Preuss e Wijst (2017)

Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing
A phase-specific analysis of negotiation styles

Melanie Preuss, Per van der Wijst,
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Melanie Preuss, Per van der Wijst, (2017) "A phase-specific analysis of negotiation styles", Journal of Business & Industrial
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A phase-specific analysis of negotiation styles
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of our study is to analyze whether negotiators stick to one single
negotiation style or whether their styles vary during the negotiation process. The paper seeks
to identify different combinations of phase-specific negotiation styles and investigates the
relationship between these combinations and negotiation performance and satisfaction.
Design/Methodology/Approach – The study is based on a large online negotiation

simulation that allows a phase-specific analysis of negotiation styles via an elaborate coding
scheme.
Findings – The findings reveal that negotiators generally do not limit themselves to a single
negotiation style. Instead, they vary their style in the course of different negotiation phases.
We distinguish between five distinct phase-specific negotiation style patterns that differ with
regard to their impact on negotiation performance but not negotiation satisfaction.
Research limitations/implications – The study demonstrates that a phase-specific analysis of

negotiation styles allows deeper insights into a negotiator’s style behavior. For future studies,
we recommend taking a phase-specific view when analyzing negotiation styles.
Practical implications – Negotiation practitioners get to know different phase-specific

negotiation style patterns and get insights into which pattern is the most promising for
negotiation performance. As a result, they can acquire this phase-specific negotiation style
pattern in order to enhance their performance.
Originality/value – The paper contributes to existing negotiation style literature, because it is

the first to analyze negotiation styles from a phase-specific point of view.
Keywords – Negotiation styles, Negotiation phases, Negotiation performance, Negotiation

satisfaction, Business-to-business marketing
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
Negotiations play a crucial role in industrial markets (Mitchell and Dickinson, 1986; Perdue
and Summers, 1991), because they are an important determining factor for the allocation of
resources between buying and selling firms (e.g., Day et al., 1988). Negotiations can therefore
contribute significantly to a company’s profitability (e.g., Balakrishnan and Eliashberg, 1995).
In increasingly competitive markets, it is not surprising that industrial companies – in the
roles of both buyers and sellers – seek to prepare their negotiation teams optimally in order to
steer the negotiation process [1].
In this context, studies stress (among other factors) that negotiators can potentially benefit
immensely from the right negotiation styles (e.g., Ogilvie and Kidder, 2008). In this way,
negotiation styles can be understood as learned patterns of negotiation behavior (Ogilvie and
Kidder, 2008) that are usually classified in five different kinds of styles: integrating,
dominating, compromising, obliging and avoiding negotiation styles.
However, the question arises as to what the right negotiation style is. To date, the tendency
has been to analyze negotiation styles as mutually exclusive behaviors (Munduate et al., 1999;
Van de Vliert et al., 1995) during the complete negotiation process. As such, most of the
existing studies assume that negotiators apply only one negotiation style during a negotiation.
In so doing, they appear to have missed the fact that negotiation styles can and may be
adapted, as negotiation processes usually evolve over different phases (e.g., Adair and Brett,
2005; Douglas 1957, 1962; Goering, 1997; Olekalns et al., 2003).
To the best of our knowledge, no study so far has empirically analyzed whether negotiation
styles vary between the different negotiation phases and, if so, what the different
combinations of phase-specific negotiation styles are that occur. The logical follow-up
question concerns the possible relation between the applied phase-specific style pattern and
the performance and satisfaction of negotiators. As such, it seems plausible that certain phase-
specific patterns lead to increased negotiation performance and negotiation satisfaction.
Against this background, the main goal of this paper is to analyze negotiation styles from a
phase-specific point of view. In this context we further investigate the relationship between
different phase-specific patterns and negotiation performance and satisfaction. We proceed by
conducting a large-scale exploratory negotiation study in which the negotiation styles of the
participants are assessed in different phases during the negotiation process via a coding
scheme that we developed. Data about their performance and satisfaction was also collected.
We close the paper by discussing the implications of our results for both research and
practice.
2. Literature review and research questions
2.1 Understanding negotiation styles
Negotiation styles in research date back to 1925, when Follett, one of the first scholars in this
field, mentioned three different ways of handling conflict: domination, integration and
compromise (Follett, 1940). However, the model of Blake and Mouton (1964) – the so-called
managerial grid – can be seen as the foundation for subsequent research into negotiation
styles (e.g., Volkema and Bergmann, 1995). They were the first to classify five different
styles of managerial behavior by means of two dimensions, namely concern for people and
concern for production (Blake and Mouton, 1964). Based on this managerial grid, various
researchers have reinterpreted these two dimensions (Montes et al., 2012) and derived
different types of negotiation styles. Among others, these negotiation styles have also been
called conflict styles, conflict modes, strategies, orientations or intentions (e.g., Thomas,
1992; Van de Vliert and Kabanoff, 1990). For instance, Rahim and Bonoma (1979) classified
five styles along the two axes of concern for self and concern for others; Pruitt’s (1983) dual
concern model included four styles on the two dimensions of concern about own outcomes
and concern about other party’s outcomes; and Thomas (1976) made a distinction between
five styles on the cooperativeness and assertiveness dimensions (e.g., Montes et al., 2012).
Despite some authors deriving only four styles from this model (e.g., Pruitt, 1983) or
researchers concentrating on even fewer than four negotiation styles (e.g., Deutsch, 1949;
Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Putnam and Wilson, 1982), most studies focus on a distinction
between five different types (Hocker and Wilmot, 1985; Van de Vliert and Kabanoff, 1990).
These five style models have been broadly accepted in literature (Sorenson et al., 1999) and
only differ slightly in their naming of the specific style. Thus, Thomas and Kilmann (1974)
and Rahim (1983), who developed two of the most famous measurement instruments of
negotiation styles (e.g., Ogilvie and Kidder, 2008; Volkema and Bergmann, 1995), have the
same understanding of negotiation styles’ characteristics but apply partly different labels for
them: The former refer to a competing, collaborating, compromising, accommodating and

avoiding style, while the latter works with a dominating, integrating, compromising, obliging
and avoiding style.
Negotiation parties who apply a dominating (competing) style try to achieve a win-lose
situation by only pursuing their own interests and neglecting the needs of the other party. By
contrast, integrating (collaborating) negotiators seek to collaborate with their negotiation
counterpart in order to obtain the best possible outcome for both of them, i.e. a win-win
situation. The compromising style illustrates a moderate concern for both one’s own and the
other party’s interest and is characterized by a mentality of giving and taking, where both
parties have to give up something in order to reach an acceptable agreement. Negotiation
parties that use the obliging (accommodating) style stress commonalities in order to satisfy
the needs of the other party and simultaneously neglect their own interests. The avoiding
negotiation style is characterized by a low concern for oneself and for the other party, and the
parties sidestep the negotiation situation (e.g., Rahim, 1983; Rahim and Bonoma, 1979;
Thomas, 1976; Thomas and Kilmann, 1974).
Despite the aforementioned broad acceptance of these five styles, two different
understandings of negotiation styles have been developed. In this context, there are studies
that can be assigned to the direct-effect models and assume that individual differences have a
direct impact on negotiation behavior (Thompson, 1990) in the form of negotiation styles.
Concurrently, there is the assumption that negotiators possess a rather stable negotiation style
behavior that depends on an individual’s characteristics (e.g., Ogilvie and Kidder, 2008) and
barely changes across different negotiation situations. For instance, Antonioni (1998) has
found that a negotiator’s personality influences the applied negotiation style (e.g., extraverted
negotiators tend to apply an integrating style). Furthermore, Slabbert (2004) has shown that
the hierarchical position within an organization leads to a fixed behavioral pattern: Middle
managers prefer integrating and dominating negotiation styles, while junior managers tend to
apply the avoiding negotiation style.
Expanding the direct-effect models, another research stream focuses on contingency models,
which assume that negotiation behavior is contingent upon an individual’s characteristics and
situational determinants (Thompson, 1990; Weitz, 1981). Thus, individual negotiators have a
characteristic, preferred negotiation style that they feel comfortable with, but at the same time
they are able to change their style according to the situation (e.g., Blake and Mouton, 1967;
Moberg, 2001; Ogilvie and Kidder, 2008; Rahim and Bonoma, 1979). For instance, Drory and
Ritov (1997) have shown that experienced managers change their negotiation style behavior
according to the level of power of their opponent (both belonging to the same organization).
While they rather apply a dominating or integrating style when faced with an equally
powerful opponent, they prefer an obliging or avoiding style when encountering a more
powerful counterpart. Furthermore, Perdue et al. (1986) revealed that industrial buyers mainly
apply an integrating negotiation style, which is followed by a preference for a dominating and
compromising style. Moreover, they detected several combinations of two styles, for instance
integrating and dominating styles, and pointed out that this could be evidence for Weitz’s
(1981) contingency model, which indicates that the effectiveness of negotiation behavior
depends on the situation.
In line with this more holistic research stream that takes situational features into account, we
understand a negotiation style as a preferred behavioral pattern (Moberg, 2001) that is a
combination of individual differences and specific situations (Ting-Toomey et al., 2001).
Although negotiation styles are then adapted to a certain degree to prevailing situations, their
application is not consciously planned before the negotiation process. This differentiates them
from negotiation strategies that are worked out before the actual negotiation (e.g., Ganesan,
1993).
Despite the existing approach that negotiation styles can vary across situations, the majority
of the studies mentioned above rely on two of the most prominent measurement instruments
of Thomas and Kilmann (1974) and Rahim (1983) (e.g., Ogilvie and Kidder, 2008; Volkema
and Bergmann, 1995), which are mainly used to capture an individual’s general preference of
negotiation style via a self-assessed questionnaire. These studies implicitly and inaccurately
assume that individuals stick only to one style during a negotiation (e.g., Nicotera, 1994; Papa
and Natalle, 1989). In line with this, Hocker and Wilmot (1985) note that the lack of process
orientation is one of the measurements’ major shortcomings. They neglect the fact that
individuals can change their behavior over time (e.g., Bergmann and Volkema, 1989) by
altering their negotiation style during the negotiation process, for example. Thereby, the
negotiation process can be seen as sequences of different situations, which may very well
trigger different negotiation styles.
2.2 Negotiation phase approaches and negotiation styles
Based on this process view of negotiations, several researchers have elaborated distinct phase
approaches (e.g., Holmes and Poole, 1991) for negotiations and distinguished between two
and eight phases (e.g., Adair and Brett, 2005; Douglas 1957, 1962; Gulliver, 1979; Morley
and Stephenson, 1977; Putnam et al., 1990; Walton, 1969). One of the first to introduce the
concept of different phases in a negotiation was Douglas (1957, 1962), who divided up the
negotiation process into three different phases, which are described by specific characteristics.
During the first phase, establishing the bargaining range, negotiators put forward their
positions and try to define the outer limits of the bargaining range. The second phase,
reconnoitering the range, is the heart of the bargaining action, as it is characterized by
moving away from the extreme positions and approaching each other through concessions.
During the final phase, precipitating the decision-making crisis, negotiators try to narrow
down the bargaining range in order to close the deal (see Morley and Stephenson, 1977, for
another three-stage model).
A few years after Douglas, Gulliver (1979) proposed a more fine-grained model consisting of
eight different phases. He assumes that two phases occur before Douglas’s first phase of
establishing the bargaining range. First, negotiators have to agree on negotiating and find a
place where the negotiation is to take place; and second, they have to decide on the agenda
and issues that have to be negotiated. The third phase can be seen as the actual start of the
negotiation, where the maximum limits of the negotiation issues are determined. During the
fourth phase, negotiators approach each other by narrowing the differences. Phases five and
six are characterized by a preparation of the final bargaining (e.g., searching for a realistic
negotiating range and refining remaining differences) and the final bargaining itself, which
concentrates on the final agreement. The last two phases complete the negotiation process by
officially affirming the negotiation outcome and executing the agreement, for instance with
the delivery of the product and the payment of the negotiated price. The first two phases are
often assumed to be pre-negotiation phases, as they occur before the two parties encounter
each other for the actual negotiation (Goering, 1997). The same applies to phases seven and
eight, which take place after the agreement has been closed and are often characterized as
post-negotiation (Goering, 1997). A recently often cited phase model in negotiation research
is the one developed by Adair and Brett (2005), who distinguish between four phases (for
examples of works citing Adair and Brett (2005), see Hine et al., 2009; Koeszegi et al., 2011;
Pesendorfer et al., 2007). Their first phase, entitled relational positioning, serves as a way to
get acquainted with the counterpart’s relational orientation: It is conceivable that negotiators
try to establish a climate of mutual trust, but as well that they signal a strong position and
create a competitive atmosphere (Adair and Brett, 2005). Irrespective of the apparent
negotiation behavior, this first phase focuses on the relationship with the counterpart.
Subsequently, the second phase, identifying the problem, is marked by a detailed discussion of
the negotiation issues and the negotiation parties’ preferences and interests. On this basis, the
third phase, generating solutions, is primarily characterized by making offers that combine
the negotiation party’s own interests and the preferences of its counterpart. If an offer is
rejected, negotiators try to influence the other party to improve their offer. This approach
stands in contrast to the features of the final phase, reaching an agreement, where the parties
rather respond to a given offer with a counteroffer instead of justifying their own offer. In so
doing, they try to reach a good deal (Adair and Brett, 2005). Precisely because of this more
detailed reflection of the negotiation process, Adair and Brett’s approach seems to be the most
appropriated one in negotiation research so far, even more so than Douglas’s three-phase
approach (1957, 1962).
In spite of the broad acknowledgment that negotiations are processes evolving over time,
corresponding phase analysis has been conducted very rarely to date, (e.g., Weingart and
Olekalns, 2004). One stream of studies deals with behavioral changes along different
negotiation phases and mainly concentrates on a differentiation between distributive and
integrative negotiation behavior (also called strategies, tactics, approaches or communicative
behavior).
The majority of researchers assume that negotiations move from competitive (distributive)
negotiation behavior to one that is coordinative (integrative) (Olekalns et al., 2003; Pruitt,
1981). In this context studies stress that coordination is very common in the later phases of
negotiations, when competitive negotiation behavior no longer appears to be effective (e.g.,
Morley and Stephenson, 1977; Pruitt, 1981; Stevens, 1963). By means of a collective
bargaining situation, Goering (1997) examines how communication strategies – in the form of
distributive-defensive, distributive-offensive and integrative messages – vary among each
other during a three-phase negotiation process. She finds evidence that later phases are
characterized by more integrative messages. Lytle et al. (1999), who concentrate on a stage-
model approach that first divides a negotiation into various fixed-time segments and then
analyzes phase-specific negotiation behavior (Olekalns et al., 2003; Weingart et al., 2004),
states that stressing power and right – both of which result in mostly distributive agreements –
occur more often in the first and third quarters of a negotiation than in the second and fourth
quarters. In line with this assertion, Olekalns et al. (2003) confirm that negotiators tend to
start their negotiation with a distributive strategy and conclude it with one that is integrative.
Adair and Brett (2005) state that negotiators behave more competitively in the first phase than
in the second phase of their four-phase stage model. In their study, negotiators in the first
phase referred to competitors or to the status of oneself/the company more often. By contrast,
during the second phase, the negotiation parties focused more on revealing information about
negotiation issues preferences. The authors further observe that, because of an increase in the
number of offers, which rational arguments reinforce or reject, the third phase and even more
so the fourth phase are mainly characterized by competitive behavior.
Besides these dynamic approaches, which are limited to distributive and integrative
negotiation behavior, a second stream of research has developed. Researchers have looked at
the implicit assumption that negotiation parties stick to one negotiation style during the
negotiation process. Based on the notion that negotiation parties do not use only one style
during the process, Van de Vliert et al. (1995) and Van de Vliert (1997) considered
conglomerated negotiation styles, while Munduate et al. (1999) studied patterns of negotiation
styles. Van de Vliert et al. (1995) describes conglomerated negotiation styles as an
aggregation of several negotiation styles whose intensity can vary. Single negotiation styles
can occur at the same time or be sequentially connected to each other. In a similar approach,
Munduate et al. (1999) – in line with the contingency theory – reveal that negotiation parties
prefer to apply a combination of negotiation styles. Overall, the authors identify five different
negotiation style patterns characterized by distinct levels of frequency. For instance, one
pattern is described by a low use of all five negotiation styles in a negotiation, whereas
another pattern reflects a higher use of the dominating and integrating style and a low use of
the remaining styles (compromising, avoiding and obliging).
Overall, studies have either focused on the development of distributive and integrative
negotiation behavior during different negotiation phases or concentrated on patterns of
negotiation styles without considering their occurrence during the negotiation process.
Although researchers stress that a static analysis of negotiation styles falls short, no study has
analyzed whether negotiation styles vary between negotiation phases. For this reason, we
examine the following research question:
RQ1: Do negotiation styles vary between negotiation phases?
If it holds true that negotiation styles vary between negotiation phases, it is necessary to
examine in a more detailed way how they are applied. More specifically, with respect to the
application of negotiation styles between negotiation phases, the analysis should focus on
whether it is possible to identify certain patterns. Consequently, we investigate the following
research question:
RQ2: Are there distinct negotiation style patterns that depend on negotiation
phases?
If there are, then insights about the effects of these so-called phase-specific negotiation style
patterns on negotiation performance (effectiveness and efficiency) and on negotiators’
satisfaction provide a deeper understanding about their characteristics and consequences.
2.3 Phase-specific negotiation style patterns and their impact on negotiation performance and
negotiators’ satisfaction
One of the primary objectives of negotiation research is to gain more knowledge about the
factors that increase the individual profit of negotiation parties (Ma, 2007). In this context,
social exchange theory proposes that negotiation outcomes come from three different
variables: negotiator characteristics, situational constraints and process variables (Graham,
1986). In line with the contingency model (Weitz, 1981), the first two variables may affect the
process variable to which negotiation styles can be assigned (e.g., Graham, 1986). This point
underlines that insights into negotiation styles’ consequences are crucial to improving the
negotiation performance (Ogilvie and Kidder, 2008).
So far there have been only a few findings concerning negotiation styles’ influence on the
individual negotiation outcome. For instance, Ma (2007) reveals by means of a cross-cultural
study that a competing style has a direct, positive impact on the individual negotiation
outcome in a setting with Canadian negotiators. However, this effect did not occur with
Chinese negotiators, which indicates the important role the cultural background of the
negotiator can play. Backhaus et al. (2008) found that negotiators with a contending style
(comparable to the dominating style) and a problem-solving style achieved higher individual
negotiation outcomes. Negotiators with a contending style performed even better than those
who used a problem-solving style. Furthermore, parties with a yielding (comparable to the
obliging style) negotiation style performed significantly worse regarding the individual
negotiation outcome.
Besides the effectiveness of the negotiation (= individual negotiation outcome), it is important

to consider its efficiency as well. It is possible for a negotiation outcome to be effective, but if
the resources are not used efficiently, the negotiation performance might be lower overall. For
instance, the time it takes to reach an agreement reflects the negotiating (in)efficiency (e.g.,
Butler, 1994). Thus, when it comes to measuring negotiation performance, the efficiency
dimension is also important (Lai et al., 2006) [1]. In this respect, Lai et al. (2006) examined
whether there is a difference between cooperative and non-cooperative negotiators. They can
point to no significant differences regarding the negotiation time and the total number of
exchanges, but non-cooperative negotiators did submit more offers (mere offers without
messages) than cooperative negotiators did (Lai et al., 2006). This point demonstrates that
their negotiation moves were less efficient. Furthermore, Butler (1994) determined that
negotiators applying the integrating style were the most efficient ones (measured by the time
needed to find the integrative solution), while he could not detect any differences among the
dominating, avoiding and obliging styles.
Although some studies provide information in response to the question of how single
negotiation styles impact negotiation’s effectiveness and efficiency, to date there have been
no insights into the effects of phase-specific negotiation style patterns on these dimensions.
Hence, we will also investigate the following research question:
RQ3: How do distinct phase-specific negotiation style patterns impact

negotiation’s effectiveness and efficiency?
Besides having the goal of maximizing their profits, negotiation parties should and generally
will try to satisfy their negotiation counterpart (e.g., Graham, 1986). However, scholars have
criticized the relative lack of attention paid to social psychological measurements in
negotiation if compared with objective tangible outcomes (Curhan et al., 2006). According to
Alexander et al. (1994), who have examined negotiation satisfaction, there is a positive
relationship between the use of a coordinative (problem-solving) negotiation behavior and the
opponent’s satisfaction with the negotiation process, and they confirm the prior results of
Graham (1986) and Campbell (1988) (Alexander et al., 1994). In line with these findings,
Ganesan (1993) shows that for the negotiation party a problem-solving behavior yields higher
satisfaction with the negotiation, whereas no effect can be revealed for compromising
behavior. No conclusive results were found for the impact of an aggressive negotiation
behavior on negotiation satisfaction.
In addition to these studies that focus on the impact of a single negotiation style on
negotiators’ satisfaction, Munduate et al. (1999) and Van de Vliert et al. (1995) also provide
some indications of negotiation style patterns’ impact on the improvement of relationship
outcomes in conflict situations. Munduate et al. (1999) conclude that the greater the number
of styles that are combined, the more effective the pattern with regard to relationship and joint
substantive outcomes (e.g., proximity to a solution). Specifically, the pattern that was
characterized by a general preference for applying the dominating, integrating and
compromising style in negotiations yielded the highest relationship and substantive outcome.
Van de Vliert et al. (1995), who refer to the same outcome variables, state that an increase in
problem-solving and accommodating behavior within the style pattern had a positive impact
on it. By contrast, an avoiding and forcing (dominating) style led to a worse relationship and
substantive outcome.
Despite some findings about the impact of single negotiation styles and static style patterns on
negotiators’ satisfaction, there are no insights as to whether distinct phase-specific patterns
influence the satisfaction level. Thus, it is conceivable that different phase-specific patterns
lead to higher satisfaction with the relationship to the counterpart than others accomplish.
This might hold true for the negotiation party’s satisfaction and/or for the satisfaction of the
counterpart. For this reason, we examine the subsequent research question from both
perspectives:
RQ4: How do distinct phase-specific negotiation style patterns impact negotiators’

satisfaction with the relationship to the counterpart?
3. Empirical study
3.1 Participants and procedures
To answer our research questions on how negotiation styles vary between negotiation phases
and what the impact of phase-specific negotiation style patterns is on economic and
psychological negotiation outcome, we conducted a large online negotiation study. Our
negotiation study relied on 259 students (average age: 23.9 years; male: 37.5 %, female:
67.5 %) who joined a negotiation course from one of the three participating universities: two
located in Germany and the other situated in the Netherlands.
The students were asked to register via an online negotiation platform. After their registration,
they could choose a time slot for their negotiation in the three days set out for the study. In
this way, the students were automatically assigned to the role of either the buyer or the seller.
Moreover, the researchers took care to ensure anonymity during this procedure in order to
avoid any bias from students consciously selecting a time slot that friends had chosen as well.
As an odd number of students enrolled and two time slots could not be filled completely, a
student assistant took on the corresponding role. These three negotiation dyads were later
removed from the data sample. Thus, in total, 128 valid negotiations comprising two students
negotiating with each other were set up.
In order to prepare adequately for the negotiation, each student received a basic negotiation
case as well as role-specific information five days before the scheduled negotiation. The
negotiation case depicted a business-to-business environment, where the firms that were
selling and buying had to come to an agreement over potential cooperation on an electronic
car project. Both parties had to negotiate the price of one complete laser system, the quantity
of delivered laser systems, distribution of development costs, time of delivery and the annual
price for a service contract per laser system. Thus, the quantity and the time of delivery
featured integrative potential. A contract was closed if the seller and the buyer agreed on all
specifications of the five negotiation issues. Both negotiation parties had an equivalent
BATNA (= best alternative to a negotiated agreement) (Fisher and Ury, 1981) in the case that
they did not find an agreement. The students’ objective was to achieve the best possible
negotiation outcome irrespective of their assigned role. There was no experimental
manipulation in our negotiation study, as an observational approach allowed our subjects to
adapt their own negotiation style approach (e.g., Graham, 1986) and underlined the
explorative character of our study.
Since the type of communication medium largely influences negotiation behavior (e.g., Poole
et al., 1992), the communicational setting in which negotiations are conducted should be
chosen carefully. An online negotiation setting, where both parties communicate with each
other through written text messages via an electronic negotiation platform, seems appropriate
for our research purpose, because online chats offer very few communication cues (Purdy et
al., 2000). In other words, negotiators can only pass on their intentions via written messages.
Chat logs permit the study of different negotiation styles in their entirety, as every intention
can only be expressed via text messages.
For this reason, the negotiation took place in a closed online chat room on the aforementioned
negotiation platform, which enabled us to retrieve the negotiation logs containing all the
written messages. The negotiation was conducted in English and restricted to 90 minutes.
After the negotiation was finished, ever participant was asked to fill in an online questionnaire
in English regarding the psychological negotiation outcome (= satisfaction level) (Curhan et
al., 2006).
In total, 126 negotiation parties eventually arrived at an agreement. Another six negotiation
dyads had to be excluded from the data sample, as the negotiation logs showed that these pairs
had miscalculated their profit or not negotiated at all but instead accepted the first offer. Thus,
in total, we relied on 120 negotiation dyads for our study.
3.2 Measures
First, each of these 120 negotiation logs was unitized according to a developed guideline that
referred to the sentence (subject-verb) as a unit of analysis (e.g., Weingart et al., 2004). By
choosing such small units, we avoid the loss of information (Weingart et al., 2004), which is
particularly crucial, because one message can convey elements of different negotiation styles
at the same time (Knapp et al., 1988). This approach yielded 16,098 units in total. To ensure
unitizing reliability, 20 negotiation logs consisting of a sub-set of 2,298 units were re-unitized
by a second coder. Unitizing reliability was at a high level (Guetzkow’s U = 0.05; Guetzkow,
1950).
Second, we divided the log of every negotiation into four phases in terms of a stage/interval
approach, following Adair and Brett (2005). A stage approach is mostly time-driven (or based
on the number of speaking turns) and defines the particular negotiation stages without relating
them to negotiation behavior (e.g., Adair and Brett, 2005; Olekalns et al., 2003). Adair and
Brett (2005) split the negotiation into quarters based on the total number of speaking turns in
each negotiation and title their four stages as follows: 1. relational positioning, 2. identifying
the problem, 3. generating solutions and 4. reaching an agreement. By contrast, an episodic
approach separates negotiation phases according to the applied negotiation behavior (e.g.,
Adair and Brett, 2005; Baxter, 1982; Holmes, 1992; Olekalns et al., 2003).
The stage approach is appropriate to verify theoretical assumptions, since it divides the
negotiation into different stages without taking the applied negotiation behavior into account
(Adair and Brett, 2005). Therefore, any negotiation behavior can characterize every stage
(Adair and Brett, 2005), which seems a necessary precondition to examine our research
question concerning whether negotiation styles vary between negotiation phases. To adapt the
stage model more adequately to the specific characteristics of each phase, we decided not to
split up the negotiation into four equally long negotiation phases (e.g., Voeth and Herbst,
2005) but instead assigned only one-sixth of the negotiation time to the first phase, relational
positioning, and another one-sixth to the fourth phase, reaching an agreement. We attributed
one-third of the total negotiation time to both the second and the third negotiation phases
(identifying the problem and generating solutions). This time distribution is necessary, as
according to Adair and Brett (2005) the second phase is characterized by a detailed discussion
of the issues and the third phase by reciprocal submissions of offers. Therefore, they can be
compared to the second phase (reconnoitering the range) of Douglas’s (1957, 1962) three-
stage model, which is described as being longer than the first phase (Voeth and Herbst (2005)
take a similar approach). Moreover, this distribution of negotiation time is justified because
our case was designed in such way that the two negotiation parties were in contact before the
actual negotiation and already had an insight into each other’s possible preferences. Adair and
Brett (2005) emphasize that negotiators who are in an established relationship with their
counterpart may move faster through the first phase. Finally, the complex structure of the
case, which had five negotiation issues, required a longer phase of problem identification and
solution generation. Once the negotiation parties had dealt with these stages, deciding about
an agreement was not a subject of lengthy discussion.
Third, we developed an extensive coding scheme to identify the negotiation styles (e.g.,
Rahim, 1983; Thomas and Kilmann, 1974) and potential phase-specific patterns. Despite the
many different coding schemes applied to negotiation behavior (e.g., Alexander et al., 1991;
Angelmar and Stern, 1978; Donohue, 1981; Weingart et al., 1990), studies that code
negotiation styles are rare (e.g., Drake, 1995). Studies on negotiation styles either focus on
self-assessed styles via questionnaires (e.g., Slabbert, 2004), on peer-assessed negotiation
styles (e.g., Gross and Guerrero, 2000) or observer-rated negotiation styles (e.g., Munduate et
al., 1999). All these measures are prone to biases or fail to take into account the potential
impact of negotiation phases.
For this reason, a negotiation style coding scheme based on negotiation style literature
(Rahim, 1983; Rahim, 2002; Rahim and Bonoma, 1979; Shell, 2001; Thomas and Kilmann,
1974) was developed. The scheme described each of the negotiation styles by means of a
short characterization and different sub-categories with exemplary statements. For instance,
the dominating style was illustrated by sub-categories such as statements meant to stress
power, express threats and make commitments to unalterable positions. The integrating style
was explained by characteristics such as emphasizing collaboration, reaching mutually
satisfying agreements and revealing or asking for underlying interests. A compromising style
was described, for example, by fostering mutual concession-making, stressing fairness and
encouraging quick solutions. The obliging style was characterized by stressing the satisfaction
of the other party, yielding statements to preserve the relationship and statements disregarding
the negotiation party’s own needs. The avoiding style was described by making evasive and
uncertain statements and by postponing an issue. Moreover, we added a category for neutral
statements, in case a unit could not be assigned to one of the five negotiation styles.
Two trained coders and one of the researchers tested the coding scheme on some negotiation
logs to ensure that the diverse style categories could be identified and to improve the
elaborated scheme. Subsequently, two of the three coders coded every negotiation log
independently of each other (e.g., Weingart et al., 2004). The frequency of the five categories
assigned to the units within a phase indicated which specific negotiation style a negotiation
party was predominantly using in this particular phase.
To measure the economic negotiation performance of each party, we differentiated between

the effectiveness and the efficiency of the negotiation outcome. We calculated the individual
negotiation outcome (IO) of each negotiation party according to the respective profit function
of its role (of either the buyer or the seller). We standardized the IO within roles by means of
a Z transformation, which permits us to make a comparison between the IOs of the buyers and
the sellers. As for the efficiency dimension, we added a category in our coding scheme that
counted the number of words within one unit. In so doing, we were able to calculate the total
amount of words for every negotiation party. Moreover, the number of messages (a message
is marked by a time stamp and might consist of several units) was counted via another
category. As a third efficiency indicator, we used the negotiation time, which illustrates the
duration of the whole negotiation process. Fewer words and messages and a shorter duration
of the negotiation indicate a more efficient negotiation.
To assess the psychological negotiation outcome that expresses negotiators’ level of

satisfaction, we used the Subjective Value Inventory of Curhan et al. (2006). The Subjective
Value Inventory comprises 16 items subsumed under four sub-scales (feelings about the
instrumental outcome, the self, the process and the relationship) and is measured on a seven-
point Likert scale. As we were interested in how phase-specific negotiation style patterns
influence negotiators’ satisfaction with the relationship with their counterpart, we
concentrated on the feelings about the relationship sub-scale. This sub-scale indicates the
level of satisfaction as expressed through elements such as trustworthiness. Overall, lower
values on the scale indicate less satisfaction, and higher values suggest greater satisfaction.
We tested the sub-scale for reliability by means of Cronbach’s Alpha (Cronbach, 1951). The
achieved Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the feelings about the relationship sub-scale was
0.93.
3.3 Data analysis and results
As mentioned above, the frequency of assigned categories to one unit indicated which style a
negotiator was using predominantly in a specific phase. To ensure that our coding system met
the criteria of interpretive reliability (Folger et al., 1984), we referred to Cohen’s kappa
(1960): Cohen’s kappa values were significant and varied from 0.67 to 0.74 between coders,
which can be judged as substantial agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977). Considering the
Cohen’s kappa value per category, the values varied between 0.47 and 0.74 (compromising =
0.47; integrating = 0.71; dominating = 0.74). Values above 0.41 can still be evaluated as
moderate (Landis and Koch, 1977). Regarding the avoiding and obliging category, no
(significant) results could be obtained, as the categories were either not or barely assessed (see
also Table 1). In the case that one of the coders could not clearly assign a style to a
negotiation party or the appointed style varied across them, the coders discussed the situation
in order to resolve any disagreement.
Table 1 shows the results of the chi-square test run in SPSS when the Monte Carlo method is
applied and reflects the distribution of the single styles across phases. The Monte Carlo
method was used, because our large 4x4 design makes an exact test calculation difficult, and
because 25% of the cells had an expected count of less than five (e.g., Camilli and Hopkins,
1978; Hammersley and Handscomb, 1964; Larntz, 1978). A significant positive correlation
between phases and negotiation styles could be detected (Cramer’s V = 0.21, p < 0.00;
Cramér, 1946). First of all, it is evident that none of the negotiation parties did apply the
avoiding negotiation style. Moreover, the obliging style was only used by two negotiation
parties in the fourth phase. Overall, 3.0% of the negotiators employed the compromising style,
and the latter was predominantly applied in the fourth phase. Clearly, the integrating style was
the most employed style (70.8%) across phases, followed by the dominating style (25.9%).
Furthermore, it becomes obvious that the integrating style is significantly less applied from
the first to the fourth phase, whereas the use of the dominating style shows a significant
increase from phase one to four. Hence, our results confirm that negotiation styles vary
between negotiation phases (see RQ1).
[Insert Table 1: Cross table between phases and negotiation styles]
As we were interested in the question as to whether or not negotiators display distinct, phase-
specific negotiation style patterns (RQ2), we combined the four assigned negotiation styles in
each of the negotiator’s phases. In total, we could detect 29 different phase-specific
negotiation style patterns across our sample (see Table 2). Five negotiation style patterns were
predominant and used by 75.4% of the negotiators. The most prevalent pattern (employed by
36.3% of the negotiators) was the one where negotiators continually applied the integrating
style. Owing to its characteristics, we named this kind of pattern the extreme problem solver.
The second pattern (wolf in sheepskin) was characterized by the integrating style in phases
one and two, and the dominating style in phases three and four. Patterns three (back stabber)
and four (tough relationship builder) were described by three phases of integrating and one
phase of dominating, either in the fourth or the third phase. The fifth pattern is marked by an
integrating phase at the beginning and followed by a dominating style until the end of the
negotiation. This pattern was named hardliner.
The integrating and dominating styles are clearly the most prevalent negotiation styles, while
the compromising and the obliging styles play a rather minor role. As mentioned above, the
avoiding style is not applied at all. The fact that the obliging and avoiding negotiation styles –
which either concentrate on the other party’s interest or neglect the interests of both parties –
barely occur in the context of buyer-seller negotiations (or not at all) is in line with the
findings of Perdue et al. (1986). Moreover, the compromising negotiation style is sometimes
described as a half-hearted attempt to apply an integrating style and therefore not considered a
separate style (Pruitt, 1983).
In the following analysis we will focus on the five predominant patterns that are applied by
most of the negotiators.
[Insert Table 2: Identified phase-specific negotiation style patterns]
To examine whether phase-specific negotiation style patterns have an impact on the

individual negotiation outcome (effectiveness dimension), the efficiency of the negotiation
(RQ3) and the negotiators’ satisfaction (RQ4), we first had to consider the intraclass
correlation coefficient (ICC) because of our sample’s dyadic structure. Using the ICC, we
tested the nonindependence between a buyer and a seller together forming one dyad (Kenny et
al., 2002). This is necessary as, for instance, the buyer’s performance might have an impact
on the seller’s performance within a dyad. We calculated the ICC according to one of the
procedures proposed by Kenny et al. (2002): By means of a one-way ANOVA, we obtained
the mean square between and within groups, which allowed us to estimate the ICC. We found
a negative ICC of -0.78 (p = 0.0001) for the individual negotiation outcome, strong positive
ICCs of 0.81 for the number of messages and 0.60 for the number of words (p = 0.001). The
ICC value for the feelings about the relationship sub-scale was 0.48 (p = 0.0001). As these
ICC values prove the nonindependence of our data (Kenny et al., 2002), our individuals
(buyers and sellers) are nested within a dyad.
To consider the fact of a nested sample, we referred to a multi-level model (Turel, 2010)
using the HLM program (HLM 7; Raudenbush et al., 2010). In these analyses, individual
negotiators (level 1) were nested within dyads (level 2). We conducted a series of analyses to
predict (1) the individual negotiation outcome, (2) the efficiency of the negotiation, (3) the
satisfaction of the negotiation party and (4) the satisfaction of the counterpart. In each of these
analyses, we included six dummy variables at level 1; they represented each of the phase-
specific negotiation style patterns. All these dummy variables were entered uncentered. We
also dropped the intercept (sometimes referred to as a zero-intercept model). No predictors
were entered at level 2. We created our multi-level model for the individual negotiation
outcome as dependent variable (analogous to the other dependent variables) as follows:
Level 1: γij = β1j * extreme problem solverij + β2j * wolf in sheepskinij + β3j * back stabberij + β4j * tough
relationship builderij + β5j * hardlinerij + β6j * diverse phase-specific patternsij + rij
Level 2: β1j = γ10; β2j = γ20; β3j = γ30; β4j = γ40; β5j = γ50; β6j = γ60;
Table 3 presents our results for the standardized individual negotiation outcome (IO). The
coefficients illustrate the mean standardized IO for each phase-specific negotiation style
pattern. Negotiators who applied the tough relationship builder pattern differ significantly
from 0 and are thus more successful than the average negotiator in our sample (IOstand =
0.3771; p < 0.05). Table 3 also shows that negotiators who applied the extreme problem
solver pattern significantly underperformed compared with the average negotiator in our data
sample (IOstand = -0.1649; p < 0.05). The diverse phase-specific patterns variable subsumes all
patterns that are not included in one of the five predominant patterns and are considered in our
analysis to guarantee a full design for our model estimation. However, because of the variety
of single style patterns, an interpretation of the results of the diverse phase-specific patterns
variable does not appear to be meaningful.
To discern whether there are significant differences between the single phase-specific
negotiation style patterns, a linear hypothesis testing was conducted between each of the
single style patterns and afterwards corrected manually for an adjustment of multiple
comparisons (mc) by means of the Bonferroni-Holm method (Holm, 1979). Thereby, it could
be detected that the pattern tough relationship builder performs significantly better than the
pattern extreme problem solver (chi-square = 7.21; df = 1; p < 0.01; pmc < 0.1) with respect to
the IO. The results of the full design appear in the appendix. Since the results have shown that
the other phase-specific negotiation style patterns do not differ significantly from each other
with regard to the IO, we concentrate in the following on a comparison between the extreme
problem solver and the tough relationship builder patterns.
[Insert Table 3: Relationship between phase-specific negotiation style patterns and individual
outcome]
To test whether different phase-specific patterns yielded higher negotiation efficiency (RQ3),
we investigated the number of messages and words that a negotiation party sent and the total
negotiation time it spent before reaching an agreement. Table 4 shows that negotiation parties
that apply the extreme problem solver pattern use the smallest number of messages and words.
With an average negotiation time of 76.62 minutes, they are also the fastest to reach an
agreement. Negotiators who employed the tough relationship builder pattern – the most
effective style pattern – directly follow the extreme problem solver pattern in terms of
efficiency (mean number of messages = 41.70; mean number of words = 740.13; mean
negotiation time = 81.43 minutes). However, no significant differences were found between
these two phase-specific negotiation style patterns with respect to the efficiency indicators.
[Insert Table 4: Relationship between phase-specific negotiation style patterns and

negotiation efficiency]
Finally, we wanted to know whether different phase-specific patterns vary in their impact on
the satisfaction of the negotiator and its counterpart (RQ4) as expressed by the feelings about
the relationship sub-scale. A higher mean value on the sub-scale represents greater
satisfaction with the relationship. Table 5 shows the mean values for a negotiation party, and
Table 6 presents the mean values for its counterpart:
[Insert Table 5: Relationship between phase-specific negotiation style patterns and the
negotiation party’s satisfaction with the relationship]
[Insert Table 6: Relationship between phase-specific negotiation style patterns and the
counterpart’s satisfaction with the relationship]
The results in Table 5 reveal that negotiators who applied the extreme problem solver pattern
rated the relationship with their counterpart the best (mean = 4.98). Negotiators who showed
the tough relationship builder pattern have the second highest value and do not differ
significantly from negotiators applying the extreme problem solver pattern.
Table 6 reveals similar results concerning the satisfaction level of the negotiation counterpart:
Negotiators who use the extreme problem solver or tough relationship builder pattern achieve
the highest level of satisfaction with their counterpart. The mean values between the two
patterns are not significantly different from each other.
4. Discussion
The aim of our paper was to analyze whether and, if so, how negotiation styles vary between
the different negotiation phases. We further investigated the impact of our identified phase-
specific negotiation style patterns on negotiation performance and negotiation satisfaction.
The negotiation’s effectiveness and efficiency were used to measure negotiation performance.
We assessed negotiation satisfaction from the perspective of both the negotiators and their
counterparts.
Our study revealed that negotiation styles do vary between the different negotiation phases.
The integrating style is applied especially at the beginning of the negotiation and decreases
toward the end, whereas the use of the dominating style increases over the course of the
negotiation. These results confirm Adair and Brett’s (2005) expectation that negotiators, once
they have identified the problem, try harder to push their own interests forward. Moreover, 29
distinct phase-specific negotiation style patterns were found, but three-quarters of negotiators
used only five of them. On the basis of their characteristics, these five patterns could be
classified as extreme problem solver, wolf in sheepskin, back stabber, tough relationship
builder and hardliner. The extreme problem solver understands the entire negotiation as a
joint task to solve and might miss the right moment to push through his own interests. The
negotiator who is a wolf in sheepskin pretends to pursue a joint problem-solving approach in
order to ascertain the interests of the other party. As soon as all preferences are disclosed, he
uses these insights in an attempt to grow his slice of the negotiation pie until the end of the
negotiation. In so doing, however, he neglects to build a foundation for future relationships.
The behavior of the back stabber, who stresses the win-win approach but turns to a
dominating style when an agreement is already within reach, can easily put the whole deal at
risk. Negotiators who deploy the tough relationship builder pattern stress that negotiation is a
joint task until it comes to the point of generating a solution, where they try to push through
their own interests. Subsequently, they attempt to finish the negotiation by restoring an
ambiance of mutual confidence. A challenge of this pattern is for the party to impart its
relationship intentions credibly after having exhibited reckless behavior toward its
counterpart. Negotiators of the hardliner pattern open the negotiation by stressing a win-win
situation, but straight after the opening they follow only their own interests. As they are not
interested in revealing the other party’s preferences, they might neglect to enlarge the
negotiation pie and pass up potential benefits.
Our second research objective was to find out how these phase-specific negotiation style
patterns impact the negotiations’ effectiveness and efficiency. Interestingly, the tough
relationship builder performed significantly better than the average negotiator, whereas
negotiators who applied the extreme problem solver pattern achieved the lowest individual
negotiation outcome. In this context, the tough relationship builder was more effective than
and as efficient as the extreme problem solver. It appears that the tough relationship builder
succeeds in showing tough negotiation behavior during the right phase in the negotiation. It is
not surprising that this pattern is as efficient as the extreme problem solver, because pushing
through positions takes as much time as exploring differences between the two negotiation
parties’ preferences. Furthermore, there are no differences between these two patterns
regarding the negotiator’s and the counterpart’s satisfaction level with the relationship, which
again stresses the superiority of the tough relationship builder pattern.
By analyzing negotiation styles from a phase-specific point of view, the present study
succeeded in showing the relevance of the distinction among negotiation phases. It therefore
provides useful additional insights into the existing literature on negotiation styles. In this
regard, we encourage future research to focus on observing negotiation styles between
negotiation phases more often in order to get deeper insights into negotiators’ style behavior.
For example, it would be interesting to examine how negotiators make the transition from one
negotiation style to another. Moreover, a phase-specific perspective could be promising for
other factors that have been shown to influence the negotiation process. It seems plausible that
preferred phase-specific negotiation style patterns depend on the individual’s culture, are
dictated by hierarchical positions or may change under time pressure.
Furthermore, on the basis of this new understanding of negotiation styles, valuable

implications can be formulated for practitioners. It has been shown that negotiators should not
only stick to their preferred style during the negotiation. Specifically, it seems
recommendable for practitioners to apply the tough relationship builder pattern. By starting
their negotiation with an integrating negotiation style, negotiators convey the message that
they are a trustworthy negotiation partner who considers the negotiation as a joint problem
that has to be solved. During the second phase, which concentrates on identifying the
problem, the integrating style allows for underlying interests to be revealed and thus for
getting an idea of the other party’s preferences and of the possible zone of agreement. In the
subsequent phase – where the objective is to generate a solution or at least to work toward a
decision – the dominating style pushes through the negotiator’s interests. In so doing,
negotiators get a larger part of the previously expanded negotiation pie. In the final phase of
the negotiation, practitioners should switch back to an integrating negotiation style, which
once again emphasizes cooperation and thus lays a good foundation for future negotiations.
Our study also comes with certain limitations. First, it was conducted via an online
negotiation platform. This has proved to be a valid setting to capture negotiation styles, since
all communication has to be expressed in written messages, which allows for conclusive
analyses of the negotiation styles. At the same time, the limiting influence of the
communication medium should be taken into account, since negotiators, when they are not
physically facing their counterpart, tend toward a more dominating negotiation style (Purdy et
al., 2000). For this reason, it is possible that our results do not correlate with those from a
face-to-face setting. Second, we only concentrated on the negotiation party’s style without
considering the influence the interaction with the negotiation counterpart may have had. It is
conceivable that a certain negotiation style in one phase came in reaction to the negotiation
style that the counterpart was using. Future research should expand our study by also focusing
on the interaction between negotiation parties during all negotiation phases. Third, our study
was based on a negotiation case with integrative potential. This may have stimulated the use
of the integrating negotiation style. Therefore, the conclusions may not hold up for
negotiations with a purely distributive character.
Overall, our study proved that negotiators should be trained to become acquainted with
different negotiation styles – beyond their preferred negotiation style – in order to adapt their
negotiation style to the characteristics of the different negotiation phases.
Notes
1 This explanation was presented in the same way in a former conference paper.
Anonymous (2014), “Is there a better style to negotiate? An analysis of negotiation styles
and their impacts on buyer-seller negotiations”, Proceedings of the 43rd EMAC
Conference, Valencia, Spain.
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Appendix
[Insert Appendix Table: Full design of phase-specific negotiation style patterns and
individual outcome]
Phase Compromising Dominating Integrating Obliging Total
1 Absolute frequency 0a 17a 223b 0a, b 240
Percent within phase 0.0 7.1 92.9 0.0 100.0
2 Absolute frequency 3a 53a 184a 0a 240
3 Absolute frequency 8a, b 90b 142a 0a, b 240
4 Absolute frequency 18a 89b 131c 2a, b 240
Total Absolute frequency 29 249 680 2 960
Percent 3.0 25.9 70.8 0.2 100.0*
Monte Carlo method: based on 10,000 sampled tables
Each subscript letter denotes a sub-set of style categories whose column proportions do not differ significantly from each
other at the .05 level.
* Minor deviations from 100 due to rounded numbers.
Style Patterns Across
No. Style Patterns Across the Four Phases Frequency Percent No. Frequency Percent
the Four Phases
1 1-1-1-1 (extreme problem solver) 87 36.3 16 2-1-1-3 2 0.8
2 1-1-2-2 (wolf in sheepskin) 26 10.8 17 2-1-2-1 2 0.8
3 1-1-1-2 (back stabber) 25 10.4 18 2-1-2-2 2 0.8
4 1-1-2-1 (tough relationship builder) 23 9.6 19 1-1-1-4 1 0.4
5 1-2-2-2 (hardliner) 20 8.3 20 1-1-2-4 1 0.4
6 1-2-1-1 9 3.8 21 1-1-3-2 1 0.4
7 1-2-1-2 8 3.3 22 1-1-3-3 1 0.4
8 2-2-2-2 5 2.1 23 1-2-3-2 1 0.4
9 1-1-1-3 4 1.7 24 1-3-1-3 1 0.4
10 1-2-2-1 4 1.7 25 1-3-3-3 1 0.4
11 1-1-2-3 3 1.3 26 2-1-3-3 1 0.4
12 1-1-3-1 3 1.3 27 2-2-2-1 1 0.4
13 1-2-1-3 2 0.8 28 2-2-2-3 1 0.4
14 1-2-2-3 2 0.8 29 2-3-1-2 1 0.4
15 2-1-1-1 2 0.8 Total 240 100.0*

1 = Integrating; 2 = Dominating; 3 = Compromising; 4 = Obliging
* Minor deviations from 100 due to rounded numbers.
Fixed Effect Coefficient – Standard Error
p-value
(Phase-specific Negotiation Style Pattern) IO Standardized (SE)
1-1-1-1 (extreme problem solver) -0.1649 0.0802 0.041
1-1-2-2 (wolf in sheepskin) -0.0290 0.1984 0.884
1-1-1-2 (back stabber) -0.1183 0.2324 0.611
1-1-2-1(tough relationship builder) 0.3771 0.1672 0.025
1-2-2-2 (hardliner) -0.0938 0.2090 0.654
diverse phase-specific patterns 0.1909 0.0911 0.037
N = 240
Fixed Effect Coefficient – Coefficient – Coefficient –
(Phase-specific Negotiation Mean No. of Messages Mean No. of Words Mean Negotiation Time
Style Pattern) (SE) (SE) (SE)
1-1-1-1 41.40 646.24 76.62
(extreme problem solver) (2.06) (35.64) (1.89)
1-1-2-2 56.08 862.27 88.73
(wolf in sheepskin) (5.12) (57.16) (1.85)
1-1-1-2 69.16 935.96 87.68
(back stabber) (7.84) (62.51) (2.18)
1-1-2-1 41.70 740.13 81.43
(tough relationship builder) (3.81) (62.03) (2.40)
1-2-2-2 68.05 816.95 88.25
(hardliner) (4.55) (50.74) (2.00)
Diverse phase-specific 46.15 684.46 80.51
patterns (3.90) (40.81) (1.87)
N = 240
Fixed Effect
Coefficient – Mean Relationship (SE)
(Phase-specific Negotiation Style Pattern)
1-1-1-1 (extreme problem solver) 4.98 (0.16)
1-1-2-2 (wolf in sheepskin) 3.72 (0.27)
1-1-1-2 (back stabber) 4.08 (0.24)
1-1-2-1 (tough relationship builder) 4.74 (0.27)
1-2-2-2 (hardliner) 3.59 (0.30)
Diverse phase-specific patterns 4.44 (0.21)
N = 222
Fixed Effect
Coefficient – Mean Relationship (SE)
(Phase-specific Negotiation Style Pattern)
1-1-1-1 (extreme problem solver) 4.95 (0.16)
1-1-2-2 (wolf in sheepskin) 3.95 (0.20)
1-1-1-2 (back stabber) 3.93 (0.30)
1-1-2-1 (tough relationship builder) 4.96 (0.20)
1-2-2-2 (hardliner) 3.39 (0.35)
Diverse phase-specific patterns 4.39 (0.21)
N = 222
Fixed Effect
(Phase-specific
Negotiation Style Pattern)
1-1-1-1 1-1-2-2 1-1-2-1
1-1-1-2 1-2-2-2
Mean difference of IO (extreme (wolf in (tough relationship
(back stabber) (hardliner)
(mean value of the line minus problem solver) sheepskin) builder)
mean value of the column)
(standard error of mean
difference)
1-1-1-1 -0.1359 -0.0466 -0.5420* -0.0711
(extreme problem solver) (0.2200) (0.2514) (0.2018) (0.2359)
1-1-2-2 0.0893 -0.4062 0.0648
(wolf in sheepskin) (0.3584) (0.2748) (0.3216)
1-1-1-2 -0.4955 -0.0245
(back stabber) (0.2871) (0.3145)
1-1-2-1 0.4710
(tough relationship builder) (0.2676)
1-2-2-2
(hardliner)

Significant according to Bonferroni-Holm method (1979), if p1 < ; p2 < ; p3 < ; …; p10 < (with k being the total number
of statistical tests; here k = 10), p1 < p2 < p3 < … < p10 and an expected significant level of α < 0.1.
* = significant difference

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Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing

A phase-specific analysis of negotiation styles

&amp; Industrial Marketing, Vol. 32 Iss 4 pp. - http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JBIM-11-2015-0233

*Related content and download information correct at time of download.

Design/Methodology/Approach – The study is based on a large online negotiation

regard to their impact on negotiation performance but not negotiation satisfaction.

Research limitations/implications – The study demonstrates that a phase-specific analysis of

Practical implications – Negotiation practitioners get to know different phase-specific

Originality/value – The paper contributes to existing negotiation style literature, because it is

Keywords – Negotiation styles, Negotiation phases, Negotiation performance, Negotiation

Paper type Research paper

2. Literature review and research questions

2.1 Understanding negotiation styles

them: The former refer to a competing, collaborating, compromising, accommodating and

2.2 Negotiation phase approaches and negotiation styles

RQ1: Do negotiation styles vary between negotiation phases?

Besides the effectiveness of the negotiation (= individual negotiation outcome), it is important

RQ3: How do distinct phase-specific negotiation style patterns impact

RQ4: How do distinct phase-specific negotiation style patterns impact negotiators’

3.1 Participants and procedures

can only be expressed via text messages.

To measure the economic negotiation performance of each party, we differentiated between

To assess the psychological negotiation outcome that expresses negotiators’ level of

3.3 Data analysis and results

[Insert Table 1: Cross table between phases and negotiation styles]

[Insert Table 2: Identified phase-specific negotiation style patterns]

To examine whether phase-specific negotiation style patterns have an impact on the

[Insert Table 4: Relationship between phase-specific negotiation style patterns and

Furthermore, on the basis of this new understanding of negotiation styles, valuable

Personal Selling & Sales Management, Vol. 14 No. 3, pp. 25-41.

power to resolve disputes”, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 31-52.

15 2-1-1-1 2 0.8 Total 240 100.0*

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& Industrial Marketing, Vol. 32 Iss 4 pp. - http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/JBIM-11-2015-0233