparta, they had
broken up the pax Laconica (3. 5. 3). Corrupted by Persian gold, they had
ruined the new anabasis (3. 5. I, 5- 2- 35). Theban traffic with the barbarian
had in the 39os deprived Greece of the fruits of Spartan hegemony. In the
36os a new compact with Persia threatened the good life of the Peloponnese
itself. It was all right for Euthycles of Sparta to journey to the King, but when
Pelopidas was sent to counter his influence, it was a mark of Theban greed
and ambition (7. I. 33). 'Those who really cared for the Peloponnese' (7. 5. I),
'those whose counsels were in the best interests of the Peloponnese' (7. 4. 35)
could only revile the Thebes of Epaminondas. The bubble of Theban military
pride had to be pricked. There was no need to dwell on Tegyra, or analyse
success at Leuctra, let alone record petty, imagined triumphs in defence of
Boeotia.s The Thebans whose morale had see-sawed up and down on the
battlefield of Haliartus (3. 5. 21) and who became eager for battle at Nemea
when it was not their turn to face the Spartans and they could comfort them-
selves by disregarding what had been agreed about the depth of the line
(4. 2. 18 and 13), these Thebans were the fire-eaters who having preened
themselves on the defeat of Sparta could not withstand the onslaught of a
hundred men under Archidamus (7. 5. 12). Traitorous to Greece, contemptible
despite success, the Thebans would gain no celebrity from Xenophon's pen,

I Cf. Ephorus' summary of his career in3 7. I. 27 is the first mention of Messene,
Diod. 15. 8I. in connection with the mission of Philiscus.
2 Diod. I5. 39. 2, 50. 6; Plut. Pel. I8. The 4 6. 5.6 alludes to the movement to found
Hellenica alludes to the Sacred Band once the Arcadian Federation.

only (7. I. 19). s Cf. Diod. 15. 34. 2*

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 257

and the man who led them into the Peloponnese

as possible, unnamed. All of which tells us a great
very little about Epaminondas. Hence Epaminondas
trious of the Greeks, and one of the most obscure.

To the best of our knowledge Epaminondas did not

until 371. There is no good reason to deny that he h
contingent with the Spartan army that attacked
doubt despite the lack of evidence he also served w
the defence of Boeotia in the 370s: he had taken an a
on the Cadmeia at the Liberation and there was no r
been exempt from regular service;2 indeed his milit
suggests such earlier experience. But if he had playe
state before 371, it seems likely that some echo wou
9. 13 who passes directly from the campaign of M
leadingly described as the Peace of Antalcidas but is p
The only evidence of earlier activity is the accou
the clash of Epaminondas and Callistratus at the Peac
universally agreed that Diodorus' account of tha
Ephorus' account of the peace of 372/1.4
Epaminondas came to the Boeotarchy at a moment
There was a double menace. To the north, in Phoc
two-thirds of the Spartan army and proportionat
allies.s We do not know when he had returned to
he had been recalled at the peace of 375,6 but it is a
that he had done so at no great interval after the re
at some time in the course of 372. The Theban sei
vention in Thespiae must have made the Phocians
since it would seem that Sparta made no other m
against Thebes in 372, it is wholly credible that the
in Phocis in summer 371 had gone out in 372.7 Th

Paus. 9. 13. I, Plut. Pel. PEpos,

4. Cf. Swoboda
cf. 4. 6. 3). The four divisions would
R.E. v col. 2678, for evidencehave of produced a Lacedaemonian con-
Epaminon-
das before 371. tingent of perhaps 2,ooo, and Cleombrotus'
2 Nepos, Epam. Io. 3. Other armydetails of this
outnumbered the Theban array of
period are more questionable about (Swoboda, op.
6,ooo (Diod. 15- 52. 2, 53. 2 ; Plut. Pel.
cit., col. 2679). Athen. 602A,20o);
in attributing
so presumably 'the todue proportion of
Epaminondas the formation ofwere
the allies' the Sacred
there.
Band, which was certainly the confusion
6 Much work of has been caused by
Gorgidas (see p. 256 n. 2), Xenophon's
is typical. remarkable brevity on the
3 The likely explanationPeaceof of Pausanias'
375 at 6. 2. I. Cf. Accame, La lega,
phrase in 9. 13. 2 is that the
91 ff.peace of16
Plut. Pel. 372/I
shows that there was a
was in large measure similarSpartan
to that armyof in Orchomenus
387/6 and Phocis in
(cf. Didymus ad Dem. 0o. 34, 375, and 7
col. indeed
11. implies
62 ff. that it was four
on the peace of 375). divisions strong. So Xenophon's account at
4 Cf. S. Lauffer, 'Die Diodordublette xv.
6. i. I is wholly acceptable. Isocrates 15. I 10
shows that zu
38 = 50o iber die FriedensschlifiBe theySparta',
were withdrawn.
Historia viii (1959), 315 ff. 7(from much
Phocis was menacedof
in 375 (Xen. Hell.
which, however, I must dissent).
6. I. I) but not dealt with until after
s Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 2; 17 (for Leuctra the four
(Diod. 15. 57. i) and this also
divisions). Cleombrotus' army must
suggests that have
the Spartans were there in 372.
been much the same as that recalled at the Cf. Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 2.
Peace of 375 (6. I. i; for -Twv av1.daXwV To

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 258 G. L. CAWKWELL

was diplomatic-a new appeal to Pers

hegemony in Greece.
The question of whether the Great K
372/1 has been much discussed.' Some
full that it is inconceivable that Persia
ment which should also lead them, on
the central part played by Epaminond
Xenophon's silence; but no argument
anything. Somes would infer from a re
of Callistratus (6. 3. 12) that Antalcid
financial aid and that no rescript had
remark is rightly taken in a literal sen
cidas remaining at Susa until it was kno
to a rescript or not. The strong argume
in the peace of 372/I is that Dionysiu
appears to derive from Philochoruss ass
in support that those who are convinced
in so full an account to notice a Persian
to one phrase in his narrative. Havin
Xenophon went on: S3o~Vi-wv E '-o'-tiV
AaKEat[od'LOL Eo GaL 7?'v Epl'V77V.
use of the hegemonic power in a peac
view of a peace which the Spartans as
from Persia. All in all, the case for Per
and the present article proceeds on tha
Negotiations with Persia took time, an
effect with the King and resulted in a
Persia in the course of 372. So when
turn of the Theban civil year, in mid w
either see Thebes tamely submit to S
Peace just as she had submitted in 3
Boeotia accepted and the way open to a
and if Thebes had to return to the cond
only would Plataea be re-established as
surprised again, and Thespiae and Tanag
and cit.
SCf. S. Lauffer, art. Diod. 15.322
46. 6 (under
ff.374/3) records an
2 e.g. T. T. B. Ryder,
assaultKoine
on the city Eirene (1965),
(... 0o p4v O11flaroC 7Ta
127. MHa-ratds Ka-raUKacufaVTE9 Ka IEUorLas gaAAo-
ploS 7rpos
3 For survey ofvariant aVrO9s 3LaKEL/Lbas
views see S. E'ErodpO7)eav).
Lauffer,
art. cit. Isocrates however in the Plataicus ? 9 (the
4 Lys. I2 (IE7aT yap AAKWaOE'ivv a'pXovra,dramatic date of which is shortly after
E4 0o 'v ELp7j'v7Y A0rvatolt E KaL AaKE-the seizure of Plataea in 373) speaks of the
Thespians and Tanagrans as being treated
3aLpLdvoLO Kal flaaoAE's ctpoaav, dcroSobs Ta
less severely than the Plataeans, and merely
OrparTE /Gaa "I9aKp drt 1L rO S ywlEraV).
s See Jacoby's Commentary on Philochorusforced into syntely with Thebes, and Paus. 9.
FI52 and FI5I (p. 522 11. I4. ff. and cf. p. 23913. 8 and I4. 2, 4 shows that the city still
11. 37 ff.). Philochorus appears to have beenexisted after Leuctra. Cf. Fortina, op. cit.
Dionysius' sole source for these annalistic
23 n. 33- Perhaps the true position was that
notices. Diodorus' Eero'dpOCqav did not fairly reflect
6 For the surprise of Plataea, Paus. 9. Ephorus'
I. account of an attack on the city
5 f. The condition of Thespiae in 372/I which
is ended in the Thespians agreeing
uncertain. Xenophon Hell. 6. 3. I, 5 treats avvrEAEv
it E lS 03flas, thus making them in
as having suffered the same fate as Plataea,Xenophon's phrase (6. 3. i) ddrt6tas, and

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 259

but also in all likelihood Theban nerve would

Corinthian War in the most daring manner. S
fident that Thrasybulus would persuade Athen
Sparta; Lysander was in a position to bring aga
Sparta's allies in Central Greece, and if the plan
had not miscarried, 395 might have seen Thebe
had willed for Athens in 404 and which Lysander
of Thebes, had prevented.' Since attaining that pe
had shown some infirmity of purpose. In the a
392/I she had been willing to come to terms w
suppliant for peace until 390, hard pressed by the
of the Spartan army based on, and supported
Orchomenus.2 So much for the confident moo
formance since the King's Peace been very satisfa
of the Boeotian nationalists. Despite the bold defi
of Ismenias and Androclidas had not only begu
Olynthus but also, in defiance of Sparta's decisi
in breach of the King's Peace, persisted to the po
to join the Spartan expedition,s succeeding yea
Promptly after the Liberation Thebes had pruden
that she had no wish to disrupt the King's Peace,4
dence which gave rise to the suspicion that Theba
to raid the Piraeus.s The purpose of that raid was,
to nip in the bud the newly formed Second Athe
a serious challenge to Spartan domination and t
by Thebans who wished to see an end to the lim
influence under the King's Peace. There must
complacent Thebans to excite such suspicion. T
prevailed. At the end of winter 378/7 Thebes
step towards the reunification of Boeotia unde
5. 4. 42-6). The Spartan harmost in Thespiae,
into Theban territory provoked a counter-attack
course of which Phoebidas was killed and the T
their walls. 'As a result the Theban business w
they campaigned against Thespiae and the other s
the people from them withdrew to Thebes...' (
(r a -v Of3alwYov) was, we may guess, the reunif
concerning this that the embassy to Thebes order
in March 377 was to go and 'persuade the Thebans
that Callias exaggeratedattack
(6. 3.on Thespiae
5) with perhaps
r7iin the late
autumn of 378 (Xen. Hell. 5. 4- 42 Kap7rOv).
HIAatcaLv Kal OEaorLmo davaLplaeU.
x Xen. Hell. 3. 5. 7-25. The movement of the Boeotian 877/os to
2 Andoc. 3. 24 f., 28 andThebes
Xen. wasHell.
before 4.
spring
5. 377
6, (Xen. Hell.
9 for Boeotian attempts5-to come
4- 47), and so to
mustterms
have occurred not
between 392 and 390. Xen. Hell.
long before the 4. 3.of15,
Decree Aristotle. So if the
5. I. 29 for the Spartan division
Boeotarchy wasin Orcho-
re-established in early 377,
menus.
it is understandable that Athens might pro-
3 Xen. Hell. 5. 2. 15, 27. test. Her alliance was with Thebes (11. 24
4 Isoc. 14. 29. and 79 of the Decree), not Boeotia; the
s Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 20. name was important.-For the date of the
6 Tod, G.H.L 123 11. 74, restoration
75. This of decree
the Boeotarchy, see Appen-
was in the seventh prytany dix I. of 378/7, the

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 260 G. L. CAWKWELL

With a large number of Boeot

ment of Boeotarchs was a natur
Boeotia and then the attack on
bent on following.' In early 375
against two divisions of the Sp
must have been riding high. Th
anti-climax that could not be
unified Boeotia. If, after the ag
again in 371, it could hardly be
by her demands and face the co
Epaminondas knew his country
see, going to have to overcome w
Peace Congress in Sparta the Th
and only tardily made their sta
twenty days laters no fewer than
Thebes and suffering siege by
Epaminondas had every reason
to Thebes that 375 would not

It is necessary briefly to digres

fought twenty days after the
Theban army must have been tr
There were four features of th
First, the concentration of forc
centration of force was not new
deep at Delium in 424 (Thuc.
with the depth agreed on in t
KXen. Hell. 6. I. I. probably similar to the peace of 372/I
2 Plut. Pel. i6, Diod. 15. 37- which was likewise sworn (Xen. Hell. 6. 3.
3 If we exempt the notice of Diodorus1815. f.). The troubles over Oropus must relate
38, there is no evidence that Thebes did not to the internal affairs of the Athenian
purely
readily submit to the Peace of 375 (cf. Confederacy, and not necessarily after the
Lauffer, art. cit. 318f.). B. R. I. Sealey, Peace of 375. Nor is the phrase Ka7rOdvsov5
Historia v (1956), 19o ff. sought to interpret Tro~Saat appropriate only to the moment
Isoc. 14- 37, which speaks of an Athenian when a peace is being made, although it is
decree to make the Thebans ,Ka7rnvSovs often so used. Cf. Dem. 23. 91, 17. 16.
for their conduct over Oropus, as support 4 Xen. Hell. 6. 3. 19.
for Diodorus' account. He postulated that
s H. Beister, Untersuchungen zu der Zeit der
when the Peace of 375 was 'presented to
thebanischen Hegemonie, Munich 1970, 13 ff.,
carefully
the Synedrion of the Athenian League, the calculated that Plutarch's interval
Thebans claimed to swear on behalf of the of twenty days between the peace of 372/I and
whole Boeotian League; thereby they the battle of Leuctra (Ages. 28. 5, Camillus
claimed to control Oropus, which the 19. 2) is ample for the sequence of events.
Athenians had recently won. So the Thebans 6 Paus. 9. 13. 6 f.
were declared iKaTrov3OL.' Thus Sealey 7 For Leuctra, cf. J. Wolter in Antike
argues similarly to W. Judeich, Rh. Mus.Schlachtfelder iv (Berlin 1926), 290-316, and
lxxvi (1927), 182. But Diodorus is plainlyJ. K. Anderson, Military Theory and Practice
not referring to the Athenian synedrion in the Age of Xenophon, ch. x. For the topo-
(Lauffer, art cit. 320), and there is no graphy, cf. W. K. Pritchett, Studies in Greek
reason to think that the Peace of 375 was Topography Part I (University of California
'presented to the Synedrion of the Athenian 1965), ch. iii, A. R. Burn, 'Helicon in
League'; it was similar to the Peace of History', B.S.A. xliv (i949), 313 ff., and H.
Antalcidas (Philochorus FI5i), which was Beister, op. cit. I3-59.
sworn in Sparta (Xen. Hell. 5. I. 32 f.), and 8 Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 12, Plut. Pel. 23. I.

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 261

battle, the Thebans had made their line 'real

Seeing that the agreed depth had been sixtee
depth of the Spartan army in the fifth century
long before Leuctra to the concentration of fo
was that the concentration was on the left flan
Greek hoplite to edge to the right in the adv
obvious prudence in posting the strongest an
right to check this drift to the right as much a
where they would be most likely to suffer the
the line. Epaminondas' reversal at Leuctra is
change in the conception of warfare. In previo
forces on each side had frequently not come in
whole line engaged at the same moment and on
did the troops on the right of each line forma
partly why Xenophon saw the battle of Corone
own lifetime (Hell. 4. 3. 16): after the Sparta
the Thebans the Orchomenians, Agesilaus de
neither need in doing so nor advantage, to
the whole a sort of knock-out contest for the
the conflict was centred on, and indeed confin
The second innovation closely served the same
to us a Greek general in a hoplite battle kept fo
battle had been joined, there was nothing m
in 371 Epaminondas drew up part of his fo
(Hell. 6. 4. 12), 'no less than fifty deep'. This ca
committing all his forces at the start of the b
of Pelopidas and the Sacred Band in the bat
23. 2). Pelopidas was able to prevent the Sparta
flank. Epaminondas must have been able to use
His work as general did not end when battle be
Thirdly, both Diodorus (I5. 55. 2) and Plut
'oblique formation', though they do not seem
of what this meant.3 Plutarch takes it to m
might be described as a leftward diagonal marc
oblique phalanx was the means whereby onl
contact with the enemy, while the right flank
to avoid engaging in the battle. Whatever tr
account, it is evident that the Diodoran picture
from parallel as they moved into contact is cor

I Cf. Thuc. 5. 68. 3. the left as it advanced, the sort of march

suddenly
2 There had been minor required of
instances the Ten to
prior Thousand by
this, but not in major encounters. Cf. Cyrus at Cunaxa. But Plutarch's words
Anderson, op. cit. 179 f., citing Thuc. 5. 9.
8, 6. 67. I, and Xen. Anab. 6. 5- 9-11. (,to0 'E7TaituvivSov vr4v OdbAayya Aoe)v d7T r
E,OvvUlov ,EAKovTOS) suggest that the move to
3 Cf. Anderson, op. cit. 324 n. 60o. Ander- the left was in addition to having the kdAaye
son imagines a conflict between Plutarch o~j. So Plutarch may well be using the
and Diodorus, the latter meaning that the term no differently from Diodorus (here at
left wing was thrust forward and so engaged 15. 55. 2 and at 17. 57. 6 of Gaugamela) and
the Spartan right before the Theban right the later military writers. Diodorus' use here
could possibly engage, the former meaning may well reproduce Ephorus.
that the whole line did an oblique march to

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 262 G. L. CAWKWELL

engage with the Peloponnesi

Macedonian army at Chaerone
Fourthly, there was the unusu
of the past, cavalry had operat
mished before the battle.2 But
began while the cavalry were st
the Spartans made their phala
before or after in Spartan hist
Xenophon's account (Hell. 6. 4
point of view, there is no hint
by Cleombrotus, although, if
the Spartan defeat, he might
say is most suggestive. He says
army perceived that he was do
foul of the hoplite array while
admirable training of the Spart
only suppose that Cleombrotus
and that before the cavalry e
advance with the left flank th
tected by the confusion caused
line bent moon-shaped round t
right, the battle displayed fo
co-ordination of arms which w
Alexander. Epaminondas timed
free to engage and were forc
force with enough in reserve t
Such a revolution in the art of
between the exclusion of Thebe
Theban army be trained to it
perience of foot-drill in an arm
parade will realize that without
and without lines and flags to
a hoplite army must have req
tionary and much more exactin
must have been carried out. Ind
army that Xenophon especiall

I Cf. N. G. L. Hammond, Klio

necessary, although in the case of Athensxxxi
the
201 ff. evidence is not very satisfactory. Pericles in
2 Cf. Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen und the Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2. 39) contrasts
Kriegfiihrung (1928), 92. Xen. Hell. 3. 2. 16 the d41rT1ovos aUK77Lt of the Spartans with the
is typical. relaxed life of the Athenians; but the
3 It may be remarked that Xenophon Spartans were constantly training for war,
appears quite unaware of the plan of battle and Pericles' words do not exclude some sort
which Anderson (p. 216) accepts. of drill at Athens. Evidently individuals
4 Hell. 7. 5. 19, 6. 5. 23. Cf. Plut. Mor. chose to keep themselves in training with
I93E. That hoplite armies generally had arms drill (cf. Plato, Laches I78A, I8IE), and
some sort of training in drill is likely indeed in Xen. Mem. 3. 12. 5 Socrates says
rather than certain. Given the difficulties of that ovK LUaKEL 3~7LOcaI 27 ' wdTA rtl 7TpdS TV
advancing over ground broken up by trees, TOdAE(Lov, but that was in a discussion of
huts, and ditches, and also the infrequencyphysical
of fitness, a different matter from
experience of full-scale battle, one might orderly manceuvring. There were regular
presume that occasional 'parades' would reviews
be at Athens (cf. Isoc. 7. 82 E~'ETraELS,

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 263

Epaminondas must therefore have begun to p

that would crown or debase his country as soo
decision to fight was no hastily conceived plan
reverse. He knew when he entered office that a new Common Peace was
likely; that Thebes would in all likelihood have to stand, as she had near
stood in 375, alone; that a large Spartan force would be strategically wel
placed to exploit her isolation. He resolved from the start to fight.
Before passing from the battle of Leuctra, one may note that the Spartan
view that Cleombrotus was to blame was wildly wrong. Conventional, con
servative Spartan warfare, nonplussed in 425 by the novel terrain of Spha
teria, was nonplussed in 371 by the novel methods of genius. It was no
Cleombrotus that failed at Leuctra, but Spartanism. Cleombrotus in fac
did well to get to Leuctra at all. Epaminondas had stationed a force unde
Chaereas' to prevent him leaving Phocis by other than the main highroa
south into Boeotia between the Copaic Lake and the mountains west of
Haliartus and Coronea, and Epaminondas was in position to fight his gre
battle where Peloponnesian superiority of numbers would be of less effec
Cleombrotus refused this course, and by appearing in the plain of Leuct
seven miles from Thebes struck terror into some Theban hearts. He had done
well enough for a Spartan. It was his misfortune to confront a military genius.

Was it Thebes' good fortune that Epaminondas was in office in 371 ? The
evidence about his age is of little value.2 He certainly was of military age by
3853 and so must have been thirty-two at least by late 372. But it is not
clear whether his assumption of the Boeotarchy4 was the natural first step of a
rising Theban, suo anno as it were, or the deliberate descent into the cave by
a remote and mature sage. In the latter case his acts of 371 would be the more
deliberate, but even in the former case there is something to be said for sup-
posing that he entered office clearly aware of what the year would bring.
There is one oddity about 371. After the re-creation of the Boeotarchy in
March 377 it was the only year when Pelopidas was not Boeotarch.s He died
in the course of his thirteenth Boeotarchy in 364, and was never unseated by
IG. II2 500 1. 12, Ar. Ath. Pol. 31. 2, and cf.I Paus. 9. 13. 3. For discussions of where
S.E.G. 14. 64), and it seems likely enough exactly Chaereas was stationed, see Beister,
that they involved drill (cf. Hell. Oxy. 15.op.
I, cit. 39-
where Conon held daily reviews in Rhodes 2 Cf. Swoboda, art. cit., col. 2675-
to keep the troops from idleness, presumably3 Paus. 9. 13. I.
more than merely presenting arms, and Xen.4 It cannot be proved that Epaminondas
Anab. I. 2. 14 f. where '"&racaE involvedwasa not Boeotarch before 371. Plut. Mor.
battle-charge). Athens with her reliance IIg29
on is of little value and Ages. 27 refers
sea-power was probably not typical; otherperhaps only to experience in battle, but
states may have been more assiduous. The the epitome of the Plutarchian life in Pau-
cwAoCjaXoE of Greece, who regarded Spartan sanias (9. 13) passes directly to 371 and, if we
drills as very complicated (Xen. Lac. Pol. exempt
I1. the notice of Diod. 15. 38, there is no
8), must have had parades at which to other evidence concerning Epaminondas
exercise their art. Men like Phalinus, who between the Liberation and the year of
Leuctra. He may have been in office in 372,
claimed to be w-7Trj-rvv . .. rcv a/tb a quiet enough year, but 373 is unlikely, for
'rdeTE TE Kat d~TAotzaXlav, had hardly mastered
their knowledge in a merely theoretical he has no part in the evidence about the
fashion. Anderson, op. cit., ch. vi usefully destruction of Plataea, to which he might
discusses tactical training, but it would be well have been opposed (cf. Plut. Comp. Pel.
helpful to have a full account of the practice et Marc. I).
of Greek states in time of peace. s Cf. Appendix I.
T

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264 G. L. CAWKWELL

the opponents of Epaminondas even

with whom Pelopidas was to the best of
Why was the man whom many Theb
real hero of Thebes restored, the victor
the only time in his career? He was not
year. As commander of the Sacred B
play in Epaminondas' great battle.
Perhaps it will not strain credulity to
Boeotarch in 371 because the man w
master in war wanted no one less than t
Band and lead it in the coming stru
proved faint-hearted. Epaminondas p
depend so much on such men.

There was more to 371, however, t

There was diplomacy too, and the yea
greatest general of the age showed the
no mean stature.

The Peace Congress of 37I must have been, for Greeks, a glitterin
The greatest of the Spartans, indeed for Theopompus the greatest m
age,' King Agesilaus, presided. Delegations from all over the Greek
there and heard the leading Athenian orator of his time, Callistratu
for concord between the leading land and naval powers of Gree
to which Xenophon was happy to accord space (Hell. 6. 3. 10-17).
impressive for his eloquence was the man of whose presence Xe
not breathe a word. Indeed the Congress was little short of a perso
for Epaminondas.
Nepos (Epam. 6. 4) concluded a discussion of Epaminondas as o
these words. 'Yet the greatest display of his eloquence was when
Sparta as ambassador before the battle of Leuctra. When the am
of the whole alliance had met there, in the hearing of a most crowde
of the embassies he exposed and denounced the Spartans' despot
such a manner that he severely shook their position by that sp
than by the battle of Leuctra. For he then brought it about, as was
apparent, that the Spartans were bereft of the support of their
was no exaggeration. He spoke, according to Plutarch (Ages. 27.
merely for Thebes but for all Greece in common', and there follow
famous altercation with Agesilaus. When Agesilaus asked him w
ideas of justice and equality included independence from Theb
cities of Boeotia, Epaminondas riposted3 with a demand for the ind
of the perioecic peoples of Laconia, a doubly remarkable reply. Not
Epaminondas asserting that Thebes had no less right to control Boe
Sparta to control Laconia, but also by choosing to speak about th
peoples rather than the helots of Messenia he was by implication p
that Thebes would seek the refoundation and independence of
Others had protested about Spartan power over other states. Ep
words portended the dissolution of the Spartan state itself. The ho
oppressed now turned to Thebes. It was no surprise that the fi
force to invade the Peloponnese contained peoples who had but late
1 F321. 2 Cf. Nepos, Epam. 6. 3
I. Cf. Paus. 9. 13. 2.

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 265

to Athens as the liberator (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 23), and

mouth of Callistratus was defending itself for sav
by Thebes,' Thebes was being widely regarded a
of the liberty of the once-oppressed peoples o
Epaminondas told all Greece at the Peace Congre
There is however one aspect of this Congress
Epaminondas' speech presumably belongs, just a
Xenophon belong, to the discussion prior to the oa
by Plutarch's account (Ages. 28. I) the altercatio
directly on the speech.2 The burden of it all was p
before the assembled Greeks that she was hege
would be in future Boeotians so called, a single
Greece, and no longer Thebans or Thespians. Y
(Hell. 6. 3. 19), the Thebans were at first listed as
and the name was erased when on the followin
registered as 'Boeotians'. How did this happen ? Of
ordered 'Thebans' to be inscribed contrary to th
embassy who, when they found out, demanded
gives no hint of this and the impression one gets f
straightforward passage3 is that the Thebans chan
Epaminondas change his mind ? He had proclaimed
Greece. Did his nerve fail, for the space of a day?
may be pardoned for believing that the faint-hear
not his least service to the cause of Boeotian natio
to wit his persuasion of his own fellow ambass
days later at Leuctra, he had Theban opposition to
succeed.

The campaigning season after Leuctra was occupied with the consolidation
of Boeotia.4 Thespiae had to be dealt with and Orchomenus subjected. After
that, Phocis, so long a stronghold of Spartan power, had to be secured. There
was in any case another reason for the Thebans not to follow up their victory.
Jason of Pherae with grandiose words and grandiose planss threatened to
dominate central Greece,6 and, until he had been killed, it was not safe to
leave Boeotia unattended. When in winter 370/69 the Arcadians appealed
unsuccessfully to Athens for protection against Sparta and turned to Thebes,7
a new period opened.
When Athens rejected the Arcadians, the debate must have been nicely
poised. Military and political experience must have advised caution: to be
involved in the web of Peloponnesian politics might finally contribute little
I G.H.L. I3 (decree of 369/8). the Thebans were listed as members of the
2 Paus. 9. 13. 2 suggests that the alter- Second Athenian Confederacy fail. They
cation was before the oath-swearing. (Note swore city by city according to Xenophon
the future idaovaUv.) (Hell. 6. 3. 19). Why did the Thebans swear ?
3 One would never guess from XenophonFor earlier discussions cf. von Stern, op. cit.
that Epaminondas and his fellow ambassa-125 ff., and Swoboda, op. cit., col. 2681.
dors are likely to have been in Sparta not as
the Theban delegation but as the delegation 4 s Diod. 15- 57.
Xen. Hell. 6. I,4.Paus. 9. and
29 ff. 14- 4.
6. 1. Io f.;
representing the Boeotian 8- os. So how Isoc. 5. I 19
they came to be listed as 'Thebans' is ob- 6 Diod. 15. 57. 2, 60o. I ff.
scure. Attempts to gloss over the difficulty 7 Diod. I5. 62. 3; Dem. I6. 12.
(e.g. Fortina, op. cit. 25) by supposing that

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 266 G. L. CAWKWELL

to stability and militarily pro

maimed, to attacks which Athe
hand, if Athens, hegemon of th
after Leuctra (Xen. Hell. 6. 5. I),
Peloponnese, they would turn t
had appealed to Athens to join
(Xen. Hell. 6. 4. 19). Demosthe
the Arcadians to be a major e
37o0/69 the right course was les
The debate at Thebes was diff
opportunity to others if Theb
whether she should actively int
the defensive, or leave the Pe
Leuctra for themselves. To u
seriously entertain the latter al
Spartiates and a loss of prest
her as hegemon of the peace.'
nationalism was at long last unf
remained-the mastery of Me
best men' of the Peloponnese t
had influence in Tegea,4 or a Eu
Sparta,s the damage of Leuctr
reckoned with. Agesilaus was at
Thebes had to intervene. Not u
been broken by depriving her
Megalopolis been established
aristocratic 'autonomy' had pr
fence of her Laconian lair. Even
alliances would be necessary. Th
clearly (Paus. 9. 14- 4).
Nonetheless there was divisio
come the opposition of Menec
I It has been much discussed whether in 371/70 for they were certainly in incdreSg
7IltEls. (lcvrEs 7q'pECS cannot mean 'all the
Sparta was represented in the Peace Congress
at Athens after Leuctra. Cf. M. Sordi, Riv.
Corinthians', for only the magistrates had
Fil. N.s. xxix (i951), 34-64, and Ryder, sworn
op. in 371/7o-Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 3.)
cit. I31 f. The arguments are of varying 2 The disturbances of Diod. 15. 40
worth, but the one drawn from the remarks probably go with chapters 38 and 39, and
of Cleiteles of Corinth in winter 370/69 belong to 371.
(Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 37) seems to show that3 Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 6 (of 370).
Sparta was included in 37/70o. When Clei- 4 Ibid. 6. 5. 7, 6. 4- x8.
s Euphron was ready enough, when the
teles spoke in 369, he spoke in support of the
Spartans, and said that if Athens did not time came, to change his loyalties (Xen.
Hell. 7. 3. 2). But in 371/70 the attempt at
help Corinth, she would be acting rrapa TobV
OpKovs, and it was the oaths of the peacerevolution
of in Sicyon failed (Diod. 15. 40. 4)
371/70, not those of 372/I, which obligedand Euphron and his ilk were still loyal to
participants to act against transgressors Sparta (Xen. Hell. 7. I. 44).
(Xen. Hell. 6. 5. 2 compared with 6. 3. I8). 6 Plut. Pel. 25 shows that it was Mene-
Cleiteles then went on to make it clear that clidas who attacked Epaminondas after his
he meant the oaths of 37I/7O-Ka- a rao'3a dtvvictorious first Peloponnesian campaign.
avro& Eorre EtzeA707c pKiov--and added Nepos, Epam. 5 is the only other evidence for
him.
orTWw 7rtaLv VcLv 7TaVrE~ 7 LEg deOLdaLLgp, v, which
makes clear that the Spartans were included

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 267

him on the policy of intervening in the Peloponn

attested, but it may be deduced from Nepos' brief r
he (Meneclidas) saw that Epaminondas was at his best
he was accustomed to urge the Thebans to prefer
services of Epaminondas as commander should no
and Nepos makes Epaminondas suitably reply '. .. if
power of Greece, you must take to the camp, not
(ibid. 5- 4). A plea for peace at all costs was unlikely
victors of Leuctra, and it is notable that neither in
nor in Nepos' is there any trace of Meneclidas' at
interventions in Thessaly which certainly and inevit
war. The alleged demand for peace must have bee
keep out of the Peloponnese. That is why Meneclidas
twice in 369.' His first prosecution on a constitution
price of refounding Messene and of invading Laco
a breach of the law, so much the worse for the
not the slightest difficulty in justifying himself.2
more point. The invasion of summer 369' achieve
Hell. 7. I. 18 f.). A few mercenaries from Diony
comfit the Theban force (ibid. 7. I. 20 f.), and resen
perhaps already plainly astir (ibid. 7. I. 23 f.). T
Meneclidas must have seemed to be coming true;
in the endless skirmishing of petty Peloponnesian
clidas had a more satisfactory pretext. Epaminon
as lukewarm in his determination to damage Sp
able to keep him out of the Boeotarchy for 368 (Dio
there was no intervention in the Peloponnese. It is p
of Meneclidas tried to prevent the first expediti
There is a curious and tell-tale remark in Xenoph
culties Epaminondas had to overcome. The Elean
Mantineans and facing Agesilaus in Arcadia di
Thebans appear; and they said that they well knew
for they had actually borrowed ten talents from
expedition' (Hell. 6. 5. I9). This is indeed curious.
help the Peloponnesians, but the Mantineans needed
Thebans would be honouring their undertaking, and
Thebans to seize the opportunity presented to them t
had to be scraped up to enable the expedition to
with this niggardliness that Epaminondas is repr
I93B, c) as having to borrow fifty drachmas for
Unable to kill the expedition outright, his oppo
starve it, and, though the details are unclear, t
replace Epaminondas and Pelopidas in their command
advocates of intervention, their opponents hoped to
Peloponnese.
The real problem for Thebes was not whether she should intervene in the
Peloponnese, but by what means she should exercise her influence there.
Like Sparta, she would rely principally on military power but, unlike Sparta,

See Appendix II. 2 Paus. 9. 14, 7, etc.

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268 G. L. CAWKWELL

she had no ready means of main

ponnesian states. Sparta had r
oligarchy. By supporting the
against the social changes which
populations behind impregna
support in return but also co
her own purposes. Further, the
to Sparta as the nearest approac
good life. In this way her powe
to disrupt. The position of Theb
Inevitably there would have t
Spartan power, but there was n
desired. No one admired Thebe
as a spiritual home. If the Pel
Thebes as well as Sparta. Inde
a portent. If under the shadow
what would happen when that
As far as we can discern it, E
control was well suited to the
inverse of the Spartan system b
Theban wing to become a democ
democracy was uncongenial. He
and the recognition by Pelopo
allowed again to become a gre
the Theban alliance, he respond
that the most influential citizen
(Xen. Hell. 7. I. 41 f.). This is
concerning the Peloponnese, b
policy is suggested by what w
in the year after Leuctra set abo
prevented the 'enslavement' of
the richest citizens of Orchom
to replace the Boeotian democra
to the federal oligarchies of t
menians were sold into slavery
Epaminondas and his consort i
at the vital moment.2 A similar
the year in which Epaminond
Thebes had to secure the 'frie
Phocis in particular, and proc
on which she did so are nota
alliance, and, when Epaminonda
37o/69, the Phocians went with

Cf. Thuc. 5. Epaminondas

29. and
I and 8I. I. Pe
2 Diod. I, 15.
cit. under 57.
and 364/3. Plut. Comp Pausa
destruction
9. 15. 3 dates the is rightly dated to 364/3
destruction of th
when Epaminondas Pelopidas mustwas have been
ceded
absent on his comm
the time of Pelopidas' arrest
final (and fatal) expedition to Thessaly, (Diod.
and
Epaminondas presumably
but Isoc. 6. 27 shows thaton probably
his Aegean i
not happened by 366.
diplomacy For the abse
(see below).

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 269

in fact freely (Hell. 7. 5. 4, 6. 5. 23). Epaminondas, it w

tage in underplaying Thebes' power.
In this he was opposed, to judge by the case of th
7. 1. 43). He was attacked on that occasion by both
political rivals for his settlement, which was shortl
were set up, and 'the best men' exiled. The sequel p
sense of Epaminondas. When these exiles recovered the
took a middle course'.' Epaminondas had perceived that
numbers of men like Euphron of Sicyon2 who would re
when Sparta lost her power to support them, and that
involve greater trouble than advantage for Thebes. Th
Peloponnese was that Peloponnesians should forget the

The peace of 366/5 set the seal on Epaminondas'

Under it the remaining members of the Peloponnes
doned Sparta, and recognized the independence of Mes
the unification of Boeotia.3 But if it is correct that th
Peace which included Athens,4 the gains were not a

Athens' ally, was a major obstacle to peace.

I O&KE T ELGUEVOV, dAA 'rpoOuj.L aUVVE-
Pasimelus, the celebrated Laconophile of
dXovv
2 Xen.-ro s AaicEaagovnot.
Hell. 7. I. 44. . ..Corinthian War (Xen. Hell. 4. 4. 4, 7)
the
3 Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 6-1I and Isocrates'
was still in power (ibid. 7. 3. 2), and the city,
headquarters
Archidamus. That the participants of the war
assented to against Thebes
(Xen. Hell. 7. for
the Theban demand, so long pressed, I. 28 for
thethe meeting of allies
recognition of the Boeotian state
there, is a pre-
as reptLE'TAEvav suggests), was a con-
sumption. Xenophon and the genial Isocratean
home for the equally Laconophile
Archidamus studiously preferXenophon the
(Diog.
term
Laert. 2. 53, 56). Why
'Thebans'. In the Hellenica then shouldrecording
after the Athenians have feared that
the King's Peace Xenophonthe uses
city 'Boeotians'
might not be a4;a 7~w 8'ptw 7rYv
'407vatw
of the federal army only (6. 5. 23,v?51I;
The terms
7. 4.in which the Corin-
36, 5. 4)- thians sought Sparta's permission to join the
4 Cf. my article 'The Common Peace of Peace (Xen. Hell. 7. 4. 8) show that there
366/5', C.Q.N.s. xi (1961), 8o ff. which was was little inclination to traffic with Thebes,
opposed by Ryder, op. cit. 83 n. I and and Xenophon (ibid. 7. 4. 6) seems to
Appendix VII, where the only point need- suggest that the whole peace movement at
ing further comment is the claim that I Corinth followed on the recognition that
appear not to have regarded, or appreciated without Athenian aid the city was defence-
the significance of, 'Timotheus' re-election less. So Athens cannot have feared that the
to the generalship in 366 and the new city would go over to Thebes. But did the
approach in the Peloponnese (the alliance Athenians really mean to seize Corinth?
with the Arcadians and the attempt to seize Hardly, for the Athenian hoplites were
Corinth . . .)' which 'seem to show that the assembled within Corinth itself (ibid. 7. 4- 5),
Athenians were pursuing a more chauvinistic and the Corinthians cannot have feared
and "tougher" policy, and were now less seizure. It seems possible enough that the
likely than before to accept the Theban curious clause in the decree of Demotion was
terms'. As to Timotheus, he may well have inspired by the changing Athenian attitude
towards Thebes, by a fear that the Corinth
been the general favoured by the Potwrd-
OVTES' (cf. Historia xii [19631, 94), and, if he of Pasimelus would prove, as earlier (ibid.
was not sent out to help Ariobarzanes 7. I. 40), the stumbling-block for peace. As
'without breaking the treaty with the Great for the Arcadian alliance (ibid. 7. 4. 2), it
King' (Dem. I5. 9) after the peace of 366/5,certainly showed a very large change of
he may have been sent so that Persia mightattitude towards Sparta, and the opposition
feel it prudent to assent to the modificationsof 'certain of the Athenians' was overcome
demanded by Athens for the Royal Rescriptonly when they realized that there was
of 367 (cf. C.Q. loc. cit. 85). As to 'the newadvantage to Sparta and Athens if the
approach in the Peloponnese', Corinth,Arcadians did not need the Thebans as well as

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 270 G. L. CAWKWELL

Athens, released from her unhappy mi

free to concentrate on what concerned
polis and the Chersonese, to both of
by the peace.'
It is therefore surprising that under the year 364/3 Diodorus (i5. 78. 4)
recorded an important development of Theban policy. Epaminondas is found
urging his countrymen to naval empire, and the Boeotians accordingly decreed
that a fleet of one hundred ships and a corresponding number of docks should
be built and the Rhodians, Chians, and Byzantians should be urged to support
these designs. Epaminondas was then sent out with a fleet to these peoples.
The Athenian general, Laches, was dispatched with a large force to prevent
the Thebans, but retired in fear, and Epaminondas 'made the cities friendly
to the Thebans' (/11as rgds rd ELS roh eSFiotS la7To rolrEv). What lies behind this
passage of Diodorus,2 and how is Epaminondas' policy to be evaluated ?
There is some supporting evidence to make us think seriously of Diodorus'
account. Aeschines (2. 105) later declared that Epaminondas had said in an
assembly that 'the Thebans must transfer the Propylaea of the Athenian
acropolis to the entrance to the Cadmea', and, since the Propylaea was the
symbol of Athens' fifth-century naval empire, the remark may well belong
to the assembly Diodorus records, or, rather, to what was said of it in Athens.
Isocrates (5- 53) said the Thebans sent out triremes to Byzantium, 'with the
intention of ruling both land and sea', and the appeal of the Heracleans to
Epaminondas, recorded by Justin (16. 4- 3-4), probably belongs to Epami-
nondas' mission.3 By 362 Byzantium was plainly on bad terms with Athens4
the Athenians. Xenophon does not dwell Dem. 23. 202 perhaps implies some special
on the motives of those Athenians who services contributed by Timotheus, and
positively wanted the alliance-motives Ariobarzanes
that may have been wavering in
may have been, to use Ryder's word, loyalty; hence the special instruction to
'chauvinistic', or alternatively of a diplo-Timotheus of Dem. 15- 9.)
matic sort; Arcadia would be assured of 2 Cf. F. Carrata Thomes, Egemonia
Athenian help against Sparta, and so would beotica e potenza marittima nella politica di
be the more able to join in a Common Peace,Epaminonda (Torino 1952), M. Fortina, op.
cit. 77 ff., and, most recently, J. Wiseman,
especially one that was not a avtpLaxla (ibid.
7. 4. Io), i.e. had no sanctions clause. (I Klio li (1969), 195 f.
therefore must retract my statement on p. 85 3 Justin's words (auxilia a Timotheo, Atiheni-
of C.Q. N.S. xi [1961] that 'Thebes occupiedensium duce, mox ab Epaminonda Thebanorum
in the Peace precisely the position that petivere) suggest that the Heracleans appealed
Sparta had occupied in the King's Peace ofto the two duces actually at the Helles-
387/6.' Thebes lacked Sparta's one-timepont.
hegemonic position.) 4 Accame, La lega ateniese, 179 n. 3, argues
This peace will always divide opinion, that Byzantium was in revolt from the
until new evidence appears. For the present,Second Athenian Confederacy from the mid
judgement depends largely on estimation of360s and cites I.G. VII 2408 (a Boeotian
Xenophon (whose details may be a good dealproxeny decree for a Byzantian) which he
more deceptive than Ryder supposes), but,dates 363. He then goes on to attach the
as I continue to hold, not entirely. special significance to the expression of
x Cf. my article discussed in the precedingDiodorus 16. 7. 3 (XlwV Kat 'PoS'wv Kal
note, p. 80 f., and also p. 85 for the suggestion
that Ariobarzanes handed over Crithote and K4wv, rL 8 Bvyav-rtwvy d roardv-rwv) of
meaning that the Byzantians were in a
Sestos (Nepos, Tim. I. 3) under the terms different
of condition, i.e. they had been in
the Common Peace. (For it is odd that a revolt for some time previously. But the date
Persian satrap, whose hyparch could be of IG. VII 2408 is quite unsure and could
said by Demosthenes (23. 142) to have held well belong in the 350s (see below) and
'the whole Hellespont', should have handed Diodorus is rather given to such 'rE SE
over territory to an Athenian general. But expressions (e.g. 15. 85. 2, i6. 19. 3, 16. 21.

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 271

and this may reflect the influence of Epaminonda

is perhaps echoed elsewhere in the evidence. But o
Diodorus says nothing to imply that the ships were

out with a force (Er - 8vvdtLEws), but there had b

since the fifth century' and he may have used for
hand.2 If as Diodorus asserts Laches retired in fear,
of the naval force of Epaminondas: presumably th
mand (ardAos d$G6eAoyo is Diodorus' term) was ma
battle and Athenians were still confident enough of
Laches must rather have feared the political conse
nondas' force and so breaking the Peace. Again,
ships ever appears in the late 360s or the 350s,
enmity to Alexander of Pherae, who did have and
were occasions for naval activity. So presumably t
the Boeotian navy.4 Nor should Diodorus' remark
the cities of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium 'atta
(15- 79. 1) be taken to mean that they revolted
Chios did not revolt until 357, though Byzantiu
what different case.s All in all, there was a grand
little.6
What occasioned such a development ? Are we to
having established, as he thought, Boeotian pow
Greece suddenly resolved to establish a naval empi
have meant naval war with Athens? Or was the
After all, such a speech in time of peace as Diod
bound to cause great excitement in Greece, and th
designs would render them less likely to succeed.
start that Epaminondas entertained Panhellenist
of the sort entertained by Jason of Pherae.7 No hin
the evidence,8 and, since the policy of concord wi
Pelopidas (Xen. Hell. 7. I. 33 ff.), it probably had t
too. So his bluntness could not have been explained
then was he so outspoken? Perhaps the right ex
affair sprang from Athens' cleruchy to Samos
4 It is hard
x). The beaching of corn-ships to know
(Dem. what6,
50. lies behind
etc.) does not necessarilyPlut.
argue more 14.
Philopoemen than
I f. Epaminondas was
bad relations. Nepos, Tim. I (Olynthios
certainly eta sea-battle, or we
not defeated in
Byzantios bello subegit) isshould
more havesubstantial,
heard of it. Perhaps there is not
much more than that he was a bad sailor
if not literally correct (cf. Isoc. 15. io8-i13,
who has nothing to say (cf.onPaus.
the8. subject-
11. 1o), but Plutarch concludes
perhaps Nepos points to little more than that
with the remark d~rparKTov K T7 Aatalas Ka
Timotheus was, according
-r6vto Dem.
v4crwv 23. 149,
adTEABEL-V KOvaUlwS. The Epaminon-
das is sadly
A'1' 14 ITOALV KaL XEppo'vqoov missed on this topic.
.... urpaTr-yds).
I Cf. Carrata Thomes, op.s cit. See p.13
270 f.
n. 4 for Byzantium, and Diod.
2 It is to be noted that the ship-building
I I. 7. 3 for the revolt of 357.
6 Cf. same
decree of Diod. 15. 79. I at the Fortina, op. cit. 85 on the purpose
moment
ordered the appeals to Rhodes, Chios, and
of the expedition.
Byzantium, presumably intending7 Xen. Hell.that both
6. I. 12, Isoc. 5. 119-
should be set in hand forthwith;
8 Plut. i.e.
Mor.there was
193C preserves a dictum of
apparently no question of Epaminondas
Epaminondas which might imply antipathy
to Persia, but presumably the Great King
waiting for ships to be built.
3 Cf. Dem. 51. 8, 50. 4, Polyaenus 6. 2. 1-
would not be supposed to be offering large
2, Diod. 15. 95. fTf. sums of money to Panhellenist politicians.

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 272 G. L. CAWKWELL

voyage is probably enough 364, the y

in the absence of Epaminondas and Pel
cleruchy.2 The decision to send the cleruc
sions in Greece. It was the first occasions since the foundation of the Second
Athenian Confederacy that Athens had had recourse to the most hated of
the institutions of the fifth-century empire, and, although Samos was not
a member of the Confederacy and there was no formal breach of the promises
of the Decree of Aristotle, it was an ominous precedent. In 357/6 the allies of
the Social War, Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium, joined in revolt because they
thought that 'Athens was plotting against them', the Rhodians at least resent-
ing the Athenians' 'recovering' what was 'their own' (Dem. 15. 3, 15), and in
365 this must have seemed precisely what was happening in Samos and about
to happen elsewhere.* When Cydias bade the Athenians in his speech about
the cleruchy imagine that 'the Hellenes were standing round them, actually
looking on and not merely going to hear report of whatever they decreed'
(Ar. Rhet. I384b32), he was presumably meaning that the debate could have
I Diodorus (15. 78 f.) places the expeditionPolitics, Carthaginians were frequent enough
under 364/3, but that proves nothing. Anin fourth-century Greece and Carthage a
argument of some value is that shortly aftermatter of interest (cf. Gsell, Histoire de
appealing unsuccessfully to Epaminondasl'Afrique du Nord iv. 152 n. 3). Nobas may
for help the Heracleans turned to Clearchuswell have had commercial dealings with
(Justin 16. 4. 4), whose tyranny was assignedThebes. Nor must the inscription be dated
by Diodorus in a chronographic notice tobefore 362. It certainly enough belongs to
364/3 (15. 81. 4). This would be decisivethe middle fourth century (Plut. Pel. 35
enough if it were not that Diodorus has put names two of the Boeotarchs the decree
one of the notices concerning the rulers oflists--cf. U. Koehler, Hermes xxiv [1889],
Heraclea in the wrong year. Clearchus after637 f.), but a date in the early 350S is
a twelve-year rule was succeeded by possible. (Indeed Epaminondas' attempt as
Timotheus (16. 36. 3, under 353/2) who inhe lay dying to have Daiphantos and then
turn after a fifteen-year rule was succeededIolaidas take command-Ael. V.H. 12. 3,
by Dionysius (16. 88. 5, under 338/7) who Plut. Mor. 194c-suggests that they were
died after a thirty-two year rule (20. 77. I,both notable Boeotarchs in 362 and perhaps
under 306/5). If the consistent notices of the earlier. Neither name is in the list of S.LG.3
successors of Clearchus are correct, Diodorus179. The only year shortly after 362 cer-
should have put the notice about Clearchus tainly excluded is 361, when Pammenes
under 365/4. (Beloch, G.G.2 iii. 2 p. 94 f. held office-Diod. 15. 94.)
curiously prefers to date Clearchus' accession 2 The only evidence for the date is Diod.
from the voyage of Epaminondas. He also18. 18. 9.
assigns Diod. 16. 88. 5 to 337/6.) So the 3 B. R. I. Sealey, Phoenix xi (0957), 95 f.
argument is not entirely satisfactory, butredated LG. II2 1609 to 370/69 (rightly, as I
prompts us to confine the voyage to 365/4hope to argue elsewhere, despiteJ. K. Davies,
and 364/3. Historia xviii [1969], 308 ff.), but the
Pelopidas marched out on his fatal ex- KA71poVKapXovrEs of line 89 are not necessarily
pedition just after 13 July 364 (Plut. Pel. 3 I), a sign that Athens had embarked on a
and, if the voyage of Epaminondas began not radical change of policy as early as 369. The
long before, both could have been absent for ancient cleruchy on Lemnos LG. II2 30
the destruction of Orchomenus (cf. p. 268 survived the King's Peace (Xen. Hell. 5. I.
n. 2). I therefore opt for 364. 31), and magistrates were sent out to the
The argument of G. Glotz ('Un Cartha- island annually throughout the century
ginois a Thebes en 365 avant J.-C.', Melanges (Ath. Pol. 62. 2 and 61. 6).
Jorga, Paris i933), which sought to connect 4 Demosthenes' phrase (15. 15) is r'ot
S.I.G.3 179 with the ship-building pro- KoJtCaaOae . .. .a VE-p TEP' VtJV O OovaaVesC.
gramme, is not cogent. There is no reason to
KotlS'EaOac is the word commonly used for
connect these honours for Nobas the recovering possessions (e.g. Dem. 23. 153,
Carthaginian with the ship-buildingIsoc. (which
8. 6, 22). T& 15idrEpa are the assets of
probably did not get very far anyhow). To
the fifth-century empire, the ~,yKTr aira of
judge by New Comedy and Aristotle's Andoc. 3. I5 and Isoc. 14. 44-

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 273

serious consequences for Athens' relations with th

there is no other evidence of its effect on Athens' al
sumption that it did lead men to fear a return to
surprising if Epaminondas decided that the moment
champion the liberty of the Greeks of the Aegean to
The peace of 366/5 is a dark affair, but at least it i
(7. 4. Io) that those who joined it merely swore to
the Theban suggestion of alliance.' This meant, in ter
that there was no sanctions clause of the sort to be f
Peace since that of 386, and it may be suggested
aimed to do was to exploit the mood of disaffection
to provide what the recent peace had failed to pr
speech in the assembly was 'to urge the Thebans t

(avTrXEcaOa r4j7 Ka7a A 77arrav 7)yE/ovlas'-Diod. 15- 78. 4), and, although the
epitome of his speech suggests that he spoke of 'sea empire' (rV-v gq Oa adTr-q
apxnv), he appears to have been talking of Spartan naval command in the
Persian Wars when there was no question of their having 'sea empire'. What-
ever his private intentions, publicly his purpose is likely to have been to create
a defensive alliance,2 and the Samian cleruchy had provided the opportunity.
As already remarked, there is no reason to suppose that Epaminondas'
initiative achieved its professed aims. Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium may have
been disposed favourably to Thebes, but no more. Should Epaminondas then
bear the discredit for having tried to light a damp squib ? Thebes was not
a naval power, and one might think that the failure of Epaminondas only
made plain what from the outset he should have seen for himself. Yet that was
not the view of Ephorus, who opined that Boeotia was well placed for the
exercise of sea hegemony (F.G.H. 7oFII9), and one must remember that
within a few years the very states to which Epaminondas made overtures
combined successfully against the naval power of Athens. The allies fought
at Chios with one hundred ships, and the Athenians sent out 12o for the
Embata campaign.3 With such naval strengths a Boeotian fleet of one hundred
could have made a decisive difference. Perhaps Epaminondas was not so
wrong in his judgement.
Why then did he not pursue the plan? The answer may well lie in the
situation which confronted him on his return. Pelopidas had marched out on
his final campaign shortly after 13 July 364, the date of the eclipse recorded
by Diodorus (15. 80. 2), and two other Boeotarchs had to lead a full expedition
to deal with Alexander of Pherae. At just the same period, at the Olympic
Games the festering rivalries of the Peloponnese erupted in fighting (Xen.
Hell. 7. 4. 28 f.). The resistance to the policies of Arcadian lawlessness had
begun. It required no great prescience in Thebes to see that the whole balance
she had established in the Peloponnese would be soon disturbed. Finally,
the wrangling at Delphi between the supporters of the Phocians and their
See above, p. 269 n. 4. minondas was in fact so imprudently blunt.
2 Admittedly the epitome of the speech in 3 Cf. Beloch, G.G.2 iii. I p. 237 f. Despite
Diodorus 15. 78. 4 seems a frank professionthe very large number of ships in the
of imperial ambition, but this may have beenAthenian navy, their fleets were never in
the Ephoran interpretation of Epaminondas'the fourth century as huge as they were in
intentions. (Cf. Isoc. 5. 53 Els BvadcrVov 86'the fifth. The largest number of ships at sea of
7rp~e~Ls E IrE7TLo V LS KaL yg s Ka'l aAd'77rTwhich we hear was 170 in the Lamian War
aptov-rEs.) But it is very unlikely that Epa-(Diod. 18. 15. 8).

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 274 G. L. CAWKWELL

opponents, which flared up in spring

begun,' and Epaminondas may have begu
was no time to be embarking on ambi
would clearly be stretched in defendin
no surprise that nothing more is heard

It was the opinion of Ephorus3 that t

to the two great leaders; for the rest,
succeed, witness the failure of the st
Similarly Polybius (6. 43). Were they cor
Epaminondas is so much the greater.
One may question whether Thebes la
In particular, Pammenes, who appears to
Epaminondas, and to have inherited the
of some eminence.4 That he is little men
the lull after 362 in the troubles of the P
tion. Certainly Thebes did not lack men
or after Epaminondas; one has only t
Corinthian War and the men who rev
failure of Thebes was due merely to lack
Ephorus' conviction, very proper in a
Thebes' decline was connected with th
converse with other men and the concen
in a sense this was an important eleme
Hellas', and Sparta, or, rather, le mirage
the good life in the Peloponnese. The p
have attained a similar position in the
power should have had a longer reign
the Peloponnese because it could not
Sacred War prevented it from fulfilling
satisfactory.
It is not profitable to guess what Epaminondas might have done had he
lived. He might have moved in time to prevent the rise of Phocian power and
so the Sacred War. The Theban influence in Thessaly and beyond did not
matter. It was, thanks to the geography of Greece, a frill which could be
abandoned without great regret or danger. Phocis, on the other hand, was
integral to the mastery of central Greece. Boeotia could not be strong if
Phocis was free and powerful. Epaminondas might have secured that it was
neither. Or he might not. In the long run, however, Thebes, like Sparta two
centuries earlier, must have come up against the facts of geography and of her
own resources in manpower and wealth. Land empire in Greece was not
I Cf. H. Pomtow, Klio vi (I906), 94 f. Epaminondas, who used him (Paus. 8. 27.
2 Cf. Phocian independence in 362, in 2) to help the Arcadians establish Megalo-
contrast with their compliance in 370/69 polis. The young Philip was lodged as
(Xen. Hell. 7. 5. 4 and 6. 5. 23). hostage with him (Plut. Pel. 26). For his
3 F I19, Diod. I5- 79. 2, and 88. 4. military career after 362, cf. Diod. 15. 94. 2,
4 Polyaenus recorded five of his a'rpa-'rqy7- 16. 34- I f., and Dem. 23. 183.
ka-ra (5. 16. I-5). Plut. Mor. 805E-F classed 5 FII19 aLLov 84 ELaL vr AodyWV KaL
him with Aristides, Phocion, Lucullus,
odLALla -r-3 rp~s dcvOpCrbovs cAtywpclaa&,
Cato, and Agesilaus, and declared that hetkdv,7S 8' E7TLEcLAlqvaL 7~g Kai- r7dAEMtOV
rose to eminence under the patronage ofdpEr?S.

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 275

within the powers of any Greek state to maintain ind

policies would in the long run have proved to have ov
resources, and Ephorus would perhaps have done bette
of Thebes in such terms.
Yet Epaminondas must be judged not in relation to these inevitable limita-
tions of Boeotian power. In politics, as opposed to morals, men are always
choosing between evils, and all policies have some consequences that are ill.
His actions must rather be judged in relation to what they prevented. To have
established the power of Boeotia and ended the Spartan domination of the
Peloponnese was the most and the best that a Boeotian could have done.
University College, Oxford G. L. CAWKWELL

APPENDIX I

The date of the restoration of the Boeotarchy

The fourth-century Boeotian state cannot be considered

until in the late 370os the perioecic cities had been wres
supported independence, but the 8-0os-, the sovereign body w
(e.g. S.I.G.3 179 and LG. VII 2408) and which was certainly co
by 373 (Paus. 9. 2. 5), may well have come into existence in
time when according to Xen. Hell. 5. 4. 46 the 8-pos- from
moved to Thebes. It seems a reasonable guess that the Boeot
at the same time.
The evidence, however, points to 378, immediately after the Liberation.
Plutarch in the Pelopidas (13. 1) has Pelopidas and two others elected Boeotarch
the morning after the murder of Leontiades, while elsewhere (14. 2) he says
of the period of the raid of Sphodrias, i.e. early 378, E7rvXE... J HEAo7m'S'as
tEra Popyitov Jootw-raPXXv. So that makes four Boeotarchs for 378, the number
Thebes had had in the 390s (Hell. Oxy. I6. 3), and many have therefore cheer-
fully set the restoration of the Boeotarchy in 378. Beloch, however, rejected
this (G.G. iii2 I p. 145 n. 2) pointing to Isocrates 14. 29, which shows that the
Thebans first tried to reassure the Spartans that they were ready t984~v KLVWELV
rciv rrpopov rpo avb'ovS <LoAoy'qpdCvwv, i.e. that the King's Peace, which
had dissolved the Boeotian states, still stood. How could they make such a
claim if they had already appointed Boeotarchs ? One may add too that the
morning after the murder of the polemarchs was no moment to engage in
constitutional discussions. Boeotarchy meant Boeotia, and the Boeotia of the
370os and the 36os was not the Boeotia described in the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia
(cf. Busolt-Swoboda, Gr. St. 1426 ff.). All that would take time. What was
needed immediately was merely magistrates, to act in place of the murdered
polemarchs. Beloch, therefore, seems right in regarding Pelopidas, Melon,
and Charon as polemarchs, and Gorgidas as hipparch (cf. Polyaenus 2. 5. 2).
Bersanetti (op. cit. 49 n. 5), who accepted the restoration of the Boeotarchy
in 378, argued (in Appendix I 89 ff.) that this was consistent with what we
know of the Boeotarchies of Pelopidas. Diodorus (I5. 81. 4) in his obituary
notice of Pelopidas declared that dJrd 7' ELs r 04flas KaOV6o 7T6v rroAUTwjv
LEXPL .T'7S EaVTov E72E7 /o3W1'LaPXXWV 7TTcdVa wvV XPBVov EIE'AEUE, and, while this
cannot be literally true since the evidence is explicit that he was not Boeotarch
in 371 (Plut. Pel. 2o. 3, 23. 6, Diod. 15. 81. 2), it prompts one to hesitate to

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 276 G. L. CAWKWELL

declare that he could not have been in

to Persia (Xen. Hell. 7. I. 33 ff.). In any
Boeotarch in 371 when he was also a
above), and it is far from clear that Pe
in absentia. Further, the arguments of
365 avant J.-C.', Milanges Jorga, Pari
invalid: the list of seven Boeotarchs
sumably does belong to the period o
Hermes xxiv [1889], 638), may well b
indeed after that of Epaminondas in 362
Beloch (G.G.2 iii. 2 pp. 249 ff.) are valid
his thirteenth Boeotarchy (Plut. Pel. 34
15. 81. 4), 377 seems to be suitable for
tion that it was in 378 leads him to see
text is much more satisfactory, in tha
dark but pregnant words about early 37
Sa'rcov palwfvv E?WvpEtVro .... This
polemarchs to the Boeotia under Boeota
What then of Diodorus' account of
gives an account of the liberation of T
of Thespiae (of early 377)- In chapter
formation and expansion of the Second
down to the campaigns of Chabrias (of
theory if the opening words of chapter
note about magistrates could be taken

27. 'r' E7row'ov, AaKEaqULOV'WV '7TTaLKO

poqaav7Es avwavEpaTqaav, Kav, K Kov'qv a
avvwaE
in aavroV....
conformity with 'oArjvatot
Diodorus' 6... K.T.A
practice
tive. If he had meant this notice about Boeotia to conclude the narrative of the
liberation, he would have put it in before the chronographic introduction
to 377/6. So, in view of the argument of this appendix, either Ephorus was
wrong or Diodorus has misrepresented him. I presume the latter to be the
case. In 29. 6 Diodorus records quite correctly that it was the Thebans whom
the Athenians 7ponEAdfoOvro E'l 'r KOLVOV 0Uvv pALOV C' 'of iOL ts-~iwuv": the
Decree of Aristotle shows this (I I. 24, 79). The whole point was in the name.
Once there were Bowo-ro, there was, technically, no longer a state called Thebes,
and Ephorus cannot have established Boeotia before he recorded the accession
of Thebes to the Confederacy. Perhaps Diodorus has misinterpreted some
proleptic remark of Ephorus.

APPENDIX II

The trials of Epaminondas

The matter has been endlessly discussed, most recen

Untersuchungen zu der Zeit der thebanischen Hegemonie (M
where a full survey will be found of the varying opinions of
hundred years. The text of this article presumes that the
Epaminondas, the first involving Epaminondas and P

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 EPAMINONDAS AND THEBES 277

from the first invasion of the Peloponnese in winter 3

acquitted, and the second involving Epaminondas
the second invasion of the Peloponnese, in which
guilty and as a result the Boeotian people 'in exaspera
the Boeotarchy and sent him out without office with
the army sent to rescue Pelopidas and Ismenias ar
Alexander of Pherae (Diod. 15. 71. 2-72. 2). (Th
the second Theban intervention in the affairs of The
of two trials needs no further discussion.
It has been commonly assumed since Beloch (G.G.2 iii. 2 p. 239) that Epami-
nondas' second invasion of the Peloponnese was in summer 369, which means
that he was Boeotarch for at least the latter part of 369. But has this assump-
tion been correct? Recently J. Wiseman in Klio li (1969), 177 ff. has argued
that we should return to the chronology of B. Niese in Hermes xxxix (1904),
84 f. which set the second invasion in 368 and would get rid of the problem
how Epaminondas (and Pelopidas) came to be on trial and to be Boeotarch
within the same year. Beister op. cit. 98 n. 3 dismissed Wiseman with a
bibliography. Others may be less confident.
I reject the Niese/Wiseman chronology principally for the following reasons:
(a) At the beginning of Book vii Xenophon recorded the discussions in
Athens about the hegemony of the alliance made in mid winter 370/69
(cf. 7. I. 2 "WTEr~Ep ... dya0Gv v 'lov EMo v ELvaC AaKESaL~Lovlovs- IAovs -rTOtETa0at
and in ? " IvypaXla, i.e. an existing alliance). He introduced the account
with the words r~r 8' tVC'pw E1EL, which have occasioned discussion. It is not
clear whether Xenophon meant, more Thucydideo, 'next campaigning season', or,
fairly improbably in an author so little concerned with official calendars,
'next archon year'. But it is not important. The real question is when the de-
tails concerning hegemony of the alliance would be likely to be made, and there
can be only one answer, viz. as soon as possible. The war was on. Even if the
Thebans did not shortly return to the Peloponnese, there were the Arcadians,
the Argives, and the Eleans (Xen. Hell. 7. I. 18) to be reckoned with. Strate-
gically, it was essential to deny the Thebans access. It would be too late to set
about arranging the defence once the attack had begun. So the only (his-
torically) conceivable date for Hell. 7. I. 1-14 is shortly after the Theban
withdrawal in April/May 369. The first sentence of ? 15 recording the decision
of the Spartans and Athenians (&ordo-rpwv av-rw-v) and the allies to defend
Oneion goes naturally with ? 14. It is hard to believe that the largest part of
a year supervenes before the second sentence, which deals with Epaminondas'
second invasion.
(b) The decree of alliance ofAthens with Dionysius of Syracuse is not evidence
that Dionysius was still alive well into 367. As D. M. Lewis pointed out (B.S.A.
xlix [i9541, 37 f.), the supplementation of the prescript is quite uncertain (cf.
K. Stroheker, Dionysius 235 n. 72 and 237 n. 83). The evidence for Diony-
sius' death for all Niese's rhetoric (art. cit. 98) is clear enough. He died shortly
after making a truce with the Carthaginians for the winter (Diod. 15. 73. 5),
and he died shortly after the Lenaean festival of January 367 (ibid. 74. I f.).
He must therefore have sent the two expeditions of Xen. Hell. 7. I. 20 f. and
28 in 369 and 368, the first of which involved the Syracusans in fighting
Epaminondas.
So Epaminondas was indeed Boeotarch in 369 shortly after his acquittal

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 278 G. L. CAWKWELL

at the first trial. How he came to be

24 and 25, Mor. I94, 540D-E, 817F), in
(V.H. I3- 42) Epaminondas held the B
expiry of his office. If this tradition is
Boeotarch after his acquittal. In Nepos
and in Cicero (Inv. I. 55 f.) he refused t
cessors. If this tradition is correct, h
for 369 in absentia but replaced in his
case he may have been tried as Boeotarc
the trial and reappointed after it. Our
is not such as to say that either proced
is that he was acquitted and was Boeo
the matter further is a waste of words.

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