Gwfmm, Vol. 24. No. 4, pp. 435-453.1993 00s7185/93 $6.00+0.

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Printedin Great Britain 0 1993 Pergmon PressLtd

Will Dodoma Ever Be the New Capital of

Tanzania?

J. M. LUSUGGA KIRONDE,* Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Ab&racti When, in 1973,Tanzania decided to shift its capital city from Dar es Salaam
to Dodoma, it was envisaged that the move would take 10 years, and that the cost
could be justified when set against a long-term perspective. A powerful agency was
created to implement an idealised capital city masterplan, which would reflect the
new status of Dodoma, and to which government machinery could move. The
decision was presented as a national one, although in fact it was that of the ruling
party. The requisite resources, however, could not be mustered; implementation
was concentrated on service infrastructure rather than on the crucial housing and
office accommodation; and, as national economic problems became acute, govem-
ment officials became indifferent to moving to Dodoma. Worse still, Dodoma lacked
the concerted backing of key national political leaders, so that deadlines to move to
Dodoma have come and gone without anybody taking sanctions. Despite the
expenditure of more than Tshs. 4.9bn, there is still little infrastructure that can
accommodate the government set up even in part. The idea of shifting Tanzania’s
capital has a history going back to the colonial days, but experience with Dodoma has
shown that the process is a hazardous one, particularly when seen against the
backdrop of economic difficulties, and indifferent and unwilling government
officials. The new multiparty political climate in the country can only mean a
reappraisal of the new capital project, which is likely to be accorded little priority, ifit
is not scrapped altogether.

Introduction
Several African countries, including Mauritania,
Botswana, Libya, Rwanda, Malawi, Tanzania,
Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire, have, within the past four
decades, adopted policies to create new capital cities.
Mauritania, Botswana and Rwanda did not have
capital cities of their own at independence and had to
create what HAMDANI (1964) has termed “neces-
sity capitals”. Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania and Cote
d’Ivoire decided to abandon their old capitals of
Zomba, Lagos, Dar es Salaam and Abidjan for new
ones of Lilongwe, Abuja, Dodoma, and Yamous-
soukro. The governments of Malawi and Cote
d’Ivoire successfully moved to their new capitals in
*Ardhi Institute, P.O. Box 35176, Dar
Tanzania.
the late 1970s and mid 198Os, respectively. With the
movement of the Nigerian government to Abuja in
early 1992, only the Tanzanian government remains
entrenched in Dar es Salaam despite two decades of
efforts and deadlines to move to the new capital. The
purpose of this paper is to provide some insights into
the conceptualisation of, and the strategies adopted
for, the creation of a new capital city for Tanzania. It
is hypothesised that the current failure of the govem-
ment to shift itself from Dar es Salaam is a result of
political as well as economic factors. Lack of a strong
personal drive for the new capital from key national
political leaders, lack of seriousness on the part of the
government, wrong priorities on the part of the Capi-
tal Development Authority (CDA), and unwilling-
ness to move by government officials have all
contributed to the continued stay of the government
es Salaam, in Dar es Salaam as much as have economic con-
straints.
435
436
This paper begins by surveying the literature on new
capital cities, and on Dodoma, and goes on to provide
a conceptual framework through which the creation
of such cities can be viewed. The history of the idea to
move Tanzania’s capital is presented next, followed
by the strategy adopted in order to create a new
capital city at Dodoma. The impact of the new capital
project on Dodoma is then discussed, followed by an
attempt to explain Dodoma’s failure to so far take off
as Tanzania’s new capital. The future of the new
capital city project is speculated upon in the light of
the changing social and political circumstances in the
country. Finally, conclusions are given.
Literature Review
SPATE (1942, p. 622) defines the capital of a country
as the place wherein the political authority of a
territorial unit is concentrated; the seat of the legisla-
ture and the headquarters of the executive. This
definition emphasises the locus of political power
rather than the size and magnitudity of the settlement
in question, although, in most instances, capital cities
tend to be complex and to have imposing structures as
phallic symbols of power.
The creation of new capital cities has attracted a lot of
scholarly attention, much of it attempting to analyse
and, in most instances, rationalise the decisions by
politicians to undertake such daunting tasks in the
light of limited resources. Analysis has also focused
on the planning and implementation of new capital
city projects, and on the various problems that are
faced in the new capitals. Besides Dodoma, attention
has been paid to new capital cities such as Yamous-
soukro (ARMSTRONG, 1985), Gaberone (BEST,
1970), Lilongwe (CONNELL, 1972; METCALFE,
1991; PO’ITS, 1985; MLIA, 1975), Brasilia (HOL-
FORD, 1962; FARRET, 1983), Belmopan
(KEARNS, 1973), Abuja (MOORE, 1984; NWA-
FOR, 1980), Islamabad (STEVENSON, 1970), and
Canberra and New Delhi (SPATE, 1956).
Shifting a country’s capital is a phenomenon with a
long history, and the reasons for such a move include
the search for national consolidation and unity, and
the need to create a national political symbol (DE
BLIJ, 1967, p. 407), especially where the capital to be
abandoned is identifiable with undesirable national
Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 4/1993
history, like colonialism. Other reasons include the
need to redistribute national wealth over space; the
removal of government from unsatisfactory sites or
from unwanted circumstances (e.g. inclement
weather, disease, insecurity, corruption, etc.) (STE-
VENSON, 1970; KEARNS, 1973; FARRET, 1983);
the need to create a node upon which territorial
infrastructure can be focused; and the need to reduce
the rate of growth of the current capital. In some
instances new capital cities are created as personal
gratification of nationally important persons in the
country’s body politic. Thus Yamoussoukro, con-
structed by President Houphet-Boigny of Cote
d’Ivoire , “is the birthplace of the Father of the
Nation, the spirit and fulcrum of the country” (ARM-
STRONG, 1985, p. 73). Even in such circumstances,
however, the construction of a new capital is usually
rationalised cifing national interests, as in the case of
Lilongwe (POTTS, 1985, p. 188).
The enormous cost of relocation has traditionally
been advanced against new capitals. Moreover, it has
been argued that the advantages of the new capital
are usually exaggerated, as are the disadvantages of
the old one. Motives to reduce the growth of the
current capital and to encourage regional develop-
ment have in particular not been realised in most
cases (KEARNS, 1973; POTTS, 1985). Besides, it
has been observed that many of the problems of the
old capital are soon replicated in the new one (GIL-
BERT, 1989). Squatter areas, for example, were
soon to develop in Brazilia (FARRET, 1983) and
Lilongwe (POTTS, 1985), contrary to expectations.
The abandoning by governments of sizeable pro-
portions of their people in the old capital can also be
questioned. Belize for example, was abandoned for
Belmopan because, inter ah, it was hurricane prone
and:
. . . had a very high congestion of houses, a collection of
third rate streets, an old broken down bridge, no water,
open sewers, inadequate communications and was over-
populated, underfinanced and administered with a kind
of desperation of a man trying to hold back disaster
(KEARNS, 1973, p. 149).
Yet in this capital (Belize) was concentrated an entire
third of the country’s population.
The cost of relocation, it has been argued, could be
best utilized to ameliorate conditions in the old capi-
GeoforumNolume 24 Number 411993
tal or on other socio-economic undertakings in the
area earmarked to benefit from the new capital. This
is particularly convincing since, despite the poverty of
the countries concerned, many plans for the new
capitals have tended to be overambitious, flamboyant
and utopian (GILBERT, 1989; MABOGUNJE,
1990). Besides, many of the nation’s cultural citadels
cannot possibly be replicated in the new capital
(HOLFORD, 1962, p. 17).
The decision to relocate a country’s capital is thus
wrought in controversy, and it is usually political
considerations that carry weight, although economic
and social ones are usually invoked to the extent, in
some cases (e.g. of Lilongwe), of portraying the
creation of a new capital city as a viable economic
undertaking. The decision whether or not to relocate
the capital is dependent on whether the protagonists
of the move can have their way within the political
power structure of the nation.
Commentators on Tanzania’s decision to move its
capital to Dodoma have generally been in favour of
the undertaking if wary of the enormous costs.
HOYLE(1979),KAHAMA(1975)andMBYOPYO
(1975) see the move as an essential undertaking
aimed at bringing justice in the distribution of
national resources, particularly if it should be borne
in mind that the Dodoma Region is regarded
nationally as a backward area. MESAKI (1982) and
CDA (1978) blame the colonial government for fail-
ing to transfer the capital. In their opinion, the
colonialists had no interests of the country at heart,
and, although the need to move from Dar es Salaam
was realised, limited commitment to the country by
the colonial governments prevented definite action.
However, perhaps due to the realisation that the new
capital project was too expensive for the nation, ideas
against the project began to be expressed from the
1980s: that the reasons put forward to justify the
undertaking were not strong enough (HAYUMA,
1981), and that, in the light of Tanzania’s aspiration
to socialism, its planned new capital would not be a
socialist city given its planned segregated residential
zones, long distances to work, lavish land uses,
extra wide boulevards, etc. (LUGALLA, 1987;
SIEBOLDS and STEINBERGER, 1981). Recent
commentators have been more desperate. The
government, for example, has been accused of not
being serious with the project, of not adhering to its
437
own deadlines, and of giving flimsy excuses for re-
maining in Dar es Salaam (SPERATUS, 1990).
There have been calls for the abandonment of the
project from academicians (IANE, 1984), and from
the local press (Figure l), all citing the dire economic
climate of the country. ’ The government, though,
continues to issue statements reiterating its total
commitment to Dodoma.*
The Conceptual Framework
Two drives behind the creation of new capitals can be
distinguished: a non-personified drive and a personi-
fied drive. A non-personified drive grows from a
general national creed in the unsuitability of the
current capital when the totality of the national cir-
cumstances is evaluated. The creed is shared by most
political shades in the country. An example of such
would be Lagos in Nigeria, which Nigerians of all
social persuasions believed should be replaced by a
more centrally located and neutral capital. Thus the
decision to create Abuja.
A personified new capital city drive, on the other
hand, grows out of the nation’s chief political power
wielder’s conviction that a new capital is necessary.
Many times this conviction is given post hoc rational-
isation, and national justification. However, the need
to create a new capital remains closely knit with the
whims of the chief political power wielder (POTTS,
Figure 1. Cartoonist’s impression of the capital transfer
project. Source: Family Mirror, first issue (May 1992). The
front-page headline in the paper read as follows:
DODOMA: A CAPITAL NOBODY WANTS: Capital
Transfer . . . A political Hoax.
438
1985). Examples of such cities would be Yamous-
soukro and Liiongwe. In reality, the above distinction
is not watertight and many new capital cities fail into
both categories. Thus, for example, while it is noted
that President Kubitschek had to build Brasilia in a
hurry because of the fear that a different government
might reverse the decision, it is also pointed out that
Brazilians have had a long historical search for an
interior capital city (STEVENSON, 1970, p. 322).
The significance of the above distinction lies, how-
ever, in the possibility that, where the new capital is
personified, resources, limited as they usually are,
can be diverted to this project with limited let or
hindrance, while, where it is non-personified, the
capital project competes for resources with other
sectors on equal footing, and its share of the national
budget will depend on how powerful the ‘new capital
lobby’ might be in the national power structure. For
these reasons, non-personified new capital cities, e.g.
Abuja and Dodoma, have tended to take long to
construct, unless special circumstances, as was the
case with Gaberone (BEST, 1970), have dictated
speedy action.
The definition given above of a capital city empha-
sises the locus of political power, and capital reioca-
tion would mean the process of moving this power
from one place to another. A capital could move,
therefore, even in the case of limited preparations. In
practice, however, new capitals have tended to be
elaborate in the creation of the necessary structures,
infrastructure and services considered as befitting a
national status, limited resources not~thstanding.
This, in part, has been necessary to attract govern-
ment officials, who stand to lose socially and econ-
omically by moving from the old capital where they
would typically be well-established. The question of
identifying the capital relocation process with the
capital ~onst~ction project has made new capitals
expensive to construct, and, where resources have
been limited to achieve the ideals of the project, as is
argued below in the case of Dodoma, officials have
found ready-made excuses to stay in the old capital.
In constructing a new capital an agency is normally
created and assigned the sole responsibility of ensur-
ing the success of the project. This approach requires
that a lot of resources are made available to the
agency, which could also be allowed or supported to
GeoforumNoiume 24 Number 4/1993
raise its own funds. On the other hand, the responsi-
bility can be shared among the various government
ministries and departments, each responsible for
ensuring the preparation of what is necessary for it to
move to the new capital. This latter approach would
be suitable where resources are limited, and where
the support for the new capital is not personified. In
both cases, though, unwave~ng political support for
the move is absolutely essential.
Background to the New Capital Movement in
Tanzania
The question of moving Tanzania’s capital goes back
to the German colonial era (1884-1917). In 1891 the
German government selected, as the capital of Ger-
man East Africa, the small settlement of Dar es
Salaam, as opposed to the welt-established port of
Bagamoyo, to take advantage of the sheltered har-
bour that Dar es Salaam had (BRODE, 1977). Dur-
ing the First World War, the German government
was forced to abandon Dar es Salaam and move to
Tabora, but during that period ideas of shifting per-
manently from Dar es Salaam were being floated. In
February 1916, the German governor, Dr Schnee,
inspected sites at Buga and Kisi along the Romuma
river valley from Kidete. He found these locations
suitable for the new seat of government, not least
because:
Mosquitoes and tsetse appear to he non existent. Cli-
matically, on account of its high situation and of the
adjacent higher mountains, the conditions for a Euro-
pean settlement are likewise favourable.3
Dr Schnee directed that, on the conclusion of peace,
the area should be further investigated for the avaii-
ability of building land and water. This was never to
be, in the light of the outcome of the war against the
Germans.
The issue of moving from Dar es Salaam occupied the
mind of the British colonial governor, Donald
Cameron. In December 1927 he appointed a com-
mittee to inquire into the present and future position
of residential and functional accommodation of gov-
ernment departments and, inter ah, look into the
possibility of removing the headquarter of any de-
partment from Dar es Salaam, bearing in mind his
minute of 21.11.1927 which read as follows:
Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 411993
I think we must always bear in mind that Dar es Salaam
may not remain the seat of Government all the time. It
probably will not.4
He suggested the commencement of a centrifugal
process so that where possible certain departments
should move from Dar es Salaam:
. . . so long as a suitable location can be found in the
healthier and cooler regions of the territory.’
Most departmental heads were against moving away
from Dar es Salaam or from the seat of government,
but the Veterinary Department was transferred to
Mpwapwa, and both the Department of Agriculture
and the Offices of the Provincial Commissioner for
the Eastern Province where moved to Morogoro in
the late 1920s.
In 1932, Governor G. Stewart Symes noted that many
people held the view that it might be convenient to
move the country’s capital from Dar es Salaam to a
more central location but was aware that the move
was not then ‘practical politics’. He nevertheless
asked the Director of Surveys to reconnoitre the
areas south of Kidete (i.e. those investigated by Dr
Schnee), and while this was going on:
. . . it will be expedient to obtain expressions of public
opinion, Europeans and Indians, on the subject.6
Colonel Maxwell, General, Manager Tanganyika
Railways, was asked to prepare a memorandum on
the subject as a basis for discussion. Views were
sought from some directors of departments and pro-
vincial commissioners on the various sites for a new
capital. The sites commented upon were: Arusha,
Chenene Hills, Dodoma, Iringa, Lushoto, Manyoni,
Morogoro, Moshi, Mpwapwa and nearby Hills,
Mwanza, Tabora and Ufiome (Figure 2). Dodoma
was seen as the most accessible and only possible site
if ever a move was made from Dar es Salaam, though
the problems of water and the rather arid climate
were realised.
Not all were in favour of the idea of capital transfer.
Both the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) and the
Director of Medical Services (DMS) opposed the
idea on the grounds of, inter diu, costs, and the
undesirability of separating the commercial from the
administrative centre. The DMS opposed Dodoma in
439
particular, as an area with an unpleasant climate,
where flies were legion and where the mosquito
nuisance was far worse than in Dar es Salaam. In his
opinion, Dar es Salaam was by no means unhealthy
for a tropical town. Living on the sea front and the
popularisation of electric appliances like fans and air
conditioners could go a long way to moderate the hot
and unpleasant climate. The SNA thought Dar es
Salaam was as healthy as any location in the country
and doubted the salubrity of hills in the tropics. The
debate ended with the adoption of a suggestion by the
DMS that a convalescence home be established in the
country where Europeans could spend their annual
leave and get rejuvenated. Both the question of costs,
and the inconclusiveness of the health advantages of
alternative more elevated sites, led to the retention of
Dar es Salaam. Critics, however, have a point when
they accuse the colonial governments of conceiving
the capital transfer not in the national, but in the
health interests of European officials.
There matters lay for another quarter of a century. In
1959, however, newly elected members of the Legis-
lative Council debated the issue of the capital trans-
fer. Initially, each member proposed his/her own
hometown as a suitable site, but eventually they all
agreed on Dodoma because of its centrality. The
issue was left in abbeyance, however, on account of
the high costs of relocation. The following year, the
Cabinet debated the issue but once again a decision
was deferred for the same reasons (CDA, 1978).
In February 1966 Mr Joseph Nyerere, brother to
Tanzania’s then President Julius Nyerere tabled a
private member’s motion in parliament in which he
proposed that the idea to shift the country’s capital be
debated. He was in favour of Dodoma, and, in order
to spread the cost of the move over the years, he
proposed the movement of government in phases.
During the debate that followed, the question of costs
could not be resolved and the then second vice
president, Rashid Kawawa, postponed a decision
when he suggested that the issue needed deeper
consideration and discussion by the people.
Six years later in August 1972, the then ruling party
(TANU)‘s Mwanza Regional Central Committee
(MRCC) resolved and suggested to the party’s
National Central Committee (NCC) that the party’s
headquarters should be moved to Dodoma so as to
440 GeoforumNolume 24 Number 4/1993

UGANDA

v ~--
M OZ A M 6 I Q U E-i’

LEGEND
N
-.-.-.-I NATIONAL BOUNDARY

i ROAD

__----- = REGIONAL BOUNDARY

0 = REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS
= OTHER PLACES MENTIONED

,&I= RAILWAY

Figure 2. Tanzania: the location of Dodoma.

bring the party closer to the people. This would in
effect amount to the transfer of government since the
party and government were one. Dodoma, the
MRCC argued, was centrally located and nodal for a
national communication network, was safe from ex-
temal attack, had a moderate climate, and could be at
the heart of the government’s efforts to build Ujumaa
(socialism), and to bring the masses and the govern-
ment close together. Moreover, Dodoma’s hinter-
land was impoverished and would benefit immensely
economically from the capital transfer.
The NCC resolved that the issue should be debated
nationwide. At the conclusion of the debate, voting
took place throughout the party branches. Of the
1859 branches that deliberated the issue, 1017 (54%)
Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 411993
voted in favour and 842 (46%) against. At the re-
gional level, 18 regions voted in favour, and three
(including Dar es Salaam) voted against. In consider-
ation of the above vote, though restricted to party
members only, the NCC decided to move the
country’s capital to Dodoma in 10 years, and this
decision was endorsed by the 16th Biennial Party
National Conference (BPNC) on 1 October 1973
(CDA, 1978, p. 47). Later that day, the president and
party chairman, Julius Nyerere, announced the de-
cision to the nation on the radio, arguing that the
issue of costs should be regarded as temporary but
that the new capital would be permanent. The longer
the decision was deferred, the higher the costs would
be. It was, therefore, wrong to judge permanent
decisions using temporary criteria, he argued.
The 1973 decision to shift the country’s capital must
be put in a wider national development perspective.
Tanzania had gained independence in 1961, and the
first 6 years were spent on conceptualising a model
that would guide the social and economic develop-
ment of the country. In 1967 socialism (U@maa) was
declared the official ideology of the country, and this
in part entailed the reorganisation of the rural popu-
lation into Ujumuu (communal) villages. Campaigns
were conducted far and wide in the country, and
material and political incentives were given to en-
courage peasants to move voluntarily to Ujumuu
villages. By 1973, however, it was obvious that the
pace of movement to these villages was too slow. At
the same time, there was not only dissatisfaction with
the division of the national wealth between rural and
urban areas, there was also the realisation that Dar es
Salaam was growing too big and too fast. The Second
National Five Year Plan (1969-1974) therefore
identified nine growth centres in the country outside
Dar es Salaam, but including Dodoma, to which
investment was to be directed, to encourage regional
development and check Dar es Salaam’s growth. The
16th BPNC of October 1973 made two major de-
cisions. One was that the hitherto voluntary move-
ment of the peasantry to Ujumuu villages was to be,
from then on, compulsory, and the other that the
country’s capital was to move from Dar es Salaam. It
was all part of the country’s social-economic trans-
formation, to fight poverty and injustice, and to
create a new socio-economic order. It might be added
as well that this was an age of radical undertakings in
Tanzania in both the local and the foreign arenas.
441
There is evidence to suggest that a decision on the
capital transfer had already been made even before
the results of the debate were known in 1973.
MESAKI (1982) notes that the government had in
1972 invited three international firms to submit pro-
posals for the best location of a new capital and the
preparation of a master-plan for its development. The
16th BPNC was therefore only briefed to approve a
fait accompli. This observation is further supported
by the fact that the presidential speech to the nation
announcing the capital transfer had already been
prepared before the decision of the BPNC was
known. It is also significant that parliament was not
consulted on such an important national decision,
reflecting the intricacies of Tanzania’s politics, where
party and government could in many instances substi-
tute each other in handling national affairs. It is also
more likely than not that key government officials
were not consulted on the question, and their role in
the creation of a new capital was not evaluated. This
lack of a clear involvement of the government and
parliament was an expensive omission. As the de-
cision was essentially that of the party, the govem-
ment was able to take matters easy, particularly after
the party headquarters had officially been moved to
Dodoma in 1975.
The capital transfer decision could not have come at a
more inappropriate time. In the first instance, the
world economy had just been jostled by the oil price
hikes of 1973, and economies like those of Tanzania
were to suffer immensely. Rapid villagisation in 1974,
together with natural calamities, soon led to a precipi-
tous decline in national agricultural output. Both of
these events and the adverse international terms of
trade led to acute balance-of-payment problems, and
huge budgetary deficits from 1978, but particularly so
during the 198Os, when Tanzania experienced its
worst economic crisis since Independence.
Second, Tanzania’s socialist charter, the Arusha Dec-
laration of 1967, had already alienated the bureau-
crats by limiting their avenues to capital
accumulation. They were not to receive two salaries,
or be directors or shareholders in private companies.
They were not to own houses which they rented. In
1971, the government had national&d thousands of
high-cost properties that were rented. Yet it was
obvious by 1973 that economic and social conditions
dictated that one should have more than one source
442
of income. Many households, including government
officials, responded to this by undertaking side busi-
nesses and forging intricate systems of ensuring sur-
vival. A move to Dodoma would have meant a
disruption of such systems, and a sacrifice on the part
of the officials for which there was no reward. The
bureaucracy, averse to changes even under the best of
conditions, was certain to adopt a lukewarm attitude
to the capital transfer unless conditions were over-
whelmingly conducive. The capital transfer decision
came at a time when both the government and indi-
vidual officials were faced with a looming economic
crisis.
Strategy for Developing the New Capital
In October 1973 the president announced the forma-
tion of two bodies: a Ministry for Capital Develop-
ment (MCD), to coordinate government efforts for
the transfer, and the CDA to carry out the actual
project implementation, including the planning and
construction of the necessary infrastructure and
structures, and the encouraging of investors and dip-
lomatic missions to move to Dodoma. Both of these
bodies had not been catered for in that year’s budget,
but somehow money was procured for their funding.
This was a clear and early sign of the independence
and importance of the capital transfer issue. On top of
that, the first CDA director was a veteran, highly
respected public official in the Tanzanian hierarchy.
While the MCD remained small, the CDA grew into
a powerful entity. By 1983 it had a powerful board of
directors made up of eight ministers and the Dodoma
Regional Commissioner. It developed an amorphous
organisation structure with nine well-manned direc-
torates (including that of the director general), and
employed some 500 local people and various ex-
patriates. It is suggested here that this was a wrong
strategy which isolated the CDA from the rest of the
bureaucracy. Instead of marshalling the collective
efforts of the bureaucracy, involving it fully in the
capital transfer project, the CDA opted to consoli-
date its position and to prepare the new capital for,
not with, the rest of the bureaucracy. This played well
in favour of the officials, particularly as, for reasons
discussed later, the CDA failed to prepare the ideal
conditions for the transfer. It became easy to blame
the failure of the various ministries to move to
Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 4/1993
Dodoma on the fact that there was no capital to move
to. This argument is now propagated by none other
than the Ministry of Works, currently responsible for
capital city construction.7 The role that the various
ministries could play in creating the conditions for
their own transfer to Dodoma has never been fully
exploited or effectively incorporated in the new capi-
tal project, although by so doing the rest of the
bureaucracy would have had a stake and a share in the
undertaking.
A Canadian firm, Project Planning Associates
(PPA), was commissioned to prepare a capital mas-
terplan, which was approved by the government in
1976. The PPA had been instructed to plan a “man
centred city with an attractive environment for work
and leisure”. In the plan, the city was to be built as a
series of villages of about 7000 inhabitants, each
grouped in four to five communities. The communi-
ties were to be connected to each other and to the
capital’s central administrative area by a transport
network based on busways, footpaths and cycleways,
and separated by park and farming land. Industry was
to be separately located. The medium-term planning
horizon was for 350,000 people earmarked to expand
to 1 million. In the new capital, there were to be no
skyscrapers and there would be only short distances
to bus stops, schools and farming areas.
Construction of a new capital was envisaged to take
10 years from 1976 and to cost a total of TShs. 3.71bn
($53m). The CDA was to get funds from the govern-
ment through the MCD and to institute the necessary
infrastructure, e.g. sewers, water pipes, roads etc., as
well as the necessary office and residential buildings.
Implementation was to be in two phases: 1976-1981,
when 40% of the government would move; and 1982-
1986, when the rest would be in Dodoma. The gov-
ernment had earmarked 10% of the development
budget, or, at any rate, TShs. 371m p.a., on the new
capital.
Performance
Between 1973/1974 and 1975/1976, the CDA spent
TShs. 43.4m, mainly on the masterplan and on setting
up the necessary administrative framework. How-
ever, right form the start, the government failed to
Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 4/1993 443

honour its financial pledges, or to meet the CDA’s
requests (Table 1).
Throughout the 10 years 1976/1977-198511986 the
government never allocated the promised TShs.
371m p.a,, and between 1981/1982 and 198911990
only 1.6% of the government budget was allocated to
the CDA as against the promised 10%. It is also
noteworthy that the % of funds allocated to CDA
compared to requests was lower during the immedi-
ate past 5 years than it was during the preceding 10
years.
Such an unfavourable financial situation would have
demanded the most prudent selection of items of
expenditure. For example, housing and office space
was most essential for the capital relocation. But the
CDA, adhering faithfully to the requirements of the
masterplan invested heavily ‘underground’ (CDA,
1983, p. 16) in infrastructure (particularly sewers and
roads), and on the establishment of alternative build-
ing materials factories. All this was seen as necessary
to give Dodoma a character befitting a national capi-
tal. The CDA, however, is not apologetic about this
strategy:
We decided to use this strategy having visited some new
capital cities where developers went straight into the
construction of the buildings before first putting in the
necessary infrastructure. These developers will have at a
later stage to wnstruct infrastructure services , . . (and)
. damage to the already constructed buildings will be
inevitable (CDA, 1983, p. 16).
The Impact of the Capital Transfer Project on
Dodoma
The commonly accepted version is that the name
Dodoma derives from the word ‘idodomya’ which, in
the local language, means a place where creatures
(people or animals) are reputed to have sunk or stuck
in the mud. A local legend has it that an elephant got
caught in the muds of the Kikuyu river, hence the
place’s name, which was later corrupted into
Dodoma. Dodoma is located 480 km from Dar es
Salaam and some 1123.1 m above sea level. The
town, including the surrounding area, is in a semi-arid
belt with an annual rainfall of below 23 in. (51 cm),
falling mainly between November and April.
Unlike nearby Mpwapwa, Dodoma was not on the
main nineteenth century caravan routes to/from the
coast. So, the first German administrative quarters in
the Dodoma area were at Mpwapwa, but were later
moved to Kilimatinde. In 1902 a military station was
established at Kondoa and, in 1912, Dodoma was
made an administrative district. This switch to
Dodoma was necessitated by the realignment of the
railway line from Dar es Salaam, whence construc-
tion had commenced in 1905, to bypass Mpwapwa
and, instead, go through Dodoma, by then a small
local settlement. The Germans gave an order for the
land to be expropriated for the construction of gov-
ernment buildings. Dodoma was to be one of the
major stations on the railway line earmarked to have
a workshop and marshalling yards. Eighty hectares of
land were acquired for the railway station. In order to
make the railway pay its way, the Germans encour-
aged the development of trading centres along the
line, and these included Dodoma, to which the local
population was encouraged to move and to settle.
Offers of free corrugated iron sheets were made for
those wishing to build. A market was built and a start
was made on the construction of a water dam. The
settlement was planned and plots allocated (CDA,
1978).

Table 1. Amount requested by and allocated to CDA, The early German plan divided Dodoma into a Euro-
1976/1977-1990/1991* pean area to the south, and an Indian and native
village to the north of the railway station. This zoning
Amount
Amount allocated was later refined so that a separate Indian area
requested and used developed in the centre of the town, with
(TShs. (TShs. % request commercial/residential structures. This legacy was
Year 000,000) 000,000) allocated
still very much apparent in Dodoma in the 1970s
1976/1977-1980/1981 1939 668 34.4 (Figure 3). Dodoma soon became a major junction of
1981/1982-1985/1986 2350 1112 47.3 the north--south and east-west road network. In
19&i/1987-1990/1991 9296 33.1 1948, it had just over 9000 people. By 1967, this had
1976/1977-1990/1991 13,585 zz: 35.8
grown to over 23,000 but Dodoma’s most dramatic
*Source: CDA (May 1992). growth was between 1978 and 1988 when the popu-
 GeoforumNolume 24 Number 4/1993

0 IKm I \.
N
’ ,/ \

LEGEND
Township boundary
Roads
+3-n Raikvay
Instctutionat uses M Market
High density reudential fs%oci
T Town WI
Medium dens+ residential SP Spcrtr field
LW de&y residential t; ~~~~~~

H Hotel
Commercial midential
G Govemmnt offices
Unpionned 3ettiements

Church

Figure 3. Dodoma ca 1973.

lation grew nearly fivefold, and when the town
jumped from the twelfth to the third rank in the
national urban hierarchy (Table 2). This is primfacie
evidence that the capital transfer project has had a
strong impact on Dodoma although the government
has not moved, for, while it is admitted that Dodoma
would have grown without being the earmarked capi-
tal, it is unlikely that it would have grown at such a
high rate.
Between 1976 and 1991, the CDA implemented the
following major projects in Dodoma, indicated, in
GeoforumNolume 24 Number 4/1!I93
Table 2. Population growth of Dodoma, 1948-1988*
Growth rate p.a. Rank in the
between current national urban
Year Population and previous year hierarchy
- Zuzu, bringing Dodoma’s electricity supply to 10
1948 9414 6
1957 12,217 2.9 6 MW, which, in view of a daily demand of 5 MW, is
1967 23,569 6.8 8 adequate.
1978 45,637 6.2 12
1988 203,837 16.1 3
*Source: population census figures, relevant years.
some cases, against expected targets for the capital’s
first-stage development (1976-1981):
(1) Construction of a presidential complex at Cham-
wino, just outside Dodoma. This has been little used
since 1981.
(2) Construction and establishing of five building
material factories to produce burnt bricks, tiles, cer-
amics, building stone, aggregate and concrete prod-
ucts. Investment was also made in warehouses to
store building materials. By 1987 only one of the
material factories was working, and even then, under
capacity. All are beset with foreign exchange con-
straints and managerial and technical problems.
Although they are unproductive, the factories had by
1991 accumulated a debt of Tshs. 7.0bn as principal
and interest on loans, which the CDA was requesting
the government to shoulder.
(3) Construction of nearly 80 km of sewers and storm
water drainage network, plus 50 m2 of temporary
oxidation ponds. Most of this network, which JEN-
SEN (1988) has baptized as “Rolls Royce Sewers”, is
idle since:
connexions (to trunk sewers) have not been allowed
because of concern about blockages in the system in the
early stages of operation. Only a few houses in h4limwa
have been connected (URT, 1988, p. 1).
Nevertheless, the expected trunk sewer network to
the existing town and new development areas have
been substantially completed (URT, 1988).
(4) Construction of nearly 20 km of trunk water
network, bringing Dodoma’s water supply to 18.2
million 1 a day. With a daily demand of nearly 23
million 1, water shortages persist and no investi-
gations have been made for long-term water supply.
Trunk water and headworks to service the existing
town and new development have been substantially
completed (URT, 1988).
(5) Construction or resurfacing of nearly 30 km of
445
Dodoma’s roads. However, none of the arterial road-
ways or busways proposed in the masterplan have
been provided.
(6) Installation of a 2-MW electricity substation at
(7) Construction of five primary schools with a
capacity for 1750 pupils, modifications to another
seven, and putting up a technical college capable of
admitting 250 students p.a. Twenty primary schools
had been envisaged.
(8) Construction of 173 residential houses, most of
which are occupied by CDA workers. The CDA had
been expected to construct 7000 housing units out of
the 9000 considered necessary in the first stage of the
capital transfer.
(9) Rehabilitation of the old central market, and
construction of a new one.
(10) Construction of a fire station.
(11) Undertaking of an afforestation programme,
based on a lo-ha nursery. As a result, 6836 ha of trees
have been planted in Dodoma.
(12) Construction of Mji Mlenzi House, the
Speaker’s Office building.
Besides CDA, the ruling party (CCM) has con-
structed its headquarters complex and several resi-
dential houses in Dodoma. A number of parastatals
have completed some 800 residential units and about
another 200 are under construction. At least eight
corporate bodies have invested in office schemes in
Dodoma, some of which are now complete. A major
input by the private sector has been the establishing
of a soft drinks manufacturing industry in Dodoma’s
Western Industrial Area.
In implementing its scheme the CDA has received
support and assistance from a number of foreign
governments, and governmental and international
agencies. These have included the countries of Aus-
tralia, Denmark, France, Germany, Indonesia, Mex-
ico, India and Pakistan, and bodies like the UNDP
(through UNEP), the African Development Bank
and the Arab Bank for the Development of Africa
(CDA, 1983, p. 1). In all, Tshs. 960m of foreign
exchange was spent on Dodoma between 1973 and
1987. Since the mid 198Os, however, foreign financial
support to the CDA has almost dried out.
The current land development status in Dodoma is
446 Ceoforum/Volume 24 Number 4/1993

shown in Figure 4. Stage 1 development (19X5-1981) pletion of full servicing in Mlimwa West and East,
proposed the servicing of the existing Dodoma town, and some ad hoc infrastructure in Makole, Hazina
Mlimwa, Kizota, Chadulu, Nkuhungu, and the West- and Nkuhungu. There has been little or no additional
ern Industrial Area. There has been substantial com- servicing in the existing Dodoma town, Kizota, Cha-

To Arusha
I

Figure 4. Dodoma: development status ca 1990. Source: Capital Development

Authority, Department of Planning.
Geofo~~olume 24 Number 411993
dulu, Mlimwa, Kikuyu and the Western Industrial
Area. Among the major impacts of the capital project
on Dodoma in terms of land uses is the establishment
of the 426-ha Western Industrial Area, 136 ha of
which is developed, 73 sites allocated, and several
industries established. On the other hand, the prep-
aration and allocation of residential plots has not kept
pace with demand so that there were in excess of 5000
people on the waiting list in 1988. In the past, the
CDA had insisted on not allocating plots until they
had been serviced, but this has had to be toned down
in the light of economic constraints, so that in the
Chinangali area plots have been allocated without
services. The masterplan had prescribed a tough
policy against unplanned development, proposing
that no com~nsation should be given to whoever
built outside the regulations. It was estimated that
there were 21,565 people living in 2270 informal
houses in the future Dodoma area in 1976. In 1988,
this figure was put at 31,968 people living in 2880
housing units (about 30% of the total population and
35% of the total units in Dodoma) in the areas of
Changombe, Chaduiu, Kikuyu, Maiii Mbili, Oyster-
bay, Kizota and Makulu (URT, 1988, pp. 3-76). This
must have been a gross underestimation since it was
by then known that 60,000 people lived in the Chan-
gombe unplanned area alone. LUGALLA (1987)
gives the population of Dodoma’s squatters as being
50% of the total, while a recent study by Ardhi
Institute put this at 67% .*
The Failure of the Capital Transfer Project
There were encouraging signs of enthusiasm for the
new capital project in the mid 1970s. The Prime
Minister’s Gffice moved to Dodoma in October 1974,
into the offices of the Regional Commissioner, while
the party’s headquarters moved in February 1975,
before the capital city masterplan was even approved.
Parliament met for the first time in Dodoma in
October 1975, in the newly created party head-
quarters. This enthusiasm did not last long however.
The Prime Minister soon went back to Dar es Salaam
although part of his ministry continued to operate
from Dodoma and the party kept a sub-head office in
Dar es Salaam where most important decisions were
made.
447
By 1981, when 40% of government ministries was
supposed to be in Dodoma, and when not a single
ministerial building had been completed, the CDA
was issuing apologetic statements that the first 5 years
had been used for laying ground work and that a
beginning was always difficult (CDA, 1983). More-
over:
We do not expect to see bushlandone day and a city the
next. We expect to see a steady, ahnost organic process
of growth, like the growth of a tree, not a musbroom
[CDA Director General, quoted in MEBAH (1982)].
In order to boost the capital transfer movement, a
presidential lodge was constructed at Chamwino at
the outskirts of Dodoma, and the pioneer of the
unde~aking, President Nyerere, moved from Dar es
Salaam and operated from Dodoma for most of 1981.
His move was not emulated by other government
officials and, after some time, the President went
back to Dar es Salaam. By that time, Tanzania was
facing excruciating economic problems. Pressure was
being exerted on the government to undertake econ-
omic reforms, including reducing public expenditure.
The capital city transfer project was one of the items
of expenditure under attack.
From the early 1980s the government seemed to have
lost enthusiasm for the new capital city project, and
this was signified in no small way in the transfer from
the project of the well-regarded veteran official and
first Director General of the CDA to the Foreign
Office in 1983. CDA was, moreover, soon rocked by
scandals and a number of its officials were convicted
of the embezzlement of funds, and many others,
including the top management, had their services
terminated. Responsibility for capital transfer was
subsequently moved from the President’s to the
Prime Minister’s Office. Recently it has been rele-
gated to the Ministry of Works, where, from a status
when it was regarded as a national project with its
own funding direct from the government, it is now a
mere subvote.
By mid 1992 only the Prime Minister’s and the
Speaker’s Offices had some considerable presence in
Dodoma. The Ministry for Local Government and
Regional Administration (which was carved out of
the Prime Minister’s Office) and the Ministry of
Water, Minerals, and Energy had some limited pres-
ence. All of these ministries have offices or suboffices
448
in Dar es Salaam, where officials spend most of their
time, and, in the case of suboffices, earn themselves
allowances (for being outside their stations of work)
amounting to millions of shillings. The rest of the
government apparatus is still in Dar es Salaam.
In explaining Dodoma’s failure to so far take off as a
new capital city, lack of resources in the light of
adverse national economic problems has always been
cited by both the CDA and the government in gen-
eral. Originally the argument was limited mainly to
lack of resources to put up sufficient office and resi-
dential accommodation, but recently it has been
extended to include lack of social and economic
infrastructure like schools, health facilities and
employment opportunities to cater for the depend-
ents of would-be movers. According to the minister
responsible for capital development, the 187 civil
servants earmarked to move to Dodoma in 1991 had
nearly 2300 children attending day schools and, as
Dodoma could not accommodate them, the transfer
was abandoned.’
The lack-of-resources argument can be challenged on
two grounds. First, the sum of over Tshs. 4.9bn
shillings that has been spent on the new capital
project so far ought to be related to some transfer of a
certain percentage of government set up, particularly
if it should be borne in mind that the whole project
was originally calculated to cost Tshs. 3.71bn. So far
there is very little of this to show. Second, a country
like Malawi, as poor as Tanzania and using more or
less the same approach, did succeed in transferring its
capital city within 10 years (1968-1978) so that, in
1984, the Lilongwe Capital Development Authority,
having fulfilled its role, was disbanded (MET-
CALFE, 1991). A combination of the following is
considered to be the main reason explaining the
stalling of the capital transfer project:
(1) Unlike Lilongwe, the new capital project in Tan-
zania has lacked a strong drive from key national
leaders. Former President Nyerere conceived the
capital transfer in a broad national interest, but,
when he realised that the project would be an
uphill task and was not supported by the rest of
the government bureaucracy, he lost interest.
For political reasons however, the project has
been left to hang on with the hope that more
conducive conditions might occur in the future.
In this respect some commentators have pointed
Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 4/1993
to Canberra, which took 50 years to be trans-
formed into Australia’s capital (URT, 1988).
(2) Because of the lack of a central push, there has
been a general lack of seriousness and contradic-
tory behavior on the part of the government
bureaucracy. Deadlines, programmes or orders
set by the government in relation to the move-
ment to Dodoma are ignored without as much as
anybody raising a finger. The following extended
examples will serve to illustrate the point:
Some divisions of the government technical
ministries, that is, Survey and Mapping, Water
Development, Forestry and Wildlife, and
Works (Buildings), were supposed to move to
Dodoma before the end of 1974 to help in the
implementation of essential preliminary proj-
ects. Temporary offices were constructed for
these divisions by the National Service. The
divisions never moved, The reason cited was
lack of housing despite the construction, in
Dodoma, of 1260 houses by individuals and
various housing agencies during that period
(MBYOPYO, 1975, p. 50).
In order to speed up the development of the new
capital, the President gave a directive in 1978
prohibiting ministries and parastatals from
building in Dar es Salaam without the per-
mission of a special committee chaired by the
Minister for Capital Development. The Dar es
Salaam City Council was not to issue building
permits unless this condition was fulfilled. This
directive has been quietly ignored, and minis-
tries and parastatals have been constructing new
buildings or extending or renovating existing
ones without fulfilling the above condition. Not
a single ministry has constructed offices or resi-
dence in Dodoma. Recently the Prime Minis-
ter’s residence in Dar es Salaam has been
extensively extended, renovated and trans-
formed, although the Prime Minister was sup-
posed to be resident in Dodoma.
Starting from 1975, all government ministries
were scheduled to be in Dodoma by 1986, the
President’s Office being the last to move. In the
light of implementation difficulties experienced,
the plan was revised downwards so that only
50% of government ministries were acquired to
be in Dodoma in 1986. But even this scaled
down target was not achieved.
Geoforum/Volume 24 Number 4/1993
In both 1984 and 1985, the party evaluated the
project and drew up an Interim Transfer Pro-
gram in which nine ministries, including the
President’s Office were to move to Dodoma
between 1985/1986 and 1989/1990. Temporary
offices were earmarked in Dodoma. The pro-
gram was never implemented.
In 1987 The United Nations Centre for Human
Settlements commissioned Cameroon McNa-
mara Pty Ltd of Brisbane, Australia (herein
referred to as the Consultants), to undertake a
review of Dodoma’s masterplan. Following the
Consultant’s recommendations, a new ‘realistic’
transfer program for the transfer of the govem-
ment to Dodoma was endorsed in March 1988.
Various ministries, parastatals and financial in-
stitutions were to substantially develop their
own office accommodation and the responsi-
bility for a large proportion of the housing needs
was to be constructed by various parastatals and
the private sector. Ministerial transfers were to
begin in 1989 following a S-year interim plan
ending 1992/1993 and involving one ministry
(including the President’s Office) each year.
Some 6200 housing units were required pro-
gressively by June 1993 (URT, 1988, p. 28).
However, by mid 1992 no significant develop-
ment had been achieved in creating the requisite
infrastructure and no ministry had put aside any
of its budget for the capital project. In view of
this, the CDA is now calling upon the govem-
ment to allocate to it all the resources that the
various ministries or parastatals are expected to
spend in Dodoma.
A Presidential Capital Transfer Commission,
established in 1984 and chaired by the Prime
Minister to oversee and assist the CDA in imple-
menting the capital transfer, directed that 25%
of all development funds for parastatal organisa-
tions be spent in Dodoma in the form of housing
and other enterprise. The directive has never
been implemented.
In 1990 a new Prime Minister, who hails from
Dodoma and who tried to inject some new life
into the capital transfer project, ordered that his
ministry should be wholly in Dodoma by the end
of 1991. This deadline has been ignored.
With regard to deadlines it is instructive to point to
the way the bureaucracy was able to move millions of
449
the peasantry into villages in 1973/1974 to the extent
that the government newspaper was able to report in
1974 that it was possible to move a whole district into
planned villages all at once and at minimum
expense. lo The same bureaucracy, however, has
demonstrably failed to enforce any deadlines on itself
to move to Dodoma.
(3) In a number of instances the government is be-
having in a contradictory manner. With relation
to diplomatic missions, 22 of these had, by Sep-
tember 1982, been allocated plots in Dodoma.
None has developed any of the plots. On the
other hand, a number of them have recently
completed, or are in the process of constructing,
diplomatic buildings in Dar es Salaam with the
blessing of the government. Likewise, the Prime
Minister ordered, in early 1992, that all office and
residential buildings belonging to the Speaker’s
Office be reallocated since this office had its
building ready in Dodoma. This has not hap-
pened and the buildings are still being used by the
Speaker’s Office, The party too has been behav-
ing curiously. In late 1991 it announced the clos-
ure of its suboffice in Dar es Salaam. The
suboffice, however, continues to operate while
the CCM headquarters complex in Dodoma re-
mains underutilised. Even when opportunities
arise suggesting a move to Dodoma these are not
utilised. The Bank of Tanzania (BOT), for
example, was burnt down in the mid 1980s. With
temporary offices secured, an opportunity of con-
structing the BOT in Dodoma was lost and in-
stead a colossal sum was spent rehabilitating the
one in Dar es Salaam. According to one member
of parliament the BOT has never even bothered
to apply for a plot in Dodoma.”
(4) The CDA could also be accused of getting its
priorities and strategies wrong. Given the
country’s poverty, and despite CDA’s arguments
above, it was perhaps unwise to spend colossal
sums ‘underground’ on infrastructure, when the
key impediments to the capital transfer were lack
of office and residential accommodation. Like-
wise, the setting up of building materials factor-
ies, one of which is reputed to be the largest in
Africa (GILBERT, 1989), would appear to have
been an uncalled for investment (which, in any
case, remains idle or grossly underutilised) , given
Dodoma’s sandy soils, lack of firewood (for
450
burning bricks and tiles) and non-acquaintance of
the local population with building with burnt
bricks or tiles (MBYOPYO, 1975, p. 51). This is
against the wisdom of manufacturing low-cost
building materials using imported ‘modem’ tech-
nology. Yet, between 1981/1982 and 1989/1990,
nearly 60% of CDA’s development budget went
to roads, trunk services, and the production and
distribution of building materials. This should be
compared with 2.8% that went to housing, and
4.5% to office accommodation (Table 3). With-
out offices and residential accommodation it was
a double uphill task to convince government
officials to move from Dar es Salaam.
(5) Talked to privately, most officials admit that they
cannot move to Dodoma because of their per-
sonal stake in Dar es Salaam. Many own or are
constructing property in the city, and have im-
portant economic and social interests in Dar es
Salaam, some of which are vital for their survival
and well-being. To them, CDA’s failure to de-
liver is a blessing in disguise. Inquiries indicated
that, while many top official were allocated plots
in Dodoma, most have adopted a.wait and see
attitude and have not developed them.
CDA’s New Strategies
Faced with a rather unfavourable response, the CDA
proposed, and in some cases adopted, new strategies
to try and speed up the capital transfer project. In
1982, it proposed the formation of a Dodoma Devel-
opment Association to seek increased participation
GeoforumNolume 24 Number 411993
by other agencies in the development of Dodoma.
This never got off the ground. The CDA also formed
a number of subsidiary companies to manufacture
and distribute building materials at prices relatively
favorable to customers in order to attract investors in
property. All these subsidiaries are reported to have
accumulated substantial losses. l2
On advice from experts who had worked on
Lilongwe, the government was in the mid 1980s
persuaded to transfer ownership of all the land in the
Dodoma Capital District (Figure 5) to the CDA
which, in turn, was expected to raise capital, particu-
larly from foreign exchange, by selling long-term
leases on this land. The initial plan was to sell 99-year
leases to diplomatic missions at Tshs. 1.5m per hec-
tare in foreign exchange. However, with uncertainty
looming over the capital transfer project, diplomatic
missions have gone no further than just expressing
interest.
In 1989, the Minister for Finance admitted in parlia-
ment that the government had failed to develop the
new capital and was trying a carrot approach to
attract the private sector to support the project by
offering special incentives stretching over 20 years
(19882008) and which were to include: a tax holiday
for businesses locating in Dodoma; a waiver on im-
port and sales taxes for building materials meant for
Dodoma; and remission of part of water and elec-
tricity rates. l3 If successful, this policy should in-
crease economic opportunities as well as
accommodation in Dodoma. However early signs do

Table 3. CDA development budget, 1981/1982-1989/1990*

Budget
Category of expenditure (000000 Tshs.) %

Building materials factories, warehouses

and workshops 469.2 16.0
CDA office extension and Speaker’s Office 141.3 4.5
Housing 87.7 2.8
Roads 638.2 20.5
Central Business Park 25.5 0.8
Education and training infrastructure 64.2 2.1
Landscaping 132.7 4.3
Trunk services 648.8 20.9
Medical infrastructure 24.8 0.8
Administration 539.0 17.3
Others 309.8 10.0
Total 3108.2 100.0

*Source: Ministry of Finance, annual development budgets.

GeoforumlVoiume 24 Number 40993 451

Rgure 5. Dodoma: area boundaries within the capital city district.

not suggest that the policy will be a success. Between
February 1989, when the Dodoma Special Invest-
menf Act of 1989 was passed, and June 1992, no
business firm had taken advantage of the incentive
scheme although, on the other hand, the cheap build-
ing materials meant for Dodoma were finding their
way to Dar es Salaam and other towns.
The Future
Despite the government’s new deadlines given in
1990, it would be too optimistic to believe that
Dodoma can be transformed into the new capital by
1995. There are no signs that new strategies are being
hatched. The feet dragging and procrastination of the
452
past has not changed and resources are unlikely to be
more plentiful as the nation’s economic situations
gets worse. A recent statement by the minister
responsible for the capital transfer made it clear that
the government could .afford no more than 5% of
CDA’s requirements and that year 2005 was a more
meaningful goal for a substantial government transfer
to Dodoma.14 The mood within the CDA is that of
frustration and uncertainty. There have been calls for
a new commitment to the capital transfer through
presidential directives and orders to “remove the
great uncertainty which has arisen in many peoples’
minds that the capital will not move” (URT, 1988, p.
10). With continued national economic difficulties,
and the advent of multipartyism, the future does not
augur well for the capital transfer project.
Conclusions
Tanzania’s concern for a new capital city goes back to
the colonial period but the decision to move was
made in the 1970s during an era of optimism and
enthusiasm for new approaches to socio-economic
development. The conceptualisation of the new capi-
tal city in terms of an idealised settlement to be
implemented by a powerful development authority
did not match the nation’s economic and social reali-
ties, which dictated a spartan capital in whose con-
struction as wide a spectrum of the relevant actors as
possible were to be involved. The result has been
lopsided investment in Dodoma by the CDA, and
continued entrenchment in Dar es Salaam by the
various government bureaucracies. Lack of a per-
sonal drive for a new capital from the nation’s
top leaders and the non-inclusion of the rest of the
bureaucracy in the actual construction of the new
capital isolated the CDA, which has seen its resources
dwindle, and its status downgraded. For policy ex-
pediency, support for the new capital has been pub-
licly propagated, but this has not been matched by
actual government movement to Dodoma even when
temporary accommodation has been put aside. The
capital transfer project, however, has had some
notable impact on Dodoma which has grown tremen-
dously in the last decade and half. The current failure
of Dodoma to transform into the country’s new
capital is seen as essentially lack of political will to
overcome the commitment to Dar es Salaam, as well
GeoforumiVolume 24 Number 4/1993
as the inappropriate strategies adopted for the
project’s implementation.
With the recent changes in the nation’s political
structure and, in particular, the adoption of multi-
party democracy, the capital project will have to be
reappraised. Tanzania is one of a dozen or so
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America that have
since World War Two planned to build new capital
cities. Successful cases have been a result of con-
certed political will. Dodoma, however, does not
seem to have engendered sufficient support within
the bureaucracy for its immediate transformation
into the new seat of government although there is a
general consensus as to the long-term need for a new
capital. For the foreseeable future, it is Dar es
Salaam, not Dodoma which is likely to remain the de
facto seat of the Tanzanian government.
1. See for example the Family Mirror, first issue (May
1992) and the Business Times (25/l/1991).
2. See Daily News (Tanzania) (91511992, p. 3): “No
change on new Capital”, says Minister.
3. Tanzania National Archives File No. 20961: “Capital
of Tanganyika, proposed new site for”.
4. Tanzania National Archives File No. 4A/lNol. I:
“Accommodation Dar es Salaam, Offices, Stores,
Workshops, etc.“.
5. As note 4.
6. As note 3.
7. Daily News (Tanzania) (91511992, p. 3).
8. Reported in Daily News (Tanzania) (27/4/1991).
9. Daily News (Tanzania) (91511992, p. 3).
10. Daily News (Tanzania) (91811974).
11. Hansard (Parliamentary Debates) (12-15 October
1986, p. 231).
12. One of these, the Capital Supplies Co., made losses of
Tshs. 2.5m in 1988 and 0.5m in 1989.
13. Daily News (Tanzania) (g/2/1989).
14. As note 2.
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