Land Titles and Deeds-Case Digests-Espina-M4

LTD | ESPINA | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – MODULE 3
MODULE 4 CASES
1. DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, G.R.
No. 83609 October 26, 1989 (ANDRIN)
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA

BISNAR, respondents
FACTS:
• Director of Lands seeks a review of a decision of the CA affirming CFI decision which granted private
respondent confirmation and registration of their 2 parcels of land.
o In the application private respondents claim to be owners in fee simple of the lots. Alleging
that they inherited those parcels of land and have been paying taxes thereon.
• Director of Lands opposed for the following grounds:
1. Applicants nor PPI did not possess sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of the
land. Did not even have a: royal grant, special grant, adjustment tile, title by purchase,
possessory information under Royal Decree or any other mode of recognition.
2. Applicants nor PPI have been in OCEN in the land for at least 30 years.
3. Properties in question are a portion of the public domain.
• Applicants amended their application alleged:
o Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby apply for
the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for more than fifty
(50) years.
• RULINGS:
o RTC: ordered the registration. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest have
been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of
land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior
to the filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by
planting coconuts, bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive
fishponds
o CA: affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the lots as timberland
by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots are indeed
more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land.
ISSUES: whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended?
RULINGS: NO. DECISION REVERSED.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled: As provided for under Section
6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act 2874, the classification or reclassification of public
lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department
of the government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for doubt that it is not the
court which determines the classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the
Executive Branch of the government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or abuse
of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1) the disputed area is within a
timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes.
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as
forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Animas,
56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation
of imperfect title do not apply. Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership (Vano vs. Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]).
A parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA
648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land.
Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. We reiterate our ruling in Amunategui that: In
confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome
the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those derived from old Spanish
grants or that he has had continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69.)
2. RP V. TAN PROPERTIES INC, G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner T.A.N. PROPERTIES, INC., respondent
FACTS:
Page 1 of 51
• This case originated from an Application for Original Registration of Title filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
with an area of 564,007 square meters, or 56.4007 hectares.
• A hearing was held. Only the RP was the oppositor represented by the Director of Lands.
• During the hearings respondent presented three witnesses: Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager
and its authorized representative in the case; Evangelista a 72-year old resident of San Bartolome,
Sto. Tomas, Batangas since birth; and Marquez, Records Officer II of the LRA.
• Testimonies:
o The testimonies of respondent’s witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang
Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the concept of
an owner since 1942.
o Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded by his son Antonio.
o Antonio executed a Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children,
Fortunato.
o Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of land.
o Hence, on 26 April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and the land
was adjudicated to one of Antonio’s children, Prospero.
o On 8 August 1997, Porting sold the land to respondent.
• RULINGS:
o RTC: the trial court adjudicated the land in favor of respondent.
o CA: affirmed in toto the trial court’s Decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
2. Whether respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier; and
RULINGS:
Whether the land is alienable and disposable;
LAW/PRINCIPLE:
All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn,
by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable
and disposable rests with the applicant.
DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and authorities of
the offices within the DENR.
• Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for
areas below 50 hectares. The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO)
issues certificate of land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
• DAO No. 38, dated 19 April 1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990
retained the authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below
50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for
lands covering over 50 hectares.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The
applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
APPLICATION:
The respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). The certifications are not sufficient. Respondent area is over 50 hectares. Respondent provided a
CENRO certificate, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do
not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
WON There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious Possession and Occupation in the
Concept of an Owner
Petitioner alleges that the trial court’s reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and Torres was misplaced,
Evangelista’s statement that the possession of respondent’s predecessors-in-interest was open, public,
continuous, peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather than factual
evidence of possession of title. It failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly,
continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and disposable.
SC agrees with petitioner.
SC finds Evangelista’s testimony for the following reasons:
1. Evangelista testifies that they have been possession of the land before 1945. Yet, Evangelista only
worked on the land for three years.
Page 2 of 51
2. Evangelista testifies that their neighbors but don’t know the relationship between respondents –
Kabesang Puroy and Fortunato. Saying KP was succeeded by Fortunato but it was actually KP’s son
– Antonio who succeeded and was not even mentioned by Antonio.
SC finds Evangelista’s testimony insufficient to prove that respondent’s predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. The tax declarations presented were
only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute
proof of claim of ownership.
4. REPUBLIC V. SANTOS, GR NO. 160453 , (CABASAG)
PETITIONER: Republic of the Philippines RESPONDENT: Arcadio Santos III, Arcadio Santos Jr.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters.”
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to be
considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the
water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of
the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property
of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to
some other person.
FACTS:
● Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Santos III
applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B in the RTC in Parañaque City.
● Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant
because of the latter's co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 30 years.
● The City of Parañaque opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed the property
for its flood control program, and assuming that the property was not covered by the legal easement,
title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that the property
was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
● The RTC granted the application for land registration. The Republic, through the Office of the OSG,
appealed. The CA affirmed the RTC.
ISSUES: Whether or not Art. 457 of the Civil Code
RULING: The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents' benefit.
● Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters.” The Republic
submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil Code was
erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents' evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the
drying up of the Parañaque River. The Republic's submission is correct.
● Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil, to
be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the
current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. Respondents should
establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for land
registration.
● However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had
formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of
the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was
previously part of the Parañaque River and became an orchard after it dried up.
● The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents' property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water level
Page 3 of 51
from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual and
imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the
water level did not recede and was more or less maintained.
● Respondents as the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. The State
exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article 502 of
the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the
State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its
property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds
should belong to some other person.
NOTES:
5. Republic v. Javier, GR NO. 214367 , (Cabasag)
PETITIONER: Republic of The Philippines RESPONDENT: Laureana Malijan-Javier, Iden Malijan-

Javier
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Applicants whose circumstances fall under Section 14 (1) need to establish only the following:
First, that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
second, that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
● A CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to establish that a land is alienable and disposable. It
should be "accompanied by an official publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance declaring
the land alienable and disposable.”
FACTS:
● Laureana and Iden's application for registration of land title over a parcel situated in Talisay, Batangas
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Batangas.
● Republic of the Philippines filed an Opposition to the application based on the following grounds: (1)
the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land in question in the concept of an owner since June 12,
1945 or earlier; (2) The tax declarations relied upon by appellees do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land by the appellees (3) The parcel of land applied
for is a land of public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.
● The Spouses Javier claimed that they purchased the property from the Spouses Lumbres. A Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed to facilitate the transaction. They had the property fenced and planted with
coconut, antipolo, and duhat. She also claimed that they had paid its property taxes since 1986.
● Hernandez, who was a Special Land Investigator I of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO), testified that he
was the one who conducted an ocular inspection on the land. He found that the land was outside a
reservation or forest zone. Hernandez also found that no prior application was filed or any patent,
decree, or title was ever issued for it. Finally, he stated that the land "did not encroach upon an
established watershed, river bed, river bank protection, creek or right of way."
● The trial court granted Laureana and Iden's application for registration of title. It held that they were
able to establish that the property was alienable and disposable since September 10, 1997.
● The CA found that Laureana and Iden were able to prove their predecessors-in-interest's possession
of property since 1937 and their possession since 1985 as evidenced by the tax declarations.
ISSUES: Whether or not the TC and the CA erred in granting the Javiers’ application for registration of
property. (YES)
RULING:
● It is well-settled that a CENRO or PENRO certification is not enough to establish that a land is
alienable and disposable. It should be "accompanied by an official publication of the DENR
Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.”
● The certification issued by the DENR Secretary is necessary since he or she is the official authorized
to approve land classification, including the release of land from public domain.
● The rule that before an inalienable land of the public domain becomes private land, the DENR
Secretary must first approve the land classification into an agricultural land and release it as
Page 4 of 51
alienable and disposable. The DENR Secretary's official acts "may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy."
● The CENRO or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer will then conduct a survey
to verify that the land for original registration falls within the DENR Secretary-approved alienable and
disposable zone.
● In this case, although respondents were able to present a CENRO certification, a DENR-CENRO report
with the testimony of the DENR officer who made the report, and the survey plan showing that the
property is already considered alienable and disposable, these pieces of evidence are still not sufficient
to prove that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. Absent the DENR
Secretary's issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable, the land remains part of the
public domain.
● Thus, even if respondents have shown, through their testimonial evidence, that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the property since June 12, 1945, they still cannot register the land for failing to establish
that the land is alienable and disposable.
NOTES:
6. De Los Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo, GR NO. 214587 , (Cabasag)
PETITIONER: Josephine De los Reyes, Julius RESPONDENT: Municipality of Kalibo, Mayor Raymar
Peralta Rebaldo
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● It is settled that an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code; imprescriptibility of registered land
is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act
does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, hereafter, protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to
obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws,
wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided.
● It is settled that equitable title is defined as a title derived through a valid contract or relation, and
based on recognized equitable principles, or the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal
title transferred to him. In order that a plaintiff may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show
that the one from whom he derives his right had himself a right to transfer.
● Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil,
to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects
of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
FACTS:
● Lot No. 2076 was registered in the name of Ana O. Peralta. Upon her demise, her property passed on
to her brother, Jose Peralta, who caused registration of the same in his name Jose later had the
property divided into Lots 2076-A and 2076-B, and sold the latter portion. Lot 2076-A, remained in
Jose's name.
● Allegedly through accretion, land was added to Lot No. 2076. Said area was first occupied by and
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ambrocio Ignacio. He was the Peraltas' tenant, but he
later executed a Quitclaim of Real Property in Jose's favor.
● When Jose died, Lot 2076-A, together with the supposed area of accretion, was transferred to his son,
Juanito Peralta. The area of accretion was apportioned and registered under the name of Juanito and
his siblings.
● The Municipality of Kalibo, through its then Mayor Diego Luces and the members of its Sangguniang
Bayan, sought to convert more or less four hectares of said area of accretion into a garbage dumpsite.
Juanito, in his capacity as his siblings' representative, opposed said project. He wrote a formal protest
to the Secretary of the DENR.
● The Municipality of Kalibo continued the project under the justification that the contested property is
actually part of the public domain. Moreover, the DENR's Environmental Compliance Certificate
Page 5 of 51
showed that the project would not harm the dumpsite's neighboring areas, including the water systems.
The municipality built a retaining wall on the property facing the Aklan river. Later, the area was
enclosed with a perimeter fence.
● RTC ruled in favor of the Peraltas. The CA ruled in favor of the respondents.
ISSUES: whether or not the CA committed an error when it reversed the RTC decision which declared
the subject parcels of land as accretion and not part of the public domain (NO)
RULING:
● The Peraltas, the petitioners in the instant case, are not even registered owners of the area adjacent
to the increment claimed, much less of the subject parcels of land. Only the late Juanito became the
registered owner of Lot 2076-A, the lot next to the supposed accretion.
● It is settled that an accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot
that receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing;
registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is another. Ownership over the accretion
received by the land adjoining a river is governed by the Civil Code; imprescriptibility of registered land
is provided in the registration law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Act
does not vest or give title to the land, but merely confirms and, hereafter, protects the title
already possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain
this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the registration laws, wherein certain
judicial procedures have been provided.
● There is no concrete evidence showing any right of title on Ignacio's part for him to be able to legally
and validly cede the property to Jose. What the quitclaim merely proves is that Ignacio had forfeited
any claim or interest over the accretion in Jose's favor. It is settled that equitable title is defined as a
title derived through a valid contract or relation, and based on recognized equitable principles, or
the right in the party, to whom it belongs, to have the legal title transferred to him. In order that a plaintiff
may draw to himself an equitable title, he must show that the one from whom he derives his right had
himself a right to transfer. The plaintiffs have neither legal nor equitable title over the contested
property.
● Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The deposit of soil,
to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects
of the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
● Ignacio characterized the land in question as swampy and its increase in size as the effect of
the change of the shoreline of the Visayan Sea, and not through the gradual deposits of soil
coming from the river or the sea. The Officer-in-Charge of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the Bureau of Lands, found upon inspection that the subject area was
predominantly composed of sand rather than soil.
NOTES:
7. Santulan v Exec. Sec, GR NO. L-28021, ()
PETITIONER: Julian Santulan RESPONDENT: Exec Sec, Sec of Agriculture and Natural
substituted by his children Resources, Director of Lands; Antonio Lusin substituted by his
(Patrocinio, Adoracion, Arturo, heirs (Teodosia Balanza-wife, and his children-Leopoldo,
Constancia, Pepita) and Armando, Alfonso, Emiliano, Magdalena, Erlinda, Estrella) and
grandchildren (Jocelyn, Rosauro, the heirs of Carolina Lusin-Lucero (Manolito and Mario Lucero)
Roberto)
Lusin allegedly converted two hectares of the said land into a
fishpond and introduced the alleged improvements from 1951 to
1953.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
● Revolves around a 30-year old disputed land (4.5 has. In Barrio Kaingin, Kawit, Cavite) between Julian
Santulan and Antonio Lusin and their heirs.
● Santulan claimed that the foreshore land was an extension of his land (Lot No. 986) of the Kawit
cadastre (17,301 sqm), registered in his name in 1937 under Original Certificate of Title No. 6 which
was issued by virtue of a free patent.
Page 6 of 51
● Santulan applied for a survey plan and it was approved by the Director of Lands in 1944.
● On December 29, 1942 Santulan, pursuant to Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, filed an application,
F.L.A. No. V-562, to lease for five years for agricultural purposes an area of 36,120 sqm of the said
foreshore land.
● Pursuant to Act No. 3077 and Lands Administrative Order No. 8-3, filed with the Bureau of Lands an
application for a revocable permit to occupy the said land. He indicated therein that he would use the
land for "capiz beds and oyster beds, the planting of bakawan and pagatpat and later to be developed
into a fishpond" (Exh. G).
● Seven years later (on December 22, 1949) Santulan filed with the Bureau of Fisheries an application
for an ordinary fishpond permit or lease of the said foreshore land.
● Director of Forestry investigated the condition of the said foreshore land and found that it was
swampy "and not an improved fishpond as alleged by Antonio Lusin" and that it is within the
disposable areas for agricultural purposes under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands.
● Chief of the division of commercial fisheries informed Lusin that he was reported to have illegally
entered the area covered by Santulan's fishpond permit application and directing him to refrain from
introducing improvements, with the warning that court proceedings would be taken against him.
● Lusin was asked to vacate the property.
● Meanwhile, Santilan beginning 1948 successfully registered his name placed in the Tax Declaration
for the property.
● Lusin contended Santilan and claimed that he had been in the continuous and exclusive possession
of the land since 1920, when it was still under water, and that he had used it as a site of his fish
corrals.
● Director Lands ruled in favor of Santulan (that it is an extension of Santulan's Lot No. 986 and it was
formerly a part of the sea; that Santulan was the first to enter the land and to make dikes thereon,
and that Lusin entered the land later and made dikes also). Motion for reconsideration was rejected.
● Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources affirmed the decision. Petition for reinvestigation was
approved and it reaffirmed the rejection of Lusin's revocable permit and foreshore lease applications
but ordered Santulan to reimburse to Lusin the appraised value of his improvements.
● Lusin appealed to the President and the Exec Sec granted the decision and reversed the Sec. of
Agriculture and Natural Resources’ decision since the record is silent as to whether or not the land
in question has been declared by the President as not necessary for the public service and as open
to disposition (Sec. 61, Public Land Law).
● CFI affirmed Exec. Sec’s decision.
● CA endorsed the case to the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Public Land Law repealed section 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-
1
RULING:
SC granted the petition and reversed the Exec. Sec’s decision (lease application of Julian Santulan mentioned
in the order of February 1, 1951 should be recorded in the names of his heirs and the obligation to make
reimbursement mentioned in the dispositive part of the Undersecretary's order should now devolve upon the
heirs of Santulan).
● Sec. 64 was amended by Act No. 3517 which took effect on February 4, 1929 (24 Public Laws 416).
Section 64, as thus amended, is substantially the same as section 67 of the 1936 Public Land Law.
● Par. 32 of Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1, issued on April 30, 1936, was promulgated under section
64 of the old Public Land Law, as amended. And since the amended section 64 was substantially
reproduced in section 67 of the present Public Land Law, it is glaringly incorrect to say that section 67
rendered obsolete the said paragraph 32. Paragraph 32 is still in force and is good under the existing
Public Land Law.
● The rule in par 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 which provides
that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the
sea forth part of the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of
the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coast guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the property
of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof ." (cited in Ignacio vs. Director
of Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).
● Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner
(riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits
due to the action of the sea
● The SC agreed with the Director of Land’s decision that Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-1 and 8-
3 are still in force and have not been superseded by any later regulations and that the directive of the
President of the Philippines to the Director of Lands dated May 24, 1966, stopping the grant of foreshore
Page 7 of 51
leases all along Manila Bay, towards Cavite and Bataan, has not rendered the instant case moot and
academic "because the foreshore lease application involved is pending award.
NOTES:
N/A
8. Cantoja v Lim, GR NO. 168386, (CAGADAS)
PETITIONER: LUCITA A. CANTOJA [LOSE] RESPONDENT: HARRY S. LIM [WON]
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
PREFERENCE OF RIPARIAN OWNER – [Section 32, Land Administrative Order No. 7-1 dated April 30,
1936]
“While lands added to the shore by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea form part of
the public domain, such lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary
for purposes of public utility, or for the established [sic] of special industries, or for the coast guard service," shall
be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof."
FACTS:
• On 16 November 1989, the late Roberto Cantoja Sr. filed with the Office of the DENR, General Santos
City, an application for a Foreshore Lease Contract.
• On 23 November 1990, the Foreshore Lease Agreement (FLA) was awarded to him.
• On 4 March 1994, herein petitioner [Harry S. Lim] filed his protest docketed as DENR Case No. 5231,
questioning the grant of the FLA to Cantoja.
• The protest was based on petitioner's allegation that Cantoja committed fraud and misrepresentation
in declaring in his application that the subject foreshore area adjoined his (Cantoja's) property.
• Petitioner presented his Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8423, over Lot 2-B, (LRC) Psd-210799,
which adjoins the foreshore area subject of the lease.
• On 23 May 1995, upon order of Regional Executive Director, the Special Investigator Romulo
Marohomsalic of the DENR Office found that Cantoja was in actual possession of the foreshore area
which was utilized as "dock-board of the Cantoja's Fishing Business. It was further ascertained, that no
portion thereof, has been occupied or possessed by any other person or persons, nor was there any
adverse claimant thereof."
• On 12 December 1995, Geodetic Engineer Bernardo L. Soria submitted his report stating, inter alia,
that "there was no overlapping of property between petitioner and respondent”.
• On 5 May 1997, petitioner filed Motion for Reconsideration of the said Order.
• On 2 May 2000, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles, rendered a Decision thereby cancelling the
FLA previously granted to Cantoja.
• On appeal, the Office of the President rendered the herein assailed Decision affirming the 17 October
2000 Order of the DENR Secretary. Like the DENR Secretary, the Office of the President also relied
on the findings of Special Investigator Marohomsalic that the petitioner's titled land is an inalienable
foreshore area which could not be subject of a valid patent or title.
• Aggrieved, respondent Harry Lim (respondent) appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 24 January 2005,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the 27 March 2003 decision of the Office of the
President and reinstating the 2 May 2000 decision of the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR).
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in cancelling the Foreshore Lease Contract granted to
Cantoja covering the foreshore area
RULING:
It is undisputed that respondent is the registered owner of the land adjacent to the foreshore area leased to
Cantoja, which is covered by TCT No. 8423 5 issued on 20 January 1975
Page 8 of 51
Thus, prior to Cantoja's foreshore lease application on 16 November 1989 and the grant of the foreshore lease
contract on 23 November 1990, respondent already owned the land adjacent to the foreshore land since August
1961.
Being the owner of the land adjoining the foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has
preferential right to lease the foreshore area as provided under paragraph 32 of the Lands Administrative Order
No. 7-1, dated 30 April 1936.
NOTES:
Santulan v. The Executive Secretary –
Reason for such grant of preferential right to the riparian or littoral owner: Article 4 of Spanish Law of
Waters of 1886 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner (riparian according to paragraph
32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.
9. Republic v CA, GR NO. L-39473, (BAGONOC)
PETITIONER: RESPONDENT:
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
1.
⚫ On September 11, 1967 - Lastimado filed a a Petition for the reopening of cadastral
proceedings over a portion of Lot No. 626 of the
Mariveles Cadastre
-Lastimado was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte
-BUT there was absence of opposition from the government, so
⚫ On October 14, 1967- the trial Court rendered a Decision granting the Petition and
adjudicating the land in favor of Lastimado
⚫ On November 20 & 21, 1967- the trial court issued an order for the issuance of a decree
of registration
⚫ Original Certificate of Title No. N-144 was also issued in her favor, she then
subdivided the land into ten lots, and the corresponding titles
2.
⚫ On June 3, 1968, or within one year from the entry of the decree of registration,Republic the led a Petition
for Review pursuant to Sec. 38, Act No. 496, on the ground of fraud, alleging that:
A. during the period of alleged adverse possession by Lastimado, said parcel of land was
part of the U.S. Military Reservation in Bataan, which was formally turned over to the Republic
of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that the same is inside the public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan and, therefore, not subject to disposition or acquisition under the Public Land
Law
3.
⚫ Trial court dismissed the petition on grounds: that the Solicitor General had failed to file opposition to
the original Petition for reopening of the cadastral proceedings and was, therefore, estopped from
questioning the decree of registration ordered issued therein
4.
⚫ Republic appealed to CA, however, CA held that there was no fraud since:
A. Republic was duly notified, so failure to file opposition is in effect an
admission that land is not part of forest land.
B. In said petition, the technical descriptions of the portion of Lot No. 626 of the
Cadastre, subject-matter of the petition were expressly stated, the
boundaries, specifically delineated. The alleged ground that the land forms
part of a forest land exists at the time petitioner was duly notified of said petition.
Page 9 of 51
WON the case can be reopened in order to prove that land was indeed public forest and thus nonregistrable
YES.
⚫ Firstly, the court discussed the essential elements for the allowance of the reopening or review of a decree,
which are:
a) that the petitioner has a real and dominical right;
b) that he has been deprived thereof;
c) through fraud;
d) that the petition is filed within one year from the issuance of the decree; and
e) that the property has not as yet been transferred to an innocent purchaser.
⚫ However, for fraud to justify the review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to
be annulled was rendered.
⚫ There is an existence of extrinsic fraud because she misrepresented that she and her predecessors-
in-interest had been in possession of the land publicly, peacefully, exclusively and adversely against the
whole world as owner for more than forty years
when, in fact, the subject land was inside the former U.S. Military Reservation, which was formally
turned over to the Republic of the Philippines only on December 22, 1965, and that she likewise contended
that her rights, as derived from the original and
primitive occupants of the land in question, are capable of judicial confirmation under
existing laws, when the truth is, said parcel of land is within the public forest of
Mariveles, Bataan, and is not subject to disposition or acquisition by private persons
under the Public Land Law.
⚫ Republic vs. Sioson "the action of the lower Court in denying the petition for review of a decree of
registration filed within one year from entry of the d without hearing the evidence in support of the allegation
and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud upon which the petition is predicated, is held to be in error, because
the lower Court should have afforded the petitioner an opportunity to prove it.
⚫ If the allegation of Republic that the land in question was inside the military reservation at the time it was
claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral nor can it be the object of reopening under
Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if the land in question, indeed forms part of the public forest, then,
possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to
register under the Torrens System.
⚫ Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect (although the Solicitor
General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot operate to bar action by the State as it
cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its officials or agents. Further, we cannot lose sight of the
cardinal consideration that "the State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land" under basic Constitutional Precepts, and that it is moreover charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.
Conclusion: The case was remanded to the trial court for the Republic to present its evidence.
NOTES:
10. Enriquez vs. DOL, G.R. No. 168065. September 6, 2017 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER:
G.R. No. 168065 RESPONDENT:
TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ represented by her G.R. No. 168065

Attorney-in-fact, JOSE MARCEL E. PANLILIO,
substituted by MONTESO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Page 10 of 51
● Enriquez, citing Carrion v. CA, avers that DIRECTOR OF LANDS, COURT OF APPEALS,
the appellate court committed a reversible GERONIMO SACLOLO, JOSEFINO SACLOLO and
error when it modified the decision of the RODRIGO SACLOLO,
trial court and granted to the Director of
Lands, who did not appeal from such ● Argued that the lands are not alienable and
decision, affirmative reliefs other than disposable because they are located within the
those granted to them by the trial court's Calumpang Point Naval Reservation –
judgment segregated from the public domain by
● that the Director of Lands should have Proclamation No. 307, dated November 20,
raised the plans' lack of verification during 1967;
the trial of the case. ● By virtue of RA 6236, the right to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title has expired;
G.R. No. 168070 ● the Saclolos has not acquired title to the subject
lands through purchase and they had not been
GERONIMO SACLOLO, JOSEFINO SACLOLO in actual and exclusive possession, occupation,
and RODRIGO SACLOLO and cultivation of the subject lands for at least 30
years immediately prior filing petition
● the Saclolos argue that the Director of ● the Director of Lands, citing Baquiran v. CA,
Lands did not appeal from the RTC counters that issues, though not specifically
decision, thus, the facts pertaining to the raised in the pleadings in the appellate court,
registration of titles are already final and may, in the interest of justice, be properly
settled; and that Proclamation No. 307 considered by the said court in deciding a case,
even strengthens their rights over the if there are questions raised in the trial court and
subject lands for the same proclamation are matters of record having some bearing on
expressly recognizes the rights of private the issue submitted which the parties failed to
parties. raise or which the lower court ignored;
G.R. No. 168070
COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ and

DIRECTOR OF LANDS
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942, particularly Section 48 (b) which provides
that:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
A mere invocation of "private rights" does not automatically entitle an applicant to have the property
registered in his name. A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. There must
be a declaration from the Executive or Legislative Department declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.
FACTS:
● 27 December 1974 – the Saclolos filed in the RTC a joint application for registration of title over three
parcels of land located at Sitio Sinalam, Bario Sapang, Ternate, Cavite. They averred that they acquired
title to the subject lands through purchase and that together with their predecessors-in-interest, they
had been in actual and exclusive possession, occupation, and cultivation of the subject lands since
time immemorial
● The Director of Lands filed an opposition arguing that the subject lands are not alienable and disposable
because they are located within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation – segregated from the public
domain.
Page 11 of 51
● 27 December 1993 - Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez filed a motion for intervention alleging that the Saclolos
had sold to her all their interests and rights over the subject lands on 19 September 1976.
RTC RULING (6 July 1995): in favor of the Saclolos
● the subject lands are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain because Proclamation No.
307 itself stressed that the segregation of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation was subject to
private rights.
● the evidence presented by the Saclolos proved that their rights over the land, being private in nature
andcharacter, were excluded from the reservation for military purposes.
CA RULING (26 May 2004) reversed and set aside RTC ruling, dismissing the application
● the lands are within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation – it could not be privately titled.
● The CA observed that the informacion possessoria did not at all indicate the area covered by the claim.
The tax declaration, technical descriptions, sketch plans, tax receipts, deeds of sale, and surveyor's
certificates did not show the nature of the Saclolos' possession.
● The appellate court concluded that the subject lands could not be registered because they lie within a
naval reservation and most of them are forest and foreshore lands.
ISSUES:
1) W/N the appellate court may declare that the lands sought to be registered are not alienable and disposable
notwithstanding the failure of the Director of Lands to appeal from the decision of the trial court decreeing the
issuance of certificates of title; (YES)
2) W/N the appellate court may resolve issues which are not raised as errors on appeal; (YES)
3) W/N the applicants for registration of title have sufficiently proved that the subject lands are alienable and
disposable (NO)
RULING:
The subject lands may still be declared public lands notwithstanding the Director of Lands' failure to
appeal from the RTC decision.
An applicant is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens system simply because no
one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show, even though there is
no opposition to the satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple.
Consequently, the appellate court may still determine whether the subject lands are indeed alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, notwithstanding the Director of Lands' failure to appeal from the RTC
decision.
The appellate court may reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than those
raised as errors on appeal.
In this case, there is no doubt that the application for registration of title hinges upon the determination of whether
the subject lands are alienable and disposable. Further, this is consistent with the appellate court's authority to
review the totality of the controversy brought on appeal.
Applicants failed to prove that the subject lots are alienable and disposable.
The application of the Saclolos was filed on December 27, 1974. Accordingly, the law governing the application
was Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended by R.A. No. 1942, particularly Section 48 (b) which
provides that:
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
Page 12 of 51
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Without first determining the nature and character of the land, all the other requirements such as the length and
nature of possession and occupation over such land do not come into play. The required length of possession
does not operate when the land is part of the public domain.
To reiterate, the Director of Lands insists that the subject lands are within the Calumpang Point Naval
Reservation. This was bolstered by the testimony of Eleutorio R. Paz, Chief of the Survey Division of the Bureau
of Lands-Region 4. Thus, it was incumbent upon the Saclolos and Enriquez to prove that the subject lands do
not form part of the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation because "when a property is officially declared a military
reservation, it becomes inalienable and outside the commerce of man."
A mere invocation of "private rights" does not automatically entitle an applicant to have the property registered
in his name. "Persons claiming the protection of private rights in order to exclude their lands from military
reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that the pieces of property in question have
been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public lands."
None of the documents presented by the Saclolos and Enriquez prove that the subject lands are alienable and
disposable:
● The investigator’s report noted that these lands are "within the extensive Calumpang Point Reservation
– thus, not alienable and disposable.
● The informacion possessoria on which they heavily rely neither states that the subject lands were
declared alienable and disposable nor indicates the area covered thereby. Moreover, it is worthy to
note that P.D. No. 892 discontinued the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law by
categorically declaring all lands recorded under the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title,
unregistered lands. P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any legal force and effect in establishing
ownership over real property.
● The Deed of Sale and the application of registration of title did not match. The alienability and
disposability of the subject lands and even the exact area covered thereof lack factual bases.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. There must be a declaration from
the Executive or Legislative Department declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes – this is absent in this case.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on
the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of
the application is alienable or disposable. Time and again, it has been held that matters of land classification
or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
As early as 1904, a certain parcel of land has already been reserved for military purposes, in which Saclolos
remained oblivious and there would have been several people who knew of such reservation considering that
the same is not confidential information. The Saclolos and even Enriquez failed to exercise such diligence
as prudent men ordinarily would. As such, they only have themselves to blame for their predicament. They
should have taken full advantage of the opportunity to present during trial all pieces of evidence to prove that
the subject lands are alienable and disposable especially in the light of the fact that the government vehemently
opposes the registration. Thus, in view of the glaring lack of evidence as regards the alienability and
disposability of the subject lands, the Court is constrained to deny their registration of title.
NOTES:
Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals:
[T]he appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors
and to consider errors not assigned. It is clothed with ample authority to review rulings even if they are not
assigned as errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the Court of Appeals may consider grounds other than those
Page 13 of 51
touched upon in the decision of the trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, the Court
of Appeals may, with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than
those raised as errors on appeal. We have applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the following instances:
(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a
just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice;
(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the lower
court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6 Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent. (citations omitted)
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines, the Court emphasized that lands of the public
domain, unless declared otherwise by virtue of a statute or law, are inalienable and can never be acquired by
prescription. No amount of time of possession or occupation can ripen into ownership over lands of the public
domain. All lands of the public domain presumably belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not
clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated
or disposed.
11. Ting vs. Heirs of Liero, G.R. No. 168913. March 14, 2007 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: ROLANDO TING RESPONDENT: HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely:

FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, AURORA L.
● no decree of registration has been issued by ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID,
the Land Registration Authority even if the EFREN A. LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L.
LRC No. N-983 decision became final and ALCOVER
executory. ● LRC No. N-983 which had become final and
● The “extinct” decision only resurfaced as executory on January 29, 1977 and which,
basis of respondent’s motion to dismiss they argued, barred the filing of petitioner's
petitioner’s application. application on the ground of res judicata.
● no action for revival of the said decision was
filed by respondents after the lapse of the
ten-year prescriptive period, "the cause of
action in the dormant judgment passé[d] into
extinction.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
SEC. 30 of PD 1529 (Property Registration Decree). When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of
decree. — The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of
thirty days to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the
judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in
accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration
and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis
supplied)
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the
judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when
no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.
Page 14 of 51
FACTS:
● December 10, 1976 – CFI Cebu granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora
Atienza for registration of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-
07-000787.
● January 29, 1977 – the LRC No. N-983 decision became final and executory.
● November 10, 1982 – the Land Registration Commission was directed to issue the corresponding
decree of registration and the certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio.
● February 12, 1997 - Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the RTC of Cebu an application for registration
of title to the same lot. The application was docketed as LRC No. 1437-N.
● The respondents filed an opposition alleging that the 1997 decision became final and executory and it
barred the filing of petitioner's application on the ground of res judicata.
RTC RULING: dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata.
ISSUES:
W/N the decision in LRC No. N-983 (respondent’s application) constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N
(Petitioner’s application).
RULING:
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land, with or without opposition, the
judgment of the court confirming the title of the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its
registration in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It becomes final when
no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's approval in LRC No. N-983 of
spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding
on the whole world including petitioner.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the decree is purely
ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of the court and the decree must
be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no
discretion in the matter. However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation
and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this
respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of
the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and
cadastral land registration proceedings. " (Emphasis supplied)
On the contention that the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not
lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration
proceedings:
This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as
a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment
that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a
reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party.
Petition is denied.
NOTES:
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al . enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in land registration
proceedings, viz:
Page 15 of 51
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED IN THIS LAND
REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME
FINAL AND UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above assignment, except in so far as it
supports his theory that after a decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after
the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority
for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years
by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules
refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This
is so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the
Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is
to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a
parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by
judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him
therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39, regarding the execution
of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession,
becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
12. Laburada vs. Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387. March 11, 1998 (Odchigue)
PETITIONER: SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA RESPONDENT: LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

LABURADA, represented by their attorney-in-fact, ● contending that to issue decree of registration
MANUEL SANTOS, JR. of the subject land would result in the
duplication of titles over the same, and thus
● Petitioners claim that they have a "clear contravene the policy and purpose of the
legal right to the act being prayed for and Torrens registration system, and destroy the
the LRA has the imperative duty to perform" integrity of the same as verification of the
because, as land registration is an in rem records on file in the Register of Deeds of the
proceeding Province of Rizal yields that the lot in question
● It is not the duty of the LRA to "take the is already covered by a TCT.
cudgels for the private persons in
possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No.
29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595."
● petitioners contend that they suffered from
the delay in the issuance of their title,
because of "the failure of the Register of
Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila to furnish
LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No.
29337 and TCT No. 6595" notwithstanding
the lack of opposition from the holders of
said titles.
● the State "consented to its being sued" in
this case[;] thus, the legislature must
recognize any judgment that may be
rendered in this case "as final and make
provision for its satisfaction."
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act
which may be compelled through mandamus. Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not
compellable by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of
mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which
is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a
right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law.
Page 16 of 51
FACTS:
● Sps. Laburada applied for the registration of Lot 3-A which was approved by the trial court.
● Upon motion of petitioners, the trial court issued an order requiring the LRA to issue the corresponding
decree of registration. However, the LRA refused.
● Hence, petitioners filed an action for mandamus. The LRA revealed that based on records, Lot 3-A
which sought to be registered by Sps. Laburada is part of Lot No. 3, over which TCT No. 6595 has
already been issued.
● Upon the other hand, Lot 3-B of said Lot 3 is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued
in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Buenaflor, which was issued as a transfer from TCT No. 6595.
● The LRA contended that to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners, it
would result in the duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and
purpose of the Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same.
ISSUES:
W/N the LRA may be compelled by mandamus to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the subject
land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate.
RULING:
NO.
We hold that mandamus is not the proper remedy for three reasons.
First : Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
The judgment they seek to enforce in this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land
Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement it. We have unambiguously ruled
that a judgment of registration does not become executory until after the expiration of one year after the
entry of the final decree of registration.
Petitioners' contention is not correct Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land
registration proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of one
(1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration
Second : A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence
or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering
the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy
and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in
the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null
and void, since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel of land only once. Thus,
if it is proven that the land which petitioners are seeking to register has already been registered in 1904and
1905, the issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said principle. The issuance of a
decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. It is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a decree of registration.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
Page 17 of 51
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act
which may be compelled through mandamus.
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable by mandamus because it is a
judicial act involving the exercise of discretion. Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when
the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and
complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law
or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely
technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or
dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.
NOTES:
On the question of whether the LRA can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general
cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez which held:
"Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in the proceedings below, these may
be ignored by the Court in the interest of substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict
adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be compelled to issue a decree of
registration over land which has already been decreed to and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate
was spurious, without offering any proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As we declared in an early case, '(t)he
very purpose of the Torrens system would be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a
second action for registration.' The application for registration of the petitioners in this case would, under the
circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D .
1529." (Emphasis supplied.)
Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable:
"Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral court, there remain many things to be
done before the final decree can be issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended
descriptions, especially
where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to
another party, to fit the said decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil.,
227, 234:
'Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated in convenient form for
transcription upon the certificate of title and must contain an accurate technical description of the land.
This
requires trained technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel of land
included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits of such portions can only be roughly
indicated in the decision of the court. In such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional
surveys become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be done by the
court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the General Land Registration Office with
such duties (Administrative Code, section 177).'
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office,
the administrative officer, the issuance of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the
reason that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an administrative officer but as an
officer of the court and so the issuance of a final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (De
los Reyes vs. De Villa, supra). . . " (Emphasis supplied.)
13. Republic v CA, GR NO. 113549, (Advincula)
Page 18 of 51
PETITIONER: Republic of the Phils. (Director of RESPONDENT: CA; Heirs of Luis Ribaya
Lands)
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there
be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice.
FACTS:
● Sps. Luis Ribaya and Agustina Revatoris applied for registration and confirmation of title of the lot
covered by Plan II-13961 before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Albay.
● CFI granted the application and Sps. Ribaya had Telesforo Untalan, a Bureau of Lands surveyor,
conduct a land survey for their property in Barrio Magragondong, Ligao, Albay. The parcel of land was
found to comprise an area of 25,542,603 sqm. The survey plan was denominated as Plan II-13961
included 4 parcels of land and allegedly approved by the Acting Director of Lands on January 3,1922.
● Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3947 covering the four lots embraced by Plan II-13961-Amd. was
issued in the names of the Sps. Ribaya even though the application was not amended to reflect the
resurvey and that the amended plan was not published.
● n 1964, the heirs of Luis Ribaya (herein private respondents) received compensation from the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission of the United States for damages sustained by the land during the
war.|||
● However, CA noted in its January 9, 1991 decision, that the said land survey exhibits did not show the
surveyor's signature. Moreover, as per Land Classification Map No. 871 of the Bureau of Forestry, the
above parcel of land was considered part of the public forest and released for disposition only on
December 31, 1930.
● Sixty-two (62) farmers occupying the land and claiming ownership thereof, requested the Director of
Lands to institute an action to annul OCT No. RO-10848.
● Directed of Lands filed petition before the RTC.
● RTC granted the petition.
● CA initially affirmed RTC’s decision but later granted the motion for reconsideration and reversed RTC’s
decision.
● Case is elevated to the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is barred by prescription to bring the action for
annulment of OCT No. 3947 and all its derivative certificates of title
RULING:
SC granted the petition and reinstated the RTC’s earlier ruling.
● The SC ruled that the one-year period provided for in Section 38 of Act No. 496 merely refers to
a petition for review and is reckoned from the entry of the decree.
● SC noted that there are other remedies available to an aggrieved party after the said one-year
period, e.g., reconveyance, covered by Section 65 of Act No. 496 which, inter alia, provides that
"in all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may pursue all his legal and equitable
remedies against the parties to such fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title."
● Likewise, an action for damages is sanctioned in cases where the property has been transferred to
an innocent purchaser for value, which may be filed within four years from discovery of the fraud.
Recourse may also be had against the Assurance Fund.
● Finally, prescription never lies against the State for the reversion of property which is part of the public
forest or of a forest reservation which was registered in favor of any party. Then too, public land
registered under the Land Registration Act may be recovered by the State at any time.
● The notice of the hearing of application of the spouses Ribaya for the registration of the land covered
by the original plan was published in March 17, 1925 issue of the Official Gazette. In short, there was
only one publication thereof. Sec. 31 of Act No. 496, the governing law then, required two publications.
Hence, the decision of September 18, 1925 of the land registration court was void for want of the
required publications. The requirement of dual publication is one of the essential bases of the
jurisdiction of the registration court; it is a jurisdictional requisite.
● Land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there
be constructive seizure of the Land through publication and service of notice.
NOTES:
N/A
Page 19 of 51
14. Eland Phils., Inc. v Garcia, GR NO. 173289, (Advincula)
PETITIONER: Eland Phils. Inc. RESPONDENT: Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, Heirs of Tiburcio
Malabanan;
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new trial and
the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion irrespective of the grounds upon
which it may have been presented.
● Sec. 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of registration may be filed "not later
than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration."
● For an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or
legal efficacy.
FACTS:
● Azucena Garcia, Elino Fajardo, and Teresa Malabanan, the heir of Tiburcio Malabanan, filed a
Complaint dated March 2, 1998 for Quieting of Title with Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the RTC,
Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City against Eland Philippines, Inc.|||
● claimed that they are the owners, in fee simple title, of a parcel of land identified as Lot 9250 Cad-355
by occupation and possession under the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public Land Law or
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended.
● The Malabanans et.al. had been in possession of the said lot for at least thirty years, and they were
not aware of any person or entity who had a legal or equitable interest or claim on the same lot until
the time they were requesting that the lot be declared for tax purposes. They found out that the lot was
the subject of a land registration proceeding that had already been decided by the same court where
their complaint was filed. They also found out that Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No. N-62686,
was already issued on August 20, 1997 to Eland Phils. Inc. pursuant to the Decision dated June 7,
1994 of the same court. They averred that they were not notified of the said land registration case;
thus, they claimed the presence of misrepresentation amounting to actual or extrinsic fraud.
● Eland Phils. filed motion to dismiss the petition but RTC denied the petition and ordered Eland Phils.to
file its answer.
● After lengthy court trials, RTC decided in favor of the Malabanans, et.al.
● CA affirmed RTC’s decision.
ISSUES: Whether or not a motion for summary judgment is proper in a motion for quieting a title
RULING:
SC granted the petition and reversed the CA’s decision.
Summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law:
● SC ruled that the grant of summary judgment was not proper. A summary judgment is permitted
only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
● A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, the
affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues
are not genuine.
● It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the determining factor in granting
a motion for summary judgment, and the movant has the burden of proving such nonexistence. The
trial court found no genuine issue as to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-
blown trial.
● By granting the summary judgment, the trial court has in effect annulled its former ruling based
on a claim of possession and ownership of the same land for more than thirty years without the
benefit of a full-blown trial. The fact that the respondents seek to nullify the original certificate of title
issued to the petitioner on the claim that the former were in possession of the same land for a number
of years, is already a clear indicium that a genuine issue of a material fact exists. This, together with
the failure of the respondents to show that there were no genuine issues involved, should have been
Page 20 of 51
enough for the trial court to give the motion for summary judgment, filed by respondents, scant
consideration. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so
only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact.
● Under Art. 476 of the New Civil Code, the remedy may be availed of only when, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding, which appears valid but is, in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, a cloud is thereby cast on the complainant's title to real property
or any interest therein. The codal provision reads:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason
of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be
prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
● An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property
or any interest therein.
● In turn, Article 477 of the same Code identifies the party who may bring an action to quiet title,
thus:
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which
is the subject-matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.
It can thus be seen that for an action for quieting of title to prosper, the plaintiff must
first have a legal, or, at least, an equitable title on the real property subject of the action
and that the alleged cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid.
● The Court cited its ruling in Robles, et al. vs. CA, where it held that it was essential for the
plaintiff or complainant to have a legal title or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. Also, the deed, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding that is being alleged as a cloud on plaintiff's title must be shown to be
in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.
● For an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his
title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.
● Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an application for
review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the decree of registration.
However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored solely on actual fraud. Shedding light
on the matter is a discussion presented in one of the recognized textbooks on property registration.
● The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for
reopening and revising a decree of registration. One of the remedies available to him is a petition
for review. To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) The petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land; TaIHEA
(b) He must show actual fraud in the procurement of the decree of registration;
(c) The petition must be filed within one year from the issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Authority; and
(d) The property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.
● A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid a certificate of title obtained under the
Torrens system. An important feature of a certificate of title is its finality. The proceedings
whereby such a title is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown, whether
actually served with notice or not, and includes all who have an interest in the land. If they do
not appear and oppose the registration of their own estate or interest in the property in the
name of another, judgment is rendered against them by default, and, in the absence of fraud,
such judgment is conclusive. If an interest in the land will not by itself operate to vacate a
decree of registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.
Petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion for new
trial:
● As long as a final decree has not been entered by the Land Registration Authority and period
of one year has not elapsed from the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration case continues to be under the control and
Page 21 of 51
sound discretion of the registration court. 62 After the lapse of said period, the decree
becomes incontrovertible and no longer subject to reopening or review.
● Sec. 32 provides that a petition for review of the decree of registration may be filed "not
later than one year from and after the date of entry of such decree of registration."
Giving this provision a literal interpretation, it may at first blush seem that the petition for review
cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. However, it has been ruled that
the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of the court's decision and before
the expiration of one year from the entry of the final decree of registration for, as noted
in Rivera v. Moran, there can be no possible reason requiring the complaining party to wait
until the final decree is entered before urging his claim for fraud.
● The one-year period stated in Sec. 32 within which a petition to re-open and review the decree
of registration refers to the decree of registration described in Section 31, which decree is
prepared and issued by the Land Registration Administrator.
● A petition for review under Section 32 is a remedy separate and distinct from a motion
for new trial and the right to the remedy is not affected by the denial of such a motion
irrespective of the grounds upon which it may have been presented. Thus, where
petitioners acquired their interest in the land before any final decree had been entered, the
litigation was therefore in effect still pending and, in these circumstances, they can hardly be
considered innocent purchasers in good faith.
NOTES:
In their motion for summary judgment, the respondents failed to clearly demonstrate the absence of any
genuine issue of fact. They merely reiterated their averments in the complaint for quieting of title and opposed
some issues raised by the petitioner in its Answer Ad Cautelam, to wit:
Nonetheless, going by the records of the admitted and uncontroverted facts and facts established there
is no more litigious or genuine issue of basic fact to be the subject of further trial on the merits. DHETIS
The first defense as to the identity of the subject property, the issue has already become nil because
of not only the lack of seriousness in the allegations but also because the identity of the subject parcel
of land Lot 9250 was proven by the approved plan Ap-04-008367 that was already presented and
offered in evidence as Exhibit "B" for the plaintiffs.
The second defense that plaintiffs' claim of the property is barred by prior judgment rule is unavailing
considering that the vital documentary evidence they presented in Land Registration Case No. TG-423
before this Honorable Court the markings and descriptions of such documents are stated in the
Judgment quoted as follows:
(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit "Q"; . . . .
(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit "R"; . . . .
(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit "S"; . . . .
(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit "T" . . . .
are the very documentary evidence adopted and relied upon by the plaintiffs in seeking the review and
nullity of the Decree No. 217313 issued on August 20, 1997 under LRC Record No. N-62686 pursuant
to the Judgment dated June 7, 1994 rendered by this Honorable Court penned by the acting presiding
Judge Eleuterio F. Guerrero in said Land Registration Case No. TG-423.
The Court observed that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried on the merits. Firstly, because
the supposed identity crisis of the controverted parcel of land covered by the Land Registration Case
No. TG-423 with the subject parcel of land is established by Plan Ap-04-006275 (Exhibit "N") LRC Case
No. 423 and by Plan A04 008367 (Exhibit "B" of the plaintiffs) and the Technical Description of Lot
9250, Cad 355 (Exhibit "B-1" of the plaintiffs). Secondly, the prior judgment rule cannot be availed of
by defendant Eland since not only intrinsic fraud but extrinsic fraud were alleged in and established by
the records. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 1184436, pro. March 21, 1997).
Thirdly, it is incontrovertible that the complaint in this case seeking to review the judgment and annul
the decree was filed on March 5, 1998 or within one (1) year from August 20, 1997 or the date of
issuance of Decree No. 217313, LRC Record No. N-62686, hence, the Original Certificate of Title No.
0-660 issued to defendant Eland has not attained incontrovertibility. (Heirs of Manuel Roxas v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 118436, prom. March 21, 1997).
Notwithstanding, the issue of possession is a question of fact by the interaction of the basic
pleadings, the observation of this Court is that the plaintiffs were able to prove by the well-nigh
Page 22 of 51
incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of

Commonwealth Act 141, as amended.
15. Serna v CA, GR NO. 124605, (Advincula)
PETITIONER: Enriquito Serna and Amparo RESPONDENT: CA; Santiago Fontanilla; Rafaella
Rasca Rasing
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional
omission of a fact required by law.
● For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to
be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
● "An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that
petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the
alleged fraudulent registration of the property."
● Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate
of title "because registration of real property is considered a 'constructive notice to all persons' and it
shall be counted 'from the time of such registering, filing or entering.”
FACTS:
● Dionisio Fontanilla was the original owner and possessor of a parcel of land located in Barangay Lucap,
Alaminos, Pangasinan and had four (4) children, namely, Rosa, Antonio, Jose and Lorenzo.
● Rosa married Estanislao Pajaro and their union produced Fructoso and Paciencia while Lorenza
married Alberto Rasca and they had a daughter, Amparo Rasca (married to Enriquito Serna).|||
● Turner Land Surveying Company surveyed the land for Dionisio in 1921, , with the agreement that the
costs of the survey would be paid upon approval of the plan by the Bureau of Lands.
● After failing to pay the survey costs and to prevent foreclosure, Dionisio sold the land to his daughter,
Rosa Fontanilla in 1938.
● On August 21, 1955, Rosa sold the land to her nephew, Santiago Fontanilla and his wife Rafaela
Rasing.
● Sps. Rasing constructed their residential house on the lot in question in 1955.
● In 1978, Sps. Rasing went to the United States and stayed there until 1981.
● Amparo Rasca, first cousin of Santiago, together with her husband Enriquito Serna, took advantage of
the absence of Sps. Rasing from the country and applied for registration of the said parcel of land in
their name.
● Land Registration Court approved the application in 1979, and pursuant to Decree N-176768, the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 139 to Enriquito Serna and
Amparo Rasca.
● The Rasings filed an action for reconveyance with damages with the CFI against Serna et.al. and
sought the annulment of O.C.T. No. 139. Serna et.al. claimed ownership of the land based on the Deed
of Sale executed by Turner, in favor of petitioner Amparo's father.
● Serna et.al., however, could not produce the Deed of Sale in court.
● Rasings presented proofs that they were enjoying open, continuous and adverse possession of the
subject property for more than sixty (60) years tacking in the possession of their predecessors in
interest.
● CFI rendered judgment declaring the Rasings as the absolute and legal owners of the land in question.
● CA affirmed the CFI’s decision and subsequently denied Serna’s et.al. motion for reconsideration.
ISSUES: Whether or not there is valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of
registration.||
RULING:
SC denied the petition and affirmed CA’s decision.
Fraud as valid and legal basis for reopening and revising a decree of registration:
Page 23 of 51
● The right of a person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by adjudication or confirmation
of title obtained by actual fraud is recognized by law as a valid and legal basis for reopening and revising
a decree of registration.
● The fraud contemplated by the law is actual and extrinsic fraud, which includes an intentional
omission of a fact required by law.
● For fraud to justify a review of a decree, it must be extrinsic or collateral, and the facts upon
which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered. Persons who were fraudulently deprived of their opportunity to
be heard in the original registration case are entitled to a review of a decree of registration.
● "An action based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years. This means that
petitioners should have enforced the trust within ten (10) years from the time of its creation or upon the
alleged fraudulent registration of the property."
● Discovery of the fraud must be deemed to have taken place from the issuance of the certificate
of title "because registration of real property is considered a 'constructive notice to all persons' and it
shall be counted 'from the time of such registering, filing or entering.”
● In the present case, respondents came to know of the fraud in securing title to the land sometime after
its registration, however, an innocent purchaser for value had not acquired the property. Extrinsic
fraud attended the application for the land registration. It was filed when respondents were out of the
country and they had no way of finding out that petitioners applied for a title under their name. cdasia
● Fortunately, respondents' action for reconveyance was timely, as it was filed within ten (10) years from
the issuance of the torrens title over the property.
NOTES:
N/A
16. SPOUSES ROQUE v. SABUG , GR NO 193787. APRIL 07, 2014, (DELMORO)
PETITIONER: SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE AND RESPONDENT: MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO,

BEATRI Z DELA CRUZ ROQUE, with deceased FRUCTUOSO C. SABUG, JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL
Jose C. Roque represented by his substitute heir OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES (NCCP),
JOVETTE ROQUE-LIBREA (LOST) represented by its Secretary General SHARON
ROSE JOY RUIZ-DUREMDES, LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES (LBP), represented by Branch
Manager EVELYN M. MONTERO, ATTY. MARIO S.P.
DIAZ, in his Official Capacity as Register of Deeds
for Rizal, Morong Branch, and CECILIO U. PULAN,
in his Official Capacity as Sheriff, Office of the
Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Binangonan,
Rizal (WON)
a) NCCP and Sabug, Jr. denied

any knowledge of the 1977 Deed of
Conditional Sale through which the
subject portion had been purportedly
conveyed to Sps. Roque
b) Aguado raised the defense of
an innocent purchaser for value as
she allegedly derived her title
a) On June 16, 2003, Sps. Roque filed a (through the 1 999 Deed of Absolute
complaint for reconveyance, annulment of sale, Sale) from Sabug, Jr., the registered
deed of real estate mortgage, foreclosure, and owner in OCT No. M-5955, covering
certificate of sale, and damages before the RTC Lot 1 8089, which certificate of title at
against Aguado, Sabug, Jr., NCCP, Land Bank, the the time of sale was free from any
Register of Deeds of Morong, Rizal, and Sheriff lien and/or encumbrances.
Cecilio U. Pulan, seeking to be declared as the true
owners of the subject portion which had been c) Land Bank averred that it had no
erroneously included in the sale between Aguado knowledge of Sps. Roque's claim
and Sabug, Jr., and, subsequently, the mortgage relative to the subject portion,
considering that at the time the loan
Page 24 of 51
to Land Bank, both covering Lot 18089 in its was taken out, Lot 18089 in its
entirety. entirety was registered in Aguado's
name and no lien and/or
encumbrance was annotated on her
certificate of title.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
(a) The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person's name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that (1) he has a legal claim on the property superior to that of
the registered owner and that (2) the property has not yet passed to the hand s of an innocent purchaser
for value.
(b) For Article 1544 of the Civil Code to apply in case of a double sale, the following requisites must concur:
i. The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly the same subject matter,
and must be valid sales transactions
ii. The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
represent conflicting interests; and
iii. The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have
bought from the same seller.
FACTS:
● On July 21, 1977, petitioners-spouses and original owners (Rivero, et al. [not parties in this case])
executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over a portion of of Lot 18089.
● After this deed’s execution, Spouses Roque immediate possessed and introduced improvements on
the subject portion which they utilized as a balut factory.
● On August 12, 1991, Fructuoso Sabug, Jr. (Sabug, Jr.), former Treasurer of the National Council of
Churches in the Philippines (NCCP), applied for a free patent over the entire Lot 1 8089 and was
eventually issued Original CertiIcate of Title (OCT) No. M-59558 in his name on October 21, 1991.
● On June 24, 1993, Sabug, Jr. and Rivero, in her personal capacity and in representation of Rivero, et
al., executed a Joint Affidavit acknowledging that the subject portion belongs to Sps. Roque and
expressed their willingness to segregate the same from the entire area of Lot 18089.
● However, On December 8, 1 999, Sabug, Jr., through a Deed of Absolute Sale, sold Lot 18089 to one
Ma. Pamela P. Aguado (Aguado) for P2,500,000.00, who, in turn, caused the cancellation of OCT No.
M-5955 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-96692 dated December 17, 1999
in her name.
● Thereafter, Aguado obtained an P8,000,000.00 loan from the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank)
secured by a mortgage over Lot 18089.
● Aguado failed to pay her obligation.
● Land Bank commenced extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings and eventually tendered the highest bid
in the auction sale.
● Upon Aguado's failure to redeem the subject property, Land Bank consolidated its ownership, and TCT
No. M-1 1 5895 was issued in its name on July 21, 2003.
● This led to petitioner-spouses to file an action for reconveyance [Please see arguments above].
● RTC dismissed the petitioner-spouses petition on the ground that they have failed to establish their
ownership (e.g. they have no proof of their title to the subject portion of Lot 18089 since the Deed of
Conditional Sale was not registered with the RD)
● The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUES: Was the Court of Appeals correct in not ordering the reconveyance of the subject portion of Lot 18089
to petioner-spouses?
RULING:
Page 25 of 51
YES. The CA correctly ruled in this case.
1) The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person's name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
2) Thus, it is incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that (a) he has a legal claim on the property
superior to that of the registered owner and that (b) the property has not yet passed to the hand s of an innocent
purchaser for value.
3) Examining the document denominated as “Deed of Conditional Sale” which was executed by Rivero
and the petitioner-spouses, the same was found to actually be a contract to sell. This is because, Rivero, the
original owner expressly reserved his ownership and that upon full payment of the purchase price of the
petitioner-spouses, the transfer of ownership was not automatic but is by virtue of executing a separate
document which would have been a Deed of Absolute Sale.
4) However, in the case at bar, it is undisputed that the petitioner-spouses were not even able to pay the
full purchase price.
5) The Court further notes that Sps. Roque did not even take any active steps to protect their claim over
the disputed portion (e.g. they did not register the “Deed of Conditional Sale”; nor did they seek to physically
segregate their claimed portion of Lot 18089 despite knowledge knowledge of the fact that, as early as 1 993,
the entire Lot 1 8089 was registered in Sabug, Jr.'s name under OCT No. M-5955.
6) Instead, Sps. Roque waited 26 years, reckoned from the execution of the 1977 Deed of Conditional Sale,
to institute an action for reconveyance (in 2003), and only after Lot 18089 was sold to Land Bank in the
foreclosure sale and title thereto was consolidated in its name.
Lastly, the petitioner-spouses reliance to Article 1544 of the Civil Code is misplaced. [See Laws and Principles
and Notes for requisites to apply Article 1544]
NOTES:
(a) The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the transfer of the property which was wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another person's name to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that (1) he has a legal claim on the property superior to that of
the registered owner and that (2) the property has not yet passed to the hand s of an innocent purchaser
for value.
(b) For Article 1544 of the Civil Code to apply in case of a double sale, the following requisites must concur:
i. The two (or more) sales transactions in issue must pertain to exactly the same subject matter,
and must be valid sales transactions
ii. The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each
represent conflicting interests; and
iii. The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must each have
bought from the same seller.
17. SPOUSES REYES v. MONTEMAYOR, GR NO. 166516. September 03, 2009, (DELMORO)
PETITIONER: SPS. EMMA VER REYES and RAMON REYES RESPONDENT: IRENE MONTEMAYOR
(WON) and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
CAVITE (LOST)
a) Petitioners asserted that private respondent was able to
cause the issuance of TCT No. T-369793 in her name by a) she denied petitioners' allegation that
presenting a simulated and fictitious Deed of Absolute Sale. the signatures of the seller were forged.
b) The signatures of the sellers were forged in the deed of b) Private respondent averred that the
sale. subject property was offered to her for sale,
Page 26 of 51
but she did not disclose who actually made

c) In support of petitioners’ claim, Marciano Cuevas testified the offer.
that he did not sell the subject property to anyone including the
private respondent. When Deed of Sale executed in favor of c) She discovered that there was no
private respondent was shown, he stated that the signatures adverse claim or any kind of encumbrance
indicated therein were not his or his wife’s. annotated on the certificate of title of the
spouses Cuevas covering the subject
property.
d) She had purchased the subject property

for value and in good faith and had been in
possession thereof.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
(a) Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property
in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title
merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be
used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must concur with
registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.
(b) A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the longstanding rule that registration
is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the
land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
(c) This having been said, an action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person
whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. Reconveyance is
always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent person for value.
FACTS:
● Petitioners filed before the RTC a Complaint for Reconveyance against private respondent and the
Register of Deeds of Cavite.
● Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-58459. They bought the subject property from the previous owner,
Marciano Cuevas (Marciano), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Marciano surrendered to
petitioners the Owner's Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-58459
● Petitioners accordingly paid the taxes on the sale of the subject property.
● However, they were unable to register the sale and effect the transfer of the certificate of title to the
subject property to their names.
● In 1993, when they went to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Cavite to pay their real estate taxes
for the years 1992 and 1 993, they were informed that the subject property was sold by Marciano to
private respondent on 1 0 November 1 992, and TCT No. T-369793.
● [SEE MAIN ARGUMENTS UNDER RESPECTIVE PARTIES TABS]
● RTC dismissed petitioner’s complaint. It ruled that Marciano’s testimony was self-serving.
● CA affirmed RTC decision. The appellate court held that petitioners were negligent in failing to register
the subject property in their names. Like RTC, it also ruled tat Marciano’s testimony was self-serving.
ISSUES: Between the parties, who has a better right over the property?
RULING:
Petitioners have the better right over the property.
1) Contrary to the findings of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC, the evidence on record reveals that
the spouses Cuevas, the previous owners of the subject property, did not sell the said property to private
respondent. Marciano's explicit statements, made under oath before the trial court, that he did not sell the subject
Page 27 of 51
property to anyone other than petitioners, and that the signatures of the vendors appearing in the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated 10 November 1992 were not made by him and his wife, were not refuted.
2) The pronouncement of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Marciano's testimony was self-
serving was utterly baseless. Neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals explained how Marciano's confirmation
of the sale of the subject property to petitioners, and his renunciation of the supposed sale of the same property
to private respondent, would accrue to Marciano's benefit.
3) It is true that a finding of forgery does not depend exclusively on the testimonies of expert witnesses
and that judges must use their own judgment, through an independent examination of the questioned signature,
in determining the authenticity of the handwriting. However, it is important to note that in this case neither the
RTC nor the Court of Appeals made any finding through an independent examination of the seller's wife’s
signatures.
4) That at least one of the signatures of the alleged vendors was indubitably established as a forgery
should have already raised serious doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
10 November 1992. This, taken together with Marciano's candid and categorical testimony that he and his wife
did not sell the subject property to private respondent or executed any deed to evidence the same, strongly
militates against the existence of a second sale of the subject property to private respondent. In comparison,
the circumstances surrounding the alleged second sale of the subject property by the spouses Cuevas to private
respondent are sketchy at best.
5) Other than the forged Deed of Absolute Sale dated 1 0 November 1 992, private respondent's bad faith
in registering the subject property in her name and her dishonest scheme in appropriating the land for herself
are further evidenced by her own admissions in the Waiver and Quitclaim: “That, I know (sic) from the very
beginning the dubiousness of my title to the above described property”
6) Private respondent's unabashed confession that she knew of the dubiousness of her title from the very
beginning is contrary to the concept of good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the possessors that the
persons from whom they received the thing are its rightful owners who could convey their title.
7) Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the registration of the property
in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title
merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should
not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good faith must
concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility.
8) A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the longstanding rule that registration
is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the
land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
9) This having been said, an action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose
property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. Reconveyance is always
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent person for value.
NOTES: [SEE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES]
18. PACETE v. ASOTIGUE, GR NO. 188575. December 10, 2012, (DELMORO)
PETITIONER: GAUDENCIO PACETE (LOST) RESPONDENT: INOCENCIO ASOTIGUE (WON)
a) Answer with Counterclaim and with Special and

Affimative Defenses, Pacete denied the material a) Asotigue averred that on March 22, 1 979, he
allegations of Asotigue acquired the disputed land, denominated as Lot No. 5-
b) Asserted that he was the owner of the disputed A, from Rizalino Umpad (Umpad)for P2,300.00 by virtue
lot, presenting OCT No. V-1 6654 issued on July 13, of a Transfer of Rights and Improvements, duly
1961 as evidence of his ownership notarized by Notary Public Rodolfo T. Calud;
Page 28 of 51
c) He claimed that sometime in 1 979, Asotigue, b) that he had been in possession and occupation
by stealth, strategy and prior knowledge, entered the of the said lot openly, publicly, notoriously, and in the
disputed lot and started planting trees despite his concept of an owner for more than 21 years.
demand to vacate the said lot. c) the present dispute arose when he found out for
d) In his defense, Pacete presented the testimonies the first time, upon filing his application for title over the
of his son, Rolito Pacete (Rolito); his wife, Angelica said lot, that it was included in Pacete's OCT No. V-1
Pacete (Angelica); and Elma Precion to disprove 6654; that he then demanded from Pacete the
Asotigue's claim of ownership over the disputed lot. reconveyance of the said lot, but his demand was
e) Rolito testified that sometime in 1979, Asotigue unheeded;
squatted on about 2.5 hectare portion of their land in d) that he brought the matter before the Office of the
Purok 1 , Dolis, Magpet, Cotabato. He claimed that he Pangkat Tagapagkasundo of Barangay Dolis, Magpet,
and his father told Asotigue not to plant anything on for amicable settlement, but to no avail;
the land, but despite their warning, the latter e) That a Certificate to File Action was subsequently
continued planting. issued
f) His father was the one paying the real taxes on f) Asotigue testified that the disputed lot was
the disputed lot and that they had the land titled in previously owned by Sambutuan Sumagad (Sumagad),
1961. He did not file any case against Asotigue a native.
because he was very young then and his parents g) To strengthen his claim of ownership, Asotigue also
were illiterate submitted documentary evidence, among which were
copies of the Transfer of Rights and Improvements,
dated March 22, 1 979; several Tax Declarations under
his name; Survey Plan of Lot No. 5, GSS-326;
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

(a) Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the
person with a better right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously
registered.
FACTS:
● The property in dispute is a parcel of agricultural land, known as Lot No. 5-A, being a portion of a
bigger agricultural land, known as Lot No. 5, GSS-326, situated in Barangay Dolis, Municipality of
Magpet, Province of Cotabato covered by Original CertiAcate of Title (OCT)No. V-1 6654, registered
in the name of petitioner Gaudencio Pacete.
● Respondent Inocencio Asotigue (Asotigue) Aled a complaint for reconveyance and damages against
Pacete before the RTC.
● [SEE ARGUMENTS UNDER RESPECTIVE PARTIES, START FROM RESPONDENT THEN
PETITIONER]
● The RTC ruled in favor respondent. Pacete was not able to substantiate his claim that he had a better
right of possession and ownership over the disputed lot.
● The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling in favor of Asotigue. the CA applied the doctrine of tacking of
● possession. It found that Asotigue was in material possession of the said lot for more than thirty (30)
years, tacking the possession of his predecessor-in-interest, Sumagad, in 1958 up to the time he filed
the case in 2000.
ISSUES: Was the reconveyance to respondent Asotigue not proper in the case at bar?
RULING:
NO. It was proper.
1) As correctly found by the CA, Pacete cannot rely on his OCT No. V-1 6654 as an incontrovertible proof of
his ownership over the property in dispute because he was not in good faith when he obtained the said title as
he was fully aware of the conveyance of the said lot between Pasague and Umpad.
2) Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a property but also to the person with a better
right than the person under whose name said property was erroneously registered.
Page 29 of 51
3) In a number of cases, the Court has ordered reconveyance of property to the true owner or to the one
with a better right, where the property had been erroneously or fraudulently titled in another person's name.
4) In the present case, when Pacete procured OCT No. V-1 6654 in 1961, the disputed lot, being a portion
covered by the said title, was already in possession of Asotigue. His predecessor-in-interest, Sumagad, had
been occupying it since 1 958. There was, therefore, an erroneous or wrongful registration of Asotigue's Lot 5-
A of Lot 5, GSS-326, in favor of Pacete, who neither possessed nor occupied the same. In as much as the latter
had not passed the lot in question to an innocent purchaser for value, an action for reconveyance is proper.
5) After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had committed fraud or
misrepresentation and, thus, holds title in bad faith.
NOTES: [SEE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES]
19. AMEROL VS BAGUMBARAN (ABOITIZ VS PO IN SYLLABUS BUT WRONG CASE TITLE FOR
THE GR NUMBER) L-33261. September 30, 1987.] (Sagocsoc)
PETITIONER: (WON) RESPONDENT:
Liwalug Amerol, Macatanto Amerol, Taib Amerol, Dibaratun Amerol, Dibaratun Molok Bagumbaran
Matabalao, Mindanao Dibaratun, Dipundugun Moro, And Manucao Moro
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
● ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud; the person obtaining it is by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
● Action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
FACTS:
● Respondent Bagumbaran sought to eject the petitioners from the parcel of land registered to his name.
● He obtained it through a free patent and subsequently registered it in his name gaining a Torrens Title.
● Herein petitioners interposed a counterclaim stating that Bagumbaran applied for a free patent through
fraud, knowing that the said land was already subject to a previous application for free patent.
● RTC said that fraud was evident, however, it dismissed the counterclaim of the petitioners because,
according to the trial court, their action has prescribed. Four years have already lapsed from the date
of the issuance of the Torrens title.
● Even though Bagumbaran acquired the property through fraud, it was adjudicated to him due to
prescription.
● The petitioners contend that the prescriptive period is ten years and not four years. Therefore, if it is
ten years, theiraction can still prosper because they brought the same nine years after the issuance of
the Torrens Title
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners are correct that the prescriptive period is 10 years and not 4
years.
● If it is 10 years, their action can still prosper because they brought the same 9 years
after the issuance of the Torrens title.
RULING:
Yes. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
Page 30 of 51
Indubitably, the act of respondent in misrepresenting that he was in actual possession and occupation of the
property in question, obtaining a patent and Original Certificate of Title No. P-466 in his name, created an
implied trust in favor of the actual possessor of the said property. In this case, the land in question was
patented and titled in respondent's name by and through his false pretenses. Molok Bagumbaran fraudulently
misrepresented that he was the occupant and actual possessor of the land in question when he was not because
it was Liwalug Datomanong. Bagumbaran falsely Pretended that there was no prior applicant for a free patent
over the land but there was-Liwanag Datomanong. By such fraudulent acts, Molok Bagumbaran is deemed to
hold the title of the property in trust and for the benefit of petitioner Liwalug Datomanong. Notwithstanding the
irrevocability of the Torrens title already issued in the name of respondent, he, even being already the registered
owner under the Torrens system, may still be compelled under the law to reconvey the subject property to
Liwalug Datomanong. After all, the Torrens system was not designed to shield and protect one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds title in bad faith.
Further, contrary to the erroneous claim of the respondent, reconveyance does not work to set aside and put
under review anew the findings of facts of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of
registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property, in this case
the title thereof, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its rightful
and legal owner, or to one with a better right. That is what reconveyance is all about. An action for reconveyance
based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of
decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule.
Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property. The only discordant note, it
seems, is Balbin vs. Medalla, which states that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.
However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Gerona vs. de Guzman. But in Gerona,
the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, hence Section 43(3) of Act No. 190, was applied, the new Civil
Code not coming into effect until August 30,1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at this juncture,
that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have no counterparts in the old Civil Code or in the
old Code of Civil Procedure, the latter being then resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period
for an action for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.
Petition is GRANTED.
NOTES:
“Miguel v. Court of Appeals, is, likewise, inapplicable. In Miguel, the actual occupant and possessor of the
controverted parcel of land, after having been enticed by Leonor Reyes, an ambulatory notary public, with
promise of help, engaged and retained the services of the latter to facilitate the issuance of a patent for the said
land in his (Miguel's) favor. Thus, there existed between the parties a relationship very much akin to that of
lawyer-client and which is similarly fiduciary in character. But Reyes, inspite of his compensation of one-fifth of
the yearly produce of the property, still violated the trust reposed on him and instead worked for the issuance of
the patent in the name of his own wife. So, after the demise of Leonor Reyes, the property was fraudulently
patented and titled in his widow's favor. The reconveyance of the property was decreed by the Court based on
"breach of fiduciary relations and/or fraud." It was shown that the parties were legally bound to each other by a
bond of fiduciary trust, a bond lacking in the case at bar.”
The case of Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals can not be availed of because the period of prescription was not
there definitely and squarely settled. In fact, Ramirez underscores a vacillation between the four-year and the
ten-year rule. There it was stated that "an action for relief on the ground of fraud — to which class the remedy
prayed for by Paguia belongs — can only be brought within four years after accrual of the right of action, or from
the discovery of the fraud." If the decision just stayed pat on that statement, there would be merit in the
respondent's presentation. But Ramirez continues: "(I)ndepedently, however, of the alleged fraud on the part of
Ramirez, the right to demand a reconveyance prescribes after 10 years from accrual of the cause of action,
June 22, 1944, the date of registration of the patent and of the issuance of OCT No. 282-A in his name."
Regarding the jurisprudence invoked by the respondent to support its claim that the 4 year period
applies: Significantly, the three cases cited by the respondent to buttress his position and support the ruling of
the trial court have a common denominator, so to speak. The cause of action assailing the frauds committed
and impugning the Torrens titles issued in those cases, all accrued prior to the effectivity of the present Civil
Code. The accrual of the cause of action in Fabian was in 1928, in Miguel, February, 1950, and in Ramirez,
1944. It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, the date of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the
old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided: SEC. 43. Other civil actions; how
limited.-Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods
after the right of action accrues:
Page 31 of 51
X X XX X XX X X
3. Within four years: x x x An action for relief on the ground of fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not
be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud;
X X XX X X X XX
In contrast, under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied or constructive trust is an offspring of
the law (Art. 1456, Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the property and the title thereto
in favor of the true owner. In this context, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.
20. HEIRS OF MAXIMO SANJORJO VS. HEIRS OF MANUEL Y. QUIJANO. G.R. No. 140457. January
19, 2005. (Sagocsoc)
Heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo, Vicente Heirs of Manuel Y. Quijano, Namely, Rosa Q. Ledesma,
Sanjorjo, Milagros Q. Yuliongsiu, Alan P. Quijano And Gwendolyn P.
Macaria Sanjorjo, Domingo Sanjorjo, Enriquez, And Vicente Z. Gulbe
Alfredo Castro, and Spouses Santos And
Lolita Inot
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● ARTICLE 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud; the person obtaining it is by force of
law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
FACTS:
● On August 29, 1988, Free Patent No. VII-4-2974 was issued to Alan P. Quijano over a parcel
of land identified as Lot 374, Cadastre 374-D wherein Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
OP-38221 was issued in his name.
● Meanwhile, on November 11, 1988, Free Patent No. VII-4-3088 was issued in favor of
Gwendolyn Q. Enriquez for Lot 379, Cadastre 374-D in which OCT No. OP-39847 was also
issued in her name.
● Alan Quijano and Gwendolyn Enriquez are among the heirs of Manuel Quijnao who are the
private respondents in this case. Enriquez filed an application for a free patent over Lot 376
of Cadastre 374-D with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
● She also filed an application for a free patent over Lot 378. However, the heirs of Guillermo
Sanjorjo, filed a protest/complaint with the DENR praying for the cancellation of Free Patent
Nos. VII-4-2974 and VII-4-3088, and for the dismissal of the free patent applications over Lots
376 and 378.
● The protestants/claimants alleged that the said parcels of land were originally owned by
Ananias Ursal but were exchanged for a parcel of land, owned by their predecessor, Guillermo
Sanjorjo, and from whom they inherited the property.
● However, the protestants/claimants withdrew their protest/complaint. Thus, on April 14, 1992,
the Regional Executive Director rendered a decision giving due course to the applications.
However, he ruled that the free patents over Lots 374 and 379 could no longer be disturbed
since the complaint for the cancellation was filed more than one year from their issuance.
● On September 13, 1993, petitioners Vicente Sanjorjo, the heirs of Maximo Sanjorjo, and
Spouses hot, filed a complaint for cancellation of titles under tax declarations and
reconveyance of possession of real property covering the Lots 374, 376, 378 and 379, against
the private respondents, the heirs of Manuel Quijano and Vicente Gulbe. Petitioners allege
that they are the owners of several parcels of land covering Lots 374, 376, 378 and 379 which
they inherited from their grandfather the late Maximo Sanjorjo.
● According to the petitioners, sometime in 1983, the parcels of land in question were leased to
Manuel Quijano for a two (2) year period. However, the lease was never paid for nor was
possession of the said properties ever returned to the petitioners, despite repeated demands
on Quijano to return the same.
Page 32 of 51
● When Manuel Quijano died, his heirs divided among themselves the land belonging to the
petitioners. Plaintiffs averred that they nor their ascendants have never sold, donated, or
mortgaged any of these lots in question to the defendants or their ascendants.
● On the other hand, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of res judicata based on the decision of the Regional Executive Director on April 14, 1992.
● They maintained that the decision of the Regional Executive Director had become final and
executory and, as such, barred the petitioners' action. They also invoked that the petitioners'
action was barred by the issuance of OCT No. OP-38221 covering Lot 374, and OCT No. OP-
39847 covering Lot 379.
● On the other hand, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of res judicata based on the decision of the Regional Executive Director on April 14, 1992.
They maintained that the decision of the Regional Executive Director had become final and
executory and, as such, barred the petitioners' action. They also invoked that the petitioners'
action was barred by the issuance of OCT No. OP-38221 covering Lot 374, and OCT No. OP-
39847 covering Lot 379.
● The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata.
● On appeal, petitioners limited the issue to Lots 374 and 379 only. The appellate court affirmed
the order of the lower court although for a different reason, i.e., prescription.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner's action for the reconveyance of Lots 374 and 379, covered by OCT No. OP-
38221 and OCT No. OP-39847 respectively is barred by prescription.
RULING:
No. The action for reconveyance of the lots in question has not yet prescribed.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of the free patents became as indefeasible as one which was judicially secured
upon the expiration of one year from date of issuance of the patent. However, an aggrieved party may still
file an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in ten years from the
date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the property provided that the property has not been acquired
by an innocent purchaser for value.
The presence of fraud or mistake creates an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful and legal owner giving
him the right to seek reconveyance of the property. All that must be alleged in the complaint are two acts:
(1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and, (2) that the defendant had illegally dispossessed him
of the same. In their complaint, the petitioners clearly asserted that their predecessors-in-interest have long
been the absolute and exclusive owners of the lots in question and that they were fraudulently deprived of
ownership thereof when the private respondents obtained free patents and certificates of title in their names.
Article 1456 of the New Civil Code provides that a person acquiring property through fraud becomes by operation
of law a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the real owner of the property. The presence of fraud in
this case created an implied trust in favor of the petitioners, giving them the right to seek reconveyance
of the property from the private respondents. However, because of the trial court's dismissal order, the
petitioners have been unable to prove their charges of fraud and misrepresentation.
The petitioners' action for reconveyance may not be said to have prescribed, for, basing the present action
on implied trust, the prescriptive period is ten years. The questioned titles were obtained on August 29,
1988 and November 11, 1988, in OCT Nos. OP-38221 and OP-39847, respectively. The petitioners commenced
their action for reconveyance on September 13, 1993. Since the petitioners' cause of action is based on fraud,
deemed to have taken place when the certificates of title were issued, the complaint filed on September 13,
1993 is, therefore, well within the prescriptive period.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED
NOTES:
The elements of res judicata are the following: (1) the previous judgment has become final; (2) the prior judgment
was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the first judgment was
made on the merits; and (4) there was substantial identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action, as
between the prior and subsequent actions.
Page 33 of 51
21. Hua Ping vs. Ayala Land, G.R. No. 173120-173141, July 26, 2017. (Sagocsoc)
G.R. No. 173120: Ayala Land, Inc.

Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw
G.R. No. 173141

Heirs Of Spouses Andres Diaz and Josefa Mia Ayala Land, Inc.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

● Under Section 38 of Act No. 496: Any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by
decree of registration obtained by fraud [may] file in the competent Court of First Instance a petition for
review within one year after entry of the decree provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired
an interest."
● When a land registration decree is marred by severe irregularity that discredits the integrity of the
Torrens system, the Court will not think twice in striking down such illegal title in order to protect
the public against unscrupulous and illicit land ownership.
● It is an enshrined principle in this jurisdiction that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
A certificate of title merely confirms or records title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of a Torrens title should not be used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the
rightful owner of real property.
● Good faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an exercise
in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal principle is that if
the registration of the land is fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a
mere trustee.
CONSOLIDATED FACTS:
● Petitioners Spouses Diaz submitted to the General Land Registration Office for approval of the Director
of Lands a survey plan designated as Psu-25909, which covered a parcel of land located at Sitio of
Kay Monica, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las Piñas, Rizal, which was then approved.
● Another survey plan was done covering the same parcel of land designated for a certain Mayuga. The
said survey, however, stated that the lot was situated at Sitio May Kokek, Barrio Almanza, Las Piñas,
Rizal.
● Another survey (PSU-80886) was undertaken for a certain Guico. Again, the survey indicated a
different address that the lots were situated in Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Piñas, Rizal.
● An additional survey plan (Psu-80886/SWO-20609) was executed over the similar parcel of land for a
certain Yaptinchay.
● OCT No. 242 and 244 were issued in favor of Yaptinchay covering Lot 2 and Lot 3.
● OCT 1609 covering Lot 3 was issued in favor of Mayuga.
● Some of the properties were sold to CPJ Corporation resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 190713 in
its name.
● Petitioner Andres Diaz filed a petition for original registration before the CFI of Pasay for Lot No. 1 of
Psu-25909 which was granted. OCT 8510 was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz. The Spouses Diaz
subdivided their 460,626-square-meter property covered by such OCT into 10 lots, described as Lots
No. 1-A to 1-J and conveyed to different third parties.
● CPJ Corporation, then owner of the land covered by TCT No. 190713, which originated from OCT No.
242, filed a Land Registration before the RTC of Pasig City against Spouses Diaz (Diaz Case). It sought
to review OCT No. 8510 in the names of Spouses Diaz on the ground that the interested persons were
not notified of the application.
● On August 30, 1976 and December 4, 1976, Andres Diaz sold to Cabautan the following parcels of
land, which originated from OCT No. 8510.
● Petitioner Spouses Yu acquired ownership over 67,813 square meters representing the undivided half-
portion of Lot 1-A originating from OCT No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz. The said property was co-owned
by Spouses Diaz with Spouses Librado and Susana Cabautan resulting from a civil case decided by
the RTC of Makati.
● Spouses Yu then acquired ownership over Lot 1-B originating from OCT No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz
with an area of 135,000 square meters. Pursuant to the transfers of land to Spouses Yu, TCT Nos.
39408 and 64549 were issued in their names.
● On the other hand, CPJ Corporation transferred their interest in the subject properties to third persons.
Page 34 of 51
● Later, in 1988, Ayala Corporation obtained the subject properties from Goldenrod, Inc. and PESALA.
In 1992, pursuant to the merger of respondent Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) and Las Piñas Ventures, Inc., ALI
acquired all the subject properties.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the complaints of Spouses Yu and Heirs of Spouses Diaz are barred by prescription.
2. Whether the validity of the surveys of OCT nos. 242, 244 and 1609 as against OCT no. 8510 can be
assailed in the present case.
a. Whether the alleged errors in PSU-80886 and PSU-47035 are of such degree so as to
invalidate OCT nos. 242, 244 and 1609 and its transfer certificates of titles.
RULING:
The actions were filed within their respective prescriptive periods.
The Yu case began when they filed a complaint before the RTC of Las Piñas against ALI for declaration of
nullity of the TCTs issued in the name of the latter because of the spurious, manipulated and void surveys of
OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609. They also sought the recovery of possession of the property covered by ALI's
title that overlapped their land alleging that their predecessors, Spouses Diaz, had open, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the same from 1921 until it was transferred to Cabautan in 1976. Spouses Yu also alleged
that Cabautan possessed the said land until it was sold to them in 1994.It was only in August 1995 that they
discovered that ALI clandestinely fenced their property and prevented them from occupying the
same. They also sought the judicial confirmation of the validity of their titles.
ALI argues that the complaint of Yu is barred by prescription because it was filed beyond the one-year period
under Section 38 of Act No. 496. On the other hand, Spouses Yu assert that their action was imprescriptible
because they sought to set aside the titles that were obtained through void surveys and they assert that the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title does not apply where fraud attended the issuance of the title.
The Court finds that the complaint of Spouses Yu is not barred by prescription. While Section 38 of Act
No. 496 states that the petition for review to question a decree of registration must be filed within one (1) year
after entry of the decree, such provision is not the only remedy of an aggrieved party who was deprived
of land by fraudulent means. The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously
registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, as was
done in this case, but, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an
ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of
an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
When the action for reconveyance is based on an implied or constructive trust, the prescriptive period
is ten (10) years, or it is imprescriptible if the movant is in the actual, continuous and peaceful
possession of the property involved.
On the other hand, when the action for reconveyance is based on a void deed or contract the action is
imprescriptible under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code. As long as the land wrongfully registered under the
Torrens system is still in the name of the person who caused such registration, an action in personam will lie to
compel him to reconvey the property to the real owner
As both the Diaz and Yu cases were properly filed and are not barred by prescription, these can be
adjudicated by the Court on the merits.
The Court cannot subscribe to the finding of the CA that the numerous defects are “not enough to deprive the
assailed decree of registration of its conclusive effect, neither are they sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that
the survey was definitely, certainly, conclusively spurious.” The Court cannot close its eyes to the blatant defects
on the surveys upon which the original titles of ALI were derived simply because its titles were registered. To
allow these certificates of title in the registration books, even though these were sourced from invalid surveys,
would tarnish and damage the Torrens system of registration, rather than uphold its integrity.
Thus, due to the numerous, blatant and unjustifiable errors in Psu-47909, Psu- 80886, and Psu-
80886/SWO-20609, these must be declared void. Likewise, OCT Nos. 242, 244, and 1609, their transfer
certificates, and instruments of conveyances that relied on the anomalous surveys, must be absolutely
declared void ab initio.
Page 35 of 51
NOTES:
The Diaz case was a petition for review before the RTC of Pasig. It assailed OCT No. 8510 in the names of
Spouses Diaz on the ground that the said title was issued through fraud because the interested persons were
not informed of their application for registration.
Here, OCT No. 8510 was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz on May 21, 1970. On the other hand, the petition
for review of CPJ Corporation was filed on May 17, 1971. Thus, the said petition was timely filed and the RTC
of Pasig could tackle the issues raised therein. When the RTC of Pasig ruled in favor of CPJ Corporation,
Spouses Diaz appealed to the CA. In the same manner, when they received an unfavorable judgment from the
CA, Spouses Diaz 􀁉led a petition for review on certiorari before the Court. Accordingly, the appeal of Spouses
Diaz is proper and it can be adjudicated on the merits.
22. GONZALES vs. IAC. [G.R. No. 69622. January 29, 1988.] (MARCELO)
PETITIONER: LILIA Y. GONZALES RESPONDENT: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

COURT and RURAL BANK OF PAVIA, INC.
● notwithstanding the good faith of the ● arguments of petitioner constitute a collateral
respondent bank, its title over the subject attack on said titles
property is fatally defective since the title of
its predecessors are null and void
LAW & PRINCIPLES: After one year from the date of the decree, the sole remedy of the landowner whose
property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is not to set aside the decree, but,
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary
court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value,
for damages.
FACTS:
● The subject property in this case is originally owned by Spouses Asuncion Sustiguer and Dioscoro
Buensuceso. Thereafter, a reconstituted original certificate of title was issued in the name of Asuncion
Astiguer alone. Also, by virtue of the sale of said property to Spouses Panzo, her title was canceled
and in lieu thereof a TCT was issued by the RD in the spouses’ name
● The Spouses Panzo then mortgaged the property to respondent Rural Bank of Pavia for P5,000.00.
Upon their failure to pay the account, the respondent bank foreclosed the mortgage and the bank was
the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by the Provincial Sheriff in its favor.
● In 1974, petitioner as judicial co-administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the late Matias Yusay brought
an action against the spouses Panzo and the respondent Rural Bank seeking the annulment and
cancellation of the title in the name of the Panzos and the issuance of a new title in favor of Yusay.
● In the complaint, petitioner alleged among other things: that the subject property was first mortgaged
to Yusay on April 30, 1929 by the spouses Sustiguer and Buensuceso; that sometime in November,
1934, said property was verbally sold to Yusay by the same spouses; that since Yusay bought the
property in 1948, he and his administrator and later plaintiff administratrix, have been in possession of
the property thru their tenant Elias Daguino. Furthermore, there is still a pending case in CFI Iloilo
involving an action of forcible entry filed by herein petitioner. Finally, the petitioner alleged that
Defendant Rural Bank was not a mortgagee in good faith because it failed to take the necessary
precaution before accepting the subject property as collateral for the loan granted to the defendant-
spouses.
● Rural Bank set up the defense of good faith alleging that the certificate of title in the names of the
spouses Panzo was free from any lien and that the rigid requirements for loan applications had been
duly deserved by the Bank. On the other hand, defendants spouses Panzo moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the property having been sold to defendant Rural Bank, spouses lost any of their
interest in the property.
● TRIAL COURT: ordered the dismissal of the case against defendant-spouses Panzo and proceeded
on sole issue of w/n defendant Rural Bank was a mortgagee and buyer for value and in good faith.
Subsequently, it ruled in favor of defendant Rural Bank.
● INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT: affirmed in toto the decision of the court a qou
ISSUES:
a. whether or not the respondent bank was an innocent mortgagee and subsequent buyer for value in good
faith of the property
b. w/n the title of the Respondent bank is fatally defective and the title of predecessors in interest are null and
void
Page 36 of 51
RULING:
a. Respondent bank is an innocent mortgagee for value and a subsequent purchaser in good faith and
for value.
The well-known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the
face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party
concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make inquiry. It has also been held that a bank is not required, before accepting a mortgage, to make an
investigation of the title of the property being given as security.
In this case, this Court believes that respondent bank had exercised the due care demanded of it relative to the
real estate loan of the Panzos for it to be considered an innocent mortgagee for value.
If anyone can be faulted for being negligent, it is the petitioner herself and her predecessors-in-interest. In the
complaint, petitioner alleged that the subject property was sold verbally to Matias Yusay by the original owners,
the spouses Buensuceso, in November, 1934 (under paragraph 5 of the same complaint, it was alleged to have
been bought by Yusay in 1948). From that time to the filing of the ejectment case in May 1971, or a period of
almost 37 years, petitioner and her predecessors did not take any step to perfect their title over the property.
There was not even a tax declaration over the subject property of Matias Yusay or his successors-in-interest.
Respondent bank is no doubt an innocent mortgagee for value but is it a subsequent purchaser in good
faith and for value?
Yes. It will be remembered that at the time of the purchase of the subject property at the foreclosure sale on
August 11, 1973, the notice of lis pendens had already been inscribed in the title of the Panzos, subject of the
mortgage.
It has been held that any subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate of title cannot
in any way prejudice the mortgage previously registered, and the lots subject thereto pass to the purchaser at
the public auction sale free from any lien or encumbrance. Otherwise, the value of the mortgage could be easily
destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound
by the posterior claim.
In the case at bar, it is the respondent bank, the mortgagee itself, which purchased the subject property in the
foreclosure sale. Being an innocent mortgagee with a superior lien over that of petitioner, its right to a foreclosure
of the property is reserved. The notice of lis pendens which antedated the foreclosure and sale at public auction
of subject property could not affect the rights of the respondent bank because the foreclosure sale retroacts to
the date of registration of the mortgage. Its character of being an innocent mortgagee continues up to the date
of actual foreclosure and sale at public auction.
b. Petitioner’s contention regarding the defective title Rural Bank has over the subject property,
cannot prosper in this case because such is a collateral attack on said titles.
It is well-settled that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity of the title can only
be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
A Torrens Title can be attacked only for fraud within one year after the date of the issuance of the decree of
registration. The attack must be direct and not by collateral proceeding. The title represented by the certificate
cannot be changed, altered, modified, enlarged or diminished in a collateral proceeding.
After one year from the date of the decree, the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully
or erroneously registered in another's name is not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree as
incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for
reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.
Here, the title of Asuncion Sustiguer was obtained on February 26, 1971 while that of the Panzos on March 3,
1971. The complaint in this action was filed only on April 18, 1974, clearly more than one year from the date of
the decree of registration. The disputed titles by then had become indefeasible. Since the property had already
been acquired by the respondent bank at the foreclosure sale, as an innocent purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance cannot prosper. The only remedy of petitioner is an action for damages against the person whom
she claims procured the wrongful registration in his name
In view of the foregoing, the decision of the IAC is herein affirmed in toto.
NOTES:
Page 37 of 51
23. VALENZUELA vs. Sps. MANO. [G.R. No. 172611. July 9, 2010.] (MARCELO)
PETITIONER: SPS. FEDERICO VALENZUELA and RESPONDENT: SPS. JOSE MANO, JR. and
LUZ BUENA-VALENZUELA ROSANNA REYES-MANO
● Jose purchased a parcel of land from ● The certificate of title issued in their name is an
Feliciano measuring only 2,056 square absolute and indefeasible evidence of
meters but his application for a free patent ownership of the property.
indicated a lot with a total area of 2,739 ● There was also no proof or evidence
square meters. presented to support the alleged fraud on the
● Jose also declared that the said property is part of Jose, nor was there any allegation of
not claimed or occupied by any person but specific acts committed by him which
the truth is that he (Federico) owned and constitute fraud.
possessed the said 447 square meters of
land.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered
and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. "The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence
of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one
merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other
party. Invariably such action must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive.”
To warrant the award of exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an
award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent
manner
FACTS:
● The disputed 447 square meter lot, located in Dampol 1st , Pulilan, Bulacan was allegedly part of the
938 square meters parcel of land inherited by herein petitioner from his father, Andres. And, sometime
in 1997, Petitioner Federico declared the said property in his name.
● It was presented that herein respondent Jose Mano (Jose) bought a 2, 056-square meters parcel of
land situated at Dampol 1st, Pulilan Bulacan, from Feliciano Geronimo (Feliciano) as evidenced by a
Deed of Conditional Sale. Thereafter, Jose applied for a Free Patent, and in 1992 OCT-No. P-351 was
issued in his name. This time, the property was indicated as covering an area of 2, 739 square meters.
● Subsequently, Jose sold a portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-351 to Balingcongan. In 1998,
TCT No. T-112865 was issued in the name of Balingcongan covering 2, 292 square meter. In the same
year, another TCT was also issued in the name of Jose covering 447 square meters.
● After sometime, Federico transferred his residence to Malabanon. Thus, he left the care of the property
to Vicente. In 1999, Federico instructed Vicente to construct a perimeter fence on his property but Jose
prevented Vicente, claiming that the 447 square meters is his as reflected in his TCT No. T-112864.
● For failure to amicably settle the matter, the petitioners lodged a complaint for Annulment of Title and/or
Reconveyance, Damages with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
● RTC: found that the preponderance of evidence showed that the disputed area of 447 square meters
rightfully belongs to Federico. This was a part of Lot No. 1306 originally owned and possessed by
Andres.
● CA: reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC, primarily on the ground that petitioners failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the fact of fraud allegedly committed by Jose in obtaining title to the
disputed property.
ISSUES:
a. Did the CA err in holding that the respondents are the owners of the disputed 447 square meter property?
b. Did the CA err in finding that no fraud was committed by the respondents in obtaining title to the disputed
property?
RULING:
a. Yes. Federico is the owner of the disputed 447 square meter lot. There is preponderance of evidence that
Federico is the owner of the disputed property.
Feliciano sold a portion of Lot 1305 to Jose. After the sale was made, a Sketch/Special Plan was prepared by
Geodetic Engineer Fortunato E. Chavez. It is clear from such documents that Lot 1305-A representing the upper
portion with an area of 1,112 square meters was retained by Feliciano and what was sold was the lower portion
thereof which became Lot No. 1305-B with a total area of 2,292 square meters. This exceeds the area of 2,056
square meters indicated in the above sale transaction.
Page 38 of 51
Furthermore, Feliciano, the owner of Lot No. 1305 from whom Jose acquired the property through sale, testified
that his lot is only about 2,000 square meters and that Andres owns the adjoining lot which is enclosed by a
fence.
b. Yes. Jose committed fraud in obtaining the title to the disputed property.
The chain of events leading to the issuance of title in his name shows beyond cavil the bad faith or a fraudulent
pattern on his part. The evidence on record disclosed that even before Jose purchased the 2,056 square meters
from Feliciano, he had already caused on January 30, 1991 the survey of a 2,739 square meters lot. Although
the document of sale expressly stated that the area sold was 2,056 square meters and is located at Dampol 1st,
Pulilan, Bulacan, however, when he filed his application for free patent in March 1991, he used the survey on
the 2,739 square meters and indicated the same to be located at Dampol II, Pulilan, Bulacan. Also, in his
application, he stated that the land described and applied for is not claimed or occupied by any person
when in reality the same is owned and possessed by Federico.
Having ruled that Jose committed fraud in obtaining title to the disputed property then he should be
liable for both moral and exemplary damages.
Article 2217 26 of the Civil Code defines what are included in moral damages while Article 2219 enumerates the
cases where they may be recovered. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate
the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
"The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence
for the law always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental
anguish, serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be shown
to have been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive." In the same fashion, to warrant the award of exemplary
damages, the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only
if the guilty party acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner.
NOTES:
24. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BAUTISTA, [G.R. No. L-21362, Nov. 29, 1968].
(MARCELO)
PETITIONER: DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE RESPONDENT: LOURDES GASPAR BAUTISTA ,

PHILIPPINES THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund only upon a showing that there be no
negligence on the part of the party sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest
therein by the operation of the Land Registration Act.
FACTS:
● Bautista loaned an amount of P4, 000.00 in Rehabilitation Finance Bank (RFC), predecessor-in-interest
of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). She mortgaged a parcel of land covered by OCT
No. P-389 to secure the said loan.
● Bautista failed to pay the amortization on the loan, with that the RFC took steps to foreclose the
mortgage extrajudicially under Act 3135. Thereafter, being the highest bidder, RFC acquired the
property. And, upon failure of Bautista to redeem the same within one year period as provided by law,
RFC consolidated its ownership thereon.
● On or about this time, however, an action (Civil Case No. 870) was filed by Rufino Ramos and Juan
Ramos in the CFI of Nueva Ecija against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
RFC (as successor in interest of Bautista) claiming ownership of the land in question and seeking the
annulment of T.C.T. No. 2336 in the name of the Government, O.C.T. No. P-389 in the name of Bautista
and T.C.T. No. NT12108 in the name of the RFC. A decision thereon was rendered on June 27, 1955
whereby the aforementioned certificates of title were declared null and void.
● Now, creditor DBP filed a complaint against debtor Bautista for the recovery of the sum of money
representing the unpaid mortgage indebtedness because though it was previously wiped out by the
bank after it acquired the title of the mortgage property in an extrajudicial sale, the said title had been
nullified in a judicial proceeding, the mortgaged land adjudged as belonging to another claimant.
● The lower court dismissed the case, it being of the view that with the due process requirement thus
flagrantly disregarded, since she was not a party in such action where her title was set aside, such a
judgment could in no wise be binding on her and be the source of a claim by the appellant bank.
Page 39 of 51
ISSUES: w/n lower court erred in dismissing the case, it being of view that due process requirement has been
disregarded; thus, judgment cannot be binding to Bautista nor be sourced of right by the DBP
RULING:
No. "The Court after examining the proofs, is constrained to sustain her on that; it will really appear that she had
never been placed within the jurisdiction of the Nueva Ecija Court; as the action there was one to annul the title,
it was an action strictly in personam, if that was the case as it was, the judgment there could not in any way bind
Lourdes(Bautista) who had not acquiesced in said decision in any way for what only happened is that as to the
mortgage, the Bank foreclosed, and then sold unto Conrada and when the title had been annulled, the Bank
reimbursed Conrada; stated otherwise, the annulment of Lourdes' title was a proceeding ex-parte as far as she
was concerned and could not bind her at all; and her mortgage was foreclosed and the Bank realized on it, when
the Bank afterwards acquiesced in the annulment of the title and took it upon itself to reimburse Conrada, the
Bank was acting on its own peril because it could not have by that, bound Lourdes at all."
As stated at the outset, the decision must be affirmed. The fundamental due process requirement having been
disregarded, appellee Bautista could not in any wise be made to suffer, whether directly or indirectly, from the
effects of such a decision. After appellant bank had acquired her title by such extrajudicial foreclosure sale and
thus, through its own act, seen to it that her obligation had been satisfied, it could not thereafter, seek to revive
the same on the allegation that the title in question was subsequently annulled, considering that she was not
made a party on the occasion of such nullification.
Reinforcement to the above conclusion comes from a codal provision. According to the Civil Code: "The
vendor shall not be obliged to make good the proper warranty, unless he is summoned in the suit for eviction at
the instance of the vendee." In effect, appellant bank would hold appellee Bautista liable for the warranty on her
title, its annulment having the same effect as that of an eviction. In such a case, it is wisely provided by the Civil
Code that appellee Bautista, as vendor, should have been summoned and given the opportunity to defend
herself. In view of her being denied her day in court, it would follow, if the intent of the above codal provision
were to be respected, that she is not "obliged to make good the proper warranty."
In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines
were likewise made defendants by appellant bank because of its belief that if no right existed as against
appellee Bautista, recovery could be had from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds no support in the
applicable law, which allows recovery only upon a showing that there be no negligence on the part of the party
sustaining any loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein by the operation of the Land
Registration Act. This certainly is not the case here, plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible for the plight in
which it now finds itself. Accordingly, the Director of Lands and the National Treasurer of the Philippines are
likewise exempt from any liability.
NOTES:
25. BASA VS. LOY, [G.R. No. 204131, June 4, 2018] (MARCELO)
PETITIONER: SPOUSES JAIME AND CATHERINE BASA, RESPONDENT: ANGELINE LOY VDA. DE
SPOUSES JUAN AND ERLINDA OGALE represented by SENLY LOY, HEIRS OF ROBERT
WINSTON OGALE, SPOUSES ROGELIO AND LUCENA CARANTES, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS
LAGASCA represented by LUCENA LAGASCA, and FOR BAGUIO CITY, and THE CITY
SPOUSES CRESENCIO AND ELEADORA APOSTOL ASSESSOR'S OFFICE OF BAGUIO CITY
● argued that they have adequately proved their
ownership of the disputed property; that the lower
courts disregarded the fact that they were in possession
of the respective portions claimed, which otherwise
constituted proof of delivery and, thus, consummation
of the sales in their favor
LAW & PRINCIPLES: "For an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject
of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must
be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.” ‘Legal
title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership.’
Page 40 of 51
FACTS:
● This case revolves around a 496-square meter residential lot situated in New Lucban, Baguio City
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-30086 (subject property) in the name of the late Busa
Carantes, who is the predecessor-in-interest of Manuel Carantes and herein respondent Robert
Carantes.
● The subject property was mortgaged to respondent Angeline Loy and her husband in 1994. Thereafter,
they foreclosed on the mortgage, and at the auction sale, they emerged the highest bidder. After
consolidating ownership over the subject property, a writ of possession was issued by the Court in their
favor.
● In 2006, herein petitioners filed a petition for quieting of title with prayer for injunctive relief and damages
against respondents Loy and Carantes, the Registry of Deeds for Baguio City, and the Baguio City
Sheriff and Assessor's Office.
● Petitioners initially claimed that in 1992 and 1993, portions of the subject property — totaling 351 square
meters — have already been sold to them by respondent Robert Carantes, by virtue of deeds of sale
executed in their favor, respectively; that they took possession of the portions sold to them; and that
the titles issued in favor of Angeline Loy created a cloud upon their title and are prejudicial to their claim
of ownership.
● Loy countered that she was entitled to the subject property as a result of the foreclosure and
consequent award to her as the highest bidder during the foreclosure sale. Later on, the property was
divided by judicial partition and new certificates of title were issued in the name of Manuel and Robert
Carantes, which were later canceled and new titles were issued in her name as co-owner of the subject
property together with Manuel Carantes. Moreover, she claimed that the supposed sale was not known
to her for such did not appear in the annotated title of Busa Carantes.
● In his answer, Robert Carantes alleged that the sales to petitioners did not materialize; that petitioners
failed to fully pay the purchase price; that his transactions with Angeline Loy and her husband were
null and void; and that he was the real owner of the subject property in issue.
● Respondents Angeline Loy and Robert Carantes failed to appear during the scheduled mediation.
Petitioners were then allowed to present their evidence ex parte.
● RTC: Denied the petition on the ground that herein petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving
the truth of their claims even by preponderance of evidence.
● CA: Affirmed the RTC decision
ISSUES: w/n petitioners have proven by preponderant evidence, their case for quieting of title
RULING:
No. In order that an action for quieting of title may prosper, it is essential that the plaintiff must have legal or
equitable title to, or interest in, the property which is the subject-matter of the action. Legal title denotes
registered ownership, while equitable title means beneficial ownership. In the absence of such legal or equitable
title, or interest, there is no cloud to be prevented or removed.
The trial court cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. By petitioners' failure to present the original copies
of the purported deeds of sale in their favor, the case for quieting of title did not have a leg to stand on.
Petitioners were unable to show their claimed right or title to the disputed property, which is an essential element
in a suit for quieting of title. Their belated presentation of the supposed originals of the deeds of sale by attaching
the same to their motion for reconsideration does not deserve consideration as well; the documents hardly
qualify as evidence.
The CA correctly found that petitioners' failure to append the original copies of the deeds of sale was
inexcusable; that the document that was appended to their motion for reconsideration was different from what
was presented and marked during the ex-parte hearing; and that the testimonies of petitioners contradicted the
affidavit of Roberto Carantes, their supposed seller, with regard to the price and lot area of subject properties.
In this case, even if petitioners are in possession of the disputed property, this does not necessarily prove their
supposed title. It may be that their possession of the disputed property is by lease or any other agreement
or arrangement with the owner — or simply by mere tolerance. Without adequately proving their title or right
to the disputed portions of the property, their case for quieting of title simply cannot prosper.
NOTES:
26. CAWIS vs. CERILLES G.R. No. 170207 April 19, 2010 , (ALOLOR)
Page 41 of 51
PETITIONER: VICENTE CAWIS (substituted by his RESPONDENT: HON. ANTONIO CERILLES, in his
son, EMILIO CAWIS), PEDRO BACLANGEN, capacity as the DENR Secretary, HON. MANUEL
FELIZA DOMILIES, IVAN MANDI-IT a.k.a. IVAN GEROCHI, in his capacity as the Director, Lands,
MANDI-IT LUPADIT, DOMINGO CAWIS and Management Bureau, and MA. EDELIZA PERALTA
GERARD LIBATIQUE
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
FACTS:
● This case involves the reversion sale of a public land located in Holy Ghost Hills Subdivision, Baguio
City. The said parcel of land with an area of 1,333 sq.m. was sold to Jose Andrada by virtue of the
Public Land Act. However, petitioners, claiming to be the actual occupants, protested the sales patent
awarded to Andrada.
● Sometime in 1987, private respondent Ma. Edeliza S. Peralta (Peralta) purchased Lot No. 47 from
Andrada. On 28 October 1987, the Deputy Public Land Inspector, in his final report of investigation,
found that neither Andrada nor Peralta had constructed a residential house on the lot, which was
required in the Order of Award and set as a condition precedent for the issuance of the sales patent.
Apparently, it was Vicente Cawis, one of the petitioners, who had built a house on Lot No. 47.
● On 13 November 1987, Sales Patent No. 1319 was nonetheless transferred to Peralta. On 8 September
1998, petitioners filed a complaint before the trial court alleging fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation in
the issuance of the sales patent and the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47. They claimed they
had interest in the lot as qualified beneficiaries of R.A. No. 6099 who met the conditions prescribed in
R.A. No. 730. They argued that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6099, Andrada’s sales patent was
deemed cancelled and revoked in their favor.
ISSUES:
Whether or not has the personality to file a complaint for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public
domain or improvements thereon?
RULING: The Court held in the negative. At the outset, we must point out that petitioners’ complaint
questioning the validity of the sales patent and the original certificate of title over Lot No. 47 is, in reality,
a reversion suit. The objective of an action for reversion of public land is the cancellation of the
certificate of title and the resulting reversion of the land covered by the title to the State. This is why an
action for reversion is oftentimes designated as an annulment suit or a cancellation suit.
Coming now to the first issue, Section 101 of the Public Land Act clearly states:
SEC. 101. All actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain or
improvements thereon shall be instituted by the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his
stead, in the proper courts, in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in bad faith, only the State
can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act and our ruling in
Alvarico v. Sola. Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have
the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the
patent, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain. Only the OSG or
the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since the title originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and the grantee.
Page 42 of 51
NOTES:
27. FRANCISCA TAAR v. CLAUDIO LAWAN, GR No. 190922, October 11, 2017, (ALOLOR)
LAW & PRINCIPLES: Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would
have the effect of canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis
of the patent, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain.
FACTS:
• The present case involves two (2) free patent applications over a 71,014-square-meter parcel of land
(the Property) located in Barangay Parsolingan, Genova, Tarlac. This was inherited by Narcisa Taar
(Narcisa), Alipio Duenas (Alipio), Fortunata Duenas (Fortunata), and Pantaleon Taar (Pantaleon).
• One (1) parcel of land was adjudicated exclusively in favor of Pantaleon while the other parcel of land
was given to Pantaleon, Narcisa, Alipio, and Fortunata. Narcisa sold her share to Spouses Primitive T.
Adaoag and Pilar Tandoc (the Adaoag Spouses) and to Spouses Ignacio Gragasin and Genoveva
Adaoag (the Gragasin Spouses).
• Later, Pantaleon, Alipio, Fortunata, the Adaoag Spouses, and the Gragasin Spouses executed an
agreement to partition the second parcel of land. Pantaleon, Alipio, and Fortunata were the
predecessors-in-interest of Francisca, Joaquina, Lucia, and Oscar L. Galo.
• Petitioners prepared a subdivision plan over the Property in 2000.
• The subdivision plan, denominated as Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-03-000964-D, was approved on
February 6, 2001. Petitioners then applied for free patents over the Property.
• Claudio Lawan (Claudio), Marcelino M. Galo (Marcelino), Artemio Abarquez (Artemio), Augusto B.
Lawan (Augusto), and Adolfo L. Galo (herein private respondents) filed a verified protest alleging that
their predecessors-in-interest had been in "actual, physical, exclusive[,] and notorious possession and
occupation of the land . . . since 1948," Petitioners countered that private respondents occupied the
property as tenants.
• Department of Environment and Natural Resources Regional Executive Director for Region III
Leonardo R. Sibbaluca (Director Sibbaluca) found that private respondents were the actual occupants
of the Property. There were no improvements or other traces of possession by petitioners. Neither of
the parties interposed an appeal or moved for reconsideration
• Hence, Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order attained finality.
• Later that year, private respondents filed their free patent applications before the Tarlac Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office. Private respondents' applications were approved.
• Petitioners filed before the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources a
Verified Petition to annul Director Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order on the ground of extrinsic fraud and
to cancel private respondents' free patents and certificates of title.
• The Department of Environment and Natural Resources Undersecretary for Legal Affairs formed an
investigating team to ascertain the actual occupants of the Property.
• During the ocular inspection, the investigating team found "concrete residential houses of [petitioners]
with fences fruit trees[,] and coconut trees" and "other houses owned by relatives and friends of the
parties."
• The investigating team gathered documentary evidence, discovered several leasehold contracts
between the parties and saw rice fields cultivated by Augusto, Marcelino, Claudio, Artemio Tabuyo,
Artemio Abarquez, and Romy Tabuyo.
• Based on their findings, the team concluded that petitioners were entitled to the Property. Secretary of
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Angelo T. Reyes (Secretary Reyes) adopted the
findings of the investigating team and ordered the cancellation of the free patents and the certificates
of title issued in favor of private respondents. Private respondents moved for reconsideration but their
Motion was denied.
• Hence, they appealed Secretary Reyes' January 18, 2007 Decision before the Office of the President.
• Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Executive Secretary
Ermita), reversed Secretary Reyes' January 18, 2007 Decision and reinstated Director Sibbaluca's May
29, 2002 Order.
• Petitioners moved for reconsideration but their Motion was denied
Page 43 of 51
• Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari against private respondents and Executive Secretary Ermita
before the Court of Appeals.
• They alleged that the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating Director
Sibbaluca's May 29, 2002 Order considering that their predecessors in interest had been declared ipso
jure owners of the Property as early as 1948 by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.
• Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari outright for being an inappropriate remedy.
• Instead of filing an original action for certiorari, they should have filed a petition for review under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court.
• Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their petition for certiorari and that the
Office of the President acted with grave abuse of discretion in reinstating Director Sibbaluca's May 29,
2002 Order. They insist that their predecessors-in-interest were declared ipso jure owners of the
Property by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. Petitioners add that private respondents procured
their free patents through fraud and misrepresentation.
• They pray for the cancellation of private respondents' free patents and certificates of title. Private
respondents assert that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by
Francisca Taar, Joaquina Taar, Lucia Taar, and the Heirs of Oscar L. Galo
2. Whether or not the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance bars Claudio Lawan,
Marcelino L. Gala, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L. Galo from applying for
free patents over the Property
3. Whether or not the free patents and certificates of title issued in favor of Claudio Lawan,
Marcelino L. Gala, Artemio Abarquez, Augusto B. Lawan, and Adolfo L. Galo are valid and were
secured through fraud and misrepresentation.
RULING: 1 and 2. The core of the controversy lies in whether or not private respondents are barred by
the principle of res judicata from instituting free patent applications over the Property claimed by
petitioners.
Decision of the Court of First Instance is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction. However, it does not bar private respondents from instituting their free patent applications
over the Property. There is no identity or substantial identity of parties and identity of subject matter
between the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance and private respondents' free
patent applications. Decision of the Court of First Instance involved an agreement between petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest. Clearly, private respondents were not parties to the agreement.
Although both relate to the same Property, the February 18, 1948 Decision of the Court of First Instance
was simply an agreement partitioning the bigger parcel of land, which embraced the smaller portion
claimed by petitioners and private respondents. On the other hand, private respondents' free patent
applications involved the establishment of their rights as the purported occupants and cultivators of the
Property. Evidently, there is no identity of subject matter.
In addition, the Court of First Instance did not recognize, expressly or impliedly, that private petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest occupied and cultivated the Property for more than 30 years since 1915. It also
did not declare petitioners' predecessors-in-interest as the ipso jure owners of the same.
Therefore, Decision of the Court of First Instance cannot bar the filing of a subsequent free patent
application over the Property Likewise, petitioners cannot rely solely on this Decision to obtain free
patents.
3. the applicant of a free patent does not claim that the land is his or her private property but
acknowledges that the land is still part of the public domain. Petitioners, in choosing to apply for free
patents, acknowledged that the land covered by their application still belongs to the government and is
still part of the public domain. Under Section 44 of the Public Land Act as amended by Republic Act No.
6940, they are required to prove continuous occupation and cultivation for 30 years prior to April 15,
1990 and payment of real estate taxes while the land has not been occupied by other persons. Again,
the Court of First Instance simply approved an agreement of partition.
If at all, the February 18, 1948 Decision could only be used as the basis of a subdivision plan. Section
91 of the Public Land Act provides the automatic cancellation of the applications filed on the ground of
Page 44 of 51
fraud and misrepresentation Only extrinsic fraud may be raised as a ground to "review or reopen a
decree of registration." It refers to that type of fraud that "is employed to deprive parties of their day in
court and thus prevent them from asserting their right to the property registered in the name of the
applicant."
Petitioners invoke Section 91 of the Public Land Act impliedly by insisting that private respondents
procured their free patents and certificates of title through extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation
The determination on the existence or nonexistence of fraud is a factual matter that is beyond the scope
of a petition for review on certiorari. Although there are exceptions to this rule, petitioners failed to allege
and prove that this case falls under the exceptions.
Assuming that private respondents procured their free patents and certificates of title through extrinsic
fraud and misrepresentation, the petition must still be denied. Petitioners are not the proper parties to
bring an action for the cancellation of free patents and certificates of title.
The validity or invalidity of free patents granted by the government and the corresponding certificates
of title is a matter between the grantee and the government.
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in bad faith, only the State
can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to Section 101 of the Public Land Act.
Private persons may not bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of
canceling a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the patent, such
that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
NOTES:
28. REPUBLIC thru DENR Regional Executive Director of Region VI vs. Espinosa et al [G.R. No.
186603. April 5, 2017 (CAGADAS)
PETITIONER: REPUBLIC thru DENR RESPONDENT:

Regional Executive Director of Region Valentina Espinosa, Register of Deeds Of The Province Of
VI [LOSE] Negros Occidental, Leonila Caliston, And Spouses Dioscoro
& Estrella Escarda [WON]
LAW & PRINCIPLES:
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the
mass of the public domain. 4 It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations
Reversion = Burden of Proof to prove fraud or lack of jurisdiction is in the State.
Land Registration = Burden of Proof to overcome Regalian Doctrine presumption that State owns the land is on
the applicant.
FACTS:
● A petition for review on certiorari seeking to nullify the Court of Appeals' (CA) July 25, 2008 Decision
upholding the validity of the OCT and TCT in the names of the respondents in this case.
● On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was issued to Valentina Espinosa (Espinosa).
● By virtue of the decree, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 191-N was issued on October 15, 1962
in the name of Espinosa.
Page 45 of 51
● On June 17, 1976, Espinosa sold the property to Leonila B. Caliston (Caliston), who was later issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-91117 7 on June 29, 1976.
● On January 13, 2003, the State, thru petitioner DENR Region VI and OSG, filed a Complaint for
annulment of title and/or reversion of land.
● The State claimed that the property is inalienable public land because it fell within a timberland area
indicated under Project No. 27-C, Block C per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as certified by
the Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986.
● The spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses Escarda) intervened alleging that they have been
occupying the property since 1976 on the belief that it belongs to the State.
● They prayed that Caliston be ordered to cease and desist from ejecting them.
● Caliston countered that the property is not timberland.
● The RTC rendered a Decision 17 dated May 12, 2004. Relying on LC Map No. 2978, the trial court
ruled in favor of the State and ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of the public domain.
● The CA rendered a Decision dated July 25, 2008 modifying the RTC Decision. It upheld the validity of
OCT No. 191-N and TCT No. 91117 issued in the names of Espinosa and Caliston, respectively.
● The CA found that the State failed to prove fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Espinosa when
she was issued OCT; State failed to prove that the property is forest land.
ISSUES:
Whether the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the time
Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.
RULING:
The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of the cadastral
decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.
Having been granted a decree in a cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. This means that Espinosa,
as the applicant, was able to prove by incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable
property in the cadastral proceedings.
As a remedy, the State may still recover the property if indeed it is part of the inalienable lands of the public
domain through an action for reversion.
The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because
it is of the public domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to prove
that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa.
There is no burden on Caliston to prove that the property in question is alienable and disposable land. At this
stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title, had already established
that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it.
The State hinges its whole claim on its lone piece of evidence, the land classification map prepared in 1986.
The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence.
The only fact proved by the map is one already admitted by the State, that is, that the land was reclassified in
1986. 45 This fact does not address the presumption/conclusion that Espinosa has, at the time of the cadastral
Page 46 of 51
proceedings conducted in 1955, proved that the land is alienable and disposable, as evidenced by the decree
issued in his favor in 1962.
Part II of Ruling
The reclassification of the area where the property is located in 1986 should not prejudice Espinosa and her
successor-in-interest.
To allow a reversion based on a classification made at the time when the property was already declared private
property by virtue of a decree would be akin to expropriation of land without due process of law.
The State failed to discharge its burden; the grant of title which carries with it the presumption that Espinosa had
already proved the alienable character of the property in the cadastral proceedings stands. To grant the
reversion based on a subsequent reclassification, more so on lack of evidence, would amount to taking of private
property without just compensation and due process of law.
NOTES:
Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back
to the mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of
to private individuals or corporations. There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds
other than fraud, such as when a "person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by
oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands
did not have jurisdiction over the same because it is of the public domain.”
In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion
of the property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that
the burden of proof rests on the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case,
asserts the affirmative of an issue.
29. Narcise v. Valbueco, GR No. 196888, July 19, 2017
Narcise, et al., the Department of Natural Resources Valbueco, Inc. filed an action for Annulment of the Free
(DENR) and the Register of Deeds of Bataan Patents, Certi􀁉cates of Title and Damages
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS, OR RESOLUTIONS (Rule 47, ROC)
FACTS:
● On March 8, 2005, respondent Valbueco, Inc. 􀁉led an action for Annulment of the Free Patents,
Certi􀁉cates of Title and Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 8144, against petitioners Narcise, et al.,
the Department of Natural Resources (DENR) and the Register of Deeds of Bataan before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga City, Branch 1.It alleged that it is the possessor of the subject lots in an
actual, peaceful, adverse and peaceful possession since 1970. Respondent averred that from 1977
until 1999, Original Certi􀁉cates of Title, Free Patents and Transfer Certi􀁉cates of Title covering the
lots in question were issued in the name of petitioners
● Petitioners filed several Motions to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, failure to state
cause of action, defect in the certificate of non-forum shopping and prescription.
● RTC granted petitioners’ motions. The RTC ruled that the instant case is an action for reversion
because petitioners are not qualified to be issued said free patents. As such, the land must revert back
to the State.
● Respondent filed MOR but was denied by RTC. On appeal, CA reversed and set aside ruling of RTC.
ISSUES: W/N instant case is actually a reversion case, and not a case for annulment of free patents and
certificates of title
Page 47 of 51
RULING:
Petition is denied
In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State ownership of the disputed
land, while in an action for annulment of patent and certificate of title, pertinent allegations deal with plaintiff's
ownership of the contested land prior to the issuance of the same as well as defendant's fraud or mistake in
successfully obtaining these documents of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
A careful perusal of respondent's complaint reads:

3. That the herein plaintiff has been in the actual, peaceful, adverse continuous and peaceful
possession since sometime in 1970 and up to the present time, by itself and its predecessor-in-
interest, some of which it acquired by transfer of rights, claims, interest as evidence [sic] by the
documents x x x and the rest by occupation and planting of root crops and
other including trees x x x.
4. That the plaintiff and its workers and employees of its ranches and the cultivation and planting of
different root crops and trees were always in the premises since 1970 or thereabouts, and their
presence were never disturbed nor molested by anybody until sometime in the year 2000 x x x.
In this view, We hold that the action is one of annulment of patents and titles. The allegations in the complaint
show that respondent asserts its ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription.
NOTES:
An action for reversion, a remedy provided under Commonwealth Act No. 141, seeks to cancel the original
certi􀁉cate of registration, and nullify the original certi􀁉cate of title, including the transfer of certi􀁉cate of title of
the successors-in-interest because the same were all procured through fraud and misrepresentation. In
cancelling and nullifying such title, it restores the public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private
individuals or corporations to the mass of public domain. Such action is 􀁉led by the OSG pursuant to its authority
under the Administrative Code.
On the other hand, an action for annulment of free patents and certificates of title also seeks for the
cancellation and nulli􀁉cation of the certi􀁉cate of title, but once the same is granted, it does not operate to revert
the property back to the State, but to its lawful owner. In such action, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit,
but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to bestow title; hence, the
issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
30. Lopez v. Noel Rubber, GR No. 1688734, April 24, 2009
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENTS, FINAL ORDERS, OR RESOLUTIONS (Rule 47, ROC)
FACTS:
● · Two consolidated Petitions:

● 1. G.R. No. 168734 - petitioners namely, Marcelino, Felisa, Leonardo and Zoilo, all surnamed Lopez
(Lopez siblings)
● 2. G.R. No. 170621 – petitioners Noel Rubber and Development Corporation (Nordec Phil.) and Dr.
Potenciano Malvar
● Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of Judgment that the Lopez siblings,
the successors-in-interest of Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land situated at
Overlooking, Sumulong Highway, Barangay Sta. Cruz, (formerly Barrio dela Paz), Antipolo City, Rizal
● In 1996, when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 96-4130 heard before the RTC of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was Atty.
Angeles who represented and protected the interest of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in said case by
􀁉ling a Motion to Dismiss. In Cabuay, Jr. , wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings were named the
respondents in the Petition eeking for Clari􀁉cation as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of the Two (2)
Final and Executory but Con􀁉icting Decisions of this Court involving the subject property, it was also
Atty. Angeles who appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
Page 48 of 51
● Further intensive investigation revealed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar that the 11 January 2001
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was rendered under circumstances amounting to
extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process, insofar as said Decision adversely affected their rights
to and interests in the subject property.
● Among the circumstances which allegedly amounted to extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process
were described by Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar. Among these: when Esquivel and Talens instituted
Civil Case No. 96-4193, they personally and through their caretakers already knew that Nordec Phils.
and Malvar already bought and took possession of the subject property, but Esquivel and Talens,
through their counsel Atty. Ang Cheng deliberately failed to implead Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar; and
(2) Atty. Angeles, who was supposed to protect the rights and interests of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar,
as their counsel, had an adverse personal interest in the subject property as he had unconscionably
taken, by way of champertous attorney's fees, almost the whole of the 19.4888-hectare land inherited
by the Lopez siblings from Hermogenes.
● Given the foregoing circumstances and the unsuccessful attempt of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar to
intervene in CA-G.R. No. 70200, Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar opted to 􀁉le with the Court of Appeals a
Petition to annul the Decision dated 11 January 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193, granting
the reconveyance of the subject property to Esquivel and Talens. Their Petition was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 91428. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar prayed in their Petition that the 11 January 2001
Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 be annulled for the reason that they were not impleaded
therein even if they were necessary, if not indispensable, parties. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar
additionally prayed that any writ of execution and other orders, which may have been or may thereafter
be issued to enforce the said RTC decision, be declared ineffective, insofar as they and their assigns
are concerned.
● CA issued its assailed Resolution in CA-GR. SP No. 91428 dismissing the Petition of Nordec Phil. and
Dr. Malvar. According to the said Resolution, the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case
No. 96-4193 could not be the proper subject of the said Petition for Annulment of Judgment given that
the very same decision was still pending appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 168734 and, thus, was
not yet final and executory. In addition, should the Court of Appeals take cognizance of such a Petition,
it could result in contrary and inconsistent rulings by the appellate court and this Court.
● Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar 􀁉led a Motion for Amendment and/or Reconsideration of the dismissal of
their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated
16 November 2005. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar then 􀁉led the instant Petition assailing the
Resolutions dated 6 October 2005 and 16 November 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
● CA-G.R. SP No. 91428. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar asseverate that they were not impleaded as
defendants in Civil Case No. 96-4193 where the RTC rendered its Decision dated 11 January 2001,
Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar's rights to and interest in the subject property. The remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief and other appropriate remedies are also no longer available to Nordec Phils.
and Dr. Malvar because of the extrinsic fraud committed upon them by the Lopez siblings, Esquivel,
Talens, Atty. Angeles, and Atty. Ang Cheng; and of the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC to
take cognizance of Civil Case No. 96-4193 and to render the 11 January 2001 Decision therein. Even
the Motion for Intervention of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in CA-G.R. No. 70200, the appeal of the 11
January 2001 Decision of the RTC, was not allowed by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, it is neither
improper nor premature for Nordec Phil. And Malvar to 􀁉le a Petition for the annulment of the said 11
January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193, even though the said Decision, after
being a􀁉rmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, is now pending appeal before this Court.
● Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar additionally argue that the Court of Appeals resolved the question of
procedure in a manner that was patently not in accordance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
particularly, when it held that (1) Rule 47 does not cover the judgment of the RTC in this particular case;
and (2) Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar still had an adequate remedy in seeking intervention in G.R. No.
167834, the appeal to this Court of the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001, as a􀁉rmed by the Court
of Appeals
● Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar insist that since Rules 37, 38 and 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
on motion for new trial, petition for relief, and appeal, respectively, simply mention "judgments or final
orders", without making any distinction as to whether or not the same is final and executory; it should
follow that where only the words "judgments or final orders" are similarly used in Rule 47 on annulment
of judgments, then such words should be understood to also refer to all judgments or final orders,
regardless of whether they are final and executory
Page 49 of 51
ISSUES: W/N CA erred in dismissing their Petition for Annulment of Judgment for being premature since the
judgment sought to be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review before this Court and is not yet final
and executory.
RULING:
Petition is denied.
The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are
remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has
been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot make
use of a petition for relief from judgment. Indubitably, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot avail themselves of
the aforesaid ordinary remedies of motion for new trial, petition for relief
from judgment, or appeal, because they were not parties to the proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which
the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 sought to be annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar
also cannot seek the annulment of the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193.
An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought
to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside
so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault
of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due
process. A person need not be a party to thejudgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can
prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely
affected thereby.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner
in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.
It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is to have the final and executory
judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought to be annulled, as in this
case, is still on appeal or under review by a higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be no
renewal of litigation because the litigation is actually still open and ongoing. In this light, the arguments of
Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be final and executory for it to
be annulled must fail
NOTES:
31. People of the Philippines v. Cainglet, GR Nos. L-21493-94, April 29, 1996 (Fuentes)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant WILFREDO G. CAINGLET, defendant-appellee.
LAW & PRINCIPLES:

CRIMINAL ACTION FOR PERJURY
FACTS:
● On December 13, 1962 Wilfredo G. Cainglet was prosecuted before the Court Of First Instance of
Zamboanga del Sur for falsification of public and/or official documents in Criminal Cases Nos. 2239
and 2231 under two informations
● On January 16, 1963, before arraignment, the accused moved to quash the aforequoted informations
on the ground that they contain averments, which if true, would constitute an excuse or justification,
invoking Section 2(g) of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. The averments referred to consist in the
statements in the informations that in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. N-184 the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur declared Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492 with improvements
thereon to be the private properties of Wilfredo G. Cainglet. Such judicial pronouncement which has
Page 50 of 51
become final, as can be inferred from the transformations, allegedly runs counter the charge that
accused falsely claimed said real estate to be his own private properties.
ISSUES: W/N final judgment in a cadastral case declaring respondent owner bars his subsequent prosecution
for falsely stating in his answers in said cadastral case that he possessed and owned Lot 8479 and 8492
RULING:
Petition is denied. Appealed order is set aside.
It is fundamental and well-settled that a final judgment in a cadastral proceeding — a proceeding in rem — is
binding and conclusive upon the whole world. Reason is that public policy and public order demand not only that
litigations must terminate at some definite point but also that titles over lands under the Torrens system should
be given stability for on it greatly depends the stability of the country's economy. Interest republicae ut sit finis
litium .
However, this conclusiveness of judgment in the registration of lands is not absolute. It admits of
exception. Public policy also dictates that those unjustly deprived of their rights over real property by reason of
the operation of our registration laws be afforded remedies. Thus, the aggrieved party may file a suit for
reconveyance of property or a personal action for recovery of damages against the party who registered his
property through fraud, or in case of insolvency of the party who procured the registration through fraud, an
action against the Treasurer of thePhilippines for recovery of damages from the Assurance Fund. Through these
remedial proceedings, the law, while holding registered titles indefeasible, allows redress calculated to prevent
one from enriching himself at the expense of other. Necessarily, without setting aside the decree of title, the
issues raised in the previous registration case are relitigated, for purposes of reconveyance of said title or
recovery of damages.
In the same way, therefore, the State may criminally prosecute for perjury the party who obtains registration
through fraud, such as by stating false assertions in the sworn answer required of applicants in cadastral
proceedings. For Section 116 of the Land Registration Act states:
"SEC. 116. Whoever knowingly swears falsely to any statement required to be made under oath by this
Act shall be guilty of perjury and liable to the penalties provided by laws for perjury."
And in this case, Section 116 of the Land Registration Act is applicable to cadastral proceedings under Act 2259,
by virtue of Section 11 thereof. From its wording, Section 116 applies to all and does not distinguish between
those who make false statements and successfully procure registration by such
statements, and those whose statements were not given credence by the land registration court. The law
therefore applies with equal brunt on both types of offenders. This is rightly so, for to give immunity from
prosecution to those successful in deceiving the registration court would, in effect, be putting a premium on
perjury and making the punishment therefor dependent upon the non- realization of the object of its commission.
For the Court, therefore, to sustain appellee's view would be to unduly discriminate in the prosecution of persons
charged with falsification or perjury. While public policy, on one hand, demands an end to litigation, and hence
puts forward the doctrine of res judicata, yet, on the other hand, every interest of public policy demands that
perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at the very
administration of the laws.It is the policy of the law that judicial proceedings and judgments shall be fair and free
from fraud, and that litigants and parties be encouraged to tell the truth, and that they be punished if they do not.
As afore-stated, a judgment on the guilt of the appellee would not undermine the indefeasibility of the titles over
Lots Nos. 8479 and 8492. Neither would the criminal proceeding for falsification or perjury be a collateral attack
on the titles in question.
The prosecution for falsification or perjury is a proceeding in personam which inquires into the criminal liability
of the accused. Not being an attack on the validity of the titles in question, any judgment rendered therein
would leave said titles undisturbed.
NOTES:
Page 51 of 51

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LTD | ESPINA | CASE DIGESTS 2020 – MODULE 3

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA

2. RP V. TAN PROPERTIES INC, G.R. No. 154953 June 26, 2008

4. REPUBLIC V. SANTOS, GR NO. 160453 , (CABASAG)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

ISSUES: Whether or not Art. 457 of the Civil Code

5. Republic v. Javier, GR NO. 214367 , (Cabasag)

PETITIONER: Republic of The Philippines RESPONDENT: Laureana Malijan-Javier, Iden Malijan-

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

6. De Los Reyes v. Municipality of Kalibo, GR NO. 214587 , (Cabasag)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

7. Santulan v Exec. Sec, GR NO. L-28021, ()

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

8. Cantoja v Lim, GR NO. 168386, (CAGADAS)

PETITIONER: LUCITA A. CANTOJA [LOSE] RESPONDENT: HARRY S. LIM [WON]

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Santulan v. The Executive Secretary –

9. Republic v CA, GR NO. L-39473, (BAGONOC)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ represented by her G.R. No. 168065

G.R. No. 168070

COURT OF APPEALS, TRINIDAD DIAZ-ENRIQUEZ and

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

RTC RULING (6 July 1995): in favor of the Saclolos

Catholic Bishop of Balanga v. Court of Appeals:

PETITIONER: ROLANDO TING RESPONDENT: HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely:

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

PETITIONER: SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA RESPONDENT: LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

First : Judgment Is Not Yet Executory

Second : A Void Judgment Is Possible

Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act

Valmonte and Jacinto vs. Nable:

13. Republic v CA, GR NO. 113549, (Advincula)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

14. Eland Phils., Inc. v Garcia, GR NO. 173289, (Advincula)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

(1) Tax Declaration No. 015224-A (Exhibit "Q"; . . . .

(2) Tax Declaration No. 05019-B (Exhibit "R"; . . . .

(3) Tax Declaration No. 01926-B (Exhibit "S"; . . . .

(4) Tax Declaration No. GR-007-0007 (Exhibit "T" . . . .

incontrovertible evidence, the aspects of possession in accordance with Section 48 (b) of

15. Serna v CA, GR NO. 124605, (Advincula)

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

16. SPOUSES ROQUE v. SABUG , GR NO 193787. APRIL 07, 2014, (DELMORO)

PETITIONER: SPOUSES JOSE C. ROQUE AND RESPONDENT: MA. PAMELA P. AGUADO,

a) NCCP and Sabug, Jr. denied

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

YES. The CA correctly ruled in this case.

but she did not disclose who actually made

d) She had purchased the subject property

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

Petitioners have the better right over the property.

NOTES: [SEE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES]

18. PACETE v. ASOTIGUE, GR NO. 188575. December 10, 2012, (DELMORO)

PETITIONER: GAUDENCIO PACETE (LOST) RESPONDENT: INOCENCIO ASOTIGUE (WON)

a) Answer with Counterclaim and with Special and

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

NO. It was proper.

NOTES: [SEE LAWS AND PRINCIPLES]

PETITIONER: (WON) RESPONDENT:

LAW & PRINCIPLES:

LAW & PRINCIPLES: