contains some flaws, because it has been often
Moralpolitik (Confucian)
SANGJUN KIM
Moralpolitik means politics based on moral-
ethical concerns. That politics and morals are
closely related is a familiar idea. As Rousseau
once stated, “those who want to treat politics and
morals separately will never understand anything
of either of them” (Rousseau 1980: 235). In this
regard, realpolitik, which means politics exclud-
ing moral-ethical concerns, signifies a rather
exceptional mode of politics, mainly applicable
to a certain aspect of international politics, and is
a residual concept of moralpolitik, not vice versa.
In moralpolitik, the relationship between morals
and politics is double-faceted: morals and pol-
itics are collaboratively intertwined on the one
hand, and in antagonistic tension on the other.
This double-faceted relationship originates from
the worldview of ethical religions. From the
viewpoint of ethical religions, the world has a
double meaning: one sinful (morally wrong),
the other blessed (God-made). Moral discon-
tent with the world marks the ethical character
of “ethical religions” in the Weberian sense.
This moral discontent causes the sharp tension
between religious morals and worldly politics.
The sharp tension between morals and politics
leads to moral interventions in politics. These
interventions constitute moralpolitik.
In the premodern era, moralpolitik took the
form of religious politics, in which religious moral
commands and politics were indivisibly fused.
To take some prominent historical examples: the
papal-ecclesiastical politics of medieval Europe,
the sage politics of Confucianism, the purohita
politics of Hinduism, the sangha-cakravatin poli-
tics of Buddhism, and the imam-ulamma politics
of Islam. These all took the form of theocracy, in
which the sacred encompasses the secular.
In modern times, the relationship between
the sacred and the secular is reversed: now, the
secular encompasses the sacred (Kim 2003; see
Fig. 1). The well-known “secularization thesis”
points to this relationship. The thesis, however,
The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Edited by George Ritzer.
© 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2007 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
DOI: 10.1002/9781405165518.wbeosm125
misunderstood as the claim that the sacred has
withered away in the modern era. The sacred,
however, has not withered away in modern times;
it has become internalized. The internalization
of the sacred is the core of the secular encom-
passment of the sacred. Internalized sacredness,
or, in other words, individualized sacredness,
cannot any longer be theocratic in modernity.
Modern moralpolitik stands on the moral base
of internalized, individualized sacredness. In
premodern moralpolitik, religious commands
and their representative church dominated over
politics. In modern moralpolitik, internalized and
individualized reflection mediates moral values
and politics.
In the premodern era, the priests of ethical
religions, armed with moral discontent about
the world, made themselves the practitioners of
moralpolitik. Thus premodern moralpolitik was
also a priestly politics. However, by making them-
selves the politicians of the world, the priests of
premodern moralpolitik were criticized on moral
grounds by the theologically more radical wings,
usually classified as heterodoxies in the history of
religions. These challengers usually made them-
selves into another, usually more fanatic, brand
of priestly politicians.
The Reformation in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Europe is the most famous and dramatic
example of this. Protestants challenged Catholic
moralpolitik, criticizing Catholic priests’ involve-
ment in worldly political affairs. Protestants
themselves, however, became deeply and even
fanatically involved in political affairs, including
wars. The “politics of the saints” of Calvinism
represents one of the most fanatic forms of
theocracy in human history. Historians have
called the warring period of Reformation and
Counter-Reformation “the early modern era.”
This early modern era was the time when reli-
gious fanaticism or “religious tyranny” rose at an
unprecedented rate and intensity (Weber 1958).
Here originates the modern worry about
extreme forms of moralpolitik. Immanuel Kant,
who is one of the most important conceivers
of the concept of modern moralpolitik, was
2 MO R A L P O L I T I K ( C O N F U C I A N)
Figure 1 The changing relationship (reversion of encompassment) of the sacred and the secular.
well aware of this danger, and attempted to
distinguish between the “moral politician” and
“despotic moralists.” The former, according to
Kant, is “someone who conceives of the principles
of political expediency in such a way that they can
co-exist with morality”; the latter, on the other
hand, are “those who err in practice, frequently
act contrary to political prudence by adopting
or recommending premature measures” (Kant
1991: 118, 119). For Kant, both types could be
moralpolitik, but only the former is desirable.
One must note, however, that for Kant the worst
type of moralpolitik is that of the “political moral-
ist” who “fashions his morality to suit his own
advantage as a statesman.”
It is ironic that modernity, the process of the
“internalization of the sacred,” was conceived
during the rampant wars of religious fanati-
cisms and intolerance when priestly moralpolitik
went to its extreme. In the terrible experience
of fanaticism and religious wars, the sacred
moved inward. Through theological or philo-
sophical reflections and also through political
compromises for survival, the idea of religious
individualism and the value of religious toler-
ance grew. Modern liberal ideas and the modern
way of life grew out of religious individualism
and religious tolerance. In sum, the unprece-
dented fanaticism of moralpolitik conceived and
introduced modernity.
The general pattern of moralpolitik can be
summed up as follows: the distinction of moral
and political values; institutionalization of
religious politics that attempts to realize religious
moral principles in politics; the consequential
tensions between religious-moral authorities and
mundane powers; the conflict between the two
distinctive powers which eventually conceives
and introduces modernity. This is also the case
with Confucian moralpolitik.
According to Kim (2000, 2002), in the Con-
fucian political history (of Korea and China),
there existed double powers: one royal-military,
the other quasi-priestly. In Confucian terms, the
former is the royal-dynastic lineage (jeongtong
in Korean, zhengtong in Chinese), the latter the
lineage of the Confucian Way (dotong, daotong).
The power of the former was based on worldly
dominance of the ruler, the latter on meticulous
practice of Confucian moral principles.
Confucian doctrines were established by Con-
fucian founders who engaged in moral struggle
against the hegemony of the warlords of the
pre-Qin era. The prime founder of Confucian
doctrine, Confucius, strove to persuade warlords
of his time to stop waging wars and instead to
govern their people in accordance with moral
principles of humaneness, benevolence, com-
passion, and harmony. Later Confucians put
Confucius at the head of the Confucian lin-
eage, calling him “the king without the throne”
(sowang, suwang). “The king without the throne”
symbolized the moral and thus sacred kingship
of Confucianism. “The king within the throne”
 MO R A L P O L I T I K ( C O N F U C I A N)
could be legitimized only if he obeyed the moral
teachings of “the king without,” Confucius
and his disciples. Some prominent disciples
of Confucius, like Mencius, earned the title of
Confucian sage and were deemed qualified to
continue the sacred Confucian Way originated by
Confucius.
The contrast between the material interests
of the worldly rulers and the ideal interests of
Confucian moralists produced sharp tension
between the two. Nevertheless, this tension did
not exclude the occasional cooptation of each
other: the rulers’ need for moral justification of
the throne and the Confucians’ need to expand
their worldly influence frequently met. Therefore,
the royal-dynastic and Confucian sacred lineages
were partly in tension and partly in collaboration,
as were religious authorities and worldly power in
the civilizations where ethical religions prevailed.
Confucians invented sage politics and con-
sistently attempted to check the worldly power
of the throne. Their weapons were Confucian
morals and manners. In the famous opening
chapter of Mencius, Mencius criticizes King
Hui of Liang for pursuing “profits” instead of
“benevolence” and “rightness.” In this argu-
ment, “profits” represent military, economic, and
logistic empowerment, while “benevolence” and
“rightness” indicate moral principles according to
which peaceful harmony of a state (and the world
as well) is to be achieved. These two principles of
action – one military, economic, and logistic; the
other moral – were in sharp tension in Confucian
doctrine. Confucian manners or rituals (ye, li)
were means through which Confucian moral
principles were realized and practiced.
Confucians believed that the ruler’s pursuit
of “profits” instead of moral principles would
eventually result in continual usurpations of the
throne by those seeking power. Historically, these
usurpations were frequently accompanied by
regicide and patricide – according to Confucian-
ism, the most terrible signs of moral degradation.
Confucians believed that only moral codes con-
solidating family values (or kinship orders) could
prevent such moral failures. Therefore, Confucian
morals and manners upheld family values like
deference to elders and the earlier generations.
The unique fusion of political and familial moral
codes in Confucianism was thus created.
3
The “Confucian sage” (seongin, shengren) was
the Confucian paragon who perfected the moral
demands of political-familial obligations in
his person and fulfilled these obligations most
meticulously in his daily actions. Confucian
moralpolitik was thus Confucian sage politics
carried out in public action. Moral remonstra-
tion and recurrent ritual disputes to correct the
throne characterized Confucian moralpolitik.
Confucians considered moral remonstration
even to death as their sacred obligation, and
they attempted to regulate their king through
recurrent moral critiques and ritual disputes.
Many Confucian martyrs sacrificed their lives in
order to confront their rulers who went against
Confucian moral doctrine. Confucian moralpoli-
tik represents Confucian moral discontent with
worldly power.
In the western image of Confucianism, the con-
cept of Confucian moralpolitik described above
does not exist. For example, Max Weber fails to
find the existence of the double powers in the
Confucian world and to acknowledge the tension
between them. His failure to recognize the moral
discontent with worldly power in Confucianism
results in his well-known denial of the inner
motivation and momentum toward modernity in
Confucianism.
Confucian moralpolitik was on many occasions
fanatic, waging moral wars not only against
the ruler with moral defects but also against
non-orthodox Confucians who were usually
labeled as “heretics” or, more literally, “rebel
enemies against our doctrine” (samunnanjeok,
siwenluanzei). The fanatic Confucian moralpolitik
in late Ming China (sixteenth to seventeenth
centuries) and late Joseon Korea (seventeenth to
eighteenth centuries) in particular opened the
door to “Confucian modernity” in both societies
(Kim 2003). The specific historical paths through
which Confucian modernity has unfolded cannot
be the same as those of the West. Rather, it is
more commonsensical to suppose that the paths
of different civilizations toward modernity must
have been different from each other.
SEE ALSO: Confucianism; Modernity; Moral
Economy; Religion; Secularization
4 MO R A L P O L I T I K ( C O N F U C I A N)
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED
READINGS
Kant, I. (1991) Kant: Political Writings. Ed. H. Reiss.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Kim, S. (2000) Inventing Moralpolitik: A Sociologi-
cal Interpretation of Confucian Ideology, Ritual, and
Politics. PhD dissertation, Columbia University.
Kim, S. (2002) The Genealogy of Confucian Moralpoli-
tik and Its Implications for Modern Civil Society. In:
Armstrong, C. (Ed.), Korean Society: Civil Society,
Democracy, and the State. Routledge, New York and
London.
Kim, S. (2003) Interpreting Confucian Modernity in
Late Joseon Korea. Daedong Munhwa Yeongu 42:
59–91.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1980) Emile. Ed. A. Bloom. University
of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Weber, M. (1958) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism. Scribner, New York.