Time, Memory, and Selflroodtn De Trinitate

One of the most interesting philosophical issues in Augustine's De l-rinitutt,is tltc

distinction between trvo levels of self-relatedness in the human mind. introducctl
in books 9 and 10, and turther explained in book 14. The flrst level Augustinc calls
se c'ogiture, the second se nosse. Both levels yield an image of the divirrc tlirrity
irr the human mind, but the se nosse is more fundamental. ln book l0 Augustinc
calls the three elements forming the trinity in the human mind memrtritt. itttrl
legentioanduoluntos/amor/dilec:tio,butinbook l4hespeaksmoreprecisclyol'rrn
"inner" memoria sLti, intellegentia sui and dilectio sal that make up the ,rc rro,s,v':
We have to "refer to the inner memory of the mind (interior mentis nrcnutritt) tvitlt
which it remembers itself and the inner understanding(interktr inteLleT4ctrtitt) witlt
which it understands itself, and the inner will (interior uoluntas) with 'uvhieh it
loves itself, where these three are simultaneously together and always havc bcrrr
simultaneously together frclm the moment they began to be, whether thcy rve rt'
being thought about (c:ogitare) or not."l
In this paper I will first expound Augustine's distinction between st <'tt,\itttti'
andse no.sse, following sections of books 9, 10 and 14. Then, I will fircus on ()r)c
of the three elements of se nosse, namely the memoria sui interior. Of coursc. thc
other two elements, intellegentia.sai and amor sui, also deserve a thorclughgoirrg
investigation, but fbr the current purpose I will restrict my analysis to nt('tn()ritt.
My approach will be indirect. I will compare the "inner" memoria sr.ri, ol'rvlriclr
Augustine speaks only in De Trinitate 14, to four other uses of the conccl;t ol'
memoria in Augustine. The tirst is memory of past experiences as found at thc
beginning of the memoria tractate in Confessiones 10. The second is mernrlry
of apriori truths including memory of God as explained in the main part ol' thc
memoria tractate and in some sections of De Trinitate 14.Third is timc lirrrnirrg
memory as in the analysis of time rn Confessbnes 11, where Augustine says tlrat
time as distentio animi is constituted by expectation, attention and mcrnory. Iiolth,
if there is an "inner" memoria szzi, there should also be an ordinary or an "()ulcr"

l. AUGUSTINE, De Trin. 14.10 (ed. W.J. Mountain, CC,SL 50A, Turrrlrout, l9(rll). Inrrrsl:rliorr
The Wtrks of Stint Augustine. A Trttnslation .for the 2lst ('?ntur.\' 'l'ltt 'li'ittitt. lrrlrrxlut tiorr
Translation and notes E. Hill, O.P, New York, 1991.
 /(,//.lAi,N/,\ ltli.l( l I I l' N I )( )lil
ut(,nt()t iu. iut(l wc llrvc to irsk rvltirt tlrc tlillt'r't'rrtt' ts lre ltt,cttl llttsc llvo. llr llrt'
lirllorvirrg, I rvill usk il lltcsc Iilur corrccpts ol' ntt'nt()t-i(t lrrc i(lctllicltl or il lll('y lllt'
tlillcrcrrl, an(l il'thc lattcr is truc, hor.v thcy are rclalcd ttl cach otltcr ittlcl lo lltc ittttct'
tttt,tttrtritr srri. I will not bc able to give a complete analysis of thc inrtcr tttt'tttt't i(t
.trri (l)t T'rin. 14). However, I hope to get closer to an understanding by corrtprrlirrg
this rncaning ctf memorid to the other meanings in Augustine.
I. - Sr coGITARE AND .tE No.tsg
ln De Tiinitare, Augustine conceives of the human mind as an image of the
clivine trinity. For an interpretation of the human mind as imago Dei, Augustinc
could reach back to a tradititin that emerged primarily from biblical writings
(Gn 1.26: let us make humans in our image and likeness), but also from Platonic
sources. Augustine takes up this tradition but gives it a new meaning by claiming
that the human mind is an image of God because it is trinitarian in structure.
'lo
concluct his project, Augustine has to show that the four principles of trinitarian
ontology, as explained in De Trinitate 5-1 , namely unity of essentia, threefold-
ness, radical equality, and mutual relatedness apply not only to God but also to the
human mind.2
ln book 9, Augustine distinguishes three elements in the human mind, namely
the mens, its self-love (amor sui), and its self-knowledge (notitia s,l), and sets out
to show that they make up a trinitarian structure. But for two reasons. Augustine
is not satisfied with this idea. The first reason isthat mens, ttmor stti, and notitia
srl form a trinity only if the mincl is in a state of moral and intellectual perfection.3
This concerns radical equality as a principle of trinity. For an equality between
umrtr sui and rnens occurs only if the mind loves itself in the right way, i.e. accord-
ing to its objective value, which makes it stand higher than material gclods and
lower than God. Likewis e, notitia sal equals the mens only if the mens interprets
itself correctly as what it really is, namely an intelligible being ranked higher than
material bodies due to its intelligibility, and lower than God due to its mutability.
Thus, in book 10 Augustine transcends the trinity of mens, amor sui, and notitia
sal, arguing that not only the wise man's mind is trinitarian, but the human mind
as such. If the human mind is really created in the image of God, then being such
an image cannot be a privilege of the saint, but must be an undeletable character
of any human being.
The second shortcoming of the mens - amor sni notitia sili trinity is this: The
Delphian injunction "know thysclf' summons us to turn away from the outward
world to seek ourselves. to become aware of what we are, and thereby to develop
2. Cf. J. BRACHTENDoRp, Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nuch Augustirtus
St'lhstrefle.rion untl Erkenntnis Gottes in ,,De Trinitate", Harnburg, 2000' pp 56-78.
'1. Au(ius'r'rNH. De Trin.9.4: 9.8.
lllll,.. lll Al()lil. t,\'/r',/ I I u( )()t, lN I )l,. llilNllAll
rttt rttlctltutlt'st'll krrorr lt rllr'. lr r'o,qittttirt,srrl.'l [-lut ltorv t:rrr lltc rtrintl scek itscll il it
tkrcs ttot ulrcirtly krrtrrv rlst'll'l As Augustinc;-xrirtts out, irll scckrrrg l)rcsul)l)()scs lt
krrorvlcdgc ol lvhirl rs sotrglrt, othcrrvise thc seeker woulcl ncithcr krurrv rvhat hc is
Iookirrg tilr. nrlr could he cven realize rvhcn the itern sclught is tirurrd.-5 liurtlrclnrorc.
irny act of seeking is motivated by love. But, as Augustine asscrts. thcre- is no
irrrlctcrminate love. Love always loves sclmething and knows rvhat it loves. -l'hus.
lllc act of striving for self'-knowledge, as the Delphian injunction commands it. is
sparked by a love that must already include the knowledge strivcn for.
Thus, Augustine claims, there must be a kind of self-arvareness or sslf'-pl'esr.nce
that does not come into being through an act of self'-reflection, but is plior to
it and cnables it. One can seek and find only if one knows what to seek. §r,
losse, for Augustir.re, is the preceding self-knowledge that enables thc seeking
and finding of oneself as commanded by the Delphian injunction. Accordirrgly.
Augustine distinguishes t'"vo levels of self-relatedness. He calls the fundarncntal
level of self'-presence se nosse', the secondary level is called se cogitura.6 Co,qittrt't,
is the mode of discursive thinking, in which we think our thoughts succcssivcly.
Here we can make various things the object of our attcntion, even ourselvcs. 'l'lrc
Delphian injunction "knclw thyself'' demands us to rvithdraw our attentiorr lhrrr
external objects and to direct it tor.vards ourselves instead-this happcns orr tlrc
level of r:ogitore. The se no.r.re, however, is intuitivc, not discursive; herc thc scll'
is not one possible object of attention amons others, but the only possiblc «lnc. As
Augustine points out. being prescnt tcl oneself in a pre-reflexive, immediatc rnotle
is thc precondition fbr unclerstanding the Delphian injunction and for devcklping
areflexive self-understanding(cogitatio sLti), in rvhich mens,utnor sri and tttttititt
su.i are equal to each other. The human mind is summoned to think of itscll'(.rr,
cogitore). ForAugustine, it can do so only because it is and has always been arvirrc
of itself (se nossa). By its very nature the human mind is always and incessantly
acquainted by itself in the .re nosse.l
ln De'frinitalc 10, Augustine further analyzes the sc noss'c and finds thrcc clc
ments in it, which he calls memoriu sui, inteLlegentia sui and uoluntos slri.8 Thcsc
three constitute a trinitarian structure as r,?c/r.\, omor sLri and ruttitiu szri did irr
.+. Aucrrs'l lNE. De'li'in. 10.4 12.
AtxrusrrNE. De Trin. 1(\.4.
-5.
6. AU(;USTINE. Dc Trin. 10.19.
7.Cf.J.BRACH'I'trNDoltt.DiaStrukturtksntenstlili<'henGclslc,r....pp. l(r3 92:l..ilirr.scttr.rr.
Tht' Reulit.t tll the Mind. Augustint's Philosoplti«tl Argunrcnts fbr tlu, Hunturt Sorrl l,: tt .\ltitittrtrl
Substurtte. Lonclon - Nerv York. 1986, pp. 159 201: R. KANY, Au,qrr.ttirr.r 'liirtiriit.vltttl;ot
Ililurt:., Kritik urtd Wciterlülrung dcr nrtderrtt,rt l-ors(hune :.u ,,[)c 'liirtittttr"', liibirrgtrr. J00/.
pp 509-341 firradetailcdanalysisolDc'l-rin.l0cf.alsoE.Bt,R\4oN. l.r,cogilo,l,utsl,tl,,'rts,',,1,
.;ttirtt Augttstirt. Paris. 2001, pp.17 104: l9.l 228.
fl. Atr(;usftNE. De Trirt. )0.11.
ll'+ .l( )l l.\NN t,,\ lili.l( II I t NI )( )tit
book 9.') Howcver, sit.tcc.rt'rlo,sst' is prior to .tt' t o,gitttn'. ttre llirrrty ol nt('ttt,t t(t \ui.
intellegerttio.s'ul and toluntus.rrrr is the trucly Iirurrtlationul orrc. Iirr Arrrrrstint'.
self-knowledge as cogitatio sui is cliscontinuor-rs. becausc lovc arrrl irrtcllcct cirrr
aim at any object. Only in rare situations do they direct thcrnselves at thc lrrintl
itself. The .s(' ,r()s.re, hclrvever, is continuous. Here, Augustine says. thc nrintl "rvirs
seen ahvays to kno"v itself and alrvays to will itselfl' and that "it rnust at the sarltc
tirne be seen always to remember itself and alr,vays to understand and lovc itsell''
(De'frin. 10.19). "The hurnan min<I. thcn, is so constructed that it never docs not
remember itself, never cloes not understand itself. neverdoes nclt lovc itself'(Dt,
Trin. l4.llt). By clairning the steacliness of sr,rro.s,ra, Augustine seemingly wants
to accour)l tor the continuity of the identical self that persists rvhether it has a
cogitutio.rul or not.
Augustirre is r'vell arvare that the terms of nu'moriu, intelleg,entia, uoluntas,
il appliecl to rc i?or.re. are misleacling. Following his reasonins here helps us
distinguish the inner tnemoria sri from ordinaly (rlr outer) nlemory. In ordinary
understanding there is a temporal diff'erence betrveen intellegentitt and nrcnruriu.
First. the intellegentia grasps a thought, then stores it in the memory where it can
be fbuncl and re-actualizcd later through remembc'ring. Norrnally, intellegettitt
and ne nttriu peribrm their ircts in three steps succeeding each other in tirrre. In the
.\e noss(, hnrvever, inrellegettiu slri and memoriu,vri are "sinrultaneclus" and have
always bccn simultaneous. Othenvisc the issue o1'seeking and finding rvould lead
to an infinite regress, because finding oneself means gaining an intellegenti(t sui;
seeking anrl finding horvcver arc possiblc only through an already cxisting knrlrvl-
edgc trl'rvhat is sotttltl in mct)l()r). i.c. throur:lr a tn(tn(trid .strit a tnttttttt'iu .ttri.
horvever. must be preccded by an ittel.legentiu.st.ti that is stoled in memory; this
intellegenliu.rri. again. can be acquirecl only on the basis of a pre-existins tnento-
rla sui. [l' this r,verc trr.re. secking and finding ctneself lvoulcl be just impossible.
Augustine, ltorvever. argues that, becar.rse we are able to seek and lind ourselves,
thcre nrust bc a sc rrrr,r,rr, r.vhere tlrc- huntan mind is imrnediätcly knorvn to itsclf,
'"vherc there is no necd to seek ancl find, because the mind has ahvays already
found itself. lvhcre the rnind does not havc Io becoma present to itself, bu1 rs and
alr'vays lrcrs been prcsent to itself. Expressed in the tcrms of intt'llegentia sll and
ttu'rrutritr.rrri: On the lcvel of ,yt,rros,rr'. neither mttttoriu.sui is prittr to ittlc!lt,.qtttriu
.rli. ncrr is irttcllegenlia .rlr prior Ict tnenrtrkt.srri, but they exist simultaneously. For
Augustine, the irterior »ramoriu,srri is co-prescnt to thc inte lleeentiu sui.to
Thereby the inncr nu'nutriu sar is ditl'erent fr«tnr the ordinary or outer mentory.
In the ordinary sense, rnenlory succeccls intelle,qcttrio in the process of learning.
and it prccceds intellcgcnlra in thc process of letlclnbering. but neither arc they
continuous nor simultaneous. Augustine is rvell arvare that using tl.re terms of
9. Au(;usTrNE. De Trin. lO.llf .
10. J. BRACHlENDoriF. Dle Struktur de,: tnurschlitltcn Cltisles.... pp. 2lti-30.
I IN'll'.. 11l' ll(r^'). l^/ t :I I l' I l( )( )l) /N I)lr'l'l{lNl'l^l l:
nt('nt()ri(t attd irttt'llt q, uti(t l(\ tlcscrilrc thc clctttcttls ()1 ,§(' /l(),s\(' rttigltl ptovoLr'
rrrisurrdcrstirnclirrgs. 'l'hcrclirrc. hc spcaks <tf int itrlt,t ittt' nrt'tttot'irr.rrri lo tlislrnl,rrislr
tlris lirrm of memory liom memory in the ordinary sensc.
Augustine aclmits that it is very harcl to clistinguish tntntrtritr untl ittltllr'.qt'rtri,t ;rl
rrll, il'the're is no temporal difference between thenr. He r.vritcs:
And thus it seems to bc difficult to distinguish in it Isc. the mindJ betrvr'crr ils rrrcruory
of itsclfancl its understanding of itself. That these are not in fhct trvo thinus. brrt orre
thing callecl by trvo names, is the impression you rnight get in this case rvhcre lhcv
are joinecl tclgether verv clos!'ly and one is not prior at all in time kr thc othcr. 1... I
And so even thoso who are slorver on the uptake rvill find some light shctl on thcst'
matters if we discuss things that are adclcd to our awarencss in tirne. anrl rvhat h:rppt'lrs
to it in a time sequcnce rvhen it remenrbers something it did not remernbcr hclirrc.
and sces something it did not see betbrc [ .] But this discussion calls lirr urxrthcr'
comnrencernent, since this book is alreatlv krng enough. \De'l'rin. l(l.lt))
Books I I through l-l are designed as a mental exercise fclr the slowcr nlin(ls l()
help them understand the simultaneity of inner ru ennrio.sal and inner itrttllt.qotritt
.rrri as elements of se nosss, and thus to teach them the ditTerence bctr.vccrr thc i l/r'
t'ior menutritL srri and the ordinary merlrory. Il Only in bclok 14.7 clocs Aug,trstirrt'
again reach the point of the endof book 10, so he can continue his scirr.elr lirl llrr'
imerge of the divine trinity in the hunran mind.
II. MeITcIRy or.' PAST E,XPERIENCES AND oF APRIORI TRLI'I.I Is
IN C('NFE.5.I/ONES IO
The fact that Augustine gives so much attention to rnemory in Cot1fi'.t.tiotrr'.r lol '
rnight seem surprising. After the narrative of Monnica's dcath at llrc t'rrtl ol
Corfes,sioncs 9.13 Augustine does not continue tclling the story ol'his lilt'. l,,r
cxatnple horv he returnecl «l Afiica ancl set up his nrorrastie comrnurrit)'. htrl stlrrt.,
a series of thcoretical treatises, of rvhich it is not irnmediately clc:rr lrorv tlrt'\
are related to the autobiography. Why does Augustine analyze metn()ry irrstt'rrtl ol
continuing the narrative <'tf CortJe ssione.s l-9'J Furthermore, in his myslicirl rrst t'rrls
as reported in Confcssiott'.s 7 and especially 9, menrory has alreatly ltlrtyctl rt tolt'
as one of the lorver levcls in the human mind that have to be trarrsccrttlctl irr ortl,'r
to reach reason, the fhculty that is capable of an intellectual vision ol'thc rlivirrr'.r I
Why does Augustine go back to the lorver levcl in book 10'7 Why docs lrc rlcrlit rrlt'
such an extensive tractate to a seerningly inf'erior faculty of the hunrarr rrrirrtl l
I l. Cl. Au(;trsrNE. De lr,r. 10. 19.
12. AU(;risl'rNF., &»if, l().tl 38.
I 3. Cf. ALlGus t'tNu,, C onl. t).21
-34.
14. Ar:(;r s rtNil. ('r»r/. L).)5:1.23.
 t.r(l lili.t( il
.l( )l l,,lNNl,,,\' 1 t.
'lir lttts'"r'ct-tltis ol tltc ut('tl(,t.t<t lt.t\
clt-tcstiort, r'vc ltavc to look ut tlte lirrtclion
tirtc.l5'l'l'rcnarrativeoihislife,asAugustinctcllsit.isast<lryol hissculclrlirr'(iotl
iutrl ol his l'inding God, a story that altogether stands undcr thc titlc: "llcstlcss is
our heart, until it rests in you"*the fänrous motto in ('onfc,t.siotrL,.s Ll. lrr rrlrrrv
places Ausustinc explains that one cannot search what one docs not krrolv at lclrsl
in some sense. Once more we have to consider that fbr Augustinc all scckinp
presupposes a knowledge of what is sou-eht, otherlvise the sceker would llcitlrcr'
know r'vhat he is looking fcrr. nor could he even realize when the item sought is
firund.
I recall rnyself to havc searched for ancl tirund many lost iterns. Fronr this cxpcricnec
I kno"v that, rvhen I rvas searching for unc ofthcm and someone said to rne "Perhaps
this is it. pcrhaps that is." I rvould alrvays say "No" until I rvas ofl'ered the object which
I sought. I-lnless I had it in nty mcmory. \\,halever it rvas. cvcn if'an offer rvas being
matle 1o me-. I rvould nol havc lbund it because I r.vould nol havc recognizetl it. This is
also §'hat h:rppens rvhcn rve seek ancl fintl sornething lost.l6
This holcls true alscl when we, in the restlessness of our hearts, seek God antl
find hirn. Even the search fbr God presupposcs some knowledgc of what is sought,
rvhich lve remember, 'nvherr rvc find God. Therefilrc. Augustine does not simply
cliangc the subject, rvhcn he encls the autobiographical part of the Confb.r.r'lr»zc.r
ancl starts discussing nrernory. Rathcr. he explains the conditions under r.vhich his
life as a search fi)r God stood in the f irst place, ancl he maintains that he always
already hacl a knor'vlcdge of God in his mer-nory. (One rnieht call this knowledge
Lt DcLtnl rrrr,r'.rt,.) ln the ntt,tnrtrirl trztctate r;»f ()onf'c,s.tionc.r 10, Augustine provides
evidencc oi'this knowlcclge. and discusses its oriqin arrcl its content. The knorvl
edge of God rcsiding in mernclry is thc precondition not only for seeking God. but
also fbr linding him. as happens in Augustine's intcllectual visions. The vision of
thc divine light, as Augustine clescribes it in Confc,s,tiones J .l 6. and of thc eternal
rvisclom (Cr»t[.9.211'.) woulcl not havc bcen possible if Augustinc' ]rad not been
able to retnembcr Gocl. Without nrenlory of God. orrl hearts u'oulcl not bc restless.
that is: the human intellect lvould not scarch for truth. and the will rvould not strire
l7
fbr happincss.
15. Clf. J. URACH'IBNDoRl:. Arrgr.r.stiuLts ('t»t.f<,ssit»rcs, Darrnstaclt,200-5. pp. 202-16.
16.AuciLrsItNFt. Conl. 10.21 (ed. M.Skutella - t-.Vcrhei.ien. CCSL2l . Turnhout. 1990).
'Irarrslittion: ,\uinl Augustint ConJession.s. Translatecl rvith an Introduction and Notcs by
H. Clhadrvick. Orf ord. 1991.
17. Corilpalctl to intcllcct ancl n'ill. menl()r.y proves to bc'a very special fecLrlt1,01'thc nrind. As
Augustine erplains in I)c lilx'rut urhitrio 3.lliO. hurnans in thc'ir fallen state sullcr lront i::ru'r,utrttt
(ignorance of God). rvhich is a dcfect of intcllcct, and lrom lillit'ultu.s. rvhich mcans thc unability
of the rvill to krve God ntore thart anything r-lse. These detects neetl «r be healed if a tallerr soLrl
is to bc rcclcenrecl. [n rlertorr- hou,cvcr. tht'hurnan n.rinrl is still rclalcci to (itttl even after lhc
lirll. Appurcntil. lirr Augustilre nrenior\ is not c()rruptc(l b-r sirr as l'"ill und irrtcllcct lrc. 'fhus.
ti'hett Augustirto anall,zes nrcnrory it Cortfi.r.tiortcs 10. hc is lrot plinrarily intcrcstcd in dclivclirrt
a picce ol psr'cholollv. although his tractatc contains marrv irrterestinu and sLrrprisingly nrotlcrn
p:vchologicltl irrsiglrts. hut hc aims at an cKposition of a verl, iirndamental rr'lation bolrvet.n llte
)tit
Nt )( l lLll . Lll,lll(/^'l l,V/t \l l l llt)t)l) lN l)ll l'lilNllT\ll1
Attgttstirtc sl:rrl: lrs ntt ut(tntt llilctirlc rvitlt a tliscttssiott ol rttcrttot its ol pirsl
t'xpclicrrces. i.c. ol sr'rrsrlrl irrrpr-cssiorts like ctllors artcl souttds, but c;uickly n)()vcs
()rl to lncrnorics concerning scicntific disciplincs and finally to thc qucstiort ol'
n)cr)rory of God. lrvcn in the realrn of the disciplines, rnerDory cl()cs n()l r))citn
gctting back to past experiences.ls ln fact, to remember here rneans to rc-prcscll
ilpriori truths like: the whole is bigger than its part, or: virtue is bctter than vicc.
Augustine talks about these apriori principles already in De magistro and ir) 1).
libent orbitrio.In De magisto, he shows that our knowledge of these prirrciplcs
rloes rrot stem fiom sense experience, but that the inner teaclrer bcstows tlrenr orr
us. irrrpressing them into our rninds.l9 ln De libero arbitrio, Augustine cxplirins
that God illumines our fäculty of reason by communicating to us the principlcs ol'
lll judgments.20 lf, as Augustine asserts, the outer teacher does not teach us thcsc
principles, but only reminds us of the knowleclge we already possess through thc
inner teacher. where does this knorvledge residc'? For Augustine, the knorvlcrlsc
of ir priori truths is krcated in lhe memorlzl, if "so relnote and pushcd irrto tlrc
background, as if in most secret caverns" (Conf. 10.11).
FolAugustine, there is an apriori knolvledge of Cod, which is the prcsup1.r115i1i1r11
of all seeking and finding God, and rvhich also resides in these secret cavcnlri ()l'
rlrcmory. Not only Christians but all human beings possess that kind «lf krrorvleclgc.
as all human beings know that the lvhole is bigger than its part. But hor,v is (iorl
knolvn here, as what is he known, or under what name? Augustine first ;rontle rs
tlre name of happiness (tleus est beatitutlo).2t Since all human beings rvunt 1o [rc
happy.they must, irccording toAugustine, have some idea of happiness. cvcn il'
they have never experienced it. Happiness, he concludes. might be thc titlc untlcr'
which all human beings possess knowledge of God in their rnemories. A scc«rrrtl
name, Augustine asserts, is the concept of truth, which is alscl universally knorvrr.
since everybody can distinguish truth fiom talsehood. Furthermore, cvcrybotly
loves truth since nobody wants to be deceived. Augustine writes:
The happy lite is joy based on the truth. This is joy grounded in you, C) Cot1, rvho
are the truth [...]. The happy til'e everyone desires: joy in the truth everyone $,ants.
1... I And rvhen they love (which is none other than joy grounded in truth) they arc
unquestionably loving the truth. And they would have no love fbr it unless therc rverc
sonre knor.vledge ol it in their memory. (ConJ. 10.33)
human mind and God.
I 8. Cf. AucusrrNE. Conl 10. l6f.
Ig. Cf. AuGUSrtNF. De mug. 10.33.
20. Cl. ALTGUSTtNI:. De lib. arh.2.l344O
21. C'l'. Au(ius'r'tNn. Conf, 10.29.
 '.)li I( )I I \N N 1 .,\' ltli.t(
'l'lrc trutlr, rtl lvlrich cvcry ltutttatt bcing lr:rs krrow'lctlgc ilr thc:ir rncrrroly, is (itxl
lrirrrscll.: ,,Whcrc Idiscovcred the truth thclc I lirund rny Ciod. trutlr itscll. rvhiclr
Il'orrr tlrc tinrc I learnt it, I have not fbrgotten" (Conl'. 10.3-S;.zz
Aucustine clearly employs a metaphysical notion of truth. Trutlr, filr hinr. is
not primarily a property of propositions but of things being. The truth ol'tlrings
is gmunded in God as the truth itself. It is only through truth itself, that reality
is recognizable for us, and that propositions can be true or false. According t«r
Augustine, truth is the light. in which the apriori truths. which are the principles «rl'
all judgment. become intellectually visible. rn De Trinitctc l4 Augustine speaks
about the principles of rmoral judgment:
It is in virtue of this light lsc. rvhich is Godl rhar evcn the godless can think about
eternity, and rightly praise and blame many elements in the bchavior of nten. And by
rvhat standards, I ask you. do theyjudge 1... l. Where do they,see these standarcls?
Where indeed arc tlrev *,ritten but in the book of that lisht rvhich is callecl truth, fmm
which every just larv is copied and transterred into the heart of the man [. . . ] by a kind
of impression, rathcr likc a seal which both passes into the rvax and does not leave the
signet ring. (De Trin. 14.21)
At the climax of his experiences of ntental ascent. Augustine recognizes Gocl
in the intellectual light, because this is the light of rrurh (cf-. Conf. 7.16), which he
knows in the remote caverns of his mernory.
But where does this knowledge of truth stem from'J "Where then did I find
you to be able to learn of yc»n" (Conf. 10.37)? Where and when were the notiones
inpre.t.urc23 inrparted on us? Where ancl rvhen has the inner teacher taught us?
Augustine rejects the idea that the rnemory of God results fiorn an experiencc
of God the soul might have made prior to embodiment. lf there is a preexisteuce
of the soul, it does not have any memory of it (cf. De Trin. 14.21). Nor can this
knowledge result from a tL.lnporal experience, because the light of truth is the
presupposition of all understanding. The knowledge of apriori truths, and of truth
itself, does not come into being in time, like e.g. Augustine's knowledge of rvhat
the city of Carthage looks like.2a Also, it cannot disappear from memory, as rhe
knowledge of Carthage can. I assume that according to Augustine the original
experience of God is the encounter witlr the inner teacher, who is the light of
our reason. This encounter in turn might simply occur in the experience of the
openness of reality to our understanding. Being is comprehensible, the world ancl
the mind are rationally accessible. The first perception of the light of truth might
22. Note that the Latin text does not mention "time" as Chaclwick's translation does: "Vbi enim
inueni ueritatem, ibi inueni deum meum, ipsant ueritatem, quam ex quo didici, non sum oblitus.
Ilaque ex quo te didici, manes in memoria mea [...]."
2-3. Augustine menti<.rns tntioiles inpre.tsae of truth (ConJ- 10.3.1), of the eternal latv (Dt tib.
nrb. l.l5), of happiness (De lih. arb.2.26; Conf- 10.29) of the good itself (De lrin. 8.4) antl ot'
rvisdom (De lilt. arb.2.40).
24. AUGUST|NTi, De Trin.8.9.
tI l l,.N I)( )liI llllll... NIl,,lll()/i). lN/,,\'l I I ll()()l) lN l)l:'lltlNllAI'l ) )()
sirrrllly bc Ilre cxlrt'rrt'n(('()l un(lcrstlncling rcality. As srxrrt r.rs lr htrrrrirn lrcirrF rrst's
tlrc lirculty ot rcusorr. it lirrtls itsc:lf as knowing alrcady thc upri«rri trullrs. ls Irirvirrg
rrolions impressed in itself, and as having already recoivcd thc tcachings ol the
irrrrcr teacher. The ori-tinal encounter with God cannot bc- of thc sanrc kinrl as
thc finding of Cod that Augustine tells us about in his autobiography. Thc laitcr
lilrcling happened at a moment in time, when Augustine was 32 years olcl. but,
irs argued before, it presupposed an already existing knowledge of God, a Dcurn
rros.se. Since the apriori knowledge of truth is the precondition for all seeking ancl
l'indin-g in time, it cannot be the result of such an act in time.
III. _ TIME FORMING MEMORY IN CoNFESs,loNEs 1I
[...] Once more memory plays an essential role in Augustine's treatise on tirnc.l5
Augtrstine explains time as clistentb onimi,26 made Llp by expectation. attelrtior).
and rnemory. The precise meaning of Augustine's analysis of time is controvcrsial
lund cannclt be discussed fully fbr the present purpose. It is quite clear, hclwcvcr,
that the initial question: "What is time?" is answered with a theory of measur-
ing tirne. The concept of tli,stentio dnimi is designed to explain, how time can bc
rneasured.2T
Primarily time is a continuous flux of infinitely small points of "now." Measurirrg
time, Augustine says, presupposes intervals or periods of time like a second. a
rninute. an hour or a year, that can be used as measures. But how can such a flux bc
transtbrmed into discrete periods of time? How can the word "now" designate not
just an infinitesirnally small point of presence, but a space in time like a second,
or an hour, or a day? This, Augustine says, is brought about by the hurnan mind,
namely by its distension. For Augustine, it is the impression of things made in thc
mind that is measured, when we measure time: "ln you [sc. the mind]. I affirm,
I rneasure periods of time. The impression rvhich passing cvents make upon you
abides when they are gone. That present consciousness is what I am measuring,
not the stream of past events which have caused it" (Conl. 10.36). The imprcssion
in the mind is not a continuous flux but an extent, which is created by the mind
stretching the moment of presence in a twofold way: first by getting holcl of thc
moment passing by and thereby stretching it backwards; second by anticipatirrg
the present moment, thereby stretching it forward. The transformation of a point
in time into an interval of time is performed by a stretching of the mind itsell', a
distentio animi. The forward distension Augustine calls expectcttio, the backwarcl
distension memorio. "There are three processes in the mind which in this is thc
active agent. For the mind expects and attends and remembers, so that r.vhat it
expects passes through what has its attention to what it remembers" (Crm.l. 10.37).
25. AUGUSTTNE. Conf. ll .17-38.
26. Ar,( iUSTINE. Cor/. I 1..1.1.
21 . C l. .1. llRA('l l't F:NDoRF. Augu.st i n us C o ttf c s.s i onc.s, pp. 24 I 46
2-10 l( )ll,lNNl,.,\' lili,l('u t t,Nt)( )tit,
Thus, accordtngto Cortlt'.r'.rrortr',r ll, tttcruory is rr prcsuppositiorr lirr tlre corrslitrr
tionof time (orof measuring tirne), bt:causc it is thc basis ol'lirrrrrirrg irrtcrvrrls rrrrtl
spaces of time.28
lV. - How ARE AUGUSTTNE's CoNCEp'rs oF Mevtxy
Relersn ro EACH Oruen?
By now we have touched all significant forms of memory in Augustine: inncr
memoria sal. ordinary memoria, memory of past experiences. memory of apriori
truths, and time forming memory. lt is time to ask what their mutual relationships
might be.
l) How is the time forming memory of Confessiones I I related to the memory
of past experiences as explained in Confessiones 10? A common point is that
memory in both senses includes an orientation towards the past-the past experi-
ence, and the moment of "now" passing by. But there are striking difTerences as
well. Memory of past experiences reaches back across a gap in time to re-actualize
impressions that once were actual but are no lclnger. This kind of memory builds a
bridge, so to speak, to contents of the mind that have no continuity with the present.
According to Confessiones ll, in contrast, memory does not bridge distances
in time, but constitutes intervals or unities of time. What the time constituting
memory keeps hold of is in continuity with the present, in fact, it is an essential
part of the present as a period of time. It is not directed towards a past experience,
but helps forming the experience of presence. Obviously the time constituting
memory is more fundamental than the memory of past experiences, since we can
remember only what once was a present experience.
2) How is memory of apriori truths related to time tbrming memory'i For
deeper understanding of this question, we have to turn to the end of Augustine's
treatise on time in Confe,ssiones 11. Here, the distentio animi appears in a quite
negative light. Augustine longs for gaining stability and solidity in the transcendent
Iife with God, who is the stable and solid truth himself. "Then I shall find stability
and solidity in you, in yourtruth which imparts form to me" (Conf. 11.40). But
the distentio animi is opposed to the stability in God. Distension here takes on
the meaning of distraction. which is the state of the mind as long as it lives in
a mutable world. Thus Augustine complains: "See horv my life is a distension"
(Ecce, di.stentio est ttita mea) (Conf. 11.39). "My years pass in groans, and you
Lord are my consolation. You are my eternal täther, but I am scattered in times"
(Conf. 11.39).
Augustine puts the distentio animi in contrast to reaching out to the eternal.
Quoting Phil 3.l3ff. he writes:
28. J. BRACHTENDoRF, Ar,grslinus Con;t'essiones, pp. 236 50.
I lhIl,;. hll.;Ll()^'). .t^/, \t l t ilt )( )t ) lN l)lr'l'lilNl l)\l l
,ll
"lirrgcllirrt:. llrr'p;r:t ;rrrl rrrorlrll l()l lowar(ls (ltosc l'tttttrc lltittgs rvlrtlt:uc lrln\rlor\
btrl (o "lltc llrings wlriclr irle hcli»c" nle, not slretclrcd ottl itt «lislnteliolr lrul crlt rrtlt'rl
irr rcach, uot by ltirrg pullcd apart but by concentratiorr. So I "pulsLrc tlrc plize ol lrip,lr
callirrg" rvhere I "rnay heürthe voice of praise" and "contcrlplalc your rlcliglrt" wlrrr lr
neither comes nor goes. (Conl. 11.39)
Augustine deliberately uses the word "before" (unte) from Paul's lcttcr to llrt'
I'hilippians, however not in a temporal sense of future events, but in a scrrsc ol'
priority. The eternal is "befbre" the temporal, because it is prior to it krgicirlly
and metaphysically. This can be seen clearly in the vision of Ostia (cl'. (i;r/. ().2.1 1.
.,vhere Augustine uses the same verse fiom the letterto the Philippians mainlrrirrirrg
that the goal of his ascent, namely Cod as the eternal truth itself, is utttc. i.c. prior
to the mutable r.vorld, fiom which Augustine starts his movement. Aprirlri truths
and even God himself do not reside in the future, but in eternity an«1 lhus iu'r'
"before" time and anything temporal. At the end of Confbssione.s ll, Augustirrc
summons the reader not to be distentus in time, butextentus. i.e. to rcach «rrrl lirr'
the eternal things.29 Augustine's mental ascents in Confessiones 7 ancl 9 arc cxrrrrr
plcs of such a reaching, or of being extentus, if under the conditions ol'tcrnl'ror':rl
lif'e. The extensio onimi will be fully realized only in the transccndertt lilc. rvlrcn'
there will be no time. no change and no distentio animi. Life in dislenlit, ttrrirrti i:
irnperfect. The happy life is the life of extensb animi. Memory of apriori tnrlhs is
apreconditiclnfortheextensionof mind,becausehumanscouldnotrcachorrl lor
God, if they did not know him in their memories under the names of happincss :rrrrl
truth. Thus, we have to conclude that time fbrming memory and memory ol rrpliori
truths are very different. Memory of apriori truths helps us leave the tcnrporrrl lilt'
behind, at least through an anticipation of the eternal lif'e. Time filrrnirrg llrcnr()r'\'.
however, works in the opposite direction, since it makes us parts ol'll.rc rrrrrlrrlrlt'.
a unstable world.
3) Hor,v is interior memoria stti of De Trinitate l4 related to the othcr l'trrrtliorrs
of memory'?
a) The inner memoria srul cannot be identical with the memory of lrasl .'xp,'rr
e nces, since the self is not itself an object of experience, but the subjcct thrrl rr urkcs
experiences. Thus, mem.oria sui as an element of se nosse must be prior lrt ltttl
experience made in time, that becomes an object of attention and is thcn st()rl'(l
in memory. Moreover, if the se no.s^se is the precondition for a person's itlcrrtity.
it cannot come abclut at a certain point of time in the lif'e history of that l)cls()n.
Finally, memory of past experiences is clearly a case of ordinary or outcr rttcrrroly.
because an event is first experienced, then stored in memory, and even latcl irr tirrrt'
remembered.
b) Is the inner memory identical rvith memory as habitual knowlcdgc ol lrgrrior i
truths'? This has to be denied, too. In several aspects. the.re no.r'.rr,, arttl rvitlr il llrt'
inner memorla sui, resembles the memory of apriori truths. The .T(' n().\,\(' r'csitlt's
29. Cl. ALr(ius]'tNFt, Corl. I l.3c).
 232 )/i), li\/) .\l I l'll()()l)
.t( )t I AN N t,.,\ ßti,,t(' I I l't,.N t )( )ti t I'lNll'.. Nll';^l( /,ry l)lr Il.llNI'lAl l,
in the remote caverns of memory, just like the knowleclgc ol (i.,tl c1rcs. Altl rrs
llr-cady bccrt. Iirorrr tlrc tcrttporal structurc ol "l)ascin," llcitlcggcl tlct ivt s iur r'\r\
there is no specific moment in time when the experiencelf truth is lratlc
r:rt5cr. tcrrtial undcrstanding o1'future and past, that grouncls llrc oltlinaly rrrrtlclstrurrlirrl
it is discovered as having always been there-, so there is no momcrrt i. tir,c, «rl'tirnc. ln Augustine, memoria sal plays a constitutive nrlc lirr.\'{'/r(),\'.r('lrs llrc t on'
when the se nosse enters the human mind. As Augustine says, the sc rr,rs,r.
is not ol-sclfhood. If the inner memoria sr.rl is identical to time lilrnrirrg lncrrrory. llrt'n
"adventitious" to the mens humana, but has alwayibeen theä since
the mincl came one could interpretAugustine's se nosse temporal in the Heideggcriarr scrrse ol rrrr
into being.30 And as the knowledge of truth turni into explicit knowledge through
original temporality that grounds the ordinary understanding ol'tirnc.
a reflexive act of remembering, so does rhe .se nosse bäcome explicitly know]r,
if a human being obeying to the Delphian injunction lifts it frornthe caverns of However, I think we have to resist the temptation of mcrging Auguslirrc's rrrrrl
memory, and brings it to the light of reflection by remembering itself. Heidegger's thoughts. Augustine's inner memorirz.rul dcles not indicatc a te rrrponrl
ityof the senosse. First,if itdid,thenthesenosse shouldnotonlycontain:rrr irurt'r'
But there are difl'erences as well. To rcmember oneself in the way clescribed nrcmoria snr, but also an inner expectatio and ottentio.ral, because tirnc is lirr.rrre tl
above is an act of memory in the ordinary sense, not in the inner r.nr.. ö, the
level not only by memory, but also by erpectatio and attentio. But Augustinc rr('\('l
of se <'ogitare, remembering oneself follows the same pattern as remembering any
speaks of an inner expectotio or atten.tio sui. Second, the inner menutriu,r'rri clurrol
apriori truth. Memory of apriori truths as well as memory of the se rzo.sse can be
be identical to time forming memory, because the latter is not a nttnroritt,rrri. lrrrl
transformed into r:ogitationes as explicit knowledge, if wL are remincled of them.
a memory of some passing event. Third, tbr Augustine selfhood in tl.tc scttst ol r,'
Here, memory as a potential krrowleclge and intellegentia as an actual knowledge
nosse will persist in the eternal life, where there will be no more di.slt'trtitt,utitrtr
succeed cach other in time, as is typical for ordinary memory, not for
the inner and no time forming memory. Then the human mind will be scl closcly assirrrilrrlt'tl
memoria szrl. Thus, memory of apriori truths is a case of oui., *..o.y, not
of to the divine mind that it will be immutable. Yet. the saints in the lil'c rvitlr (iotl ivill
inner memory. The inner tnemoria sui is not iclentical with rnemory oi apriori
not lose their selfhood, but keep it, so that the se nosse remains in tlrclrr.'l'ltrts. llrr'
truths. but is one of its objects, since the se nos.te as a whole is hiddenin memory
se nosse, and with it the inner ne moria sui is not identical to time tirrnr irrc n rr'n ror \'.
as the notion of truth is. lf the se nosse is a precondition to se cogitare,
then the but its precondition. A self must already be there, so it can mcflsurc linrc.
inner memoriu sui also is a preconclition to the memory of aprioii truths. only
rational beings that are selfs can have knowledge of apriäri truths. AII in all we have to conclude that fbrAugustine the interior trrt'trrotitr ttti t',
not identical with any of the others kinds of memoria. In fact, it is thc rttosl lrrrr
I want to suggest another difference between se nosse, including inner memoria
damental sort of memory. According to Augustine, the human sttul is rt lrr'tttl llr;tl
,sni, and the knowledge of apriori truths, including the Deum itsse.
Augustine lives in time and reaches out for the eternal, that is created to live firrcvcr'.'l'lrt' sorrl
occasionally says that apriori knor,vledge, although ii is universal among all human
gives structure to the flux of time, it remembers its past, it relnernbcrs ( iotl :rrr,l
beings, is not natural tcl the human min<J, because the human mincl is mutable,
itself. But it can do all this only, because it has been and will always bc ptt'st'ttl l,
while the eternal truths are immutable. Therefore, Augustine thinks that the
eternal itself in the way of se nos,se. This self-presence does not encompass all ol slt;rl rl
truths must someh<lr'v he conveyed to the mincl, i.e. impressed on it, or taught
by means to be a self, but according to Augustine it is the core of self}rxxl. 'l'lrt' inrr,'r
the inner teacher, or what his metaphors might be. The .re no.rse, however, seems
memoria.sr.ri is a constitutive element of this core, indicating the continuity rrrrtl llr,'
to be part of the nature of the human mincl. For Augustine, remembering, know-
permanence of the self as a being that rvas once created and will cxisl irr clt'r'rrit\
ing, and loving itself is natural to the men.s humana, while knowing God is not.
Accordingly, Augustine never says that the se nosse is taught by thelnner teacher Johannes Bn,qt't tt t,Nl x rttt
as the apriori truths are. Again, the inner metnoria sui must be clifferent Universitrit'l'iibi r rpt'r r
tiom the
memory of God.
c)Finally, how is the interior memori. slrl related to time fbrming memory?
At this point it would be_very tempting to connect Augustine to H-eiaeggerlr
According to Heidegger the selfhood .f "Dasein" is teÄporal. For him, 6eing
a self means coming towards oneself and fincling oneself äs something that hai

30. AUGUSTTNE, De Trin. 14.13.

31. cf. J. BRACHT'ENDORF, "Memoria uncl die Temporalität des Daseins,,, in selbsterkenntnis
urttl Gotte.ssut'he. Augustinus Confbssiones 10, N. Fischer D. Hattrup (ecls.), paderborn.2007,
pp.79-94.
 ('ollt't lrorr tlt's lrlrrtlt's Atrltrslirrir'rrnt's

.\t;t'it Arrtitluiti - 192

Collection des Etudes Augustiniennes

I,E DE TRINITATE DE SAINT AUGUSTIN
Fondateurs : I-.-. CnynE t et G. FOLLIET t Ex6göse, logique et no6tique
Ancien Directeur : Jean-Claude F'REDOUII-t.E t
Directer-rr : Fre<d6ric CHAPOT

Ct]nsciI scientifitlue : M. ALEXANDRE, N. BERIoU. A.-I. BOUToN.TOUBOULIC, N. DL]\AL

J. FONTAINE, CI. LEPELLEY. P. PETITMENGIN. V. ZARINI Actes du colloque international de Bordeaux, 16-19 juin 2010,

6dit6s par Emmanuel BBRnroN et Gerard O'Da.ly

Pr6face de Rowan Wtlr,rams

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