GHASSAN ABDULLAH AL-SHARBI

Only one Al-Qaeda operative was mentioned by name in the memo, the rest had
no direct connection to al-Qaeda. Kenneth J. Williams reported in the EC that Ghassan
Abdullah al-Sharbi was “known to have contact with bin Laden lieutenant Abu
Zubaydah.” Kenneth J. Williams wrote, that Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi had moved to
Arizona in 1998, but had left the United States in October 1999. Williams also wrote that
two persons arrested in June 2001 in Bahrain had admitted to being members of al-
Qaeda and had been planning an “operation-to bomb the U.S. embassy and military
forces in Saudi Arabia.” At the time of their arrest, which was kept secret by the
Bahrainians, they had in their possession a passport of a man who was believed to be a
relative of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi. Williams wrote that the man who was believed
to be a relative of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi previously had entered the United States
in 1998 with this passport and was associated with an address known to be that of
Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi.1

The 9/11 Joint Intelligence Committee: “The FBI also has determined since
September 11, 2001 that (deleted) mentioned in the Phoenix Communication is also
connected to the al-Qaeda network. (Deleted) was arrested along with Abu Zubaydah.”
Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi was captured in Pakistan on March 28, 2002 along with
Abu Zubaydah. In August 2000, al-Sharbi, a Saudi citizen and Electrical engineering
graduate of Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, in Prescott, Arizona, departed the
United States to train in Afghanistan. In July 2001 Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi attended
the al-Qaeda al-Farouq training camp, where he was first introduced to Usama bin
Laden. At al-Farouq, al-Sharbi's training included physical training, military tactics,
weapons instruction, and firing on a variety of individual and crew-served weapons.
During July and August 2001 Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi stood watch with loaded
weapons at al-Farouq at times when Usama bin Laden visited the camp. From July
2001 to September 13, 2001, Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi provided English translation
for another camp attendee's military training at al-Farouq, to include translating the
attendee's personal bayat to Usama bin Laden. On September 13, 2001, anticipating a
military response to al-Qaeda’s’ attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001,
Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi and the remaining trainees were ordered to evacuate al-
Farouq. Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi and others fled the camp and were told to fire
warning shots in the air if they saw American missiles approaching. 2

The UBLU was adept at closing investigations of our Brothers. “Lynn” another
Intelligence Research Specialist at the UBLU stated that she believed that “Jane” sent
her the Williams EC because Jane was aware of her field office's earlier investigation of
Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi and several of his associates. Lynn said that in these
investigations, the FBI observed some trends, such as that all of the subjects were of
Saudi descent, were employed by Saudi airlines, and were involved with aircraft
maintenance or had pilots' licenses, and that the Saudi Airline company was paying for
their training. Lynn said that the investigation also had revealed that the subjects were
calling various gun dealers and gun shops. She said that the FBI personnel involved in
1
. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0606/final.pdf
2
. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2005/d20051104sharbi.pdf
the investigation questioned whether the subjects were using Saudi Airlines to transport
weapons, but that nothing further had developed in the investigations to support this
theory and that the Field Office investigation was closed. According to Lynn by the time
the name of Ghassan Abdullah al-Sharbi resurfaced in June 2001 based on the arrest
of the two al-Qaeda operatives in Bahrain, he had not been in her area for
approximately three years. Did that make him any less dangerous, any less relevant to
William’s thesis? Basically all Kenneth Williams suggested was that the FBI should
make a list of all the aviation schools in the United States and see if any jihadi were
enrolled there.3 Had the FBI done so it might have actually come across the names of
some of our jihadi?

LOTFI RAISSI

In February 2001 Brother Hanjour, the Shaheed who flew a plane into the
Pentagon, enrolled at Sawyer flight school Phoenix, Arizona, where he studied
advanced simulator training in order to learn how to fly an airliner. 4 In his
memo Kenneth Williams also reported the presence of two Algerian
Islamist “extremists” at aviation schools in Arizona. One of them was
Lofti Raissi, whom the FBI assumed to be September 11 th Shaheed Hani
Hanjour’s associate. Raissi left the United States in April 2000 and
returned in June 2001, remaining in the United States for approximately
one month. The FBI speculated that Raissi might have returned to the
United States either to evaluate Hanjour's flying skills, or to provide Hanjour with his
final training on the flight simulator before the September 11 th Events. Lotfi Raissi was
an experienced flight instructor who was certified to fly Boeing 737s. The FBI seized on
the fact that on five days when Hanjour trained on an AST simulator, Lotfi Raissi too
recorded use of the machine.

After being held for six months in a British goal, and then released, Lotfi Raissi
has been indicted in the United States for not disclosing any information regarding his
previous knee surgery on a FAA form and for not disclosing that he had a 1993 criminal
conviction for theft, which carried a maximum penalty of ten years, from the Uxbridge
Magistrate’s Court in England.

The Joint Inquiry noted:

There are indications that hijacker Hani Hanjour, who was unknown
to the Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies before
September 11th, associated with Lotfi Raissi, an individual who was
mentioned in the Phoenix Electronic Communication, had taken flight
training in the United States, and was possibly a radical fundamentalist.
There are several reasons why Lotfi Raissi’s association with Hani
Hanjour did not bring Hani Hanjour to the FBI’s attention before
September 11th. FBI personnel believe that, beginning in 1997, Hani
3
. Boston Globe page A16 May 24, 2002. July 10, 2001, “Memo from a Phoenix FBI agent.”
4
. Jim Yardley and Jo Thomas “Traces of Terror Report” New York Times June 19, 2002.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F10711FC3C5B0C7A8DDDAF0894DA404482
 Hanjour and Lotfi Raissi in the Phoenix Electronic Communication trained
together at a flight school in Arizona and may also have known each other
through a religious center. The Bureau attempted to investigate Lotfi
Raissi in May 2001, but discovered that he was out of the country. The
Phoenix office generally did not open investigations on persons they
believed had permanently left the United States. Although there were no
legal bars to opening an investigation, Headquarters discouraged this
practice. The Phoenix office did not notify INS, the State Department, or
CIA of its interest in Lotfi Raissi. The FBI was apparently unaware that
Lotfi Raissi returned to the United States soon thereafter and may have
associated with Hanjour and several other Islamic extremists. For the FBI
to be aware that persons of investigative interest have returned to the
United States, close contact must be maintained with INS and CIA.
Unfortunately, before September 11 th, no system was in place to ensure
coordination. In this case, the FBI did not notify the INS, State
Department, or CIA of its interest in the Phoenix subject Lotfi Raissi.
Therefore, Lotfi Raissi was able to get back into the United States without
any notification to the FBI.

Wes Fults, who had been the simulator manager at Sawyer, said that Raissi “had
a group of several guys who would come in and do simulator training with him” and one
of those men was September 11th Shaheed Ziad Samir Jarrah.5

The FBI should have been investigating Hani Hanjour but what little investigation
it did was focused on Lotfi Raissi. FBI Agent Williams reported in the EC that
investigations of “Subject No.3 [Raissi] and Subject No. 4 had been opened based on
information from foreign governments demonstrating that they were both involved with
African Islamic extremist / terror activity and had associated with individuals who had
associated with Ahmed Ressam.” Others who might have been mentioned in the memo,
which is still highly deleted, included Faisal Al Salmi, who was convicted of lying about
having known Hanjour, and Malek Seif, who was convicted of using a false Social
Security number and immigration violations. No one mentioned therein was ever
charged with “terrorism.”

FBI PREOCCUPIED WITH WAR ON DRUGS

In an August 21, 2001 email message from the Phoenix FBI Field Office,
Kenneth Williams urged David Frasca, head of the anti-Islamist unit aka Radical
Fundamentalist Unit at FBI headquarters, to check all schools nationwide for such
students - advice that wasn’t followed until after September 11 th because Kenneth
Williams had suggested this was a long term operation to plant sleeper agents in the
aviation industry and judging by the way he had handled it, there was no rush. Anyway
the priorities of FBI headquarters were focused on the War on Drugs, not on our
activities.

5
. Scott Thomsen and Jacques Billeaud “Suspect frequented Phoenix school” Associated Press September 29, 2001
http://www.azstarnet.com/attack/10929Npilotside.html
 During the Clinton presidency more than three times the number of people were
arrested for marijuana than were arrested during the Nixon administration, which
Islamists approve of on two levels – we oppose drug use and favor any pressing
concern that takes the FBI’s attention away from Islamism.

A similar situation regarding priorities existed in the FBI’s Field Offices. For much
of the 1990’s the Arizona division was preoccupied with fighting drugs, and treated our
activities as a low priority, even though Tucson had been one of the nation’s earliest
meccas for radical Muslim groups. Before the September 11 th Raids out of the Tucson
division’s total of 230 agents more than 60 were dedicated to drug work, while about 16
were to spy on Islamists and domestic militias; one former agent says the number of
agents dedicated to guarding against international “terrorism” was about eight.

The FBI was so ashamed of their lack of vigilance that it waited until May 15,
2002 before they admitted that the memo about our agents training in the U.S. cited
Usama bin Laden by name and suggested that his followers could use the flight schools
to train for “terror” operations – actually counter-terror operations - since America is the
biggest terrorist state in existence. Had the analysts at FBI Headquarters put this
information together with the information that follows, it would have been a whole new
soccer game but prior to the September 11 th Raids, only one FBI analyst was assigned
full time to al-Qaeda, although others were working on individual “terrorist” cases related
to Usama bin Laden’s network. In 1999, the CIA’s counter terrorism center had only
three analysts assigned full time to al-Qaeda, as breaking up international drug cartels
was even the CIA’s priority.

THE OTHER 2000 CLUES

Additional evidence that al-Qaeda was planning an action involving aircraft

surfaced at East African Embassy bombing trial when L’Houssaine Kherchtou revealed:

I observed an Egyptian named Ali-Mohamed who was not a pilot

debriefing a friend of his, Ihab Mohamed Ali (also known as Ihab Ali
Nawawi), about how air traffic control works and what people say over the
air traffic control system, and it was my belief that there might have been a
 plan to send a pilot to Saudi Arabia or someone familiar with that to
monitor the air traffic communications so they could possibly attack an
airplane perhaps belonging to an Egyptian president or something in
Saudi Arabia.6

L'HOUSSAINE KHERCHTOU AND THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF KING

ZAHIR SHAH

King Muhammad Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, overthrown in 1973,

became a symbol of national unity for the Mujahedin Islamic
fundamentalist resistance groups. In 1991 the Afghan government
restored Zahir's citizenship. L'Houssaine Kherchtou was involved in an
assassination attempt on Zahir Shah while Muhammad Zahir Shah was
in exile in Italy: In November 1991 an al-Qaeda operative pretending to
be a journalist stabbed King Muhammad Zahir Shah in the middle of an
pretense interview. The Brother grabbed a knife from a “gift” he had for the king and
plunged it into his heart. Zahir Shah, however, smoked cigars and had a metal cigar
case right there, and it deflected the blade. The Brother was arrested. He was carrying
a Portuguese passport in the name of Jose de Almeida Santo Paulo, but police were
unable to explain his motives or say if the passport was forged. Sergeant Ali-Mohamed
was sent to Italy to investigate and reported the results of his investigation to
L'Houssaine Kherchtou, who had lived in Italy and had aided the assassin. The U.S.
Attorney downplayed Kherchtou’s role: “Ali-Mohamed was frustrated in his investigation
and brought back articles from the Italian newspaper concerning the event of a stabbing
of the king of Afghanistan and brought them back to Nairobi, and Kherchtou translated
some of them.”7 L'Houssaine Kherchtou was placed in the witness protection program.

THE CIA TAKES ITS LUMPURS

MOHAMMED AHMED AL-HADA

When questioned by the FBI about the East African Embassies Events,
Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-‘Owhali gave agents the telephone number of an al-Qaeda
safe house in the Yemeni city of Sanaa, owned by a Yemeni bin Laden loyalist Sameer
Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada, the father-in-law of September 11 th Shaheed Khalid al-
Midhar. Al-‘Owhali had called Khalid al-Midhar's father-in-law at the Sanaa guesthouse
right after the East African Embassy bombing despite the fact that Al-‘Owhali was
supposed to be dead. With the help of Yemeni Security Forces the NSA put a tap on
Brother Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada’s telephone.

THE 1998 EAST AFRICAN EMBASSY EVENT AND “KHALLAD”

After giving up this phone number Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-‘Owhali

cooperated with the FBI and told them all he knew. Part of his confession involved a
“Khallad” LNU:

6
. 98 Cr. 1023 USDC SDNY
7
. 98 Cr. 1023 USDC SDNY
About two to three months ago I was instructed by Azzam to go to
Pakistan and to meet with a man named Khallad. Upon arriving in
Pakistan, I was briefed on the parts of the mission by Azzam and Khallad.
Azzam departed and told me that Khallad would provide me with all the
necessary details about the mission. Khallad told me that my mission was
a martyrdom mission, where I would be driving a vehicle filled with
explosives into a target that would result in my death. Khallad told me that
the target was a U.S. Embassy in East Africa but I was not told the exact
country. Since the mission was a martyrdom mission, Khallad took a video
of me that would be played after the mission was completed. During the
filming of the video Khallad told me to claim that I was from the Third
Martyr Barracks, 1st Squad of the Al Bara’ Bin Malik Division of the
Liberation Army of Islamic Holy Lands. I never heard of this organization
before this video but it was what Khallad wanted me to say. Khallad told
me I would be traveling to Nairobi, Kenya where I would receive the rest of
the details of my mission. I arrived in Nairobi on August 2, 1998 and called
Khallad to tell him I had arrived. A man known as Harun who paid my
hotel bill and took me to his house picked me up at the hotel. The next day
at Harun’s house I met Azzam and a man named Saleh [Rashid Saleh
Hemed] both of who had arrived from Mombassa. Rashid Saleh Hemed
told me Harun was the owner of the house and the
facilitator/administrative person for this mission. Rashid Saleh Hemed then
briefed me about the mission. Rashid Saleh Hemed told me that their
mission had two targets that were to be blown up on the same day,
August 7, 1998. Rashid Saleh Hemed told me that the two targets were
the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar el Salaam, Tanzania.
Rashid Saleh Hemed gave me some photographs and diagrams of the
U.S. Embassy in Nairobi. I was shown the bomb-laden vehicle which was
in the garage of Harun’s house…I was told the bomb weighed about three
times which had been cut back from the original plan of 5 tons because of
concern about collateral damage to Kenyan civilians…Usama bin Laden
has several people who control the missions. Bin Laden controls the
political objectives and gives instructions to the senior people, not to
people like myself, or Azzam. It was not that this was a bin Laden
operation specifically but I believe it was. Bin Laden’s method of operation
in public statements was to shy away from taking direct responsibility for
attacks like this…Every attack helps the morale of Muslims worldwide in
their struggle. Rashid Saleh Hemed and I discussed attacks inside the
U.S. Rashid Saleh Hemed told me that there are targets inside the U.S.
that could be hit but not everything is in place yet. Rashid Saleh Hemed
added that many more attacks first had to be conducted on the U.S. in
other parts of the world first. These attacks would weaken the U.S. and
open the way for strikes inside U.S. soil. I leaned at these camps that
attacks on U.S. Embassies achieve several objectives to include hitting
the U.S. ambassador, the military attaché, the press attaché and most
 importantly, intelligence officers. My training prioritized U.S. targets as
being:

1. U.S. military bases or sites.

2. U.S. Diplomatic or political sites and
3. Kidnapping Ambassadors.

The kidnapping of ambassadors would be done to arrange for a

release of Muslim prisoners like Ramzi Yousef and Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman and myself.”8

In 1998 the FBI knew Khallad was a key player in al-Qaeda. Khallad was the
nom de guerre of Tawfiq bin Attash.

TAWFIQ BIN ATTASH

Born in the late seventies in Yemen, Tawfiq bin Attash was

raised in Saudi Arabia, where his father was an associate of Osama bin
Laden, Abdullah Azzam, and His Eminence Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman. The Bin-Attashes were forced to move after the patriarch of
the family was exiled from Yemen for holding Islamist religious views.
The younger bin Attash joined the Afghan resistance’s fight against the
Northern Alliance in 1994, and after his brother was killed in battle in
1997, a meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was arranged between bin Laden and bin
Attash, who then officially became a member of al-Qaeda. When Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed was captured in March 2003, bin Attash was seen as a possible successor,
though he himself would be captured just two months later in a raid on a Karachi
warehouse that also produced the arrest of Ammar al-Baluchi, Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, and
four other al-Qaeda members. Since then, Bin Attash has been a key U.S. asset and is
now known as Tawfiq bin Rattash.9

In early 1999 the NSA got Brother Nawaf al-Hazmi’s full name and nothing else
from the Sanaa guesthouse tap. This did not meet NSA’s reporting threshold at the
time. In late 1999 NSA heard the names Khalid and Nawaf and from this and other
information were able to figure out the full names of two future Shaheeds. Then came
what might have been a big break for America. The FBI Inspector General’s Office
reported, “In the midst of the Millennium period concerns in late 1999, the NSA
analyzed communications associated with a suspected terrorist facility in the Middle
East linked to Al-Qaeda activities directed against U.S. interests. The communications
indicated that several members of an operational cadre were planning to travel to Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia, in early January 2000.” Analysis of the communications revealed that
persons named “Nawaf,” “Khalid” and “Salem” (September 11 th Shaheed Salem al-
Hazmi, Nawaf’s brother also attended the meeting) 10 were involved. In early 2000, the

8
. USA v Moussaoui Defendant’s Exhibit 767
9
. http://tkb.org/KeyLeader.jsp?memID=6294
10
. Oliver Schroum Die - “U.S. Investigators Knew About Planned Terror Attacks Let the Suspects Get Away: More Clues That CIA
and FBI Could Have Prevented the Attack on America” Ziet [German newsweekly] - October 1, 2002.
NSA analyzed what appeared to be related communications concerning a “Khallad.”
This met the reporting criterion as the Khallad call was about the upcoming meeting at
Yazid Sufaat’s vacation condominium, or safehouse, however you want to look at it.

THE DEATH OF BROTHER AL-HADA

On February 12, 2002 Brother Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada, aged 25,
was killed after trying to flee from Yemeni Security Forces that had staked out his house
in suburban San'a. Yemeni security forces were met with gunfire during the raid.
Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada ran and in the process attempted to throw a
grenade at security officers. The explosive, however, detonated in his hand and killed
Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada instantly. No police were injured. The incident
happened nearby the San'a University. Sameer Mohammed Ahmed Al-Hada died a
hero and his death inspired others in his family to take action. In May 2004, members of
the Saudi al-Ansari family carried out an attack against a Saudi oil refinery. One of the
attackers was Mustafa Abdel-Qader Abed al-Ansari, a former member of the Committee
for the Defense of Legitimate Rights. Mustafa Ansari was the brother-in-law of Khalid al-
Midhar as both men married into the al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Hada family. 11 Mohammed
al-Massari, a former Saudi diplomat and physicist who fled the country in the mid-1990s
and was the secretary general of the Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights in
London, remembered al-Ansari well.

From the tap the CIA had learned about the planned meeting in Malaysia one
month in advance.12 In January 2000 Malaysian Security Forces photographed Hambali,
Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi, entering and leaving Yazid Sufaat’s apartment
during a secret meeting in Kuala Lumpur. 13 They also got a photo of a man identified
only as “Khallad.” The United States Joint Committee on intelligence reported, “CIA
arranged surveillance of the meeting and the DCI was kept informed of the operation as
it progressed.”14 The CIA however, did not have an ELSUR listening device planted
within the safehouse and the Brothers were taught to be circumspect while talking on
the telephone. Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi told Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
they believed they were surveiled from Thailand to the U.S. 15 The Thai authorities were
on to Khalid al-Midhar and he was watchlisted. The CIA had developed traces on Khalid
al-Midhar by this time, and the Agency had his passport number and other minor
personal data but he was on no Watchlists whatsoever. Despite the fact Attash used the
name Salah Saeed Mohammed Bin Yousaf when traveling with Khalid al-Midhar the
Thais also watchlisted the Brother.16

In January 2001 when shown a surveillance photo of the Kuala Lumpur meeting,
Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-‘Owhali said he had previously encountered one of the
participants. He identified Khallad in one of the photographs as the same Khallad he

11
. http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/katz_kern200507110810.asp
12
. Oliver Schröm Die Zeit, Hamburg Oct. 1, 2002 Deadly Mistakes
13
. Philip Shelton “Denial of Search Warrant For Subject’s Belongings is at Center of Inquiry” New York Times June 7, 2002.
14
. USA v Moussaoui Def. Ex. 538-H
15
. http://www.rcfp.org/moussaoui/pdf/DX-0941.pdf
16
. USA v Moussaoui Def. Ex. 940
had described as involved with the East African bombings, 17 thus connecting the
purported mastermind of the attack on the East African Embassies with the Malaysia
meetings attended by Khalid al- Khalid al-Midhar and others. This should have put
September 11th martyrs al-Midhar and al-Hazmi high up on the Al-Qaeda food chain for
associating with Khallad, a man who had killed hundreds of people many of them
innocent Kenyans but the CIA and NSA must have been preoccupied tracking
Columbian drug cartels and the FBI old drug cases. 18 The meeting had taken place in
January 2000 and the pictures were displayed one year later – obviously terrorism was
not a priority for the FBI or CIA.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA, “In January 2000, the two operatives
involved in the planes operation flew to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Al-Midhar and al-
Hazmi knew that they would be involved in Shaheed operation somewhere in the United
States. The operatives were in contact with Hambali during the visit to Kuala Lumpur,
but only because Hambali as a rule had to be informed of the activities of al-Qaeda
operatives in Southeast Asia.” On August 15, 2003 Hambali was captured in Thailand
after the CIA tracked his cell phone calls. Under torture he confessed that he worked
closely with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed who had sent him funds to finance an attack on
a Marriott Hotel that took place after the Bali nightclub event, where, on October 12,
2002 two hundred infidels, mostly Christian Australians 19 were killed and another 200
wounded.20

In March 2002 the Canadian Security Intelligence Service arrested Mohammed

Monsour Jabarah Abdulrahman. Under interrogation he said he pledged bayat to bin
Laden, “to fight against all those who hate Islam and stand by Usama bin Laden until
death.” Circa May 2001 – June 2001 bin Laden told him he had been chosen for a
mission and he was sent to Karachi where he met Hambali and Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, who told Jabarah, “he wanted [him] to go to Malaysia to meet with
individuals who were planning an operation against the U.S. and Israeli embassies in
the Philippines.” Khalid Shaikh Mohammed gave Jabarah money and ordered him to
leave Pakistan for Malaysia before September 11 th 2001.21 Mohammed Jabarah told the
Canadians that in January 2002 Hambali discussed carrying out attacks with his group:
“His plan was to conduct small bombings in bars, cafes or nightclubs frequented by
Westerners in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines and Indonesia." Hambali also
stated that he had one ton of explosives in Indonesia. The West had warning of our
intentions but concentrated on extraditing Jabarah to America – eventually Jabarah
went to the U.S. “voluntarily.”22
17
. Infonnation developed after September 11, 2001, revealed this was a misidentification, and the person identified as Khallad was
actually Hazmi.
18
. Independent June 6, 2002.
19
. Jack Roche - a Muslim convert and follower of Abu Bakar Bashir, was arrested in Australia for plotting to destroy two Zionist
embassies there. Roche said that he had been a supporter of al-Qaeda, whom he did not believe was responsible for the
September 11th attacks and that our organization in Australia, Jemaah Islamiah was a term that could apply to “any Muslim at any
time” as it meant “a group of Muslims.” “Nobody ever says they're a member of JI and I'm not going to say I’m a member of JI,”
Roche said. “In Islam you can’t divide politics from religion and any Muslim who tells you any different is a liar.” Roche co-operated
with the authorities and was given a nine year sentence although he could be released as eary as 2007. (JI Long Active in Australia”
The Age Melbourne Australia March 22, 2003)
20
. Matthew Moore “Al Qaeda Sent Money for Bali Bombers - Hambali” - The Age Melbourne Australia September 29, 2003.
21
. Sidney Morning Herald May 16, 2003.
22
. http://www.ccla.org/pos/letters/Sep23toMcLellanreJabarah.pdf
KHALLAD AND THE COLE ATTACK

Shortly after the U.S.S. Cole was attacked on October 12, 2000,
the CIA and the FBI received a photograph and information that a man
named Khallad was the purported mastermind behind the attack. As
part of the Cole investigation, the FBI sought to find Khallad. Two Cole
suspects, Fahd Al-Quso and Ibrahim Nibras had fingered Khallad:
“During his interview by FBI Agents in Yemen, Fahd Al-Quso originally
told interviewers that on approximately January 6, 2000, he and Ibrahim
Nibras traveled on a Gulf Air Flight from Yemen to Kuala Lumpur via
Dubai, UAE. (Deleted) Al-Quso and Nibras ultimate destination was to be Bangkok,
where he and Nibras would pass Khallad, the suspected financier of the Cole Operation
$36,000 (US) which had been sent to Khallad from his parents. Al-Quso later retracted
that statement and claimed he and Nibras traveled from Yemen to Bangkok where Thai
authorities refused to allow the two to travel onward to Singapore because they did not
possess the proper travel documents. Thus the money was passed to Khallad in
Bangkok. Investigation of the USS Cole attack did not develop evidence to support
either version of Al-Quso’s story. (Deleted) of further interest is the fact that (deleted).
According to Al-Quso, Nibras contacted his home where he left a message for Khallad
as to where they could be reached when the two were unable to make their final travel
destination.” Yemeni authorities were holding Al-Quos in connection with the Cole
attack when he escaped from prison in April 2003. Another member of the Cole Crew,
Nasser Ahmad Nasser Al-Bahri, was released after receiving amnesty from the
president of Yemen, Ali Abdallah Saleh.23 I am sure everyone gets the idea…

As you have heard, Mohamed Rashed Daoud Al-‘Owhali had given the CIA and
the FBI information about an al-Qaeda operative known as "Khallad" and described him
as being heavily involved with the East African embassy bombings in August 1998 on
behalf of Usama bin Laden. Not only was Khallad linked to the East African Embassy
Action, but he was the jihadi who had helped put a hole in the battleship Cole. When the
name Khallad popped up on the radar a CIA agent described him as “a major league
killer who orchestrated the Cole attack.” For the love of Allah, why did the U.S. welcome
his associates to their country with open arms? Finally, based on this information FBI
Headquarters ordered New York to open a full field intelligence investigation, locate
Khalid al-Midhar and interview him.”24 This was a case of too little, too late.

AMERICA READMITS AL-MIDHAR

Additionally, the CIA knew that al-Midhar possessed a multiple-entry visa

permitting him to travel freely to and from the United States. The CIA, however, still did
not bother to tell the FBI that al-Midhar had a multiple-entry visa that would allow him to
enter the United States, or at least that was what the FBI claimed as the CIA produced
a cable showing this had been done. There was much rear-end covering over whether
the CIA told the FBI anything at all about al-Hazmi and al-Midhar. CIA e-mail traffic,
23
. http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP76704
24
. USA v Moussaoui FBI NA-88-1655
however, suggested that the CIA did brief the FBI in general terms but did not mention
the Brothers ability to visit the U.S. –

This continues to be an [intelligence] operation. Thus far a lot of

suspicious activity has been observed but nothing that would indicate
evidence of an impending attack or criminal enterprise. Told [the first FBI
agent] that as soon as something concrete is developed leading us to the
criminal arena or to known FBI cases, we will immediately bring FBI into
the loop. Like [the first FBI agent] yesterday, [the second FBI agent] stated
that this was a fine approach and thanked me for keeping him in the
loop.25

The Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice determined that
the CIA cable was never transmitted to the FBI. “Dwight” drafted a Central Intelligence
Report in which he summarized the information that had been disseminated by the NSA
about Mihdhar. He also provided detailed information about Mihdhar's passport, visa,
and visa application indicating that New York had been his intended destination.
According to CIA records, this Central Intelligence Report never was disseminated to
the FBI. A desk officer's note on the draft Central Intelligence Report indicated that the
Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit, John, had instructed the draft Central Intelligence
Report be put on hold (a note was added to the CIR in the CIA's computer system: "pls
hold off on CIR for now per [the CIA Deputy Chief of Bin Laden Unit]" and Dwight
contacted him through an e-mail about the disposition of the Central Intelligence Report
a week later. Despite this e-mail, the evidence clearly shows that the Central
Intelligence Report never was disseminated to the FBI.” Dwight was a detailee from the
Washington FBI Field Office who focused on the financial aspects of terrorism and
obtained information through the Counter Terrorism Center to help identify and
investigate persons who were responsible for funding terrorism. He had access to CIA
cables and reviewed them for potential leads or other information related to terroris t
financing. The NSA independently possessed information linking Brother Nawaf al-
Hazmi to al-Qaeda from the tap on al-Hada’s phone. Neither the CIA nor the NSA,
however, saw fit to provide their names to the Justice Department’s TIPOFF “terrorist”
database.

Nawaf al-Hazmi had arrived in Los Angeles on January 15, 2000, shortly after
the Kuala Lumpur meeting. In early March 2000, the CIA learned of his arrival. Despite
having just learned of the presence in this country of one of our key operatives, the CIA
still told no one about this. The internal cable CIA transmitting this information about
Nawaf al-Hazmi, in fact, contained the notation: “Action Required: None, FYI.” Nawaf al-
Hazmi had arrived in Los Angeles at the height of the U.S. Intelligence Community’s
alarm over our “Millennium Plot,” when Ahmed Ressam was supposed to have arrived
in Los Angeles to conduct operations. The CIA knew this. Still, Alhumdulallah, the CIA
refused to notify anyone of Nawaf al-Hazmi’s presence in the country.

25
. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/092002hill.html
 By this point, both al-Midhar and al-Hazmi – both mujahedeen known to the CIA
– were living in San Diego under their true names. They signed these names on their
rental agreement, both used their real names in taking flight school training in May
2000, and al-Midhar even used his real name in obtaining a motor vehicle identification
card from the State of California. In July 2000, Nawaf al-Hazmi brazenly applied to the
INS for an extension of his visa, sending in this application using both his real name and
his current address in San Diego (where he would remain until that December). INS, of
course, had no reason to be concerned, since the CIA had withheld the two Brothers’
names from TIPOFF. Nor did the FBI have any reason to look for them by conducting a
basic Internet search for their names or by querying its informants in Southern California
– since the last it had heard from CIA was that these two Brothers were overseas.

THE UNNOTICED CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION

Al-Midhar had traveled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, at the time of this monumental
intelligence failure, and applied for a new U.S. visa in June 2001. On June 13, 2001 al-
Midhar obtained a new U.S. visa in Jeddah, using a different passport than the one he
had used to enter the United States in January 2000, but using the same name. On his
visa application, he checked “no” in response to the question whether he had ever been
in the United States. This was a clear predicate for a criminal investigation that no one
appeared to notice at the time. In her Electronic Communication, FBI Agent Dina Corsi
noted that Khalid al-Midhar had previously traveled to the United States, according to
information she had obtained from the INS. After the FBI's intelligence investigation was
opened, she obtained and forwarded to FBI Agent Robert Fuller a copy Khalid al-
Midhar's June 2001 visa application on which he stated that he had not previously been
issued a visa and had never traveled to the United States. Thus, there was a clear basis
to charge Khalid al-Midhar criminally with false statements or visa fraud. Significantly,
this information had been provided to the FBI without the restrictive caveats placed on
NSA reports and other intelligence information. As a result, if Khalid al-Midhar had been
found, he could have been arrested and charged with a criminal violation based on the
false statements on his visa application. However, the FBI did not seem to notice this
when deciding whether to use criminal or intelligence resources to locate Khalid al-
Midhar. Dina Corsi, a woman, had composed this memo. Corsi had all the Khallad
information at her disposal and knew how dangerous he was. Yet she maintained a
tolerant attitude toward his associates. Why? Only a few re-treads from the Soviet-era
were assigned to watch us. Many failed to take a personal interest in combating
Islamism as they did Communism or they underestimated our ability to fight an
asymmetrical war. None of the Agents were Jewish, or at least did not have Jewish-
sounding names, for the Jews have a heavy stake in all of this but were excluded due to
their loyalty to the Zionist entity.

The State Department officials who took Khalid al-Midhar’s application followed
procedures and checked his name against their Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS) database. The CLASS name check system includes information from the
TIPOFF “terrorist” Watch List, which is managed by the State Department’s Bureau of
Intelligence and Research. This list contains declassified biographical information, such
as name, birth date, or passport number on thousands of suspected “terrorists.” This
information is drawn from sensitive all-source intelligence and law enforcement data
provided by the FBI, the CIA, and other intelligence community agencies. When a
consular officer using CLASS receives a TIPOFF “hit” on an applicant’s name, the
officer refers the case to the TIPOFF staff at the Department of State. The TIPOFF staff
will then make available the classified information supporting the TIPOFF entry to
authorized consular and legal experts within the Department of State, who then
determine whether the evidence is sufficient to deny the visa request. The consular
officer may not issue a visa until the Bureau of Consular Affairs has responded with its
security advisory opinion. TIPOFF “hits” through the CLASS system are coordinated
with the FBI and other agencies. Foreknowledge of pending “terrorist” travel has, in the
past, enabled authorities to arrest “terrorist” suspects at ports of entry, or to conduct
surveillance of them inside the United States.

Because CIA failed to put the name of Brother Khalid al-Midhar into TIPOFF,
however, no CLASS “hits” occurred, and Khalid al-Midhar was given a visa and returned
to the United States on July 4, 2001. Putting his name on the Watch List would have
enabled INS agents to stop him at the border. 26 Even when given the opportunity to tell
the FBI, in face-to-face meetings, about the presence of these two heroes of the
Ummah in the United States, the CIA refused. At a meeting in June 2001 with FBI
officials from the New York Field Office who were working on the U.S.S. Cole case, a
CIA official refused to tell them that al-Midhar and al-Hazmi had come to the United
States. CIA Director Tenet told a joint Congressional committee in October 2002 that he
would reveal the names of counterterrorism officials responsible for the failure to put the
men on the Watch List but in May 2003 the liar and child of liars refused to do so. The
CIA actually promoted one of these counterterrorism officials.

The CIA only decided to watch list al-Hazmi and al-Midhar on August 23, 2001:
Subject: Request To Enter Bin-Laden Related Individuals Into VISA/VIPER, TIPOFF
and TECS (paragraph deleted). Action: Please enter the following individuals into
VISA/VIPER, TIPOFF and TECHS due to their confirmed links to (deleted) operatives
and suspicious activities while traveling in South East Asia. We recommend that these
individuals be watchlisted immediately to be denied entry into the United States.” The
rest of the information in the CIA document, save for passport, travel and visa details
has largely been deleted. 27 Some of it was revealed in another document which read,
“Bin-Laden related individuals” al-Hazmi, the al-Midhar brothers and Khallad are to be
watchlisted immediately and be denied entry into the United States, “due to their
confirmed links to Egyptian Islamic Jihad operatives and suspicious activities while
traveling in East Asia.” On August 23, 2001, the director of Central Intelligence was
briefed about Moussaoui. On August 24, 2001 the State Department placed al-Midhar

26
. David Johnston and Elizabeth Becker “CIA Was Tracking Hijacker Months Earlier Than It Had Said” New York Times June 3,
2002. http://www.senate.gov/~intelligence/shelby.pdf
27
. USA v Moussaoui Def Ex 468
and his travel companions on its terrorism watchlist. This is the first record of the
placement of al-Midhar or Hazmi on any U.S. watchlist.

SHOULD FULLER GET THE BRUSH?

The Office of the Inspector General of the United States Justice Department
reported,

On September 4, 2001 FBI Agent Robert Fuller requested a local criminal

history check on al-Midhar through the New York City Police Department.
Agent Fuller initially focused on al-Midhar since he was captioned as the
subject of the investigation in the predicating Electronic Communication.
After reviewing the Electronic Communication several times, Fuller noted
the connection to Hazmi, so he conducted the same record checks on
Hazmi as he had on al-Midhar.” The OIG does not characterize Fuller as
the brightest of lights and it was true FBI Agent Fuller was groping around
in the dark. On September 4, 2001 FBI Agent Fuller completed a lookout
request for the INS, identifying Khalid al-Midhar as a potential witness in a
terrorist investigation. Due to his unfamiliarity with completing the lookout
form, Fuller contacted an INS Special Agent who was assigned to the
FBI's Joint Terrorist Task Force in New York. The INS lookout form had a
box indicating whether the individual was wanted for "security/terrorism"
reasons. FBI Agent Robert Fuller did not check this box. He said that he
thought the INS Agent told him to identify the subject on the form as a
witness, not a potential terrorist, to prevent overzealous immigration
officials from overreacting. The INS Agent who was assigned to the Joint
Terrorist Task Force since September 1996, claimed he did not provide
this advice to Fuller and he always checked the security/terrorism box
whenever he completed the lookout form for a potential witness in a
terrorism investigation.28

By this point in time the Brothers were already in the United States and in the
final stages of preparing for the September 11 th attacks, all praise to Allah, and it was
too late for the FBI to stop them. On September 5, 2001 Fuller requested an NCIC
criminal history check, credit checks, and motor vehicle records be searched in
reference to al-Midhar and Hazmi. On September 5, 2001 Fuller contacted the loss-
prevention personnel for the New York area Marriott hotels, since al-Midhar had
indicated when he entered the United States in July 2001 that was his destination. No
luck.

Although the FBI scrambled and fumbled in late August 2001 and early
September 2001 to locate the two in the United States, it denied itself the services of
any of its own agents assigned to criminal work and refused even to conduct a basic
Internet search that would have revealed al-Hazmi and al-Midhar living under their true

28
. USDOG IG’S 9/11 Report November 2004 USA v Moussaoui Def Ex 952-A
names in San Diego. Instead the FBI went to a private contractor, ChoicePoint, 29 which
came up with nothing. Praise Allah for privatization! An FBI agent in New York
conducted such an Internet search after the September 11 th attacks, and found al-
Midhar’s address within hours. The FBI also denied itself any assistance that could
have been obtained from Treasury officials in tracking down al-Midhar and al-Hazmi
through their credit card or banking transactions. Evidence of this was presented at the
sentencing phase of the Moussaoui trial:

The evidence will be that in late August of 2001 a high government official
told [Robert Fuller], the rookie FBI agent tasked to try to find Khalid al-
Midhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi specifically not to seek credit card information
from the Saudi airlines, the airline upon which these two had recently
traveled and which is owned by our supposed ally. Why? That government
official said she didn't think it was prudent to ask. You as jurors will be able
to see how this occurred and what could have happened in the search for
two known killers in our country had a more or less prudent approach
been taken.30

Had these men been wanted on drug charges, the FBI would have put all their
efforts into finding them and frozen their accounts. Alhumdulallah, for the FBI’s
blindness, the CIA’s refusal to share its information and the NSA’s bureaucratic
bungling!31 We also wonder what happened to Operation Boulder, which was put into
effect in 1972 and was designed to screen out and deny visas to jihadi.32 Had it met the
same fate as the Alien Border Control Committee that had been formed in 1986 when
the Jewish pervert Congressman Barney Frank and others amended the Immigration
and Nationality Act, so that membership in a so-called terrorist group was not enough
for the denial of a visa – one had to have actually committed so-called terrorist acts. 33

After the World Trade Center victory approximately 20,000 new lookouts were
quickly entered into TIPOFF and the Central Information Integration Center began
operation on May 1, 2003. The center fused and analyzed Jihad-related information
collected domestically and abroad to form what America hopes to be a comprehensive
threat picture. It is designed to be in one central location where information from all
sources is shared, integrated, and analyzed. A senior U.S. government official, who will
report to the Director of the CIA, will head the center. As soon as an appropriate facility
is available, FBI’s Counterterrorism Division, the Director of Central Intelligence’s
Counterterrorism Center, and the center will relocate to a single new facility. As soon as
al-Qaeda finds out that location it will be a prime target. The information gathered there,
including biometric profiles, will be passed to the Terrorist Screening Center, which will

29
. This did not stop Carol A. DiBattiste for taking a job there after leaving her post as Deputy Administrator of the Transportation
Safety Agency.
30
. http://cryptome.quintessenz.at/mirror/usa-v-zm-030606-02.htm
31
. David Johnston and Don Van Natta Jr. “Congress’ Inquiry into 9/11 Will Look Back as Far as 1986” New York Times June 5,
2002.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F30C13FB355E0C768CDDAF0894DA404482
32
. Bill Richards and LaBarbara Bowman “Slaying of Alon Activiated U.S. Watch for Terrorists” Washington Post July 4, 1973 Page
A1.
33
. Mark Reibling Wedge – How the Secret War Between the CIA and FBI has Endangered National Security Touchstone Books,
November 2002.
consolidate this information with the FBI’s Watch List, TIPOFF and the Transportation
Security Agencies No-Fly List. The Americans hope to accumulate a list of 100,000
names. Brian Davis, a Canadian immigration official in Paris claimed, “The U.S. lookout
index contains some five million names of known terrorists and other persons
representing a potential problem.” 34 We must admit that this centralization will make it
much more difficult for al-Qaeda to penetrate America’s borders or infiltrate its
institutions once we are within.35

ABDUSSATTAR SHAIKH: WAS HE ANOTHER TRIPLE AGENT?

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA,

It was my idea that Khalid al-Midhar and al-Hazmi should reside in San
Diego, California, after arriving in Los Angeles on January 2000. There
was no al-Qaeda operative or facilitator in the United States to help al-
Midhar and al-Hazmi settle in the United States. Al-Midhar and al-Hazmi
were not engaged in casing activity while in San Diego, given that they
barely knew how to function in U.S. society.

This statement was contradicted by the fact that many Arab-Americans Al-
Midhar and al-Hazmi came into contact with had been looked at by the Counter-
Islamist, or “counter-terrorist” community.

The FBI thought it had a high-level informer in San Diego,

California in its employ before the September 11 th Raids named
Abdussattar Shaikh of Lemon Grove, California, but Shaikh knew
how to play the Bureau. Shaikh, a key FBI asset, was the landlord
of Khalid al-Midhar from May 2000 to June 2000 and Nawaf al-
Hazmi from May 2000 to December 2000! FBI Special Agent
Steven Butler had recruited Abdussattar Shaikh On May 14,
1994. Agent Butler had first visited the Islamic Center of San
Diego, a large Clairemont mosque, to investigate eight
threatening calls that were received within hours of the Oklahoma City bombing. One
caller said the center would be blown up if it were proved that Arabs were responsible.
Abdussattar was the co-founder of this Mosque and a prominent member of the Muslim
Community. When Butler realized that Muslims were not responsible for the Murrah
attack he began to sympathize with them.

Butler remained the asset's handling agent or "control agent" - until he retired in
February 2002. Abdussattar Shaikh was as an informational source, providing the FBI
with information acquired in his normal daily routine. The FBI normally questioned him,
although he occasionally volunteered information that he thought might be relevant.
After September 11th even the FBI’s Office of the Inspector General was unable to
interview Shaikh. The Joint Intelligence Committee Inquiry had attempted to interview
34
. http://www.canoe.ca/NewsStand/TorontoSun/News/2004/01/20/318488.html
35
. http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/fed91603memund.pdf USDOS Memo Of Understanding signed by Colin Powell
September 16, 2003.
him also without success. The Committee then submitted interrogatories that Shaikh
declined to answer, asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. Shaikh indicated through
his attorney that if subpoenaed by the Committee, he would not testify without a grant of
immunity. The FBI was unwilling to allow this informer to testify even before a closed
session of Congress, claiming it would damage efforts to recruit sources from Arab-
American communities. Was this the real reason or was the FBI informant’s true
allegiance to Allah?

After 9/11, Abdussattar Shaikh told the FBI the two Brothers were good, religious
Muslims. They did not work, yet they always seemed to have money. Although they did
not fit the profile of rich Saudis, Abdussattar Shaikh never questioned them about
finances. They did not act in a peculiar manner and did nothing to arouse his suspicions
although they often would go outside when using their cellular telephones. Shaikh said
he identified the two only by their first names to the FBI. Later he said that he had not
mentioned them at all. These Brothers living in Abdussattar Shaikh's home were in a
position to put Shaikh and the information he supplied to the FBI in jeopardy. Therefore,
prudence and operational security would suggest that information about persons living
with the asset should have been sought by the FBI, at least to the extent of learning and
documenting their names, and perhaps running a records check on them. This was not
done.

During one of their last contacts, Nawaf al-Hazmi advised Abdussattar Shaikh
that he was moving to Arizona to attend flight training, but Shaikh did not advise the FBI
of this information until after the September 11 th attacks. Abdussattar Shaikh claimed
Nawaf al-Hazmi never mentioned flight training he received while living in San Diego yet
he told San Diego Magazine36 “They said they were old friends from Saudi Arabia who
were here to study and become pilots. But they didn’t have any anger, or temper.
Believe me, if I had known they were on some sort of terrorist list, I would have
immediately informed authorities. I’ve lived in this country 42 years. What happened last
year was horrible, and I hope and pray nothing like that ever happens again.” Which
side was Shaikh on, Allah’s or the Evil Doers? Only his God knows for sure!

The fools of the Joint Committee on Intelligence wondered about this and other
strange events: “First, while there are several indications suggesting that future hijacker
Hani Hanjour had contact with Shaikh in December 2000, Shaikh has repeatedly
advised the FBI that he does not recognize photos of Hanjour. Second, Shaikh told the
FBI that the hijackers did nothing to arouse his suspicion, but Shaikh also
acknowledged that Nawaf al-Hazmi had contacts with at least four individuals Shaikh
knew were of interest to the FBI and about whom Shaikh had previously reported to the
FBI. Third, Shaikh has made numerous inconsistent statements to the FBI during the
course of interviews after September 11, 2001. Fourth, Shaikh’s responses during an
FBI polygraph examination to very specific questions about his advance knowledge of
the September 11th plot were judged by the FBI to be inconclusive, although the FBI
asserts that this type of result is not unusual for such individuals in such circumstances.”
Shaikh asked for immunity from prosecution if he was called to testify under oath and

36
. http://www.sandiego-online.com/issues/september02/featured30902.shtml
commented, “I don’t know why I have been accused. I think I’m going to ask them [the
FBI].” Shaikh denied he was an FBI informant and said he was shocked by the
suggestion. Initially Shaikh was not paid. In July 2003, Shaikh was given a $100,000
payment and closed as an asset.

EDWAR SALAMAH

There were other clues as to our presence in San Diego. Edwar Salamah, a
Palestinian-born U.S. citizen and manager of Sam's Star Mart gas station in La Mesa,
who was at the time being investigated by the FBI, hired Nawaf al-Hazmi to work for him
briefly, after receiving a call from a mutual friend at the Ar-Ribat al-Islami Mosque in La
Mesa. In January 2000, before Nawaf al-Hazmi’s employment at Sam's Star Mart gas
station, the FBI Los Angeles field office initiated an investigation of Salamah after a
person whom the FBI was surveilling entered Salamah’s car in a mosque parking lot.
That person was the brother of a bin Laden operative. Salamah was under FBI
investigation when he hired Nawaf al-Hazmi.

OSAMA "SAM" MUSTAFA

The owner of Sam’s Star Mart, Osama “Sam” Mustafa 37 cheered upon learning of
the September 11th Raids and had been investigated by the FBI numerous times. The
first investigation was opened in August 1991 upon receipt of reports from the San
Diego Police Department that, during a traffic stop, Mustafa had stated that the United
States needed another Pan Am 103 attack and that he could be the one to carry it out.
Pan Am Flight 103, en route to New York from London, exploded in the air over
Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 passengers, among them 189 Americans, and 11
people on the ground. Libya has taken responsibility for this action. Mustafa also said
that all Americans should be killed for what they did to Iraqis. During the investigation,
the FBI developed information that Mustafa was associated with members of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in San Diego and Chicago. In 1994, San
Diego police also received an anonymous call stating that Mustafa was a Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine member.38 The FBI received information in 1994 that
Mustafa had threatened to kill a former Israeli intelligence officer who resided in San
Diego. Mustafa informed the Israeli that he was a member of the PLO and that the
orders to kill him had come from the PLO. The FBI closed its investigation of Mustafa,

37
. http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/terror/20030725-9999_1n25report.html
38
. In 1967 Wadi Haddad formed the Marxist PFLP that advocated the liberation of Palestine by acts of violence against the Zionist
entity. The PFLP kidnapped OPEC leaders in Vienna in 1975 and also commandeered a Lufthansa airliner going to Mogadishu in
1977. “Carlos the Jackal” carried out these attacks as a Haddad operative. The PFLP hijacked an Air France airliner enroute to
Entebbe in 1976 where they met a warm welcome from Idi Amin, a convert to Islam and a historical revisionist, who killed the Zionist
Dora Bloch, as she faked illness in a local hospital. Amin would be granted asylum in Saudi Arabia, where he died in August 2003.
In March 1978 Wadi Haddad, aged only forty-nine, died from suspected leukemia in an East German hospital – the same hospital
where Abu Nidal had been treated for leukemia. The Mossad was responsible for the leukemia that struck him down. In Baghdad of
1977, fine chocolates were rare. The Mossad, working with a Palestinian who had become close to Haddad, secretly gave him
Belgian chocolate laced with poison over six months, Mossad agent and Time Magazine Jerusalem correspondant Arron Klein told
the media in the course of promoting his book Striking Back. (http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/wire/sns-ap-israel-
killing-by-chocolate,1,4872993.story?coll=sns-ap-world-headlines). Haddad died in March 1978, showing only symptoms of
leukemia but no signs of poisoning. There are many well-documented cases of radiation-induced leukemia in humans. The early
scientists who worked with x-rays and radioactive substances did not realize the risk. Marie Curie who first isolated radium from
uranium ore died of leukemia, as did her daughter-assistant.
but reopened it in 1997 when it received information tying him to a possible plot based
in North Carolina.

In 1996 the FBI began Operation Smokescreen, after a number of Muslims were
seen buying large quantities of cigarettes from wholesalers in North Carolina. In 1997
Bassam Youssef Hamood, of Charlotte, North Carolina, was arrested for cigarette
smuggling. It was believed that his profits were being donated to the Hizb’allah. 39
Hizb’allah earned an estimated profit of $1.5 million between 1996 and 2000 by
purchasing cigarettes in a low tax state for a lower price and selling them in a high tax
state at a higher price.40

In July 2000 Hamood was charged with the same offense. Although the media
reported that the profits from this enterprise were again funneled to our Brothers in the
Hizb’allah he was not charged with giving the Hizb’allah material support until after the
September 11th Raids. Hamood was convicted by a jury verdict on June 21, 2002, for
providing material support to a designated terrorist organization, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act, cigarette smuggling, money laundering, and immigration
fraud. On February 28, 2003, he was sentenced to 155 years in prison. It is not clear if
this is the plot Mustafa was tied to. In February 2001, a stockbroker called the FBI to
say that Mustafa had closed his account, explaining that he was sending the money to
freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Mustafa now resides in Riverside, California.

ANWAR AL-AWLAKI

In addition, Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki of the Masjid Ar-Ribat Al-Islam, who was the
subject of an FBI counterterrorism inquiry for part of the time that the future Shaheeds
Midhar & Hazmi were in San Diego, served as their spiritual advisor there. Born and
raised in the U.S., Awlaki obtained B.S. in Civil Engineering from Colorado State
University, M.A. in Education Leadership from San Diego State University and studied
for a PhD in Human Resource Development at George Washington University, where
he served as the Muslim Chaplin. 41 The FBI opened a “counterterrorism” inquiry into
Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki's activities in June 1999. During the inquiry the FBI discovered
that the Imam was in contact with a number of other persons of investigative interest. In
early 2000, a subject of a Los Angeles investigation closely associated with Sheik Omar
Abdel Rahman visited the Imam (probably Firas Jandali, 42 part of the Sami Al-Arian
Defense Committee). The FBI closed its inquiry into the activities of the Imam in March
2000, approximately two months after al-Hazmi and al-Midhar arrived in San Diego. In
the case-closing memorandum, the agent asserted that the Imam had been “fully
identified and does not meet the criterion for [further] investigation.” The investigation
was closed despite the Imam’s contacts with other subjects of “counterterrorism”
investigations and reports concerning the Imam’s connection to suspect organizations.
Mohadar Mohamed Abdoulah, who also worshipped at the Masjid Ar-Ribat Al-Islam,

39
. http://www.tobacco.org/news/96217.html
40
. GAO Report “Terrorist Financing” November 2003 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04163.pdf
41
. http://www.usrah.co.uk/anwar_awlarki_profile.htm
42
Telephone - 510.919.6440
provided some help with air reservations and finding a flight training school for Brother
al-Hazmi and Hanjour.43

When Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki moved to one of the largest Muslim communities in
the country at the Dar Al-Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church, Virginia Nawaf al-Hazmi and
Hanjour followed and began attending that mosque. 44 After the September 11th Raids
this holy man said: “Islam does not approve of this. There is no way that the people who
did this could be Muslim, and if they claim to be Muslim, then they have perverted their
religion… Now, to what extent [Osama bin Laden] has any coordination or relationship
with the Taliban is not known. But I think that the reason the Taliban is defending him is
that not only do they think that he didn't do this, but also in their tribal customs—
remember that the Taliban are predominantly Pashtun—it is a shame to hand over
somebody who sought your protection. These are tribal rules that go back centuries. If
someone comes to you and says, "I want to be under your protection," you do not give
that person up even if you end up sacrificing your life. So it's a tribal custom that they
have. So this is how this alliance came about, but it's something that is fairly recent.
Plus, I think they're grateful to him for his assistance in the war against the Russians.
The Taliban themselves, as a movement, they have come out very strongly in their
condemnation of what happened in the U.S. They do not approve of this terrorism. But
the issue here is that they cannot give up this person who sought their protection. It's
not that they approve of what he is doing. But I think that Osama bin Laden did approve
of what happened, and reports that I've heard are that he said, "I did not do it, but I'm
not against it." So you can see that there's a difference of opinion. They're not really in
alliance.”45 Brother Al-Awlaki left the United States in September 2002, returned briefly
to clear up some unfinished business then moved to Yemen where he now resides. 46 In
January 2003 Al-Awlaki visited England and exhorted the faithful at the Masjid at-
Tawhid mosque in London to become shaheeds, and die in the sake of Allah
[subhanahu wa ta’ala].47 The September 11th Commission concluded that Al-Awalki had
provided aid to the Brothers but was aware of their intentions.

OSAMA AWADALLAH

Osama Awadallah, a Jordanian student, was also accused of

helping the September 11th Shaheeds while they were in San Diego.
FBI agents found a scrap of paper with the words “Osama 589-5316”
inside a car abandoned by Nawaf Al-Hazmi at Washington Dulles
International Airport on the afternoon of September 11 th 2001. The FBI
subsequently matched this number to a phone at a residence where
Osama Awadallah had briefly lived nearly two years earlier. A consent
search of Osama Awadallah’s apartment uncovered a box-cutter and
several computer-generated photographs of Usama bin Laden along
with a tape entitled “Martyrs of Bosnia” a documentary of the activity of the Mujahadeen
in Bosnia, replete with armed masked Religious Holy Warriors, charred corpses and
43
. James Sterngold “Muslims in San Diego Waver on Bail Pledge” New York Times December 9, 2001
44
. Kelly Thornton “Chance to Foil 9/11 Plot Lost Here, Report Finds,” San Diego Tribune July 25, 2003.
45
. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/09/0927_imampart1.html
46
. Telephone conversation with Dar Al-Hijrah Mosque October 12, 2003 703-536-1030
47
. Steven Emerson tape provided to World Net Daily September 11, 2003.
guerilla combat. This film was a translation by Azzam Publications of original material
produced by the Mojahedin Regiment of Bosnia.

The FBI came to his home to question him but at this time Osama Awadallah had
to prepare himself for afternoon prayers. He had to urinate, and he needed to wash his
body. But when he entered his bathroom and closed the bathroom door, an agent
opened the door and forcibly kept it open with his foot. Awadallah explained to the agent
that it was against his religion to urinate with people watching him, but the agent said
that the door had to be open. Osama Awadallah was so scared that although he needed
to urinate, he was unable to. Agent Reilly described Awadallah as “uncomfortable with
having the door open while using the restroom.” Agent Weston testified that Awadallah
actually urinated. The government in a memorandum speculated that perhaps
Awadallah didn't really need to urinate. When, as part of his pre-prayer washing ritual,
Mr. Awadallah wiped water on the tops of his socks, the agents watched and laughed
and said, “Look he put water on his socks!” 48

Despite this ugly treatment Osama Awadallah agreed to accompany the agents
to the San Diego FBI Field Office where he underwent a polygraph exam, which began
around 7:30 a.m. Osama Awadallah was advised of his rights and he signed an advice-
of-rights form. Agent Antonio Falcon conducted a polygraph examination for two hours
during which FBI Agent Falcone left the room for a few minutes and then returned to
complete the test. Agent Falcon returned ten minutes later and told Awadallah that the
polygraph showed that he had lied on the following two questions: (a) Did you know
beforehand of any specific plans to destroy any of those U.S. targets, on September 11,
2001? Answer - No. (b) Did you participate in any way in any of those attacks against
U.S. targets, on September 11, 2001? Answer - No. While confronting Osama
Awadallah, Agent Falcon repeatedly intimidated him, warning that he could be
sentenced to prison for five years if lied. After twenty minutes, the FBI agents who had
brought him to the Field Office came into the room and told Osama Awadallah that he
was “one of the terrorists” and he knew about the September 11 th attacks in advance.
The agents also told Osama Awadallah that nobody could hurt him except them.
Awadallah attempted to stand up, but the agents ordered him: “Sit down and don’t
move.” Awadallah saw that things were “going wrong,” and he “feared that they were
going to do something to him.” Osama Awadallah said he wanted to call his lawyer and
his brother, but the agents refused his request. The agents continued to question
Awadallah, who repeated four or five times that he had to leave for Friday prayer. The
conversation became heated and the agents told Awadallah that if he continued to lie,
he could go to prison and be deported. The agents informed Awadallah that he was
going to miss Friday prayer and instead they were going to fly him to New York and
detain him “for one year” so that they could “find out” more about him.

Osama Awadallah was arrested and held as a material witness. 49 Awadallah was
represented by two lawyers, Randall Hamud, who had no federal criminal trial
experience, and Abdeen Jabara, who did. Before either defense attorney could say a

48
. USDC SDNY 02CR1269-SAS Tr. 88 Tr. 913 Tr. 160
49
. USDC SDNY 01 CR 1026 Second Order and Opinion Shira A. Scheindlin
single word, the Government moved Mr. Hamud's admission to this court pro hac vice,50
and Judge Mukasey granted it. The Government then immediately moved to “excuse”
Jabara, arguing only that the fact that he had previously represented Sheik Omar Abdel
Rahman created a conflict which was not necessary to explain, and that Jabara “was
only appearing here as co-counsel” and that Awadallah had Hamud. When Hamud
objected, stating that he was not familiar with the nuances of the Southern District,
Judge Mukasey asked Mr. Hamud the unanswerable question, “Which nuances are you
not familiar with?” When Mr. Hamud said that because his practice was not in New
York, it was appropriate for him to have local counsel, Judge Mukasey asked, “Then
what is the point of admitting you pro hac vice?” and ordered Mr. Jabara excluded. 51

Osama Awadallah was called before a Grand Jury and presented with an essay
he had composed in an English as a second language class in which stated that he had
met “Khalid” and “Nawaf,” the first names of two of the September 11 th Shaheeds. When
confronted with this he said, “This handwriting is not my handwriting. All of them is my
handwriting except ‘his name Khalid.’ I wouldn't write Khalid like that.” He said the same
thing about the word “Nawaf.” It never occurred to him that the FBI could not have
written these names in his essay, as there was not enough space between the words to
insert them. After being tortured for 83 days in numerous federal prisons, Awadallah
was released on a half a million dollars bail. While at MDC he was beaten while being
transferred from cell to cell. When William Kunstler’s wife asked for a copy of the
surveillance tape of this she was told that a high-ranking correction officer had reviewed
it, found no evidence of brutality, and then recycled it. Awadallah’s trial before Judge
Shira Scheindlin began in April 2006 and ended in a mistrial thanks to a Jewish subway
worker turned male nurse (the Learned Elders of Islam know what that means) named
David Lipschultz, who hammered another nail in his and all the Jews coffins.

Awadallah was a sympathizer as evidenced by the media from Azzam

Publications, but not a member or affiliate of our organization. The FBI made an
example out of him – sending a message to others Muslims that if they lie to the FBI
about al-Qaeda they will be put on trial then go to prison then be deported.

HARRY SAMIT AND ZACARIAS MOUSSAOUI

Our entire plan could have unraveled and al-Qaeda

could have been prevented from carrying out most or all of
the September 11th Mission if the work of a FBI Field
Agent named Harry Samit had been taken seriously by
FBI officials in Washington, D.C. Samit put together most
of the September 11th 2001 puzzle pieces in August 2001
but was prevented from obtaining certain key puzzle
pieces by FBI officials at the J. Edgar Hoover Building.
Zacarias Moussaoui was the weakest link in the jihadi chain as he refused to follow
orders. Samit was a Lieutenant commander in the United States Navy from May 1990
until joining the FBI in January 1999 specializing in intelligence.
50
. For This Occasion
51
. USDC SDNY 02CR1269-SAS Tr. 785; Minutes of 10/2/01, p. 4
 After Moussaoui was arrested by the INS in Minneapolis, Minnesota in August
2001 on immigration violations Moussaoui began his first of two interviews by stating he
was highly suspicious of immigration authorities in general because of a problem he had
in the UK in 1993 while traveling on his identity card provided by the French Consulate
in London. Moussaoui indicated that he was questioned extensively by UK immigration
authorities who believed he was Algerian, despite his possession of valid French
documents. Moussaoui related that he was saved from this difficulty only through a
friend's acquaintance with a French Senator who interceded in his behalf, but whose
name he could not recall.”52

On October 24, 1993 three French consular officials in Algeria were abducted.
The French newspaper Le Soir reported a French magistrate traveled to London to
investigate the case with information that a “Zacarias” living in London was involved. Le
Soir also reported Moussaoui had been in contact with an Algerian Islamic militant, Farid
Melouk, who is now serving a nine-year sentence in a Brussels prison. Melouk was a member of
the Armed Islamic Group, and was arrested in 1998 after a shootout with police who raided his
home in Brussels.

By 1998 Zacarias Moussaoui left Europe and met with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
in Afghanistan. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was impressed by the work that Moussaoui
had carried out on behalf of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria and Moussaoui swore
bayat to al-Qaeda. Later Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, in an attempt to save Moussaoui’s
life, would say that he had many qualms about using Zacarias as an operative because
Zacarias evidenced mental instability. He was problematic and unstable. But he was
admitted into al-Qaeda circles none-the-less. Mohamed Atta’s handwriting was found on
a document in Moussaoui’s possession. At the crash scene in Pennsylvania, the FBI
found a business card with the name of the uncle of Zaid Jarrah, (one of the September
11th Shaheeds) on it. On the back of this card was found an address in Germany, 14 A
Bilstedderhaupt. A telephone number connected to this address was found in
Moussaoui’s notebook.53 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed tried to convince the CIA that
Moussaoui was marginal and that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had punished him by
enrolling him in a reform school in Qandahar, Afghanistan after which al-Qaeda
leadership considered him reformed, however, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed stated he was
not convinced. No such Al-Qaeda reform school was known to exist.

In September 2000 Zacarias Moussaoui flew to Malaysia on Kahlid Sheikh

Mohammed’s instructions. Hambali went to Malaysia to meet Moussaoui and brought
him to Kuala Lumpur. Hambali put Moussaoui up in Yazid Sufaat's condominium.
Hambali learned that the purpose of Moussaoui's visit was to enroll in flight school and
take flight training at the Malaysian Flying Academy in Malacca. Yazid assisted
Moussaoui in looking for flight schools and Hambali recalled seeing Moussaoui reading
a flight school brochure, although he could not remember from which flight school.
Later, Moussaoui complained that training was difficult in Malaysia because of the
52
. USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 692
53
. USA v. Moussaoui United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit No. 03-4792 December 3, 2003, Transcript of CIPA
proceedings
constant rain. Hambali believed that Moussaoui was not diligent about his mission, as
he never actually enrolled in a flight school. Hambali described Moussaoui to his CIA
interrogators as very troubled, not right in the head, and as having a bad character. He
told them that while in Malaysia Moussaoui insisted on going outside when any
sensitive information was discussed yet he talked freely in Brother Faiz Bafana’s home
about a dream he had to fly an airplane into the White House and that Moussaoui
managed to annoy everyone he came in contact with. Hambali had many arguments
with Moussaoui because he was criticizing Jemaah Islamiah for sitting around and
reading the Qu’ran instead of conducting operations. He said Moussaoui was constantly
suggesting operations that the rest of them thought were ridiculous, such as kidnapping
local Chinese businessmen and holding them for ransom, and robbing motorists.
Hambali told Moussaoui that if he wanted to do such things, he should do it in Europe,
and not cause trouble in Jemaah Islamiah's neighborhood, as there were plenty of
activists there already.54

Moussaoui’s desire to make Jihad and not just talk about it was the cause of
Yazid’s arrest - instead of getting flight training soon after arriving, Moussaoui told Yazid
Sufaat and Hambali that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had instructed him to buy 40 tons of
ammonium nitrate for a mission. He would not tell Yazid or Hambali what the mission
was, but since the instructions came from Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, they believed they
needed to assist Moussaoui. Hambali said they thought Moussaoui must have been
mistaken as to the amount of ammonium nitrate needed, as 40 tons was a tremendous
amount, and they did not have enough money to purchase that much. Instead, they
purchased four tons, hoping that was the actual amount requested. Yazid Sufaat and
Moussaoui purchased the ammonium nitrate for approximately 8,000 Malaysian Ringets
(approximately $1580 in July 2000). Hambali said he was not involved in the purchase
and did not know the name of the company from which they bought it. They purchased
the ammonium nitrate under the guise that it was for Yazid's lab, the Green Lab.
Hambali said that even four tons of ammonium nitrate was a huge amount, and they
were very concerned about where to store it. When Moussaoui left, his hosts were stuck
with the ammonium nitrate and the bill. Hambali said he was puzzled and angered by
this. When they later asked Sheikh Mohammed what they should do with the
ammonium nitrate, Sheikh Mohammed professed ignorance, and said he had never told
Moussaoui to buy ammonium nitrate, let alone 40 tons of it. Sufaat had to do something
with the fertilizer so he gave it to a Jemaah Islamiah cell that was penetrated by
Malaysian intelligence and ended up in prison.

In September 2000 Moussaoui contacted Airman Flight School in Norman,

Oklahoma about flight training. In December 2000, he flew from London, England to
Pakistan then returned to London on February 7, 2001. Then, on February 23, 2001,
Moussaoui flew from London to Chicago, Illinois, declaring approximately $35,000 cash
54
. Hambali was an associate of Jemaah Islamiah leader Abu Bakar Bashir, 64, who was put on trial in Indonesia for an action
against an outpost of Western “culture” if you want to dignify it by calling it that - a discotheque in Bali. Bashir faced 15 years in
prison for treason - trying to set up an Islamic state. Prosecutors also claimed he gave final approval for the bombing of several
churches on Christmas Eve 2000 during which more than 30 kuffar died. Bashir was sentenced to 30 months in jail for being part of
an "evil conspiracy" in 2003 but was cleared of leading Jemaah Islamiyyah and was released in April 2004 shortly after Indonesia's
parliamentary polls. Under U.S. pressure the police immediately rearrested this frail old man. Much to the dismay of Bashir bashers,
Bashir was released in June 2006 after serving about one year in prison.
to U.S. Customs when he entered the country. He then flew to Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma and thereafter traveled to Norman, Oklahoma where he opened a bank
account depositing $32,000. Moussaoui attended the Norman Mosque regularly and
just as he was instructed not to do, called attention to himself by being very outspoken
about his feelings regarding the incompatibility of practicing the Islamic faith while living
in the United States. He tore down posters he found offensive. On May 23, 2001,
Moussaoui e-mailed the Pan Am International Flight Academy in Miami, Florida to find
out about attending its flight simulator school.

In August 2001, Moussaoui drove with his co-religionist,

potential jihadi and roommate Hussein al-Attas from Oklahoma to
Eagan Minnesota to attend Pan Am International Flight Academy’s
Minnesota facility. Moussaoui had initially written to Matthew Tierney at
the Pan Am International Flight Academy in May 2001, using a Hotmail
account with the name pilotz123@hotmail.com. –

Hello, Mrs. Matt. I am Mrs. Zacarias. I contacted you

today by phone. Basically I need to know if you can help to achieve my
goal, my dream. I would like to fly in a professional like manner one of the
big airliners. I have to made my mind which of the following: Boeing 747,
757, 767, or 777 and/or Airbus 300 (it will depend on the cost and which
one is easiest to learn). The level that I would like to achieve is to be able
to take off and land, to handle communication with ATC, [Air Traffic
Control] to be able to successfully navigate from A to B, JFK to Heathrow,
for example, in a sense to be able to pilot one of these big bird, even if I
am not a real professional pilot. I am ready to take instrument course to
achieve some basic understanding. I have around 55 hours of flying and a
152, [a single-engine Cessna] and I passed my written PPL last month. I
know it could be better but I am sure that you can do something. After all,
we are in America, and everything is possible. Have a nice day, waiting for
a positive fly. Thanks you, Zac.55

Moussaoui was accepted as a student and began his “crash course” in aviation.

MOUSSAOUI’S BUST

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA that by August 2001 he had already
begun to think about the need to get Moussaoui out of the U.S. before he was caught
because there was no telling what Moussaoui might say or do. This was a fabrication
since no steps were ever taken to do so. On August 16, 2001 INS and Joint Terrorism
Task Force FBI agents in Minnesota arrested Zacarias Moussaoui, after a Pan
American flight school instructor became suspicious of his wish to learn to fly a
commercial jet despite his having no prior aviation experience. 56 Moussaoui said he
wanted to learn to fly because it was “an ego boosting thing” and was interested in the
55
. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/2564 Also USA v Moussaoui Sentencing Phase
56
. John Solomon “An FBI Memo Sought Flight School Probe” Associated Press May 4, 2002.
http://www.freep.com/news/nw/probe4_20020504.htm
operation of cabin doors. Later it was said that Moussaoui asked about the possibility of
the pilot shutting off oxygen to the passengers.57

Timothy Nelson an instructor at the Pan American Flight School

in Minneapolis called the FBI after Moussaoui indicated he only wished
to learn to take off and land a commercial jet aircraft and paid for his
training in cash. Moussaoui told the flight instructors that he was not
Muslim and his agitated demeanor did not fit the profile of a pilot.
Moussaoui was picked up for overstaying his visa waiver 58 and was
placed under arrest without incident.

During a search of his person, agents discovered a short dagger with a

scabbard in one of his pockets. A subsequent consensual search of Al-
Atta’s vehicle revealed an additional folding knife under the driver's seat
that Moussaoui admitted was his. After Moussaoui was removed from the
scene to the INS District Office for processing, [his friend] Al-Attas was
accompanied back to the room to retrieve documents proving he was still
enrolled as a student. Al-Attas, who had a key to the room and advised
that he was staying there with Moussaoui, gave written consent to search
the room. This was done in the interest of Agent safety and included
searches for weapons of bags and cases within Al-Attas’ reach. Upon
opening several bags and a small metal suitcase that AI-Attas indicated
were Moussaoui’s, a laptop computer, numerous aviation study materials,
a cellular telephone and one small walkie-talkie-type radio were
discovered. No additional weapons were found and Moussaoui’s effects
were not searched beyond the above described check for weapons and
other dangerous items.

Moussaoui denied consent to search his room and effects but agreed to have his
possessions transported to the INS office and placed in storage. Samit began to grill
Moussaoui who indicated that on his completion of training at Pan Am, he and Al-Attas
planned to travel to New York City to see “sites” including the “Statue of Liberty,” the
“Empire State” and the “White House.” These were “sites” alright, if you define the word
as “targets.” Samit noted that Moussaoui had no convincing explanations about the
flight training, who was financing it and his foreign travel. When interviewed a second
time one day later (August 17, 2001) Moussaoui denied that he was an extremist intent
on using his aviation training in furtherance of a terrorist goal and, instead, reiterated
that he merely sought flight training for personal enjoyment.

MOUSSAOUI AND BIN LADEN

MOUSSAOUI’S RICH SAUDI COUSIN

57
. http://www.danielpipes.org/article/2564
58
. Travelers visiting the United States under the Visa Waiver Program are not subject to the same degree of screening as travelers
with visas because a consular officer need not interview them before arriving at a U.S. port of entry. Citizens of France may enter
the country without a visa for 90 days. In September 2006 the General Accountability Office reported that France is responsible for
more illegal attempted entries to the U.S. than any other country in the program.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06854.pdf
 Moussaoui told Samit “that he earns some income from relatives Saudi Arabia.
When asked in what capacity this occurs, Moussaoui indicated that it is “absolutely
legal, but private.” When asked how a business venture could be private, Moussaoui
began describing his family connections in Saudi Arabia without attempting to answer
the question.”59 When Agent Samit heard this the name Usama bin Laden, who was
known as the al-Qaeda financier, crossed his mind.

MOUSSAOUI’S MYSTERY SHEIKH

In a sworn affidavit Hussein al-Attas stated that Moussaoui

…has refused to reveal his Sheikh to me for fear that I would not
like the Sheikh because of the Sheikh’s belief or country of origin…(al-
Attas was born in Saudi Arabia where Usama bin Laden was unpopular in
certain circles)…When asked if he was speaking about Usama bin Laden,
Al-Attas advised that he did not believe this was the case. He indicated
that the only reference he has seen Moussaoui make to bin Laden
occurred when the two were watching CNN on television and his picture
appeared. Al-Attas indicated that Moussaoui called his attention to bin
Laden, but did not comment further on him. In addition to the unidentified
Sheikh, Al-Attas gave several other examples of quotations from Islamic
prophets that Moussaoui draws upon as justifications for his beliefs and
actions. Al-Attas stated that Moussaoui quoted Omar Ibn Al Khattar,
referred to as the companion prophet: “teach your children how to swim,
ride a horse and know how to fight.” He indicated that Moussaoui used
this as justification for his physical training and preparation for fighting. In
referring to Moussaoui’s dislike of living in any country which does not
follow strict Islamic Law, he quoted the Prophet Mohammad in saying, “If
he does something good in Islam, love him that much. If he does
something bad in Islam, hate him that much.” Al-Attas indicated that
Moussaoui’s dislike of countries not adhering to Islamic Law extends to
secular Muslim states. Al-Attas related that in arguing his beliefs,
Moussaoui has referred to Fatwas, or religious orders written by various
Islamic scholars. Al-Attas advised that he has seen him reading various
fatwas on the Internet. One such scholar whose name Al-Attas can recall
is Abdul-Aziz Bin Baz, a Saudi who wrote a fatwa in which Moussaoui was
interested. A check of ACS (Automated Case Support System) indices for
Bin Baz revealed one entry which is believed to be identical in 265C-DE
79386 Serial 82 regarding Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz in Taef, Saudi Arabia.

The late Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz was a hafiz before the age of puberty and
studied with the scholars in his homeland before traveling to seek knowledge in other
countries. He completely lost his eyesight at the age 19 because of illness. Although he
parroted the official Saudi line it must be said that Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz was a supporter
of the Al-Haramain Charitable Foundation and as a result, the Bin Baz Foundation was

59
. USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 692
established in his honor.60 Sheik Ibn Baz fatwas drew sharp criticism from Usama bin
Laden who pointed out that during the preceding two decades, the Saudi regime
enlarged his role because of what it knows of his weakness and flexibility:

The government began to strike with the cane of Bin Baz, every corrective
program which the honest scholars put forward, further, it extracted a
fatwa to hand over Palestine to the Jews, and before this, to permit entry
into the country of the two sacred mosques to the modern day Crusaders
under the rule of necessity, then it relied on a letter from him to the
Minister for Internal Affairs and placed the honest scholars in the goals.
The confidence of the people and the youth in Abdul-Aziz Ibn Baz was
therefore shaken, however the price was very high, whilst the confidence
of the people in the working scholars, particularly those in the prisons had
been increased.

Through the Advice and Reform Committee, al-Qaeda published an open letter
to King Fahd in August 1995:

1. Corruption has spread, and Ulema have been complicit in sanctioning

usury (charging interest for bank loans, which is considered haram by
some Muslims). Osama bin Laden states that the Sheikh has deceived the
people by not making a distinction “between rulers who merely tolerate
usury and rulers who legitimize and legalize usury.” Those who legitimize
usury are apostates and infidels, but Bi Sheik Ibn Baz continues to praise
the regime. The current economic struggles are a punishment from God
for allowing usury.

2. King Fahd wore a cross, and Sheik Ibn Baz justified this action,
although it is clearly apostasy. The king’s poor health is clear indication
that this was infidelity.

3. Sheik Ibn Baz issued a fatwa permitting the Crusader-Jewish alliance

that occupied the country in the name of liberating Kuwait. This was an
abominable action that insulted the honor of the Umma, sullied its dignity,
and defiled the holy places.

4. Sheik Ibn Baz kept silent when the Saudi regime aided the communists
in Yemen, considering them to be fellow Muslims. Osama bin Laden
writes, “When were the communists ever Muslims? Aren’t you the one
who previously issued a fatwa on their apostasy and the necessity of
killing them in Afghanistan? Or is there a difference between Yemeni
communists and Afghan communists?”

60
. http://www.alharamain.org
 5. Sheik Ibn Baz wrote a fatwa allowing the “attacks and maltreatment” of
the Ulema that resulted in the arrest and detention of Salman al-’Awdah
and Safar al-Hawali.61

Samit:

Moussaoui became very agitated when asked, if on the basis of his

religious beliefs, there are any particular Islamic scholars. He claimed that
“things are very clear for him” and that he is able to think for himself.
Moussaoui indicated he follows the Islamic practice of praying five times
per day and of helping his Muslim Brothers. He indicated that in regard to
studying fatwas, he is unable to read Arabic, only to speak it, and that this
precludes his ability to understand them.

MOUSSAOUI’S SUSPICIOUS TRAVEL

Moussaoui told agent Samit

He has traveled to Morocco and all over Europe. He also advised that in
connection with the Indonesian telephone card venture, he visited
Malaysia for approximately three weeks, Indonesia for approximately one
week and Pakistan for two months. He indicated that he was in Pakistan
approximately six months ago and at first claimed that he was there in
connection with the Indonesian telephone card venture. When asked why
the Malaysian and Indonesian visits were much shorter than his trip to
Pakistan, he explained that his reasons for being there were both
connected to the business venture as well as personal. After being
pressed to provide a reason, Moussaoui indicated that he was there
attempting to get married, but that did not work out. Moussaoui stated that
he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan and that he stayed at hotels in that city
the entire time. When asked who he contacted in Pakistan, he indicated
that he was in touch with the brother of a close friend of Pakistani origin
who resided in London. Although he was unable to recall the brother’s
name, he stated that his friend’s nickname was Talil. When asked for
something more descriptive, Moussaoui stated that he could not recall his
friends last name but his first was Achmed. When asked if he traveled
outside Pakistan to another country during his trip or if he had visited any
other cities in Pakistan, Moussaoui did not answer directly, but instead
claimed that he was aware of what the interviewing agents were trying to
accuse him of as a result of his having watched television. This line of
questioning caused him to become extremely agitated and he refused to
discuss the matter further. A previous examination of Moussaoui’s French
Passport showed that he entered Pakistan on December 9, 2000 and
exited on February 7, 2001…There were no entry or exit stamps for
Indonesia or Malaysia and no visas to enter these countries in

61
. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_003345.asp
 Moussaoui’s passport, which was issued by the French Consulate in
London on October 31, 2000. When asked why these stamps did not
appear, he indicated that this document was a recently issued
replacement for one which had gone through the washing machine. Later
in the interview Moussaoui also disclosed that he has traveled to Saudi
Arabia in September 1996 for Umrah…He also advised that he planned to
travel to Denver to do some unspecified business with United Airlines.
(August 16, 2001)

FBI agent Harry Samit later testified that Moussaoui

Informed me that [the visas] had been carried in a previously issued

passport, which had been accidentally destroyed by going through the
washing machine. I was aware that frequently terrorists to mask
suspicious travel or frequent travel, that couldn't be explained by their job
or by their nationality, would regularly destroy passports accidentally or
report them stolen in order to mask that travel, so they weren't carrying
incriminating entry and exit stamps.

Samit suspected that Moussaoui traveled to Afghanistan to meet with bin Laden:
“Moussaoui was unable to convincingly explain a trip to Pakistan lasting from December
2000 until February 2001, initially informing agents that this was for ‘personal reasons.’
He later indicated that he was in Pakistan attempting to find a wife. Recipients will note
that Moussaoui arrived in the U.S. only 15 days after leaving Pakistan, a country
determined through other Minneapolis investigations to be a conduit for persons
traveling to Afghanistan in order to provide or receive terrorist training and indoctrination
(two paragraphs deleted).”62

With all these links to bin Laden Samit was asked by Moussaoui’s lawyer,

Q. Okay. So instead of going to the Usama bin Laden Unit, you said you
went to the what unit?

A. To the Radical Fundamentalist Unit.

Q. And why is this that you went to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit?

A. We knew that Mr. Moussaoui was a Sunni Muslim, he was an

extremist, and we believed he was involved in an ongoing plot. The
Radical Fundamentalist Unit was the logical unit.

Q. Why did you go to the Iran unit then?

62
. FBI LHM August 24, 200l Minn Minn
 A. Because before speaking with Mr. Moussaoui, FBI database checks
indicated that his name might be connected to Iran [the first traces on
Moussaoui linked him to the Hizb’allah].

Q. Okay. And what happened when your Electronic Communication got to

Iran? Did you get kicked over to the RFU unit?

A. We did. By then there had been enough of a delay, the interviews had
occurred, and we were well aware that it was not under the purview of the
Iran unit but in fact the Radical Fundamentalist Unit.

Q. So when -- so you never got kicked over to the Usama bin Laden Unit,
though; is that right?

A. That's correct…63

THE SECOND MOUSSAOUI INTERVIEW

Although Moussaoui began this second interview in a very subdued

manner, in an attempt to appear cooperative, as the questions began to
touch on the gaps in his financial beliefs, he became increasingly angry.
He was again unable to convincingly explain his source of income, now
indicating that the money came from friends in the UK. When asked their
names, he indicated that Talil, whose true name he had been unable to
recall the day before, had provided him money. He added that Talil’s full
name was Ahmed Atif (phonetic) and that he worked as an executive for a
large Dutch Company whose name he could not recall. Automated Case
Support System indices were negative for Atif. When pressed for names
of other people who have provided him financial support, he indicated
there was a Habib (LNU) in Germany as well. Moussaoui was unable to
name the city where Habib lives, his place of employment, a telephone
number or even a means by which they met or contact one another. In
continuing to attempt to explain his presence in the U.S. and at
Minneapolis, Moussaoui indicated that he was simply interested in
learning to fly. He gave as an example of this the names of several other
flight training facilities in the U.S. including Flight Safety International and
the University of Minnesota flying program. He further stated that all of
these schools advertised on the Internet, he could show interviewing
agents if allowed access to a computer. He was then asked if such
materials were on his laptop computer, to which he quickly replied in the
negative. In writer’s opinion the suggestion that the FBI might access his
laptop provoked an extremely strong reaction. For information, a
subsequent internet check of Minnesota Aviation Educational Institutions
provided by the Minnesota Department of Transportation revealed that the
University of Minnesota Twin Cities campus does not have a flight training

63
. http://cryptome.quintessenz.org/mirror/usa-v-zm-030906-02.htm
 program [however the University of Minnesota at Crookston offered a
course in crop dusting]. Moussaoui was then confronted with the
information that he was known to be an extremist intent on using his past
and future aviation training in furtherance of a terrorist goal. He was asked
to provide the name of his group, the religious scholars, the religious
scholars whom they followed, and to describe his plan in detail.
Moussaoui was visibly surprised at the mention that he was a member of
a group and that the FBI/INS were aware that he subscribed to
fundamentalist beliefs. He began repeating his earlier claims that he was
here to enjoy the 747-400 simulator and that this was all that interested
him. A short time after this he invoked his right to “an immigration lawyer”
and questioning was halted.

THE AL-ATTAS STORY

Like Moussaoui, Hussein al-Attas was arrested in Eagan, Minnesota on August

16, 2001 for immigration violations. Al-Attas was charged with having worked at the
Norman Mosque when he possessed only a student visa and having overstayed that
visa. In an FBI interview before his arrest, Al-Attas said that Moussaoui

Believes that it is acceptable to kill civilians who harm Muslims and that he
approves of martyrs. Al-Attas was also asked if he had ever heard
Moussaoui make a plan to kill those who harm Muslims and in doing so
become a martyr. Al-Attas admitted that he may have heard him do so,
but because it is not in his own heart to carry out acts of this nature, he
claimed that he kept himself from actually hearing and understanding.” Al-
Attas said that Moussaoui believes that it is the highest level of duty of
Muslims everywhere to know of the suffering of Muslims in lands where
they are oppressed. Al-Attas cited specific examples of the Philippines,
China, the Kashmir, Kosovo, Macedonia, Palestine and Bosnia as areas
where Moussaoui stated this is occurring.

But when Harry Samit asked Moussaoui how he felt about the situation in Israel
regarding their treatment of the Palestinians,

Moussaoui indicated that this makes him sad. He stated that ‘seeing a six
year old child shot in the head’ and watching Israel ‘take Arab land’ makes
him sad but denied that any of this makes him angry. When asked if he
has ever been so sad that he spoke openly about hurting people in
retaliation, he stated that he must think about the answer to this question,
ultimately refusing to give one…He indicated that he had no weapons
training of any kind, but that he shot handguns once or twice in France
with friends whose names he could not recall. Moussaoui stated he would
like to learn to use weapons as he is curious about them, but repeated
that he has never previously been taught to use one. Minneapolis opines
 that Moussaoui was being deceptive in stating that he has never been
trained in the use of weapons based on his reaction to the questions.

Al-Attas: Moussaoui considers the U.S. full of unbelievers, making it not a fit
place for Muslims to reside. He made this argument to many people at the Anur Mosque
in Oklahoma City, causing them to consider him very extreme.” But when Moussaoui
was asked why he resides in the UK, he indicated “that he was educated there and likes
the qualities of the British people.”

WILLIAM D. WEBB

The report of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into the September 11 th Raids
reported that Suhaib Web, the Imam at the Muslim Islamic Center in Oklahoma City
attempted to post bond for Hussein al-Attas, had been the subject of a full-field FBI
international “terrorism” investigation in the Oklahoma City Field Office. According to
FBI reports, this individual was a Vice President of Overseas Operations and Recruiting
for al-Fatah and a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was also a close associate of
the Imam Anwar Al-Awlaki and Rahman unindicted co-conspirator Siraj Wahhaj. Agent
Samit and the head of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit both testified that neither of
them knew that the individual who had attempted to post bond for Moussaoui’s
roommate was the subject of a terrorism investigation before the September 11 th Raids
although information about Suhaib Web that may have contradicted this has been
deleted from Samit’s August 22, 2001 FBI report. This information most likely concerns
the reason the Brother’s bail money was turned down.

Suhaib Web was born William D. Webb in Oklahoma City,

Oklahoma in 1972. Webb has had a criminal past and a troubled
youth with drugs, violence, gangsterism, etc. He was a rap DJ
known as “wax-master” Will. Webb is white and converted to Islam
in 1992. Currently, he studies at Al-Azhar University in Cairo Egypt.
Imam Webb has been a very popular speaker at conferences
sponsored by CAIR. Mufid Abdul Qader was one of the
incorporators of the Islamic Society of Greater Oklahoma City.
Qader is currently under Federal indictment in the Holy Land Foundation (HLF) case.

MAJAHID ABDUL-QUAADIR MENEPTA

Majahid Abdulquaadir Menepta, a former roommate of al-Attas'

and a friend of Moussaoui's, traveled to Minneapolis after the arrests and
posted a $5,000 bond for al-Attas. Norman Mosque leader Abdul-Quaadir
Menepta was born in Missouri as Melvin Lattimore. Lattimore was a star
football player at Soldan high school in the 1960's. After high school he
went on to become an activist in the black liberation struggle. Menepta
was convicted in 1971 in Colorado Springs, Colorado of a felony --
aggravated robbery and spent three years in prison. He converted to
Islam, changed his name in 1989, and visited Pakistan, where he made his way to
Afghanistan. In the 1990's he became an Imam at two St. Louis Mosques, Masjid At-
Taqwa Wa-Jihad and the Islamic Institute of Learning. After 9/11 the Islamic Institute
was investigated for its charitable contributions to Palestinians. Menepta was arrested in
1997 during a demonstration in St. Louis and was put on probation for carrying a
concealed weapon. While in Norman in the late 1990’s he announced that any
policeman who entered the prayer area of his Mosque would be shot. Menepta told the
FBI “he had never heard Moussaoui discuss violence in any way. He characterized
Moussaoui as ‘a pain in the butt’ who chose to quibble over points of procedure at the
Mosque. He advised that no one in group espoused violence and that the imam would
not tolerate such talk as he was committed to peaceful study. Menepta he had been to
Pakistan once in 1989 (the FBI found he had applied for a tourist visa to Pakistan in
April 1990).”

After the 9/11 Victory he was held as a material witness and his home was
searched. Several weapons were uncovered. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms
(BATF) Agent Jeffrey Whitney told the court that some telephone numbers connected
with cell phones seized in a search of Menepta's home were associated with continuing
criminal investigations in Oklahoma City, St. Louis, Detroit, El Paso and Kansas City,
Missouri. These involved organized crime, drugs and money laundering. Agent Jeffrey
Whitney testified that in 1995 an informer told federal agents that Brother Menepta had
belonged to an Islamist group in Norman and St. Louis, whose leaders advocated Jihad.
Agent Jeffrey Whitney also told the court that Menepta had said the Secret Service told
him that one of the “terrorists” who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993 had used
his visa credit card number. Agent Jeffrey Whitney said he could not confirm Menepta's
account. The Brother was sentenced to 15 months in prison. 64 In an FBI interview after
the September 11th Raids, a maintenance man recalled doing repair work in Menepta's
former apartment on April 30, 2001. The repairman said September 11 th Shaheed
Nawaf al-Hazmi, whom he identified from photos, was present. 65 Nawaf al-Hazmi was in
Oklahoma and on April 1, 2001 received a speeding ticket on Interstate Highway 40
near Clifton, Oklahoma. The FBI discounted this story otherwise the Brother would have
received more than 15 months.

AL-ATTAS’ ALOCUTION

Agent Samit was convinced Al-Attas was a potential Brother after he found a will
in which al-Attas wrote, “I don’t want to elaborate for death has approached.” During a
conversation from jail with Imam Elhadj Ndiaye al-Attas was asked, “I heard you want to
go in Jihad” and he replied, “Sheikh, do not talk about it now.” Al-Attas told the FBI that
he wished to participate in Jihad in the future. 66 After September 11th al-Attas was
arrested on a material witness warrant and swooped off to New York. He made this
statement upon sentencing regarding his prior statements to the FBI:

64
. http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fr/669338/posts
65
. Greg Gordon Star Tribune Washington Bureau December 1, 2002.
http://www.sacbee.com/content/news/projects/attacks/story/5440104p-6425421c.html
66
. USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 40
 On August 17, 2001 I was interviewed in Minnesota by FBI agents who
asked me questions about myself and Moussaoui. During that interview I
made a number of false statements. For example, the agents asked me
about application I had with me for a visa to travel to Pakistan. I told them
falsely that I wanted to go there to look into possible medical care for a
sick relative. The real reason was that Moussaoui had convinced me to go
to Pakistan to speak with Islamist scholars and others who hold the belief
that Islamic religion favors participation in Jihad. During the interview the
agents asked me if I knew ‘Shaqil's’ real name. He had never referred to
himself by any name other than Shaqil but I had noticed the name
Zacarias Moussaoui on one of his luggage tags. When the agents asked
me if I knew his real name I lied and I said I did not. The truth is that
because I had seen the luggage tag I believe his real name was Zacarias
Moussaoui.

Eventually, I gave Shaqil a ride to Minnesota. In September 11, 2001, FBI

agents arrested me in Norman, Oklahoma, and asked me more questions
about my brief association with Shaqil. I lied in this interview. First, I told
the agents that I did not have any knowledge of Shaqil's desire to
participate in Jihad. The truth is that on several occasions during the short
time I knew him Shaqil had expressed a general desire to participate in
Jihad. So my statement to the contrary was false.

This was not what had happened, “Al-Attas was also asked if he had ever heard
Moussaoui make a plan to kill those who harm Muslims and in doing so become a
martyr. Al-Attas admitted that he may have heard him do so, but because it is not in his
own heart to carry out acts of this nature, he claimed that he kept himself from actually
hearing and understanding.” This is how al-Attas was told to testify to please the Justice
Department and the FBI. Al-Attas had told Samit Moussaoui was into Jihad, but higher
FBI officials just shrugged.

I also told the agents that I had not made any plans to travel to New York
with Shaqil after he finished his class in Minnesota. The truth is that I had
planned to travel with him to visit New York, Colorado and possibly Los
Angeles before returning to Norman to pick up my things for the planned
trip to Pakistan. Eventually, while in Minnesota we dropped plans to go to
Colorado and Los Angeles. Since we never ended up making these trips I
sought to create the false impression that I had not even intended to make
them. So, I told the agents that I had always planned to register for fall
semester classes at the University of Oklahoma when Shaqil finished his
classes in Minnesota. The truth is that I had already decided not to
register for fall semester by the time I left for Minnesota because I was
planning to go to Pakistan. The agents asked me about other people
Shaqil might know in Norman. They specifically asked me about a person
I knew had been a classmate of Shaqil at the American school -- at the
Airman Flight School in Norman. When they asked me about this person
 though they mispronounced his name. I know exactly who they meant and
I knew Shaqil knew him. But I did not want to say anything that would
cause problems for anyone else, so I misled the agents by saying Shaqil
did not know anyone by the mispronounced name. 67

Al-Attas was sentenced to time served then held as a material witness in the
case against Moussaoui. He was deposed on videotape in June 2004 then deported.

SAMIT: A VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS

On August 21, 2001 Samit sent an e-mail to the Radical Fundamentalist Unit
supervisory agent at FBI Headquarters stating: “[It is] imperative that the [U.S. Secret
Service] be apprised of this threat potential indicated by the evidence. If [Moussaoui]
seizes an aircraft flying from Heathrow to NYC, it will have the fuel on board to reach
D.C.”68 FBI Agent Samit wrote

FBI Minneapolis opines that Moussaoui and al-Attas were, at the time of
their arrest, involved in preparing for a terrorist attack involving a Boeing-
747 aircraft at the direction of an as yet unknown international radical
fundamentalist group…Moussaoui is in the U.S. in preparation for an act
of international terrorism and this was interrupted by his arrest. 69

This was the truth. A tabloid newspaper reported the existence of an FBI memo
about Moussaoui stating that there was a handwritten notation from Harry Samit that
Moussouai might be planning to fly a plane into the World Trade Center! 70 The CIA
warned its stations around the world that Moussaoui was a “suspect airline suicide
attacker,” who might be “involved in a larger plot to target airlines traveling from Europe
to the U.S…” FBI agent Harry Samit testified under oath that he told his superiors at FBI
headquarters that he believed Brother Moussaoui had been planning to hijack a plane
traveling from London to New York and that "if he seizes the aircraft, it will have enough
fuel to reach D.C." Samit said he urged the FBI to warn the Secret Service, but that FBI
officials refused and ordered him not to contact the Secret Service or Federal Aviation
Administration. Samit believed Brother Moussaoui had “terrorist” written all over him!
Even Al-Attas agreed. Moussaoui Defense attorney Edward B. MacMahon Jr. asked
Michael E. Rolince the retired head of the FBI's International Terrorism Operations
Section, whether he knew that agent Harry Samit had warned in an August 18, 2001
memo to his office that Moussaoui was a potential terrorist. "No," he answered at
Moussaoui's death penalty trial. 71 Rolince claimed to have never seen Samit’s report
and anyway believed the report to be “suppositions, hunches and suspicions.”

Michael E. Rolince earned a B.A. in Mathematics from the State University of

New York, and joined the FBI after he graduated in 1974. He was assigned to a
67
. USDC SDNY USA v Al-Attas
68
824. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 738
69
. USA v Moussaoui Exhibit 327
70
. Brian Blomquist “FBI Man's Chilling 9/11 ‘Prediction'” New York Post May 9, 2002.
71
. Jerry Markon and Timothy Dwyer Moussaoui Memo Unseen, Court Told Ex-FBI Official Was Unaware of Agent's Warning
Washington Post Staff Writers Wednesday, March 22, 2006; A07
 specialized surveillance component in the San Francisco office
(counter-surveillance against the Soviets) then was assigned to the
New Orleans office where he worked Bank Robbery and Fugitive
investigations. In August 1988 Rolince was designated as a
Supervisory Special Agent within the Boston division, charged with
managing a Russian counterintelligence squad. In 1992 the FBI
reported 4 “terrorist” incidents within the United States. That figure rose
to 12 in 1993. In October 1993 Rolince was transferred to the
Washington Field Office where he was specialized in Espionage and
Counterintelligence cases. When the incidents of “terrorism” dropped to 0 in 1995
Rolince was promoted and assigned to the National Security Division at FBI
Headquarters. In February 1996 he was promoted to Assistant Special Agent in Charge
of the Counterintelligence and Counter terrorism programs.

After September 11th 2001 Rolince was intent on not making the same mistake
he made in August 2001 and was a player in the roundup and detention of Arabs based
purely on ethnic considerations. For example Ali al-Maqtari was detained when
authorities found two box cutters in his car, along with postcards of New York City, as
he drove to Fort Campbell, Kentucky where his wife was reporting for Army duty on
September 15, 2001. Although an immigration judge asked the government to present
more solid evidence for holding Maqtari, the government declined to do so, saying only
that he might be part of a larger terrorist "mosaic." "What may seem trivial to some may
appear of great moment to those within the FBI or the intelligence community," wrote
Rolince in an October 11, 2001 affidavit justifying Maqtari's detention. He added that the
bureau was unable to rule out the possibility he was linked to the September 11 th
attacks.72 Rolince is now a defendant in lawsuits brought by former MDC detainees. In
August 2002 Rolince was accepted into the Senior Executive Service within the United
States government (members of the SES serve in the key positions just below the top
Presidential appointees) and he assumed the position of Section Chief of the FBI’s
International Terrorism Operations Section.73 Rolince retired in October 2005.

FRENCH INTELLIGENCE ON BROTHER MOUSSAOUI

French Intelligence reported in on Moussaoui,

On September 28, 2000 our service (deleted) had an interview with Abd-
Samad Moussaoui regarding the Mujahideen and Masood Al-Benin who
was killed in Chechnya during April 2000. Learning of the death of Masood
Al-Benin, Abd-Samad Moussaoui spontaneously accused his brother
Zacarias Moussaoui (DOB May 30, 1968 at Saint Jean De Luz – the FBI
72
.http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/transcrime/articles/Swept%20Up%20in%20a%20Dragnet,%20Hundreds%20Sit%20in%20Custody
%20and%20Ask,%20'Why'.htm
73
. http://ifpafletchercambridge.info/oldsite/speakers/rolince.htm
 had the same information) of being responsible
for the death of their common friend. Masood Al-
Benin was apparently a friend to both brothers.
Abd-Samad Moussaoui affirmed that it was well
known that it was his brother Zacarias who
introduced Masood Al-Benin to the doctrine of
Radical Fundamentalism while they worked
together on a BTS [t.n. technical degree]
(technical commercial) at Perpignan, France (Department 66). Masood Al-
Benin rejoined Moussaoui in Great Britain where he obtained his diploma.
Abd-Samad Moussaoui described Masood Al-Benin as an individual with
superior intelligence and he brilliantly obtained his Masters degree at the
University of Cambridge. It was in London that Moussaoui was taken in
hand and initiated by the fundamentalists of ‘Backstreet’ and ‘Finnsbury
Park’ [t.n. probably refers to radical mosques at these locations, i.e. Baker
Street and Finsbury Park]. According to Abd-Samad Moussaoui this is the
same group that also recruited and converted Masood Al-Benin to the
extremist doctrine, when he arrived in Great Britain. He noted he had not
seen Masood Al-Benin since 1995, when Moussaoui returned to France to
visit his family and friends. It was during the course of this visit that
Moussaoui revealed that he had become completely enlightened on
religious matters. In spite of the force of the certain conviction
characterized by Abd-Samad Moussaoui himself schooled by the
‘habachi’74 Imam Khaled El Zahz, his intellectual guide, all his attempts to
orient Masood Al-Benin towards an Islam of tolerance and moderation
which Abd-Samad Moussaoui himself follows, were done in vain.
Moussaoui, wholly convinced of Jihad, maintained his radical convictions.
According to his brother Moussaoui had been arrested by Moroccan police
upon his arrival in Morocco in 1997. That same year Moussaoui went to
Norborne, France (Department 11). His ardent and emotional preaching in
favor of Jihad agitated a large number of his childhood friends who he had
not seen since his departure to Great Britain. Abd-Samad Moussaoui
informed of the trip by (deleted) to the region of Norborne himself (deleted)
being situated in Morocco, had advised local Muslim community
representatives of the moral danger that Moussaoui could represent for a
number of young Muslims loosing their religious bearings and social
placement. In this regard Moussaoui was driven from at-risk urban areas
by his co-religionists for propagating his message of intolerance and
hatred. Abd-Samad Moussaoui, who hasn’t had any direct news from
Moussaoui since 1997, knows only that he has traveled to Kuwait, Turkey
and Afghanistan. Abd-Samad Moussaoui described Moussaoui as in
individual who is extremely cynical, completely devoted to the Wahabist
cause and concerned with progressing that cause. He depicted him as a
cold stubborn man, capable of nurturing a plan over several months, or
even years, and of committing himself to this task in all elements of his

74
. Deviationist sect of Islam founded by the Ethiopian Abdoullah Al Habachi and condemned by Sheikh Ibn Bin Baz.
 life. Implacable, Moussaoui is a strategist that Abd-Samad Moussaoui
qualified as potentially being very dangerous and against who should be
surveiled by French authorities should he decide to return to France.
Completely upset and unable to find any excuses for his brother Abd-
Samad Moussaoui emphasized he would make sure to notify us (deleted)
of any indication that Moussaoui would return to France, stating that
where ever Moussaoui, he will try hard to put his competencies and
intelligence to the service of subversion. According to Abd-Samad
Moussaoui, Zacarias and Masood Al-Benin were inseparable, one was the
head and the other was the armed hand of the same monster. The French
advised they would require that Moussaoui be accompanied by a law
enforcement entity of the United States (FBI preferred but not required)
during transport to France. Furthermore they will request that Moussaoui’s
computer, mobile telephone and any other pertinent evidence suitable for
examination not be returned to Moussaoui during this trip. They would
request that such materials be transported by the escorting law
enforcement official and handed over to French authorities upon arrival in
France to better facilitate their exploitation of the evidence.” 75

Samit summarized this report,

Information provided by [deleted of French

Intelligence] indicated that he/she is aware of
Moussaoui through his association with a Masood
Al-Benin in 1971 at Bassas [da India – a island
possession of] France (Department 33). Masood
Al-Benin’s mother was French and his father is
from the country of Benin. Masood Al-Benin died
on April 12, 2000 in Chechnya fighting with the
Mujahideen. While in Chechnya Masood Al- Benin
was a computer expert working for Emir Ibn Al-
Khattab, aka Al Sooueilem Samer, a Saudi
known as the Black Arabian and a Mujahideen
leader in Chechnya. After Masood Al-Benin’s
death, Abd-Samad Moussaoui was told by
(deleted) that Moussaoui recruited Masood Al- Benin
to go to Chechnya. Abd-Samad Moussaoui
advised that Masood Al-Benin stated that
Moussaoui was ‘the dangerous one.’ (Deleted) was contacted regarding
these individuals and indicated that Ibn Al-Khattab is well known to be the
leader of the Chechen Mujahideen Movement. In addition he is known to
be an associate of Usama bin Ladin from past who shared involvement in
combat. (Deleted) was also aware that a Masood Al-Benin was in fact a
fighter for Al-Khattab who perished in Chechnya in April 2000 as reported
by (deleted).76
75
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 59B
76
. FBI LHM August 24, 2001 Minneapolis, Minnesota
AZZAM PUBLICATIONS

What was missing from this report was this most important and easily
ascertainable fact: Masood Al-Benin was a correspondent for azzam.com, the Internet
website of Al-Qaeda run by Azzam Publishers, the in house press of Al-Qaeda. Azzam
Publications “was set up to propagate the call for Jihad, among the Muslims who are
sitting down, ignorant of this vital duty…Thus the purpose of Azzam Publications is to
'Incite the believers' and also secondly to raise some money for the brothers. Obviously
the best way of helping Jihad and the Mujahideen is by actually going to the lands of
Jihad and physically fighting.” www.azzam.com site published Usama bin Laden’s 1996
“Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy
Places.” Azzam was the media propaganda outfit for Mujahideen Field Commander Ibn
Khattab, Moussaoui’s role model. Azzam Publications produced the definitive Khattab
video in 2000 and it was available on the Azzam websites in 2001 and the Maktabah Al
Ansaar Bookshop in Birmingham, England. At the end of the video, Khattab stated:

The Brothers in Britain, May Allah Reward them, have put much
efforts to publicize the Jihad. There is an organization by the name of
Azzam Publications, which is run by Brothers who are known to us and
maintain regular contact with us. So anyone who wishes to support us or
requires any further information about the situation here, they should
contact this organization. So the brothers at Azzam Publications, may
Allah preserve them, are cooperating with us in media efforts. They have
made commendable efforts to publicize the Jihad, so if you make contact
with them and support them, Ishallah, it will be very beneficial.” An email
message was also received by Azzam Publications from Chechen
Mujahideen Commander Shamil Basayev through the email address
chechenjihad@hotmail.com which stated: “Did you forget Cahar
Dudayev,77 Salman Raduyev,78 Hamza Halidov…We want their profiles in
your site. What happened to ‘alonewolfs.’ 21st April is Dudayev’s death
time. Please write his profiles…Chechens of Turkey.” On May 7, 2001, the
response from Qoqaz.net was “Send us their profiles, in English, and we’ll
include them on our site.79

U.S. officials believe Azzam.com encrypted messages in the images on their

Web site, and European officials believe a known al-Qaeda operative, Said Bahaji, a
member of the Hamburg cell believed to have been instrumental in planning the
September 11th Raids, had accessed the site.

77
. Soviet General Chechen Cahar Dudayev began fighting in 1990 for Chechens independence. Dudayev was killed in 1995.
78
. Salman was a Chechen freedom fighter noted chiefly for a spectacular operation in 1996 that propelled him on to television
screen and the front pages of newspapers across the world when he led a band of 300 of his “Lone Wolf” guerrilla fighters in the
seizure of a hospital in Kizlyar in Dagestan, taking more than 1,000 hostages. The aim was to force the Russians to sue for peace in
their war against Chechen separatists. In March 2000 he was arrested at his home in Novogroznensky by the Russians and put on
trial on 18 different charges including murder and terrorism. He was found guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The
Russian killed him in 2002.
http://www.salaam.co.uk/knowledge/biography/viewentry.php?id=2007
79
. http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ct/Documents/AHMAD%20extradition%20affidavit.pdf
LOOSE ISLAMIST LIPS SINK SHIPS: U.S.S. BENFOLD

In August 2004 Babar Ahmad, the owner of Azzam.com was arrested in London
and charged with aiding terrorists. This is what the American Government accused him
of in its Request for Extradition.

Babar Ahmad was in possession of a document which

concerned authentic battle group plans of a U.S. naval
battle-group operating in the Straits of Hormuz in April,
2001. The document was seized from Ahmad in
December 2003, by British authorities. The document
specifically describes the battle-group's vulnerability to
a terrorist attack, and provides specific examples on
how the ships might be attacked…This file discusses a
U.S. Navy battle group, each of its member ships
(including the U.S.S. Benfold), the specifications and
assignments of each ship, the battle group’s planned
movements, and a drawing of the group’s formation
when it was to pass through the Straits of Hormuz. The document
specifically notes that the battle group was tasked with enforcing sanctions
against Iraq and conducting operations against Afghanistan and Al Qaida.
Navy officials have confirmed the battle group composition; the dates and
location of the movements of this battle group in the documents are
accurate and were classified at the time this document appears to have
been written. The document states that the battle group was scheduled to
pass through the Straits on April 29, 2001, at night, under a
communications blackout, and explicitly describes the group’s vulnerability
to a terrorist attack: Weakness: “They have nothing to stop a small craft
with RPG etc, except their Seals' stinger missile.” Several of the e-mail
exchanges between late 2000 through 2001 are with an individual who
described himself as an enlistee in the United States Navy on active duty
in the middle east; the e-mail header information indicates that the
individual was communicating from the U.S.S. Benfold at the time, one of
the ships listed in the diagram described above found on a floppy disk in
Babar Ahmad’s room. One of the e-mails, sent in July 2001, describes the
reaction of officers and other enlistees to a briefing given on the ship. The
e-mail indicates that the briefing was provided to help Naval personnel
protect against terrorist attacks similar to the March 2001 attack on the
U.S.S. Cole. Voicing enmity towards the "American enemies" and strong
support for the "Mujahideen Feesabilillah," [jihadi fighting in the way of
Allah] the e-mail praises those who attacked the U.S.S. Cole and "the men
who have brought honor this week to the Ummah in the lands of Jihad
Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, etc."

The response sent from the Azzam Publications e-mail account praised
the enlistee’s comments and encouraged the enlistee to "Keep up with the
Da’wah and the psychological warefare [sic]." The Azzam Publications reply e-
mail was sent on July 19, 2001.

DOCUMENTS RETRIEVED FROM AHMAD

A search of the bedroom at 42a Fountain Road in London in December 2003,

uncovered approximately 25 to 30 pages of correspondence between Babar Ahmad
and various export companies from mid-1997 through early 1998, in which Ahmad
sought to purchase up to 5,000 tons of sulfur / phosphate based fertilizers and large
amounts of several chemicals, on behalf of a third party. A purchase order from one of
the companies that Babar Ahmad contacted reflects a shipment of “miscellaneous
items” on or about June 12, 1997, to a purported company in Pakistan. A July 1, 1997,
letter to Babar Ahmad from that company enclosed a bank check for the exact same
amount of the purchase. Agents continue to investigate the significance of this as well
as this computer file,

…Quite a number of years ago, I worked in Turkey with a fellow…

who claimed to be a hell of an urban trapper…[He] claimed he waited two
weeks one time for a neighborhood deli owner to walk down a set of stairs
from an overpass onto an elevated subway platform in Chicago. At just the
right moment, [he] threw several packages . . . onto the subway stairs.
The deli owner then slipped and fell down the last few steps and fell over
onto the train tracks, where he was crushed by an oncoming train.”

What was absent from the information on Moussaoui supplied by French

Intelligence was the story of the French Magistrate’s trip to London to question
Moussaoui. When Moussaoui was questioned on August 17, 2001 he indicated that he
had no criminal record in France and that his “file is clear.” Moussaoui stated that he
has never been in jail in France or questioned by any security or police authorities. He
stated that he is aware his father has been in trouble with the law, and indicated that his
father is a builder who undercut projects and built buildings “not to standard.” Although
he gave the name of his brother, Abdsamed Moussaoui (phonetic) who is an
engineering professor in Montpelier, France, he would not explain why they are
estranged stating that it is a personal matter. ACS indices were negative for Abdsamed
Moussaoui.”

WHAT THE FBI KNEW ABOUT KHATTAB IN EARLY 2000

In linking Brother Arnaout and the Benevolence International Foundation to

Usama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, FBI Agent Robert Walker wrote,

In or about early 2000, a website (www.aoaaz.net) [azzam.net]

dedicated to the cause of Chechen mujahideen identified the leaders of
the military fight in Chechnya as including Ibn al Khattab and included
pictures of mujahideen training as well as killed mujahideen. CW-1 has
identified Ibn al Khattab as a well-known mujahideen leader with links to
 Usama bin Laden. Similarly, CS has described Ibn al Khattab as another
leader of the mujahideen who joined the Jihad in Chechnya in 1994, after
participating in the Afghani Jihad. According to CS, once in Chechnya, Ibn
al Khattab sent word that he did not need any more fighters but instead
needed financial support. The website sought doctors to travel to
Chechnya to link up with Ibn al Khattab and provide medical services at
the front. The website indicated that those wishing to donate money for
the Chechnyan mujahideen should save their money and not donate it
until a trustworthy aid organization was identified in the website which was
to take place on or before February 2000…The same website urged those
wishing to go Chechnya to fight to get training in Afghanistan and noted:
Anyone interested in going to fight (if they are trained) or in going to train
should contact members of their own communities and countries who are
known to have been for Jihad, You will know these people and they will
know you. In these cases, you should, only speak in confidence to those
whom you trust, rather than speaking to everyone. Qoqaz web-sites
[website with similar stories and layout to Azzam that Masood Al-Benin
worked for]80 trust and recommend the people to give their donations to.
The website urged doctors and medical supplies to "make their way to
Chechnya through the aid organizations and join the fighting units of Ibn al
Khattab." The website condemned America for its alleged secret financial
support for the Russians fighting in Chechnya and elsewhere on the site
indicated that "on the other hand, as for those fighting the Muslims and
those who support this fight with money, words or actions, the Muslims
consider them all as enemies and in the same group. The website also
indicated that the news reports on its site were received from
correspondents traveling with the fighting units of Ibn al Khattab and that
the reports were checked by "Field Commander Khattab” before being
posted on the site. The website also indicated that large news
organizations desiring to interview Khattab (or a Chechen military leader
with whom he worked) could e-mail questions to the site "and we can try
without promising to have those questions answered by them. 81

IBN Al-KHATTAB AND BASAYEV HAD POSSESSED CESIUM

In November 1995, Field Commander Shamil Basayev, leader of

a group of Islamist rebels from Chechnya, planted a container of
cesium-137 in Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park to demonstrate Russia’s
vulnerability.82 Police found a vial of cesium buried near a footpath after
Basayev directed a Russian TV crew to the site. In early August 1999,
Basayev, together with fellow field commander Ibn Al-Khattab, launched
the ill-fated incursions into neighboring Dagestan that impelled the
Russian leadership to embark on war. Shamil Basayev played a key role in the

80
. http://www.cromwell-intl.com/security/nu/ru.html; http://www.islamic.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/Biographies/bio_1.htm
81
. Case 1:02-cr-00414 Document 1 Filed 04/29/2002 Page 27 of 36 United States District Court Northern District of Illionois Eastern
Division 1:02CR414 JBG
82
. OMRI Daily Digest, November 27, 1995.
resistance throughout this second war, despite incurring serious injuries in February
2000 during the retreat from Grozny that necessitated the amputation of one leg. On
October 15, 2002 Russian border guards detained Chechnyan Ilyasdavlet Murzaliyev
carrying a container attached to his chest and neck. The Russian news agency Itar-
Tass described the container as lead and weighing about 2.2 pounds. The smuggled
substance was an alloy of plutonium and osmium, a metallic element more often
associated with industrial catalysts, perfect fuel for an RDD. 83 Before he was killed in
July 2006 by a missile that homed in on his phone – the method used to kill Chechen
separatist President Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1996 - Basayev served as coordinator and
commander of the various groups of resistance fighters across the North Caucasus, and
claimed responsibility for a string of acts, including a car-bomb attack on the Chechen
government building in Grozny in December 2003, the killing of pro-Moscow Chechen
administration head Akhmad-hadji Kadyrov in May 2004, and the Beslan Movie Theatre
hostage crisis in September 2004, in which more than 320 people were killed.

APRIL (DELETED) 2001 MEMO TO FBI DIRECTOR FREEH

RE: IBN KHATTAB AND USAMA BIN LADEN

This note is to advise you of recent threat reporting deemed significant

and urgent to the Intelligence Community. (deleted) The U.S. Government
has received information indicating that serious operational planning has
been underway since late 2000, with an intended culmination in late
Spring 2001. Sunni extremists are undertaking these plans with links to
Ibn al-Khattab, an extremist leader in Chechnya, and to Usama bin Laden.
There are several planning channels, some with connections to
Afghanistan, all within a large shared mujahideen recruitment network. It is
not known whether there are several different parallel plans or whether all
activity centers on one major operation, since all the players are heavily
intertwined. The spark, which appears to have ignited interest in pursuing
a terrorist operation, was the renewal of the Palestinian intifada in
September 2000. In October 2000 Ibn al-Khattab issued his strongest
statement to date in favor of the Palestinian Jihad. He then devised a plan
to train mujahideen. In late 2000, a Usama bin Laden lieutenant and
mujahideen facilitator had also turned his attention to the Palestinian
cause and he was in charge of preparations for operational activity. He
sought financiers for the operation, which was close to completion.
Additionally, another mujahideen facilitator with ties to the Usama bin
Laden lieutenant was stepping up his activity in March and also was
pursuing funds to expedite matters because something was going to
happen. (paragraph deleted) Multiple sources also suggest that Usama
83
. “Chechen Caught With Radioactive Package Smuggler Carrying Material That Could be Used for 'Dirty Bomb.’” UPI Moscow,
October15, 2002.
http://www.stevequayle.com/News.alert/NBC/021017.Chechen.caught.radi.html
 bin Laden's organization is planning a terrorist attack against US interests
(deleted). The reporting involves movement of terrorists from (deleted)
following training there, and the smuggling of explosives and arms into
(deleted) for the use against the US and / or Western targets.” The
International Terrorism Operations Section responded, “The Usama bin
Laden Unit is preparing an Electronic Communication for all FBI field
offices and Legats, advising of the heightened threat environment. Field
Offices will be requested to utilize all resources, including electronic
databases and human sources, for the supplemental information to be
reported to FBIHQ. Those offices with Usama bin Laden FISAs will be
asked to conduct a review of recent technical cuts in light of threat
information. In addition (deleted) is being provided detailed information on
(deleted) current operational activities, to assist possible investigation
(deleted) – Dale Watson.84

Watson was dangerous to al-Qaeda but was ignored. His father was a World
War II Navy veteran. Dale Watson attended Florida State then joined the military. He
joined the FBI in 1978 and seven years later he was assigned a field supervisory desk
at the Washington field office. From there he became head of the counter-terrorism
branch of the National Security Division. In 1991 he became chief of the Iran Unit,
Counterterrorism Section of the International Terrorism Section. After a stint as the FBI's
first representative to the CIA's Counter-Terrorism Center, he became Chief of the
International Terrorism Operations Section. 85 Watson took the blame for our First World
Trade Center Event and in 1995 he was demoted to second in charge of the Kansas
City field division. In 1995, as second in charge of the Kansas City field division, he
played a key role in the investigation into the Oklahoma City bombing. In 1999 he
became first Assistant Director for the Counter-terrorism Division with responsibility for
overall direction and management of the international and domestic terrorism programs
including the National Infrastructure Protection Center. In March 2001 Watson said he
“fell off [his] chair” when he learned that Ashcroft had failed to list combating terrorism
as one of department’s priorities in a department-wide memo. Watson was totally
demoralized when on September 10, 2001 USAG Ashcroft's office rejected a proposed
$58-million increase to pay for the FBI's counterterrorism programs. 86 But drug use had
to wiped out in American despite the fact the “crack epidemic” had subsided.

In a deposition taken on Dec. 8, 2004, former FBI Agent Bassem Youssef’s

lawyer Stephen Kohn asked Watson: “Do you know who Osama bin Laden's spiritual
leader was?" He answered, “Can't recall.” And do you know the differences in the
religion between Shiite and Sunni Muslims? He responded, “Not technically, no.”

Al-Khattab was killed on March 20, 2002, when a Dagestani messenger hired by
the Russian Federal Security Bureau gave Khattab a poisoned letter (the assassin was
later tracked down and shot dead in Azerbaijan). He has been succeeded in his role as
financier-mediator by Amir Abu al-Walid, who was killed in 2004.
84
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 792
85
.http://www.fsu.edu/~fstime/FS-Times/volume8/aug02web/7aug02.html http://www.nd.edu/~ndjlepp/symposia/watson.doc
86
. http://www-tech.mit.edu/V124/PDF/N19.pdf
 About the importance of Chechnya Zawahiri the Elder had this to say, “If the
Chechens and other Caucasian mujahideen reach the shores of the oil-rich Caspian
Sea, the only thing that will separate them from Afghanistan will be the neutral state of
Turkmenistan. This will form a mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia that will be
connected in the east to Pakistan, which is brimming with mujahideen movements in
Kashmir. The belt will be linked to the south with Iran and Turkey that are sympathetic
to the Muslims of Central Asia. This will break the cordon that is struck around the
Muslim Caucasus and allow it to communicate with the Islamic world in general.
Furthermore the liberation of the Muslim Caucasus will lead to the fragmentation of the
Russian Federation and will help escalate the Jihad movements that already exist in the
republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose governments get Russian backing
against those jihadist movements. The fragmentation of the Russian Federation on the
rock of the fundamentalist movement and at the hands of the Muslims of the Caucasus
and Central Asia will topple a basic ally of the United States in its battle against the
Islamic jihadist reawakening. For this reason the United States chose to begin by
crushing the Chechens by providing Western financing for the Russian Army so that
when this brutal campaign against the Chechen mujahideen is completed, the campaign
can move southwards to Afghanistan either by the action of former Soviet republics that
are US agents or with the participation of US troops under the guise of combating
terrorism, drug trafficking, and the claims about liberating that region's women.”

THE FISA

On August 24, 2001 FBI Agent Samit had asked for a FISA warrant based on the
fact that he was in possession

Of intelligence indicating that Moussaoui is connected to a radical

fundamentalist group operating in Chechnya, whose leader has ties to
Usama bin Laden. For this reason it is imperative that his effects be
searched in order to gather intelligence relating to these connections and
to any plans for terrorist attacks against the United States or United States
persons to which he may be a party.87

Bells should have tolled when this information reached the FBI Radical
Fundamentalist Unit. Why didn’t they? FBI officials were terrified that their previous
reporting that bin Laden’s targets were U.S. interests overseas was dead wrong. If the
Moussaoui information were correct than they would have to awaken from the state of
complacency that the RFU had lulled itself into. From the FBI point of view there had
been no terrorist incidents by Islamists within in the United States since 1993. The Kasi
CIA attack, EgyptAir 990, and TWA Flight 800 were not considered part of the Islamist
pattern. Additionally, the FBI knew that having a terrorist in one’s midst was like having
“mouse” instead of mice. You can never have just one! So the FBI wanted no part of
this report and did not even put it though the FBI system to see if it meshed with any
other reports.

87
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 330
 There was no doubt that Moussaoui fit the term “Agent of a Foreign Power” as
defined by FISA:

(1) A foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not

recognized by the United States;
(2) A faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of
United States persons;
(3) An entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or
governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or
governments;
(4) A group engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation
therefore;
(5) A foreign-based political organization, not substantially composed of
United States persons; or
(6) An entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.

God is Great! Washington FBI lawyers repeatedly declined Samit’s requests to

seek a special warrant under the FISA authorizing a search of Moussaoui’s belongings.
The 26-page Electronic Communication from the Minneapolis Division had information
that an FBI agent working today would have concluded in a heartbeat was sufficient to
obtain a FISA warrant. As a result of these donkeys stubbornness the excuses started
coming in from FBI Headquarters in Washington. Samit was asked if he was sure this
was not a case of mistaken identity despite the fact that Zacarias Moussaoui was not a
common name.88

On August 24, 2001 FBI Agent Samit asked the Radical Fundamentalist Unit, “Is
there anything you have that establishes Ibn al-Khatab's connection to Usama bin
Laden / Al-Qaeda other than their past association? We're trying to close the wiggle
room for FBIHQ to claim that there's no connection to a foreign power. Since al-Qaeda
is a designated group, anything that you have which indicates an Al-Qaeda connection
to Moussaoui via Ibn Khatab would help. Thanks, Harry.” Why was the FBI brass
looking for an excuse to weasel out of investigating the presence of a man who was
clearly a member of “a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in
preparation therefore?” How could the Radical Fundamentalist Unit believe Moussaoui
was not acting on behalf of a named group or country when it was obvious he had
visited Afghanistan via Pakistan?

FBI Agent Charles Frahm responded,

Many thanks for this information. French information also was highly
interesting - am not sure why this is not enough to firmly link Moussaoui to
a terrorist group - Ibn Al-Khattab is well known to be the leader of the
Mujahideen Movement and to be a close buddy with Usama bin Ladin

88
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 332
 from their earlier fighting days. From a read of French information,
Moussaoui is a recruiter for Khattab. I can confirm from our own
information that in fact the dead guy was a fighter for Khattab who
perished in Chechnya in April 2000.89

In 1991 Charles Frahm was at the FBI New York Office and was a member of the
Joint Terrorism Task Force. In 1997, he was promoted to supervisor and started the
National Infrastructure Protection Squad in New York, to protect America’s cyber-based
systems. In 1999, Frahm was appointed Coordinating Supervisor of the Joint Terrorism
Task Force. In 2000, when he generated this Electronic Communication regarding
Moussaoui, he was Deputy Group Chief at the CIA's Counterintelligence Center in
Langley, Virginia. Frahm is now the Acting Deputy Assistant Director of the FBI’s
Counterterrorism Division.90 The RFU also provided no new information on Moussaoui.

ONE ROTTEN DATE CAN SPOIL THE WHOLE BARREL

On September 10, 2001 Samit was informed, “ITO S/RFU SSA Michael Maltbie
has determined that we do not have enough for either a criminal search warrant or a
FISA search warrant of Moussaoui’s computer. We did not pursue this matter further
because they have directed that this is an INS matter and that the ‘FBI does not have a
dog in this fight.’ Of course I strongly disagree.” Michael Maltbie was a CIA agent 91 on
temporary assignment with the FBI.

Samit was convinced Moussaoui was dangerous. If Moussaoui was deported,

Samit wanted to accompany him to France and be present when the French authorities
searched Moussaoui’s hard-drive. FBI SA Catherine Kiser commented on this state of
affairs that same day – “thanks for the update. Very sorry that this matter was handled
the way it was, but you fought the good fight. God Help us all if the next terrorist incident
involves the same type of plane.”92

In 1984 FBI agent Coleen Rowley was assigned to the New York Office where,
for more than 6 years, she worked on Italian organized crime and Sicilian heroin drug
investigations. In 1990, Coleen was transferred to Minneapolis where she assumed the
duties of Principal Legal Advisor (which later became "Chief Division Counsel"). After
9/11 Rowley complained to the United States Congress about the FISA fiasco. She
charged that RFU team members Michael Maltbie, and his boss, David Frasca, tried to
make the application not viable, by playing down information obtained from French
intelligence sources about Moussaoui’s links to foreign terrorist organizations. 93 She
said Supervising Special Agent (SSA) Michael Maltbie removed certain information
before making a presentation of questionable accuracy and length to the National
89
. USA v Moussaoui Ex 500
90
. http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/052402.htm
91
. The FBI and the CIA routinely detail senior-level officers to the counterterrorism office of their counterpart. The Deputy Chief of
the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center is an FBI official, while the Deputy Section Chief in the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division is a CIA
official. Additionally, the staff of the newly instituted Office of Intelligence at the FBI is headed by a CIA official and includes staff on
detail from the CIA.
92
. USA v Moussaoui Ex. 334
93 Philip Shenon
. , “FBI Denial Of Search Warrant” New York Times June 7, 2002 - also “Crucial Terror Data Did Exist” The New York
Times News Service.
Security Law Unit. Michael Maltbie was convinced that Moussaoui was a harmless nut,
“Please bear in mind there is no indication that either of these two [Moussaoui and
Attas] had plans for nefarious activity, as was apparently indicated in an earlier
communication.”94 Her allegations were substantiated by email traffic: On August 28,
2001, after a series of e-mails between Minneapolis and FBIHQ which suggested that
SSA Michael Maltbie had deliberately further undercut the FISA efforts, the Minneapolis
agents were notified that the National Security Law Unit Chief did not think there was
sufficient evidence of Moussaoui’s connection to a foreign power. Minneapolis FBI
personnel are still unaware of the specifics of the verbal presentations by the FBIHQ
SSA Michael Maltbie to the National Security Law Unit or whether anyone in the
National Security Law Unit ever was afforded the opportunity to actually read for
him/herself all of the information on Moussaoui that had been gathered by the
Minneapolis Division, the CIA, and French Intelligence. Had they done so 9/11 might
have been averted.

MARION “SPIKE” BOWMAN SPIKES THE FISA APPLICATION

Verbal presentations are far more susceptible to mis-characterization and error,

however, Deputy General Counsel Marion “Spike” Bowman, who handled the FISA
matter for the FBI’s National Security Law Unit said he concurred with SSA Maltbie that
there was insufficient evidence to move forward with the FISA warrant application.
When Deputy General Counsel Marion Bowman was made aware of the information
that had been removed from the application, he maintained that even with that
information the application still should not have gone forward. Bowman tended to err on
the side of caution – in the Wen Ho Lee espionage case Bowman was reticent about
searching Ho’s computer despite the suspicion of the FBI that Ho created TAR Archive
files containing very sensitive documents about atomic weapons and transferred them
to an unrestricted computer.

Spike Bowman told him [the agent requesting the FISA] that as a rule,
there was an expectation of privacy on the part of government employees
despite the fact that they are using government computers. (Deleted July
16, 1999). According to (Deleted) he was told by Bowman that unless
there was a banner on the computer, a warrant would be required, and
that even a banner might not be enough to permit the FBI, as opposed to
the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory system administrator, to search Lee’s
computer. In addition to talking to Bowman (Deleted) ‘thumbed through’
some materials from the Computer Crime Section of the DOJ’s Criminal
Division. Ultimately, (Deleted) concluded, since he had been told by FBI
Albuquerque that there was no banner on the computer at Los Alamos
Nuclear Laboratory, that the computer user had an expectation of privacy.
If there was no banner (Deleted) therefore told SSA (Deleted) he would
need to get a warrant? No one in the National Security Law Unit, however,
considered whether the facts specific to Wen Lee Ho’s Los Alamos
Nuclear Laboratory office or the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory computer

94
. USA v Moussaoui Defendant’s Exhibit 639
 system might reveal that Lee Ho had no cognizable expectation of privacy
in the first place.

Bowman’s judgment was also questioned in a footnote,

According to Bowman, he not only asked (Deleted) if there was a banner

on Wen Ho Lee’s but also whether Lee had signed a waiver. (Bowman
August 11, 1999). Bowman said he told (Deleted) that unless there was
some fair notice to Lee of possible monitoring, a warrant would be
required to search the computer. Thus, there is a significant discrepancy
between (Deleted) and Bowman’s recollection of this conversation. If
Bowman’s recollection of what he told (Deleted) is correct, this ‘fair notice’
advice did not get imparted to FBI Albuquerque. 95

It must be said that Bowman had not seen the Kenneth Williams Memo about
Arabs in flight schools so could not put it together with Moussaoui’s interest in aviation.
It is the totality of information that makes up an intelligence picture, not one isolated bit
or piece. Additionally like any other organization where lives were at stake, FBI officials
protected each other.

A United States Senate report found the FBI supervisors and lawyers
aggressively blocked the search warrant. 96 Michael Maltbie was moved out of the
counter terrorism division at bureau headquarters to the Cleveland office, where he now
works as a field supervisor keeping an eye on the “international terrorist mecca” of Ohio!
In January 2003 Marion Bowman received a meritorious service award and a large cash
bonus!97

After 9/11 Bowman was questioned by the United States Senate about his
actions in regard to Moussaoui, “While I cannot discuss specific cases in a public
hearing, the FBI has encountered individuals who cannot be sufficiently linked to a
terrorist group or organization as required by FISA.” 98 Senator Jon Kyle believed him,
“Although Moussaoui was found to have some associations with Chechen terrorists, the
evidence was inadequate to show that he served as an agent of that group--or that he
had any links to Al Qaeda. Thus, as the FBI's Deputy General Counsel has confirmed, it
was the strength of Moussaoui's connection to the Chechens--not a misunderstanding
of whether the Chechens constituted a recognized foreign power for FISA purposes that
ultimately prevented the issuance of a warrant.” Even the isolated piece of the mosaic
indicated that Moussaoui was a recruiter for the Brothers in Chechnya, an association
on a leadership level, so this statement was as real as mirage in the Sahara.

At the time of Moussaoui’s arrest the FBI claimed it was wary of making any
surveillance requests to the special FISA court after its judges complained bitterly the
year before that they were being seriously misled by the bureau in FBI affidavits
95
. http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/bellows9a.pdf
96 Philip Shenon
. “Senate Report on Pre-9/11 Failures Tells of Bungling at FBI” New York Times August 28, 2002.
97
. http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/ps/guiawards.htm; Senator Charles Grassely Press Release January 9, 2003
http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2003/p03r01-09a.htm
98
. http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/bowman073102.htm
requesting surveillance of Hamas. Then there was the “wall” excuse, which seemed to
hold more water since the onus was upon the Clinton Administration, if not for one thing
– former Attorney General Ashcroft failed to tear down “the wall” after he came to
power. The “wall” was thrown up after U.S. President Nixon used the CIA and FBI to
spy on his political enemies as well as those opposed to the Vietnam War. The Jew
Seymour Hersh revealed this activity in the New York Times just as he had exposed
other events that cast America in bad light such as the My Lai Massacre in Vietnam. As
a result, National Security Intelligence could not be used by the President to get
information of criminal wrongdoing on his enemies in a democracy. The President could
not use the CIA and FBI and NSA as a secret police force. As a result a FISA court was
established to prevent the Intelligence Community from being used in this fashion. But
as it turned out, it approved more than 12,000 Justice Department applications for the
FBI, rejected only one in the more than two decades of its existence 99 and was no more
than a rubber stamp for the Intelligence Community. No doubt it would have approved
the Moussaoui FISA request.

THE GREED OF THE JEW GORELICK

TIES THE HANDS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Then, is it to be expected of you, if ye were put in authority, that ye will do mischief, in

the land, and break your ties of kith and kin? - Muhammad 47 22

Then, Praise Allah, the evil and greed of the Jew entered the FISA picture
embodied in Jamie S. Gorelick, a Jewish Assistant United States Attorney with limitless
ambitions of greed. Gorelick has to be one of the strangest creatures that the religion of
apes and pigs ever produced.

As an attorney from 1975 to 1979 and again from 1980 to 1993 (she
was an assistant to the U.S. Secretary of Energy from 1979 to 1980) with
the law firm of Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin in Washington, D.C.,
Gorelick represented major U.S. companies on behalf of the Zionist entity.
Nathan Lewin, the most prominent member of this firm, is a Judaist and
Kahanist. Lewin represents other Judaists and even represented the
bearded bag of camel dung Jewish Supremacist Leader Rabbi Kahane. 100
Lewin has called for the death of small Muslim children in a form of collective
punishment reminiscent of the German National Socialists, a tactic that would deter al-
Qaeda from accomplishing its goals but make out-and-out Nazis out of the Jews. Lewin
wrote:

Studies of Palestinian suicide bombers and of those who, knowing their

death was imminent, carried out the September 11 th horror indicate that
most were closely knit to their families - to parents, brothers, and sisters.
Indeed, these family members routinely give press briefings extolling the
suicide killers, and they are the recipients of financial bounties from
99
. Greg Gordon “FAA security took no action against Moussaoui” Star Tribune January 13, 2002.
http://www.startribune.com/stories/1576/1028069.html
100
. “Kahane Citzenship Trial to Go Before Pollard Judge” The Jewish Press June 1, 1990.
 supportive Muslim charities and governmental organizations. What if Israel
and the United States announced that henceforth the perpetrators of all
suicide attacks would be treated as if they had brought their parents and
brothers and sisters with them to the site of the explosion? Suicide killers
should know that they will take the lives of not only themselves and the
many people they don’t know (but nonetheless hate) in the crowd that
surrounds them when they squeeze the button that detonates their bomb,
but also the lives of their parents, brothers, and sisters.”101 What about
Arab babies who have not yet learned to speak, not yet learned of Zionist
oppression? Should they be put to death? The FBI’s October Plan called
for, “aggressive – even obvious – surveillance” techniques to be used on a
short list of people suspected of being terrorist sympathizers, but who
have not committed a crime. Other “persons of interest,” including their
family members, may also be brought for questioning… 102

Lewin represented Rabbi Chiam Berger, who was extradited from occupied
Palestine, to the United States, after it was alleged that the New Square Hasidic
community was persuaded to vote for Hillary Clinton in return for reduction of their co-
religionists prison sentences for fraud.103

In 1993, Gorelick was the Vice Chair of the Task Force on the Audit, Inspection
and Investigation Components of the Department of Defense. Then Gorelick became
General Counsel for the Department of Defense. There, she structured the
Department's involvement in the consolidation of the defense industry in the 1990s, and
was awarded the Secretary of Defense Distinguished Service Medal for her outstanding
service to the Department. After she left government the military industrial complex
rewarded her by making her a Board Member of the defense and aerospace giant
United Technologies with 220,000 employees (2005) (67% of these are based outside
the United States) where she serves on its Finance and Public Issues Review
Committees.

In March 1994 Gorelick became the Justice Department's number two official, the
Department's chief operating officer, provided overall supervision of the Department,
and functioned as the direct manager of its law enforcement components. It was there
that she decided to tap into Saudi money by making it harder to stop Islamic
Fundamentalists from operating in the United States under the guise of preserving “civil
liberties.” She did it in a way in which the new rules she laid down were so convoluted
many FBI-types were unsure of their meaning and erred on the side of caution.

THE GORELICK MEMORANDUM

[March 1995] The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District
of New York and the FBI have been conducting criminal investigations of
101
. Nathan Lewin Sh’ma.com - “Detering Suicide Killers.” http://www.shma.com/may02/nathan.htm
102
. http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aadc/aadcdhs101706cmp1.html
103
. When Rabbi Berger was incarcerated at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, inmate Ari Unger prepared
special kosher meals for Rabbi Berger. Nonetheless, members of the Satmar community called the Bureau of Prisons to complain
that Unger used a non-kosher microwave to heat up Berger’s food. For his kindness Unger was almost thrown in “the hole.”
 certain terrorist acts, including the bombing of the World Trade Center,
and potential obstruction of the indicted case of United States v. Rahman,
et al. During the course of those investigations significant
counterintelligence information has been developed related to the
activities and plans of agents of foreign powers operating in this country
and overseas, including previously unknown connections between
separate terrorist groups [al-Qaeda]. Although information and evidence
relevant to possible future criminal prosecutions is still being sought, it has
become overwhelmingly apparent that there is a compelling need to
further develop and expand that foreign counterintelligence information.
Consequently, the FBI has initiated a separate full field counterintelligence
investigation.
This makes it seem as if as a result of our activities, the FBI has gained knowledge of
the infrastructure we have established in America and its connection to Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and is determined to root out our cells, and the Justice Department is on
board, gung-ho and ready to act.
“Although the counterintelligence investigation may result in the incidental
collection of information relevant to possible future criminal prosecutions,
the primary purpose of the counterintelligence investigation will be to
collect foreign counterintelligence information. Because the
counterintelligence investigation will involve the use of surveillance
techniques authorized under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) against targets that, in some instances, had been subject to
surveillance under Title III, [Criminal Wiretap Statutes] and because it will
involve some of the same sources and targets as the criminal
investigation, we believe that it is prudent to establish a set of instructions
that will clearly separate the counterintelligence investigation from the
more limited, but continued, criminal investigations. These go beyond
what is legally required, and will prevent any risk of creating an
unwarranted appearance that FISA is being used to avoid procedural
safeguards which would apply in a criminal investigation.
Where was the problem? Who made the charge that the power of the Intelligence
Community was being misused? If anything by American standards, it was not used
enough in the case of the first World Trade Center Event. The phrase beyond what is
legally required has been repeated over and over again to show that the FBI hand’s
were tied by Democrats who controlled the Justice Department.

(1) The focus of the Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) investigation will be

on preventing future terrorist acts and obtaining foreign counterintelligence
information about the individuals and groups engaging in, or preparing to
engage in, terrorist activities in the United States and abroad.

(2) The criminal investigations will focus on the indicted cases of United
States v. Yousef. et al. and United States v. Rahman, et al., and the
potential obstruction of the Rahman case. The criminal investigations
 will also focus on the conspiracy to bomb United States airlines recently
uncovered in the Philippines and the bombing of a Philippine airliner.

(3) No "pro-active" investigative efforts or technical coverages are

presently contemplated in any of the ongoing criminal investigations,
which primarily focus on past criminal conduct, with the exception of the
obstruction investigation.

The list of Rahman’s unindicted co-conspirators would not be acted upon and the policy
of the Justice Department would be, “Let sleeper Islamists lie.” The Justice Department
never revealed any details about the potential obstruction of the Rahman case.

If in the future, the criminal investigations develop information requiring

"pro-active" efforts or technical coverages, the United States Attorneys
Office (USAO) and the criminal agents will consult with the Office of
Intelligence Policy and Review (OIPR), and the Foreign Counter-
Intelligence agents before undertaking such efforts, absent exigent
circumstances, in order to determine the impact, if any, on the Foreign
Counter-Intelligence investigation.

The FBI had to get permission from the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review and
from the Foreign Counter-Intelligence agents before starting a so-call “Criminal
Terrorist” investigation, as if monitoring our infrastructure was more important that
stopping our activities.

(4) The subjects, who are presently under pen register surveillance in the
criminal Investigation, will be investigated as Foreign Counter-Intelligence
subjects under the foreign counterintelligence investigation guidelines
using all available techniques, including FISA, without any direction or
control by the USAO, Southern District of New York or the Criminal
Division, Department of Justice. The current pen registers will be
discontinued before any FISA-authorized surveillances are initiated.

The members of the Brooklyn-Jersey City cell, whose incoming and

outgoing calls are being recorded as far as their destination and origin, but
whose phones are not tapped, will no longer be investigated as criminals
and are no longer of interest to the Southern District of New York or the
Criminal Division, Department of Justice, so phone numbers connected to
them will no longer be recorded.

(5) (Redacted) FBI memoranda and investigative reports, including 302's

from (redacted) will be prepared as follows: all information relating to the
aforementioned indicted cases and investigations, including the
obstruction case will be segregated into separate reports which will be
provided to the United States Attorney’s Office, Office of Intelligence
Policy and Review, and the Criminal Division. All foreign
 counterintelligence information (including all foreign counterintelligence
relating to future terrorist activities) will be in classified reports which will
be provided to Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, but will not be
provided either to the criminal agents, the United States Attorney’s Office,
or the Criminal Division, without Federal Bureau of Investigation
Headquarters and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review concurrence.
The FBI agent [Anticev] responsible for handling the (redacted) will remain
involved in the on-going trial of United States v. Rahman, but will
otherwise be assigned to the foreign counterintelligence investigation and
report to foreign counterintelligence supervisors.

(6) Foreign counterintelligence collected during the course of the foreign

counterintelligence investigation will be disseminated pursuant to FBI
guidelines and FISA. If, in the case of the foreign counterintelligence
investigation, facts or circumstances are developed that reasonably
indicate that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be
committed, the FBI and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review are each
independently responsible for notifying the United States Attorney’s Office
and the Criminal Division. Notice shall include the facts and circumstances
developed during the PCI [Potential Criminal Information] investigation
that supplied the indication of significant federal criminal activity,
whether or not such activity relates to the indicted cases or criminal
investigations referred to in subparagraph (2) above.

It seemed as if the Justice Department is getting very picky about “terrorists” and are
only interested in those who took part in the Rahman Bridge and Tunnel Event or the
First WTC Strike.

An Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) from the Southern District of New
York who has knowledge of, but no active involvement in, the on-going criminal
investigations, will continue to be assigned to work with Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review and the Foreign Counterintelligence agents to review such foreign intelligence
information to ensure that evidence that might be exculpatory to any defendants
currently under indictment is promptly considered for dissemination to criminal
investigative personnel, the United States Attorney’s Office, and the Criminal Division.
This Assistant United States Attorney will also serve to ensure, in conjunction with the
FBI and Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, that information which reasonably
indicates that a significant federal crime has been, is being, or may be committed is
appropriately disseminated to criminal investigative personnel, the United States
Attorney’s Office, and the Criminal Division pursuant to the procedures set forth above.
That Assistant United States Attorney will continue to be "walled off" from participation
in the on-going criminal investigations and cases and will continue to abide by all FISA
dissemination provisions and guidelines. 104

104
. http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/testimony/2004/1995_gorelick_memo.pdf
 This was on many agents’ minds, the blurry line between intelligence and
criminal intelligence a distinction unknown to the Learned Elders of Islam as for al-
Qaeda it is a distinction between planning to make a bomb and making one. In the
course of a very superficial investigation of Shaheeds Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaf al-
Hazmi on September 10, 2001 FBI Agent Robert Fuller, new to counter-Islamism noted,
“The following contains information (deleted). This information is not cleared for review
by agents working Usama bin Laden criminal matters. Prior approval from FBIHQ must
be obtained before forwarding this information to any agent working Usama bin Laden
criminal case.”105

Gorelick left the Justice Department in January 1997 and by Allah in 2002 she
became a member of the Schlumberger Board of Directors, an oil field machinery firm
with close financial connections to the Saudis. This was her reward for tying the hands
of the FBI so a variation on Wahabist Islam could strike. Gorelick served as Vice
Chairman of the scandal-ridden Federal National Mortgage Association (FannieMae)
from 1997 to 2003 where she legally received millions in dollars in stock options. 106

Since she was responsible for quashing an investigation that might have
prevented our September 11th Raids she was appointed to the Blue Ribbon 9/11
Commission so that she could cover-up her political party’s culpability. In July 2003
Gorelick became a partner in Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Door LLP, an
international law firm with close connections to the Democratic Party. Gorelick's firm has
agreed to represent Prince Mohammed al-Faisal in the suit by the 9/11 families. The
families contend that al-Faisal has legal responsibility for the 9/11 attacks. When the
Israeli spies Steve Rosen and Keith Weissman from AIPAC were apprehended and
AIPAC double-crossed them by pulling out of an agreement to pay their legal fees,
Gorelick was hired by AIPAC to get the two disgruntled spies off AIPAC’s back.
Gorelick’s credentials are impeccable and no one dares say she works on our behalf.
Her husband Richard Waldhorn is an analyst at Pittsburgh University's Center for
Biosecurity. She is beyond reproach.

On August 25, 2001 FBI Agent Samit completed the Minneapolis FBI's formal
FISA request, which consisted of a 6 page Letter Head Memorandum and e-mailed it to
FBI Headquarters. The Letter Head Memorandum stated that the Minneapolis FBI was
requesting a FISA search warrant on an emergency basis and that: "Minneapolis
wish[ed] to emphasize the urgency of this matter in reminding recipients that Moussaoui
is in INS Custody pending deportation.” Attorney General Ashcroft could have obtained
an emergency FISA that allowed him without prior approval of the FISA Court to
authorize the execution of a search warrant or electronic surveillance if he determined
that "an emergency situation existed" and there was a "the factual basis for issuance of
an order" in accordance with the statute. The government was required to present an
application to the FISA Court with respect to any such warrantless search or electronic
surveillance within 24 hours of the execution of the search or surveillance. But the

105
USA v Moussaoui Defendants Exhibit 471
106
. http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/f3jg03312003.pdf
information on Moussaoui was not taken seriously enough to reach his desk and this
type of emergency FISA rarely was used before September 11, 2001.107

The FBI's Assistant Legal Attaché in London first contacted the British authorities
by telephone and in a written communication dated August 21, 2001. The Assistant
Legal Attaché summarized the status of the FBI's investigation of Moussaoui, provided
a document describing the results of the investigation at that time, and asked for traces
to be conducted on Moussaoui and all of the individuals listed in his
communication...The Assistant Legal Attaché told the Office of the Inspector General of
the Justice Department that he had had several meetings and telephone calls with the
British authorities in which Moussaoui was discussed. He said that the British were well
aware of the importance of the matter. In addition, he said that on September 5, 2001
he provided the British with the additional information about Moussaoui that the FBI had
received from the French authorities. The Assistant Legal Attaché told the Office of the
Inspector General that he did not know why the British authorities failed to provide the
information about Moussaoui sooner. However, he said that 10 to 15 days to respond to
a request for information from the FBI was normal. On September 11, 2001 after the
attacks, the London Legat again requested information about Moussaoui from the
British. According to British reports that the FBI reviewed on September 12, 2001
Moussaoui had attended an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. The information
from the British was not provided to the FBI until after the September 11 th Raids
because al-Qaeda was not a major British priority and its front groups operated openly
in Londonstan.

WHAT IF?

Had the warrant been issued the FBI would have found that Brother Moussaoui’s
laptop computer contained a letter of employment from Infocus Tech, a Malaysian
computer firm that Yazid Sufaat owned signed by Yazid Sufaat, a suspect in the Cole
Operation due to the meeting held at his safehouse. When Moussaoui was arrested in
September 2001, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed assumed that Moussaoui had used
Sufaat's name and address to create a cover story. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said that
for security purposes, he should not have used the true name and address of a brother
in order to do this. The letter stated Moussaoui was Infocus Tech’s overseas sales
representative. Under interrogation by the CIA Hambali said Yazid Sufaat was surprised
when Moussaoui was arrested and was concerned for his own safety because Yazid
Sufaat said Moussaoui had a letter from him written on stationary with the letterhead of
Yazid Sufaat's company. Had this letter been recovered and traced back to Sufaat,
Sufaat could have been linked to Bojinga and the reason for Moussaoui’s enrollment in
flight school would have become apparent. The September 11 th Raids might have been
stopped, but this was not the will of Allah! Khalid Shaikh Mohammed recalled learning
from the news that Sufaat’s home address was found with Moussaoui, which he said
resulted in Sufaat being a wanted man and raising scrutiny of travelers from Malaysia
direct from Pakistan.

107
. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0606/final.pdf
 Traces of communications to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed might have been
recovered by the FBI had they copied and analyzed Moussaoui’s computers hard drive:
Before sending Moussaoui to the U.S., Khalid Shaikh Mohammed instructed him about
the need for strict operational security, telling him that under no circumstances should
he mention aircraft in any communications. Shortly after Moussaoui reached the U.S.,
however, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed received an email from Moussaoui in which he
detailed his attempts to get flight training on various aircraft. Exasperated, Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed instructed Ramzi Bin al-Shibh to send Moussaoui money from Germany
because he felt it was safer to send Moussaoui money from there and Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed said he was disgusted and did not want to deal with Moussaoui any longer
- in fact he claimed he instructed Ramzi Bin al-Shibh to break off contact with
Moussaoui after the money transfer because Moussaoui was problematic, unpredictable
and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed thought it was a better move to cut ties with him while he
was still taking his flight training. After September 11 th Ramzi bin al-Shibh’s name was
found on Moussaoui’s laptop. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told his CIA interrogators that
Moussaoui

Had a different state of mind than other operatives because he had been
raised in the West. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed explained that Moussaoui
had a high level of self-confidence, and because of this he had a hard time
taking instructions from other Brothers that were from non-Western
countries, particularly on matters of operational security. Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed stated that Westerners have a different point of view because
of their freedom. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said he believed that
Moussaoui's confidence caused him to practice lax operational security,
adding that if an operative was too confident he would not be careful in his
emails, phone calls, or discussions with friends. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
stated that his low regard for security was Moussaoui's main flaw.

MOUSSAOUI: A SECOND WAVE OPERATIVE

In May 2006 Usama bin Laden commented on the status of Brother Moussaoui,

I begin by talking about the honorable Brother Zacarias Moussaoui. The

truth is that he has no connection whatsoever with the events of Sept
11th, and I am certain of what I say, because I was responsible for
entrusting the 19 brothers -- Allah have mercy upon them -- with those
raids, and I did not assign Brother Zacarias to be with them on that
mission. And his confession that he was assigned to participate in those
raids is a false confession, which no intelligent person doubts is a result of
the pressure put upon him for the past four and a half years. And were this
pressure lifted from him for him to return to his normal state, he would
state the fact I mentioned. And among the things that confirm this fact is
that the participants in Sept 11th were two groups: pilots and support
teams for each pilot in order to control the aircraft. And since Zacarias
Moussaoui was learning how to fly, it follows that he was not component
 number 20 from the teams which helped to control the airplanes, as your
government previously claimed, and your government knows this fact with
certainty. And if Moussaoui was studying aviation to become a pilot of one
of the planes, then let him tell us the names of those assigned to help him
control the plane. But he won't be able to tell us their names, for a simple
reason: that in fact they don't exist. This is from one perspective, and from
another perspective, the Brother Moussaoui was arrested two weeks
before the events, and had he known anything -- however little -- about the
Sept 11th group, we would have told the Brother Commander Mohamed
Atta and his Brothers -- Allah have mercy upon them -- to leave America
immediately before their affair was exposed. And with this it becomes
clear to even the novice investigator, not to mention the seasoned one,
that there is no connection between him and the events of Sept 11th.

Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh told interrogators that Moussaoui was an untrusted
backup pilot for September 11th.108 Moussaoui:

Millions of people have watched the brave Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh
explain how our dear Brother Mohammad Atta and others have planned
this extraordinary Jihad operation. You must give me this tape. It is proof
that this is a conspiracy to murder me by you. The U.S. government has
organized a complete blackout on information about Ramzi bin al-Shibh
because they know they must stop him speaking out about my non-
participation in the operation 9/11.

After his capture, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told interrogators that Moussaoui
was not part of the September 11 th cell, but was in the United States for a second wave
attack.109 Under CIA interrogation Khalid Shaikh Mohammed explained that the second
wave attack entailed taking the same steps as the September 11 th raiders: getting flight
lessons, purchasing knives, etc. During another CIA interrogation "second wave"
referred to any plans for attacks in the United States slated to follow 9/11, whether a
sequel of aerial attacks or something entirely different like subway strikes, poisoning of
reservoirs, demolition of bridges, etc. To clarify Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was told by
his CIA interrogators that if he chose to continue using the phrase "second wave" in this
discussion, he had to be absolutely clear about its meaning. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
took the point and explained his intended meaning. He indicated that "second wave"
refers to efforts begun in parallel with the 9/11 plot to identify and train pilots and muscle
for additional 9/11-style strikes in the United States. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed stated
that the second wave was not completely planned or ready for execution, but was on
the "back burner." He said he had no idea that the damage of the first attack would be
as catastrophic as it was, and he did not plan on the U.S. responding to the attacks as
fiercely as they did, which led to the next phase being postponed. In its attempt to
portray Moussaoui as the 20th Hijacker the United States Department of Justice offered

108
. Saint Petersburg Times March 2, 2003 “Raid Snares Key 9/11 Suspect.”
http://www.sptimes.com/2003/03/02/Worldandnation/Raid_snares_key_911_s.shtml
109
. Brian Blomquist “Moussaoui Part of Second Terror Wave” New York Post March 18, 2003.
http://www.intellnet.org/news/2003/03/18/18105-1.htm
this specious argument, “As late as August 2001, al-Qaeda was still trying to insert new
hijackers into the September 11th attacks suggests an operation much more in flux than
the defense theory that the targets and the players were in place by July 2001 when
Atta and Ramzi Bin al-Shibh met in Spain.”110 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told the CIA
“he was impressed by the security measures implemented in the U.S. in the immediate
aftermath of the attacks. Based on the U.S. reaction to the attacks and future plots to
the U.S., he assessed at least for the short term that the prospects for a second round
of hijacking attacks in the U.S. were dismal.”

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said that he was not even aware of Moussaoui's
arrest until after 9/11 and he did not worry about not having heard from Moussaoui in
the weeks before the 9/11 Operation because Moussaoui was supposed to be in flight
school and was not supposed to be in contact with him or anyone until after graduating.
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed said that Moussaoui did not know Atta and there was never
any contact between the two of them. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed pointed out that the
9/11 operation proceeded on schedule after Moussaoui's arrest, noting that if
Moussaoui was part of the plot, there should have been some disruption or change of
plans.

MOUSSAOUI THE DEMENTED?

Moussaoui has been characterized as a madman by the American media. But he

was sane enough to earn a degree from a business school in the United Kingdom, sane
enough to be part of other Islamist operations, and as you have seen from his FBI file,
Moussaoui was completely coherent when he spoke with Agent Samit. After he was
accused in the September 11th Events he appreciated the gravity of the situation and
decided to feign insanity however Moussaoui said he would not undergo a psychiatric
examination because he would “not participate in an obscene Jewish science.”
Moussaoui was familiar with the symptoms of mental illness - his sister Nadia suffered
depression and numerous suicide attempts. Nadia’s delusions took the form of Zionism
and love of the Jewish people. Her younger sister was also mentally ill. 111 Moussaoui
began to file a series of motions that seemed to indicate he was insane.

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH

Open Filed 15 July.
Zacarias Moussaoui, Muslim. v. Godless U.S.

Moussaoui is crazy because he wanted to get married when he arrived in

Norman. (OK). Motion to stop Leonie Brinkema to undermine my chance
to live by her smearing campaign. ALLAHU AKBAR! In their constant
effort to remove me from my defense Brinkema and her lawyer have
produced an interview of an Imam in Oklahoma. If the FBI report is to be
believed, the American Imam pondered about my state of mind because I
asked him to help me get married. Maybe it is strange for a muslin to go
110
. United State Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit No. 03-4742 Brief for the United States filed October 31, 2002
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss102403gbrf.pdf
111
. Susan Dominus “Everybody Has A Mother” New York Times Magazine February 9, 2003.
 an ask the imam for marital help in America but in the entire Muslim world
it is the first person a man will go to get married. That the kind of
“histarical” psychiatric information they standby is Frankenstein doctor will
use to declare me crazy. Having left Britain on an unsuccessful attempt to
get married it is possible that I was a bit in a hurry when I ask this Imam to
help me when I just arrived in Norman Oklahoma. After all even Muslim
have a heart. Of course the FBI did not want to declassified this interview
because it confirm that I intended (and still intend) to have a familly. A Jury
might find a bit difficult to believe that even a Muslim fundamentalist will
marry one day and kill himself the next. So yes when you want to get
marry in the Muslim community you ask the Imam. Again Leonie Brinkema
is trying to exploit ignorance and prejudice.

IN THE NAME OF ALLAH

Open Filed 15 July
Zacarias Moussaoui Muslim v. U.S. Godless gov.

My fan was in the apartment. Attas and Mukhram will testify to this. Motion
to Stop the FBI to Tamper with Evidence and to have Hussein al-Attas
and Ali Mukhram Called as Witness. Immediate hearing. ALLAHU
AKBAR. The FBI now is hidding concrete evidence of their cover up
operation before September 11 against me and the 19 th hijacker: the
bugged electric fan planted by the FBI. This bugged electric fan was in the
apartment 209 1A Wadsack, Norman, I brought it there when I moved in
with Attas and Hussein. Hussein Al-Attas used it a lot because the
apartment was badly ventilated. Hussein Al-Attas (May ALLAH help him)
and Ali Mukaram (May ALLAH make it easy) know that I brought this
bugged electric fan into the house at 209 1A Wadsack. Now the FBI
refuse to give it to me so it will be examined by electronic forensic expert
to uncover the FBI bug. The FBI must give me the bugged fan. In their
usual conning and lying exercise the FBI will claim that the fan belong to
Ali Mukhram and that he was not part of the investigation on ZACARIAS
MOUSSAOUI. Leonie Brinkema, know that, as I explain it in my first
motion on the Fan but she always let the FBI go away with crime. Leonie
Brinkema must order that absolutely all item seized should be provided.
SHE MUST ASK THE FBI FOR THE BUGGED FAN.

Slave of ALLAH
/s/ Zacarias Moussaoui
ALLAH U AKBAR, AND THE FIGHT GO ON, ALLAH U AKBAR.

Bugged electric fan? The Brother was not trying to cop an insanity plea but trying
to avoid the death penalty. Moussaoui’s motions became even more bizarre: “20 th
HIJACKER GOD CURSE THE QUEEN. Title: Little Bitch of Buckingham. Original
United Best Lyric UK Release Soon!!! The DJ Must submit order to force the FBI to
disclose their affairs with Her Machavelic MI-5, 6, 7 etc. of the United Killer (AKA UK).”
Judge Brinkema would have no part of this and threatened to withhold Moussaoui’s
rantings from the public. Moussaoui responded,

Zacarias Moussaoui v. US
Muslim v. Kafir

DEATH TO UNTIED SATAN DEMONCRACY

MOUSSAOUI ATTACK ON THE WTC

September 11th is much more than simply the collapse of the World Trade
Center, it is the death of the WTC, World Tyrant Constitution. In an Under
Seal letter to Death Judge Leonie Brinkerna, the Fascist Bureau of
Inquisition and the US government asked: "we now submit that the
continuous stream of pleading not be presumptively publicly disseminated"
August 22, 2002. What about "Express Yourself?" Bearing in mind that the
SAM is no more than Special Assassination of Moussaoui and the World
Tyrant Constitution has received double impact (like the WTC). Not to
forget the New Home Spy scheme of Ascroft who makes the Homo
Founder of the FBI, Hoover look like a left wing softy. (Homo, of course.)...
So when the government of the United Satan say "the defendant has no
right to file so called pleading that may be harmful to the public” (US of
course) they are absolutely right, I have no right but the obligation, the
duty to harm the United Satan by any means possible and imaginable. As
ALLAH order me. "KILL THE DISBELIEVER WHEREVER YOU FIND
THEM AND BESIEGE THEM AND LIE IN WAIT FOR THEM IN EACH
AND EVERY AMBUSH.” ALLAH order me, "Urge the believer to fight" So
I, Zacarias Mossaoui urge, incite, encourage, solicit Muslim to kill
American, civilian or military, anywhere around the world until all our
children will get revenge and that all American troops and civilians leave
Muslim lands. Kill Americans, anywhere, anyhow, anytime until they get
the point out of the Holy Land. "THEN FIGHT IN THE CAUSE OF ALLAH
YOU ARE NOT HELD RESPONSIBLE EXCEPT FOR YOURSELF AND
INCITE THE BELIEVER TO FIGHT ALONG WITH YOU. IT MAY BE
THAT ALLAH WILL RESTRAIN THE EVIL MIGHT OF THE
DISBELIEVERS. AND ALLAH IS STRONGER IN MIGHT AN STRONGER
IN PUNISHING.

MOUSSAOUI’S LEGAL REPRESENTATION

Moussaoui believed that his defense team were: “Jewish zealots…I pray to Allah,
Al Shadeed Al Y Rikab, the severe in punishment for the destruction of the Jewish
people and states and for the liberation of Palestine by the Muslim, for the Muslim. O,
pray to Allah the protector for the destruction of the United States of America.”
Moussaoui said he had stopped shaking the hands of the lawyers on his “blood-sucking
death team” because “I find them so repulsive as unbelievers.” 112 In reality only one of
112
. Philip Shenon “In Motion Defendant Declares he is Hostile to Jews and U.S.” New York Times June 18, 2002
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00B12FD34580C7B8DDDAF0894DA404482
Moussaoui’s lawyers was Jewish, none-the-less Islamic law dictated that his attorney be
a Muslim, as he related:

This is from the Qu’ran: ‘In the name of Allah, Oh you who believe, take
not your bitanah113 outside of your religion, since they will not fail to do
their best to corrupt you. They desire to harm you severely. Hatred has
already appeared from their mouth. But what their breast conceals in far
worse.’114 Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman also quoted this verse: "Take not
the Jews and the Christians for your friends and protectors. They are but
friends and protectors to each other. And he amongst you that turns to
them (for friendship) is of them.

Moussaoui continued,

Allah, forgive me for I failed to fully understand. Under the cover of

assistance of defense counsel, the legal version of humanitarian
assistance, the United States is orchestrating my being sent to the safe
haven, Bosnia style. What they have done is a sophisticated version of the
Troy Horse or the kiss of death. Dead, injured judge, investigator, and the
so-called defender are all federal employees. I can’t wait for the jury. They
appointed, imposed the dream team. The game is deception. My lawyers
say we can go to the judge and say that you are a bit paranoid. The
government might agree because in the U.S. we do execute mentally
retarded people, Mr. Moussaoui.

Moussaoui requested a Muslim lawyer, Charles Freeman, who he

could relate to.115 Freeman, in a filing entitled, “Is this how Alexandria
Division treats its guests?” asked why he was “being threatened” for giving
Moussaoui “out-of-court legal assistance solely on federal law.” Freeman
said in the filing that he would not serve as “so-called stand-by counsel
because I refuse to be a toothless tiger amounting to no counsel at all!”
Although he wanted to be in charge of the case Judge Brinkema
disqualified him because he was not licensed to practice law in the State of
Virginia. Sadiq Reza, Legal Services Department, American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, also agreed to defend Moussaoui. Raza shared a platform
with Abdeen Jabara at a lecture entitled “Current Legal Threats to Muslims in the United
States.” Moussaoui wished that Sadiq Kahn, a lawyer for Louis Farrakhan, who fought
against Farrakhan’s exclusion from Britain since 1986 on the basis of fears he would stir
up racial tensions if allowed in, could help him with his case. Despite all these
candidates Moussaoui ended up with Gerald Zerkin, the Jew that he hated, as his
counsel.

113
. Entourage, advisors, consultants, helpers - In Saudi Arabia Fifth graders learn "It is forbidden for a Muslim to be a loyal friend to
someone who does not believe in God and his prophet, or someone who fights the religion of Islam."
114
. Qu’ran Sura Al-i–Imram, Number 3, Ayat 118
115
. Charles Freeman, P.O. Box 52818 Houston, Texas Born 1948; Admitted 1985; Lamar University, B.A.; University of Houston,
J.D.
 By July 2002 Moussaoui was demoralized and offered to plead guilty:

I, Moussaoui Zacarias, I want to enter a plea today of guilty, because this

will ensure to save my life, because this is conspiracy law. It’s much more
complicated than what you want to make people believe, because even if I
plead guilty, I will be able to prove that I have certain knowledge about
September 11th and I know exactly who done it. I know which group, who
participated, when it was decided. I have many information. But it will
ensure me to save my life; because the jury will be able to evaluate how
much responsibility I have in this. But by carrying on with this farcical
justice, I will be put aside soon, because already the standby counsel are
speaking in my behalf in open court, where they are here only for protocol
and procedure…I will certainly be gagged during trial, and you will carry
on your so-called justice, and the jury will be inflamed, because
September 11th, it’s a very serious affair, and they will, they will pronounce
my death. I Moussaoui Zacarias, in the interests to preserve my life, enter
with full conscience a plea of guilty, because I have knowledge and
participated in al-Qaeda. In the interests to preserve my life, enter with full
conscience a plea of guilty, because I have knowledge and participated in
al-Qaeda. I am a member of al-Qaeda, I pledge bayat to Usama bin
Laden…I was sent to the U.S. to take flight training to fly a plane into a
building in the U.S. bin Laden personally approved my participation in the
attack.” [Judge Brinkema called the Marshalls] So today the world should
know that Moussaoui Zacarias have entered formally a guilty plea fully
and completely, and he want to have the trial as soon as possible to be
able to, to show the extent of his guilt. That’s only what matter now. I am
guilty. Now the question is how much.

Judge Brinkema told Moussaoui that she would give him one more week to make
up his mind that he wished to plead guilty. “Bet on me, I will,” he said. On July 25, 2002
Brother Moussaoui withdrew his guilty plea. “Dictated by my obligation to my creator,
Allah, and to save and defend my life, I withdraw my guilty plea. I was not directly
involved with these people.” In March 2006 undermining his own case, Moussaoui said
that he and Richard Reid were part of the first wave of attacks and were assigned the
task of flying a plane into the White House. 116 There was no telling what the Brother
might do next!

MOHAMMED WARSAME

Mohammed Warsame was arrested in December 2003 as a material witness in

the Zacarias Moussaoui case yet he was never directly linked in any manner shape or
form to Moussaoui. Warsame was born in Somalia and sought refugee status in
Canada in 1989. He became a naturalized Canadian citizen and moved to Minneapolis
in 2002. At the time of his arrest, he was a student at Minneapolis Community and
Technical College. In January 2004, Warsame was indicted and charged with

116
. Neil Lewis Moussoui, Underminding Case, Now Ties Himself to 9/11 Plot New York Times March 28, 2006.
conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qaeda. Warsame has admitted attending
an al-Qaeda training camp in 2000 and 2001 and receiving military training (weapons,
martial arts). He attended lectures given by bin Ladin and even sat next to him at a meal
during the same time al-Qaeda attacked the U.S.S. Cole while anchored at a harbor in
Yemen. Moreover, he fought with the Taliban and provided financial assistance to al-
Qaeda members in Pakistan once he had returned to the United States. The name
Mohamed Warsama was listed on a Kenyan business card seized in 1997 from Wadih
el-Hage117 however, there is an attorney in Kenya named Mohamed Warsama. 118

In January 2004 a federal indictment was handed down in Minnesota charging

Warsame with one count of supplying material to al-Qaeda beginning in March 2000
and ending after his arrest. 119 The Government relied upon CS-1 and CS-2 to show that
Warsame attended al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, that he received training in
firearms and explosives, and that he fought with the Taliban against the Northern
Alliance. The Government also relied upon the confidential sources for the proposition
that Warsame’s travel back to Canada was paid for by al-Qaeda, and that Warsame
remained in contact with al-Qaeda after he returned to Canada. 120 Warsame was
released on January 30, 2004.121

USE OF SECRET EVIDENCE IN THE U.S. JUDICIAL SYSTEM

BRINKEMASHIP

The Moussaoui indictment identified Ramzi Bin al-Shibh and charged that he was
a key member of a cell in Hamburg, Germany, that carried out the September 11 th
Raids. It said that Ramzi Bin al-Shibh wired $14,000 to Moussaoui from Germany in
August 2001. The capture of Ramzi Bin al-Shibh created a dilemma for prosecutors,
since the Defense Department and CIA refused to make him available for defense
interviews even though that could mean scuttling the case against Moussaoui, because
Moussaoui had a constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him.
Moussaoui also wanted to call Khalid Shaikh Mohammed as a defense witness. Judge
Brinkema ruled on the Defendant’s “Emergency Motion to Force Ashcroft and the FBI to
produce [Khalid] Mohammed statement that Zacarias Moussaoui was not part of the
9/11 Mujahid operations” and subsequently ordered the Justice Department to provide
defense lawyers with any statement made by captured leaders of al-Qaeda that would
tend to exonerate Moussaoui and ruled that Moussaoui’s rights could not be negated by
America’s right to conduct a war. Judge Brinkema also ruled that the testimony of other
Brothers could possibly mitigate the death penalty being sought by the Government. A
Federal Appeals Court ruled that prosecutors can introduce evidence of the 9/11 attacks
at trial and seek the death penalty against the Brother while Moussaoui may subpoena
enemy combatants for his defense.122

117
. Dan Eggen and Jerry Markon “Canadian Probed for Al Qaeda Ties” Washington Post December 13, 2003.
118
. Daily Nation Kenya November 26, 2003.
119
. Susan Schmidt “Canadian Held For Alleged Al Qaeda Ties U.S. Accuses Man of Plotting To Provide Aid to Terrorists”
Washington Post January 22, 2004; Page A03.
120
. Stewart Bell, “Canadian Arrested in US linked to 9/11 Suspect” National Post December 12, 2003. FBI Agent
Donnachie’s Affidavit in support of Arrest Warrant at paragraphs 6 and 7
121
Mohammed Abdullah Warsame 11355-041
122
. http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss42204opn.pdf
 In November 2002 the White House weighed a proposal to abandon the Justice
Department’s prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui in a federal court, remove him from
the United States and place him before a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay (now
ruled illegal by the United States Supreme Court), Cuba because Judge Brinkema was
upset when the evidence against the Brother was presented at a secret hearing: “The
Court, too, is disturbed by the extent to which the United States’ intelligence officials
have classified the pleadings, orders and memorandum opinions in this case; and
further agrees with the defendant’s skepticism of the Government’s ability to prosecute
this case in open court in light of the shroud of secrecy under which it seeks to
proceed.” Much legal maneuvering occurred 123 but the point became moot after
Moussaoui pleaded guilty.

This “right to confront and cross-examine witnesses” tactic worked for Mounir el-
Motassadeq124 a Moroccan who came to Germany125 in 1993 to study engineering who
was tried in Hamburg for involvement in the September 11 th Raids and sentenced to
seven years in prison but allowed to remain free while his case was appealed: By
August 29, 1998 el-Motassadeq was under surveillance by German authorities when he
and Mohamed Haydar Zammar, who had already been identified by police as a
suspected Brother, met at the Hamburg home of Said Bahaji. Bahaji later moved in with
Mohammed Atta and Ramzi bin al-Shibh at 54 Marienstrasse in Hamburg. Transcripts
of tapped calls contain conversations between Bahaji and World Trade Center Shaheed
Marwan al-Shehhi. In March 1999, German intelligence officials gave the CIA the first
name and telephone number of Marwan al-Shehhi, and asked the Americans to track
him.126 Again, the FBI had other priorities in 1999 when 46 percent of the 1,532,200 total
arrests for drug abuse violations were for marijuana.

After the September 11th Raids Mounir Motassadeq was convicted of more than
3,000 counts of murder and was sentenced to the maximum 15 years in prison,
however the verdict was overturned and he was granted a new trial at which the
Americans turned over exculpatory evidence from some of our Brothers they held as
prisoners who they warned might be, “intentionally withholding information and
employing counter-interrogation techniques.” Mounir Motassadeq was convicted of a
lesser crime – belonging to our organization - and in August 2005 sentenced to five to
seven years in prison, but in February 2006 he was released on bail pending appeal. An
123
. USDC Eastern District Virginia Criminal No. 01 445-A Filed October 2, 2002 Memorandum Opinion
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss100203opn.pdf Judge Brinkema granted a request by Moussaoui’s lawyers
that they be allowed to question Ramzi bin al-Shibh. Two appellate hearings on this matter, one unclassified, the other classified,
were scheduled for June 3, 2003. Moussaoui was not allowed to attend one of these hearings, and declined to attend another,
during which the government presented its objections to bringing Ramzi bin al-Shibh to America to testify on the Brother’s behalf.
The court ruled that Moussaoui could call the witness in his behalf but the Government, after it was denied a re-hearing, refused to
abide by this decision. Prosecutors then asked Brinkema to drop the charges against the Brother so that they could re-instate them
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit but she refused.
124
. Desmond Butler “Saying U.S. Hinders Its Case Defense Seeks End to German Trial” New York Times December 4, 2002
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/04/international/europe/04HAMB.html
125
. During the first trial of Mounir el-Motassadeq witness Shahid Nickels, who was a member of Mohammed Atta's core group
between 1998 and 2000, said the following: “Atta's weltanschauung was based on a National Socialist way of thinking. He was
convinced that ‘the Jews’ are determined to achieve world domination. He considered New York City to be the center of world Jewry
that was, in his opinion, Enemy Number One. He was convinced that Jews control the American government as well as the media
and the economy of the United States.” Ralf Götsche who lived in the same student dormitory as Motassadeq, recalled,
“Motassadeq once said: ‘What Hitler did to the Jews was not at all bad.’” Dr. Matthias Küntzel Islamic Anti-Semitism And Its Nazi
Roots.
126
. Risen and Lichtblau “C.I.A. Was Given Data on Hijacker Long Before 9/11” New York Times February 24, 2004.
appeals court overturned that ruling, saying he had played a direct role in plotting the
event.

FATWA OKAYS MASS MURDER OF KUFFAR

As an after word it should be noted that a few members of our own faith would
say that the 3,000 casualties that came about as a result of the September 11 th Events
constituted mass murder. Sheik Ali bin Khdheir presented his fatwa that explained:

The weeping, the sorrow, and the pain over the [American] victims among
those termed ‘innocent’ are strange. Those victims were unbelieving
Americans who must not be sorrowed over, because the unbelieving
American is considered an enemy combatant due to his connection to his
government, or because he supports it with money or opinion or counsel,
as is customary in their political regime, may Allah not multiply such
regimes...It is permissible to kill the combatants among them, as well as
those who are non-combatants, for example the aged man, the blind man,
and the dhimmi, as the clerics agree. 127

Allah said, “The only reward of those who make war upon Allah and His
messenger and strive after corruption in the land will be that they will be killed or
crucified, or have their hands and feet and alternate sides cut off, or will be expelled out
of the land.”128

MOUSSAOUI AND THE SHEIK OMAR ABDEL RAHMAN

Moussaoui pleaded guilty to six counts of conspiracy to commit the September

11th Raids and was subsequently put on trial to determine whether he should live or die.
After pleading guilty on April 22, 2005 Moussaoui stated,

I came to the United States of America to be part, okay, okay, of a

conspiracy to use airplane as a weapon of mass destruction...but this
conspiracy was a different conspiracy than 9/11. My conspiracy has for
aim to free Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the
Blind Sheik, who is held in Florence, Colorado, okay, and we wanted to
use the 747 because it is a long-distance plane who could reach
Afghanistan without any stopover to give a chance to special forces to
storm the plane. So I am guilty of a broad conspiracy to use weapon of
mass destruction to hit the White House if the American government
refuse to negotiate, okay.129

127
. MEMRI Report January 18, 2002, “The Role of Fatwas in Incitement to Terrorism.”
http://www.standwithus.com/actions/011702.asp
128
. Surat al-Maidah 33, 34
129
. New York Times
Neil A Lewis February 6, 2006 http://i.cnn.net/cnn/2005/images/04/23/moussaoui.plea.transcript.pdf
 The defense strategy for Brother Moussaoui was based on the assumption that
even without a confession from Moussaoui the FBI should have known about our
September 11th plans. The jury spared Moussaoui and he was sentenced to life in
solitary confinement.

MOUSSAOUI’S MISSION

The American mass media reported that a cropduster manual was found in the
possession of Zacarias Moussouai but as you have observed from early FBI reports this
was not the case, for something of that nature would not have escaped Agent Samit.
The original indictment handed down against Moussaoui in December 2001 said that
among possessions seized from Moussaoui was a computer disk containing information
related to the aerial application of pesticides. The indictment read: “On or about June
2001, in Norman, Oklahoma, Zacarias Moussaoui made inquiries about starting a crop
dusting company.”130 His inquiries about hiring a cropduster plane were seen as
evidence of a plot to spread chemical, biological or radioactive material in an American
city.”131 On June 23, 2002 the United States Just-ice Department altered the indictment,
dropping indications that he was implicated in planning attacks with crop-dusting planes.
There was no official explanation for the change. 132 None-the-less the Marine Corps’
Chemical Biological Incident Response Force guarded Moussaoui’s preliminary
hearings in Virginia. Cropdusters played a recurrent theme in the plans of Al-Qaeda.
Barely two weeks before his arrest Moussaoui inquired about the University of
Minnesota's crop-dusting program, a move suggesting the he considered staying in
Minnesota for a year or more. Moussaoui e-mailed the university's Crookston,
Minnesota, campus on July 31, 2001.

From: zulaman tangotango [pilotz123@hotmail.com]

Sent: Tuesday, July 31, 2001 10:19 AM
To: Leake, Larry
Subject: to become a crop duster

Hello, my name is Zacarias and I am french and I currently in the US to

train to become a Commercial pilot and then open a business of Crop
Dusting in Morocco (where I am from originally) or may be France. I would
like to have detail information about two main thing. First, what time of
short course you offer to become a crop duster (6 month, 1 years max)
price etc, Second do you offer advice on how to run a small medium size
crop dusting business. I am interested to know what type of aircraft,
material equipment, something in detail, a kind of business plan. I have in
mind to come to visit you by the end of august, will it be possible? Thank

130
. http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/moussaouiindictment.htm
131
. “Moussaoui 'Slipped Through Net'” B B C D e c e m b e r 1 2 ,
2 0 0 1 ,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1706000/1706326.stm
132
. “I n d i c t m e n t D r o p s C r o p - D u s t e r
M e n t i o n ” Miami Herald Wire Services Posted on June 21, 2002.
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/3513250.htm
 in advance for your help. PS do you know any book that can help me in
this matter.

Moussaoui made a fleeting reference to the e-mail in a court filing in July 2002 in
Alexandria and told Samit that he was interested in an aviation related course at the
University of Minnesota.

Essam al-Ridi was the first al-Qaeda cooperator, to mention the word
“cropduster” to the Americans. Al-Ridi, an Egyptian-American pilot, helped prosecutors
penetrate al-Qaeda long before the September 11 th Raids. His testimony was crucial in
convicting Wadih el-Hage for conspiring in the 1998 plot to bomb two American
Embassies in East Africa. Al-Ridi told the FBI that he had taken classes and taught
other Brothers at the now-defunct Ed Boardman Aviation School in Fort Worth. Essam
Al-Ridi also said that in the mid-1990s he purchased a used Saber-40 aircraft on bin
Laden’s behalf for $210,000 in Tucson, Arizona. Usama bin Laden had asked al-Ridi to
start a crop-dusting business in the Sudan.

Q. Your understanding was that Mr. Bin Laden wanted you to be available
to not only fly an airplane if he wanted to travel but also for crop dusting
for the farming companies owned by Mr. Bin Laden, is that right?

A. The crop dusting came very later after that, when we went back to
Sudan, they wanted to have somebody who has already the license and
he can fly crop dusting…When I first came to Nairobi, it was just to fly Mr.
Bin Laden’s personal plane, but then later on it was expanded to include
crop dusting of the farms.

In 1999 al-Ridi wrote a report about this but the understaffed FBI International
Terrorism components never asked him for it until after the September 11 th Raids, when
agents suddenly recalled that several of jihadi had inquired about crop-dusting
planes.133 The Justice Department was supposed to protect al-Ridi from our revenge,
but when al-Ridi entered Egypt he was detained, kicked and held incommunicado as
retribution for his previous association with bin Laden. When the United States sought
his help again after September 11th Raids, Qatar Airways concluded he was a security
risk and fired him.134

At a September 2000 meeting with FBI agents, L’Houssaine Kherchtou reported

that he had been sent to flight school by Usama bin Laden so he could operate
cropdusters allegedly caring for al-Qaeda’s crops in Sudan.

Cropdusters reappear in our mythology in June 2000; shortly

after Shaheed Mohammad Atta entered the U.S. Atta visited Johnell
Bryant, a loan officer at a U.S. Department of Agriculture office in
Homestead, Florida. He told her he had just arrived from Afghanistan
133
. Judith Miller “A Witness Against Al-Qaeda Says The U.S. Let Him Down” New York Times June 3, 2002.
134
. Phil Hirshkorn “Key terrorism witness looking to U.S. for help” CNN.com August 16, 2002
http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/07/02/al.qaeda.witness/
and hoped to get his pilot’s license and buy a plane to use for charter flights and for
crop-dusting. She told no one of this visit until years later, when she confessed to the
FBI and the news media, of her stupidity:

It wasn’t actually a crop-duster in itself that he was wanting to finance. He

wanted to finance a twin-engine, six-passenger aircraft that he could use
for charter flights and remove the seats. And he said he was an engineer,
and he wanted to build a chemical tank that would fit inside the aircraft,
and take up every available square inch of the aircraft, except for where
the pilot would be sitting. And run the spray nozzles along the wingspan.
And use it as both a crop-duster plane, and as a charter plane by building
a specially made chemical tank to put into the aircraft to hold the
chemicals for crop-dusting, and yet remove that when he, when he
needed to, and replace the seats for, in, for charter type, plane. He
mentioned that he could get a larger tank in a twin-engine plane than what
he could, than the chemical capacity of a regular crop-duster plane, which
he said that he could use it, to stay up in the air longer while he’s spraying
sugar cane, out in the Broward County area.135

When ABC newsman Bryant Ross asked her: “And, when did you first meet
someone who you say is Mohamed Atta?” she responded: “I met him somewhere
between the end of April, around the third week of April to the third week of May
2000.”136 Atta’s first entry into the United States was June 3, 2000, Newark, New
Jersey.137 This is why women are kept in a subordinate position in Islam. Atta then tried
to get a loan at the Community Bank of Florida so that he could purchase a cropduster,
but with no success. The Florida bank president said that one of his loan officers
remembered getting a request by telephone for financing to buy a crop-duster or crop-
dusting company. Robert Epling president of Community Bank of Florida in Homestead
said the officer could not identify the caller as Atta, and that the caller never submitted a
loan application. But Epling said the loan officer remembered the call because there is
little crop-dusting in the area, and few requests to finance that business.

In August 2001, Mohammad Atta began to make repeated trips to rural airports,
trying to learn everything he could about cropdusters. He said he was interested in
starting a crop dusting business. D. “Will” Lee, 62, general manager of South Florida
Crop Care in Belle Glade, said that groups of two or three Middle Eastern men came by
almost every weekend for six or eight weeks before the so called terrorist attacks,
including the weekend just before the assaults. Lee said a co-worker, James Lester,
positively identified one of the hijacking suspects as Atta. Atta was a persistent
questioner. “The guy kept trying to get in the airplane.” The ground crew chief had to
order him away from one of the planes at one point because he kept trying to climb onto
the wing and into the cockpit. He asked questions about the capabilities of crop-dusters,
including how big a load of chemicals they could carry. The 9/11 Commission reported,
135
. Associated Press – Court TV – September 25, 2002 “Virginia Man Charged with Helping Hijackers Get ID’s.”
http://www.courttv.com/assault_on_america/0925_hijackers_fakeids_ap.html
136
. Transcript - Brian Ross' interview with government worker who encountered a September 11 th terrorist.
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/wnt/DailyNews/WNT_ross-bryant_transcript1.html
137
. http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/2002_05/fullreport.pdf
"In February 2001, Atta and Shehhi traveled to Virginia Beach, Virginia, where they
opened a mailbox account. A crop duster pilot in Belle Glade, Florida identified Atta as
inquiring about the purchase and operation of crop dusters while Atta was living in the
Atlanta area."138 In October 2001 the Americans discovered computer programs on how
to use cropduster aircraft to spread pesticide when they raided the offices of the Saudi
High Commissioner to Bosnia.

ATTA EXAMINES CROPDUSTER NOZZLE

In October 2001, pharmacist and farmer Gregg Chatterton of Huber Drugs in

Delray Beach, just north of Fort Lauderdale, told the FBI that in late August 2001
Mohamed Atta, accompanied by September 11 th Shaheed Marwan Al-Shehhi, bought
medication for his hands, both of which were red from the wrist down. Chatterton did
know what to make of the Brothers. Atta was well dressed, told the American he dealt in
computers, but would not say what area he specialized in, yet he seemed to have been
around some industrial chemicals that were basic, like lye. Chatterton thought that the
men worked at a nearby cement plant. He wondered if one of them had failed to wear
his gloves and his hands had become irritated from a chemical used there. He sold Atta
a 1-ounce tube of Acid Mantle for $5.49 to restore the natural ph balance of his skin:

I asked him if he ever came in contact with toluene which is used to

produce TNT. He wouldn’t tell me what he got it from and he kept avoiding
me. He would not make eye contact with me. I told him that he had to tell
me how his hands got messed up. If it was a result of a fungus you have
to treat it with an anti-fungal, if it was chemical he had to be treated with a
cream.

He put his hand on me, pushed me to get my attention and said my friend
has a cough and got feverish at night. He said just wanted to stop the
cough so I told him to take Robitussin AC. The cough that the other man
demonstrated sounded flu-like and bothersome. I thought his friend came
back with a prescription for some medication but I couldn’t find it. I looked
all through my file. These guys were definitely suspicious characters, I
thought they might have been manufacturing free base cocaine.

After the post September 11th anthrax mailings, Chatterton had been told that
Atta had crawled into a cropduster and tried to undo one of the sprayer nozzles so that
he could see if it would spray another noxious agent. The nozzle had chemical residue
on it that contaminated his hands.

The reason I believed the cropduster planes were touched or a fitting may
have been attempted to be removed for later changes (for proper
dispersement) is that the chemicals used in spraying the fields may have
been irritating and that Atta was out at the field on several occasions
showing different groups the cropdusters. I got the impression that Atta
138
. Report of the Joint Inquiry Into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 -- By The House Permanent Selected
Committee on Intelligence And The Senate Select Committee p137
 had been cleaning something, because there were clear demarcations.
The both sides of his hands were affected showing that he didn’t simply
touch something. He was evasive and did not wish to express the reason
his hands were red. His own words were devoid [of reference to] any
caustic agent or bio-terroristic agent. The other fellow could barely talk, so
Atta had do much of the talking and made the purchase from a pocket full
of cash.139

The FBI tested the dwellings of the September 11 th raiders for anthrax and
chemical agents but found none. Clearly, the Al-Qaeda Second Wave Attack Plan
involved cropdusters. Moussaoui and Atta’s interest in cropdusters could not have been
two co-incidental rogue operations. The jihadi believed that even after a first wave of
attacks they could still operate within the United States. They were going to either
obtain dangerous chemicals from truck drivers who had Hazardous Material Licenses or
from associates who owned chemical plants. If this did not work they would spay the
Jewish insects with conventional pesticide.

Brother Abu Jihad called the Florida Department of Agriculture and questioned
them about obtaining dangerous pesticides. He was told,

What we deal with in this office is restricted-use pesticides. If you own the
property you would need to get a private license. To do this you must pass
a written examination. Contact your local county extension office and set
up an examination time and order study material or sometimes they have
training sessions before exams. There are fifty questions - multiple choice.
I don’t know of any criminal check or background check. They need your
home address Social Security number and you will fill out a form. We have
to know where you are spraying, how the chemicals are going to be used.
If you have a corporation you would need a commercial license especially
if you have a cropduster and you are going to be contracting out work. We
just have to know the name of the business and you employer and where
you are spraying and all that. You must choose a category. With a
commercial license there are many different categories. There is the Agro-
crop category. Aquatic category if you are going to spray ponds. Then you
must pass the General Standards core examination.

Once this license was obtained all that remained was to fill out an application
and send in a fee of $250 per brand along with the label of the pesticide. 140 Ah, the best
laid plans of Muslims and men are often doomed to failure. After the September 11 th
Raids the FBI grounded all flights of cropdusters and airtankers. Had we succeeded in
starting a cropdusting firm near Miami, we would have dusted thousands of plants in
Miami or Fort Lauderdale – beginning with each and every Wandering Jew. The rich,
complacent yehudi that inhabit these retirement areas would have realized that their
wealth was no defense against our determination to finish where Hitler had left off. Allah
Akbar, they would scurry like rats from homes and synagogues.
139
. Recorded telephone conversation with Gregg Chatterton.
140
. Telephone conversation with Florida Dept. of Agriculture recorded November 2003.
WE SHOULD HAVE BOMBED A NUCLEAR REACTOR

We have focused on the failures of American intelligence enough to choke a

camel. Now it is time to examine the only failure of the September 11 th Victory - the
premature crash of United Airlines Flight 93 that was willed by God as we chose the
wrong target. If al-Qaeda would have known how difficult it would be to attack the
American homeland after September 11 th Raids and how infrequently al-Qaeda would
be able to strike we would have targeted a nuclear reactor. In September 2002 Yemen-
born Ramzi bin al-Shaibah, a coordinator of Islamist activities who was based in
Germany and shared an apartment with Mohammed Atta in Hamburg, and Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed head of the al-Qaeda military committee, said the initial plan for the
September 11th raiders had been to crash planes into nuclear power plants in the United
States: “About two and a half years before the holy raids on Washington and New York,
the military committee held a meeting during which we decided to start planning for a
martyrdom operation inside America. As we were discussing targets, we first thought of
striking at a couple of nuclear facilities but decided against it for fear it would go out of
control. It was eventually decided to leave out nuclear targets for now,” 141 and the
Capitol Building had been targeted. We do not fear an attack “getting out of control”
because its target is a nuclear plant. If this was the case why was so much effort
expended by al-Qaeda to obtain enriched uranium? What difference does it make if we
cause an explosion and spread deadly radioactivity by exploding a bomb or by targeting
a reactor? We were showing the infidels mercy, and that was a mistake.

Later Khalid Shaikh Mohammed told his American interrogators that in early
2001, our leaders discussed attacking gasoline stations in New York as well as a
nuclear reactor, but decided against it and that Usama bin Laden gave Mohammed Atta
a list of targets that included the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the United States
Capitol, the White House, the Israeli Embassy in Washington and the Sears Tower in
Chicago.142

PEACH BOTTOM AND HOPE CREEK REACTORS

We suppose Flight 93 and its full tank of fuel could have collided with the
containment building of operative Three Mile Island Unit 1, located near Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania, at a speed of 450 miles per hour. But Three Mile Island had one of the
most robust containment buildings of any nuclear reactor, with three feet of concrete
and six inches of steel protecting the reactor, due to the fact that it was located in the
flight path of planes landing at Harrisburg Airport. 143 In September 2002 nineteen
141
. Yosri Fouda “We Left Out Nuclear Targets for Now” The Guardian March 4, 2003.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4617629-111026,00.html
142
. “Al-Qaeda: Bin Laden Chose September 11th Targets Rejected Nuclear Plant Attack” NTI Global Security Newswire March 20,
2003.
http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/thisweek/2003_3_25_terr.html
143
. In September 2002 a cooler holding metal containers linked with the Three Mile Island nuclear plant was found at the Flight 93
crash site, spurring an FBI investigation. Investigators weren’t sure what to make of it and said they discovered no explosives,
radiation or other threats. It was reported the FBI summoned a hazardous-materials unit from Philadelphia to further examine the
cooler that held two stainless-steel containers roughly the size of a coffee cup that in some way indicated that they were from Three
Mile Island but police would not say exactly how they made that connection. When the Philadelphia Hazmet people were contacted
prominent nuclear experts concluded that a reactor containment building could
withstand a jetliner crash. A test was performed in 1988 by mounting an unmanned
plane on rails and “flying” it at about 480 M.P.H. into a test wall. 144 The engines
penetrated only about two inches and the fuselage even less. The International Atomic
Energy Agency, however, had to admit that no commercial reactor in the world was
designed to withstand the impact of a large jetliner at high speed with a full load of fuel.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission reluctantly was forced to say the same. It
was not our mission to settle this dispute – we should have hit a “softer” target such as
the spent fuel rods at the Peachbottom or Hope reactors.

Built in 1968 on a 620-acre site on the banks of the

Susquehanna River, just north of the Maryland state line
the Peach Bottom Nuclear Facility had its spent fuel rods
stored on top of the reactor: Certain types of reactors,
called Mk. 1 and Mk. 2, keep their spent fuel five stories
above the reactors. This is a particularly vulnerable
situation and at Peach Bottom there was nothing between
the spent-fuel pool and a direct hit from an airliner except
for corrugated steel.145 Once the water escapes from the
fuel pool, the spent fuel rods will become red hot since the
fuel rods still generate heat, even years after being
removed from a reactor and the water is needed to prevent meltdown. Water also
provides radiation shielding. But the pool requires additional systems: heat exchangers
to keep the water from boiling away, and filtration systems to pick out the radioactive
material that builds up in the water. A jet airliner’s fuel, once ignited, will put an abrupt
end to the fuel pools functionality.

The NRC has never performance tested a power plants ability to protect spent
fuel pools from an aerial attack. In October 2000, the NRC started to recognize the
problem of spent fuel fires in a study of the effects of accidents. However, in over 100
pages of analysis, they never considered a jetliner filled with fuel flying into it. The spent
fuel pools are so dangerous that a jihadi with a knapsack filled with explosives could
attack it. This would allow him to blow a sizeable hole in the reinforced concrete bottom
or wall of a spent fuel pool. At nuclear plants that have boiling water reactors (like
Peach Bottom and Hope Creek) things could be even better for us. In these cases
where the spent fuel pools are above ground and not inside the containment building, a
certain kind of explosive could be launched from outside the fence line into the side of
the pool – the Brother would not even have to enter the secured area. According to an
unclassified study by Brookhaven National Lab, under certain conditions the pool would
start draining immediately.146 This could result in the immediate release of high levels of
radiation, quickly turning into an uncontrolled radioactive fire, and the plant could do
they denied having been dispatched. The containers have not yet been opened. Police said it’s possible that anything could be
inside – including a forgetful visitor’s stale coffee. “We don’t know if someone left it here as a prank, or whether it’s misplaced
property.”
144
. Matthew Wald “Experts say Nuclear Plant can Survive Jetliner Crash.”New York Times September 20, 2002.
145
. Faye Flam “Scientists Debate Terror Risk At US Reactors” Phillynews.com September 20, 2002 http://www.eco-
pravda.km.ru/nute/nn21s.htm
146
. Danielle Brian “Nuclear Plants and Terrorism” Counterpunch June 5, 2002.
http://www.counterpunch.org/brian0605.html
nothing effective to stop it. This report found that a severe fire in the spent fuel pool
could render about 188 square miles uninhabitable, cause as many as 28,000 cancer
fatalities, and cost $59 billion in damage. It could also destroy the containment building
underneath it, cause a nuclear meltdown and result in the formation of a radioactive
cloud.

Following our airbourne commando attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC
commissioned the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to examine potential effects of
sabotage directed at spent fuel pools. The Corps conducted several computer-based
analyses of the potential effects of armor-piercing weapons and high explosives on
typical spent fuel pools. The analyses found that the penetration of armor-piercing
weapons and high explosives could vary considerably, depending, among other things,
on the size of the weapon or explosive and the sophistication of the attacker. 147 The
neat grid of 3,819 spaces at the bottom of the pool where the Peach Bottom plant stores
its spent fuel has steadily filled with fuel rods.

New Jersey State Assemblyman Gary Guear said he received information from a
reliable National Guard source that a map of the Hope Creek plant was found by U.S.
military forces inside a cave in Afghanistan. 148 The Hope Creek is a General Electric Mk.
1 boiling water reactor, where the spent fuel pool is situated above the main reactor –
outside of the main containment area—in the upper third of the reactor’s building.
Though Public Service Electric and Gas Nuclear Power Company nuclear spokesmen
say the spent fuel pool are protected by hardened concrete and steel-reinforced
structures, they are not fortified to the same extent as the main reactors. Since the pool
lounges above ground, it is easier to drain.

The Commander and Chief of the United States’ Zionist-Crusaders said this in
his State of the Union Message “And the depth of their hatred is equaled by the
madness of the destruction they design. We have found diagrams of American nuclear
power plants [in their safehouses].” 149 Had al-Qaeda targeted Peach Bottom, it would
have caused the greatest panic America had ever seen. Millions of people would have
had to leave the Washington, Maryland, Virginia area, government employees such as
FBI and CIA would have been dislocated, the American economy would have collapsed,
cancer rates in all of America would soon have increased rapidly and the revenge of the
Palestinians and other Muslims would never be forgotten. There were nuclear reactors
that were closer Washington like Calvert, but Calvert’s was not a Mk. 1 or Mk. 2 type
reactor. One day, by Allah, this will happen! We will not make the same mistake again.

THE PRECEDENTS FOR AN ATTACK ON AN AMERICAN NUCLEAR FACILITY

147
. GAO Report July 2003 “Spent Nuclear Fuel – Options to Further Enhance Security.”
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03426.pdf
148
. Dennis Thompson and Adam Taylor “Lawmaker Stirs Up Nuclear Plant Worries” Wilmington Delaware News Journal April 5,
2002.
http://209.157.64.200/focus/f-news/660146/posts
149
. Jim Garamone “The Price of Freedom Is High, but Never too High” American Forces Press Service February 1, 2002 15:05:21 –
0800
 Attacks on nuclear facilities have figured into many of our communiqués. The
Liberation Army Fifth Battalion, the group of imprisoned martyrs who carried out the first
World Trade Center Event, had this to say:

If our demands are not met, all our functional groups in the army will
continue to execute our missions against military and civilian targets in
and out the United States. This also will include some potential nuclear
targets. For your own information, our army has more than 150 suicidal
soldiers ready to go ahead.

A communiqué found on the hard-drive of Brother Ayyad’s computer, read:

We will attack Swedish targets for granting asylum to two women

who denounced Islam and Muslims. This action by Sweden made it
become an unfavorable country against Islam, Muslims and their prophet.
This is a warning to the American Government in the event it does not
stop its assistance to Israel they will suffer the consequences of revenge
inside and outside of America. The consequences will include attacks on
nuclear facilities…150

When the FBI interviewed Ramzi Yousef he said:

I came to the United States in September 1992 to obtain an American

passport and look for targets. I wanted an American passport so that I
could freely travel in and out of the U.S. The targets are possible bombing
sites in the U.S. and I looked at potential bombing targets in New York,
Pennsylvania, Connecticut and New Jersey. My goal was to select a
bombing site and return to Pakistan to recruit funds for the bombing
operation.

This message was found on the hard drive of Brother Yousef’s computer:

All people who support the U.S. government are our targets in our future
plans and that is because all those people are responsible for their
government’s actions and they support the U.S. foreign policy and are
satisfied with it. We will hit all U.S. nuclear targets. If the U.S. government
keeps supporting Israel, then we will continue to carry out operations
inside and outside the United States to include…

The text ended here. During the Bojinga trial FBI Agent Pellegrino stated that
Ramzi Yousef and Murad had talked about possibly bombing a nuclear facility in the
United States:

150
. USA v Ramzi Yousef Lab# 50120018 D BY Q1
 MS. BARRETT: Your Honor, I have an objection to certain testimony that
was just given by Agent Pellegrino about alleged plans by Mr. Murad to
bomb nuclear facility and Northwest Airlines – I believe that was the
testimony. Those are evidence of uncharged crimes and it is also 404(b)
material that I don’t remember receiving any notice with respect to plans to
bomb a nuclear facility in America...

THE COURT: I was surprised that nobody objected at the time it came
out, but it is a little late to object now. If I tell the jury to take it out of their
minds it will be like telling them to go sit in a corner and not think of pink
elephants or white elephants or whatever the hell that is. So I am going to
let it stand.

MR. GREENFIELD: My problem particularly is with the nuclear facility. I

had a hard time hearing. It was something about nuclear. Objecting to
something like that in front of the jury is also a problem. You bring it to the
jury’s attention. We discussed it after it happened and we all had the same
feeling. It certainly was something I was going to object to.

THE COURT: Unfortunately, or fortunately, the rules provide that you are
supposed to object at or about the time, not now.

The jihadi who were part of the Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman’s Gama’a cell in New
York City and New Jersey had cased Three Mile Island after having tested a bomb 151 in
the vicinity of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania:

Siddig: Do you remember the garbage bags?

Salem: What?

Siddig: Garbage bags (UI) we go out at night, all dark, I am showing you
what I have, I dress (UI) I have a janitor uniform (UI) and the other one for
night operations, it is called re-con (UI) you bring information and you
come back from behind the enemy line, we use to go out, Emad (UI)
Emad in New York, I mean Harrisburg Pennsylvania, 152 there was an
electric power station, three times the size of this building, it was guarded
by soldiers. It was under heavy protection they said today, we are going to
conduct reconnaissance, God, we want to get good reconnaissance
report, everything. Between our lease and its location are 18 kilometers.
There are fields between us and station, and valleys. And trees, spiders
and crawling animals. Snakes, there are narrow streets, people ride cars,
like this, they gave us exactly to reach it, fifty minutes you reach it, they
told us that we will return by car. (UI) our man, our commander, is a
Marine; he is still in the marines. He said that he is a Marine, see how the
Marines going to be. On God’s blessing he outbursted, dark, you can’t
151.
John Miller The Cell
152
. USA v Rahman TT 1598
 see, they are creators in what? Because at night it is dark, so the outfit
must be black-grey, they took the outfits and dyed them, so that it won’t be
like this (UI) do you know who was with them? Abdul-Rahman Haggag.
Also there was Hamdi Ali…I use to direct all the people, the most
important thing, we got there then, when a car use to pass by, the area
was a military zone.

Salem: Yeah.

Siddig: All of it is Aryan Nation, white, KKK who wears white robes.

Salem: Of course!

Siddig: When a car goes by everybody hits the ground on the street, ha,
the car passes by, we conducted this reconnaissance 4-5 times Sheik and
we executed the operation means if we had something to place it there ha
(UI) whispering.

Salem: What?

Siddig: No God, but God.

Salem: You could have hunted them?

Siddig: We could have done a catastrophe.

Salem: Huh.

Siddig: We reached the guard, Sheik, there was between me and him this
much, we were crawling, (UI) there was somebody with him (UI) I will have
to meet him, (UI) of the Hambaka too.153

During a meeting in Spain, Shaheed Mohamed Atta mentioned that he had

considered targeting a nuclear facility he had seen during familiarization flights near
New York - a target they referred to as "electrical engineering." According to Brother
Ramzi bin al-Shibh, the other pilots did not like the idea. They thought a nuclear target
would be difficult because the airspace around it was restricted, making reconnaissance
flights impossible and increasing the likelihood that any plane would be shot down
before impact. Moreover, unlike the approved targets, this alternative had not been
discussed with senior Al-Qaeda leaders and therefore did not have the requisite
blessing. Nor would a nuclear facility have particular symbolic value. Atta did not ask
Ramzi bin al-Shibh to pass this idea on to bin Ladin, Atef, or Khalid Shaikh Mohammed,
and bin al-Shibh says he did not mention it to them until after September 11 th Raids.

KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED’S DISINFORMATION

153
. USA v. Rahman June 23, 1993 CM-62
 The transcripts of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s interrogation are prefaced with a
warning that Mohammed “has been known to withhold information or deliberately
mislead.”154 In an assessment of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s reporting, the CIA
concluded that protecting operatives in the United States appeared to be a "major part"
of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed's resistance efforts. For example, in response to questions
about U.S. zip codes found in his notebooks, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed provided the
less than satisfactory explanation that he was planning to use the zip codes to open
“new email accounts.” This according to CIA report, Intelligence Community Terrorist
Threat Assessment, "Khalid Shaykh Muhammad’s Threat Reporting-Precious Truths,
Surrounded by a Bodyguard of Lies," April 3, 2003.

Although Khalid Shaikh Mohammed gave up a number of Brothers he

deliberately misled the Americans in regard to our interest in striking a nuclear reactor
so that America would remain off guard and not place surface-to-air missiles around
them. Even in 2006 the United States General Accountability Office reported, “The
Design Basis Threat (DBT) for radiological sabotage applied to nuclear power plants
identifies the terrorist capabilities (or “adversary characteristics”) that sites are required
to defend against. The adversary characteristics generally describe the components of
a ground assault and include the number of attackers; the size of a vehicle bomb; and
the weapons, equipment, and tactics that could be used in an attack. Other threats in
the Design Basis Threat include a waterborne assault and the threat of an insider. The
Design Basis Threat does not include the threat of an airborne attack. However,
according to Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials, Nuclear Regulatory Commission
regulations do require nuclear power plants to implement readily available measures to
mitigate against the potential consequences of such an attack.” 155

MI-5
Thanks to the so-called “free-press” of the West, word of our intention to target a
reactor did leak out after the FBI sent a report to the British Intelligence Agency MI-5
saying that a “credible source” had said that the “terrorists” might have been planning to
hit a nuclear plant. This was based on their analysis that Pittsburgh is near several
power stations including Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania, Hope Creek in New Jersey,
and Peach Bottom in Maryland156 for they had no credible source within our organization
at that time. Later, a right-thinking Brother named Salahuddin Khaled, jailed in
Afghanistan, said that the September 11 th Raiders should have flown into a U.S. nuclear
power plant.157 Nizar Trabelsi boasted in a radio interview that he had intended to bomb
an air base that is believed to house American nuclear weapons. 158

In November 2003 the news media in Australia carried reports that

al-Qaeda operative Willie Brigitte may have been plotting attacks against
Sydney's Lucas Heights nuclear reactor. Brigitte's interest in nuclear sites
154
. http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040330-120655-9785r.htm
155
. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06388.pdf
156
. Nicholas Rufford, David Leppard and Paul Eddy “Terrorism Mission Aborted: The Downed Plane's Flight Path Took It Close To
Five Nuclear Plants Nuclear Mystery: Crashed Plane's Target May Have Been Reactor” The London Times October 21, 2001.
157
. “Terrorist Says Go For The Nukes” Washington Post October 30, 2001.
158
. Desmond Bulter New York Times November 16, 2002 “From Belgium Jail Man Brags About His Plot to Bomb Air Base.”
was discussed at length at a government hearing. In March 1999, Brigitte was charged
and imprisoned in Yemen for his involvement in an attempted kidnapping of a Western
diplomat but was released three weeks later and deported to France. 159 The French
became aware of his connections to al-Qaeda when two Brothers suspected of
masterminding the bombing of a synagogue in Tunisia gave him up under torture.
Brigitte fled to Australia where he married Melanie Brown, an Arabic interpreter for the
Australian military and an Anglican convert to Judaism and presumably a lesbian (she
belonged to a group of Jewish degenerates) before turning to the Muslim faith. 160 “I am
not a terrorist. I am not a criminal. I never prepare a terrorist action against a nuclear
place in Australia. The media and the Australian Government lie on me for justifying my
arrest for extradition or expulsion. I am innocent. May Allah help you and protect you.”

THE WHITE HOUSE VERSUS THE CAPITOL

American intelligence agencies claimed, “The plotters argued about everything,

including whether to target the White House or the Capitol. The conflict apparently
wasn’t resolved before 9/11 when the fourth hijacked jet, headed for Washington
crashed…”161 The 9/11 Commission reported, “Bin Ladin told Ramzi bin al-Shibh to
instruct Atta and the others to focus on their security and that of the operation, and to
advise Atta to proceed as planned with the targets discussed before Atta left
Afghanistan in early 2000 - the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, the White House,
and the Capitol.” According to Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh, bin Ladin said he preferred
the White House to the Capitol, asking bin al-Shibh to confirm that Atta understood this
preference. Destroy the White House? It is a two-story building surrounded by much
taller buildings filled with many Jack Abramoff’s and would have been a very difficult
target. Brother bin al-Shibh told his captors that bin Ladin had given the same message
to Shaheed Mohlad Alshehri for conveyance to Atta earlier that spring.

When Atta received these messages he said he understood bin Ladin's interest
in striking the White House. Atta said he thought this target too difficult, but had tasked
Brothers Nawaf al-Hazmi and Hanjour to evaluate its feasibility and was awaiting their
answer. Atta said that the two jihadi had rented small aircraft and flown reconnaissance
flights near the Pentagon. Atta explained that Hanjour was assigned to attack the
Pentagon, Jarrah the Capitol, and that both Atta and Shehhi would hit the World Trade
Center. If any pilot could not reach his intended target, he was to crash the plane. If Atta
could not strike the World Trade Center, he planned to crash his aircraft directly into the
streets of New York. Atta told Ramzi bin al-Shibh that each pilot had volunteered for his
assigned target, and that the assignments were subject to change.

On August 3, 2001 Atta and bin al-Shibh discussed several matters, such as the
best way for the jihadi to purchase plane tickets and the assignment of “muscle”
hijackers to individual teams. Atta and bin al-Shibh also revisited the question of
whether to target the White House. They discussed targets in coded language,

159
. Martin Chulov, “Brigitte's N-reactor bomb plot” The Advertiser November 10, 2003.
The Advertiser November 8, 2003 “The butcher who became a terrorist.”
160
. Charles Miranda, “Synagogue bombing led French to Brigitte” The Daily Telegraph November 13, 2003
161
. New York Post Vincent Morris, Andy Geller June 17, 2004
pretending to be students discussing various fields of study: "architecture" referred to
the World Trade Center, "arts" the Pentagon, "law" the Capitol, and "politics" the White
House. Ramzi bin al-Shibh reminded Atta that bin Ladin wanted to target the White
House. Atta again cautioned that this would be difficult. When bin al-Shibh persisted,
Atta agreed to include the White House but suggested they keep the Capitol as an
alternate target in case the White House proved too difficult. Atta also suggested that
the attacks would not happen until after the first week in September, when Congress
reconvened. Abu Zubaydah told investigators the intended target of United Airlines
Flight 93 was the White House.

THE AMERICAN TALIBAN’S REPORT

John Walker Lindh, once a mere Taliban foot soldier told the American military
that the word in the lower ranks of our army was that: “The original plan was separated
into three phases totaling twenty different attacks.” The first phase “consisted of five
attacks,” but he cited only four; two on the World Trade Center, one on the Pentagon
and one aimed at the White House. Usama bin Laden’s associate, Hakeen At-Taizzi,
told Lindh that, “there should have been five planes used” on September 11 th, “the fifth
targeting the White House.”162 Lindh:

The second phase of attacks could involve the use of unspecified

biological agents, possible attack on natural gas resources, or nuclear
weapons facilities in the United States. (Field Comment: Source was
making assumptions and conjectures based on talk among his
colleagues.) The second phase was supposed to make the United States
forget about the first phase. And the third phase would finish the U.S.”
Lindh said that and that he had heard that fifty al-Qaeda jihadis were sent
to commit twenty suicide operations, and that “fifteen more operations
were pending.

We wish this were so!

KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED 1999

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed repeatedly visited Hamburg in 1999, and planning

began for the September 11 th Raids. Mohammed slipped into Germany without raising
any alert, even though he had been identified as early as 1995 by the United States as
a suspect in “terrorist” attacks, because America failed to share this information with
Germany. The New York Times reported that the CIA failed to adequately scrutinize
information it received before September 11 th about the growing threat he posed. A joint
Congressional committee issued a report that included a cryptic reference to a “key al-
Qaeda leader” that the United States intelligence community had identified as early as
1995. The report was critical of the failure to “recognize his growing importance to al-
Qaeda” and said the intelligence community “did not anticipate his involvement in a
terrorist attack of September 11th’s magnitude,” even though information about him had

162
. US Army memo regarding Lynd interrogation JPWL-000391
been collected for at least six years. When the FBI asked Ramzi Yousef if he knew of
any plans for future airline bombings, or any plans for other types of terrorist attacks he
told them that although he did not know of any such plans, “There are many committed
people in the world with sufficient knowledge to carry out attacks against United States
targets. Four people, including myself were involved in Bojinga, and I had personally
trained the others, and they are still capable of carrying out the operation. I refuse to
further identify these Brothers.”

KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED 2000

On January 4, 2000 Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s Saudi passport, which

contained a visa for travel to the United States was photocopied and forwarded to CIA
headquarters. This passport came from a foreign intelligence source. The Learned
Elders of Islam know that this source was the Saudis, who allowed Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed free passage although Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was a fugitive. This
information was not shared with FBI headquarters until August 2001.

In September 2000, a CIA source had reported that an individual named Khalid
al-Shaykh al-Ballushi was a key lieutenant in al-Qaeda. Al-Ballushi means "from
Balochistan." It was known from Bojinga that Ramzi Yousef was originally from
Balochistan and that he was related to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. The intelligence
community was aware that a “Khallad” had recruited players in the African American
Embassies Operation and even though this was a different “Khallad” is still should have
aroused suspicion because of the similarity of names, if not description. Late May 2001
brought reports to the Americans of a possible hostage plot against its citizens abroad
to force the release of the "Blind Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman." The reporting noted that
jihadi might opt to hijack an aircraft or storm a U.S. embassy. It led to an Federal
Aviation Administration information circular to airlines noting the potential for "an airline
hijacking to free terrorists incarcerated in the United States." Another airline-targeting
operation and another clue. In June 2001 the CIA disseminated a report that a Mukhtar
had traveled to the United States in May 2001 and was sending recruits to there to meet
colleagues already in the country and routinely told others that he could arrange their
entry into the United States as well. 163 The CIA did not know who Mukhtar was at the
time - only that he associated with Al-Qaeda lieutenant Abu Zubaydah and that, based
on the nature of the information, he was evidently involved in planning possible jihadi
activities on behalf of Al-Qaeda. On June 12, 2001, a CIA report said that "Khaled" was
actively recruiting people to travel outside Afghanistan, including to the United States
where colleagues were reportedly already in the country to meet them, to carry out
“terrorist-related” activities for us. CIA headquarters presumed from the details of the
reporting that this person was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. In July 2001, the same source
who supplied the information for the June 12, 2001 report was shown a series of
photographs and identified a photograph of Khalid Shaikh Mohammed as the Khaled he
had previously discussed. That recruiter profile dovetailed with the Muktar report, but
still Mukhtar was not identified as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. On July 23, 2001 Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed obtained a visa to visit the United States by using the third party
163
. Report Of The Joint Inquiry Into The Terrorist Attacks Of September 11, 2001 – By The House Permanent Select Committee On
Intelligence And The Senate Select Committee On Intelligence
Express Visa System.164 During the summer of 2001 the NSA intercepted phone calls
between Sheik Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Mohamed Atta and on September 10,
2001, the US monitored a call from Atta to Mohammed who was in Afghanistan. 165

In May 2001, Michael Scheuer, the former Deputy Chief of the Bin Laden Unit,
who by that time was detailed to International Terrorism Operations Section in FBI
Headquarters, had continuing concerns about the Malaysia meetings especially whether
they had any nexus to the Cole attack. CIA records show that on May 15, 2001 Michael
Scheuer accessed the March 2000 cable stating that Mihdhar, Hazmi, and another
person had traveled to Bangkok from Malaysia on January 8, 2000. Around this same
time in May, Michael Scheuer began inquiring about the Malaysia meetings with a
Counter Terrorism Center analyst at CIA Headquarters. Michael Scheuer said he knew
that the Counter Terrorism Center analyst had been down in the weeds, and knew the
nuts and bolts of the Cole investigation because he had been assigned to prepare a
Counter Terrorism Center report on who was responsible for the Cole attack. Michael
Scheuer told him "something bad was definitely up." The Counter Terrorism Center
analyst replied in an e-mail dated May 18, 2001 "My head is spinning over this East
Asia travel. Do you know if anyone in [the CIA's Bin Laden Unit] or FBI mapped this?"

THE FBI’s USAMA BIN LADEN UNIT

The FBI’s now disbanded Usama bin Laden Unit 166 had only vague reports on our
activity. On June 13, 2001 an FBI Alert was sent to all Field Offices from
Counterterrorism / Usama bin Laden Unit / SIOC Cat A Contact Unit Chief Deborah
Stafford,167 Special Supervisory Agent Rodney D. Middleton and Special Supervisory
Agent Kevin A. Cassidy Approved by Dale L. Watson, Thomas Pickard, Michael
Rolince, Deborah Stafford and Drafted by Rodney Middleton, Frederick Stremmel, John
Salata and Jennifer Maitner.

To advise all SACs of continued aggressive and pro-active efforts to

counter Usama bin Laden (UBL) related threats, as evidenced by recent
pre-operational planning of key Usama bin Laden lieutenant and
mujahideen operator, (deleted probably Khalid Shaikh Mohammed)
Details: The Intelligence Community, in a coordinated Community
Advisory, estimates that there is a heightened threat of terrorist attacks
against U.S. facilities, personnel and other interests in coming weeks by
Sunni extremists associated with Usama bin Laden. Reporting strongly
suggests an increased level of planning and activity may be underway
which may presage one or more attacks. Indications of terrorist planning
and (deleted) preparation in recent weeks seem to focus on (deleted –
probably Saudi Arabia) and (deleted – probably Israel possibly Pakistan)
as possible target locations. U.S. interests in (deleted – Saudi Arabia)
164
. Reuters January 26, 2004 citing National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
165
. Independent UK September 15, 2002.
166
. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F70D15FC39540C778CDDAE0894DE404482
167
. SA Stafford served as the first SSA of the Washington Field Office’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), which has the
responsibility for terrorism cases in Washington, D.C. and Northern Virginia. She is currently the SSA of the JTTF in Kansas City,
responsible for the investigation of international terrorism cases, assuming there are any in Kansas.
 particularly (deleted – it’s oil industry) remain Usama bin Laden’s preferred
target. Al-Qaeda associated personnel also are reported to be stepping up
efforts to conduct possible attacks in (deleted Pakistan or Israel - Abu
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi got money from Al Qaeda in 2001 to organize his own
terrorist unit with possible operations in Israel). 168 The reporting available
on Al-Qaeda operations possibly being planned for (deleted – Pakistan or
Israel) contains no information on specific targets. The current reporting
suggesting the increased level of threat warning is a compilation of
(deleted). The Al-Qaeda organization and associated extremists are
known to be searching worldwide for security vulnerabilities, which might
enable a successful attack against U.S. facilities or personnel. Lack of
reporting is not indicative of reduced risk, as in addition to the areas
discussed above Sunni extremists are known to have associates located
in many areas worldwide. As demonstrated by the attack on the USS Cole
they are capable of long-term surveillance and planning in a target area
that enables them to recognize and exploit vulnerabilities, including those
that have a limited window of opportunity. Historically, attack planning and
execution have taken at least several months. Notably, reporting has
indicated that Al-Qaeda operatives (deleted) have been involved in
operational planning in several different geographic locations. Reporting
noted the continued movement of personnel and material between
(deleted – Afghanistan) and (deleted - Pakistan) as well as between
(Afghanistan) and (deleted - Iran). Additionally, reporting implied that
(deleted) activities must be completed in the next few weeks, but did
address specific dates. (Deleted) Usama bin Laden’s organization may be
in the advanced planning stages of a terrorist attack against U.S. interests
in (deleted – Saudi Arabia). The reporting involves movement of terrorists
from Afghanistan following training there. Furthermore explosives and
arms were smuggled into (deleted – Saudi Arabia) for use against U.S.
and Western targets. However the intelligence community has been
unable to narrow the list of potential targets. It should be noted that targets
could include (deleted). Other possible targets could include (deleted)
which could be prominently identified as American. Several Islamic jihadi
have had a heightened interest in targeting (deleted) since (deleted). In
(deleted) March 2001, a (deleted) extremist (deleted) made plans to
expedite work on a suspicious (deleted) the need for haste as travel was
planned (deleted). Also in (deleted) March engaged in apparent
operational preparation with (deleted) One limiting factor which seems to
be evident is funding. Intelligence suggests that preparation is slowed
down by the lack of funding to support the operations. 169

The FBI knew about as much about us as the Rabbis of Jerusalem know about
Jesus and used deletion to protect their image. The FBI had no idea that we were going
to strike within the United States again, and was not pointed in that direction by the
168
. http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:t620ki-WAeQJ:www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp%3Fpage%3Dstory_22-10-
2004_pg3_5+%22Navidul+Islam+Trust%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=2
169
. USA v Moussaoui Defendant’s Exhibit 428
Justice Department who regarded our first World Trade Center attack as an aberration
unworthy of proactive investigation. With this mindset a lot of information was
misinterpreted or garbled. FBI Official Thomas Pickard told the Kean Commission
investigating our September 11th Raids "that although he initially briefed the attorney
general (Ashcroft) regarding these threats, after two such briefings the attorney general
told him he did not want to hear this information anymore." 170 It would not have mattered
had Ashcroft listened because the information was “way off base” in regard to Al-
Qaeda.

It was not until August 28, 2001 that a cable arrived reporting that Khalid the
Elder’s nom-de-guerre was Mukhtar. What took so long to make this connection? Was
the attention of the intelligence community still focused on drug cartels? Cold cases?
This connection might also have underscored concern about the June 2001 reporting
that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was recruiting terrorists to travel, including to the United
States. Only after 9/11 would it be discovered that Mukhtar / Khalid Shaikh Mohammed
had communicated with a phone that was used by Brother Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and that
Ramzi bin al-Shibh had used the same phone to communicate with Brother Moussaoui.
These connections could never have been made, not because it was beyond human
ability, but because it was God’s will that they remained a mystery. 171

THE FALL OF KHALID SHAIKH MOHAMMED

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed narrowly avoided capture in September 2002.

Pakistani authorities say they had information, based on utility records that a senior al-
Qaeda leader might be in an apartment just outside of Karachi. Instead, they found
three children, two women and a man. One of the women was a caretaker, and one
child was hers. The other woman was a “foster mother” of sorts to the other two
children, and the man her husband. The two boys, ages 7 and 9, were named Omar
and Abdullah. Their father was Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence Agency has had Mohammed’s two young sons in custody since then and
there is still no word on their fate. This was not the only time Americans and their
surrogates resorted to kidnapping innocents: Ali Abd al-Rahman al-Faqasi al-Ghamdi,
aka “Abu Bakr,” the al-Qaeda field commander for Saudi Arabia surrendered on June
26, 2003 in exchange for his wife's freedom. This hostage taking tells the Elder’s that
our enemies are not much different from us, and our targeting of so-called civilians is
not only justified by God but by the laws of man.

After the people the Inter-Services Intelligence Agency captured were threatened
they told the Pakistani traitors about a group of Arabs living at another address in the
Defense Apartment Complex, the authorities hurried across town. The police and the
agents and the army all gathered for a massacre at the Defense Apartment Complex.
“Our officers moved immediately,” said a senior Pakistani official. “No, we didn’t know
that he was there. But from the interviews and surveillance we knew there was
something big going on. The number of people there, the weapons, and the intelligence
we gathered. Then it was a free-for-all. We fired at the windowpanes, put in tear gas
170
. Philip Shenon and Eric Lichtblau “F.B.I. Is Assailed for Its Handling of Terror Risks” New York Times April 14, 2004.
171
. The 9/11 Commission Report p276
and stormed them.” Two Brothers were murdered and would-be September 11 th pilot
Ramzi bin al-Shibh was captured.

RAHMAN’S SON BECOMES A TRAITOR

OR WHO KILLED KHALID ROBIN?

On February 14, 2003 police conducted a raid in the frontier town of Quetta,
Pakistan looking for two foreigners - one of them Khalid Shaikh Mohammed - said to be
there. Greedy aged neighbors had grown suspicious and tipped off police in hopes of a
reward. But Khalid “the brain” Mohammed was gone by the time authorities arrived.
Police did arrest an Egyptian man who, after telling many different stories, eventually
gave his name as Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman. At first “Rahman admitted there
was someone else with him, but he never said anything about Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed,” said a top police officer.

Then what happened next must never be told to Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman,
least his remaining years, or months or days in prison be turned to worse sorrow than
they already are. The worst-case scenario has Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman, that
son of a Blind Sheikh, offering to help capture Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and split the
reward with the Pakistani police officials. Another scenario is that under Pakistani style
interrogation, he told police that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed had also lived at the address
then broke down, began to cry like a simpering wimp and agreed to help snare Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed. The “Sword of Islam” turned out to be a toothpick in the hands of
the Americans. If he roomed with Khalid Shaikh Mohammed then he was trusted with
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s whereabouts.

THE “PERSUADED” INFORMANT VERSION

Newsweek Magazine reported,

An Egyptian, who was arrested in a raid of an al-Qaeda safehouse in

Pakistan’s border town of Quetta, made a deal with the USA to reveal
Khalid’s whereabouts in exchange for money, a Middle-East intelligence
official is quoted as saying.

The Guardian reported,

Pakistani intelligence sources said the real breakthrough had come when
the FBI had managed to persuade an al-Qaeda operative arrested earlier
to reveal the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden or his close associates.
The man was arrested in Quetta, capital of Balochistan province, but his
identity was never made public. These sources say the Pakistani officials
were kept in the dark about the real identity of this man, or the deal that
 the American had cut with him. The sources said it was only a few hours
before the raid on Mohammed's hideout in Rawalpindi that the FBI had
informed Pakistani intelligence, and had asked it to carry out the raid
without the help of the local police or the civilian intelligence services.
Though the FBI was not directly involved in the raid to seize Mohammed,
it observed the operation from a distance, and got immediately involved in
the interrogation process, the sources said.

The Pakistani press reported that Muhammed Omar Abdel-Rahman was the only
one arrested in that safehouse. A BBC article went on to quote a Quetta policeman as
saying, “We got some information about two foreigners who were in the neighborhood.
When we went there we found only one.”172

The British tabloid The Sun reported the informant was “an Egyptian father-of-
four and a suspected Taliban officer 173 who was tracked down by the CIA and arrested
in the Pakistani border town of Quetta on February 14, 2003. The man was offered a
new identity, and had asked to move with his family to the central English town of
Leicester, which has a large Muslim population, because a friend lives nearby, the Sun
reported. A security source told the tabloid: ‘He was given no choice but to co-operate
and wisely decided it would be stupid to turn down a life of guaranteed luxury.’” The
Sun added that Usama bin Laden had now put a £500,000 price on the informer's head.
The informant apparently demanded and received an extra two million pounds to
relocate with his family to England.

February 14, 2003 was the same day Mohammed Omar Abdel Rahman was
arrested.

THE SURVEILLANCE VERSION

The semi-official Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram reported, “According to one

version, police in Quetta discovered Mohamed Abdel-Rahman. They trailed him for a
few days, and traced phone calls which led to his arrest. Some of the calls were to a
house in Nisar Road in Rawalpindi. Surveillance and phone monitoring of that house led
police to uncover Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.174

THE PHONE CALLS, EMAIL AND COOPERATION VERSION

The BBC reported, “FBI officials allegedly managed to persuade an Al-Qaeda

operative captured in Quetta to reveal the whereabouts of Sheikh "They got information
from the man they picked up in Quetta and from phone calls until they tracked him down
to Rawalpindi." The same story reported, “an e-mail from the younger Abdel Rahman to
Mohammed Omar Abdel Rahman eventually led investigators to the address in
Rawalpindi.”175
172
. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2818245.stm
173
. Al-harm published another version of events that described the source as a low-ranking Al-Qaeda member.
174
. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/630/int2.htm
175
. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2818245.stm
THE CIA MOLE STORY

In February 2004 director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet said a CIA spy
turned in Khalid Shaikh Mohammed. A senior American intelligence official said that the
capture of Mr. Mohammed "was entirely the result of excellent human operations. The
FBI, CIA and I.S.I. did not arrest Khalid Shaikh Mohammed immediately but put him
under surveillance for almost a month before capturing him.” 176

AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN NEEDED MONEY

One can see from the Sattar transcripts that in December 2000 Sattar spoke with
Ahmed Abdel Rahman regarding the need for Sattar to transfer money to him in
Afghanistan. Al-Sirri agreed to help in this matter. Ahmed Abdel Rahman did receive
this money. In June 2003 lawyers for Sattar, who believed that Ahmed Abdel Rahman
was being held at Guantanamo Bay with other detainees asked permission to question
him about what use this money was put to. The United State Attorney, James B. Comey
refused to provide any information about this Brother and did not acknowledge whether
the Blind Sheik Rahman’s son was even in custody. Like his Brother Mohamed Abdel-
Rahman was involved in funneling money to Al-Qaeda and might have said, along with
the lure of a contribution, that he had a letter from his father to Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed.

THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE AHMED ABDEL RAHMAN WAS A JIHADI

Montassar al-Zayyet had this to say about Ahmed Abdel Rahman,

Bin Laden and Zawahiri had talked during a press conference in

Afghanistan about Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and convinced his son
Mohamed to deliver a speech about his father. Ever since, the security
authorities across the world have considered the Sheikh's sons Mohamed
and Ahmed to be members of Al-Qaeda, although they were never wanted
by any country, including Egypt. The Egyptian authorities never mentioned
any role for the sheikh's sons in any of the many court cases against the
Gama'a al-Islamiyya…The Americans hyped up Muhammed Omar Abdel-
Rahman’s arrest as if they had captured a prominent Al-Qaeda figure to
convince the American public that the campaign against Afghanistan was
fruitful. We all know that the two sons, who had been in Afghanistan for
more than ten years, had never worked for Al-Qaeda or Islamic Jihad.

Of course one must remember that al-Zayyet would be hesitant to incriminate

Brothers.

THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT

176
. Don Van Natta Jr. and Desmond Butler “How Tiny Swiss Cellphone Chips Helped Track Global Terror Web” New York Times
March 4, 2004
 On the other hand there are conflicting news stories to the effect that Muhammed
Omar Abdel-Rahman is a ghost prisoner rumored to have been incarcerated in Poland,
North Africa, Guantánamo Bay in the custody of the CIA. If we are to believe a list of
Gitmo prisoners released by the American Military on May 15, 2006, Muhammed Omar
Abdel-Rahman is not at Gitmo.177 But there is no way to be certain that he is not free
and living under a different identity.

WHO RECEIVED THE REWARD?

Then there is the question of the reward and to whom it was paid that arose at a
State Department news conference on March 5 2003:

Question: Well, are you giving the $25 million to Mr. Musharraf, or to who?
(Laughter.)

Mr. Boucher: The possible rewards for information leading to the arrest
and capture are not for government officials who are doing this as a matter
of national policy in performance of their duties and national interests, but I
don't know. It would be -- whether there was some private individual who
might qualify or not, I don't know.

Question: You don't know if anyone has applied for the –

Mr. Boucher: I wouldn't be able to talk about it at this stage anyway,

unless we actually entertained an application and decided on it.

Question: Oh, really? You can't say that -- it has to be decided –

Mr. Boucher: Yes. That's normally been what it is, yeah.

Question: How much -- you know, but a case -- a big fish like this, how
much is he worth, if someone were to apply?

Mr. Boucher: It's not a bounty for an individual. It's an appreciation for the
quality of evidence and information that's provided so –

Question: Pretty good, wasn't it?

Mr. Boucher: I don't know that any individual provided this information.
Perhaps it was just diligent work by law enforcement authorities and a
good result produced by conscientious government officials, which does
happen from time to time, I have to point out. 178

LIKE SON, LIKE FATHER?

177
. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/detaineesFOIArelease15May2006.pdf
178
. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2003/18144.htm
 The Americans circulated a tape of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman in the course of
the USA v Sattar trial that implied that the Sheik considered becoming an American
agent:

ABDEL RAHMAN: Ask her if she believes that the American government
desires that I become its agent.

Yousry: Do you think that the American government thinks or wants that,
uh, use me as an agent for it in the Middle East?

Stewart: Eh, I don’t think they would go that far.

Yousry: The word “agent-”

Stewart: I don't think so.

Yousry: Sir, eh, what does the word “agent” mean?

ABDEL RAHMAN: It means, one who carries out its orders, like they buy
me.

Yousry: You think that they want to buy me, or that they think that they
want to use their influence to buy me, to buy my co-operation with them?

Stewart: I don’t know. You know there are some people that - whose
image is irreproachable and that they understand they, they could not
uhm, it, it would- well let me put it this way, in the, well in some ways, they
are responsible for your image as far as that's concerned here, and there,
so, eh, eh, I don’t, I don't know that answer, they are capable of almost
anything.

Yousry: She says, Sir, that she doesn’t know the answer to this question.
But you must bear in mind that what is now said about you, you are (UI),
you are an important person and (UI) against their policy, is all made by
them. They know, more than anybody else, that you, Sir, being here eh,
eh, as a major enemy to them, at the same time, your return to Egypt can
be useful to them.

ABDEL RAHMAN: In what way can it be useful to them?

Yousry: How would the Americans uh, benefit from uh, me being here and
keeping me here?

Stewart: By, they keep the Egyptian people from having a focus, a focal
point, a way to push their Movement into uh, a personality who would
seize the reins of power, right, and eh....
 Yousry: Ah, in other words, in other word, muscles, no brains.

Stewart: Yeah.

Yousry: She says, Sir, that being here is very beneficial to them because
even if your Movement, the Islamic Movement in Egypt, a major and a
strong Movement, if you seize its driving power which is the brain, you
paralyze it. So they are killing two birds with one stone, they know that the
brains are here, they have Hosni Mubarak, the head of the Egyptian
government in place, and at the same time they annihilate the Movement
with you, Sir, being here. In other words, they are controlling him and
annihilating the Movement.

Stewart: And uh-

Yousry: Ah. There is uh-

Stewart: And they hope that people will forget, that is their, that’s why
they-

Yousry: Of course, they hope that people will forget.

Stewart: When the people forget, then, they have, they have won in a
(UI).

KHALID IS COLLARED

On March 1, 2003, two weeks after Mohammed Omar Abdel Rahman made his
deal with the devil, for which he will never be forgiven in this world and the next, and
after having been a fugitive for nine years, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was arrested
when some 18 to 20 policemen raided the house of Dr. Ahmad Abdul Qudoos, 78, in
Rawalpindi, the old city adjacent to Islamabad, after the authorities first took away
Qudoos’ mentally retarded son, Aqeel Ahmed Abdul Qudoos. Dr. Qudoos lived with his
wife Mahlaqa, a high profile Jamaat-e-Islami activist, their son Ahmed, 42, his wife and
their two young children

Dr. Abdul Qudoos is a former employee of the United Nations and

a retired microbiologist who runs a respected cardiology institute. Dr.
Qudoos and his wife were at a wedding in Lahore when the raid
occurred. Members of Jamaat-e-Islami, the group to which the doctor
and his wife belonged said: “We condemn the raid during which the
doctor’s son, a simple and noble man, had been kidnapped without any
legal justification.” They also presented some official letters that had
been issued by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) and also produced a medical certificate, showing Aqeel Ahmed Abdul
Qudoos as mentally deranged from lead poisoning.

Jamaat-e-Islami woman activist Maluka Khatoon was arrested on October 4,

2002 and “during the investigation, she confessed having relations with Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed and said that she had facilitated meetings between Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed and his son who was in Pakistan,” said Interior Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat.
“Maluka is running a trust called ‘Naveed Islam Trust’ in Clifton and Shazia Sadique, an
activist of the JI, is the chairperson of this trust.” 179 Maluka Khatoon’s arrest transpired in
a house owned by JI associates of Dr. Ahmad Abdul Qadoos.

Jamaat-e-Islami is a main faction of Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and has

neither dissociated itself from its activists having links with Al-Qaeda network nor
condemned their activities. The MMA alliance rules the Northwest Frontier Province
bordering Afghanistan and opposes the military-backed Pakistan Muslim League central
government in Punjab.

Dr. Qudoos was charged with illegal possession of arms but will not be charged
in a so-called terrorist court. As of March 28, 2003, he was in a hospital for a cardiac
problem and had been granted "pre-arrest bail." Khalid Shaikh Mohammed did try to
resist, and fired at least one round from an AK-47 assault rifle before surrendering to the
authorities. An army colonel was hit in the foot, and recovered at a military hospital in
Rawalpindi. A few days after his capture democracy-related sanctions were lifted
against Pakistan. A few weeks later Pakistan and the United States signed an
agreement that cancelled $1 billion debt owed by Islamabad to Washington.

It was a great setback to al-Qaeda when Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was arrested
for his target was again New York City, and involved the revival of Sheik Rahman’s
bridge and tunnel plan. Khalid Shaikh Mohammed no doubt underwent torture and was
made to stand hooded, naked, his arms raised and chained to the ceiling, his feet
shackled, unable to move for hours at a time, day and night only to be freed to eat, pray
and go to the bathroom. He was kicked and shouted at to stop him from falling asleep.
He was deprived of light and food, water and medical attention. He was beaten, and
almost killed, as two Brothers were in Bagram Prison in December 2002. He might be
driven to attempt suicide as twenty Brothers were in Guantanamo. The American media
reported that the Pakistanis threatened Khalid Shaikh Mohammed’s children if he did
not divulge Usama bin Laden’s whereabouts and our plans to them. They were told:
“The Sheikh is a hero of Islam and I am his tiny servant. Life, family, money, everything
can be sacrificed for the Sheikh.” The London Daily Telegraph reported that the children
are in the custody of the CIA and are to be moved to the United States: “We are
handling them with kid gloves. After all, they are only little children,” said one official,
“but we need to know as much about their father's recent activities as possible. We
have child psychologists on hand at all times and they are given the best of care.” The
CIA told CAIR that this was untrue and Pakistan was not holding the children on its
behalf.
179
. http://72.14.209.104/search?q=cache:mttH9o9SJkYJ:www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp%3Fpage%3Dstory_17-8-
2004_pg7_46+%22Maluka+Khatoon+%22&hl=en&gl=us&ct=clnk&cd=3
 It has been reported that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed has talked. The members of
any violent anti-American movement are aware every moment of their lives that it is only
a matter of time before the tentacles of the Great Satan ensnare a Brother. Success is
measured in how long this can be avoided. Once a Brother is apprehended he will come
under great pressure to co-operate. Few can withstand this pressure and almost all
imprisoned Brothers have given the Americans information. Therefore we instruct our
leaders and rank and file jihadi to pretend to co-operate. This requires that they divulge
a mixture of true and false information.

ABU ZUBAYDAH COOPERATES

Abu Zubaydah is the second highest-ranking member of the Brotherhood of

Islamists in U.S. custody. He was captured in March 2002 in Faisalabad Pakistan was
held in Thailand. Zubaydah’s whereabouts in Pakistan had been determined in part
through intercepted Internet communications, but for days after his capture his identity
was in doubt. He had surgically altered his appearance and was using an alias. But
when agents used a nickname for Zubaydah, he acknowledged his true identity, which
was confirmed through analysis of his voice, facial structure and DNA tests. Zubaydah’s
condition was rapidly deteriorating when he arrived in Thailand. Zubaydah nearly died of
his infected wounds. He was covertly rushed to a hospital after C.I.A. medical officers
warned that he might not survive if he did not receive more extensive medical treatment.
Zubaydah, still weak from his wounds, was stripped and placed in a cell without a bunk
or blankets. He stood or lay on the bare floor, sometimes with air-conditioning adjusted
so that Zubaydah seemed to turn blue. The interrogators piped in deafening blasts of
music by groups like the Red Hot Chili Peppers. 180 Zubaydah was arrested after an
email or a call was traced to Dr. Ahmed Khawaja’s number, a noted physician who had
treated Zubaydah’s wife. Zubaydah became an unwilling collaborator after he was
subjected to torture. This caused al-Qaeda grave problems, as he was the person in
charge of the training camps. He received young men from all countries. He accepted
them or rejected them. He took care of the expenses of the camps. He made
arrangements for the Brothers when they traveled coming in or leaving. It was only after
the September 11th Raids that he involved himself in the operational side of our
international organization.

The information that Abu Zubaydah gave up dovetailed with the information
provided by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed: Zubaydah was the source of warnings of
attacks on the Statue of Liberty. He also divulged the existence of the Brooklyn Bridge
attack that never materialized. Zubaydah was the key source for the information that al-
Qaeda was threatening to attack banks in the northeastern United States, an operation
that also failed to materialize. The FBI reported that Zubaydah later retracted this
information. Zubaydah divulged that a plan had been devised to smuggle a RDD into
the U.S.A., and the description of the person assigned to this task. Brother Muhajir
(Jose Padilla) was subsequently arrested as a result of this information. Zubaydah gave
the Americans much more information. In this regard our spokesman, Abu Gheith, gave

180
. New York Times September 10, 2006
him a warning when he made this statement on Al Jazeera television: “We dare you to
get anything useful from Abu Zubaydah.” 181

181
. CNN June 25, 2002 Posted: 11:33 AM EDT (1533 GMT)