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Card
Card
David Card
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 1 / 37
Immigration
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 2 / 37
Immigration
terrorism
crime
creating burden on existing welfare services - Medicaid in USA
impact on the employment opportunities and wages of natives
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 3 / 37
Immigration
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 4 / 37
Literature before Card(1970)
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 5 / 37
Two views on the findings :
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 6 / 37
Innovation of the paper
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 7 / 37
Background
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 8 / 37
Background and Stylized facts
David Card THE IMPACT OF THE MARIEL BOATLIFT ON THE MIAMI May
LABOR
25, 2020
MARKET 9 / 37
Data
For comparative purposes, Card looks at similar data for 4 other cities :
Atlanta, Los Angeles, Houston and Tampa-St. Petersburg
relatively large populations of blacks and Hispanics
economic conditions were similar between 1976 and 1984
Real earning levels for Whites remained fairly constant between 1979
and 1985 in Miami and the comparison cities
Black wages were roughly constant from 1979 to 1980, fell in 1982
and 1983 and rose to previous levels in 1984
Slight dip in 1982-83 for wages non-Cuban Hispanics.Otherwise, fairly
stable.
Decline in wage rates of Cubans from 1979 to 1982
This data does not provide any evidence of a negative impact of the
Mariel immigration on wages of Non-Cubans in Miami.
For Cubans, the decline is consistent with the addition of around
45,000 Mariel workers to the pool of Cuban workers in Miami and
with the 34 per cent wage differentials between Mariels and other
Cubans.
Separately analyses the set of all blacks and the set of blacks with less
than 12 years of education.
Depicts both the unadjusted difference in log and a regression
adjusted differential which controls for education, gender, marital
status, part-time status, private/public employment and experience
The actual log Cuban wages shows a decline of 9 per cent between
1979 and 1985. This was a result of two complementary factors.
6 per cent was due to the decline in the ”quality” of the Cuban labor
force in Miami. Two thirds of the wage gap is attributed to the
changing productivity levels of the Cuban labor force.
The remaining 3 per cent is due to the quality adjusted wage gap
between Cuban workers in Miami and Hispanic workers in the
comparison cities. That is, one third of the wage gap is
attributed to the decline in returns to skills for Cubans in the
Miami labor market because of the influx of immigrants.
The difference between the means of the first and the fourth quartiles
is 9 percent higher in 1984 than 1979, but then the gap narrows to
only 2 per cent in 1985.
This is indicative of the decline in earnings for the Cubans at the
lower end of the distribution due to the Mariel immigration
(Indicative of the substitutability)
Assessing the difference between the effect of Miami and elsewhere in
the USA. Since, the fraction of the Mariels in Miami and res of US is
roughly the same, it controls for any unobservable difference (say in
the language ability) between the Mariels and the rest of the Cuban
immigrants. The differentials so calculated are roughly the same
between 1979 and 1984.
The 1985 difference indicates a slightly higher wage for the Cubans
outside of Miami. But, more importantly no significant difference in
the wages in the year immediately following the boatlift.
Since the wages are constant for Cubans outside of Miami, the
downturn could be attributed the dilution of the Cuban labor force
with less-skilled immigrants.